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Network Policies
If you want to control traffic flow at the IP address or port level for TCP, UDP, and SCTP protocols, then you might consider using Kubernetes NetworkPolicies for particular applications in your cluster. NetworkPolicies are an application-centric construct which allow you to specify how a pod is allowed to communicate with various network "entities" (we use the word "entity" here to avoid overloading the more common terms such as "endpoints" and "services", which have specific Kubernetes connotations) over the network. NetworkPolicies apply to a connection with a pod on one or both ends, and are not relevant to other connections.
The entities that a Pod can communicate with are identified through a combination of the following 3 identifiers:
- Other pods that are allowed (exception: a pod cannot block access to itself)
- Namespaces that are allowed
- IP blocks (exception: traffic to and from the node where a Pod is running is always allowed, regardless of the IP address of the Pod or the node)
When defining a pod- or namespace- based NetworkPolicy, you use a selector to specify what traffic is allowed to and from the Pod(s) that match the selector.
Meanwhile, when IP based NetworkPolicies are created, we define policies based on IP blocks (CIDR ranges).
Prerequisites
Network policies are implemented by the network plugin. To use network policies, you must be using a networking solution which supports NetworkPolicy. Creating a NetworkPolicy resource without a controller that implements it will have no effect.
The Two Sorts of Pod Isolation
There are two sorts of isolation for a pod: isolation for egress, and isolation for ingress. They concern what connections may be established. "Isolation" here is not absolute, rather it means "some restrictions apply". The alternative, "non-isolated for $direction", means that no restrictions apply in the stated direction. The two sorts of isolation (or not) are declared independently, and are both relevant for a connection from one pod to another.
By default, a pod is non-isolated for egress; all outbound connections are allowed.
A pod is isolated for egress if there is any NetworkPolicy that both selects the pod and has
"Egress" in its policyTypes
; we say that such a policy applies to the pod for egress.
When a pod is isolated for egress, the only allowed connections from the pod are those allowed by
the egress
list of some NetworkPolicy that applies to the pod for egress.
The effects of those egress
lists combine additively.
By default, a pod is non-isolated for ingress; all inbound connections are allowed.
A pod is isolated for ingress if there is any NetworkPolicy that both selects the pod and
has "Ingress" in its policyTypes
; we say that such a policy applies to the pod for ingress.
When a pod is isolated for ingress, the only allowed connections into the pod are those from
the pod's node and those allowed by the ingress
list of some NetworkPolicy that applies to
the pod for ingress. The effects of those ingress
lists combine additively.
Network policies do not conflict; they are additive. If any policy or policies apply to a given pod for a given direction, the connections allowed in that direction from that pod is the union of what the applicable policies allow. Thus, order of evaluation does not affect the policy result.
For a connection from a source pod to a destination pod to be allowed, both the egress policy on the source pod and the ingress policy on the destination pod need to allow the connection. If either side does not allow the connection, it will not happen.
The NetworkPolicy resource
See the NetworkPolicy reference for a full definition of the resource.
An example NetworkPolicy might look like this:
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: test-network-policy
namespace: default
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
role: db
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
ingress:
- from:
- ipBlock:
cidr: 172.17.0.0/16
except:
- 172.17.1.0/24
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
project: myproject
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
role: frontend
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 6379
egress:
- to:
- ipBlock:
cidr: 10.0.0.0/24
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 5978
Mandatory Fields: As with all other Kubernetes config, a NetworkPolicy needs apiVersion
,
kind
, and metadata
fields. For general information about working with config files, see
Configure a Pod to Use a ConfigMap,
and Object Management.
spec: NetworkPolicy spec has all the information needed to define a particular network policy in the given namespace.
podSelector: Each NetworkPolicy includes a podSelector
which selects the grouping of pods to
which the policy applies. The example policy selects pods with the label "role=db". An empty
podSelector
selects all pods in the namespace.
policyTypes: Each NetworkPolicy includes a policyTypes
list which may include either
Ingress
, Egress
, or both. The policyTypes
field indicates whether or not the given policy
applies to ingress traffic to selected pod, egress traffic from selected pods, or both. If no
policyTypes
are specified on a NetworkPolicy then by default Ingress
will always be set and
Egress
will be set if the NetworkPolicy has any egress rules.
ingress: Each NetworkPolicy may include a list of allowed ingress
rules. Each rule allows
traffic which matches both the from
and ports
sections. The example policy contains a single
rule, which matches traffic on a single port, from one of three sources, the first specified via
an ipBlock
, the second via a namespaceSelector
and the third via a podSelector
.
egress: Each NetworkPolicy may include a list of allowed egress
rules. Each rule allows
traffic which matches both the to
and ports
sections. The example policy contains a single
rule, which matches traffic on a single port to any destination in 10.0.0.0/24
.
So, the example NetworkPolicy:
-
isolates
role=db
pods in thedefault
namespace for both ingress and egress traffic (if they weren't already isolated) -
(Ingress rules) allows connections to all pods in the
default
namespace with the labelrole=db
on TCP port 6379 from:- any pod in the
default
namespace with the labelrole=frontend
- any pod in a namespace with the label
project=myproject
- IP addresses in the ranges
172.17.0.0
–172.17.0.255
and172.17.2.0
–172.17.255.255
(ie, all of172.17.0.0/16
except172.17.1.0/24
)
- any pod in the
-
(Egress rules) allows connections from any pod in the
default
namespace with the labelrole=db
to CIDR10.0.0.0/24
on TCP port 5978
See the Declare Network Policy walkthrough for further examples.
Behavior of to
and from
selectors
There are four kinds of selectors that can be specified in an ingress
from
section or egress
to
section:
podSelector: This selects particular Pods in the same namespace as the NetworkPolicy which should be allowed as ingress sources or egress destinations.
namespaceSelector: This selects particular namespaces for which all Pods should be allowed as ingress sources or egress destinations.
namespaceSelector and podSelector: A single to
/from
entry that specifies both
namespaceSelector
and podSelector
selects particular Pods within particular namespaces. Be
careful to use correct YAML syntax. For example:
...
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
user: alice
podSelector:
matchLabels:
role: client
...
This policy contains a single from
element allowing connections from Pods with the label
role=client
in namespaces with the label user=alice
. But the following policy is different:
...
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
user: alice
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
role: client
...
It contains two elements in the from
array, and allows connections from Pods in the local
Namespace with the label role=client
, or from any Pod in any namespace with the label
user=alice
.
When in doubt, use kubectl describe
to see how Kubernetes has interpreted the policy.
ipBlock: This selects particular IP CIDR ranges to allow as ingress sources or egress destinations. These should be cluster-external IPs, since Pod IPs are ephemeral and unpredictable.
Cluster ingress and egress mechanisms often require rewriting the source or destination IP
of packets. In cases where this happens, it is not defined whether this happens before or
after NetworkPolicy processing, and the behavior may be different for different
combinations of network plugin, cloud provider, Service
implementation, etc.
In the case of ingress, this means that in some cases you may be able to filter incoming
packets based on the actual original source IP, while in other cases, the "source IP" that
the NetworkPolicy acts on may be the IP of a LoadBalancer
or of the Pod's node, etc.
For egress, this means that connections from pods to Service
IPs that get rewritten to
cluster-external IPs may or may not be subject to ipBlock
-based policies.
Default policies
By default, if no policies exist in a namespace, then all ingress and egress traffic is allowed to and from pods in that namespace. The following examples let you change the default behavior in that namespace.
Default deny all ingress traffic
You can create a "default" ingress isolation policy for a namespace by creating a NetworkPolicy that selects all pods but does not allow any ingress traffic to those pods.
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-ingress
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
This ensures that even pods that aren't selected by any other NetworkPolicy will still be isolated for ingress. This policy does not affect isolation for egress from any pod.
Allow all ingress traffic
If you want to allow all incoming connections to all pods in a namespace, you can create a policy that explicitly allows that.
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-all-ingress
spec:
podSelector: {}
ingress:
- {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
With this policy in place, no additional policy or policies can cause any incoming connection to those pods to be denied. This policy has no effect on isolation for egress from any pod.
Default deny all egress traffic
You can create a "default" egress isolation policy for a namespace by creating a NetworkPolicy that selects all pods but does not allow any egress traffic from those pods.
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-egress
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Egress
This ensures that even pods that aren't selected by any other NetworkPolicy will not be allowed egress traffic. This policy does not change the ingress isolation behavior of any pod.
Allow all egress traffic
If you want to allow all connections from all pods in a namespace, you can create a policy that explicitly allows all outgoing connections from pods in that namespace.
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-all-egress
spec:
podSelector: {}
egress:
- {}
policyTypes:
- Egress
With this policy in place, no additional policy or policies can cause any outgoing connection from those pods to be denied. This policy has no effect on isolation for ingress to any pod.
Default deny all ingress and all egress traffic
You can create a "default" policy for a namespace which prevents all ingress AND egress traffic by creating the following NetworkPolicy in that namespace.
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-all
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
This ensures that even pods that aren't selected by any other NetworkPolicy will not be allowed ingress or egress traffic.
Network traffic filtering
NetworkPolicy is defined for layer 4 connections (TCP, UDP, and optionally SCTP). For all the other protocols, the behaviour may vary across network plugins.
When a deny all
network policy is defined, it is only guaranteed to deny TCP, UDP and SCTP
connections. For other protocols, such as ARP or ICMP, the behaviour is undefined.
The same applies to allow rules: when a specific pod is allowed as ingress source or egress destination,
it is undefined what happens with (for example) ICMP packets. Protocols such as ICMP may be allowed by some
network plugins and denied by others.
Targeting a range of ports
Kubernetes v1.25 [stable]
When writing a NetworkPolicy, you can target a range of ports instead of a single port.
This is achievable with the usage of the endPort
field, as the following example:
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: multi-port-egress
namespace: default
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
role: db
policyTypes:
- Egress
egress:
- to:
- ipBlock:
cidr: 10.0.0.0/24
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 32000
endPort: 32768
The above rule allows any Pod with label role=db
on the namespace default
to communicate
with any IP within the range 10.0.0.0/24
over TCP, provided that the target
port is between the range 32000 and 32768.
The following restrictions apply when using this field:
- The
endPort
field must be equal to or greater than theport
field. endPort
can only be defined ifport
is also defined.- Both ports must be numeric.
endPort
field in NetworkPolicy specifications.
If your network plugin
does not support the endPort
field and you specify a NetworkPolicy with that,
the policy will be applied only for the single port
field.
Targeting multiple namespaces by label
In this scenario, your Egress
NetworkPolicy targets more than one namespace using their
label names. For this to work, you need to label the target namespaces. For example:
kubectl label namespace frontend namespace=frontend
kubectl label namespace backend namespace=backend
Add the labels under namespaceSelector
in your NetworkPolicy document. For example:
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: egress-namespaces
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: myapp
policyTypes:
- Egress
egress:
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchExpressions:
- key: namespace
operator: In
values: ["frontend", "backend"]
namespaceSelector
with matchLabels
or matchExpressions
to select the
namespaces based on their labels.
Targeting a Namespace by its name
The Kubernetes control plane sets an immutable label kubernetes.io/metadata.name
on all
namespaces, the value of the label is the namespace name.
While NetworkPolicy cannot target a namespace by its name with some object field, you can use the standardized label to target a specific namespace.
Pod lifecycle
When a new NetworkPolicy object is created, it may take some time for a network plugin to handle the new object. If a pod that is affected by a NetworkPolicy is created before the network plugin has completed NetworkPolicy handling, that pod may be started unprotected, and isolation rules will be applied when the NetworkPolicy handling is completed.
Once the NetworkPolicy is handled by a network plugin,
-
All newly created pods affected by a given NetworkPolicy will be isolated before they are started. Implementations of NetworkPolicy must ensure that filtering is effective throughout the Pod lifecycle, even from the very first instant that any container in that Pod is started. Because they are applied at Pod level, NetworkPolicies apply equally to init containers, sidecar containers, and regular containers.
-
Allow rules will be applied eventually after the isolation rules (or may be applied at the same time). In the worst case, a newly created pod may have no network connectivity at all when it is first started, if isolation rules were already applied, but no allow rules were applied yet.
Every created NetworkPolicy will be handled by a network plugin eventually, but there is no way to tell from the Kubernetes API when exactly that happens.
Therefore, pods must be resilient against being started up with different network connectivity than expected. If you need to make sure the pod can reach certain destinations before being started, you can use an init container to wait for those destinations to be reachable before kubelet starts the app containers.
Every NetworkPolicy will be applied to all selected pods eventually. Because the network plugin may implement NetworkPolicy in a distributed manner, it is possible that pods may see a slightly inconsistent view of network policies when the pod is first created, or when pods or policies change. For example, a newly-created pod that is supposed to be able to reach both Pod A on Node 1 and Pod B on Node 2 may find that it can reach Pod A immediately, but cannot reach Pod B until a few seconds later.
NetworkPolicy and hostNetwork
pods
NetworkPolicy behaviour for hostNetwork
pods is undefined, but it should be limited to 2 possibilities:
- The network plugin can distinguish
hostNetwork
pod traffic from all other traffic (including being able to distinguish traffic from differenthostNetwork
pods on the same node), and will apply NetworkPolicy tohostNetwork
pods just like it does to pod-network pods. - The network plugin cannot properly distinguish
hostNetwork
pod traffic, and so it ignoreshostNetwork
pods when matchingpodSelector
andnamespaceSelector
. Traffic to/fromhostNetwork
pods is treated the same as all other traffic to/from the node IP. (This is the most common implementation.)
This applies when
-
a
hostNetwork
pod is selected byspec.podSelector
.... spec: podSelector: matchLabels: role: client ...
-
a
hostNetwork
pod is selected by apodSelector
ornamespaceSelector
in aningress
oregress
rule.... ingress: - from: - podSelector: matchLabels: role: client ...
At the same time, since hostNetwork
pods have the same IP addresses as the nodes they reside on,
their connections will be treated as node connections. For example, you can allow traffic
from a hostNetwork
Pod using an ipBlock
rule.
What you can't do with network policies (at least, not yet)
As of Kubernetes 1.28, the following functionality does not exist in the NetworkPolicy API, but you might be able to implement workarounds using Operating System components (such as SELinux, OpenVSwitch, IPTables, and so on) or Layer 7 technologies (Ingress controllers, Service Mesh implementations) or admission controllers. In case you are new to network security in Kubernetes, its worth noting that the following User Stories cannot (yet) be implemented using the NetworkPolicy API.
- Forcing internal cluster traffic to go through a common gateway (this might be best served with a service mesh or other proxy).
- Anything TLS related (use a service mesh or ingress controller for this).
- Node specific policies (you can use CIDR notation for these, but you cannot target nodes by their Kubernetes identities specifically).
- Targeting of services by name (you can, however, target pods or namespaces by their labels, which is often a viable workaround).
- Creation or management of "Policy requests" that are fulfilled by a third party.
- Default policies which are applied to all namespaces or pods (there are some third party Kubernetes distributions and projects which can do this).
- Advanced policy querying and reachability tooling.
- The ability to log network security events (for example connections that are blocked or accepted).
- The ability to explicitly deny policies (currently the model for NetworkPolicies are deny by default, with only the ability to add allow rules).
- The ability to prevent loopback or incoming host traffic (Pods cannot currently block localhost access, nor do they have the ability to block access from their resident node).
What's next
- See the Declare Network Policy walkthrough for further examples.
- See more recipes for common scenarios enabled by the NetworkPolicy resource.