

# Mid-Term Review Report

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## INDEPENDENT MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE NDC PARTNERSHIP'S 2021-2025 WORK PROGRAM

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## List of Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
CAEP	Climate Action Enhancement Package
CE	Country Engagement
COP	Conference of Parties
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
KEQ	Key Evaluation Question
KII	Key Informant Interview
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MEE	Major and Emerging Economy
MEF	Monitoring and Evaluation Framework
MIS	Management Information System
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NDC	National Determined Contributions
NDCP	NDC Partnership
PACT	Partnering for Accelerated Climate Transition
PAF	Partnership Action Fund
PP	Partnership Plan
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEQ	Sub-Evaluation Question
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SU	Support Unit
TBE	Theory-Based Evaluation
UFE	Utilization-Focused Evaluation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
WP	Work Program
WRI	Work Resources Institute
YEP	Youth Engagement Plan

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## 1. Introduction

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### 1.1 Background

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Climate change represents one of the gravest challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. **Though it poses a global threat, vulnerability to it is unequally distributed.** While developing countries have contributed least to the problem, they are more adversely affected by climate change. Climate change threatens their ability to meet their future development goals whilst also compromising the progress achieved thus far.

**Building on the global momentum to combat climate change and advance human development, the world endorsed the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015.** These agreements presented countries with an unprecedented opportunity to realize the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through strong climate action to improve the lives and livelihoods of all people, while achieving a low-emission, climate-resilient world.

**Under the Paris Agreement, countries are expected to update their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) – each country’s strategy to cut its own greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the now-unavoidable impacts of climate change.** Under the Paris Agreement, NDCs are to be updated regularly, increasing ambition, and every five years there is to be a global stocktake to assess whether countries are making sufficient progress, collectively, to meet their agreed-upon goal.

**It must be noted that the NDCs are not an end in themselves. Rather they are to be viewed as a starting point towards climate mainstreaming into countries’ development agendas.** They set the national targets and commitments on climate change but require coordination among a large number of institutions and stakeholders at both the national and global levels for successful implementation.

**However, developing countries across the Global South face challenges in updating and implementing their NDCs.** For instance, countries may lack availability of and access to good data to form baselines, inform policies, and facilitate reporting; capacity to efficiently engage all stakeholders and line ministries; clear regulatory frameworks and long-term strategies to implement NDCs; and capacity to access climate finance.

**Countries continue to face challenges in aligning agendas on sustainable development, green recovery, and green economy with climate action for effective governance and implementation.** This is especially true for developing countries as they reel under post-pandemic socio-economic stresses and skyrocketing inflation and fuel prices induced by global geopolitical tensions along with the threat of reduced donor funding. **The challenges are more pronounced for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). At the same time, while international technical assistance, expertise, financing, and other resources for climate action exist, these were not being deployed effectively or in coordinated way,** to maximize efforts towards achieving Paris Climate Agreement goals.

### 1.2 Introduction to the NDC Partnership & the 2021-2025 Work Program

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#### The NDC Partnership

In the context of the challenges briefly highlighted above, the **NDC Partnership (or the Partnership)** was launched at **COP 22 in Marrakesh** in November 2016. The Partnership currently brings together **more than 220 members**, including more than 120 countries, developed and developing, and more than 80 institutions to create and deliver on ambitious climate action that helps achieve the Paris Agreement and the SDGs. Governments identify their NDC implementation priorities and the type of support that is needed to translate them into actionable policies and programs. Based on these requests, the membership offers a tailored package of expertise, technical assistance, and funding. This collaborative response is intended to provide developing countries and emerging economies with efficient access to a wide range of resources to adapt to and mitigate climate change and foster more equitable and sustainable development.

The Partnership's is based on the philosophy that while significant international technical assistance, expertise, financing, and other resources for climate action exist, these are not being deployed effectively or in coordinated way, to maximize efforts towards achieving Paris Climate Agreement goals. **Thus, the Partnership aims to facilitate this by providing fast, nimble, and catalytic support for accelerated climate action and developed its work plan based four impact pathways.**

### Governance

The NDC Partnership, reflective of its diverse membership, is led by **two ministerial-level Co-Chairs** and guided by a **Steering Committee** to ensure strategic direction for the fulfilment of the Partnership's Work Program objectives. Facilitating the Partnership's activities is the **Support Unit**, serving as a neutral secretariat that promotes coordination, planning, and engagement among members and partners, involving stakeholders across government and society. This Support Unit is hosted by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat, the World Resources Institute (WRI), and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

At the country level, the NDC Partnership works closely with the Ministry of Environment which anchors the development, update, and implementation of NDCs (generally), and with the Ministries of Finance/Economy/Planning. The dual focal point strategy aims at mainstreaming climate into national development planning and budgeting.

**It is important to note that the "Partnership" refers to the global coalition of 200+ members, whereas the "Support Unit" refers to the Partnership's secretariat.**

**Different Types of Members:** There are three types of Partnership Members, all of which appoint Partnership Focal Points:

1. **Country Membership:** open to all countries committed to ambitious NDC implementation and long-term, climate-resilient, low-emission development.
2. **Institutional Membership:** open to international institutions, including multilateral banks and bilateral development agencies committed to ambitious NDC implementation.
3. **Associate Membership:** open to non-state actors which meet select criteria.

**Non-Member partners:** These are organizations/institutions that have not formally joined the Partnership but play an important role in the success of its work. These could include multilateral institutions, international initiatives, national institutions, sub-national actors and the private sector.

More detailed description of the types of members, partners and key actors are presented in the table below:

*Table 1. Types of members, partners and key actors in the NDC Partnership's Work*

MEMBERS & PARTNERS	
<b>Developing Countries</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Share information on country initiatives and coordination</li> <li>• Develop aligned NDC implementation and enhancement processes</li> </ul>
<b>Development Partners</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Developed countries (members or non-members)</li> <li>• Provide funding to developing countries, implementing partners, the PAF and in some cases, for the operations of the Support Unit</li> </ul>
<b>Implementing Partners</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Members or non-members</li> <li>• Support member countries' implementation and update of the NDCs</li> </ul>
KEY ACTORS	
<b>Focal Points</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Senior representatives of a country or institution who assume responsibility for internal coordination to guide their engagement in the Partnership.</li> <li>• Country Focal Points represent ministries responsible for addressing climate change and development, typically the ministry of environment and the ministry of finance or planning.</li> </ul>

<b>In-Country Facilitators</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Individuals identified and approved by the country government, who serve as the NDC Partnership’s national-level interface, operating as a liaison between the country and the NDC Partnership and coordinating the implementation of the NDC Action Plans.</li> </ul> <p>NDC Action Plans refers to national government-owned plans outlining how a country will implement or enhance their NDC, with support from the Partnership. It includes Partnership Plans (PPs), Request for Support Letters (RSLs), support provided through the Climate Action Enhancement Package (CAEP), the Economic Advisory (EA) Initiative, ad-hoc requests, etc.</p>
<b>Embedded Advisors</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>More than 100 embedded advisors deployed to various ministries, including environment, finance, planning and sector-specific, as well as Central Banks of country members (partly through Economic Advisory Initiative)</li> </ul>

*The Work Program (WP) 2021-2025:*

The 2021-2025 WP sets a high ambition to support countries in reducing GHG emissions, enhancing adaptive capacity and resilience and access to climate finance and investments. **The Partnership proposes to achieve these results through four impact pathways which is outlined in the Partnership’s Theory of Change and results framework:**

- Accelerated NDC implementation
- Raising NDC ambition and quality
- Mobilizing finance for climate action
- Mainstreaming NDCs and SDGs into development plans and budgets.

Figure 1. NDC Partnership: Theory of Change

IMPACT	OUTCOMES	INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES	OUTPUTS	ASSUMPTIONS	
Countries successfully reduce emissions, improve climate resilience, and advance sustainable development, with strong international support consistent with the achievement of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	By 2025, member countries are on track or ahead of schedule to implement their NDCs with the support of the Partnership	Implementing and development partners accelerate and coordinate support so that member countries have the capacity and resources needed to implement and update their NDCs using a whole-of-society approach	Implementing and development partners have the capacity and resources to respond with speed and flexibility to requests from countries through the Partnership	High level commitment from members and other stakeholders in line with the Guiding Principles of the NDC Partnership	
			Member countries have results-based, equitable, and inclusive NDC Action Plans in place, aligned with development and recovery plans		Availability of technical and financial resources and capacity building support from members for NDC implementation and updating at the national and subnational levels.
	Member countries communicate new NDCs reflecting greater quality and ambition by 2025 with the support of the Partnership, inspiring and informing others	Member countries have integrated NDC mitigation and adaptation targets into national and subnational development plans, policies, budgets, and recovery plans	Member countries have participatory NDC coordination mechanisms and resources for inclusive and transparent NDC implementation and updating	Implementing and development partner members are willing to use country requests presented through the Partnership as a key element in their resource programming	
			Increased country access to knowledge and capacity development		
			Member countries receive increased investment flows towards climate action	Improved enabling environment established and public and private finance providers mobilized	Members receiving support have cross-government commitment to the ongoing implementation and enhancement of their NDCs and to the work of the Partnership
				Implementing and development partners use Partnership data and insights to program support in alignment with NDC Action Plans	

The WP and MEF are complemented by several other strategies – **Country Engagement (CE) Strategy, Finance Strategy, the Knowledge and Learning (K&L) Strategy, Major and Emerging Economy (MEE) Strategy, Gender Strategy and a Youth Engagement Plan.**

The **CE Strategy** drives country support by providing an adaptive five-stage cycle (shown in figure 2 below) through which priority needs of member countries are matched against the support of the Partnership’s members and beyond.

Figure 2. Country Engagement Stages



The **K&L strategy** focuses on improving access to information and tools via the Partnership’s Knowledge Portal (The Climate Toolbox; The Climate Finance Explorer; The Good Practice Database; and the Data Modules), the Knowledge Management System (kNook); organizing dialogues and exchange activities, building a more detailed shared knowledge base in its action areas (NDC Enhancement, Whole-of-Society Approach, Gender Equality, Youth Engagement, Finance Mobilization, Major and Emerging Economies) and other rising priorities and ad hoc topics; and elaborating outreach and public information products (including the annual Partnership in Action Reports, among others).

The **Finance Strategy** outlines the Partnership’s efforts to mobilize technical resources and expertise of its members to support countries in their efforts to access climate finance. In particular, the NDC Partnership engages with relevant climate-finance related stakeholders at the global, regional and nation levels to seek opportunities for their involvement in and use of NDC Partnership country-level processes, including the development of Project Information Notes (PIN) to support investment needs of countries. Further, the **Major Emerging Economies (MEE) Strategy** highlights how the Partnership’s established country-driven processes and lessons learned can be adapted or reinforced to add value for MEE members. NDC Partnership is also committed to implementing its **Youth Engagement Plan (YEP)**, developed by a Youth Task Force (YTF) in 2020 that comprised representatives from Partnership country and institutional members. The Work Plan is also complemented by a **Gender Strategy** which emphasizes gender equality and women’s empowerment as a high priority for the Partnership.

Furthermore, the Partnership also launched the **Partnership Action Fund (PAF) in December 2021**. The PAF is the last step of the NDC Partnership’s Country Engagement process. Its primary purpose is to bridge gaps in support and enable NDC implementation in-country by acting as a last resort funding mechanism. The PAF is a multi-donor trust fund managed by the Support Unit through two of its hosts, WRI and UNOPS. PAF is accessible only to members and PAF resources are deployed to respond to unsupported requests, only after members have responded with their own resources and programs.

PAF has two funding windows:

- Window 1: facilitation and embedded advisory support; and
- Window 2: technical assistance and scoping support, included through Thematic Calls.

To date, the PAF has received contributions from nine Development Partners, including: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Within the MTR Reference period, the capitalization of the PAF stands at USD 38.82 million.

**Work Program (WP) Financial Status:**

The amount of funds deployed for the Partnership work is measured through the M&E framework. As mentioned in the SC Fall report, as of August 2023, the Partnership has mobilized more than USD 1.7 billion and aligned nearly USD 9.5 billion to Partnership Plans (PPs) in assistance to member countries through implementing and development partners (IP/DPs).

Furthermore, the Partnership Action Fund (PAF) has allocated approximately USD 13.6 million under PAF Window 2 to 46 member countries and one regional organization in response to country requests (as of August 2023). 22 Implementing Partners (IPs) have been selected to receive grants to support countries. PAF has leveraged co-financing from 15 of these IPs at 10.7 per cent of its allocated resources. In addition, PAF has allocated USD 2.1 million through PAF Window 1 to support in-country facilitators and embedded advisors in member countries.

Overall, the budget for the 2021-2025 Work Program is given below, which includes the cash flow summary for WRI and UNOPS.

<b>Cashflow Summary (2021 – 2025)</b>				
	<b>UNOPS</b>	<b>WRI</b>	<b>UNFCCC</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Income</b>	<b>29,073,827</b>	<b>35,723,737</b>		



<i>SU Activities</i>	12,818,196	31,473,737		44,291,933
<i>PAF (Grants)</i>	16,020,148	4,250,000		20,270,148
<i>Interest</i>	235,483			235,483
<b>Expenditure</b>	<b>16,544,319</b>	<b>27,434,999</b>		
<i>SU Activities + Fees</i>	5,472,019	23,844,47		
<i>SU Commitments + Fees</i>	782,559	0		
<i>PAF + Fees</i>	5,517,791	2,938,177		
<i>PAF Commitments + Fee</i>	4,771,950	652,343		
<b>Cash Balance (Surplus)</b>	<b>12,294,025</b>	<b>8,288,738</b>		
<i>SU Activities + Fees</i>	6,563,618	7,629,258		
<i>PAF + Fees</i>	5,730,407	659,480		

## 2. Mid-Term Review Objectives & Scope

### 2.1 Mid-Term Review Objectives

The overarching purpose of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the NDC Partnership’s 2021-2025 Work Program (WP) was to provide evidence and recommendations that are useful and relevant to support evidence-based program management and broader strategic decision-making.

Based on the Request for Proposal (RFP) document, the overarching objectives of the MTR were three-fold:

- **Accountability:** To help the Partnership meet its accountability needs and independently assess the progress made towards achieving the WP’s outputs and outcomes in line with the Paris Agreement and SDG objectives, as outlined in the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (MEF)
- **Learning:** To assess the WP’s Theory of Change (ToC), to analyze the 4 Impact Pathways and the underlying hypotheses, assumptions, and risks, to draw insights on “how” the Partnership and the different types of members contributed to the intended results. It assesses how the various strategies and other key funds and initiatives are embedded within the WP and complement each other, and are leading to the envisaged outputs, outcomes and impacts. It analyzed what worked well, what did not and in what contexts, the underlying success factors and challenges to help identify good practices and lessons to date.
- **Course-Corrections and Forward-Looking Recommendations:** To provide forward-looking (i) strategic and operational recommendations to support implementation during the remaining period, including adjustments to the MEF; (ii) strategic recommendations to guide priority setting for 2024 and 2025 under the current WP; (iii) strategic insights to shape the post-2025 WP and (iv) recommendations on improve reporting to the Partnership’s funders and Steering Committee and other relevant stakeholders (such as members, potential partners/funders, etc.)

### 2.2 Scope

As per the RFP document, the specific evaluation objectives were:

- **Component 1 (50%):** A high-level assessment of the NDC Partnership’s theory of change, value-added, and overall progress in implementing the 2021-2025 Work Program as elaborated by the MEF, including assessment of results against the four stated impact pathways. We evaluated how the ToC aligns with country needs, checked the coherence of inputs and outputs, and assessed progress against targets. We also examined the ToC’s underlying assumptions and risks. This comprehensive assessment offers insights into the Partnership’s performance and areas for improvement.
- **Component 2 (15%):** A programmatic assessment of the Partnership’s main workstreams (Country Engagement; Knowledge and Learning; Outreach and Governance; and Operations), which included a review of strengths and weaknesses, relevant strategies, and efforts in facilitating the delivery of results in line with the 2021-2025 Work Program and relevant workstream strategies.

- **Component 3 (15%):** An assessment of the Partnership’s efforts to implement its (1) Finance Strategy, (2) MEE Strategy, (3) Gender Strategy and (4) Youth Engagement Plan (YEP).
- **Component 4 (10%):** An assessment of the Partnership’s efforts in communicating results. This included a light review of reporting efforts and recommendations on how the Support Unit can dynamically communicate its impact to different audiences (for example, Ministers and heads of organizations, funders, Steering Committee, general public).
- **Component 5 (10%):** An early assessment of the Partnership Action Fund (PAF), focusing on its operations and implementation thus far and its role in the Country Engagement process, and on identifying areas and options for improvement for it to effectively deliver on the Partnership’s 2021 – 2025 Work Program.

### 3. Approach & Methodology

#### 3.1 Approach

A combination of approaches was used to systematically address the scope and objectives of the mid-term review. Firstly, we adopted a **participatory and consultative approach** to engage all relevant stakeholders. Further, we applied a **Utilization-Focused Evaluation (UFE) approach**, closely aligning our evaluation tools and processes with the needs of the MTR users.


Recognizing the complex and multifaceted nature of the Partnership's work involving diverse stakeholders and strategies, we embraced a **systems-based assessment approach for the evaluation**. This approach allowed us to navigate the intricate web of interactions between its different set of stakeholders, including country members, SC representatives, SU Staff members, and IP/DPs representatives, as well as programs, initiatives, and underlying pathways, all contributing to the achievement of the Partnership's overarching goals. Lastly, we integrated **gender and youth as cross-cutting themes across the MTR**, acknowledging their critical importance in the Partnership's work.

#### 3.2 Methodology

##### Theory-Based Evaluation

A **theory-based evaluation (TBE) approach using contribution analysis** was deployed to draw inferences and conclusions on whether and how the four impact pathways, strategies and key initiatives are leading to the overall goals and objectives of the Partnership and its WP 2021-2025. We analysed the ToC and the MEF and tested the **causal chain of results at various levels of inputs, outputs, intermediate outcomes and impacts**. Through **contribution analysis**, we unpacked “the how and why” part of the Partnership Work Program ToC and the associated outcomes and impacts. We attempted to assess how the different impact pathways, strategies and key initiatives have contributed to changes at country and global level and identified key factors or inputs that have led to change. We also attempted to review the main barriers, the impact of external factors on the overall implementation and underlying assumptions in ToC, and how those risks were mitigated. This was done mainly through gathering of evidence from various stakeholders and desk review of documents and validating it with experts and implementors.

Figure 3. Steps for Contribution Analysis



##### Evaluation Matrix

The evaluation matrix has been designed based on the **6 OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, impact (likely), and sustainability** with gender and youth as cross-cutting dimensions. These criteria served as the main analytical framework for the operationalization of the MTR of the Work Program into

measurable evaluation questions in line with accepted international standards of good quality development evaluation. The table below presents the Key Evaluation Questions (KEQs) and Sub-Evaluation Questions (SEQs) and the means of verification used to answer the question along with the stakeholders approached. We have also mapped the component (s) of the scope addressed by each SEQ.

Evaluation Criteria & Key Evaluation Question (KEQ)	Scope Component Covered <sup>1</sup>	Sub-Evaluation Question (SEQ)	Means of Verification/ Lines of Evidence
<p><b>(1) Relevance:</b></p> <p>To what extent are the NDC Partnership objectives, strategies, key initiatives, and operational model responding to global and national priorities in NDC preparation (and improvement) and their implementation?</p>	C1, C2, C3, C5	<p><b>Global</b></p> <p>1.1. How well-aligned is the Partnership WP (and its 4 impact pathways), associated strategies and key initiatives/PAF aligned with the global agendas (Paris Agreement, SDGs, COPs, etc.) on NDC preparation, enhancing NDC ambition and advancing NDC implementation? Gaps and Areas of Improvement.</p>	<p><b>Desk Review of Documents:</b> WP and MEF, Strategies, NDCs and climate policy and planning documents of countries, progress reports sent to donors, overall progress reports.</p> <p><b>KIIs/FGDs</b> with: Support Unit, Regional Managers, In-Country Facilitators, Advisors, Steering Committee Co-Chairs and Members, Funders, Institutional Members, Associate Members, Implementation Partners</p>
	C1, C2, C3, C5	<p><b>National</b></p> <p>1.2. To what extent are the Partnership objectives, WP and (and its 4 impact pathways) aligned with the national priorities of supported countries with respect to NDC preparation, enhancing NDC ambition and advancing NDC implementation? Gaps and Areas of Improvement.</p> <p>1.3. How have each of the associated strategies and key initiatives been operationalized to align with the relevant country contexts and needs (example, LDCs, Africa, SIDs, Latin America)? Gaps and Areas of Improvement.</p>	
	C1, C2, C3, C4, C5	<p><b>Donor and Partner Alignment</b></p> <p>1.4. What is the extent to which the NDC Partnership is aligned with the priorities of its various development partners (donors) and other key partners.</p>	
<p><b>(2) Coherence</b></p> <p>What are the synergies, coordination, and complementarities of the NDC Partnership activities between each other and/or with other relevant activities implemented by the Partnership's members?</p>	C1, C2, C3, C5	<p><b>Internal Coherence</b></p> <p>2.1. What is the degree of complementarity among the 4 impact pathways of the NDCP WP? How well are each of the associated strategies and key initiatives (incl. PAF) complementing each other and are embedded within the WP?</p> <p>2.2. How well do the global, regional and in-country activities of the Partnership support, complement and reinforce each other? Gaps and Areas of Improvement.</p>	<p><b>Desk Review of Documents:</b> WP and MEF, Strategies, NDCs and climate policy and planning documents of countries, progress reports sent to donors, overall progress reports, documents and literature related to other programmes related to other related programmes</p> <p><b>KIIs/FGDs</b> with: Support Unit, Regional Managers, In-Country Facilitators, Advisors, Steering Committee Co-Chairs and Members, Funders, Developing Country Members, Government Focal Persons, Institutional Members, Associate Members, Implementation Partners</p>
	C1, C2, C3, C5	<p><b>External Coherence</b></p> <p>2.3. How well does the PARTNERSHIP align and complement other NDC-related activities of Partnership members (e.g., country governments, donors, institutional and associate members, like UN agencies, GCF, GEF, etc.). Examples include, the World Bank NDC Support Facility, UNDP's NDC Support Program, GIZ's NDC Assist, FCDO's Partnering for Accelerated Climate Transition (PACT), EBRD's NDC Support Program, ADB's NDC Advance Accelerating climate actions in Asia and the Pacific.</p>	
	C1, C2, C3, C4, C5	<p><b>(2A) Value Added</b></p> <p>2.4. What is the unique value added and additionality of the NDCP and its approach at the global and country levels? How much do the country's value their association with the NDC Partnership and the support offered by it?</p>	

<sup>1</sup> C1: High-Level Assessment of ToC, Value Added and Overall Progress (50%); C2: Assessment of Main Workstreams: Country Engagement, Knowledge and Learning, Outreach and Governance and Operations (15%); C3: Assessment of Finance Strategy, Major and Emerging Economy Strategy, Gender Strategy and Youth Engagement Plan (15%); C4: Light touch review of the Partnership's Communication Efforts to Different Stakeholders (10%) (5) Early Assessment of the Partnership Action Fund (10%)

<p><b>(3) Efficiency:</b></p> <p>To what extent has the NDC Partnership delivered results (outputs and outcomes) in a timely and economic way? How appropriately is the program managed and overseen?</p>	C1, C2, C3, C4, C5	<p><b>Quality of Programme Management, Governance and Operations</b></p> <p>3.1. To what extent are the governance structure and operational mechanisms appropriate to deliver the WP’s objectives – at the global, regional and country level? Are these processes participatory and consultative and effective for decision making, communication flows and coordination among the different stakeholders across the NDC Partnership?</p>	<p><b>Desk Review of Documents:</b> WP and MEF, Strategies, NDCs and climate policy and planning documents of countries, progress reports sent to donors, overall progress reports, documents, PAF operating manual, PAF progress reports, strategy progress reports, in-country documents (donor reports, Partnership plans, Request for Support Letters (RSLs), NDC Action Plans, PINs), financial data, risk management documents, M&amp;E documents, MIS, previous evaluation reports, usage data of the Online Partnership Plan Tool, Knook, Minutes of the meeting from the Steering Committee, Results from the Annual Member Surveys, Events’ Evaluation/Assessment Reports</p> <p><b>KIIs/FGDs</b> with: Support Unit, Regional Managers, In-Country Facilitators, Advisors, Steering Committee Co-Chairs and Members, Funders, Developing Country Members, Government Focal Persons, Institutional Members, Associate Members, Implementation Partners</p>
	C1, C2, C3, C4, C5	<p><b>Support Unit</b></p> <p>1.1. How well is the Support Unit functioning (including coordination between the three hosts) and how efficiently and effectively does it respond to requests raised by countries and is able to catalyze/unlock/deploy the right set of resources – human, financial and technical? How well will it continue to do so in the context of rising requests from countries? Gaps and areas of improvement.</p> <p>1.2. What are the different types of Partnership arrangements that the NDC Partnership has? Which of these have proved to be most efficient and why? How well does the Partnership work collaboratively with other stakeholders?</p> <p>1.3. How well-resourced is the Support Unit (financial and human resources, skills, capacity) and are these adequate to meet its responsibilities and the rising requests from countries?</p>	
	C1, C2	<p><b>Cost Effectiveness and Timeliness</b></p> <p>1.4. To what extent were resources and operational process carried out in a timely and cost-effective manners by the Support Unit, Member Countries, Implementing Partners and Developing Partners? Deviations and Areas of Improvement.</p>	
	C1, C2, C5	<p><b>Agility, Adaptiveness and Risk Management</b></p> <p>3.1 How well (speed, flexibility and with scale) has the Partnership been able to respond to requests from countries?</p> <p>3.2 PAF: Assessment of prioritization of activities/functions supported through the Fund; degree of leverage, its adequacy to support country government’s needs; the fund mobilization strategy and its effectiveness and how the fiduciary risks are managed, among others.</p> <p>3.3 How has the NDC Partnership’s operational model been adapted to different contexts and changing circumstances to remain relevant? How well have the risks been identified and managed?</p>	
	C1, C2, C4	<p><b>Monitoring and Evaluation Systems; Reporting and Learning</b></p> <p>3.7. Is the WP supported by a robust and adequate M&amp;E framework, strategy and system to generate evidence for better accountability and learning? How robust is the monitoring (overall) and for each of the strategies?</p> <p>3.8. How has the NDC Partnership used or addressed the findings and recommendations of previous reviews or studies?</p> <p>3.9. Quality of reporting (Of reports received by the NDC Partnership from partners and the Partnership’s reporting to its donors). How well (timely and effectively) is the Partnership communicating its results and impact to different audiences (e.g., high-level stakeholders like governments, Ministers,</p>	

		Head of International Organizations, current and potential donors and partners, Steering Committee and the wider climate and general community).	
<p><b>(4) Effectiveness</b></p> <p>To what extent has the NDC Partnership and its strategies achieved/likely to achieve its outputs and outcomes in the Work Program 2021-2025 (expected and unexpected)? To what extent has it contributed to capacity building, planning, inter-ministerial coordination and NDC implementation?</p>	C1	<p><b>Contribution to better Coordination and Synergies</b></p> <p>4.1. To what extent has the NDC Partnership contributed in building coherence and coordination in the NDC Support landscape (a) at the international level (e.g., coordinating global support programs) and country level (e.g., coordinating country specific activities, improved coordination among donors/implementing partners; open new funding opportunities, etc.)?</p>	<p><b>Desk Review of Documents:</b> WP and MEF, Strategies, NDCs and climate policy and planning documents of countries, progress reports sent to donors, overall progress reports, documents, PAF operating manual, PAF progress reports, strategy progress reports, in-country documents (donor reports, Partnership plans, Request for Support Letters (RSLs), NDC Action Plans, PINs), financial data, risk management documents, M&amp;E documents, MIS, previous evaluation reports, usage data of the Online Partnership Plan Tool, Knook, Minutes of the meeting from the Steering Committee, different types of knowledge products, Results from the Annual Member Surveys, Events' Evaluation/Assessment Reports</p> <p><b>KIIs/FGDs</b> with: Support Unit, Regional Managers, In-Country Facilitators, Advisors, Steering Committee Co-Chairs and Members, Funders, Developing Country Members, Government Focal Persons, Institutional Members, Associate Members, Implementation Partners</p>
	C1, C2, C3	<p><b>Country Engagement Strategy (and MEE Strategy)</b></p> <p>4.2. To what extent has the Partnership's work contributed to improved planning, strengthened country-level coordination, institutional capacities, accelerating NDC implementation, translating NDCs into sectoral and financial policies (with integrated NDC mitigation and adaptation targets), enhancing access to climate finance, improved NDC reporting systems at the country level?</p> <p>4.3. How has the NDC – Partnership's work contributed towards</p>	
	C1, C2, C3	<p><b>Knowledge and Learning Strategy</b></p> <p>4.4. To what extent have the NDC Partnership increased country access to knowledge and capacity development? How well are the different Partnership members using the knowledge and data generated for accelerated NDC implementation, enhancement and the development of related plans, policies, budgets and projects with integrated NDC mitigation and adaptation targets? (Includes assessment of the usage of the Partnership's Knowledge Portal)</p> <p>4.5. How well has the efforts of the NDC Partnership resulted in better global learning and cross-fertilization of best practices and learning in-country and globally?</p>	
	C1, C3, C5	<p><b>Finance Strategy</b></p> <p>4.6. To what extent has the NDC Partnership supported member countries improve the enabling environment and mobilize public and private finance for NDCs (examples include, developing climate finance strategies and financial roadmaps; ii) Integrating NDCs into national planning, budgets, and revenue; iii) Project and program financing and resource mobilization; iv) Developing bankable projects and pipelines; and v) enhanced private sector engagement?</p> <p>4.7. To what extent has the NDC Partnership's work contributed to member countries receiving increased investment flows towards climate action?</p>	
	C3	<p><b>Gender Strategy and Youth Engagement Plan</b></p> <p>4.8. How well has the NDC Partnership contributed to the adoption of a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach towards NDC enhancement and implementation and mainstreaming gender and youth considerations (including targets, financial and technical and knowledge support) in the NDC Process?</p>	
	C5	<p><b>Partnership Action Fund</b></p> <p>4.9. Assessment of the PAF's performance/implementation status against its set KPIs and the broader goals and objectives of the PARTNERSHIP (identify challenges, areas of improvement and priority actions for it to efficiently and effectively deliver the PARTNERSHIP's thematic calls, global deployment of embedded advisors and facilitators and response to countries' request.</p>	

	C1, C2, C3, C4, C5	<p><b>Successes, Challenges and Lessons Learned</b></p> <p>4.9. What have been the key success factors, challenges and lessons learned at the global, regional and national levels?</p>	
<p><b>(5) Impact</b></p> <p>How has the Partnership contributed to the Paris Agreement objectives and the Sustainable Development Goals (both intended or unintended)?</p>	C1, C2, C3, C4, C5	<p><b>Raising/Enhancing NDC Ambition and Quality</b></p> <p>5.1. To what extent has the PARTNERSHIP contributed to countries raised and improved NDC ambition and enhanced NDC quality of supported countries? The extent to which member countries have integrated NDC mitigation and adaptation targets into national and subnational development plans, policies, budgets, and projects.</p> <p><b>Accelerating NDC Implementation and Achievement of Targets</b></p> <p>5.2. To what extent has the PARTNERSHIP contributing to a faster NDC implementation and achieving the NDC targets in alignment with the Paris Agreement Objectives and the SDGs?</p> <p><i>Examples for 5.1 and 5.2 include: Strengthening adaptation and mitigation targets in countries' NDCs; Raising countries ambition (strengthening emission reduction) or sector-specific targets; Broadening the scope of NDCs to more sectors; Moving from conditional to unconditional targets; Expediting timelines; Adding Policies, Programmes, Projects for NDC implementation; NDCs with targets derived from strong underlined data, detailed, achievable and verifiable; NDC development in an inclusive and transparent process; Detailed action plans, including sector-specific plans, with outcomes, costing, financing, governance, and the use of robust methodology (scenario-based modelling), which ensures that targets are strategically aligned with national policy and Long-Term Strategy (LTS); Strengthening mechanisms for monitoring and oversight; Including additional information on vulnerabilities, gaps, and barriers to inform adaptation planning.</i></p>	<p><b>Desk Review of Documents:</b> WP and MEF, Strategies, NDCs and climate policy and planning documents of countries, progress reports sent to donors, overall progress reports, documents, PAF progress reports, strategy progress reports, in-country documents (donor reports, Partnership plans, Request for Support Letters (RSLs), NDC Action Plans, PINs), previous evaluation reports, usage, knowledge products, Results from the Annual Member Surveys, Events' Evaluation/Assessment Reports.</p> <p><b>KIIs/FGDs</b> with: Support Unit, Regional Managers, In-Country Facilitators, Advisors, Steering Committee Co-Chairs and Members, Funders, Developing Country Members, Government Focal Persons, Institutional Members, Associate Members, Implementation Partners</p>
<p><b>(6) Sustainability:</b></p> <p>To what extent are the benefits/impacts of the PARTNERSHIP likely to continue and to what extent has it contributed to strengthening and building systems and stakeholder capacities to take the results forward and be sustainable?</p>	<p>C1, C2, C3</p> <p>C1, C2, C3, C5</p> <p>C1</p>	<p>6.1. To what extent are the benefits generated by the NDC Partnership likely to be sustained (for example, in national climate coordination mechanisms, and processes including inter-ministerial coordination; financial, technical capacity support, knowledge and learning efforts from implementing partners, sustained civic engagement and whole of society consultation processes, participation of gender and youth stakeholders in climate planning and implementation)?</p> <p>6.2. To what extent are sustainability (exit) considerations/strategies built into the WP (and the associated strategies and key initiatives (including the PAF) and how have these been operationalized?</p> <p>6.3. How well is the NDC Partnership and its objectives supported by members at the global and country levels and is this support likely to continue? (Level of ownership among different stakeholders)</p>	<p><b>Desk Review of Documents:</b> WP and MEF, Strategies, NDCs and climate policy and planning documents of countries, progress reports sent to donors, overall progress reports.</p> <p><b>KIIs/FGDs</b> with: Support Unit, Regional Managers, In-Country Facilitators, Advisors, Steering Committee Co-Chairs and Members, Funders, Institutional Members, Associate Members, Implementation Partners</p>

### 3.4 Methods & Tools

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The MTR was conducted over a period of 6 months (April 2023 - September 2023). It was initiated by the preparation of the inception report and the questionnaires for different stakeholder groups. This was followed by data collection activities. Data collection activities at the global level were carried out virtually. In addition, the team conducted 4 five-day long country missions. These activities were supplemented by an extensive review of program documents.

Various 'lines of evidence' include the following:

#### Secondary Data:

**Desk review of program documents, global literature, country plans and programs and available secondary data related to the 2021-2025 WP** (including data from the MIS tracking the MEF KPIs, financial and budget data, analysis of requests received from countries from the kNook database, usage and trends data emerging the Knowledge Portal and Annual Member Surveys).

#### Primary Data:

**Online Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs): with various internal and external stakeholders at the global and country levels.** The MTR followed a purposive sampling strategy. It was informed by the MTR objectives and scope and was derived in joint consultation with the Support Unit. The MTR Team ensured appropriate representation of all stakeholder groups associated with the Partnership – the Management Team, different teams within the Partnership Support Unit, Steering Committee Members, Country Members, Institutional Members and Implementation Partners.

**Country Missions: The final set of countries selected for the deep-dive studies were Benin, Rwanda, Panama, and Mongolia.** These were selected based on their (1) Geographical Distribution and (2) Level of Engagement and Learning Potential. Each country deep dive involved consultations with purposively selected in-country stakeholders (internal and external - including the Partnership's Focal Points, the Partnership's facilitator, embedded advisors, as well as representatives of relevant government ministries, Implementing and Development Partners). In addition, we conducted detailed review of country documents including Request of Support Letters and Responses, Partnership Plans, Project Information Notes (PINs), different types of progress reports, knowledge products, as well as NDCs and relevant national planning documents.

**Observation of Global Convening/Country-Level Stop and Reflect Sessions:** The MTR team members observed the NDC Conference in Berlin, Germany co-organized by the NDC Partnership in June 2023. At the country level, the team attended the Stop and Reflect Sessions and Technical and Financial Partners Coordination Meeting co-hosted by the Partnership in Benin and Mongolia. Moreover, the team attended the 2023 Youth Engagement Forum to observe its structure and assess its delivery. Lastly, the team also presented the preliminary findings and recommendations during the Fall Steering Committee October 2023. This helped in the validation of the MTR findings and recommendations.

### 3.5 Ethical Considerations

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The key ethical considerations followed during the MTR were:

- **Informed consent:** We ensured free and fair execution of the respondents' right to know the purpose and scope of the MTR. The interviewers informed the respondents about the nature and purpose of the research clearly, and prior consent of the participants was taken before initiating the interview.
- **Freedom to terminate the interview and not to respond to questions:** Respondents were given complete freedom to not respond to specific questions or to terminate the interview at any point during the interview.
- **Respect and dignity of the respondent:** The respondents were treated as being engaged in a process, rather than being mere information providers. The teams were respectful of the rights and dignity of all the participants.

### 3.6 Limitations of the Mid-Term Review

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While the team developed and followed a robust methodology, there were a few practical limitations during the MTR process. These are described below:



**Mission Scheduling Conflict:** The overlap between the MTR country missions and the Country Engagement team’s missions created scheduling conflicts. This challenge was communicated to the Support Unit early on during MTR, and suitable adjustments were made to ensure both teams had time to successfully complete their interviews and meetings.

**Respondents Availability and Information:** The availability of some respondents posed a significant challenge, impacting timely data collection efforts and introducing minimal bias, as limited participant availability may not have represented a comprehensive range of perspectives. In addition to this, the team encountered a few cases where the respondents (global level) did not have in-depth knowledge about the NDC Partnership’s work because they had recently associated or had smaller engagements with the initiative. To mitigate this risk, we expanded our outreach efforts to identify and engage a diverse pool of participants.

## 4. Findings

### 4.1. Relevance

*This section assesses the extent to which the NDC Partnership’s objectives, strategies (along with complementary support packages), and operational model respond to the global and national priorities in NDC updating and their implementation.*

#### GLOBAL LEVEL

The Mid-Term Review (MTR) finds that the NDC Partnership is **well-aligned and highly relevant to the Paris Agreement objectives**, with the NDCs often being cited as one of the key tools towards the achievement of the Paris Agreement. Initially rallying for NDC preparation and then for their enhancement and implementation, stakeholders opined that the Partnership has **played a paramount role in elevating the political status of NDCs at the global level**.

Given the complexity of the global climate landscape and multitude of initiatives, stakeholders highlighted the importance of a global platform for cooperation and coordination of support – **a critical niche filled by the NDC Partnership**. Thus, the Partnership’s vast membership and exclusive focus on NDCs has consolidated its convening power and helped established itself as a “legitimate place for developing countries to seek assistance on NDC enhancement”.

Coinciding with the five-year Paris Agreement cycle, 2021-2025 Workplan (WP) (and the four impact pathways) and its **associated strategies and other targeted support packages were found to be aligned with the global discussions on action on climate change and sustainable development**. The Partnership has four Impact Pathways, namely, (1) Accelerated NDC Implementation (2) Raising NDC Ambition and Quality (3) Mobilizing Finance for Climate Action and (4) Mainstreaming NDCs and SDGs into development plans and budgets. Each of these aspects have also been underscored as a part of the Technical Dialogue of the First Global Stocktake (September 2023) pointing towards the strong relevance of the Partnership.<sup>2</sup>

Stakeholder consultations highlighted the importance and relevance of establishing such a platform to strengthen the global response to climate change. In particular, **most Implementing Partners (IPs)/Development Partners (DPs) have highlighted the relevance of a global platform that helps avoid duplicity and ensures a collective, well-coordinated effort through a neutral, transparent, and credible framework for climate change action— a role that the Partnership is currently fulfilling**. In particular, they opined that the Partnership allows them to understand the work of other partners in the ecosystem, creates transparency, access to a unique dataset highlighting country needs and the ability to channel flexible support for countries’ upcoming/urgent needs through initiatives like the Partnership Action Fund (PAF) and the Thematic Calls, especially in countries wherein they do not have presence or find difficult to cater to.

**The WP is complemented by several other strategies such as those on Finance, Knowledge and Learning and Country Engagement, among others**. Developing countries face enormous challenges in accessing climate finance due to constrained fiscal space, policy and regulatory impediments and weak institutional structures and capacity limitations. **The Partnership’s Finance strategy has appropriately recognized these challenges** and is focusing on capacity building at the national and sub-national levels, creating enabling environments, aligning processes, identifying funding opportunities, and enhancing private sector participation. Furthermore, both developing and developed countries

<sup>2</sup> Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake. Synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue. <https://unfccc.int/documents/631600>

highlighted that given the current characteristics of the global climate finance architecture, **flexible mechanisms like the PAF are highly relevant and useful**, especially for smaller countries, to rapidly unlock technical assistance support. However, a few stakeholders opined that the Partnership’s support on access to finance is not adequate in the context of the scale of the financing gap, an issue discussed in detail, subsequently.

**On Knowledge and Learning (K&L), the MTR finds that the Partnership addresses the demand from various Partners on best practices and country climate-related needs.** Various stakeholders opined that given the breadth of its membership, the Partnership provides a conducive space for the exchange of lessons and learnings through its convenings, stop and reflect sessions, knowledge events, knowledge products and tools. Consultations also acknowledged that through its Knowledge Management System, the kNook, the Partnership provides access to a unique database that articulates developing country members’ needs and is focusing on generating valuable insights on trends and gaps on which members can focus more strongly.

In addition, the current WP acknowledges the need for equitable and inclusive systems transformation for NDC implementation. Stakeholders emphasized the importance of inclusive NDCs, incorporating perspectives on youth and gender. Desk review of documents highlights that integration of gender co-benefits and consideration of specific gender impacts from climate change have become relevant and central to international climate change and NDC discussions. In line with this, the current WP has incorporated two key cross-cutting programmatic themes—gender and youth—in both country engagement and knowledge and learning. **The Partnership has done well in developing mechanisms and tools to support member countries with mainstreaming gender in the NDCs.** At the global level, stakeholders commended the Partnership for their guidance through the Gender Strategy and Youth Engagement Plan. It is important to note that strategies were formulated at a macro or global level. However, countries face challenges to contextualize these and are therefore requesting for more specific support on gender and youth at the country level.

Interactions with Steering Committee members highlighted that **the Partnership has emerged as a “global champion” for NDCs and remained relevant throughout the period of the current Work Plan by launching timely and Paris-aligned targeted support packages for developing countries.** For instance, the support on Long-Term Low Emissions Strategies (LT-LEDs) was announced at COP27 to support the development and updating of LT-LEDs, enhancing, and raising ambitions of updates to NDCs, fostering alignment with LT-LEDs and with the Paris Agreement temperature target and allowing for timely submission of the NDCs due 2025 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Various development partners and developing countries such as Georgia and Mongolia cited the launch of the Thematic Call on LT-LEDs as timely and useful. Developing countries were also largely appreciative of previous initiatives such as the Climate Action Enhancement Package (CAEP), a targeted, fast-track support to countries to enhance the quality, increase the ambition, and implement NDCs. Similarly, the Economic Advisory Initiative (EAI) was launched during the COVID-19 pandemic to support developing countries with the preparation of climate compatible recovery packages by embedding economic advisors into finance and planning ministries. **In both cases, the Partnership was appreciated for its early anticipation of global demands and the timely launch of flexible initiatives to address emerging issues in the global climate landscape.**

## COUNTRY LEVEL

**In addition to its strong alignment with global climate discussions, the MTR finds that the Partnership’s support has been relevant to member country priorities.** The UNFCCC 2022 NDC Synthesis Report<sup>3</sup> also highlights that most Parties (74 per cent) identified capacity-building as a prerequisite for NDC implementation. Capacity-building needs for formulating policies, integrating mitigation and adaptation into sectoral planning processes, accessing finance, and providing the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding of NDCs were identified.

Developing countries were highly appreciative of the **Partnership’s neutral broker role in NDC discussions** – relaying country needs, catalyzing technical and financial support from a wide range of partners, and knowledge sharing, thereby contributing to NDC enhancement and implementation. This neutrality is pivotal and addresses concerns about potential donor influence on national development priorities. **Our country missions and online consultations with government counterparts commend the Partnership’s country-driven approach**, as it empowers governments to express their needs through National Focal Points. Whilst there was a broad endorsement of the Partnership being country-driven and neutral, the experience has varied across countries. Some developing country counterparts shared that they were not proactively

<sup>3</sup> 2022 NDC Synthesis Report. <https://unfccc.int/ndc-synthesis-report-2022>

being involved in the procurement or hiring decisions of facilitators and technical service providers, not to mention some instances wherein certain implementing partners have also tried to push their (non-aligned) agendas in-country. Governments highlighted that such practices undermine the extent to which the Partnership is “truly country-owned or driven”.

In addition to being a country-driven neutral broker, we also observed that the Partnership’s approach and strategy and its focus on whole-of-systems approach to establish synergies, coherence, and bolster coordination on NDC processes and implementation between different departments and donors are appropriate and relevant. This approach is particularly relevant for resource-constrained developing countries, as also highlighted various UN reports and global literature.

Additionally, interactions with various DPs, IPs and developing country members highlighted that the NDC Partnership appears to have been **more relevant and useful for the needs of smaller countries with lower partner traction or presence and where resource mobilization for climate actions has historically been low**. For instance, interactions with various LAC IPs, highlighted that various small island countries such as Antigua and Barbuda, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, etc. do recognize the NDC Partnership as their preferred mechanism to unlock technical assistance support with speed. **However, the suitability or attraction for the larger countries has been variable**. For instance, some Latin American IP stakeholders cited that the Partnership has not been able to engage effectively with larger countries (or Major and Emerging Economies) such as Brazil. It must also be noted that various so-called Major and Emerging Economies (MEEs) such as Nigeria and Indonesia were not aware that they are a part of this classification by the Partnership.

To sum up, while the Work Program and strategies were largely assessed as appropriate and relevant, **their operationalization can be significantly enhanced**, as elucidated in the efficiency and effectiveness sections. Additionally, various members, especially developing countries highlighted that the Partnership has been relevant and useful in terms of Raising NDC Ambition and Quality. **However, they expressed an urgency and a stronger focus on the mobilization of finance to support NDC implementation which hitherto has remained weak**. For example, officials from the Government of Benin appreciated the Partnership support in developing the NDC Implementation Framework. However, they expressed a stronger need for support for project preparation than for studies to achieve their targets, particularly in sectors such as energy and transportation. Several stakeholders (IPs and DPs) also expressed similar sentiment on the need to support project development, which is equally relevant and critical towards achievement of the global emission targets.

## 4.2 Coherence

*This section assesses the synergies, coordination, and complementarities of the NDC Partnership activities among each other and/or with other relevant activities implemented by the Partnership’s members.*

One of the key objectives of the Partnership is to strengthen the coherence and coordination of the NDC enhancement process and their implementation, globally and nationally. This is important given that one of the key objectives of the Partnership is to facilitate better collaboration across countries, within countries, and across IP/DPs, for countries to achieve the NDC objectives and avoid duplicity of efforts.

**The MTR team finds the overall design of the Work Program to be coherent with the four impact pathways being complementary to each other.** The impact pathways and work program activities address the interlinked issues of capacity, knowledge, coordination, facilitating or linking finance, investment, and resources, supporting the enabling environment through multistakeholder engagement. The MTR team finds that this approach is appropriate as addressing climate change challenges requires flexibility, a multi-faceted approach, and Partnerships. However, the 4 impact pathways of Partnership are not explicitly stated or reflected in the Theory of Change which at times lead to reporting challenges. **In this light, the four impact pathways should be integrated with the Work Program Theory of Change (ToC) and the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (MEF) indicator to aid better reporting and communication of the Partnership’s work.**

In terms of the Work Program ToC, our review and consultations highlight that the effectiveness and impact of the Partnership is largely dependent on some of the underlying assumptions like high level of commitment, availability of technical and financial resources and capacity building, willingness of IPs/DPs and cross-government commitment and coordination. These are some of the major gaps in NDC implementation in many countries. Though new instruments like

PAF are useful to address the challenges of low response to country requests, these are not sufficient to address overall gaps for translation of the outputs to outcomes and impact.

Additionally, **there is a felt need for a coherent approach in rolling out of technical assistance support of NDCs for achieving the desired outputs and outcomes.** Our country missions and online stakeholder consultations highlighted that though an NDC Implementation Framework has been developed in most countries, its operationalization is largely dependent on the availability of domestic or external funding/support. In many cases, this availability of external funding/support is neither timely nor aligned or deployed in a coherent manner, affecting overall outcomes and impact. For translation of outputs to outcomes, there is a need for stronger coherence and synergistic implementation across partners and the NDC Partnership can play a stronger role in securing this coordination at the country level. Discussions with the IP/DPs and desk review reflect that there is also an opportunity for requests for support to be more coherent and aligned with the Partnership Plans and priorities which are often missing.

**The MTR finds that there is coherence and consensus at the global level among developed countries for a collaborative approach in addressing NDCs.** However, at the country level, there are opportunities for improved coherence and alignment. The Partnership has aimed to strengthen coordination to bolster coherence and coordination among IP/DPs within countries. However, competitiveness stemming from issues related to visibility, credit and attribution limits collaboration and synergistic implementation, as stated in various interviews. In addition, in many cases, IP/DPs and MDBs do not act in concert due to institutional constraints and pre-existing relationships with governments, among other factors. We observed that the donor coordination and outreach/ communication on NDCs is absent and with many of them being unaware of the Partnership Plans and activities in in many countries like Benin and Mongolia. Interviews with country level Focal Points (FPs) and in-country facilitators indicated that this kind of coordination among IPs is not prioritized as FPs and often times the facilitator are overly stretched.

With respect other NDC-related initiatives of its members, we find that the Partnership **has complementarity with the UNDP's Climate Promise, GIZ's NDC Assist and UK Government's Partnering for Accelerated Climate Transitions (UK PACT).** There are several instances in which the Partnership Plans and other activities were funded/supported by the UNDP Climate Promise or by GIZ NDC Assist, as shared during the interviews. In some cases, associate members such as WWF designed specific projects to deliver the Partnership's country work, ensuring more convergence among members to respond to specific country needs. The Partnership aligns, promotes, and further deepens these member-driven initiatives as development and implementing partners allocate flexible resources to respond to country requests.

**Beyond donor coordination and coherence across global initiatives, the success of the Partnership is also dependent on inter-sectoral and ministerial coordination at national level.** Our country visits and discussions reflect that there have been improvements in coordination during NDC development and revision with more stakeholders involved in the process. The Partnership's dual focal point approach and practice of embedding facilitators has led to improved coordination between climate planning and finance. Discussions also revealed that the presence of the facilitator has also helped in more intersectoral/departmental collaboration in some countries like Rwanda. However, this effectiveness of this coordination has varied substantially across countries.

**Our country missions and consultations reflect that there has been increase in cross-sectoral awareness on NDCs because of introduction of the whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.** However, coherence and inter-ministerial coordination on NDCs remains a challenge. In many countries the Partnership has successfully incorporated or mainstreamed NDC objectives and priorities in the national plans and climate strategies or action plans. However, it is yet to be mainstreamed in implementation. For instance, the Partnership has advised on and supported the incorporation of NDCs into sectoral plans and policies of the Ministry of Energy in Benin, but departmental silos and resource gaps hinder mainstreaming.

**Along with horizontal coordination at the national level, it is equally essential to have vertical coordination with the sub-national governments which is at a nascent stage in most countries.** Evaluative evidence from interviews shows that vertical coordination is not as prevalent as horizontal coordination within government and needs to be further enhanced. Local level action and building capacities at sub-national level for NDC updates and implementation is critical to achieving ambitious climate targets. Interviews with IP/DPs and other stakeholders indicated that the coordination and activities at sub-national level is dependent on the level of decentralization and capacity at sub-national levels. Most of the developing countries have limited capacity, systems, and resources for addressing the needs and priorities at the sub-national level.

## 4.3 Efficiency

*This section presents the findings on efficiency of the NDC Partnership based on the analysis of the quality of governance, management and operational structure for efficient and effective delivery of its objectives; timeliness of response including scale and risk management practices and appropriateness of the monitoring and reporting systems.*

### GOVERNANCE

The Steering Committee (SC) serves as the governance body of the NDC Partnership, with the Support Unit functioning as the Secretariat. The SC is mandated to meet biannually and to provide strategic direction and oversight and helping ensure the achievement of the Partnership's overall goals. The Steering Committee has equal representation of developing and developed countries and led by two Co-chairs, one from a developed country (from 2021-2023 this was the United Kingdom, and from 2024-2025 Denmark) and one from a developing country (from 2023-2024 Rwanda). The Steering Committee has seventeen members made up of five developing and five developed country seats, along with four institutional members seats and three seats for the institutions which host the Support Unit. It must also be noted that the number of seats was increased in 2022 to reflect the expanded membership of the Partnership.

While the Steering Committee meets regularly to discuss updates and progress on the Partnership, **SC members echoed concerns on the quality of engagement within the Committee.** Firstly, all development partners, developing countries and institutional (non-MDB) partners on the Steering Committee shared that the engagement with the **MDBs is lacking and needs substantial improvement.** Secondly, whilst **Global South countries are represented**, with equal representation of both Developed and Developing countries, **some of the stakeholders opined that the voices of developing countries are "limited" in this forum.** Some of the actively engaged developing country Steering Committee members also attributed this to the limited in-person attendance of developing countries and limited interaction within this cohort for coordination. Some countries from Latin America also shared that the current representation of the region with just one country (that is currently Colombia) is inadequate to represent its expanse and diversity fully.

Next, some Steering Committee members suggested that **the coordination within the different member groups** (like developing countries, MBDs and implementing partners) **could be improved, which would help in increasing complementarity in approach, and also sharing concerns or learnings to the wider group.** Furthermore, many Steering Committee members also shared concern about how the Partnership engages with all types of non-active Partnership members. Likewise, there is also no forum or process within the Partnership for the Steering Committee to engage with other major donors who are not on the Steering Committee which deters alignment, as cited by some of the development partners. Broadening and deepening the level engagement with active and non-active partners will strengthen the Partnership's efficacy and effectiveness in supporting the member countries and institutions.

While the conduct of the meetings **was reported to have improved over the years**, almost all stakeholders shared that the Steering Committee does not function like a true decision-making body. Interviewees shared that Steering Committee meetings seem to be a "workshop or discussion without substantive steering or strategic decisions being made". Additionally, many stakeholders opined that **certain standard protocols with respect to decision-making must be codified given that the current practice seems to rather be "ex-post validation" or "announcement" of the decisions made by the SU along with the Co-Chairs.** Committee members also requested for a more participatory approach in finalizing the Steering Committee meeting agendas. Steering Committee members felt that opportunity for active participation in decision-making would enrich the Partnership's strategy and actions through collective wisdom.

Lastly and most importantly, Steering Committee stakeholders expressed unhappiness on the quality of reports shared for the SC meetings and **made a unanimous request to increase and improve the transparency and quality for financial and program reporting.** In line with a Results-Based Management approach, country members requested detailed breakdown of budgets and spends by various workstreams/outputs and outcomes instead of just functional heads like travel and staff. This information will also be critical for the Steering Committee members to provide more strategic and actionable advice to the SU. There was also a strong push to improve the overall quality of Steering Committee reports (which is discussed in greater detail under the M&E Section).

### Support Unit

The operations and work of the Partnership are coordinated and managed by the Support Unit (SU) which is hosted by the Bonn-based UNFCCC and UNOPS and WRI in Washington D.C. Prior to 2021, the SU was co-hosted by WRI and the UNFCCC Secretariat – two of the early champions of the Partnership. In 2021, UNOPS was onboarded as the third host institution to provide infrastructure, procurement, project and grant management and transactional services to **enhance the administrative capacity of the SU**. The UNOPS also serves as the grant manager for the Partnership Action Fund (PAF) along with WRI.

The SU is led by the **Management Team (MT)** which consists of the: Global Director, Director and Deputy Director of Country Engagement, Director of Knowledge and Learning, Deputy Director of Outreach and Governance, Head of the Bonn Office and the Deputy Director of Operations. The SU has been organized into various workstreams, namely (Operations, Country Engagement, Knowledge and Learning, Outreach and Governance). **Certain critical functions such as Finance are nested within multiple teams such as Country Engagement and Knowledge and Learning given the cross-cutting nature of the topic. Issues and functions such as Gender and M&E have been embedded within the K&L.** As highlighted earlier, the Partnership’s membership has increased manifold. **The size and capacity of the Support Unit (SU) has attempted to rise commensurately with this growth**, and now counts close to 80 members of staff. Given the increased geographic breadth and scope of engagement the Evaluation Team finds it to be appropriate.

Discussions with stakeholders reflect that the staff members have necessary skills to address the main mandate of the Partnership that is running the Secretariat for the Partnership, coordination, and facilitation with members, non-members, grant management, and knowledge management. However, a few stakeholders also mentioned that the SU needs to hire staff with strong technical or subject-matter expertise in emerging areas like climate finance, carbon trading, just transitions, etc. to provide more value-added technical advice to the country government partners. This is also true for the country facilitators as few country governments like Rwanda expressed their preference for a facilitator with a strong domain expertise to guide and advise them.

The other issue that was raised in the discussions and during country visits concerns staff deployment or staff location. Even though the structure of the SU is systematically laid out, most development partners opined that the **Support Unit is “centralized”**. Consultations with development partners and regional managers/country engagement specialists highlighted that the **concentration of the Country Engagement team placed in Bonn and Washington is a not appropriate and advocated for the decentralization of the SU**. This will ensure that the SU is closer to the countries and the quality of country engagement also improves from the very beginning.

In terms of country engagement staff, Regional Managers coordinate the regional activities of the Partnership as well as the application of its strategies to drive implementation of NDCs in member countries. On the other hand, Country Engagement Specialists facilitate coordination and collaboration between member countries and partners, ensuring effective support for NDC implementation and climate action. However, some of external stakeholders suggested for improved clarity on the distinction between the role of Regional Managers and Country Engagement Specialists and their value addition. Additionally, our discussions with Regional Managers and Country Engagement Specialists highlighted that they are significantly stretched in their roles. A few Country Engagement Specialists highlighted that they have up to 6-9 countries to oversee which constrains deep engagement. Further, various development and implementing partners **cited the high staff turnover** as a significant challenge to the quality and continuity of engagement. Some members complained that high staff turnover affects relationship and workflow as it takes time to onboard and getting in speed for new joiners.

Lastly, there are opportunities of **fostering coordination and alignment among the different teams** to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the SU’s functioning, as highlighted during consultations with the various SU teams. Whilst, in principle, alignment with country engagement strategy is noteworthy, various internal consultations highlighted that the “in-practice” or actual collaboration between country engagement process and K&L functions could substantially improve. Various staff highlighted that there are “greater avenues for the K&L function to meaningfully support country engagement”. Examples shared in this regard were more frequent technical analyses and disseminations on the kNook data, support with monitoring and evaluation, among others.

## RESPONSIVENESS AND TIMELINESS

Our discussions reflect that the Support Unit is perceived as **highly responsive by Members, in general and has unanimously been called an “active and eager collaborator”**. We understand that the SU is responsive and efficient with respect to screening and sharing the requests from country governments to members, and decisions and clarifications from members to country governments. However, a few challenges with respect to timely response of requests have been gathered and will be detailed in the subsequent sections. Some of the country governments appreciated the proactiveness of the SU staff to provide information on events, awareness sessions and possible areas of support and funding. Also, the country governments were appreciative of the support of CAEP at the time of COVID-19, which they found to be timely and useful.

Discussions with various stakeholders reflect that the Partnership is flexible in its approach and support as it is driven primarily by the country requests and Partnership’s mandate. However, there is a mixed response related to speed and scale of support. **The Partnership’s model consists of (1) receiving requests for support from countries and circulating these to all Members; (2) matching these country requests with offers of support from Implementing or Development Partners following its own processes and (3) through PAF which has recently been set up.** Analysis of the various sets of requests and discussions with the stakeholders reflect that there is declining trend in response to support from 2020 and the scale of support is technical in nature and are of smaller financial value. However, it is important to note that the number and size of the country requests are rising with the countries moving from update to implementation.

Year	Number of requests circulated	Average # of requests per country	Number of requests with support committed	Average per cent of country requests with support committed	# of countries requesting support
2017	15	15	14	93%	1
2018	372	41	243	78%	9
2019	1,145	21	809	95%	55
2020	714	11	618	99%	63
2021	294	16	181	82%	26
2022	1,134	29	472	58%	50
2023 <sup>4</sup>	601	12	241	58%	51
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,275</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>2,578</b>	<b>77%</b>	<b>89</b>

Interactions with stakeholders illustrate that response to requests for support varies from 4-5 months to more than a year. The Support Unit collates the requests received, shares these via e-mail with the entire members and gathers responses from potential IPs and DPs. The SU then consolidates the responses from different partners and help facilitation clarifications on requests, channel feedback and final approval from the governments. Various IP/DPs consulted highlighted that **the SU largely plays a good and efficient relaying role between them and the governments whilst keeping them informed** on the updates. **However, there do seem to be some variations on a case-to-case basis with partners and country governments suggesting that the follow-up and engagement from the country engagement colleagues was inadequate and delayed.** Additionally, various IPs and DPs mentioned that they were largely **unclear with respect to the frequency and timelines for the different types of Call for Proposals and advocated for a higher degree of predictability and prior communications** regarding the same which would help them to plan and in responding positively and with speed.

Consultations with IPs highlighted the challenges in responding to the requests for support shared by countries. Many of them opined that the **short timeframe for responding to requests**, especially under the PAF constrains partners to offer support. Furthermore, the average grant size is often quite small which acts as a disincentive for various IPs to put through elaborate proposals within a short timeframe, especially **when transaction costs are high.**

Also, the delay in responding to requests is also related to limited resources and flexibility of IPs. Some IPs highlighted that given that they are project-based, they do not have free resources and flexibility to provide support during the first round of circulation of requests and ultimately wait for the request to fall to the PAF. Many IPs who would like to be more

<sup>4</sup> Data on trends in 2023 reflects requests submitted between 1 January and 13 July 2023.

active within the Partnership **highlighted that they face challenges in aligning their work with the country requests within a short duration given that the timing of the requests is not necessarily aligned with their programming and budgeting cycles.** Additionally, the timeframes are not long enough for them to enter partnerships with others or negotiate funding support from donors.

Apart from challenges and delays related to response to requests, various IPs also highlighted issues regarding the not-very-clear articulation of requests which have culminated in implementation delays. According to some IP interviewees, the information contained within the country requests communicated are not very well-detailed to allow for IPs' correct understanding of the country needs and aligned budget estimations. Partners also highlighted that there is often a significant mismatch between the government's expected timeframe vis-à-vis the actual period that will be required for proper implementation of the project. IPs also highlighted that once their proposals are submitted, multiple rounds of feedback from the government eventually end up in drastic changes to the original terms of reference, resulting in disagreements and challenges for IPs and delays in implementation.

Moreover, Focal Point turnovers have caused delays and lost opportunities in some countries such as Liberia and Nepal as cited by some of the implementation partners. Focal Point turnover in some countries has also led to challenges in coordination both between Focal Points and with Implementing Partners, leading to limited engagement or lengthy processes to review planned activities.

Additionally, internal administrative processes of Implementing and Development Partners as well as the SU Host Institutions have resulted in delayed support, and the time gap between pledging support and delivered support can be substantial, clashing with the Partnership's mandate to provide timely support to countries. Lastly, some country members also highlighted that sometime IPs have tried to foster their own agendas with country governments, leading to conflict and, ultimately, delays in support.

Further, DPs and IPs requested for improved coordination among the hosts to **streamline contracting and management processes given that these are currently being managed separately by UNOPS and WRI, with significant differences in the procedures. Different systems and processes within the same institutions also creates confusions and operational difficulties for staff and IPs.** Interactions with Host Institutions highlighted that there are opportunities to simplify these processes in the context of the NDC Partnership along with the need to map the comparative advantages of the three host institutions to define robust criteria to decide which type of support will be channelled through which institution. Interactions with Steering Committee Members (including the Host Institutions) highlighted that that the Partnership is a growing organization with various stakeholders at both global and country level having substantial expectations from them. **Given this, they advocated for a robust organizational structure with codified processes suitable for a mature institution. This will also aid the concerns regarding greater transparency that were articulated earlier.**

However, it is important to note that interactions with the implementing partners as well as developing countries such as Rwanda, Benin, Panama, Nigeria, Jamaica, etc. highlighted that, **on average, the NDC Partnership's model is faster to unlock resources for technical assistance support than most other organizations whose support can take several months to years notwithstanding the need to further streamline processes to expedite the support.**

## AGILITY, ADAPTIVENESS, AND RISK MANAGEMENT

**The operational model of the NDC Partnership emerged as dynamic and flexible, effectively navigating diverse contexts and adapting to the changing circumstances of its member countries.** The Partnership approach allows countries to self-nominate Focal Points (FPs). While the typical model for developing countries involves two FPs, one from the Ministry of Environment (or the ministry responsible for climate/environment) and one from the Ministry of Finance or Planning, the Partnership recognizes the need for customization. For instance, Panama has implemented a successful model with a third FP within the Department of Planning, aligning with the country's specific institutional structure. In contrast, countries like Niger have opted for a single FP.

**This approach underscores the Partnership's responsiveness to the unique needs and circumstances of each country.** Our conversation with various stakeholders reflects that the Partnership has adapted its approach and



interventions based on the requests and demand from the countries, as it is reflected that in the last couple of years there is greater attention towards access to finance or training and capacity building on Article 6. Also, the Partnership remained flexible to the deployment of embedded resources based on the countries' requests. This was observed in Rwanda where an additional senior technical expert has been deployed, and in Mongolia where an additional facilitator to fully cover the scope of the facilitation work at the two governments' request given that the work entails different skillsets and expertise (networking and building connections vs. operational tasks).

Further, the **in-country facilitators** serve as the key linchpin of the Partnership's work at the country level, as acknowledged by various stakeholders including development and implementing partners. At the time of reporting, there were 42 country facilitators. The facilitators are responsible for primarily for inter-ministerial coordination and development partner coordination at country level, however many of them are also expected and provide support in developing plans and strategies for the Government and day-to-day functioning of the Ministries, as observed in Benin. Country missions and informal interactions with various in-country facilitators during the NDC Conference highlighted that facilitators are **burdened with an overwhelming workload due to the multitude of tasks assigned to them.**

In addition, the **contracting process for the facilitator was also cited to be a challenge.** The management of contracting is often led by a donor or implementing agency resulting in confusions about the facilitator's affiliation and reporting. **It also raises concerns with regards to the real neutrality and conflict of interest for the facilitator because they are also drawn into the day-to-day work of their organization sponsoring their position.** Many of them suggested that this also affects their coordination role as some of the members or IPs do not respond to their mail as they affiliation creates a perception they are writing on behalf of the sponsoring agency and not for the Partnership. This concern was echoed more strongly in the Africa and MENA context than for the LAC region (where it did not seem to matter significantly). Various members suggested for **all facilitators should be under one management structure, and,** preferably, under the SU which is perceived as a neutral agency. **This arrangement would also create direct accountability of the facilitators as well as stronger feedback mechanisms back to the SU to further strengthen country engagement.**

Stakeholders also highlighted that the Partnership has shown flexibility and adaptability in establishing the PAF in 2021 to overcome the challenges and difficulties resulting in poor response to support from member countries. The PAF has indeed been recognized as a flexible funding mechanism which is being "enthusiastically used" by various developing country members. Through the PAF, the Support Unit manages technical assistance funds on behalf of some development partners, which covers, among others, in-country facilitation support. This reduces overall transaction costs for development partners who do not have large implementation agencies to manage such funds. Development Partners contributing to the PAF were appreciative of the fact that PAF allows them to provide flexible funding support to countries outside their regular programming cycles.

Various partner consultations also lauded the Support Unit PAF team's proactive information sharing, responsiveness, and flexibility. PAF has gradually become one of the key mechanisms of the NDC Partnership to deliver support to Developing Country members, particularly in regions and countries with low partner traction or presence, and where resource mobilization for climate actions is limited. Interactions with country members highlighted that the PAF support has been more relevant, attractive and useful for LDCs and "smaller" developing countries such as the SIDS (especially in the LAC region). For instance, interactions with various LAC IPs, highlighted that various small island countries such as Antigua and Barbuda, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, etc. do recognize the NDC Partnership as their preferred mechanism to unlock technical assistance support with speed.

Given the typical small grant size under the PAF, many countries have opted for specific "small-scale" requests. However, our interactions with DPs and MDBs cite these requests as "ad-hoc". While ad-hoc requests are considered efficient to address specific funding gaps, their long-term efficiency and effectiveness have been questioned by some stakeholders, especially MDBs and DPs who are keener to allocate strategic funding to achieve system-wide impacts.

Further, cumbersome contracting processes and high transaction costs/overheads stemming from individual contracting for each activity being supported by a given IP has been cited as a common hindrance in the PAF process and dampens partner motivation to proactively participate in the PAF. This is especially the case for smaller IPs with limited administrative capacity. These have culminated in delays/lags in the actual implementation of activities under the PAF as

also shared by beneficiary countries and IPs. Some IPs also highlighted that the separate grant agreements add additional reporting burdens on them given that the timelines associated with the various contracts are different and require a new report.

Additionally, implementation partners cited the short timeline for PAF proposal preparation whilst also requesting greater clarity and information sharing on PAF cycles to assist partners in planning, more consistent feedback cycles and harmonization of communication channels. Thus, the PAF team must revisit the timeline for proposal development, explore the possibilities of bundling/bunching smaller grants together, experiment with simplified due diligence and procurement requirements depending on project value and other factors, especially for small-sized grants. This will also be beneficial for the SU which is currently overstretched with the PAF implementation as also highlighted during consultations with the team. This is especially true given that the pressure to deploy PAF support is rising due to an increase in the number of countries requesting support and requests submitted per country. Stakeholders also highlighted that the inclusion of the support for the NDC Partnership Thematic Calls are also included as a part of the PAF Calls for Proposal and are stretching already limited PAF resources.

## MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS, REPORTING AND LEARNING

**The NDC Partnership WP 2021-2025 has a well-established Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (MEF) and the MEF comprises appropriate set of indicators at the impact level.** The intermediate outcomes and outputs are aligned with the Work Program and the strategies and the Partnership's 4 Impact Pathways. This is high-level alignment is encouraging.

Interactions with SU staff highlighted that the impact-level indicator reporting primarily draws from secondary data sources. However, given that most of the support coordinated through the Partnership is technical assistance, it is difficult to attribute or quantify the impact of the Partnership's work on high-level indicators such as emissions reduction. Furthermore, many of these secondary sources of data are not updated annually which make challenging to report progress appropriately on these indicators in a given year.

Additionally, our review of the MEF and interactions with SU staff and development partners highlighted that about 50 per cent of the indicators utilize the data collected through the annually conducted Member Surveys and self-reported without any critical validation. Whilst involving partners in M&E processes is encouraging, various development partners raised concerns on the reliability of the data given challenges traditionally associated with self-reporting survey tools. These include non-response from members, especially country members and discrepancies stemming from extrapolating the results to the entire Partnership, not to mention the possible biases in self-reported data. In addition to these challenges, stakeholders also pointed that the MEF indicators do not capture the extent or depth of engagement within the countries. This was especially highlighted with respect to the "integration of whole of systems approaches" and "alignment with national development plans and policies" where partners suggested that there might be variations and ambiguity in the way different countries define these vis-à-vis the Partnership's mandate/definition.

Furthermore, various development partners and some implementing partners highlighted that the **MEF is primarily quantitative in nature and does not capture the full extent or breadth of the Partnership's work.** There are opportunities to incorporate qualitative metrics or evidence that are collected through the Annual Member Survey and by other SU functions like Country Engagement. **Development partners strongly requested for various improvements in reporting. Whilst they appreciated that donor reports are heavily quantitative highlighting "results such as the number or percentage of requests supported", they unanimously requested for stronger narratives connecting the numbers to the kind of support unlocked/catalysed by the Partnership and the results/outcomes that the support would lead to, at both global and country levels.** The MTR finds that whilst qualitative insights and impact narratives are present in the Support Unit's Annual Partnership in Action (PIA) Report, these are not fully integrated into donor reporting resulting in the perceived dissonance in the reporting style. **Thus, there are opportunities to strengthen the narratives around the support catalyzed by the Partnership.**

The other area that came up in the country level discussions is **setting up of the Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) systems to measure the progress against the NDC targets. These are yet to be set up in most of the countries.** Absence of proper monitoring systems for emission and adaptation targets is a key bottleneck for reporting on the impact

and outcome indicators. All the countries visited suggested this aspect is really important and requested for support to set up the MRV systems.

Additionally, there was a **unanimous request from the Steering Committee requesting the adoption of standard results-based management practices in financial reporting**. Development Partners advocated for the need to report results by spending on each of the Impact Pathways, Outcomes/Outputs and workstreams such as Country Engagement, Knowledge and Learning, Finance, etc. Addressing this concern will also allay the concerns regarding the transparency highlighted earlier.

**Operationally, interactions with Support Unit staff cited the absence of dedicated monitoring and evaluation staff during the previous work plans as a challenge to streamlining internal knowledge management and results.** Addressing this critical gap, the SU established a formal M&E function with a 2-member team (an M&E Manager and Analyst) within the K&L function in 2022. This team is mandated to cater to the M&E needs of the Partnership. Whilst these first steps are in the right direction, there are various areas of improvement.

The MTR team also observed that there is a need to streamline and integrate data systems within the Support Unit, given that different teams/individuals are responsible for collecting and “owning” these data. For instance, data related to gender is managed by the gender team. Similarly, stakeholders also highlighted that the data collection for the PAF and the Thematic Calls currently operate in silos vis-à-vis other data collection processes. Thus, there is an opportunity for the M&E team to support these initiatives better.

Similarly, staff also highlighted that the M&E function currently majorly focus on the indicators stipulated in the Work Program’s MEF. However, there are opportunities for the M&E function to identify reporting and data needs across the various SU teams to support them better with decision-making throughout the year. Furthermore, it also appeared that presently the M&E function chiefly focuses on reporting and accountability with data collection on WP KPIs taking place bi-annually without much focus on “continuous learning”.

Consultations with the SU highlighted the need to establish a strong culture of learning from data and evidence. There are opportunities for M&E data and evidence gathered from the Annual Member Surveys to inform the Annual Work Planning processes of the Support Unit and the various internal teams. Similarly, there are also opportunities to support the Country Engagement Team and the in-country facilitators to better define indicators at various levels and support the quality improvement in country level reporting which was cited a key challenge.

At the same time, it is encouraging to note that the focus on M&E in the current Work Program has started resulting in positive changes: For instance, in 2023, the data from the Member Surveys analyzed and presented through region-specific workshops with different partners which proved to be useful. The M&E staff are also updating the M&E guidelines and conducting internal consultations to map the Support Unit’s needs to better integrate with the work of other teams, integrate and automate data systems that are currently in place. Thus, the establishment of a formal M&E function and is the step in the right direction. Future success will depend on the integration of data and information systems, strengthening validation, building a holistic understanding of the learning needs across the SU and the Partnership and to inform the Partnership’s work through data-backed strategic insights throughout the year.

#### 4.4 Effectiveness

*This section assesses the extent to which the NDC Partnership is likely to achieve its outputs and outcomes in the Work Program 2021-2025 and how it has contributed to capacity building, planning, inter-ministerial coordination and NDC implementation.*

#### CONTRIBUTION TO BETTER COORDINATION AND SYNERGIES

One of the NDC Partnership’s primary goal is to **enhance coherence and synergies and strengthen coordination among various actors working on NDCs at both global and national levels**. Many steering Committee members acknowledged the **leading role that the NDC Partnership has played in better coordination and coherence in global NDC programming**. Given the multitude of climate-focused initiatives, players and programs, our consultations with a range of stakeholders

underscored the importance of better coordination. Several (but not all) development partners highlighted that the NDC Partnership has become a vital tool **for them for harmonizing existing and forthcoming initiatives to avoid duplication of efforts** to sustain the Partnership's efforts to facilitate NDC enhancement and implementation.

Whilst the Partnership is attempting to better engage and harmonize work with different categories of members including MDBs and regional banks, **consultations highlighted that coordination and harmonisation with MDBs remains a weak link of the Partnership and calls for collective action** from the development banks, development partners and the Partnership Support Unit. However, on the positive side, the Partnership, at the global level aligned itself well with initiatives with similar objectives such as the GIZ NDC Assist Programme, UK PACT and the UNDP Climate Promise as brought out during our online consultations, albeit the actual country level coordination and synergy was found to vary significantly.

The Partnership has been **lauded for its neutral position and its convening power**. Thus, the Partnership has been viewed as good partner with a neutral positioning and convening power to coordinate across various global programs. **However, in many instances, this global level endorsement and partner coordination does not seem to have percolated to that extent at the country level.** For instance, our country missions to Benin, Panama, and Mongolia found that many country level donor/embassy staff of Partnership members responsible for climate related development cooperation **were not aware of the NDC Partnership or its role in the country.** However, in some countries like Rwanda various IPs/DPs were aware of NDC Partnership and its activities but there is still room for improvement for effective donor coordination.

Inefficiencies in coordination have been noted, primarily stemming from the absence of a nationally led effective coordination mechanisms. Furthermore, there is a discernible lack of outreach and collaboration with external partners in some of the countries visited by the MTR team, as facilitators, who would normally be responsible for this task, are stretched with inter-ministerial coordination and internal day-to-day functions. It is crucial to acknowledge that our country missions and online consultations with partners have underscored a significant issue: even when Partnership opportunities arise for donor coordination, there is often a lack of synchronized action among Implementing and Development Partners in many contexts. This is driven by a tendency among partners to operate independently due to competitiveness. This disjointed approach is also attributed to institutional constraints and existing relationships with the government.

There is a degree of variability in development partners' priorities and actions aligning with the Partnership. While there is a greater degree of homogeneity and consensus at the global level, **at the country level there is scope for further improvement, especially in countries where national governments have less influence in donor coordination.** Moreover, some development/implementation partners argue that they do not necessarily need to align with the Partnership. They view the Partnership as a platform designed to bring together various stakeholders, including themselves, to collectively address countries' needs. In this sense, they believe that the country's priority needs should guide their actions, rather than having to conform to a specific "Partnership" Plan. Indeed, during interactions with regional officers of donor agencies in Latin America, a distinct viewpoint was expressed. **These officers highlighted that the very name of the Partnership Plan disincentivises other donor agencies to consider the document as "their own".** In other words, as they perceive it as an external document, they are hesitant to conform to it.

The apparent lack of coordination and communication leads to duplicity of effort and missing opportunities for leveraging resources as highlighted during the workshop in Mongolia on blended approaches for renewable project and poor response to requests. Stakeholder discussions highlighted that there are opportunities to strengthen communication flows between headquarters and country offices of IPs/DPs. There are also instances of dissonance between the requests communicated by developing country members to development partners at the country level vis-à-vis those communicated to the NDC Partnership (and thus shared with HQ focal points). Even if aware of the NDC Partnership, in many instances country level counterparts highlighted that they were not aware of countries' requests to the NDC Partnership because they had not been circulated internally. Thus, the Support Unit through its Country Engagement Team and In-Country Facilitators can play a stronger role to push for better development partner coordination, both horizontal and vertical. As suggested by members of the SU, the Partnership is lacking a Partner Engagement Strategy that can guide in this direction.

The challenge of **EGO and LOGO** persists and hampers convergence and coordination as some IPs and DPs continue to feel that there is competition for visibility and credit along with the confusion regarding the attribution of the support. This challenge hinders transparency and collaboration among donors. It suggests that, in some contexts, donors may be more focused on receiving recognition for their contributions, potentially leading to a lack of effective coordination and synergy in supporting climate and development initiatives.

Furthermore, insights gathered from interviews with facilitators and IPs reveal that instances of overlap often arise when the Terms of Reference (TORs) for activities lack clarity, occasionally undergoing changes after an Implementing Partner has already accepted a support request. Enhancing coordination, therefore, involves fostering clearer communication channels and refining the precision of TORs to mitigate potential overlaps and maintain alignment throughout the implementation process.

**Interviews with Focal Points and Implementing Partners indicated that some turf wars/power struggles continue to affect inter-ministerial/departmental coordination and need to be continually resolved.** The reasons for these challenges vary across different contexts and settings. In some instances, there may be insufficient financial resources to adequately support NDC implementation, leading to competition among ministries for available funds. Additionally, a lack of interest in climate action within some ministries or government entities can further hinder effective inter-ministerial coordination. Even in cases like Benin, where additional ministries have been involved in the formulation of Partnership Plans and NDCs, their participation has been limited to yearly updates, impacting the effectiveness of collaboration. In other cases, like in Burkina Faso, governments are missing resources to meet more regularly with all ministries to check on progress on NDC implementation.

**The MTR Team observed that there has been some improvement in awareness and interest in cross-ministerial approaches at national level, it has not happened to that extent at subnational level in many countries.** The awareness (and thus ownership) of the NDCs at the sub-national level still seem to be limited which also undermines the effectiveness of certain studies and technical assistance that the Partnership is supporting at the sub-national level. Our discussions reflect one of the constraints is the lack of norms and capacity for decentralized or bottom-up planning processes and regulatory and coordination frameworks in many countries.

From our discussions we noted that effective implementation of the NDCs in a resource constraint scenario requires improved coordination across members at both country and global levels. At the global level improved coordination and advocacy can lead to streamlining of processes for access to climate finance or improved allocation of resources for NDC implementation. At country level, improved coordination can lead to synergy and complementarity in capacity building efforts, improved climate sensitive sectoral plans and regulatory reforms, improved linkages between technical support and investments. There has been gradual progress towards these objectives, but this has been slow and incremental. Also, there are possibilities to explore opportunities for improved engagement between members both active and nonactive.

**Furthermore, the role of the facilitator is essential, as they track the implementation of the Partnership Plan, act as a liaison between the government and various stakeholders and build the government's capacity to coordinate and facilitate effectively.** This collaborative model ensures that each country can take ownership of and direct its climate action plan, leading to more tailored and successful climate initiatives. The NDC Partnership's ability to adapt and collaborate with member countries exemplifies its commitment to fostering effective climate action and achieving national development objectives.

## COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY AND MEE STRATEGY

The NDC Partnership has played a vital role in advancing climate action in member countries. Overall, data from the Annual Member Survey highlights that 84 countries have reported that the Partnership have contributed to practical improvements or changes to planning or implementation of the NDCs. Moreover, the Annual results framework mentions that 72 per cent of the countries reported that Partnerships support has inspired and influenced improved NDC implementation, raised ambition or led to follow up action. Even though the numbers are self-reported, this result is impressive. The Partnership's support extends to translating NDCs into sectoral and financial policies, integrating

mitigation and adaptation targets. However, challenges persist, particularly in terms of cross-sectoral, as observed in countries like Benin and Mongolia.

**The Partnership has helped the countries in establishing a framework to align and integrate climate change processes and priorities with national planning and implementation processes.** The Partnership has provided a wide range of support as per countries' requests throughout this Work Program period, which is reflected in the following kNook data. 68 of the 72 countries that submitted requests between January 2021 and August 2023 had received confirmed support as of August 2023. **45 per cent of all requests submitted in this Work Program period (2,086) have received either full or partial support as of August 2023.** In this period, adaptation requests receive slightly more support (40 per cent) than mitigation (39 per cent), but both received less support than cross-cutting requests (53 per cent).

The rate of supported requests in this Work Program is above average (45 per cent) for LAC (46 per cent) and East Asia and the Pacific (58 per cent), Europe and Central Asia (54 per cent), the Middle East and North Africa (57 per cent), and South Asia (87 per cent) regions, while it is lower for Sub-Saharan Africa (40 per cent). Requests from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in this Work Program period are supported 42 per cent of the time, while 45 per cent of requests from Small Island Developing States (SIDS) were answered.

**One of the key contributions of the Partnership was the push for a “Whole-of-Government-Approach” in developing and implementation of the NDCs.** The Partnership has been successful in developing an integrated NDC framework, highlighting coordination and complementarity. Governments also acknowledged that integration with sectoral policies and plans is useful in developing and implementing the NDCs. Our conversations reflect that the NDC plans has also been integrated into national planning processes as observed in Benin and Rwanda. Conversely, existing development plans and agendas within countries as well as plans for implementation of the SDGs have been incorporated in the Partnership Plans and NDC Implementation Plans.

The Partnership's results framework reports that 89 per cent of the Partnership member countries has improved whole society approaches due to Partnerships facilitation. Moreover, discussions have revealed that the NDC updating processes witnessed notable enhancements in participation and planning at the national level, particularly across various ministries. **Notably, the planning process, inclusive of the development of NDC Partnership Plans, has demonstrated a commendable level of inclusivity. This broader engagement encompasses active participation from donors and, in certain countries, involves collaboration with public and private sectors, civil societies, academia, research institutes, and various partners.** Impressively, these collaborative efforts have persisted even in the challenging context of the COVID-19 pandemic, reflecting a commitment to fostering comprehensive and resilient climate action strategies.

**Consultations with development partners highlighted that the strong buy-in from the Finance Ministries have contributed to elevating the political importance of the NDCs across other ministries** and advocated for a push for this across other countries as well. Interactions with countries highlighted that they are expanding their whole-of-government approaches by broadening the involvement of sectoral ministries in climate action, which has helped countries raise cross-sectoral awareness of the NDC. Interviews highlighted Partnership members confirm that the support and whole-of-government approach encouraged by the Partnership helps bring ministries of finance, planning, economics, energy, environment, agriculture, forestry, and health into the NDC process (some examples include, Rwanda, Colombia, Benin, Vietnam, Mozambique, Dominican Republic) and have lauded the role of the in-country facilitator who plays a key role in this process.

However, the experience has varied across countries. The Annual Report mentions that 93 per cent member countries have integrated NDC measures in national, subnational/sectoral plans and 47 per cent of member countries have mainstreamed low carbon climate resilient development projects in their national plans. Consultations with IP/DPs reveal that in many LDCs inter-ministerial commitment is mostly on paper and would require more concerted effort across ministries and development partners for actual translation. The MTR Team observed that cross-sectoral integration of climate change in sector-specific policies, programs and strategies is relatively weak or absent in the countries visited. This is due to uneven awareness and understanding of NDCs across sectors and line ministries, which is exacerbated by the weak institutional mandates. Interactions with implementing partners at the country levels highlight that in many

countries national climate change policies, sectoral action plans and budgets form the thrust of their programming and are the government's guiding documents rather the NDCs.

While embedding concepts of climate change and the NDCs in broader development plans and policies has advanced, integrating specific climate change and NDC action in sectoral budget lines and procedures is not as widespread. For example, while concepts may be integrated in development planning, there are often no specific budget lines for climate in national budgets, making it more challenging to track climate-related expenditures in most countries. However, discussions with Indonesia and other MEEs reflect that NDC priorities have been integrated into the budget framework for implementation.

The Partnership's Country Engagement Strategy clearly embraced the principles of aid effectiveness. However, the exact extent to which integration within countries has happened is not always easy to assess and may require a longer and more in-depth analysis and insight into national and sectoral policies, strategies, and plans. Implementing Partners interviewed for this evaluation assured the evaluation team that their goal is to integrate climate change within national development agendas, but the Evaluation Team observed the institutional capacity for integration is limited.

One area of cross-sectoral integration that was not planned but was important in many member countries was integration with processes of economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. As discussed in the Efficiency Section, the Partnership responded swiftly by supporting countries to ensure that national climate ambition is an integral component of short-and long-term recovery and economic growth strategies to drive green recovery in response to the pandemic. Embedding economic advisors in ministries of finance and economy to enhance the inclusion of a green sustainable development process in COVID-19 recovery plans has been a positive and innovative step.

**The Partnership continues to support governments in building capacity through embedding advisors, and facilitators in the country government systems.** More than 50 countries have facilitators, and 37 countries have 99 embedded advisors, which is increasing over the years. The country government appreciated the support and contributions of the facilitators and advisors in NDC planning and implementation. In Rwanda, the embedded advisor has supported in creating access to climate finance from IREME and IMF. We also found that embedding advisors into ministries of economy/finance/planning has been useful for developing the COVID-19 recovery strategy.

**However, embedding advisors for a limited period has generally not translated in building capacity at the country level. Often, the short tenure of the advisors, couple with the absence of a sustainability or knowledge transfer strategy, has been cited as the reason behind this failure.** Overall, discussions confirm that deployment of external consultants and advisors can address specific gaps or requirements but does not necessarily lead to capacity building and systems strengthening. Some mention that these are short-term band aid approached, but not a system transformative mechanism, as climate change is complex and requires systems-wide capacity development initiatives. From our country visits and discussions, we observed that there is a broad understanding of country governments' capacity gaps, but there is no plan nor strategy on how these can be addressed, which partners can fund and support capacity-building initiatives, and how the different capacity building initiatives of various partners can be made more synergistic and complementary.

Interviews with member countries also underscored a significant shift wherein climate considerations, facilitated by embedded economic advisors, are increasingly becoming integral to the deliberations of finance, and planning ministries, including central banks and sectoral advisors. This collaborative approach at the country level reflects a shared interest among finance and economy ministries in embedding such advisors, fostering a mutually beneficial situation. However, this should also be extended to the sub-national levels which hitherto has been limited. In many cases, the placement of these advisors has been of a short-term nature, potentially limiting the opportunity to build and sustain the capacity of the relevant ministries over an extended period. **Thus, the Partnership can build on the success of the EAI and meet the growing interest and requests for embedded climate finance experts with a long-term focus. This would enable countries to explore opportunities and strengthen regulatory frameworks and capacities for accessing finance.**

## KNOWLEDGE AND LEARNING STRATEGY

Knowledge and capacity are one of the key challenges that countries face for NDC updating and implementation as came out in our discussions and literature review. Leveraging its unique positioning and broad-based membership, the NDC

Partnership has facilitated knowledge sharing, exchanges, and learnings on NDC enhancement and implementation, which have been acknowledged by partners. The Partnership Knowledge and Learning Strategy focuses on developing and disseminating tools, knowledge products and other learning activities to further support countries in NDC ambition-raising efforts and their implementation. Importantly, 73 per cent of respondents reported increasing their knowledge or capacity for NDC implementation in 2022, which was facilitated by the Partnership.

Within the MTR reference period, the Support Unit organized 31 events – convenings, conferences, webinars, workshops. Largely, the evaluation found these events to be well-attended. Data from the Annual Member Survey highlights that, in 2022, 34 countries/124 countries (27 per cent) actively engaged in their events. Stakeholders’ consultation and observations revealed that members are highly appreciative of the global “Stop-and-Reflect” Session hosted by the Support Unit at the sidelines of the SB Session held Bonn in June 2023 and the NDC Conference 2023. The widely attended sessions garnered praise for providing a suitable platform for convening a wide range of stakeholders for sharing lessons and learnings on NDC implementation prior to the 2023 Global Stocktake. Many of the partners mentioned that NDC Stop and Reflect sessions and other events help them to network, build awareness on best practices and understand some the global discourse.

**However, the effectiveness of the Stop and Reflect Sessions at the country level gathered a mixed response.** For instance, during the Benin mission the evaluators found the session to be enthusiastically attended by various government counterparts and other partners in country. By contrast, the Mongolia session failed to gather a wide audience that could have potentially contributed to meaningful discussions. **Nonetheless, the Partnership’s convenings, peer-to-peer exchanges and events broadly emerged as the most lauded K&L efforts.** However, in both countries, we observed that the Stop and Reflect sessions were more for information sharing and building awareness on NDC Partnership rather than building capacity. Desk review reflects that only around one third of survey respondents who participated in an event (e.g., conference, webinar, and workshops) organized by the Partnership, indicated that these exchanges contributed to practical improvements or changes to NDC planning or implementation.

Consultations with various country members, like Indonesia, Nigeria, Benin, and Panama highlighted that they highly valued the Partnership’s support during the various COPs providing countries a key opportunity to present their NDCs, share experiences, connect with peers, and engage in south-south and north-south knowledge exchange and learning. Other countries like Cuba, Bolivia and Niger mentioned that it would be very appreciated if support was given to promote their participation to COPs, highlighting that engagement in international platforms for exchange are of utmost relevance for country members.

**Within the evaluation reference period, the SU published 37 knowledge products.** The knowledge products include the Annual Partnership in Action Reports, case studies, insight briefs, articles, blogs and press releases. Despite the significant volume of products being published, the uptake and use of the same has been limited. Nearly one third of respondents from the Annual Members Survey had consulted written products from the Partnership whilst 29 per cent reported that the knowledge products had contributed to adjustments or changes in NDC planning and implementation.

Interactions with external stakeholders, especially development partners, highlighted the need for data on country requests and responses, producing regular technical analysis and facilitating learning events and exchanges to add greater value to partner’s in-country and global work. Whilst this work is being done through Insight Briefs, the MTR acknowledges that there is possibly a need to promote these knowledge products better and gather technical feedback from partners to further improve their content.

While the Support Unit has made commendable efforts in cataloguing country requests, stakeholder consultations revealed discrepancies in the classification of requests, particularly in the realm of climate finance. Concerns were raised about data completeness and timeliness, with instances of misclassification ("false positives" and "false negatives") in long-term strategy-related requests. In general, however, stakeholders emphasized the need for country dashboards extending beyond request repositories. They seek comprehensive insights, including strategic priorities, governance details, presence of implementation frameworks, active Implementing Partners, and other contextual information. This, they believe, would significantly enhance coordination and inform program decision-making.



Further, the Partnership's Knowledge Portal encompasses the Good Practice Database, the Climate Toolbox, the Climate Finance Explorer, the NDC Content Explorer, as well as modules on NDC-SDG linkages, historical GHG emissions, and action areas. According to the latest Annual Member Survey, the percentage of members using the Knowledge Portal has grown from 35 per cent in 2021 to 57 per cent in 2023. Whilst this appears to be impressive, it must be noted that the above data reflects subjective observations from self-reported data from countries.

**Our consultations with nearly all developing countries, development partners and various associate members/implementation partners highlighted that most of them have not used Knowledge Products published on the Knowledge Portal or considered these less effective.** Our country level discussions also reflect that members are appreciative of the global conventions but surprisingly, they have not used and in many cases are not aware of the various knowledge products and information available online. This fact was acknowledged by the K&L team whilst also pointing towards the challenge for them to assess how Knowledge Products are really contributing to impact. Additionally, interviews also highlighted the lack of an appropriate strategy to adequately prioritise and promote different knowledge products to different types of audiences based on potential uses.

Similarly, Partnership has also developed an **Online Partnership Plan Tool (OPPT)** to host and optimize the management and update of Partnership Plans, NDC Implementation Plans, NDC Implementation Frameworks, and NDC Action Plans. The Tool is flexible and can be customized for each country, following the Partnership's country-driven approach. The Annual Member Survey 2023 points that 20 per cent of the respondents utilized the OPPT. **However, during our consultations almost none of the partners or countries interviewed were aware of the OPPT or had not used it. This is especially interesting to note in the context that most stakeholders requested for functionalities (such as tracking of country requests, existing frameworks, etc.) that are present in the tool, pointing towards the need for stronger awareness about the OPPT.**

**Aligned with the above observations on the unique dataset on country requests managed by the SU, stakeholders especially IPs and DPs highlighted that they find immense value in the kNook.** The kNook is the Partnership's knowledge management system through which it manages the data and insights gathered from the country requests generated through the CEP. Our consultations highlighted that the data generated from the portal is found useful by Development partners to commence discussions with the country governments to program their own support. However, only 18 out of 58 respondents in the Annual Members Survey of 2023 mention having used the kNook to inform or program support for NDC Action Plans. In Panama, a respondent amongst the IP/DPs, mentioned that the greatest value addition of the Partnership has been the kNook as, before outlining the strategy for her donor agency, she visited the platform to understand what the country needed the most.

## FINANCE STRATEGY

Access to climate finance poses a critical bottleneck for NDC implementation and achieving Paris Agreement targets, particularly in developing countries with limited fiscal space, technical capacity, and an enabling environment to attract global funding and private sector investment. The current landscape of international climate finance is often driven by donor priorities, creating challenges for countries lacking awareness and capacity to navigate the application process. **The NDC Partnership has aimed to serve as a neutral broker and facilitator, addressing both demand and supply-side constraints through its Finance Strategy.** A desk review indicates that 66 countries (85 per cent of those requesting support) have sought finance-related assistance, encompassing planning, budgeting, capacity building, private sector engagement, project financing, resource mobilization, and the development of bankable projects. Notably, 58 per cent of these requests have received support, reflecting the Partnership's efforts to the finance gap and facilitate effective NDC implementation.

On the supply side, the Partnership support relates to helping countries identify and access external financial resources and technical support for NDC implementation by collaborating with members such as the MDBs and DFIs. Our discussions reflect that there is greater opportunity for improved collaboration on resource allocation within the Partnership which has not been exploited. **The NDC Partnership also developed the NDC Investment Planning Guidance and checklist that can be tailored by countries and provides them step-by-step guidance** to develop and strengthen their climate commitments into actions through the preparation of climate investment plans based on current best practices collected by the NDC Partnership. In addition, the Partnership has supported the preparation **25 Project Information Notes (PINs)**

**collectively amounting to USD 510 m**, for governments to present their investable Partnership Plan projects to investor for investments. The purpose of the PIN initiative is to obtain finance for the implementation of the NDCs and reduce, to a certain degree, the burden on countries of having to do the search and present them to potential investors. The Partnership also helps countries identify potential external funding sources for project implementation through knowledge tools such as the Climate Funds Explorer and the Climate Finance Bulletin.

The Partnership has also provided technical support and analysis for integration of climate finance in budgets and expenditure framework, tracking of public funds for climate-change-related purposes and developing national market mechanisms through embedded advisors or through the IPs. **The Economic Advisory Initiative (EAI) launched during the pandemic was useful to developing the economic recovery and green transition roadmaps. Consultations also garnered praise for the launch of the highly relevant Greening Central Banks readiness programme that aims to embed on-ground support for building and sustaining a green financial system.** However, the effectiveness of the support in domestic resource mobilisation and tracking in less developed countries is uneven as observed in Benin and Mongolia. Discussions reflect that the budget coding and tracking of climate expenditures have not been implemented in most of the countries.

**Countries welcomed support from the Partnership, but feedback indicates that the assistance provided fell short of adequately addressing the core challenges related to accessing finance.** Discussions with countries underscored a pronounced demand for aid in preparing bankable project pipelines and securing financing for implementation. NDC data reveals that nearly 49 per cent of requests remain unsupported, pointing to a potential misalignment between the nature of requests and the expertise/resources made available through the Partnership. Donors and MDBs expressed the view that specialized skills are essential for project feasibility assessment and the development of bankable projects, suggesting a need for enhanced technical capabilities within the Partnership.

The other key area of focus on access to climate finance is on support to creating the enabling environment through policy and regulatory reforms to attract private sector investments. Discussions at the global Stop and Reflect event and country visits reflect that support has been provided on policy reforms, pre-feasibility assessments, or investment plan screening however these have not led to much change in enabling environment and investment flows in most of the LDCs. **Stakeholder discussions reflect that apart from MEEs the institutional capacity of government to engage and attract private sector investment on climate transition and adaptation is weak.** In many countries the capacity of domestic private sector is also relatively weak with respect to technology and financing. Discussions reflect that capacity building and technical support on PPPs, technical assistance on developing and deepening the financial markets and instruments, advisory support in the review of fiscal space and measures for investment and subsidies for attracting private sector investments and technology transfer for green transitions, clear and consistent policy and regulatory for stable and predictable environment for private sector investment is needed.

However, while the Partnership has facilitated or supported mobilization of additional resources mainly through the technical assistance (support country requests, etc.) these resources remain inadequate in the face of overall demand. This challenge is evident in countries even where the Partnership has had a presence for an extended period, such as Benin, as well as in larger economies like Colombia. Countries expect more direct support for helping them in access to finance both public and private investment for NDC implementation and outcomes.

To support the countries' need for significant increase in the level of investment for NDC implementation, **the NDC Partnership needs to shift its focus from short-term financial support to a more comprehensive technical assistance and partnerships to catalyse or unlock substantial and increased investments.** However, various development partners and Steering Committee members also highlighted that the Partnership (and its Support Unit) **must define its role with regard to finance more clearly given that there is a high possibility that the Partnership will encroach upon or duplicate the mandates of other organizations operating in this space.** Also, many of the partners also highlighted that SU may not be best suited for project feasibility preparation and assessment as many aspects of climate finance requires specialized skills.

## GENDER STRATEGY AND YOUTH ENGAGEMENT PLAN

**Since its inception, the NDC Partnership has identified gender equality as one of its ten guiding principles.** Addressing gender in the context of climate change is not unique to the Partnership as countries are expected to integrate gender as

a dimension within all work areas. Through its Gender Strategy, the Partnership has attempted to advance gender mainstreaming in member countries' NDCs and climate action. Several interviews with national Focal Points during the MTR indicated that a key issue in this regard is not objecting to the integration of a gender lens but rather the lack of a full understanding on how to do so. To address this, the Partnership also launched a Practical Guide on Developing Gender-Responsive NDC Action Plans with the IUCN to steer efforts towards enhancing gender equality considerations and to exemplify how gender tools and methodologies can be used to develop gender responsive NDC action plans. Also, country missions reflect that most of the countries were unaware of the Partnership's gender strategy though they have incorporated gender in updated plans. **Overall, the Partnership's efforts are in line with the Paris Agreement and guidance from the UNFCCC which calls on the Parties to respect, promote, and consider gender justice and the empowerment of women when taking action to address climate change.**

Our desk review shows that there has been good progress on updating of NDC which are more gender sensitive and inclusive. The Spring 2023 progress on the MEF shows that 89 per cent of member countries receiving Partnership support that have validated NDC Partnership Plans which are gender-sensitive, gender-aware, or gender-responsive, showing a 2 per cent increase from Fall 2022. In addition, under the CAEP programme, 55 countries took more inclusive approaches to their NDCs, considering distributional impacts of commitments and associated policies on vulnerable groups. Information on gender saw the greatest enhancement, evident for 53 out of 55 countries, with 49 cases linked to CAEP support. Activities around this theme included stakeholder consultations on gender, research into ways gender plays into climate vulnerability, and measures that target female empowerment as part of the climate strategy. Similarly, 41 out of 55 countries enhanced both the NDC inclusiveness and their NDC alignment with SDGs, demonstrating the link between sustainable development and gender, youth, and socio-economic inclusion.

**A particular example in this regard is Burkina Faso, which expanded ten sectoral action plans to include strong gender mainstreaming elements.** CAEP support focused on coordination and stakeholder engagement, liaising with key stakeholders to gain their input and validation of the plans. Next to increasing adaptive capacity and reducing GHG emissions in key sectors, gender equity was a lead priority of the process. This involved actions such as improving data gathering and analysis of gender-disaggregated impacts of climate change, building capacity on the importance of considering gender in climate change strategies, and ensuring that gender equality is a key component of any climate projects and programs designed for each sector.

The data related to RSLs and responses shows that there is limited requests and support provided on gender. A 2023 review on Support Gaps on Gender highlights that the Partnership had received and circulated 4,275 requests for support under the NDC Action Plans of which only 271 related to gender equality, making up 6 per cent of all requests. Less than half (36 per cent) of all gender equality requests have not received any support. Technical gender capacity building (73 requests) and gender mainstreaming (97 requests) make up the largest group of gender activities out of the 271 requests. However, the Partnership has recently received generous support from Environment and Climate Change Canada specifically for gender focused work, which might lead to better response on gender requests and gender inclusiveness in implementation of NDC planning and implementation.

**Our observations from the field visits reflect that many of the countries have incorporated gender within their plans and frameworks but gender mainstreaming and inclusiveness of approach and gender-focused planning and investments are missing in many countries.** Efforts towards gender inclusiveness has mostly concentrated towards training and capacity building. In Benin, gender mainstreaming is mandated across all development initiative including NDCs, but our discussions reflect that efforts are stated in plans but have not translated into actual implementation. Further, our in-country stakeholder discussions reflected that most countries were unaware of the Partnership's gender strategy though they have incorporated gender in updated plans. Lastly, it is too early to assess if the investments coming out of the NDCs are truly gender responsive. This will be possible when the processes to mainstream gender equality produce concrete actions that support gender responsiveness. However, this will not be evident until the implementation plans are translated into financed investments, which in most countries is still in its infancy or not even underway.

In addition to the Gender Strategy, the Partnership has also adopted a Youth Engagement Plan (YEP) that was developed through a participatory process with elaborate consultation with youth from several countries and Partnership members.

Whilst not a full-fledged strategy, the YEP suggested actionable and innovative recommendations to increase youth participation in climate policy and practice.

Based on the country level discussions and observations from the Youth Engagement Forum, the MTR identified a discrepancy in the perception of the NDC Partnership's role in youth engagement during country-level discussions and observations from the Youth Engagement Forum. **While various organizations and ministries showcased youth-led initiatives in climate action, there was a lack of clarity regarding the Partnership's role as a sponsor of youth-focused climate events rather than a catalyst for meaningful youth engagement in NDC processes.** The Youth Forum highlighted youth-led initiatives, primarily from Sub-Saharan Africa, but their direct connection to NDCs was not explicitly stated. The effectiveness of the Partnership's contribution to youth engagement remains mixed. Data from kNook (November 2023) indicates that 36 countries submitted 95 requests for youth-focused activities, with 56 per cent receiving support. However, only a few countries considered the impact on youth as actual targets in their NDCs.

During the country missions, stakeholders in Benin and Panama acknowledged not referring to the Youth Engagement Plan in formulating their NDCs. Despite 91 per cent of Partnership-supported countries reporting youth engagement in NDC consultations in a 2023-member survey, a review of two countries' Partnership Plans revealed limited explicit integration of youth considerations. **Nonetheless, success stories emerged, such as Pakistan's NDC, one of three CAEP-supported NDCs with explicit youth engagement targets. Pakistan's targets focus on education, volunteering, research, innovation, and job creation to support NDC implementation.** The Ministry of Climate Change conducted a youth survey, providing valuable insights into the role of youth in community-level adaptation and mitigation measures.

## PARTNERSHIP ACTION FUND

As mentioned earlier, the Partnership Action Fund (PAF) has been established as a Pooled Funding Mechanism (PFM) with a particular focus on speed, flexibility, and the ability to address unsupported country needs. The PAF builds on the successes of the CAEP's Technical Assistance Fund (TAF) and is aligned with the Partnership's objectives and Work Program. Designed as a multi-donor trust fund, it acts like a "last resort" and supports countries through two "windows". Window 1 which caters to facilitation and embedded advisory support and Window 2 that is devoted to technical assistance and scoping support, including through the Thematic Calls.

It must be noted that the PAF has been operational for close to two years. Within the period, PAF has confirmed support to 47 countries, (24 countries through Window 1, and 36 countries and one regional organization through Window 2), as of November 2023. Viewed thematically, the largest share of activities submitted for PAF (80 per cent) is cross-cutting, while 13 per cent is focused on mitigation and the remaining 7 per cent on adaptation.

**Our discussions reflect that the PAF has been an effective instrument in providing support to countries request as a last resort and has kept the relevance of the Partnership intact.** It valued by country members as it helps them carry out unfunded activities that they deem essential or important for the achievement of their NDCs. PAF is also gaining recognition in light of the declining response rate for RSLs. Our consultations noted that some partners were unable to respond to such requests, as they increasingly look to support large-scale, long-term programs. Members expressed concerns about supporting small-budget requests and the comparatively high transaction costs. However, members also acknowledged being responsive to smaller requests will contribute to identifying needs across countries, which can inform IP/DP programming, and will also contribute to establishing relationships which may be a precursor to broader, high impact collaboration. The instrument also helps the developed countries to support initiatives with limited transaction costs and countries where they have limited engagement or presence. The instrument also helps to fund initiatives in climate vulnerable countries that are not the typical "donor darlings" or those left out of bilateral donors' country strategies.

**Stakeholder consultations also highlighted that the PAF has made remarkable strides particularly in regions and countries with low partner traction or presence, and where resource mobilization for climate actions has historically been limited.** Interactions with country members revealed that the PAF support has been more relevant, attractive, and useful for "smaller" developing countries such as the SIDS (especially in the LAC region). For instance, interactions with various LAC IPs, highlighted that various small island countries such as Antigua and Barbados, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, etc. do recognize the NDC Partnership as their preferred mechanism to unlock technical assistance support with

speed. Our discussions reflect that the instrument would be more valuable if it regularly considered higher ticket size items. Indonesia, a Major and Emerging Economy, mentioned that the PAF ticket size is small compared to their need and therefore have chosen to not opt for support under PAF.

**The MTR finds that most PAF-supported activities from the first two Calls for Proposals (CFPs) were still under implementation. As such it is, it might be too early to comment on the impacts achieved as a result of the support.** Nonetheless, the PAF is making an impressive contribution to the progress of NDC Partnership’s Work Program. For instance, on Impact Pathway 1 (Accelerating NDC Implementation), the PAF resources are supporting countries such as Armenia, Dominican Republic, Jordan, Lao PDR, Palestine and Sao Tome and Principe, to further develop countries’ capacities and accelerate their work on stakeholder mobilization and engagement, whole-of-government coordination through functional institutional arrangements and robust monitoring and reporting of climate policies, projects and action plans. Similarly, several countries are undertaking work in specific sectors, such as transport (Lao PDR, Nepal), energy (Benin, Ecuador), waste and water (Côte d’Ivoire, Nauru); or in mainstreaming gender in the NDC implementation, as well as enhancing monitoring and evaluation systems for tracking gender outcomes (Antigua and Barbuda, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Jordan, Nepal, Palestine, Saint Kitts and Nevis).

On Impact Pathway 3 on Mobilizing Financing for Climate Action, Climate Analytics is working on the development of an NDC Financing Strategy in Antigua and Barbuda. In another example, Grenada developed four sectoral NDC investment plans in the energy, transport, waste, and forestry sectors and, through PAF, these efforts were complemented by a new NDC communications strategy for the public.

Furthermore, on Impact Pathway 4 relating to Mainstreaming NDCs and SDGs into Developmental Plans and Budgets, the PAF has assisted countries like Antigua and Barbuda, Eswatini, Liberia and Peru to mainstream climate change issues and NDC commitments into their national planning framework, budgeting process, and sectoral plans; and in decentralizing implementation by aligning sub-national plans with the NDC. Jordan is working to align the NDC and its SDG framework, while Zambia is developing a Green Growth Strategy aimed at providing direction for climate change adaptation, mitigation, and other cross-cutting issues. These are important set of activities for effective and swift NDC implementation.

**Given the small grant size, many countries have opted for specific “small-scale” requests.** However, during our interactions these requests have often cited as “ad-hoc”. While ad hoc requests are considered efficient to address specific funding gaps, their long-term efficiency and effectiveness have been questioned by some stakeholders, especially multilateral development banks and development partners who are keener to allocate strategic funding to achieve system-wide impacts. Even though the Country Engagement works with countries to revise and prioritize the unsupported requests to be included in the PAF Call for Proposals, members advocated for a better prioritization and articulation of requests to unleash strategic and system-wide and larger scale impacts.

One of the key challenges is that all the partners found PAF to be administratively burdensome and requested the SU further streamline and simplify processes. The IPs mentioned of high transaction costs of applying for PAF given the ticket size of the grant/ contract members have suggested consolidating similar requests across countries to make it more attractive and efficient for partners to respond.

## 4.5 Impact

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***This section gives an overview of the extent to which the Partnership contributed to countries’ raised and improved NDC ambitions and enhanced NDC quality of supported countries. It also comments on how member countries have integrated NDC mitigation and adaptation targets into national and subnational development plans, policies, budgets, and projects.***

**The NDC Partnership has played a significant role in elevating and enhancing countries' NDC ambition, thus improving the quality of their NDCs with a dual focus on emissions reduction and resilience strengthening.** A review of the program documents and secondary data, along stakeholder discussions highlighted that there has been an improvement in the quality of NDCs amongst country members. The current NDCs are more evidence-based, with cross-sectoral linkages, including with the Ministries of Finance, and are incorporated with national development plans. Also, the NDCs are more

credible as the information is clearer and better defined with more country ownership and engagement. Further, many countries have also developed NDC Implementation Frameworks and financing strategies along with strengthening engagement with finance ministries, sectoral line ministries, sub-national actors, private sector, and others. For example, 100 per cent of the NDCs supported raised their adaptation ambition, 84 per cent raised the mitigation targets, and 38 per cent of countries expanded their unconditional targets. Many countries included mitigation targets for the first time, which is an important accomplishment, and GHG inventories have been developed and enhanced. Not all increased ambitions can be attributed to the support provided through the Partnership.

UNFCCC reports also highlight that new or updated NDCs include, in comparison with the same Parties' previous NDCs, more information on time-bound quantitative adaptation targets and the associated indicator frameworks, more specific links between adaptation efforts and efforts towards the SDGs, and more specific information on synergies and co-benefits between adaptation and mitigation. Many (57 per cent) linked their NDCs to their commitment to transitioning to a sustainable and/or low-carbon and resilient economy, considering social, environmental, and economic factors as well as the SDGs. In addition, 46 per cent of country members indicated that they have integrated their NDC targets, goals, and policies into national legislative, regulatory, and planning processes as a means of ensuring implementation.

64 per cent of country members highlighted policy coherence and synergies between their domestic mitigation measures and development priorities, which include the SDGs and, for those that submitted new or updated NDCs, LT-LEDS and green recovery from the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. Most Parties (75 per cent) provided information related to gender in their NDCs and some (39 per cent) affirmed that they will take gender into account in implementing them. Of the members that referenced gender in their previous NDCs, some (20 per cent) elaborated more on the topic in their new or updated NDCs.

**Of the Parties that communicated new or updated NDCs after the adoption of the Glasgow Climate Pact, the shares that indicated mitigation options were 14–22 per cent higher than the corresponding shares of the 193 Parties in the latest available NDCs.** In particular, the shares of those Parties that indicated phasing down unabated coal power generation and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies and reforming fossil fuel subsidies were more than triple the corresponding shares of the 193 Parties. Many (50 per cent) Parties considered mitigation co-benefits resulting from their adaptation action and/or economic diversification plans. In their new or updated NDCs, more members reported on mitigation co-benefits of adaptation action and economic diversification plans, including information on specific projects, measures, and activities with the resulting co-benefits, compared with the information in their previous NDC. Discussions with the country governments suggest that the support from the Partnership has helped in improved awareness, planning, and developing the updated plans and implementation frameworks.

**The Partnership has successfully established itself as a credible global platform dedicated to NDCs, an accomplishment reflected in its expanded membership, now spanning 222 members.** Initially rallying for NDC preparation and then for their enhancement and implementation, the Partnership has bolstered its membership bringing together a range of partners with complementary expertise to deliver on ambitious climate action. As an endorsement of the Partnership's vision, its membership has witnessed an exponential increase—currently reflecting 222 members (126 countries (107 developing and 19 developed), 56 institutions and 40 associates). The Partnership's vast membership and exclusive focus on NDCs has consolidated its convening power and helped established itself as a “legitimate place for developing countries to seek assistance with respect to the NDCs and their enhancement”.

**Increase in membership has also created opportunity for greater synergies, voice, and credibility to advocate and implement NDCs.** The increase in Partnership has also created a greater access to new set of donors for technical and financial support as some of the island countries mentioned during the interviews. The Partnership's presence within governments was recognized as essential in securing buy-in from new donors, including smaller organizations in Latin America that lacked prior government engagement. Similarly, it has also helped many of the Developed countries, for example some Nordic countries like Denmark and Netherlands to support countries in Africa where they have limited presence and bilateral programs.

The NDC Partnership has also had a significant impact on increasing political ownership and awareness of climate and NDCs across various countries through its advocacy and outreach efforts, particularly evident in Francophone Africa. Interviews with stakeholders from some African countries like Burkina Faso and Niger highlighted the transformative role

of the Partnership in raising awareness about NDCs within governments. Increased political ownership and capacity building support through the embedded advisors and facilitators and have helped the countries to make incremental approach to a whole systems and gender inclusive approach resulting in improved alignment between climate and development agendas.

**The Partnership has been valued both by the developing countries and developed countries and its support has helped the countries in incremental progress towards achieving the NDC targets.** The Partnership Steering Committee annual progress report mentions that 84 countries reported of reduced GHG emissions on a year-on-year basis (2019-2020). Also, the report mentions that 74 out of 124 Partnership countries have reported to have enhanced adaptive capacity, strengthened resilience and reduced vulnerability.

As mentioned earlier, the Partnership has provided crucial support to 85 countries, with a strong 65 per cent response rate to country requests. In addition to the first responders' support that amounts to USD 1.7 billion, the allocation of USD 8.4 million through the Partnership Action Fund (PAF) and support for 33 countries in the development of Long-Term Low-Emission Development Strategies (LT-LEDs) and NDC enhancement through the Thematic Call have also been instrumental.

**While progress has been made in raising and enhancing NDC ambition and quality, determining the exact impact on achieving Paris Agreement targets may pose challenges. Country discussions indicate that achievements will fall short of the set targets as there are limited capacities and resources for implementation.** The Technical Discussion on the Global Stocktake 2023 also highlighted that though there is a global commitment, more effort and action is needed to increase both the mitigation ambition of NDCs and the implementation of measures to achieve their targets as the global emissions targets are likely to be missed and there is a rapidly narrowing window to raise ambition and implement existing commitments. The MTR team could not measure the level of GHG emissions reductions from the NDCs supported by the Partnership since there was not enough information. The M&E framework for the current work program 2021-2025 includes some promising indicators that could be used to estimate this if the Partnership is supporting reductions greater than those outside the Partnership. However, given that most of the countries are yet to establish MRV systems, the self-reported estimations may not be accurate. Our discussions at country level also show that achievement in the previous NDCs was much lower than the target. For example, Benin has achieved an emission reduction of 4 per cent against a target of 24 per cent. Country governments mentioned that in absence of resources, access to technologies and capacity there would be shortfall against targets.

Review of secondary literature and stakeholder discussions reflect that though various trainings, capacity building activities and knowledge events were conducted, institutional capacity to plan, mobilize resources and adopt whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches largely remains weak. There has been integration of NDCs in national or sectoral plans in many countries but not in all. Also, these have not percolated to sub-national levels nor are being integrated in the budgeting systems and inclusive policy making processes in most of the developing countries.

On access to climate finance and climate investment, **a key demand from countries for implementation of NDCs, the Partnership's work through the Finance Strategy, embedded advisors, workshops on Article 6, global events, the Central Bank Initiative on green finance, PAF etc.** have made contributions to member countries in terms of building knowledge and awareness for facilitating access to resources for climate action. The Partnership has supported Caribbean Central Bank on green finance, Rwanda on enabling environment for green gaps, establishing an environment unit in Ministry of Finance in Liberia, building capacity of officials in Zimbabwe for involving private sector in NDC implementation and in few other countries like São Tomé and Príncipe and, Jamaica, and others.

Though the support has been appreciated, discussions with stakeholders reflect that **these are necessary but inadequate to unlock larger strategic investment flows to the countries.** It is worth noting that these contributions are primarily in the form of small financial assistance and technical support with expectations that it would facilitate long-term investments. In many cases, these contributions represent one-off payments or support for specific projects or initiatives and are not systems-transformative in nature. Discussions also reflect that there has not much increase in investment flows, nor it has able to smoothen the process for accessing global funds.

**Advocacy at the global level has not been able to streamline processes for accessing finance from institutions like the Green Climate Fund (GCF) or other institutions nor are able to influence MDBs to increase investments significantly on NDCs in LDCs.** Overall, the support at country level has not made significant changes at macro-economic conditions nor policy and regulatory level to facilitate countries to leverage much additional finance or increased investment flows for NDCs barring in few countries like Rwanda. Most members interviewed, from all categories, indicated that boosting access to finance for NDC implementation to enable developing countries to implement their NDCs should be a priority for the Partnership. Beyond infrastructure projects, there is also a need for technical assistance for the policy reforms for attracting private finance. Furthermore, there is also much to learn and support on ensuring financial access for NDCs at the subnational level since much of the implementation will take place at this level.

**Data on finance flows is improving, but less is known about the impacts and outcomes of deployed climate finance.** Public international climate finance is advancing with respect to reporting methodologies, which enables providers to better understand and prioritize climate investments. However, the same level of sophistication and consistency in reporting is lacking from the private sector, as well as in public domestic budgets, which leads to data gaps. More broadly, there are knowledge gaps in impact, outcome, and outcome levels of climate finance that are important to assess their effectiveness.

#### 4.6 Sustainability

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***This section assesses the extent to which the NDC Partnership and its objectives are supported by members at various levels. It evaluates the extent to which the impacts of the Partnership are likely to continue and how well it is contributing to strengthening and building systems and stakeholder capacities to take the results forward.***

**Given the complexities of the issues, capacities, and challenges there is felt need for continued support of the Partnership. Many members have expressed the need for continued support, deepening engagement, and coordination for achieving the targets.** The Global Stocktake report also calls for international cooperation and credible and transparent actions by non-Party stakeholders to strengthen efforts for systems transformations. The MTR reflected a call for the Support Unit and the Partnership Steering Committee, particularly the Co-Chairs, to work towards maximizing the involvement of all members to address. This includes more constructive engagement with Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs); and critical developing countries like China and India (even though they are currently not members); and development partners that may not be currently involved in the Steering Committee. **Strengthening ownership and commitment from this diverse group of stakeholders is seen as a crucial step in advancing the Partnership's mission and expanding its impact.**

At the country level, the Work Plan mentions that **country governments should absorb the responsibilities of in-country facilitators after five years. However, many countries felt it is not feasible** given that most countries do not have resources to absorb the facilitators. The ambiguity in the contract tenure of the in-country facilitator is a concern that was widely echoed by some of the implementing partners. This acts a potential threat to the continuity and momentum of the Partnership's work in a country, given that the in-country facilitator is the "linchpin" of the success of the Partnership's country engagement process.

**Further, the inherently political nature of national-level climate action makes it challenging to anticipate how changes in government leadership may impact the Partnership's ongoing efforts.** For instance, in Panama, the sustainability of the Partnership's efforts is threatened by an upcoming presidential election. However, Focal Points have been working to establish a robust foundation, allowing for the continuity of ongoing initiatives by the next government. While the success of this approach depends on the specific context, it highlights the importance of institutionalizing mechanisms designed for long-term sustainability.

**Evaluative evidence from the country missions highlights that other than Rwanda the institutionalization of the processes is weak and there are significant capacity gaps.** In most countries visited like Benin, the engagement is driven by one or two champions or is entirely driven only by the in-country facilitator. **Overall, the extent to which these benefits, particularly in national climate coordination mechanisms and various processes, will endure over time is uncertain.** The presence and effectiveness of coordination mechanisms introduced by the Partnership vary widely among countries, and the utilization of valuable tools like Partnership Plans is inconsistent.



Financial and technical support, while valuable in the short term, **often face sustainability hurdles due to staff turnover and a loss of institutional memories.** The engagement of women and youth in climate planning and implementation is a long-term endeavour, still in its early stages in many countries. Similarly, the sustainability of civic engagement and whole-of-society consultation processes is contingent on their institutionalization and stakeholder commitment. One of the key issues brought forth during the interviews was the transfer of knowledge and capacity from the embedded advisors to the government staff for systems strengthening which are critical for sustainability. This is in tandem with the Technical Discussion on the Global Stocktake that calls for stronger capacity building efforts in developing countries. **While there has been progress, the long-term sustainability of these benefits will necessitate ongoing commitment and efforts from both countries and the NDC Partnership to ensure the endurance of these positive impacts.**

## 5. Lessons Learned, Conclusion, and Recommendations

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### 5.1 Lessons Learned

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1. One of the key lessons is that NDC actions are dependent on the political will and commitment of country governments. For building political traction, it is important that the actions to implement the NDCs highlight and address some of the key political priorities of developing country governments like jobs, economic growth, and energy requirements. Therefore, pitching for domestic resources and action should highlight the political and economic gains associated with NDC actions and energy transitions.
2. The “whole-of-society approach” is commendable and desirable. However, only capacity building on NDCs and coordination efforts may not lead to desired outcome. For fully imbibing the whole-of-society approach it is equally important to have communications with wider stakeholders, including civil society and country-level research organizations, and build synergies with other government/donor-funded program and initiatives supporting decentralization and local governance. This is important since the level of decentralization and institutional capacity at subnational levels is weak in many of the LDCs.
3. The other key lesson emerging from the MTR is that there is a need for a fine balance between neutrality and advising country governments on prioritization of requests. We understand that for the sake of neutrality, prioritization has not been given sufficient attention. Given the limited resources on climate finance, and short window of opportunity, it is important to guide countries on prioritization in a neutral fashion so that it leads to bigger and better impact on emissions reduction and adaptation.
4. Global literature review studies highlight that the effectiveness and success of platforms are dependent on shared responsibility and contribution. Thus, it is important to have a common alignment of purpose, shared ownership, and active engagement of all the members. Therefore, proper communication, voice, and participation in the decision-making process of the Partnership is important.
5. Another key lesson is that the NDC framework and actions are not separate from the overall development agenda and programs of the countries. Therefore, greater synergies with other development projects are important and critical especially with respect to adaptation measures for building a sustainable and climate-resilient infrastructure and practices.
6. Timely and adequate support is essential to achieve the Paris Agreement objectives. Raising ambition without a proper investment strategy and detailed and actionable implementation plans may not be useful.

### 5.2 Conclusion

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**Drawing from evidence at the global level and country missions, this MTR finds that the Partnership has supported and facilitated progress against the Paris Agreement objectives.** Developing countries are making progress on increased ambitions and are taking measures despite the limited resources to accelerate the implementation of NDCs. However, given the chasm between ambition and actions and ‘narrowing window to raise ambition and implement existing commitments’ there is a greater imperative and need for the Partnership to play a more comprehensive coordination role to convene and galvanise different actors to co-create solutions, build capacities, mobilise resources, and support implementation which is equitable and inclusive.

As mentioned in the Findings Section, the NDC Partnership has emerged as a strong global force on NDC enhancement and implementation. **Over the years the Partnership has effectively established itself as a credible, neutral, and dedicated platform for NDCs at the global level.** The Partnership fills a strong-felt gap in coordinating climate efforts at both the global and country levels through its inclusive whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches. The Partnership’s work rests on a country-driven approach and has helped elevate the voice and visibility countries’ climate needs to various development and implementation partners. **The Partnership has also played a paramount role in**

**elevating the political status of the NDCs, globally, establishing country ownership of NDC process and actions and assumed a front runner position on emerging issues on NDCs.**

**Notwithstanding its impressive achievements many observers mentioned that the Partnership is “acting on the fringes” of the global climate landscape and has yet to fully exploit the full potential of its large membership base to bring the desired outcomes.** This highlights the pressing need for improved communication, information-sharing mechanisms, and better coordination among partners to avoid redundancy and amplify the collective impact. The onus for this does not necessarily rest with the SU or the host institutions but on all the members towards the achievement of the Paris Agreement objectives. There is a need for active engagement of all partners and a sense of collective ownership and shared responsibilities.

**There is not only a greater need for deeper and better engagement of with existing partners but also a pressing need to expand and diversify the pool of engaged partners including players like the GCF, philanthropies, sovereign debt funds and other private sector partners.** The private sector is not formally a part of the Partnership even though it is being recognized as the cornerstone for increasing the scale of finance and implementation. There is need for improved communication on the roles, responsibilities, and functions of NDC Partnership as many developing countries perceive the Partnership as a funding agency or delivery partner and IPs or other agencies perceive the Partnership as a competing agency. To address these, it is important to strengthen the existing governance, management, and operations of the Partnership for ensuring efficiency and effectiveness of the support.

For bridging the chasm between ambition and action there is critical need for addressing the financing and capacity gaps. It is well documented that countries collectively need USD 5.8-5.9 trillion to deliver the NDCs. While the Partnership is attempting to address these, **this requires more collaborative and complementary approaches among members.** There is demand for universal access to finance and not just in volume but also in terms of efficient and effective access to resources. Despite the importance accorded to climate finance by the Partnership, there remains a strong need for support scaled-up mobilization of public finance to de-risk private capital and crowding in private finance to enhance access for developing countries. Simplified and improved access to climate finance can allow for the more rapid deployment of urgently needed finance while also better serving local needs. Multilateral development banks and other international financial institutions have potential to evolve and strengthen their roles, mitigate financial risks, lower investment costs, enhance access to finance and address debt sustainability. **NDC Partnership through its members especially the Development partners have a constructive role to play to influence the multilateral banks’ decisions, and push for reforming the processes and instruments for climate finance.** This will also strengthen the enabling environment at the country level to address the overarching challenges in attracting investments.

While the Partnership’s flexible support and TA related initiatives have been praised, there exists a trade-off size and nature of the support offered vis-à-vis unlocking long-term strategic impact. Here, there is an opportunity to balance between delivering rapid responses that address immediate needs and the risk of providing only temporary solutions rather than enabling countries to unlock support for long-term strategic climate action and socio-economic outcomes.

The recent technical dialogue under the first global stocktake highlighted that global emissions are not in line with modelled global mitigation pathways consistent with the Paris Agreement goals. It highlighted that much more ambition, action and support is needed across all sectors and systems to implement Paris aligned measures. Additionally, there is also a need to align with each country’s LT-LEDS towards just transitions to net zero emissions by or around 2050, while also enhancing transparency. It must be noted that the NDC Partnership is taking steps towards the same.

**Lastly, one of the key lessons from the MTR is that the NDCs are negotiated political documents rather than purely technical documents.** In this light, it is imperative to foster a heightened sense of political ownership both at the global and country levels. At the national level, this would need the strengthening of ministerial coordination and mainstreaming of NDC actions through the national plans and budgets which so far have mostly remained on paper or partially achieved in most countries. Further, these have not percolated to sub-national level nor are being integrated in the budgeting systems and policy making processes in most of the developing countries.

Thus, in summary, it is critical for the Partnership to fully harness the complete potential of its extensive membership to achieve the desired results. **The recommendations stemming from the MTR necessitates active involvement from all partners (and not just the SU or host institutions) and a sense of collective ownership and shared responsibilities.** This underscores the urgent requirement for enhanced communication, mechanisms for sharing information, and improved collaboration among partners to prevent duplication and magnify their collective impact.

## 5.3 Recommendations

### Strategic Recommendations

#### Bolster Country Engagement

- Given that the current country engagement model and human resources are concentrated in Bonn and Washington levels, the Partnership Support Unit is perceived to lack sufficient presence in the countries where it works. **Thus, the MTR recommends a decentralized country engagement model with larger teams at the regional levels.** Additionally, allocating fewer countries per country engagement specialist who are currently overstretched will ensure adequate division of workload and help enhance the depth and effectiveness of the Partnership's country engagement work.
 

[Support Unit and Steering Committee]
- The in-country facilitator's neutrality is one of the critical keystones of their ability to drive the Partnership's work at the country level. However, this neutrality is compromised when the position's contracting is led by a donor or agency while also contributing to confusion about their affiliation. **Therefore, the MTR suggests that the contracting and management of the in-country facilitators should be brought under a single and neutral management structure, potentially the Support Unit. Alternatively, DPs/IPs (the contracting body) should ensure the facilitators' independence and autonomy with reporting lines to the SU and the country governments.** This will mitigate the currently perceived conflict of interest and will also create direct accountability of the facilitators as well as stronger feedback mechanisms back to the SU to further strengthen country engagement.
 

[Steering Committee, Development Partners, Implementing Partners, SU]
- Capacity building and technical assistance are central to unlocking wide-ranging and sustained climate action. They require effective country-led and needs-based cooperation to ensure capacities are enhanced and retained over time, as also highlighted during the recent Global Stocktake consultations. With country-led approaches being at the heart of the Partnership's success, it **should strengthen existing capacity-building activities to address the identified needs to guide and support countries in formulating requests with long-term strategic objectives.** This could potentially involve leading and building collaboration providing training and resources to enhance the quality of requests, ensuring alignment with outcome-driven objectives while upholding the country-driven approach. This will allay the concern on country requests being "ad hoc". Additionally, the Partnership should explore the aggregation of smaller projects with similar strategic intent if the timing of requests across countries aligns, and further sharing information about successful models across countries to inform the work of other member countries. **This approach will establish a catalytic link between advisory support and unlocking investments whilst also improving overall efficiency.**

[Steering Committee, SU and Developing Countries]

#### Widen and Deepen Partner Engagement

- The review also highlighted that the global level endorsement and coordination of the Partnership has not adequately percolated to the country level. Also, despite improvements, insufficient coordination among different partners remains a key deterrent to NDC implementation at both the country and global levels. This points towards weak vertical and horizontal coordination. **The responsibility of improving coordination lies with all Partnership members** - they have to improve internal coordination (for example, bolstering communication and coordination among development partner HQ and country embassies) and also among themselves, especially at the country level on NDCs. Further, the developing countries need to strengthen their coordination with DPs/IPs around their identified needs through dedicated staff and objectives. **Additionally, the SU can support this objective by adopting a well-defined Partner Engagement Strategy at various levels and shared ownership of NDC outcomes, as pointed out by several SU staff.** Further, establishing robust communication channels to bridge information gaps regarding incoming requests for support and ensuring that resources are utilized efficiently. Moreover, there is a critical need to enhance donor coordination and engagement at the country level. **By promoting a collaborative approach among donors, overlapping initiatives can be identified and mitigated, thus streamlining efforts, and maximizing the impact of development projects through synergies.**

[Implementation, Development Partners, Developing Countries and SU]

- While the Partnership has successfully adopted an ambitious and well-aligned Major Emerging Economy Strategy, evaluative evidence suggested varied success in terms of actual engagement, especially with critical players such as Brazil. In addition, the Partnership may want to consider engaging non-members MEEs, such as China, and India (who are currently not mentioned in the strategy). One of the reasons cited for the uneven engagement is that, unlike smaller countries, MEEs generally have more capacity to improve the quality of their NDCs and raise resources for NDC implementation through other avenues, independently. While this may be true, it could be beneficial to engage these countries not only from the point of view of impact but also for them to share their experiences with others and possibly benefit from the Partnership approach. **Thus, efforts must be made to identify differentiated approaches and instruments for MEE and raise the visibility of the Partnership's benefits to Major and Emerging Economies (MEEs) to engage them more constructively. The Steering Committee co-chairs should play an active role in reaching out to the climate change Focal Points of those countries, on behalf of the Partnership and the opportunities for these countries to play a leading role in climate action.**

[Steering Committee, SU]

- The recent Global Stocktake Technical Dialogue pointed out that Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) have the potential to evolve and strengthen their landscape, enhance access to finance, mitigate financial risks, lower investment costs and address debt sustainability. Notwithstanding their critical role in the global climate landscape, the engagement between the NDC Partnership and MDBs was reported to be inadequate. **In this context, it is imperative to collaboratively develop a strategy with MDBs to incentivize and closely work together on implementing NDCs at both the global and country levels within the ambit of the Partnership.** In this light, the SU can strengthen ongoing coordination to align and leverage the expertise and resources of the MDBs on an ongoing basis. Likewise, MDBs should engage more proactively as Partnership members by aligning their resources to respond to country requests surfaced through the Partnership (including contributing to and using Partnership planning processes/outputs supported by the Partnership (e.g. NDC Implementation Plans/Partnership Plans) to inform their programming, using the Partnership as a platform to coordinate with other DPs/IPs). This is critical given the demand and access to finance. MDBs can play a critical role in providing long term finance for project implementation.

[MDBs, Steering Committee, and SU]

### Strengthening Access to Finance for NDC Implementation

- The Partnership has rightly prioritized the mobilization of climate finance for developing countries, helping them address both demand and supply side issues. That said, there are opportunities to strengthen the Partnership's work in this regard. **The Partnership can actively pursue collaborations with new types of funders** like philanthropic organizations and sovereign wealth funds. This diversification of funding sources will not only bolster financial resources but also bring unique perspectives and expertise to the initiative. Moreover, a concerted effort should be made to engage private capital funds and owners, encouraging their investment in alliance with MDBs to promote blended finance solutions. **The Partnership should actively facilitate this collaboration, creating an environment conducive to private sector involvement.**

**Furthermore, there is a need to foster greater exchange and technical assistance involving key stakeholders** like ministries of finance, regulators, supervisors, and financial actors from the supported countries. This will ensure a more comprehensive and tailored approach to financial facilitation. **Additionally, the SU should play a facilitating role in ensuring technical and advisory through support from IPs/DPs and MDBs on policy and regulatory reforms, capacity building, and strengthening Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).** With shrinking ODA budgets, it is equally important that developing countries explore alternative sources of finance – blended finance, private sector, which can materialise through improved enabling environments. Lastly, in collaboration with the Partnership platform and global boards, it is crucial for Developed Countries to engage closely, facilitate, and influence MDBs and players like the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to streamline and simplify their processes and systems.

[Steering Committee, MDBs, Development Partners, Implementing Partners and SU]

### Gaining Political Traction

- For improved traction, the Partnership's engagement needs to move up the political ladder and **directly or indirectly align and support key development (and political) priorities of developing countries.** Climate mitigation and adaptation are both technical and political processes. Therefore, it is vital for the Partnership to be **present in international political discussions and exchanges to unfold its full potential across the table.**

[Steering Committee, Development Partners and SU]

## Re-Focusing Knowledge and Learning Efforts

- **To bolster knowledge and learning, the SU should prioritize initiatives that enhance usability, broaden reach, and increase usage of resources.** This entails a targeted focus on country-specific information, key thematic areas, and the practical aspects of NDC implementation. Overall, the Partnership should concentrate on its unique value proposition. This involves using the data on country requests and responses, NDC activities and donor mapping. Furthermore, there should be a concerted effort towards technical analysis (e.g. sharing of best practices and information analysis to inform programming and investments) and the facilitation of learning events and exchanges.  
[Support Unit, Implementing Partners and Development Partners]

## Operational Recommendations

### Strengthening the Steering Committee's Governance Mechanisms

- High-level consultations highlighted that the Steering Committee acts as a medium for ex-post validation of pre-taken decisions. This necessitates the Steering Committee to be made more inclusive and transparent. **The SC meetings must be utilized as a space for decision-making.** The quality of discussions during the meetings can also be improved by involving all members in setting the agenda for the bi-Annual meetings ahead of time. Most importantly, there must be a **culture of transparent sharing and discussion on financial decisions and budget utilization** and reporting to instil a sense of ownership and trust.  
[Co-Chairs and Support Unit]
- **Improved coordination among representatives from developing countries, especially before the SC meeting is critical to ensure that the voices from the Global South are amplified in the Steering Committee meetings.** In general, there is a need for stronger mobilization of developing countries for critical meetings which could also aid the countries' complementarity in approach, bargaining power for reforms and sharing concerns or learnings to the wider group of participants.  
[Developing Country Chair and Developing Country SC Members]
- Various Steering Committee members also shared that the Steering Committee mostly involves highly active members raising a concern on how the Partnership engages with non-active Partnership members. **Therefore, the Support Unit along with the Co-Chairs should institute some forum or process to engage with other major donors and critical partners who are not on the Steering Committee for better strategic alignment.**

[Co-Chairs and Support Unit]

### Reducing Transaction Costs

- A key finding stemming from the light touch assessment of the PAF was the small-budget requests and the comparatively high transaction costs. **Therefore, there is a need for streamlining internal processes to reduce transaction costs and timeliness for responding to requests to avoid dampening IPs' interest.** In addition, streamlining operations across different processes (country requests, PAF, etc.), will also reduce transaction costs and ensure timely responses. Practical actionable steps could involve establishing a centralized request management system, leveraging technology to automate processes, and defining clear workflows. This will not only expedite responses but will also minimize administrative burdens.

[Support Unit, UNOPs and WRI]

### Improve MEL Culture, Reporting and Supporting with MRV Systems

- The Support Unit should **adopt standard results-based management practices** in donor reporting highlighting achievements (outputs and outcomes) against financial spending. The inclusion of **qualitative aspects** in Steering Committee reports focusing on the effective depth of engagement will make results reporting more comprehensive. **Strengthen data collection processes and validation mechanisms through participatory assessment techniques.** This includes a more robust assessment of the quality of engagement, the content and impact of NDCs, and the overall results achieved. Establishing a strong culture of learning from data and evidence beyond accountability needs within the SU. Specifically, better utilize the M&E and Member Survey data for the Annual Work Planning process and periodic reflections.

[Support Unit and Steering Committee]

- **Strengthen support to country governments in establishing MRV systems.** This is critical to measure the impact of the interventions on emission reduction and adaptation. This will also help the programmes to take course corrective actions.

**[Implementing, Development Partners and Developing Countries]**

## Annexures

### Annexure 1: Documents Reviewed

S.No.	Name of the Document
1.	2021-2025 Work Program - Progress Report in Full
2.	2021-2025 Work Program - Abbreviated Progress Report
3.	Support Gap Summary for Gender
4.	Updated Country Engagement Strategy, 2022
5.	Updated Knowledge and Learning Strategy, 2022
6.	Finance Strategy
7.	Major and Emerging Economy Strategy
8.	Gender Strategy
9.	Youth Engagement Plan
10.	Global Support Trends Analysis
11.	Key Partner Support Mechanisms
12.	Finance Strategy Implementation Update
13.	2022 Associate Membership Engagement Review
14.	2018-2020 Work External Evaluation Report
15.	Co-chairs Term and Rotation
16.	Support Trends Across the Partnership, August 2022
17.	Partnership in Action Reports 2022 and 2021
18.	2021-2025 Work Program Full Progress Report, Spring 2023
19.	Finance Strategy Implementation Update 2023
20.	2021-2025 Work Program Full Progress Report, Spring 2022
21.	Climate Action Enhancement Package 2025
22.	Partnership Action Fund Operating Manual
23.	Partnership Action Fund Progress Report, March 2023
24.	NDC Partnership Steering Committee Terms of Reference
25.	United Nations Climate Change Annual Report 2022

## Annexure 2: Stakeholders Consulted under the MTR

### Global-Level Interviews

#### Steering Committee Members

S.No.	Name	Position	Organization
<b>Rwanda</b>			
1.	Ariane Zingiro	Director General of National Planning	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
	Beatrice Cyiza	Director General of Environment and Climate Change	Ministry of Environment
	Theophile Dusengimana	Environment and Climate Change Policy Specialist	Ministry of Environment
	Patrick Karera	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Environment
<b>The United Kingdom</b>			
2.	Fran Walker	Principal Policy Advisor	Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ)
<b>Jamaica</b>			
3.	Claire Bernard	Deputy Director General, Sustainable Development and Social Planning	Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ)
	Omar Alcock	Senior Technical Officer (Mitigation), Climate Change Division	Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation
<b>Germany</b>			
4.	Flora Hartmann	Senior Policy Officer Climate and Development Partnerships	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
	Till Tibbe	Policy Officer	Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK)
<b>The Netherlands</b>			
5.	René van Hell	Director, Inclusive Green Growth and Ambassador for Sustainable Development	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Gersom van der Elst	Senior Policy Advisor Climate Adaptation	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>Norway</b>			
6.	Lars Andreas Lunde	Assistant Director	National Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad)
	Ragnhild Marie Falkenberg Valstad	Senior Adviser	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>Sweden</b>			
7.	Louise Herrmann	Senior Policy Advisor in Environment and Climate	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)
	Nicki Khorram-Manesh	Climate Diplomacy	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Dag Sjöögren	Head of Climate Team	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>Denmark</b>			
8.	Tomas Anker	Climate Ambassador	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Signe Köllner Christensen	Head of Section	Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities (MEUC)
	Andreas Møller Iversen	Head of Section, Department for International Relations	Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities (MEUC)
	Merete Villum Pedersen	Head of section	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>United States of America (USA)</b>			
9.	Emily Weeks	Senior Policy Advisor, Natural Resource Management, Land Resource Governance	US Agency for International Development (USAID)
<b>Indonesia</b>			



10.	Yulia Suryanti	Director of Mitigation of Climate Change	Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK)
	Emma Rachmawaty	Head of Task Force of Second NDC Indonesia	Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK)
<b>Colombia</b>			
11.	Luis Alejandro Noguera	NDC Partnership Facilitator for Climate Finance	National Department of Planning (DNP)
<b>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</b>			
12.	Jennifer Baumwoll	Climate Promise Global Coordinator	UNDP
	Christian Glass	Senior Advisor, Climate Change	UNDP
<b>World Bank</b>			
13.	Sudharshan Canagarajah	Practice Manager for Strategy, Knowledge and Learning	World Bank Group
<b>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)</b>			
14.	Gerrit Held	Climate Finance & Carbon Markets Associate, Climate Strategy and Regional Delivery (CSRD)	EBRD
	Sung-Ah Kyun	Head of Green Policy and Climate Analytics, Associate Director, Climate Strategy and Regional Delivery (CSRD)	EBRD
	Jan-Willem van de Ven	Head of International Policy and Engagement, Associate Director, Climate Strategy and Regional Delivery (CSRD)	EBRD
<b>International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)</b>			
15.	Elizabeth Press	Director of Planning and Programme Support	IRENA
	Claire Kiss	Associate Programme Officer – Planning and Programme Support	IRENA
<b>World Resources Institute (WRI)</b>			
16.	Craig Hanson	Managing Director of Programs	WRI
<b>United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)</b>			
17.	Gurel Gurkan	Head of Programme, Austria Multi-country office (AUMCO)	UNOPS
	Katrin Lichtenberg	Vienna Representative and Head of Portfolio for Water Environment and Climate Change, AUMCO	UNOPS
	Markus Schnall	Regional Fund Manager, Southeast Asia Energy Transitions	UNOPS

### Developing Countries (Non-Steering Committee Members)

S.No.	Name	Position	Organization
1.	Juan Carlos Torrico	Director of the Joint Mitigation and Adaptation Mechanism	Ministry of Environment and Water, Bolivia,
2.	Ulises Fernandez Gomez	Director of International Relations	Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment, Cuba,
3.	Harouna Ramata Abba Kiari	Secretary	Ministry of Environment, Niger
4.	Do Etienne Traore	National Focal Point for UNFCCC, Permanent Secretariat of the National	Council for Sustainable Development, Burkina Faso
5.	Ahmed Waheed	Director, Climate Change Department	Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, and Technology, Maldives
6.	Maia Tskhvaradze	Acting Head of Climate Change Division	Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture (MEPA), Georgia

7.	Iniobong Abiola-Awe	Director of the Department of Climate Change	Federal Ministry of Environment (FMEnv), Nigeria
8.	Edidiong Aboje	NDC Desk Officer	Federal Ministry of Environment (FMEnv), Nigeria
9.	Salisu Dahiru	Director General, National Council on Climate Change (NCCC)	Office of Vice President, Nigeria
10.	Michael Ivenso	National Council on Climate Change (NCCC)	Office of Vice President, Nigeria

#### Developed Countries (Non-Steering Committee Members)

S.No.	Name	Position	Organization
<b>Belgium</b>			
1.	Annemarie Vanderavort	Directorate General International Cooperation and Humanitarian Help	Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation
2.	Camille Reyniers	Climate Change Policy Expert	Federal Public Service Health, Food Chain Safety and Environment
3.	Marine Lugen	Climate Change Policy Expert	Federal Public Service Health, Food Chain Safety and Environment

#### Institutional Members (Non-Steering Committee Members)

S.No.	Name	Position	Organization
1.	Jerome Malavelle	Finance Unit, Energy and Climate Branch	United Nations Environment Programme
2.	Unnikrishnan Nair	Head of Climate change	Commonwealth Secretariat (COMSEC)
3.	Anna Lena Mohrmann	Associate Policy Officer	European Investment Bank (EIB)
4.	Katrin Riedel	Mandate Officer	European Investment Bank (EIB)
5.	Isabella Van Grunderbeeck	Head of Unit	European Investment Bank (EIB)
6.	Holger Treidel	Head of the Environmental Programme	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
7.	Kirstin Huecking	Climate Policy Advisor	GIZ
8.	Michelle Pena Nelz	Senior Climate Policy Advisor	GIZ
9.	Dennis Mutschler-Neumann	GIZ NDC Assist	GIZ
10.	Silvia Brugger	GIZ Coordinator Climate Governance EUROCLIMA+ Programme	EUROCLIMA+ Programme
11.	Shirley Matheson	Global NDC Enhancement Coordinator	World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)
12.	Frances Fuller	Head of Offices and Director of New York Office	Climate Analytics
13.	Jan Sindt	Head of Implementation Strategies Team	Climate Analytics
14.	Andres Mogro	Manager of the Climate Change Programme	Fundacion Avina
15.	Virginia Scardamaglia	Climate Change Officer	Fundacion Avina
16.	Kiryssa Kasprzyk	Senior Manager, Climate Change Policy	Conservation International
17.	Annie Mendes	Manager, Multilateral and US Government Relations	Conservation International
18.	Peter Mulbah	Country Director Liberia	Conservation International

## Country-Level Interviews

### Benin

S.No.	Name	Position	Organization
1.	Wilfried Mongazi	Director General	Ministry of Environment and Transport
2.	Raphael Koudjou	Director General	Ministry of Economy and Finance
3.		Representative	Ministry of Energy, Water, and Mines
4.		Representative	Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries
5.	Andreea Tanasa	Programme Officer	EU Delegation for Energy in Benin
6.	Hermann Fickinger	Coordinator	GIZ
7.	Basile Marius Gandonou	Programme Manager	UNDP Benin
8.	Imane Bourkhane	Representative (Adaptation)	AFD in Benin
9.		Representative	FAO Benin
10.		Representative	Chamber of Commerce and Industry
11.		Representative	Employers' Association of the Private Sector
12.	Olaodjewou Odjougebe	In-Country Facilitator	NDC Partnership
13.	Imane Chafiq	Country Engagement Specialist	NDC Partnership
14.	Mohamed Boussaid	Regional Manager	NDC Partnership

### Rwanda

S.No.	Name	Position	Organization
1.	Patrick Karera -	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Environment (MoE)
2.	Ariane Zingiro	Director General of National Planning	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
3.	Beatrice Cyiza	Director General of Environment and Climate Change	Ministry of Environment
4.	Theophile Dusengimana	Environment and Climate Change Policy Specialist	Ministry of Environment
5.	Fred Sabiti	Representative	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
6.	Juliet Kabera	Deputy General	Rwandan Environment Management Authority (REMA)
7.	Faustin	Deputy Director General	Rwandan Environment Management Authority (REMA)
8.	Alex Mulisa	Strategic Advisor	Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance
9.	Teddy Mugabo Sandrine Kamikazi Yvan Rugwizangoga Felicien Bamporineza	Representatives	Rwanda Green Fund (FONERWA)
10.	Nick Barigye	CEO	Kigali International Financial Center (KIFC)
11.	Hortense Mudenge	Representative	Rwanda Finance Limited
12.	Rousseau Malaika	Representative	Rwanda Finance Limited
13.	Gwilym Jones	Representative	British High Commission/Department of Business, Energy, Industrial Strategy (BEIS)
14.	Tobias Cossen	Representative	Germany Embassy/GIZ
15.	Immaculee Uwimana	Representative	UNDP
16.	Aurelia Calabro	Representative	UNIDO
17.	Tabitha Benegusenga	Former Facilitator	NDC Partnership
18.	Margaret Barihaihi	Regional Manager	NDC Partnership

### Panama

S.No.	Name	Position	Organization
1.	Ligia Castro de Doens	Director of Climate Change and Advisor to the Minister of the Environment	Ministry of Environment
2.	Vilma Alfú	Head of the Climate Action Department	Ministry of Environment
3.	Maribel Pinto	Head of the Adaptation and Resilience Department	Ministry of Environment
4.	Guadalupe Gonzalez	Director of the National Secretary of Energy	Department of Energy
5.	Alejandro Augusto Vernaza	Director	Ministry of Economy and Finance
6.	Nicholas Timothy Smith	Senior Financial Sector Specialist	World Bank
7.	William Holness	Climate Ambition and Transparency Coordinator	UNEP Panama
8.	María del Carmen Ruiz-Jaén	Community-based Forestry and Forest Monitoring Specialist for Latin America	FAO Panama
9.	Jessica Young	Environmental Climate Change and Sustainable Development Country Manager	UNDP Panama
10.	Esperanza Gonzalez Mahecha	Climate Change Specialist	Inter-American Development Bank
11.	Thomas Hickey	Project Director	The Pew Charitable Trusts.
12.	Gianluca Merlo	Technical Advisor, UNDP Climate Strategies and Policy for Latin America and the Caribbean	UNDP
13.	Fernando Andrade	Climate Change Regional specialist for Latin America and the Caribbean	UNDP
14.	Roberto de la Cruz	In-Country Facilitator	NDC Partnership
15.	Julianne Baker Gallegos	Country Engagement Specialist	NDC Partnership

## Mongolia

S.No.	Name	Position	Organization
1.	Tserendulam Shagdarsuren	Director General	Climate Change Department, Ministry of Environment
2.	Balchinluvsan	Director General	Ministry of Planning
3.	Saruul Dolgorsuren	National Project Coordinator	UNDP
4.	Annaka Peterson	Country Director	Global Green Growth Institute
5.	Vinod Ahuja	Country Representative	FAO
6.	Giovanni Ruta	Lead Environmental Economist	World Bank
7.		EU Delegation	
8.			Bank of Mongolia
9.	Deo Gabinete	Regional Manager Asia-Pacific	NDC Partnership
10.	Sukhragcha Mijidsuren	In-Country Facilitator	NDC Partnership
11.	Tamir EnkhAmgalan	Technical support	FAO/NDC Partnership
12.	Syeda Hadika Jamshaid	Country Engagement Specialist	NDC Partnership