# Central Intelligence Agency
## Office of General Counsel
### Washington, DC 20505

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| **To:** | **Mr. David Laufman** |
| **Organization:** | **Kelley, Drye & Warren** |
| **Phone:** | **(202) 342-8803** |
| **Fax:** | **(202) 342-8451** |
| | |
| **From:** | **David Suski** ˅ *LARRY PASSAR* |
| **Organization:** | **OGC/Contract Law Division** |
| **Phone:** | **(703) 874-3101** |
| **Fax:** | **(703) 874-3208** |

Pages including cover sheet: ❋  1ˢᵗ of 3 faxes
(32 pp incl. coversheet) Beginning w/
.— 15 Feb 2008 ltr to D. Ashen (pp. 1-11)
— Exhibit A - Beginning w/ Bates # 000203
ε stopping at Bates # 000221

Mr. Laufman —
The Agency approves release of this
filing in its entirety to TAC. Counsel for
intervenor has no objection. Please submit a
redacted version for spectal by noon Tuesday. — LARRY
PASSAR

**PROTECTED MATERIAL**
**TO BE DISCLOSED ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH**
**GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABABILITY OFFICE PROTECTIVE ORDER**

**Matter Of:**   The Analysis Corporation
**File:**        B-310924
**Agency:**      Central Intelligence Agency

February 15, 2008

David A. Ashen, Esq.
Deputy Assistant General Counsel
Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC  20548

Re:     Agency Response to TAC Document Production

Dear Mr. Ashen:

The Agency now has had a chance to review the documents produced by TAC in response to GAO's reverse discovery order. The documents highlight several gross inconsistencies between the position TAC took in its proposal and the position that it has taken in this protest. The inconsistencies are dramatic, and show the following:

1.   While TAC now claims that it founded its entire proposal strategy upon its belief that the historic database was dramatically increasing, TAC's documents demonstrate that its proposal strategy was tied down well prior to the first publication of the 1.8 million figure, which TAC blames for its growth and productivity inferences. This fact goes to the very heart of TAC's prejudice argument, and pierces it.

2.   While TAC now claims that none of its subcontractors would share any information with it regarding the incumbent Watchlist activities, TAC's documents demonstrate that TAC in fact engaged in substantive discussions with SRA (one of its incumbent subcontractors) regarding, not only the incumbent program generally, but the historic dataset in particular. (Perhaps this contrary fact simply slipped TAC's mind because, as shown below, it agreed with SRA not to document the substance of their conversations in writing.) TAC's documents further show that it possessed what it now calls "inside information" from its subcontractor BAE, from at least one former senior Government official on TAC's staff who obviously was familiar with the Program, as well as from other Watchlist Program participants.

3.   While TAC now claims that it had no reason to think to ask a question to the Agency regarding the historic dataset, TAC's documents show that it did ask exactly that

- 1 -

question to one of its incumbent teammates, but elected to remain silent when it came to the Agency.

4.   . While TAC recently broadened its view of what triggered TAC's purported inferences to include a purported decline in CIRs processed per FTE per week, (a) the inferred decline was mentioned nowhere in Mr. Drew's multiple declarations and (b) the inferred decline is mentioned nowhere in the documents TAC recently produced. One would think that an inference that apparently so pervasively influenced TAC's proposal approach would be found somewhere in TAC's documents. It is not to be found. The Agency submits that this is because, as demonstrated in our prior filing, TAC did not base its proposal on any such inference.

Against this background, the Agency is extremely concerned regarding the apparent disingenuousness of TAC's protest. While the Agency submits that the clear unreasonableness  . of TAC's claimed "inference" should be enough to deny this protest, we now have clear evidence that TAC never drew such an inference in the first place. Additionally, we have clear evidence that several other statements made by TAC in its protest documents are directly at odds with TAC's contemporaneous documents.

Furthermore, it now is readily apparent that TAC's initial OCI arguments have absolutely no merit. TAC was not found to be "Marginal" with this highest risk of all offerors because it lacked access to inside information. TAC was found to be "Marginal" with the highest risk of all offerors because it made a series of bad decisions, including relying on draft documents, figures deleted from the RFP, and advice from outside the Agency rather than asking a simple question to the Agency. TAC's protest should be denied, or dismissed.

**I.      TAC developed its proposal strategy for which it was downgraded prior to the release of the final RFP; accordingly, its alleged inferences purportedly drawn from the size of the historic database and the number of CIRs reviewed per week were immaterial to its proposal.**

As discussed previously, on September 17, 2007, the Agency eliminated TAC from the competitive range because its proposal was far inferior to that of the other three offerors. Specifically, the Agency concluded that TAC's proposal was only "Marginal" in the most important evaluation factors, was "medium high" risk, would require a "significant level of Agency involvement in contract performance," and would necessitate substantial proposal revisions to even get TAC to a place where it could be even remotely competitive. AR, Tab 17. As compared to the other three offerors, these ratings put TAC last in line for award.

The following table summarizes the offerors' ratings prior to the competitive range determination:

| Offeror | No. of Ratings Satisfactory or Above | No. of Ratings Marginal or Below | Risk |
|---------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------|
| SAIC | 7 of 7 | 0 of 7 | Medium Low |
| Spectal | 7 of 7 | 0 of 7 | Low |
| Raytheon | 7 of 7 | 0 of 7 | Low |
| **TAC** | 3 of 7. | 4 of 7 | **Medium High** |

AR, Tab 17 at 2; *see also* Daley Declaration. In its protest filings, and in Mr. Drew's sworn declaration, TAC has asserted that (a) its purported inferences regarding historic dataset growth and a failing incumbent real-time effort *caused it* to make the proposal decisions it made and (b) that it would not have made those decisions but for the inferred increasing historic dataset and failing real-time effort. Accordingly, TAC argues, it was prejudiced by the Agency's failure to inform offorors of the reasons for the numbers ultimately included in the RFP (and ultimately deleted from the RFP).

In its most recent filing, the Agency walked through each of TAC's assigned weaknesses and demonstrated how almost all of them had nothing to do with TAC's purported inferences. *See* 13 Feb. Agency Filing at 13-18. Now that the Agency has had the chance to review TAC's documents, it is clear that, in actuality, TAC's strategic decisions had nothing at all to do with its purported inferences. In fact, every material element of TAC's proposal strategy was in place prior to the issuance of the Final RFP on May 23, 2007 (which included the first public reference to the 1.8 million names and the 2 CIR/FTE/week figure, upon which TAC now contends to have so strongly relied).

### A.    Technical/Management and Risk Factors

### 1.    Real Time and Historical Technical Approach Subfactors

TAC contends that it was prejudiced under the Real Time and Historical Technical Approach subfactors because its purported growth assumption led it to propose new approaches and technologies that the Agency deemed risky, including its Threat Reduction Approach to Processing ("TRAP"), End-to-End processing, and technology insertion approach. TAC 28 Jan. Filing at 8-9. In its prior filing, the Agency demonstrated that none of the weaknesses assessed against TAC's proposal under the Real Time Technical Approach subfactor had anything to do with the new approaches and technologies proposed by TAC. *See* 13 Feb. Agency Filing at 14-15. The Agency further established that, even if TAC had not proposed those new approaches and technologies, it nevertheless would have received a "Marginal" rating under the Historical Technical Approach subfactor based upon its failure to propose sufficient personnel for the task. *Id.*

Contrary to TAC's sworn declaration, the documents produced by TAC now establish that TAC's decision to propose TRAP, End-to-End processing, and its technology insertion approach had absolutely nothing to do with any purported historical growth or declining productivity assumptions. In fact, TAC had decided on these approaches by no later than April 2007. That is nearlytwo months before the RFP disclosed the 1.8 million names and 2 CIRs/analyst/week figures from which TAC claims to have inferred the historical growth and declining productivity that purportedly formed the basis for its proposal.

TAC's claim that it would have maintained the status quo, but for its purported growth and productivity assumptions, is belied by, among number other documents, an April 2007 draft of TAC's proposal that includes all of the elements for which TAC claims to have been downgraded. For example:

- TAC's April 2007 draft proposal explains that it will make "substantial changes" to workflow. "At the core of that change," TAC explained, "is an end to [end] production process" in which "[e]ach analyst will review documents and provide CIR drafts." TAC 000208 (Exhibit A hereto); *see also id.* at 000209, ¶ 1.1.1 (same). TAC explained that End-to-End processing would "fundamentally change the processes and procedures for reviewing historical cable traffic" by providing for "Full Scope Analysts" that would be responsible for both drafting cables and analyzing CIRs. *Id.* at 000213, ¶1.1.2.4.

- TAC's April 2007 draft proposal also claimed that a "heavy emphasis must be placed on . . . introducing information technology tools to support analysis and CIR drafting." *Id.* at 00209, ¶ 1.1. Among the proposed technologies discussed at length in TAC's draft proposal are "Inxight ThingFinder" and "Endeca" (TAC 000215-00216, ¶¶ 1.1.3.1.1, 1.1.3.1.2) – the very same two technologies the evaluators found to create risk in connection with TAC's proposal under the Real Time Technical Approach and Historical Technical Approach subfactors. AR, Tab 15 at 1.2, 1.3. TAC's plan to use these technologies, their functions, and their purported benefits also are detailed in a chart set forth in the "New Technology Deployment Recommendations" section of the same draft proposal. *Id.* at 000231, ¶ 1.4.7; *see also id.* at 000235-000236, ¶¶ 1.4.8.1, 1.4.8.2.

- TAC's April 2007 draft proposal also included TAC's plan to use TRAP. TAC 000212, ¶ 1.1.2.2. According to TAC, TRAP would reduce risk more quickly than the nominal burn down rate. *Id.*

Many of these strategies also were disclosed in a March 29, 2007 draft of TAC's proposal. *See* "WLP_Technologies" (Mar. 29, 2007) (Exhibit B hereto). TAC further expounded on all of these proposed approaches in multiple subsequent drafts of its proposal dated well before the Agency released the 1.8 million names and 2 CIRs/analyst/week figures first disclosed in the May 23, 2007 RFP. *See, e.g.,* TAC 00340-00361 (Apr. 20, 2007 draft); *Id.* at 000365-000401 (Apr. 25, 2007 draft); *Id.* at 000415-000496 (May 9, 2007 draft).

It is axiomatic that a cause must occur before its effect. Here, the documents produced by TAC conclusively establish that TAC had solidified its plan to use TRAP, End-to-End processing, and its technology insertion approach by no later than early April 2007 – more than 6 weeks before the earliest date upon which it could have inferred historical growth and declining productivity based on the numbers disclosed in the May 23, 2007 RFP. Thus, TAC's sworn statement that those assumptions caused it to propose approaches that the Agency deemed risky is simply false, and TAC cannot establish that it was prejudiced.

### 2. Management Approach

TAC contends that its growth assumption caused it to propose more personnel, which, in turn, required it to propose the large team of subcontractors for which it was downgraded under the Management Approach factor. TAC 28 Jan. Filing at 9; Second Drew Decl. at ¶ 4. In its prior filing, the Agency established that TAC's staffing calculations were based on the information disclosed in the BOE section of the final RFP, did not reference the 1.3 million names and 4.4. CIRs/analysts/week figure on which TAC claims to have relied, and did not include any historical growth or declining productivity assumptions. *See* 13 Feb. Agency Filing at 15-16. The Agency further demonstrated that, because TAC did not base its staffing calculations on any assumed growth or declining productivity, TAC's claim that it would have proposed fewer subcontractors but for those purported assumptions is demonstrably false. *Id.* at 16.

In addition, the documents produced by TAC now establish that TAC had planned to use an unusually large team of subcontractors well before issuance of the final RFP. Specifically, a May 9, 2007 version of TAC's proposal shows that TAC intended to propose no fewer than 13 subcontractors by that date. TAC 000368-000369, ¶ 2.1.2 – ¶ 2.1.4 (Exhibit C hereto). Thus, TAC's claim that it would have proposed fewer subcontractors but for its alleged historical growth and declining productivity assumptions is demonstrably false.

### 3. Personnel Qualifications and Availability

TAC's only allegation of prejudice with respect to the Personnel Qualifications and Availability factor is that its purported growth assumption caused it to propose more personnel and thus a lower percentage of incumbent personnel. TAC 28 Jan. Filing at 9; Second Drew Decl. at ¶ 5. In its prior filing, the Agency established that TAC was not downgraded on that basis. *See* 13 Feb. Agency Filing at 16. The Agency further explained that TAC's "Marginal" Personnel qualifications and Availability rating resulted instead from TAC's failure to propose personnel with the requisite level of experience, failure to provide adequate information regarding the qualifications of certain of its proposed personnel, and failure to provide adequate letters of commitment from other personnel. *Id.* at 16-17.

Thus, there is simply no basis for TAC's claim that it would have proposed fewer overall personnel, and thus a higher percentage of incumbent personnel, had it not allegedly inferred historical growth and declining productivity. Nothing in TAC's document production suggests otherwise.

### B. Cost

TAC claims that its purported growth assumption caused it to propose more personnel, which, in turn, increased its evaluated cost. TAC 28 Jan. Filing at 9; Second Drew Decl. at ¶ 4. In its prior filing, the Agency demonstrated that this argument is disingenuous because no historical growth or declining productivity assumptions were included in the contemporaneous calculations on which TAC based its proposed staffing. *See* 13 Feb. Agency Filing at 10-12, 15, 18. As a result, TAC's alleged growth and productivity assumptions could not have impacted its "high" evaluated cost. AR, Tab 17 at 3.

TAC has produced additional copies of contemporaneous calculations confirming that its proposed staffing was not based, in any way, on its purported historical growth and declining productivity assumptions. *See* "Current and Proposed Production" (June 21, 2007) (Exhibit D hereto). Conversely, TAC has not produced any documentation that even remotely suggest that TAC's staffing calculations incorporated any historical growth or declining productivity assumptions. Accordingly, TAC's assertion that it would have proposed fewer personnel, but for its alleged historical growth and declining productivity assumptions, is demonstrably false, and TAC was not prejudiced.

<div align="center">*       *       *</div>

While the Agency maintains that TAC's claimed "inference" is so unreasonable that the GAO need not even consider the question of prejudice, if the question is considered, it is clear that TAC was not prejudiced by anything other than its own willingness to ignore the Solicitation, and its own proposal strategy – developed well in advance of any claimed reliance on the Agency's 1.8 million figure explicitly deleted from the Solicitation.

II.   **Notwithstanding the picture that TAC has tried to paint of itself throughout this protest as an outsider with no access to useful information regarding the Agency's Watchlisting Program, TAC's documents show that it did have what it now claims to be "inside information."**

TAC has asserted in this protest that none of its subcontractors would share any information with it regarding the historic dataset due to the existence of an NDA . Protest at 15. The documents, however, show that TAC did engage in conversations with its subcontractors, and that its subcontractors did share information with TAC.

For example, following the issuance of the final RFP, which included the discrepant 1.3 and 1.8 million historic dataset figures, TAC, rather than raising a question with the Agency, went to its subcontractor SRA – an incumbent on the current program – for its opinion regarding the discrepant numbers. The conversation is notable:

On June 3, 2007, David Reid, a key architect of TAC's proposal, wrote to teammate Harold E. Pickett, III (of incumbent SRA) the following:

> Harold
>
> Thanks again for all your input and assistance on FRI - it was very helpful!  I do have a few more questions:
>
> <div align="center">*       *       *</div>
>
> - The HIST data indicates there are 1.8mn "name nominations in the dataset" - can you explain what this really means for production?  That just seems excessive - it's 7% of the IZ population!!

Exhibit E hereto at 2. Mr. Pickett responded to Mr. Reid's request as follows:

> Excessive [is] right and I can tell you one major reason for this is the nomination criteria. Many of the analysts on project agree that the criteria is too broad and catches subjects who really shouldn't be nominated. **I can get into this more in person.** As for production, depending on the timeframe given to complete the HIST data you would have to do one of two things:
>
> 1) Have a large number of personnel dedicated to HIST only and let them work till done.
>
> 2) Go over the current HIST process and see if the process can be streamlined. If the old systems that I worked under is still in place it is no wonder they haven't made a dent in the work as it was a long and drawn out process. **Besides what we talked about on Friday I am still at a loss to explain how the number in HIST has increased.**
>
> **I could elaborate on this more but as I stated earlier I would rather do that in person.**

*Id.* at 2-3 (emphasis added). SRA's response is notable for many reasons. First, contrary to TAC's assertions in this protest, the TAC/SRA correspondence demonstrates that TAC did have access to information regarding the historic dataset. Second, it demonstrates that TAC did engage in discussions with its subcontractors. (Apparently, when TAC argued in this protest that its subcontractors would not share information with it, it meant only that its subcontractors would not put that information in writing.) Third, it demonstrates that TAC did have a question regarding the Agency's deletion of the 1.3 million figure, and the insertion of the 1.8 million figure – which it now claims it did not have prior to proposal submission – but, instead of asking the Agency, TAC strategically decided only to ask an incumbent contractor – *off the record.*

But TAC's substantive conversations with its knowledgeable subcontractors were not limited to the historic dataset. TAC had multiple conversations with its subcontactors. TAC simply ignored what its subcontractors told it. Consider the following example.

TAC claims that its proposal was downgraded for, among other things, its "End-to-End" review approach. TAC 28 Jan. Filing at 8-9. However, TAC understood the inherent risk of its approach well before it submitted its proposal. In fact, TAC was so concerned about the risk inherent in its end-to-end approach that it held a risk mitigation strategy session with its teammates to focus on this very issue. The teammates involved in this strategy session included BAE and SRA, a Watchlist incumbent.

At this risk mitigation strategy session, BAE and SRA identified "many risks" inherent in TAC's End-to-End strategy. *See* Exhibit F hereto. Consequently, BAE and SRA (as well as TAC's Capture Manager) recommended removing the End-to-End concept from TAC's proposal. *Id.* Even TAC's President and CEO, John Brennan, the former Deputy Executive Director of the CIA, and the creator of the Agency's Terrorist Threat Integration Center (the

forerunner to the National Counterterrorism Center) was involved in these discussions. When Mr. Brennan learned that TAC would be considering backing away from its end-to-end proposal strategy, Mr. Brennan asked what partners were consulted and whether the view was "definitive." *Id.* Mr. Drew, TAC's proposal lead, responded in the affirmative. The discussion between Mr. Brennan and Mr. Drew is worth quoting here because, once again, it highlights the disingenuousness of TAC's litigation-minded claim that it had no access to information regarding the Agency or its Watchlisting program:

On Friday, June 1, Mr. Drew sent the following email to Mr. Brennan and others:

> All,
> **After a long risk mitigation strategy session and in talking with some of our partners,** I reached the conclusion that it might be too much of a problem for the Sponsor to not only change personnel, but also change the process. **We found many risks associated with conducting both changes** . . . . .

*Id.* Mr. Brennan promptly responded by Blackberry as follows:

> **Wow. What partners were consulted? I presume the view was definitive.**

*Id.* Finally, Mr. Drew responded to Mr. Brennan as follows:

> **BAE and SRA.  Also, once we started out identifying the transition risks we determined it would be too hard of a sell.**

*Id.* (emphasis added). Once again, TAC's post-protest contention that it had no access to information regarding the Agency's Program is simply not true.

One interesting post-script to this particular example is worth adding here. Notwithstanding the clear, "definitive" advice of its teammates not to propose an End-to-End approach because it was too risky, TAC went ahead and proposed it anyway. The Agency, not surprisingly, criticized TAC for its approach – just as BAE and SRA had advised. AR, Tab 15 at 1.3.1.[1]

Of course TAC did not rely exclusively on its past experience with the Agency, and its teammates' experience on the incumbent contract. TAC also went outside official channels in an effort to gain a further strategic advantage.

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[1]  In light of TAC's claim that the primary reason it submitted such a "Marginal" and risky proposal was because of its pervasive inference regarding the historic dataset, it is notable that the Agency's concern over TAC's end-to-end methodology had absolutely nothing to do with such an inference. As discussed above, TAC had planned to employ its End-to-End approach well before it the issuance of the Final RFP, which, if its protest papers are to be believed, is the document that caused it to draw its "reasonable conclusion" regarding historic dataset growth. AR, Tab 15 at 1.3.1.

In early June, for example, Rudy Rousseau, TAC's Program Manager and a 24 year Agency veteran and a former Chief, Strategic Resources, within the Agency's Counterterrorism Center (who retired only one month earlier), interviewed a former Agency program analyst who had recently departed the Agency's Watchlist program. *See* Exhibit G hereto. The two discussed real-time and historic work flow, quality assurance issues, training issues, and the like. This "interview" is notable for several reasons. *Id.* First, it, once again, highlights the falsity of TAC's claim that it did not have information regarding the Agency's Watchlist Program. But more importantly, it highlights the fact that, rather than asking the Agency a simple question where it felt it needed information, it instead chose to engage in unofficial conversations with former program personnel.

Finally, yet one more example of TAC's knowledge of the Watchlist Program is useful here. On February 27, 2007, before the issuance of the draft RFP, Mr. Rousseau provided the entire TAC team with a detailed overview of the Agency's Watchlist Program. Mr. Rousseau's overview is notable in several ways. Among other things, Mr. Rousseau advised his team as follows:

1. The historic dataset contained only cables from 1990-2005 – in other words it was static. *TAC's current protest claim that it based its entire proposal on the fact that real-time names were "spilling over" into the historic dataset clearly was never run by Mr. Rousseau.*

2. The reason the historic dataset still existed is because the "bulk of the contractor FTE" has been focused on real time reviewing. *Once again, Mr. Rousseau's contemporaneous explanation is a far cry from TAC's current, litigative position regarding real-time "spill-over."*

3. In order to eliminate the "1990-2005" historic dataset, TAC should "use technical means. . . ." *Again, TAC's recent argument that it proposed its technical solution only because of the inferred 100,000 per month historic dataset growth resulting from the purported spill-over of new names from the real-time effort rings hollow.*

4. The "perennial problem" with the overall Watchlist Program stems from the Agency's own "staff officers." *This statement stands in sharp contrast to TAC's current position that it determined that the incumbent contractor was failing in its real time effort.*

*See* TAC 001946-1951 (Exhibit H hereto). In short, as Mr. Rousseau's program briefing reveals, TAC did not develop its strategy because of historic dataset growth, or because of real-time spill-over. TAC developed its strategy because it thought that strategy was best. The Agency exercised its judgment and disagreed. That was the Agency's prerogative. TAC cannot now be allowed to change its story to avoid what its own documents demonstrate.

**III.**    **TAC's recent assertion that it did not ask the agency a question because it had no reason to question the growth it inferred from the introduction of the 1.8 million figure is belied by TAC's raising exactly that question with its incumbent teammate, SRA.**

TAC has argued throughout this protest that it never occurred to it to ask a question regarding the introduction of the 1.8 million figure in the May 23, 2007 Final RFP. *See, e.g.,* TAC 28 Jan. Filing at 3. As noted above, however, following the circulation of the Final RFP, which contained the obvious discrepancy between the 1.3 million figure and the 1.8 million figure, TAC immediately noticed the discrepancy. But did TAC raise the issue with the Agency? No. Did TAC ask a single question to the Agency? No. What TAC did, as discussed above, was contact its incumbent subcontractor, SRA, and discuss the issue with it – off the record. The Agency finds this behavior troublesome. The Agency provides for Questions and Answers so that issues can be raised, vetted, and responded to. If a contractor elects to keep perceived deficiencies and ambiguities to itself rather than raising them with the Agency, then the Agency cannot know that confusion exists.

Here, instead of raising the issue with the Agency, TAC asked an incumbent teammate to explain the 1.8 figure, which TAC viewed as "excessive." *See* Exhibit at E. The incumbent teammate responded as follows:

> **Excessive [is] right. \* \* \***
> **Besides what we talked about on Friday I am still at a loss to explain how the number in HIST has increased.**
> **I could elaborate on this more but as I stated earlier I would rather do that in person. . . .**

*Id* (emphasis added). Armed with this information, TAC kept its cards close to its vest and remained silent.[2] Such an approach is (a) not smart, (b) not in keeping with the purpose of a Q&A period, and (c) risky. Such an approach also is wholly contrary to the story that TAC has told in its protest papers.

**IV.**    **Conclusion.**

It now is indisputable that the shortcomings in TAC's proposal cannot be attributed to Government failures. The Government stands firmly behind its position that the exclusion of TAC from the competitive range was done in compliance with all applicable rules, regulations, and policies requiring that offerors be treated fairly and equitably. The Government cannot predict and prevent every bad decision made by an offeror in constructing its proposal. It should not be (and is not) required to explain the rationale for every difference between a draft RFP and a final RFP. An agency should, however, be able to rely upon offerors doing business with the Government to communicate openly with it during an acquisition (consistent, of course, with RFP instructions), and to communicate with candor both during the acquisition and in any

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[2]    In fact, TAC went so far as to mark the few questions that it did submit with a "proprietary" legend. The Agency, of course instructed TAC that, if it wanted its questions answered, it would have to remove its "proprietary" legend.

challenges thereafter.  In our view, TAC, and TAC alone, has failed to meet these reasonable expectations of a party to this important process.

For the reasons discussed in the Agency's prior filings, as supplemented here, TAC's protest should be denied, or dismissed.

Respectfully,

David A. Suski
Arthur L. Passar
Office of General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency

CC:    David H. Laufman, Esq.
       Jonathan S. Aronie, Esq.

# Exhibit A

## David Reid

| | |
|---|---|
| **From:** | David Reid |
| **Sent:** | Friday, April 06, 2007 2:35 PM |
| **To:** | Nancy Cahill |
| **Subject:** | MGMT SECTION & COMMITMENT SUMMARY |

**Attachments:**  Management_Section_Summary (6 APR 2007).doc; Management_Section (6 APR 2007).doc

Management_Secti   Management_Secti
on_Summary (6 ...   on (6 APR 2007...

Thanks,

David

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**David A. Reid**
**The Analysis Corporation**
C: 703-622-2915
E: dreid@theanalysiscorp.com

**NOTICE:** E-mails can never contain or allude to classified information.  If in doubt about adding content to an e-mail, check with Russ Hierl, ext. 2846, prior to sending.

| **Tracking:** | **Recipient** | **Read** |
|---|---|---|
| | Nancy Cahill | Read: 4/6/2007 2:36 PM |

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## COMMITMENT SUMMARY

The following items provide a summary of the key initiatives and corporate commitments contained in the Management Section of the HAWKEYE Proposal Response.

These items should be reviewed to ensure we're in agreement on the approach and are aware of the potential impact to the TAC corporate infrastructure or additional costs associated with the HE effort.

**MANAGEMENT**

- ☐ Partner Planning Board (Strategic)
    - o Chaired by John and W/L PM
    - o Monthly Meetings
    - o Meeting Minutes (edited) forwarded to Government
- ☐ Partner Portal (Tactical)
    - o Vacancy posting/Partner submit candidates
    - o Maintains queue of slated candidates
    - o Captures exit interview data from all Partners to feed detailed Recruiting and Retention Metrics
- ☐ Best-Candidate selection for all positions
    - o All positions open to all Partners
- ☐ Monthly Program Management Review (PMR) with John, Alex, W/L PM, and Government Reps.

**OPS**

- ☐ Functional Model – HIST and RT are separate
- ☐ Two (2) Deputy Product Managers – HIST and RT
    - o We need to think of this as two contracts being executed under the same contract vehicle. Both need to receive equal focus.
- ☐ Migrate Sites to RT or HIST Centers of Excellence
    - o This can happen over time with proper training and without displacing anyone
- ☐ Dynamic Load Balancing – the ability to move people/teams from one functional area to another to meet world events or to assist in an overworked area
- ☐ IPT (Improvement Process Team) – 2-3 Process Engineers/Planners for Continuous Process Improvement

**RECRUITING & RETENTION**

- ☐ GOAL: Maintain Staffing Levels at 90%+
- ☐ GOAL: Staffing Roster + 10% - provide a list of 220 TS/SCI/ISSA names in the Proposal Response to demonstrate we can meet the 200 and have the ability to fill vacancies and address normal attrition – let's start exceeding their expectations in the Proposal Response

**VOLUME III: TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT PROPOSAL** Page ☐ PAGE ☐1☐
1501 Farm Credit Dr., Suite 2300, McLean, VA 22102  703.738.2840  703.883.4037
www.theanalysiscorp.com   000204
Use or disclosure of data contained on this sheet is subject to the restriction on the title page of this proposal or quotation.

- Backfill Pool (Ready Reserve) – Maintain 5-10 analysts on the bench ready to fill planned and unplanned vacancies
- Create a Watchlisting Employee Development and Retention Program
  - Provide Education and Training
  - Establish and Post Advancement Criteria
  - Create a Process Improvement Suggestion Award
  - Create a Watchlisting Program Newsletter
  - Create a Watchlisting Program Awards Program
  - Set aside a portion of the Award Fee for employees
- Establish detailed Recruiting & Retention Metric for the Watchlisting Program
  - This would impact the TAC HR and Recruiting Departments
  - We would need to collect data from all Partners
- Provide Cross-Training
  - Functional Areas
  - Research, Writing, Editing

## PHASE-IN/TRANSITION PERIOD

- Establish Leadership Team & Contract Infrastructure prior to Contract Award
- Transition will need to begin 30-days in advance of projected Contract Award to meet Transition timescale requirements
- Transition Team – corporate resource to include a dedicated Transition Manager, Security Specialist, and Contract/Admin Specialist
- Attempt to accelerate Transition – complete in less than 60-business days
- Advanced Transition/Phase-In – 2 DPMs will be committed w/n 1-5 business days (same as Key Personnel); 50% - 12-13 Team Leads will be committed w/n 5-15 business days (15-30 business sooner than required)
- Focus on RT to avoid any backlog

## REPORTING

- Dashboards (3) – Staffing, Recruiting & Retention, Production – these will require some development in Excel or Access or the Partner Portal

## CONTINGENCY PLANNING

- Use Backfill Pool to provide extra resources – potentially above the 200 contracted slots to address backlogs due to external factors
- Contingency Database – database of analysts on the contract that are willing to work shift work and/or weekends to alleviate backlogs due to external factors

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## MANAGEMENT SECTION RED, AMBER, GREEN STATUS (RAG)

| Section | Status |
|---|---|
| VOL I: Attachment J-6: Key Management Personnel List (KMPL) | |
| VOL III: Glossary/Acronym List (RFP Section L, Para. 3.0, p. 57-58) | |
| 1.5 New Technology Insertion | |
| 2.1 Management Approach | |
| 2.1.1.a & 2.1.1.b Minimize Turnover/Retain Highly Qualified, Experienced Workforce | |
| 2.1.1.c Improvement Process Team (IPT) | |
| 2.1.2.a Acquire the Total Required Staff | |
| 2.1.2.b Assume full responsibility and accountability within the Phase In/Transition Phase | |
| 2.1.3.1 Clear Lines of Authority: Corporate Alignment and Access | |
| 2.1.3.2 Proven Management Practices and Procedures | |
| 2.1.3.3 Applied Metrics to Ensure Personnel Retention | |
| 2.1.3.4 Effective Management Controls for Phase-In/Transition | |
| a. Track and Report Costs | |
| b. Schedule and Performance Management Information for planned and completed activities | |
| c. Proper Phase-In/Transition, so that all technical and admin WP requirements are completed | |
| d. Adequate and Effective Man | |

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The remainder of volume III of this proposal details how the TAC Team will implement each element of the solution both from a technical and a management perspective, what positive outcomes the NCS can expect and how the TAC Team will measure the level of success of these outcomes, and how the Team's past experience supports our confidence in the success of Operation Vigilance.

For ease of evaluation, we have organized this Technical/Management volume in with the order of the Evaluation Factors presented in the RFP. The volume begins with a Table of Contents, which is followed by a compliance matrix that maps the Evaluation Factors, the Statement of Work, and the Section L instructions to our response.

Counterterrorism is TAC's core business. TAC has deep expertise in the substance of counterterrorism generally and watchlisting specifically. TAC has participated in the watchlist process for two decades. Our participation has given this company unusual insights into both the substantive and technical issues that affect CIA's Watchlist Project.

TAC understands watchlisting from the strategic to tactical levels because we are working at it every day. TAC employees receive and work with CIA's watchlist nominations every day. They discuss watchlist issues with CIA employees every day. As a company, we understand that watchlists serve as a first line of homeland defense. They are a deadly serious business and we treat them that way.

TAC has further strengthened its team for this project by carefully selecting firms with complementary counterterrorism, watchlisting and technical capabilities. Their extensive pool of managers, analysts, and technology professionals will be integral to this effort. TAC employees have led the U.S. Government's key watchlist programs. John Arriza ran the State Department's program and created TIPOFF and managed that program for 17 years. John Brennan, President and CEO of TAC, stood up TTIC and NCTC and led them.

TAC fully understands the risks and challenges CTC faces at this time. The threat inherent in the backlog of names from the historic files is significant. Each name remaining on that list represents a potential threat to the homeland and to CIA. Reducing that threat as quickly as possible is a primary focus of TAC's proposal. TAC proposes to reduce the threat by nominating first individuals from terrorist groups which pose the greatest threat, and working through the backlog terrorist group by terrorist group using potential risk to prioritize the review. That approach will reduce threat much faster than the current more random approach.

TAC also understands the imperative to support real-time review and nominations. TAC accomplishes that mission daily in the watchlist community. TAC will provide the support required to complete that review every day and every day without exception. The TAC proposal will include technical innovations that will help address the problems causing significant backlogs in TCI production and coordination. These innovations will facilitate both analysis and coordination by enabling analysts and coordinators to focus their attention on the data supporting a nomination and making all appropriate documents available to both analysis and coordination without the need for time consuming, document by document retrieval.

TAC is also an information technology company. It has deep roots and expertise in developing and applying technical solutions to substantive problems. A key element of TAC's proposal will use that technical expertise to improve both productivity and quality of the watchlisting process. TAC's technical solutions will enable analysts to identify all messages relevant to an individual before they begin analysis. Another technical tool will enable analysts to identify information relevant to nomination decisions within messages. The tools to support TAC's approach are already approved and in use at CIA – but they are

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not being used to support watchlisting. These tools are not pie-in-the-sky technical promises, but ready-to-go to support the mission.

[Comment [arc1]: important point needs to be made earlier.]

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**1.  Technical Evaluation Factors**

**Factors 2 and 3: Real Time and Historical Technical Approaches**

This proposal introduces significantly different approaches to analyst's responsibilities; technical support for analysis; and processes for producing CIR's. It includes a major change in the approach to the historical backlog. TAC proposes to make overall Threat Reduction the guiding principle of the historical effort instead of the essentially random processing of identities currently employed.

TAC will draw on its experience with counterterrorism and watchlisting missions across the government and its proven ability to develop, deploy and deliver information technology tools to support those missions. To achieve the Sponsor's mission objectives. TAC assesses that, a heavy emphasis must be placed on changing current workflow processes and introducing information technology tools to support analysis and CIR drafting

TAC will approach real time and historical work as two elements of the same project, not two separate projects. The Project Manager and two Deputies (Historical and Real Time) will ensure that resources are optimally balanced between real time and historical. The workflows will be similar and similarly supported by new analytic tools. The analysts and managers will be trained and certified to the same standards. Real time analysts will work on the historical backlog as time permits. Historical analysts will be available for real time surges if necessary

### 1.1.1  Real Time Technical Approach

TAC's principal objective in real time support is to ensure that by the end of each day, all messages have been read; reviewed; appropriate nomination decisions made and first rate CIR's drafted. TAC's goal is no backlog at day's end.

In order to achieve that objective, TAC will bring highly qualified analysts and managers to the real time mission. It will support their work with technical innovations that will increase productivity; improve quality and facilitate coordination. It will adopt a straightforward message review process in which each analyst is responsible for making nomination decisions, drafting CIR's and forwarding them to their supervisor.

#### 1.1.1.1  Real Time Organization

TAC's real time support effort will mirror the sponsor's organization. The working concept is to develop subject matter expertise by focusing on the flow of messages to specific Sponsor units which will facilitate decisions about whether an individual meets the standards for nomination. This organization will also develop the familiarity required to learn the equities of specific units and, over time, earn their trust. Both organizing principles should help facilitate the coordination process.

Initially, TAC will use the existing real time staffing pattern as the baseline. As necessary, we will adjust the number of real time analysts, based upon our preliminary review (But given the very low rates of productivity shown in the sample data provided with the draft RFP, we doubt that we will need more real

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time analysts.) In any case, we fully expect to adjust staffing levels over time as we improve productivity and as the flow of messages varies with events.

TAC processes will accommodate temporary surges of messages by enabling lead analysts to request short term support from the Deputy Program Managers. Those managers will be responsible for balancing the load among analysts, most likely by identifying real time analysts who have time available. If no real time analysts are available, analysts engaged in historical research can provide temporary support.

For longer term, but still temporary requirements, TAC will also maintain an analytic reserve prepared to move support surges in traffic and other requirements . These employees will be trained and certified as are all other employees working on the project. This reserve will be provided at no cost to the government. TAC is able to maintain these employees because it is engaged in many different activities across the CT community that require essentially the same skill sets as the Watchlisting Project.

Each TAC analyst engaged in real time work will also have a queue of historical messages ready for review. When their real time work is done, the analyst will be required to turn to the historical work. This queue will parallel the priority order on which TAC historical analysts are working.

### 1.1.1.2  Quality

As the recipient of watchlisting CIR's from across the government, TAC employees currently engaged in the watchlisting process are particularly sensitive to the content quality of nominations. Many of the employees and most of the supervisors who will be working on this project have prior experience in the watchlisting process. They will focus on providing accurate information that responds to all of the watchlisting standards.. Their lead analysts and editors will quality control nomination recommendations and CIR drafts.

TAC employees have a built-in advantage of an ability to reach back—or reach out—to their TAC colleagues working watchlisting issues at other agencies. Those colleagues can provide advice and guidance about content issues that should facilitate both coordination and value of the product for recipients.

TAC will incorporate a sophisticated Quality Assurance program into the project. This program will be based on industry best practices. Its results will be available to the sponsor and to TAC managers. This QA program will be used to evaluate performance of individual analysts, as well as the entire Watchlisting Program, and will provide information that will inform decisions about training content, remedial measures for individual analysts, performance of each TAC unit and the program as a whole.

TAC embeds analytic performance management in all levels of the processes and procedures. Quality control/assurance reviews as well as developmental, full, and line edits will be aligned with desired performance outcomes at regular and specified increments of the work flow process to ensure quality products.

TAC understands the requirements of tactical analysis and Watchlisting, and we possess an existing and comprehensive inventory of courses and content modules that respond directly and meaningfully to the functional needs of Watchlisting. Inarguably, this enhances the likelihood that our team will demonstrate a high level of success in the knowledge and skill areas recognized as critical to performance outcomes and to the requisite certification requirements. Our existing counterterrorism/Watchlisting training is without equal, as is our performance management approach that accounts for its implementation and demonstrated performance success.

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### 1.1.1.3 Nominations and Completing CIR's

Robust staffing, technical innovations and process improvements will yield impressive increases in both productivity and quality. Technical innovations will enable analysts to focus on analyzing information and making recommendations, rather than spending the bulk of their time on document searches and drafting. Process improvements will enable analysts to produce higher quality finished products more rapidly; will improve job satisfaction and increase accountability and rewards.

TAC analysis and CIR drafting will be guided by the following principles:

- Analysts should spend their time analyzing, not retrieving documents.
  Document retrieval will be automated.

- IT tools should order and organized information to match the analytic task.

- Analysts should convey the substance of their decisions easily and quickly—not through keystroke by keystroke drafting.

- All analytic decisions should be fully documented and available for review by supervisors, coordinators and downstream agencies.

Those principles will be possible in the TAC process because:

- The documents analysts review to make nomination decisions will be organized and ordered by the technical tools TAC will bring to the project.

- Within those documents, the information analysts require to make and support nomination decisions will be highlighted and ordered so that they will not need to search for it.

- Analysts will be able to reorder their data to answer key analytic questions by using tools available on their desktop

- Most of the substance of a nomination message will be developed by dropping data from messages into a CIR template.

- All documentation supporting a nomination will be added to the coordination package through the use of a specific tool.

### Workflow

Section *** lays out the workflow we propose to use for real time and historical reviews. The details of the capabilities and availability of each IT tool TAC will employ are described in the Section ** Technical Innovation. Each step of the workflow is designed to ensure that analysts have the information they require to make nomination decisions and that they can easily and quickly convey and document their decisions.

### 1.1.2 Historical Technical Approach

### 1.1.2.1 Proposed Burn Down Rate

**Comment [nrc7]:** One of our "10 risks" should be that Sponsor will be flooded with unprocessed CIR downstream. How do we help them coordinate this?

**Comment [nrc8]:** Fix heading (Nancy)

**Comment [nrc9]:** Rudy and David working on graphic for "current vs TAC" comparison. Need to make sure there is a graphic impact showing how complex it is now vs how simple/streamlined ours will be

**Comment [nrc10]:** Need to address MANAGEMENT of technology question, e.g. how does it fit into the workflow and the project phases we propose? How do we manage the technology integration and/or development lifecycle?

**Comment [nrc11]:** We need to do a proof of concept to make sure the technology tools we are proposing actually do what we say they will do.

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We will approach the proposed burn down rate through substantial changes in the substantive approach to the mission; the workflow process; the responsibilities of analysts and the analytic tools available to them.

### 1.1.2.2 Threat Reduction Approach

We believe that the historical review will be best executed as a threat reduction mission. The current process of a numerical record-by-record review of Historical cables implicitly assumes that all individuals reported in message traffic pose equal threats. TAC's Threat Reduction Approach (TRA) recognizes that some inividuals and some groups represent a greater national security threat than others. TAC will review individuals associated with the most threatening terrorist group in the historical backlog first, then move to the next most threatening group, as illustrated in Table XX.

Graphic: Table of Current Group Priorities IT UNCLASSIFIED

AQ
Hezbollah

FARC
Hamas

Not only will TRA enable the US to nominate the more dangerous individuals first, this new approach to the mission will also enhance our security by helping degrade the capabilities of the entire terrorist group because a substantial travel of a substantial number of its associates will be inhibited by potential detection by numerous national and international lookout systems.

Using the TRA, the threat to the US would be reduced much more quickly than the nominal burn down rate. The following graphics illustrate that point.

Insert Graphics

TAC recognizes that individuals not associated with a terrorist group are becoming increasingly dangerous as terrorists. The Threat Reduction process will screen for and prioritize individuals who are acting essentially outside of an organized terrorist group. The main focus will be on identifying individuals who have engaged in violent acts or are specifically targeting US interests in the homeland or abroad. Those individuals will be nominated in parallel to individuals from the most dangerous groups.

### 1.1.2.3 Assessment of Remaining Threat

Our experience with the watchlists leads us to believe that at some point, the threat posed by identities in the lowest priority groups may be so minimal that the Sponsor will be able to decide that few, if any, of those identities need to be reviewed. For example, names of Japanese Red Army members in ten year old messages may fall below the threshold of current risk and concern. TAC will use a sampling technique to estimate remaining risk in trhe backlog. The sponsor will be able to determine if the Historical review needs to continue or whether the risk has been reduced to the point at which time and resources are better spent on other counterterrorist missions. TAC is aware that the Sponsor used essentially that same technique to determine that approximately one third of the messages in the original historical database need not be reviewed.

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### 1.1.2.4   *Processes and Procedures for Completing Review of Historical Cable Traffic*

The current process for historical review grew from the early origins of the program. TAC assesses that this process now serves as a significant impediment to completing the mission. The production rates documented in the data provided with the draft RFP are many orders of magnitude lower than required to meet the sponsor's suggested goal.

TAC proposes to fundamentally change the processes and procedures for reviewing historical cable traffic. In addition to the Threat Reduction Approach and CIR coordination improvements discussed above, three process principles will drive this change.

Full Scope Analysts. Analysts will be trained and certified to analyze the cables and to draft the CIR's. TAC's realtime and historic analysts will have the same skills and training. TAC will deploy first class full scope analysts. This fundamental project precept will eliminate a major factor in job dissatisfaction and turnover found in the current workforce..

Developing Expertise. By focusing their analytic efforts on identities from one terrorist group at a time, we expect that their expertise will grow quickly and, with that, so will their productivity.

Using Analytic Tools. TAC will use existing and new analytic tools to screen and prepare documents so that scarce analytic resources are used productively. TAC will also use advanced analytic tools to facilitate CIR drafting and coordination

### 1.1.2.5   *Workflow*

The workflow for historical and real time are essentially identical except for the beginning of the process. In historical work, identities are pending in the backlog and are available for screening. In real time, they arrive daily in cables. The first step in the historic workflow is to ensure that analysts are able to focus on identities not already in TIDE or identities with insufficient biographic information to support a nomination. Prior to assigning identities for analysis, they will be screened for previous nomination and sufficient bio data.

Preliminary screening is particularly important because the production data from the week of September 18, 2006 provided to us in the draft RFP indicates that 84% of the names reviewed did not meet the standard for nomination to any watchlist. This error rate from the current Phase 1 review is a principal reason for the size of the backlog. It also represents the principal management challenge to accomplishing the mission with the time and resources available. The production statistics from that week indicate that about 38% of the names in the backlog were already listed in TIDE. No analytic resources should be used on any of those names. About 17% of the names had no bio with them. We will be able to use our technical capabilities to eliminate those names.

For the historic project, TAC analysts will review the most recent messages first. The most recent messages are more likely to reflect more recent terrorist activity. They are also more likely to include, even if only by reference, all of the information available about a terrorist. Determining whether or not such an individual meets the standard for nomination will take less time. From a Threat Reduction perspective, terrorists who have been active more recently may well represent a more acute threat than terrorists active in an earlier era.

### 1.1.2.6   Process Change Nominations

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The Sponsor's main outstanding risk lies with having a backlog of over 1 million individuals already identified by Phase 1 as potentially eligible for nomination. That risk needs to be reduced as quickly as possible. In addition to cable triage, cable analysis, and CIR coordination mentioned in Section ***, TAC proposes to increase the pace by focusing analysts on determining whether the individual meets the criteria for nomination—and once that standard is met, ending the analytic portion of the task and nominating the individual immediately.

While forwarding all available information in the initial nominating CIR may be a traditional approach to watchlisting nominations, the more important Threat Reduction objective is to nominate as soon as the information available supports a nomination to a watchlist. Then the analyst moves on to the next potential terrorist and nominates him. This approach explicitly trades off reducing threat inherent in the historical backlog as quickly as possible against engaging in traditional and time consuming research which informs downstream agencies about all available information about an individual. As a practical matter, we will be forwarding the additional information within documentation attached to the CIR, but would not be including it in the CIR itself.

### 1.1.2.7  Process Change—CIR's

We are struck by the large number of names in the CIR queue—612 for the week of September 18. When TAC increases the flow of nominations—which we must—the CIR queue quickly will become an even more unacceptable bottleneck. TAC recognizes that part of the cause of the coordination bottleneck lies with the current coordination practices and procedures and proposes to work with the Sponsor to suggest some approaches that would preserve the equities of Sponsor components, but facilitate the coordination process. In addition, TAC has some preliminary proposals to address this issue.

TAC analysts will be responsible for producing draft CIR's that meet all of the Sponsor's substantive and technical standards for coordination and dissemination. TAC is particularly aware that poorly drafted CIR's waste valuable time for the Sponsor's already hard pressed staff officers involved in the coordination and review process. The TAC analysts will be selected for their ability to fulfill this requirement and will be trained to do so. Experienced, trained supervisors will review the product and help resolve any substantive or procedural issues. Analysts will be responsible for completing the coordination process—as are analysts in the Sponsor's organization. Their supervisors will be available for support as required, just as supervisors in the Sponsor's organization.

TAC will eliminate the complex, and time consuming, current, three phase work process  in which one analyst screens documents, another analyst conducts research and drafts a CIR and a third analyst re-reviews that work and polishes the CIR . TAC' s analyst's responsibilities and review procedures will mirror the Sponsor's. Staff officers with questions about a message will not have to wade through layers of reviewers—they will know who is responsible for the message; who can answer their questions and address their concerns.

> **Comment [nro16]:** Where is this introduced/defined? Need to make it clear in initial workflow chart and in textual discussion.

TAC will work with the Sponsor to provide a supporting IT infrastructure to facilitate CIR drafts. That infrastructure will include templates and pull down menus that anticipate most of the format and technical language used in writing watchlisting CIR's. The goal is to focus the main drafting efforts of the analyst on the key substantive elements of the message.

### 1.1.3  Workflow Detail:  Real Time and Historical

(This needs to be accompanied by a workflow graphic or graphics)

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We have provided the organizing principles of our technical approaches to real time and historical work. The following section provides the more detailed processes and analytic tools we will employ for the Watchlist Project.

In this proposal, the only significant workflow difference between historical and real time analysis is the origin of the messages the analyst will review. In real time, the real time teams will work from the daily flow of cables and will be dependent on their substance as the basis for organizing and executing their analysis. In historical, identities are available for processing in large numbers, the size and composition of the backlog is relatively stable. The entire backlog is the basis for prioritizing and preprocessing historical analysis.

### 1.1.3.1  Messages Prepared for Distribution to Analysts

One of the principles of TAC's process is to enable analysts to focus on deciding whether an identity requires nomination, instead of spending time retrieving documents and reading unproductive portions of them. TAC will use analytic tools to support that principle and increase analysts' productivity.

### 1.1.3.1.1  Triage, Processing and Priorities

The first activity that can be improved with leading-edge technology is the triage of Watchlisting requests, both in the backlog and in real time. The first part of both the real time and historic triage process will identify and isolate the names contained in cables and identify and eliminate the names that are already in TIDE.

The TAC team will deploy identity matching and similarity algorithms to match the identities found in cables with the Identities Datamart and will eliminate those names that have already been added to a watchlist.

The TAC team will deploy an entity extractor, such as Inxight ThingFinder, optionally coupled with an Arabic name normalizing algorithm, to identify and mark, or "tag", the names in every cable; not only will tagging the names in the cables allow analysts to quickly and accurately distinguish the people who are the topics of cables, but also enables further value to be added by other technologies.

Since names must be augmented with biographic data for watchlist nomination, the TAC team will implement an automated rules engine that will highlight and prioritize cables that contain both a name and biographic information, such as date of birth or other identifying information.

To support the Threat Reduction Approach to historical work, the TAC team will use currently deployed technology to place identities into the terrorist groups with which they are associated so that historical analysts may work on them according to the priorities provided in Table ***. This is, essentially, the only workflow difference between real time and historic.

Finally, before analysts touch a message, the TAC team proposes to deploy Endeca, the industry leading text analysis and knowledge discovery suite, to analyze the text content in the remaining cables, measured relative to a set of key words and phrases specified by the customer and/or determined by analytic subject matter experts on the TAC team, to assess the risk of attack likely to be associated with the identities contained in each cable. The product of this assessment will be a relative threat score for each cable, and the analyst workflow will be prioritized such that analysts are always working on the

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cables that pertain to the most dangerous individuals within their assigned terrorist group or real time message queues.

Based on statistics gathered from the current process, this automated process is likely to eliminate approximately 60% of the backlog names, ensuring that valuable analytic and subject matter experts spend their time working on the most important cables. The result of revolutionizing the analytic process with cutting-edge technology will be greater productivity and, more importantly, quickly reducing the threat of attack. Furthermore, because the key information in each document will be highlighted, analysts will not normally need to read the entire text of long messages.

### 1.1.3.1.2   Cable Analysis

At this point, analysts will begin their review of messages. TAC will configure and optimize the Endeca Information Access Platform and will utilize its staff of Endeca analytic experts to train all analysts to get the most out of the Endeca platform. The power of Endeca lies in its ability to empower the user to "ask questions" of the entire corpus of cable data simply by clicking on the topics, themes, and keywords contained in the traffic. In short, the key terms in a cable, a set of cables or millions of cables, nearly jump out at a user. [a screen shot will be attached]. By allowing a user to quickly and clearly explore the prioritized cable data, with watchlist criteria automatically highlighted in every cable, analysis will be further expedited.

At this point, analysts are working with the messages on their desktop. They have all the tools at hand to make nomination decisions. If they require additional information, they can use Endeca, or other search tools currently available in the Sponsor's CT database to develop additional information.

### 1.1.3.1.3   Report Drafting and Coordination

After an analyst decides that an identity meets standards for a watchlist, a CIR is created and a lengthy coordination process is initiated. During coordination, two major bottlenecks—writing the CIR manually and vetting of information in the CIR by all relevant parties—may prevent the nomination from reaching completion in a fashion timely enough to make reducing the cable backlog realistic. The cable backlog, however, will be significantly reduced by applying technology to standardize, expedite, and automate the CIR writing process and to allow the coordination reviewers to easily review only those portions of the cables that are relevant to the nomination, without needing to find the cable in the cable system and read it in full. The TAC team will help the customer to accomplish these goals and reduce the cable backlog with a simple and highly effective technology, which is already deployed and in use by hundreds of users at the customer site, and is integrated with the customer's cable system.

Polaris is a tool that performs an incredibly simple task that nearly every analyst has, at some time, asked to have automated. It allows a user to drag and drop snippets from a cable in the customer's cable system to Microsoft Word and carries with it all classification markings and portion markings. In addition, Polaris creates document sourcing footnotes in the Word report and copies the entire source cable to the end of the report—all by simply dragging and dropping your relevant snippet into your report in Microsoft Word. Having been developed by a component of BAE, a TAC team member, the TAC team employs engineers with the expertise to customize Polaris to suit the specific needs of the Watchlisting Program. This team of experts will create an automated CIR utility, which will allow a user to select the derog in a cable to support a nomination, specify several key criteria, such as the watchlist to which an identity will be nominated, and Polaris will automatically insert the data into a properly classified and portion-marked CIR, complete with source footnotes and full copies of all relevant source cables attached. This CIR will then be reviewed by the analyst's supervisor and forwarded to all appropriate coordination parties, who

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ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH
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can then see the relevant portions in the report and, if necessary, can even see the entire cable, simply by turning to the appendix in the report.

By deploying cutting-edge, mission-focused technology, the TAC team will relieve the many of the major bottlenecks and frustrations in the vital activities of cable triage, analysis, and coordination. Analysts will spend their time working on cables that describe the most acute threats of attack, and reports will be automatically generated with sourcing that will allow coordination without ever logging into the cable

### Deploying Technology

The Technology Insertion section will provide a detailed review of the timing and process of bringing new analytic tools to the watchlisting process. We want to be clear that we will begin the transition period using the same IT tools now available. We will use some of the extractors in different ways in order to prioritize the historical backlog to carry our TAC's Threat Reduction Approacth. We will introduce new analytic tools in a measured way to ensure that the workforce is trained and comfortable with their use. We have selected analytic tools that are, for the most part, available on the Sponsor's system or can be made available within a relatively short time. As a Team with deep roots in information technology, we will be continually on the lookout for new analytic tools to apply to this program.

Our experience with the Sponsor's internal processes indicates to us that we are likely to receive approval to apply the new analytic tools in weeks and months, not years. We cannot control the pace of the Sponsor's process, but we will be prepared to provide all the information required to gain approvals as quickly as possible. We would anticipate that we could deploy ***** within **** weeks of contract award and ***** relatively soon after that.  **** will take months, not weeks. We will gain substantial improvements in productivity through the process changes we have proposed. Those gains will be accelerated as we bring our full suite of analytic tools to bear on the process.

**Factor 1: Personnel Qualifications and Availability**

TAC has 200 Analysts Ready to Go with Qualifications that Mission Exceed the SOW Requirements

TAC will provide a unique program of responsibilities, incentives, and accountability to meet retention objectives.

<div style="float:right; border:1px solid;">
Comment [nrc17]: Remove "Factor 1" from heading, since we are now addressing them out of order.

Comment [nrc18]: Reorganize: Start with Factor 2 & 3 (Real-Time and Historical) then Factor 1 (Personnel (Qual's and Availability))

Comment [nrc19]: Need to address three key topics: (1) we have enough people, ready to go; (2) we understand what an analyst is expected to do (discuss); and (3) these are the qualifications our people have and what they will do to help accomplish WL mission.
</div>

### 1.2.1  Personnel: Qualifications and Availability

TAC and its partners are committed to support the Watchlist Project with trained and certified analysts managed by seasoned professionals with years of experience in watchlisting and counterterrorism. Drawing on ongoing support for watchlisting throughout the government, the TAC team will have the personnel it needs from inception to completion of the Watchlist Project.

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### 1.2.2   Personnel Proposal

TAC and its team have been supporting watchlisting for two decades. It has a well established cadre of substantive and technical professionals experienced in all aspects of watchlist programs. TAC will draw on that cadre to staff the core of the Watchlist Project.

Watchlist training is a particularly well developed program at TAC. TAC's support for watchlisting has required effective training programs. They will require some added elements unique to the sponsor and its requirements, but the training process is robust and prepared for additional substantive requirements.

We train analysts to demonstrate high levels of operational performance in areas such as researching for analytic outcomes, identifying and extracting derogatory from source documents, scanning and identifying deconfliction issues, liaising and negotiating for follow-on data exploitation. Centrally important, our analysts understand the intelligence product and can produce a watchlist recommendation that provides a not only well-written report on a known or suspected terrorist that requires minimal quality control at the Sponsor's Coordination level, but also a quality report accepted at NCTC and TSC (the primary consumers) and the IC. In short, we demonstrate the know-how and the technology to develop, mentor, and retain in systematic fashion the analysts we recruit.

TAC training is only the beginning of the preparation process for CT work. Before TAC employees work hands on anywhere, they are tested and certified by TAC, as required by the Statement of Work and TAC's own standard practices. In the case of the Watchlist Project, we will also require that analysts and managers demonstrate their capability to support real time watchlisting by spending time working on the historic backlog. Their products—both recommendations and CIR's can be closely supervised without the deadline pressures required in the real time environment. This training program will have the added advantage of reducing the historic backlog, particularly at the beginning of the program when 200 or so employees work on those names during the transition.

### 1.2.3   Staffing Roster:  Quality Personnel Ready to Go

We have 200 fully cleared professionals ready to support the Watchlist Project. The resumes speak to the quality of the proposed personnel and demonstrate that they meet or exceed the qualifications established in the Statement of Work. Table ** provides that compliance data in summarized form. They include professionals with experience in the Terrorist Screening Center, National Counterterrorism Center, National Targeting Center, Department of State, Defense Intelligence Agency, and CIA. Some will need training in the Sponsor's unique and demanding environment, however, all are well acquainted with the substance of watchlist programs.

### 1.2.4   Retention

[text obscured/redacted]

[text obscured/redacted]

> **Comment [nrc20]:** Don't address recruitment/retention issues here - these go in the management section.

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Response to RFP No. 2007-WP
**Watchlisting**
NCS/CTC/TTD

NO. 2637  T TP. 30

CLOSURE
ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH
GAO PROTECTIVE ORDER

TAC

[redacted paragraph]

[redacted paragraph]

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TAC is confident that these personnel resumes exceed SOW qualifications by offering a talent pool of Intelligence Analysts (IA) at all levels, ranging from junior IAs to Subject Matter Experts (SME) assembled from throughout the Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and Watchlisting Communities, providing a depth and breadth of knowledge unique for this WP. Current presence and experience include individuals assigned from the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), National Targeting Center (NTC), Department of State (DOS), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This provides the WP a strong personnel foundation from which to draw and become immediately productive for the government.

### 1.2.5  Training and Certification

### 1.1.5 Training and Certification

Counterterrorism and Watchlisting training is where the TAC Team shines. We are aware of no other existing, currently deployed Watchlisting training that has been specifically designed and tested to serve the full life-cycle of Watchlisting processes. TAC has been serving watchlisting programs for two decades, and its time-tested training leads the way in serving knowledge and pragmatic operational needs. Our training program is robust with built-in flexibility to respond to unique sponsor requirements. We fully expect our Sponsor-approved training program to be in place far in advance of the specified 30 days after contract award. Prior to contract award date, the existing TAC Orientation Program will enable analysts to achieve the required knowledge and skills thresholds, represented by TAC's comprehensive inventory of counterterrorism/Watchlisting benchmarks for professional development that currently define its CT/Watchlisting training.

*Our goal is to improve productivity by reducing the number of revisions of the finished product, and to facilitate the flow of the watchlisting process as a whole. TAC Team analysts will be trained and certified per the Sponsor's requirements to an "industry standard" based on years of experience supporting recipients of the Sponsor's watchlist nominations. Our team of facilitators and subject matter experts monitor and guide students every step of the way in a collaborative learning environment that combines personal mentoring with on-line enabling tools.*

*TAC training begins before contract award with an Orientation Program that closely mirrors our proposed training program. We fully understand that our watchlist project training and certification program must be approved by the sponsor and that cannot happen until contract award. TAC's Orientation Program is designed to insure that analysts, supervisors and managers are ready for final training and preparation for operational work by contract award date.*

*TAC's Orientation Program enables analysts to achieve the knowledge and skills required for their assigned positions through a combination of assessments and course work. New analysts are*

Comment [rirc21]: Make the point that our Training Plan will be ready far in advance of the specified 30 days after contract award.

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*administered assessments to establish a baseline of knowledge and skills in tactical analysis and watchlisting.  Based on the outcome of the assessments, analysts enroll in a selection of 12 counter-terrorism/watchlisting courses and 32 content modules in TAC's on-line learning system to close knowledge and skills gaps. Each course is conducted in a collaborative learning environment under close supervision of our team of facilitators and subject matter experts. The TAC team tracks individual performance in the courses and modules, adjusts the program as necessary, and verifies and documents achievement of learning objectives.*

### 1.2.6   Training Program

We fully understand that our watchlist project training and certification program must be approved by the sponsor and that cannot happen until contract award.  TAC will have the training proposal ready for Sponsor review and approval within days of the contract award.  TAC's Orientation Program is designed to insure that analysts, supervisors and managers are ready for final training and preparation for operational work by contract award date.  After they have completed their Orientation Program, they will be ready to participate in a Sponsor-approved Training Program that fully prepares them for the watchlisting project.

The Watchlist Project training and certification program that we will propose to the Sponsor is customized to serve three experience levels, from new analysts to quality assurance staff.  Course selection is based on our high level of expertise and experience in watchlisting and counterterrorism environments across the IC, with roots in our past and current performances in TIPOFF, TIDE, TSDB and (X,y,z).  To protect the security of sensitive or classified learning topics, our training program spans a variety of security domains.  We take full advantage of the unclassified, password protected domain for 24/7 on-line training on the basic skills foundation that suits all schedules and is especially suited to ensure that our partners are trained to the same high standards as TAC employees.  Training on sensitive topics continues in the classified domain.

Depending on their experience level and future assignments, TAC will use the collaborative approach employed in the Orientation Program to train  and certify team members to one of three levels as described in Exhibit xx below.

Comment [ntc22]: Need to include "Training" in CMP – Phase 0.

Comment [ntc23]: Are we covering how to use TIDE in our training program? Yes – that will go in the classified prop.

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