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Emendatio ex 13:10, 13 Martii 2015
Universalismus moralis, etiam obiectivismus moralis et moralitas universalis appellatus, est status meta-ethicus qui dicit nonnullam ethicarum rationem, vel ethicam universam, in universum adhiberi, hoc est, pro "omnibus singulis similiter sitis,"[1] neglegens culturam, phylen, sexum, religionem, nationalitatem, propensionem sexualem, vel alias proprietates distinctas.[2] Universalismus moralis nihilismo morali et relativismo morali adversatur; non omnes autem formae universalismi moralis absolutisticae, nec necessario monismus pretiorum sunt; multa universalismi genera, sicut utilitarianismus, sunt non absolutisti, et nonnulla, sicut ratio Isaiae Berlin, pluralistica erga pretia esse possunt.
Praeter rationes realismi moralis, universalismus moralis alias comprehendit rationes morales cognitivisticas, sicut subiectivistica ratio spectatoris perfecti et ratio iussorum divinorum, et ratio moralis noncognitivistica[3] praescriptivismi universalis.[4]
Vide etiam
Notae
- ↑ Garth Kemerling, "Philosophy Pages," www.philosophypages.com, 12 Novembris 2011: "According to Immanuel Kant and Richard Mervyn Hare, . . . moral imperatives must be regarded as equally binding on everyone."
- ↑ Chris Gowans, "Moral Relativism," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (ed. vere 2012), 8 Decembris 2008: "Let us say that moral objectivism maintains that moral judgments are ordinarily true or false in an absolute or universal sense, that some of them are true, and that people sometimes are justified in accepting true moral judgments (and rejecting false ones) on the basis of evidence available to any reasonable and well-informed person."
- ↑ Noncognitivismus est "A meta-ethical theory according to which moral issues are not subject to rational determination. Dealing with values, not facts, moral assertions are neither true nor false, but merely express attitudes, feelings, desires, or demands." Philosophy Pages.
- ↑ Praescriptivismus universalis est "R. M. Hare's contention that the use of moral language conveys an implicit commitment to act accordingly. Thus, for example, saying that 'Murder is wrong' not only entails acceptance of a universalizable obligation not to kill, but also leads to avoidance of the act of killing." Philosophy Pages.
Bibliographia
- Browning, Don, ed. 2006. Universalism vs. Relativism: Making Moral Judgments in a Changing, Pluralistic, and Threatening World. Lanham Terrae Mariae: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0742550893, ISBN 9780742550896.
- Richardson, Henry S., et Melissa S. Williams. 2009. Moral Universalism and Pluralism. Novi Eboraci: New York University Press. ISBN 9780814794487. ISBN 0814794483.
Nexus externi
- "The Middle Way as the basis of moral objectivity," www.moralobjectivity.net