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The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge Audible Audiobook – Unabridged

Paul A. Rahe (Author), Bronson Pinchot (Narrator), Blackstone Audio, Inc. (Publisher)
4.6 4.6 out of 5 stars 104 ratings
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More than 2,500 years ago, a confederation of small Greek city-states defeated the invading armies of Persia, the most powerful empire in the world. In this meticulously researched study, historian Paul Rahe argues that Sparta was responsible for the initial establishment of the Hellenic defensive coalition and was, in fact, the most essential player in its ultimate victory.

Drawing from an impressive range of ancient sources, including Herodotus and Plutarch, the author veers from the traditional Athenocentric view of the Greco-Persian Wars to examine from a Spartan perspective the grand strategy that halted the Persian juggernaut. Rahe provides a fascinating, detailed picture of life in Sparta circa 480 BC, revealing how the Spartans' form of government and the regimen to which they subjected themselves instilled within them the pride, confidence, discipline, and discernment necessary to forge an alliance that would stand firm against a great empire, driven by religious fervor, that held sway over two-fifths of the human race.

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  1. Part of series
    Yale Library of Military History
  2. Listening Length
    14 hours and 27 minutes
  3. Author
    Paul A. Rahe
  4. Narrator
    Bronson Pinchot
  5. Audible release date
    November 24, 2015
  6. Language
    English
  7. Publisher
    Blackstone Audio, Inc.
  8. ASIN
    B01863JFYE
  9. Version
    Unabridged
  10. Program Type
    Audiobook
  11. See all details
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Product details

Listening Length 14 hours and 27 minutes
Author Paul A. Rahe
Narrator Bronson Pinchot
Whispersync for Voice Ready
Audible.com Release Date November 24, 2015
Publisher Blackstone Audio, Inc.
Program Type Audiobook
Version Unabridged
Language English
ASIN B01863JFYE
Best Sellers Rank #98,567 in Audible Books & Originals (See Top 100 in Audible Books & Originals)
#31 in Ancient Military History (Audible Books & Originals)
#70 in Ancient & Classical Greek History
#75 in Greek History

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4.6 out of 5 stars
104 global ratings

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Customers say

Customers find the book's narrative style exciting and adventurous. They appreciate the author's original study of strategy and policy, as well as his thorough research and analysis. The writing quality is described as clear and well-written, appealing to casual readers.

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Narrative styleStrategyWriting quality
11 customers mention "Narrative style"11 positive0 negative

Customers find the narrative style engaging and informative. They appreciate the step-by-step narrative of the Persian Wars that makes the story comprehensible. The book provides a clear overview of the terrain and seascapes of the Persian invasion and battles, making it an excellent introduction to ancient history for those interested in the subject. Readers also mention that the author provides useful notes and acknowledgments at the end.

"...The author also supports the history in the end, with notes, acknowledgments, abbreviations and an excellent index...." Read more

"...It is a definitive account of the Persian Wars taking all available sources into consideration, with no detail too small for Rahe’s discerning..." Read more

"...He surveys the geography of the war, clarifying the terrain and seascapes of the Persian invasion and the battles almost from the point of view of..." Read more

"...Again, this book was decent narrative history of Sparta and the Persian Wars, but it was duplicative of items already in my collections." Read more

8 customers mention "Strategy"8 positive0 negative

Customers find the book an original and insightful study of Spartan strategy and policy. They appreciate the author's thorough research, analysis, and use of both Greek and Persian sources. The book is a useful reference for academics and a good blend of available historical sources.

"...He is a master of strategy, both military and political, and he is level-headed to boot." Read more

"...Rahe relays everything with an authoritative voice and exhaustive research. This is not a popular narrative history meant for the lay-reader...." Read more

"In The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge, Paul Rahe provides the best step-by-step narrative of the Persian Wars that I have..." Read more

"A worthwhile review and explanation of Spartan strategy and policy. Too narrow and focused for most, but a fun read." Read more

5 customers mention "Writing quality"5 positive0 negative

Customers find the book well-written and engaging. They appreciate the clear narrative of events and the author's ability to write movingly. Readers also mention that the history section at the end includes notes and acknowledgments.

"...The author also supports the history in the end, with notes, acknowledgments, abbreviations and an excellent index...." Read more

"...Mr. Rahe is a real scholar who can write very well, and even write movingly...." Read more

"...Rahe’s well-written narrative of events should appeal to the casual reader who is interested in Greek or Persian history...." Read more

"...involved with the Sparta/Athens conflicts, this is a great and well written book by Mr. Rahe...." Read more

Captivating,
5 out of 5 stars
Captivating,
In respect to The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challengeby Paul Anthony Rahe, The Yale Library of Military HistoryI felt this book was outstanding. I agree with a few other readers in regard to the title, but I am happy it dragged me in, and it does have merit. I enjoyed the cover graphics as wellProfessor Rahe, had to lay out a lot of ancient actors to get the flow of the history in place, which had to be a daunting task. Rahe does accomplish this with hundreds of side stories assembled, that as a whole bring it all together, which I learned to really appreciate.The author does not skimp on maps, as I believe there are 27 in total, covering land, sea and gulf routes, areas of battle etc, they are all well appreciated.The author also supports the history in the end, with notes, acknowledgments, abbreviations and an excellent index.This is a book I would consider reading for a second time, if life were just a tad longer or I just can't resist, as I am already nibbling at the edges once againReading the epilogue seems imperative. It might hold in some small part, the answer to the burning question, was this The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta after allI do question whether I should have begun with another of the professors books first, for a better understanding of the Spartan chronology and way of life, but the broad, overarching story seems to work for me in this instanceIt was a privilege reading the book no doubt, thank you Professor, I am spoiled, simply fabulous, I look forward to another of his works in the near future
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Top reviews from the United States

  • Rey Mundo Magnus
    5.0 out of 5 stars Captivating,
    Reviewed in the United States on March 11, 2023
    Verified Purchase
    In respect to The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge
    by Paul Anthony Rahe, The Yale Library of Military History

    I felt this book was outstanding. I agree with a few other readers in regard to the title, but I am happy it dragged me in, and it does have merit. I enjoyed the cover graphics as well

    Professor Rahe, had to lay out a lot of ancient actors to get the flow of the history in place, which had to be a daunting task. Rahe does accomplish this with hundreds of side stories assembled, that as a whole bring it all together, which I learned to really appreciate.

    The author does not skimp on maps, as I believe there are 27 in total, covering land, sea and gulf routes, areas of battle etc, they are all well appreciated.

    The author also supports the history in the end, with notes, acknowledgments, abbreviations and an excellent index.

    This is a book I would consider reading for a second time, if life were just a tad longer or I just can't resist, as I am already nibbling at the edges once again

    Reading the epilogue seems imperative. It might hold in some small part, the answer to the burning question, was this The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta after all

    I do question whether I should have begun with another of the professors books first, for a better understanding of the Spartan chronology and way of life, but the broad, overarching story seems to work for me in this instance

    It was a privilege reading the book no doubt, thank you Professor, I am spoiled, simply fabulous, I look forward to another of his works in the near future
    Customer image
    Rey Mundo Magnus
    5.0 out of 5 stars Captivating,
    Reviewed in the United States on March 11, 2023
    In respect to The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge
    by Paul Anthony Rahe, The Yale Library of Military History

    I felt this book was outstanding. I agree with a few other readers in regard to the title, but I am happy it dragged me in, and it does have merit. I enjoyed the cover graphics as well

    Professor Rahe, had to lay out a lot of ancient actors to get the flow of the history in place, which had to be a daunting task. Rahe does accomplish this with hundreds of side stories assembled, that as a whole bring it all together, which I learned to really appreciate.

    The author does not skimp on maps, as I believe there are 27 in total, covering land, sea and gulf routes, areas of battle etc, they are all well appreciated.

    The author also supports the history in the end, with notes, acknowledgments, abbreviations and an excellent index.

    This is a book I would consider reading for a second time, if life were just a tad longer or I just can't resist, as I am already nibbling at the edges once again

    Reading the epilogue seems imperative. It might hold in some small part, the answer to the burning question, was this The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta after all

    I do question whether I should have begun with another of the professors books first, for a better understanding of the Spartan chronology and way of life, but the broad, overarching story seems to work for me in this instance

    It was a privilege reading the book no doubt, thank you Professor, I am spoiled, simply fabulous, I look forward to another of his works in the near future
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    9 people found this helpful
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  • Thomas R. Hanson
    5.0 out of 5 stars A good read for the thoughtful
    Reviewed in the United States on August 30, 2016
    Verified Purchase
    My other option was to give this brief book 3 stars to warn off general readers (which would have been fair to those readers who like their history well written but draw a line about, for want of a better word, background). Mr. Rahe is a real scholar who can write very well, and even write movingly. He wants to explain why and how moves were made by the Persians, the Spartans, and the Athenians. To do that, and do it honestly requires time because he has to deal with not with two, but three very different cultures. Without that long ramp up, which pop-military-history buffs apparently don't enjoy very much, readers can't begin to understand moves made by any of those three cultures without knowing how the double kings came about. Nor can they understand how Themistocles in Athens maneuvered the political minefields as he did dealing with Sparta and other city-states, in order to build a fleet essentially from scratch, and also learned how to use a fleet a on the fly. The Persian culture is respected and he gives the reader an understanding of how Darius and Xerxes operated, and probably how they felt about Greek cultures. So the military narration itself is comparatively brief. But it became exciting even to me who certainly knew the basics of what was going to happen before I began to read it. I recommend it to people who know very little about the Persian wars because Mr Rahe writes very clearly, with some humor and a taste for irony. He is a master of strategy, both military and political, and he is level-headed to boot.
    39 people found this helpful
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  • T. Graczewski
    4.0 out of 5 stars The Grand Strategy of Classical Athens
    Reviewed in the United States on August 11, 2018
    Verified Purchase
    They say you shouldn’t judge a book by its cover. The same could even be said for its title. Paul Rahe’s latest effort, “The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge,” is an excellent book, it just doesn’t have all that much to do with the grand strategy of classical Sparta. Rather, it is a comprehensive narrative of the Greek wars against Persia in the early fifth century BC. Or as Rahe explains: “[‘The Grand Strategy of Sparta’] describes a clash of civilizations in which liberty successfully withstood the assault of despotism and a collection of diminutive and impoverished self-governing cities defeated one of the greatest empires the world has ever known.”

    Before leaving the topic at hand, did the Spartans have a grand strategy? And what is “grand strategy,” anyhow? Duke political scientist Peter Feaver defined the term this way in a thoughtful essay in Foreign Policy Magazine in 2009: “Grand strategy is a term of art from academia, and refers to the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state’s national interest.” In the case of the Spartans, most of the “plans and policies” centered on the creation of a warrior elite. Everything about a young Spartan's upbringing was controlled by the state and, according to Rahe, was meant to foster “stamina, grit, endurance, and courage.” The author quotes extensively from the Spartan poet Tyrtarus, whose great works praise the virtue and valor of dying in the frontline of battle and the immortal shame of retreat. The male citizen body was “a legion of men-at-arms,” which likely never numbered more than 10,000. A permanently enslaved community of Messenians, known as Helots, who outnumbered the Spartans perhaps seven-to-one, conducted all non-military labor. Due to the constant threat of slave revolt and the relatively small number of citizen warriors, the Spartans could never afford to either venture very from their homeland on the Peloponnese nor risk losing too many of their elite soldiers in battle. All-in-all, Spartan “grand strategy” doesn’t sound all that grand.

    The Athenians, on the other hand, had a grand strategy. Themistocles, the father of the vaunted Athenian navy, was reported to have said: “I cannot tune a harp or play a lyre, but I know how to make a small city great.” He wasn’t kidding. Prior to the fifth century, Athens was a minor Greek city-state in Attica of little political, military or economic importance with no history of seafaring. Themistocles would almost single-handedly change all of that. His vision was simple but incredibly bold and far-sighted. Athens would make itself a virtual island. The city would be enclosed in massive walls with a fortified corridor running nearly five miles down from the Acropolis to the harbor at Piraeus. The proceeds from a recent silver mine strike at Laurium would be used to build over 100 triremes, the most modern naval warship of the day. All political opponents to Themistocles’ grand strategy were systematically ostracized from Athens to ensure the plan was fully implemented. Contemporary military historian Eliot Cohen has recently dismissed the entire concept of grand strategy as “an idea whose time will never come, because the human condition does not permit it.” I’m generally inclined to agree with him, but the story of Themistocles and the Athenian navy is a truly remarkable exception.

    The threat confronting the elite Spartan band of warriors and the upstart Athenian fleet was enormous. The Persian Empire was vast by any measure. At its height, the Persian realm, stretching across much of the modern Middle East and Central Asia, included as much as 40% of the world’s total population, more than any other empire in history up till then or since. And it aimed for more. In fact, according to Rahe, it aimed for world domination. “Universal empire was the raison d’etre of the Persian monarchy,” he writes. “It was the imperative driving the regime.” The leaders of the empire, the so-called King of Kings, “operated like spiders at the center of a great web.” They moved from one part of the empire to the other tirelessly and endlessly. For over half-a-century the kingdom enjoyed a succession of intelligent, quick-witted, and aggressive leaders: Cyrus (ruled 559-529), Cambyses (529-522), and Darius (522-486). That would come to an end with Xerxes (486-465), a man Rahe calls “weak, self-indulgent, and more than a bit of a fool.”

    The Persians had received “earth and water” – a ritualistic expression of subservience – from scores of Greek communities along the eastern Aegean, making those city-states the “bandaka” of the King, the Persian word for slave, but also expressing a general dependence. These Greek states of Ionia revolted in 499. Athens came to their assistance. Arguably, this Athenian support marked the beginning of the Persian Wars. Rahe writes that Darius clearly had aims of universal empire and would have invaded Greece sooner-or-later. Others, including the Spartans, felt that the Athenians provoked the Persians. “One thing is clear,” Rahe says, “had the Ionian revolt succeeded, the Greek heartland would have been safe.” The revolt raged on for half-a-decade until the decisive naval battle of Lade in 494 off the coast of Miletus in which a large contingent of Ionian ships defected, leaving their outnumbered fellow Greeks to the mercy of a giant Persian fleet of some 600 triremes. On the issue of Athenian assistance to the Ionians, Darius would neither forgive nor forget, and the Athenians knew it.

    “The Greek David could defeat the Persian Goliath,” Rahe says, “but only … if he could dictate the terms on which the contest took place.” And that is precisely what the Greeks would do time and again in the Persian War. At Marathon in 490, Miltiades ensured that the Persian cavalry, so dangerous to the hoplite phalanx, would play no role in the battle. The narrow pass at Thermopylae in 480 allowed a few hundred Spartans under their king, Leonidas, to inflict thousands of casualties on the Persians. Themistocles tricked the Persian fleet into engaging the much smaller Greek navy in the narrow waters off Salamis, negating the influence of the Persian’s superior numbers and maneuverability. Finally, the young Spartan Pausanias would do the same over the broken plains of Plataea in 479. Rarely in history has such an outnumbered force performed so well, so consistently.

    Rahe relays everything with an authoritative voice and exhaustive research. This is not a popular narrative history meant for the lay-reader. It is a definitive account of the Persian Wars taking all available sources into consideration, with no detail too small for Rahe’s discerning scholarship. Consider the case of Sicinnus, the slave of Themistocles who delivered the critical message to the Persians the night before the battle of Salamis, tricking them into attacking the Greeks in the narrow straits at dawn the following morning. Here is how Rahe reviews the simple question of Sicinnus’ ethnicity and whom he delivered his message to that night: “Aeschylus reports that Sicinnus was a Greek and that he delivered Themistocles’ message to Xerxes himself. Herodotus says nothing about his nationality and implies that he met with Xerxes’ admirals but not with the Great King. Plutarch asserts that Sicinnus was of Persian extraction, and he and Diodorus presume that he met with the King of Kings. Athenaeus reports a claim that he hailed from Crete. We are left to guess at the details, and guess we will.” This is but one example of Rahe’s tireless (one might say excessive) effort to get at the truth.

    The Persian Wars would loom much larger in the memory of the Greeks than that of the Persians. The defeated Persian Empire would flourish for well over another century. The events in Greece had been nothing but a sideshow so far as the King of Kings was concerned. Xerxes could – and did – emphasize the positive: the victory at Thermopylae (never mind the details); the death of the Spartan King, Leonidas; the sack of Athens; and the capture of many Greek slaves.

    For the Greeks, especially the Athenians, the war had been a defining moment. The Hellenic League, cobbled together to resist “what was arguably the largest army and most formidable fleet ever assembled,” had proven a remarkable success. The Athenians slid comfortably into the role previously played by the Persians in the Aegean. The Ionian Greek city-states had merely changed one master for another, albeit a native Greek master. The annual tribute once postmarked to Susa was now payable to Athens. The maritime alliance once created to defend the Greek homeland from foreign invasion was now repurposed to defend and expand Athenian political, economic, and military hegemony from the island of Crete through the Aegean Sea and Hellespont to the rich granaries of the Black Sea. In the course of a single generation, the Athenians had transformed themselves from a community of sleepy Attic hill farmers to the most powerful naval empire the world had ever known.

    Now that’s grand strategy!
    31 people found this helpful
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Top reviews from other countries

  • marco carrara
    4.0 out of 5 stars Great book, misleading title
    Reviewed in Italy on November 1, 2024
    Verified Purchase
    If you want to have a detailed knowledge of the Persian invasions of Greece this is your book. It’s well written, detailed and very informative and interesting. A really good piece of historical writing. The grand strategy of Sparta is just explained in few pages. It’s very clearly described but definitely its place in the book doesn’t justify the title of the book. This is the only reason for the missing fifth star in the evaluation.
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  • Sacred Sparta.
    5.0 out of 5 stars I enjoyed this book and I think Rahe suffers from the ...
    Reviewed in the United Kingdom on July 29, 2016
    Verified Purchase
    I enjoyed this book and I think Rahe suffers from the problem all authors would experience trying to cover this period, what was the Spartan strategy when they were not exactly forward at either telling anyone (including their allies) about it or writing it down? The characteristic Spartan trait of circumspection, and obsessive (and occasionally convenient) religiosity presents a challenge to any historian and will inevitably drift more towards Athenian strategies of which there is more tangible evidence to draw on. As a Phalanx drifts to the Right this book tells us more about Athenian strategy than Spartan but that is no fault of the author, despite the gruelling outcome of the Peloponnesian war it seems history was not written by the victors.
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  • JPS
    4.0 out of 5 stars Grand Strategy?
    Reviewed in the United Kingdom on July 10, 2016
    Verified Purchase
    I had somewhat mixed feelings about this book. It has many qualities, but I also had a number of problems.

    The main quality is that this is a narrative of Sparta that starts well before the beginning of the Persian wars with the emergence of the Persian Empire in the Middle East, but also of Sparta and its growing dominance of the Peloponnesus. One problem here is that the author has chosen to write a trilogy of which one volume is to be called “the Spartan Regime” and will focus on the city’s institutions. Accordingly, this volume only includes a rather brief overview of what could have been a key element of this book and a key component of Sparta’s so-called “Grand Strategy”. Two things are missing in particular. One is an analysis on how Sparta’s institutions evolved over time. Another is how the key institutions – the two Kings, the Gerousia and the Ephors – interacted and could come into conflict.

    Another strong point is to insist upon the fact that Sparta’s foreign policy was always influenced, or perhaps dominated, by domestic considerations. In particular, Sparta always feared that its helots would revolt and take advantage of any Spartan expedition abroad to claim their independence. This is perfectly true, although not original since it can be found in the sources and the point has been made before by a number of other authors, starting with Cartledge. To the extent that the whole of Sparta’s power and dominance was predicated upon maintaining the helots in what amounted to slavery, one can wonder to what extent the expression “Grand Strategy” is an apt one.

    Perhaps my main problem with this book is the author’s tendency to see the Persian Wars as part of a “clash of civilisations.” This ideological and biased view is historically wrong. Only a minority of Greek cities (thirty one out of several hundred) opposed the Persian Empire and many including all of Thessaly, Euboea and Boetia sided with the Empire. Another point which the author tends to minimise is that even within the cities that resisted, and within Athens and Sparta in particular, there was a pro-Persian faction, or at least a faction that believed that resistance was futile and submission was in the best interest of their respective cities. So, contrary to the propaganda and myths developed after the end of the Persian Wars, and the staples of popular culture that have developed ever since, there was even little unity among the Greeks opposing the invading Empire.

    This, if anything, makes the ultimate victory all the more remarkable, especially since during the conflict, Sparta was very tempted to retreat, abandon Athens and only defend the Isthmus of Corinth, as some of her allies (and one of her factions) pressed her to do. The most remarkable feat here is that Sparta resisted the temptation to conceive its interests in a short-sighted way, both at Salamis and then through the Plataea campaign. It should however also be acknowledged that, in both cases, the Athenians threatened to break from the alliance and even sail away to found a new city in Italy or even reached a separate agreement if their own interests were not taken into consideration. In fact, Athens and Attica were invaded and ravaged twice by the Persians. This is also something that the author tends to minimise and which jars with his preconceived view about a “clash of civilisations” that is at best very doubtful.

    Another questionable point is the author’s view of Xerxes, who is somewhat caricatured as a megalomaniac tyrant who was attempting to conquer Europe and waging some kind of religious war. Again, the author tends to be anachronistic and such views are not entirely supported by the narrative and only tell part of the story. To the extent that Eretria and Athens had actively supported the revolt of Persia’s Ionian subjects, the King of Kings had little choice than to “punish the culprits”, just like it had to punish Sparta for executing its ambassadors, which, by the way, was also something of a sacrilege.

    The main point here is that while the author’s narrative does include numerous good points mixed up with shortcomings. One is to explain the withdrawal of the “Marathon expedition” by the end of the sailing season. However, with his tendency to only consider the Greek points of view, the author fails to appreciate that the expedition, which was to raid and punish those that had supported the Ionian revolt, was not a failure but a semi-success to the extent that Eretria had indeed been punished.

    This points to what is perhaps the main shortcoming of this book. The story is not so much told from Sparta’s viewpoint as it is told from an essentially Greek point, leading to a somewhat biased narrative. The King of Kings decision to return to Asia is unlikely to have been an admission of failure or a move made out of fear that the Greek fleet would cut his retreat by seizing the bridges over the Hellespont. If anything, it may have been motivated by his prolonged absence from Asia and by his need to ensure that Babylonia did not once again rebel.

    One last point is about the notion of “barbarian”, which the Greeks attributed to all non-Greeks in general, and to the Persians and their subject in particular. To the extent that “barbarian” was rapidly equated with “uncivilised”, the civilisations of the Persians, Phoenicians, Babylonians or Egyptians were certainly more advanced and sophisticated than that of the relatively poor and smallish city-states of Greece at the very beginning of the Fifth century BC.

    So despite the fact that the book is well written, easy to read and well supported by numerous and good maps, and despite the fact that it also includes useful elements on the early development of the city-states of Sparta but also of Athens, I can only give this book a somewhat generous four stars, although three stars and a half would perhaps be more accurate.
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