



FREEDOM IN THE WORLD

POLITICAL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES

1984~1985

Raymond D. Gastil

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Freedom in the World

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

1984-1985

A FREEDOM HOUSE BOOK

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Raymond D. Gastil

With Essays by

Samuel P. Huntington
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.
Leonard R. Sussman



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Preface

Americans have many foreign policy interests. For most citizens our economic and security relations are foremost, and our foreign policy is directed primarily to securing these interests. However, in the long run the future of our country will only be secured in a free and democratic world. From this perspective achieving this world is both a vital interest of Americans and a vital interest of all peoples. To help us in understanding where we are in the struggle to achieve this world and to keep the relevance of this issue before the public, Freedom House has supported the Comparative Survey of Freedom since 1972.

This yearbook marks the twelfth year of the Comparative Survey and is the sixth edition in the Freedom House series of annual publications. Previous yearbooks, in addition to focusing on the Comparative Survey, have emphasized different aspects of freedom and human rights. The first yearbook, the 1978 edition, examined basic theoretical issues of freedom and democracy and assessed the record of the Year of Human Rights. The second yearbook reported a conference on the potential internal and external factors promoting press and trade union freedoms, the struggle for democracy in Iran, elections in Zimbabwe, and the relationship between human rights policy and morality. The 1981 yearbook contained essays and discussions from a Freedom House conference on the prospects for freedom in Muslim Central Asia. The 1982 yearbook emphasized a variety of approaches to economic freedom and its relation to political and civil freedom. The 1983-84 yearbook addressed the problems of corporatism, and the health of democracy in the third world. It also incorporated the papers and discussions of a conference held at Freedom House on supporting democracy in mainland China and Taiwan.

In addition to the materials of the Comparative Survey the 1984-1985 yearbook considers aspects of the current UNESCO controversy, and includes reports on elections in El Salvador and Panama. (A Freedom House report on the 1984 election in Nicaragua will be available shortly.) We return this year to the themes of the first yearbook: the definition of democracy and freedom and a consideration of their development. The particular problems of democracy in Central America and of the general history and diffusion of democracy are analyzed. This year the country

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summaries are augmented for the first time by summaries for the related territories.

We acknowledge, once again, the contribution made by the advisory panel for the Comparative Survey. The panel consists of: Robert J. Alexander, Richard W. Cottam, Herbert J. Ellison, Seymour Martin Lipset, Lucian W. Pye, Leslie Rubin, Giovanni Sartori, Robert Scalapino, and Paxil Seabury. We would also like to thank the Academy of Independent Scholars in Boulder, Colorado and Hillsdale College for the opportunity to develop further a few of the ideas in this yearbook.

We also express our appreciation to those foundations whose grants have made the Survey and the publication of this yearbook possible. We are especially grateful for the continuing primary assistance provided to the Survey by the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust. The Survey and all Freedom House activities are also assisted by the generous support of individual members of the organization as well as trade unions, corporations, and public foundations which contribute to our general budget. No financial support from any government—now or in the past—has been either solicited or accepted.

We also acknowledge the research and editorial assistance of Jeannette C. Gastil in producing this yearbook.

PART I

The Survey in 1984

Introduction: Freedom in the Comparative Survey

It is the natural right of all people to have an equal share in the governance of their society and to reach consensus through open discussion with their fellow citizens on the nature of their society. To support this proposition, the Comparative Survey of Freedom was first published in 1973; it has appeared annually in the Freedom House journal, *Freedom at Issue*.¹ Since 1978 the Survey has also been included in *Freedom in the World*.² In the Survey, democracy is seen as the institutional form of freedom in the modern world. From the point of view of the Survey, "freedom" is essentially internal political freedom and the necessary context of that freedom.

While the individuals and organizations that support the Survey are interested in a variety of national and international issues, it has been from the beginning a central principle of the Survey that it not be influenced or sidetracked by the demands of current or prospective policy concerns. Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile, and Poland should be seen through the same lens and judged on the same basis. Each year there has been one or more challenges to this principle, but by and large it has been preserved. This year the decision to improve the rating of Iran may seem an affront to some Americans. Iran's leaders certainly do not appeal to most of us; the horrors they have inflicted on those they disagree with are indefensible. Yet as in Poland, South Africa, and so many other troubled countries, there are elements of democracy and pluralism in their behavior that we must also recognize in a fair-minded analysis.

Freedom should be distinguished from independence or group self-determination. Many an autocrat has come to power through his appeal as a defender or advocate of his group's right to self-determination. This has been a major part of the appeal of Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Castro to their respective peoples. Yet as the history of Haiti has shown repeatedly, national independence has little to do with individual or even group freedom. The

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Haitian people would be freer today if they had never gained their independence from France in the bloody struggles for independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Certainly the people in the French dependencies of Guadeloupe and Martinique are "freer," as well as the many peoples around them that remained with the British Empire until recently. Nevertheless, interest in political democracy and group freedom overlap, for, if framed in a democratic context, the desire for greater self-determination for minorities in great states, or of colonies in empires, is a justified concern of democrats.

It is our belief that people everywhere are interested in the freedoms with which we are concerned, and that if they come to experience them and feel they have a reasonable chance to secure them, they will rise in their defense. Evidence for this is contained in a recent report of the Indian "People's Union for Civil Liberties." After decrying the many problems for civil liberties in India the report continues:

It is a tribute to the resilience of the Indian people that when the State is becoming the oppressor of the people, and the institutional decay has left the people unprotected, scores of local action groups, of tribals, landless, workers in unorganized sectors, bonded labour, students, journalists, and women have started to assert themselves in defense of the values of the civil society. It is a measure of their success, though as yet modest and fractional, that the government has had to beat a retreat on the proposed Forest Bill, withdraw the Bihar Press Bill, initiate a bill on criminal assaults against women, revise minimum wages, and move slightly forward on the bonded labour issue. The compulsions created by the energized public opinion, with excellent support from higher echelons of the judiciary and a section of the Press have generated a new democratic force in the country.³

Although as the foregoing quote suggests electoral processes are not the only source of change in democratic societies, freedom as defined in the Survey of Freedom requires that a people has a proven right to change their government through their politically equal votes, and that they are free to organize and propagandize for the purpose of achieving these changes. Only with the possession of these rights can the people be the sponsor of their political system, and government employees be their servants.⁴

The first set of rights are political rights and the second set, which alone make the first effective, are civil liberties.

With this in mind, the Comparative Survey is based on separate scales for Political and Civil Rights. There is no attempt at absolute ranking. It would not be useful to try to rank all 165 or so independent nations in one list, like tennis players. It is hard enough to assign nations to generalized categories in a relatively simple scheme.

For both political and civil rights there is an informal checklist of questions to be considered when making judgments. It should be emphasized that the answers to these questions are not assigned additive values. It is necessary to look at patterns of answers, and ask whether, in terms of democracy, country A belongs with countries with similar ratings, or belongs above or below that level.

The checklist for political rights asks whether the chief authority in a country is elected or has been recently elected by a meaningful process. This includes consideration of the many levels of choice offered the voter, varying from no choice at all to pre-selected one-party choices, to government approved choices (as, for example, in Iran), to choices and candidates beyond the control of government or ruling party. The political checklist also includes these questions: Are there multiple political parties that can organize different points of view for the voters? Are there recent shifts in power through elections? Do elections show a significant, or any, opposition vote? When elections occur, does there appear to be a fair opportunity for all parties or individuals to campaign, and is there fair polling and tabulation? These questions are necessary because so often the government and the dominant political party it represents arrange the political scene so that effective political opposition is impossible in spite of the appearance of multiple parties and open elections. Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mexico are examples. It is also important to ask whether those elected actually have significant power. In monarchies such as Nepal or Morocco that appear on the surface to be comparable to the United Kingdom, the transfer of power from the monarch has remained very incomplete. Neither is the effective chief of state open to public choice in current Iran.

Going beyond electoral processes, we need to ask whether military leaders play an important or overwhelming role in the political process? Is there significant or overwhelming foreign influence in the political process? Is there decentralization of

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political control, such that democratic decision making occurs at several levels throughout the political system? We want to ask whether, as with the Kurds in Turkey, there is an important group that is denied a reasonable degree of self-determination. Finally we ask whether there is an informal consensus underlying the political system such that even those important segments of society formally out of power still have an important input into the political process? This is especially significant when we consider the remaining, relatively small, traditional societies.

These questions are asked in ways that can most readily be answered by going through the flow of essentially journalistic information that comes to the Comparative Survey. There may be deeper questions, but it is hard enough to get answers to relatively simple questions of surface behavior. The emphasis is on behavior rather than on constitutional questions. The important issue is not what a system says it is, but how its behavioral output defines it. And in interpreting output we must make some critical assumptions. For example, it is hard to know if, as officially reported, one hundred percent of the people of a country such as Mongolia approve of their government voluntarily, but the Survey assumes they do not. The questions about degree of military or foreign influence are asked conservatively. In other words, foreign influence is considered only when it is blatant, such as by invasion, or the intervention of large numbers of foreign troops in a civil war. Mongolia, Cambodia, Angola, Afghanistan, and Lebanon are under strong foreign influence, as was true in 1984, at least, of Grenada. Finland is also under foreign pressure—which has been regularly confirmed by both Soviet and Finnish statesmen. But the pressure on Finland is not comparable to that on countries such as Lebanon. Most countries in the world are not considered to be under foreign influence in this accounting—of course, all states influence one another, large and small alike. The same conservative attitude is taken toward evidence of military interference in the political process. It has to be major and obvious, such as would be expressed by a military coup or blatant military refusal to take orders from civilian leaders, as often happens in Central America.

The issue of group self-determination is addressed in the Survey both directly and as an aspect of the questions on decentralized political power, regional power separate from central government domination, and informal consensus. Certainly the ratings of Spain have been raised in recent years because of the efforts of the government to expand the self-determination of

subgroups. The effective federal system has also been a plus for Yugoslavia's rating within the communist world, and, in spite of all its problems, of India's rating within the third world. Lack of acceptance of even the minimal rights to self-determination of the Kurds has tended to depress the ratings of Turkey.

Countries with high ratings include most of the democracies of Western and Northern Europe, as well as North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. There are also a number of smaller countries that fit this category, such as Costa Rica in Central America, Venezuela in South America, Barbados in the Caribbean, and tiny Tuvalu in the South Pacific. These countries by and large come up with top "scores" on most of the questions. Other democracies with functioning electoral systems have particular problems that lower the scores. These include, among other things, foreign pressure on political choices, such as is the case for Finland, lack of individual autonomy or undeveloped understanding of the political process, as in Papua New Guinea or Ecuador, or the definition of the state as belonging to a particular religious or ethnic group, as in Israel or Fiji.

At the next level nations such as Brazil or Thailand have apparently free electoral processes, but for one reason or another the process does not represent an open democracy. Democracy may be constrained by the continuing power of the military in the polity, either constitutionally or in practice, or it may be by conscious and continued control over the system by a self-appointed elite so that the party in power never really has to face a test of its power. The dominant party in Singapore, for example, has almost completely monopolized the political system; it only begrudgingly allows any opposition at all. The political system of Western Samoa represents a mixture of traditional and Western ideas in which only family heads are allowed to vote. Such restricted suffrage has many historic parallels.

Below this, principal opposition parties may be banned from participation. In South Africa, Paraguay, and South Korea elections occur but political equality is denied. At this level are also included a number of small societies, such as Qatar or Tonga, in which many citizens appear to have access to a traditional power structure, with the complexity and pluralism that often characterizes such structures.

In not-free countries the system allows no effective influence on policy through electoral or analogous systems. States here are one-party or no party autocracies. However, authoritarian rule is still considerably modified. There may be elections, and the

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elections may have some meaning. For example, in Tanzania one can choose between candidates, although the candidates only campaign as the government directs, and no discussion of policy is allowed. Similar rules govern election in a number of communist and quasi-communist states. Some states at this level have no elections, but the absolutism is modified by elements of pluralism, as in Oman or Nicaragua before November 1984. In these cases we might emphasize evidence for an informal consensus. Placed at the bottom of the ratings are simple dictatorships, military or otherwise, such as Haiti, Mali, Afghanistan, or Albania.

Civil liberties are as important as political rights in the Survey, for without them political rights have little meaning. Unlike political rights civil liberties are valuable in themselves. To determine the level of civil liberties the questions that are regularly asked include: Are the communications media free of political censorship? and, Are the press and broadcasting media independent of the government? (Unfortunately, in much of the world broadcasting has become more important than the written word, and it is more likely to be a government monopoly.) Equally important are questions as to whether there is open public discussion or freedom of assembly and demonstration. This latter is related to a broader question of freedom to organize, and particularly to organize political parties, trade unions, professional organizations, businesses, or cooperatives, as well as religious societies or churches.

There is also the question of the nondiscriminatory rule of law, which is tied into that of the independence of the judiciary, and the respect the police show for the citizenry. The questions of freedom from government terror, including torture, and freedom from imprisonment for reasons of conscience are considered. In regard to the latter two areas, one question that the information available to the Survey helps answer is whether in politically relevant cases the government ever loses in the courts. In a state such as the Soviet Union this is essentially unheard of, whereas in authoritarian Chile or South Africa it is common. In considering political imprisonment one should note that by using the phrase "prisoners of conscience" we exclude those many cases in which political imprisonment occurs that is justified on other grounds, such as defense against terrorism. Often the outsider is not sure whether the imprisonment of particular individuals is for violent or nonviolent expression of opposition, but over a period of time patterns become clear.

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In addition to the basic civil liberties most closely related to political equality, and to which the Survey directs greatest attention, certain contextual questions are also considered. These include the degree to which the society grants personal social rights, such as those to property, travel, or to independent decisions in regard to marriage and the family. It also includes the level of socioeconomic rights, such as the freedom of individuals from dependence on landlords, bosses, union leaders, and bureaucrats. The degree of socioeconomic inequality and the diminution of freedom resulting from gross government indifference and corruption are also considered. For the coarse-grained purposes of the Survey, these issues will become central to the discussion only at the extremes, as in the corruption of Mexico or Zaire, or the gross inequality of Saudi Arabia.

For civil liberties the same breakdown of countries by category could be presented as for political rights. The countries found toward the top and bottom of the scale for civil liberties are much the same as those discussed above under political rights, although there are sometimes important exceptions. In many countries, particularly in Latin America, periods of military rule may be characterized by a surprisingly high level of civil liberties, especially in communications. This relationship is usually transitional, for under these conditions the period of military rule is usually short or the government becomes increasingly repressive. It is hard to maintain a high level of civil liberties for any period of time without granting a parallel recognition of political rights. Peoples everywhere now demand political rights: as soon as they get a chance to speak out, the pressure starts building up for the end of arbitrary, unlegitimized rule, and the organization of free elections.

The Survey ratings are grouped, for the purpose of producing a "freedom map," into overall categories of "free," "partly free," and "not free." The results of the latest Survey suggest that about forty-three percent of the people of the world live in "not free" states, thirty-five percent in "free" states, and the rest in "partly free." Using these categories there are fifty-three countries that can reasonably be called democracies. This number is larger than many would suppose, although it is true that some of these states are very small.

A central purpose of the Survey is to offer perspective on the day-to-day flow of news about denials of political or civil liberties. The gains from this perspective are manifold. The Survey brings into consciousness the often forgotten fact that the

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countries most often accused of repression are generally not the most repressive. There is simply too little news from the most repressive states—such as North Korea and Albania—for the world to give them the sustained attention received by states with a more moderate level of repression, such as Chile or Nicaragua. If the Survey were a study of levels of overt political violence, on the other hand, the results might be quite different.

The Comparative Survey of Freedom was not the first attempt of its kind. The primary difficulty of previous surveys of freedom or lists of democratic states was that they were nearly always one-shot studies that in a rapidly changing world were quickly outdated.⁵ Often these studies have been based on a greater degree of quantification than the Survey. However, quantifying the variables that go into the ratings and adding them up arithmetically often gives an appearance of precision without actually increasing precision. It is reassuring that in so far as comparisons are possible, there has been close agreement among those who have attempted to publish lists of democracies.

The reason for this agreement has been the tendency to look at very much the same factors and indices as we examine. For example, in a consideration of measures of democracy published in 1980 Kenneth Bollen examines press freedom, freedom of group opposition, government sanctions (such as censorship, curfews, and arrest of opposition leaders), the fairness of elections, the degree to which the executive is chosen by electoral processes, and the degree to which the legislature is elected, and if elected is effective. Bollen's retrospective examination for the years 1960 and 1965 is based on the best studies available. Its results are expressed on a thousand point scale—although the author makes no claim for actually achieving such precision. His judgments appear very similar to those the Survey might have produced for these years.⁶

The purpose of the Comparative Survey is not exactitude. Whether a country is given a two or three on a particular right, or whether taken all in all it should be called "partly free" or "not free" is necessarily a decision based on incomplete information. No matter how numerical the categories may look, the effort is meant to be suggestive of the state of the world and of the comparative performance of different states in regard to a particular set of indicators. The objectives of the Survey will be satisfied if critics find that any particular state should receive a rating one point higher or lower than that given by the Survey for political or civil rights. For example, perhaps El

Salvador should receive a (2) or a (4) on political rights instead of the (3) it received in the latest listing. But if the serious critic can find a state that belongs more than one level away from its rating in the Survey, then my information is deficient or the system bears reworking. The Survey asserts, in other words, that for political rights El Salvador should not receive a (1), alongside France or the USA, or a (5), alongside Paraguay or South Africa. Obviously this level of acceptable imprecision implies that many countries on the margins between the general categories of "free," "partly free," and "not free," could reasonably be placed in either of two categories.

The Survey rates freedom, or the level of democratic, political accomplishment. It does not rate "goodness" or "desirability." Many people might prefer to live in Hungary rather than Trinidad—but they would not be as politically free in Hungary. Indeed, as Harvey Mansfield has pointed out, freedom and democracy do not automatically assure perfection even in terms of the values they represent. Freedom requires the acceptance of a gap between its ideal and the reality it produces.⁷

The Comparative Survey of Freedom, then, provides a vantage point from which to consider past trends toward expanding democracy and the extrapolation of these trends into the future. In this regard considering the short-term trends that may have emerged since the beginning of the Survey is relatively unimportant. In the short-term there has been little change. Since the first Survey published in January 1973, some parts of the world have exhibited frequent rating changes, but worldwide the percentage of people living in freedom or the percentage of free nations has not changed noticeably. The few countries, for example, that became independent during this period did not change their freedom ratings: the independence this year of Brunei did not make it democratic; the recent achievement of independence by St. Kitts and Nevis took place in the context of an already functioning democracy.

Analysts should be warned that there has been a gradual change in the evaluator as well as the evaluated since 1972 when the first work was done. My belief is that there has been a glacial improvement in the democratic rights of many countries in the world during this period that is not reflected in the ratings because my standards have become slightly more stringent. If one did not learn from making the Survey, it would not be a very useful exercise.

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NOTES

1. The first Survey was published as R. D. Gastil, "The New Criteria of Freedom," *Freedom at Issue*, January-February 1973. No. 17. Subsequent Surveys were published in *Freedom at Issue* in the January-February editions through 1983.

2. R. D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World: 1978* (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1978). This yearbook has since appeared annually, either published by Freedom House or, most recently, Greenwood Press in Westport, Conn.

3. PUCL (People's Union for Civil Liberties) Bulletin, 4, 6 June, 1984, page 6.

4. See Alfred Kuhn, *The Logic of Social Systems* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974), 329-367.

5. For example, Arthur Banks and Robert Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1963); Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institute, 1967), 290-91; Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 231-49; Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 131, and note 1, 366. Thomas D. Anderson, a geographer, has developed a similar list in reaction to the Survey, in "Civil and Political Liberties in the World: A Geographical Analysis," paper presented at the East Lakes Division Meetings of the Association of American Geographers, London, Ontario, November 8, 1980.

6. Kenneth A. Bollen, "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy," *American Sociological Review* 1980, Vol. 45 (June: 370-390).

7. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., "The Anti-Power Ethic," *Review in Government and Opposition*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1982).

Survey Ratings and Tables for 1984

This has been a good year for freedom.

This conclusion emerges from consideration of the usual mixture of advances and retreats. Since the last Survey, Nigeria's return to military rule and the completion of Argentina's return to democracy were the outstanding events. These events symbolized two of the most important trends of recent years: the erosive decline of freedom in most of Africa and the progress of freedom in the Americas. Without making predictions about the future significance of the year's events in particular countries, it should be noted that every Central American country except already free Belize and Costa Rica improved its freedom ratings in 1984.

The Tabulated Ratings

The accompanying Table 1 (Independent Nations) and Table 2 (Related Territories) rate each state or territory on seven-point scales for political and civil freedoms, and then provide an overall judgment of each as "free," "partly free," or "not free." In each scale, a rating of (1) is freest and (7) least free. Instead of using absolute standards, standards are comparative. The goal is to have ratings such that, for example, most observers would be likely to judge states rated (1) as freer than those rated (2). No state, of course, is absolutely free or unfree, but the degree of freedom does make a great deal of difference to the quality of life.¹

In **political rights**, states rated (1) have a fully competitive electoral process and those elected clearly rule. Most West European democracies belong here. Relatively free states may receive a (2) because, although the electoral process works and the elected rule, there are factors that cause us to lower our rating of the effective equality of the process. These factors may include extreme economic inequality, illiteracy, or intima-

TABLE 1

INDEPENDENT NATIONS :
COMPARATIVE MEASURES OF FREEDOM

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Inf.Mort./ GNP/Cap. ³
Afghanistan	7	7	NF	205/170
Albania	7	7	NF	47/840
Algeria	6	6	NF	118/2100
Angola	7	7	NF	154/800
Antigua & Barbuda	2	3	F	NA
Argentina	2 +	2 +	F +	45/2600
Australia	1	1	F	11/12200
Austria	1	1	F	14/10300
Bahamas	2	2	F	32/3600
Bahrain	5	5	PF	53/7500
Bangladesh	6	5	PF	136/150
Barbados	1	2 -	F	25/3500
Belgium	1	1	F	11/12000
Belize	2 •	1 •	F	34/1100
Benin	7	7 •	NF	154/300
Bhutan	5	5	PF	150/80
Bolivia	2	3	F	131/600
Botswana	2	3	F	83/900
Brazil	3	3	PF *	77/2200
Brunei	6	6 • -	NF	20/11900
Bulgaria	7	7	NF	20/4200
Burkina Faso ⁶	7 -	5	NF -	211/250
Burma	7	7	NF	101/200
Burundi	7 •	6	NF	122/250
Cambodia ⁴	7	7	NF	212/100
Cameroon	6	7 -	NF	109/800
Canada	1	1	F	11/11200

Notes to the Table

1. The scales use the numbers 1-7, with 1 comparatively offering the highest level of political or civil rights and 7 the lowest. A plus or minus following a rating indicates an improvement or decline since the last yearbook. A rating marked with a raised period (•) has been reevaluated by the author in this time; there may have been little change in the country.

2. F designates "free," EF "partly free," NF "not free."

3. Infant mortality per thousand live births over GNP per capita. Figures are from J. P. Lewis and V. Kallab (eds.), U. S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1963 (New York: Praeger 1983), pages 207-221.

4. Also known as Kampuchea.

5. Formerly New Hebrides.

6. Formerly Upper Volta.

*. Expected imminent change toward freedom.

Comparative Survey: 1984

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Inf.Mort./ GNP/Cap. ³
Cape Verde Islands	6	7 •	NF	82/300
Central African Rep.	7	6 -	NF	149/300
Chad	7	7 • -	NF	149/100
Chile	6	5	PF	38/2600
China(Mainland)	6	6	NF	45/300
China(Taiwan)	5	5	PF	24/2500
Colombia	2	3	F	56/1300
Comoros	5 •	5 •	PF	93/300
Congo	7	6	NF	129/1100
Costa Rica	1	1	F	24/1500
Cuba	6	6	NF	19/700
Cyprus(G)	1	2	F	18/3800
Cyprus(T)	4	3	PF	NA
Czechoslovakia	7	6	NF	17/5800
Denmark	1	1	F	9/12800
Djibouti	5	6	PF •	NA/500
Dominica	2	2	F	20/750
Dominican Republic	1	3 -	F	68/1300
Ecuador	2	2	F	82/1200
Egypt	4 +	4 +	PF	103/650
El Salvador	3 +	5	PF	53/650
Equatorial Guinea	7	6	NF	143/200
Ethiopia	7	7	NF	147/150
Fiji	2	2	F	37/1900
Finland	2	2	F	8/10400
France	1	2	F	10/12100
Gabon	6	6	NF	117/3900
Gambia	3	4	PF	198/350
Germany(E)	7	6 • +	NF	12/7200
Germany(W)	1	2	F	13/13500
Ghana	7 -	6 -	NF	103/400
Greece	1	2	F	19/4500
Grenada	5 +	3 +	PF + *	15/900
Guatemala	5 +	6	PF +	70/1200
Guinea	7	5 +	NF	165/300
Guinea-Bissau	6 • +	6	NF	149/200
Guyana	5	5	PF	44/700
Haiti	7	6	NF	115/300
Honduras	2 +	3	F +	88/600
Hungary	6	5	PF •	23/4200
Iceland	1	1	F	8/12600
India	2	3	F	123/250
Indonesia	5	6 •	PF	93/500
Iran	5 • +	6	PF • +	108/1900
Iraq	7 •	7	NF	78/3000
Ireland	1	1	F	12/5400
Israel	2	2	F	14/5500
Italy	1	1 +	F	14/6800
Ivory Coast	6 •	5	PF	127/1200

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Table 1 (continued)	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Inf.Mort./ GNP/Cap. ³
Jamaica	2	3	F	16/1200
Japan	1	1	F	7/10300
Jordan	5 +	5 +	EF +	69/1600
Kenya	6 -	5	EF	87/400
Kiribati	1	2	F	NA
Korea(N)	7	7	NF	34/1100
Korea(S)	5	5 +	EF	34/1700
Kuwait	4	4	EF	39/26000
Laos	7	7	NF	129/100
Lebanon	5	4	EF	41/1900
Lesotho	5	5	EF	115/500
Liberia	6 -	5	EF	154/500
Libya	6	6	NF	100/8600
Luxembourg	1	1	F	12/14000
Madagascar	5	6	EF	71/350
Malawi	6	7	NF	172/200
Malaysia	3	5 -	EF	31/1800
Maldives	5	5	EF	120/400
Mali	7	6	NF	154/200
Malta	2	4	EF	16/4000
Mauritania	7	6	NF	143/500
Mauritius	2	2	F	33/1300
Mexico	3	4	EF	56/2300
Mongolia	7	7	NF	55/800
Morocco	4	5	EF	107/900
Mozambique	6 •	7 •	NF	115/250
Nauru	2	2	F	NA
Nepal	3	4	EF	150/150
Netherlands	1	1	F	9/11100
New Zealand	1	1	F	13/7600
Nicaragua	5 +	5	EF	90/900
Niger	7	6	NF	146/350
Nigeria	7 -	5 -	NF -	135/900
Norway	1	1	F	9/13800
Oman	6	6	NF	128/5900
Pakistan	7	5	NF	126/350
Panama	4 +	3 +	EF	34/1900
Papua New Guinea	2	2	F	104/800
Paraguay	5	5	EF	47/1600
Peru	2	3	F	88/1100
Philippines	4 +	4 +	EF	55/800
Poland	6	5	EF	21/3900
Portugal	1	2	F	26/2500
Qatar	5	5	EF	53/28000
Romania	7	7 •	NF	32/2500
Rwanda	6	6	NF	107/250
St. Kitts & Nevis	1 •	1 •	F	NA
St. Lucia	1 •	2	F	33/850
St. Vincent	2	2	F	38/500

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	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Inf.Mort./ GNP/Cap. ³
Sao Tome & Principe	7	7	NF	50/400
Saudi Arabia	6	7	NF	114/12700
Senegal	3 ·	4	PF	147/500
Seychelles	6	6	NF	27/1800
Sierra Leone	4 ·	5	PF	206/400
Singapore	4	5	PF	12/5200
Solomon Islands	2	3 ·	F	78/600
Somalia	7	7	NF	147/300
South Africa	5	6	PF	96/2300
Spain	1	2	F	11/5800
Sri Lanka	3	4	PF	37/300
Sudan	6 -	6 -	NF -	124/400
Suriname	7	6	NF	36/3000
Swaziland	5	6 ·	PF	135/850
Sweden	1	1	F	7/14500
Switzerland	1	1	F	9/17200
Syria	6	7	NF	62/1600
Tanzania	6	6	NF	103/300
Thailand	3	4	PF	55/800
Togo	6 ·	6	NF	109/400
Tonga	5	3	PF	21/500
Transkei	5	6	PF	NA
Trinidad & Tobago	1	2	F	26/5300
Tunisia	5	5	PF	100/1400
Turkey	3 +	5	PF	123/1500
Tuvalu	1	2	F	NA
Uganda	4	5	PF	97/350
USSR	7 ·	7	NF	36/4600
United Arab Emirates	5	5	PF	53/26000
United Kingdom	1	1	F	12/9000
United States	1	1	F	12/12500
Uruguay	5	4	PF *	37/2800
Vanuatu 5	2	4	PF	NA
Venezuela	1	2	F	42/4200
Vietnam	7	6	NF	100/200
Western Samoa	4	3	PF	40/850
Yemen(N)	5 ·	5	PF ·	162/450
Yemen(S)	6	7	NF	146/500
Yugoslavia	6	5	PF	33/2800
Zaire	6	7	NF	112/200
Zambia	5	5 ·	PF	106/600
Zimbabwe	4	5	PF	74/800

TABLE 2

RELATED TERRITORIES:
COMPARATIVE MEASURES OF FREEDOM

	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Inf.Mort./ GNP/Cap. ³
Australia				
Christmas Island	4	2	PF	NA
Cocos Island	4	2	PF	NA
Norfolk Island	4	2	PF	NA
Chile				
Easter Island	6 +	5	PF +	NA
Denmark				
Faroe Islands	1 .	1	F	NA
Greenland	1 . +	1	F	NA
France				
French Guiana	3	2	PF	NA
French Polynesia	3	2	PF	33/6500
Guadeloupe	3	2	PF	25/3900
Martinique	3	2	PF	22/4600
Mahore (Mayotte)	2	2	F	NA
Monaco ⁴	4	2	PF	NA
New Caledonia	3	2	F	30/7000
Reunion	3	2	PF	20/3800
St. Pierre & Miquelon	2 .	2	F .	NA
Wallis and Futuna	4	3	PF	NA
Israel				
Occupied Territories	5	5	PF	NA
Italy				
San Marino ⁴	1	2	F	NA
Vatican City ⁴	6	4	PF	NA
Netherlands				
Neth. Antilles	2	1 .	F	25/4300

Notes to the Table

1, 2, 3. See Notes, Table 1.

4. These states are not listed as independent because all have explicit legal forms of dependence on a particular country (or countries in the case of Andorra) in such areas as foreign affairs, defense, customs, or services.

5. The geography and history of these newly independent "homelands" cause us to consider them dependencies.

6. Now in transition; high degree of self-determination.

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	Political Rights ¹	Civil Liberties ¹	Status of Freedom ²	Inf.Mort./ GNP/Cap. ³
New Zealand				
Cook Islands	2 +	2	F	NA
Niue	2	2	F	NA
Tokelau Islands	4	2	FF	NA
Portugal				
Azores	2	2	F	NA
Macao	3 +	4	FF	18/2000
Madeira	2	2	F	NA
South Africa				
Bophuthatswana ⁵	6	5 .	FF .	NA
Ciskei ⁵	6	6	NF	NA
SW Africa (Namibia)	6	5	NF	120/1400
Venda ⁵	6	6	NF	NA
Spain				
Canary Islands	1	2	F	NA
Places of Sovereignty in North Africa	2 .	3 .	F	NA
Switzerland				
Liechtenstein	3 + .	1	F + .	NA
United Kingdom				
Anguilla	2	2	F	NA
Bermuda	2	1	F	NA
B. Virgin Islands	2 .	1 .	F	NA
Cayman Islands	2	2	F	NA
Channel Islands	2	1	F	11/6800
Falkland Islands	2	2	F	NA
Gibraltar	1	2	F	NA
Hong Kong	4	2	FF	13/5500
Isle of Man	1 .	1 .	F	NA
Montserrat	2	2	F	NA
St. Helena	2	2	F	NA
Turks and Caicos	2	2	F	NA
United States				
American Samoa	2	2	F	NA
Belau ⁶	2	2	F	(31/920)
Federated States of Micronesia ⁶	2	2	F	(31/920)
Guam	3	2	FF	16/7000
Marshall Islands ⁶	2	2	F	(31/920)
Northern Marianas ⁶	2	2	F	(31/920)
Puerto Rico	2	1	F	20/3000
Virgin Islands	2	3	F	NA
France-Spain Condominium				
Andorra ⁴	3	3	FF	NA

ting violence. They also include the weakening of effective competition that is implied by the absence of periodic shifts in rule from one group or party to another.

Below this level, political ratings of (3) through (5) represent successively less effective implementation of democratic processes. Mexico, for example, has periodic elections and limited opposition, but for many years its governments have been selected outside the public view by the leaders of factions within the one dominant Mexican party. Governments of states rated (5) sometimes have no effective voting processes at all, but strive for consensus among a variety of groups in society in a way weakly analogous to those of the democracies. States at (6) do not allow competitive electoral processes that would give the people a chance to voice their desire for a new ruling party or for a change in policy. The rulers of states at this level assume that one person or a small group has the right to decide what is best for the nation, and that no one should be allowed to challenge that right. Such rulers do respond, however, to popular desire in some areas, or respect (and therefore are constrained by) belief systems (for example, Islam) that are the property of the society as a whole. At (7) the political despots at the top appear by their actions to feel little constraint from either public opinion or popular tradition.

Turning to the scale for **civil liberties**, in countries rated (1) publications are not closed because of the expression of rational political opinion, especially when the intent of the expression is to affect the legitimate political process. No major media are simply conduits for government propaganda. The courts protect the individual; persons are not imprisoned for their opinions; private rights and desires in education, occupation, religion, and residence are generally respected; and law-abiding persons do not fear for their lives because of their rational political activities. States at this level include most traditional democracies. There are, of course, flaws in the liberties of all of these states, and these flaws are significant when measured against the standards these states set themselves.

Movement down from (2) to (7) represents a steady loss of the civil freedoms we have detailed. Compared to (1), the police and courts of states at (2) have more authoritarian traditions. In some cases they may simply have a less institutionalized or secure set of liberties, such as in Portugal or Greece. Those rated (3) or below may have political prisoners and generally varying forms of censorship. Too often their security services practice tor-

ture. States rated (6) almost always have political prisoners; usually the legitimate media are completely under government supervision; there is no right of assembly; and, often, travel, residence, and occupation are narrowly restricted. However, at (6) there still may be relative freedom in private conversation, especially in the home; illegal demonstrations do take place; and underground literature is published. At (7) there is pervading fear, little independent expression takes place even in private, almost no public expressions of opposition emerge in the police-state environment, and imprisonment or execution is often swift and sure.

Political terror is an attempt by a government or private group to get its way through the use of murder, torture, exile, prevention of departure, police controls, or threats against the family. These weapons are usually directed against the expression of civil liberties. To this extent they surely are a part of the civil liberty "score." Unfortunately, because of their dramatic and newsworthy nature, such denials of civil liberties often become identified in the minds of informed persons with the whole of civil liberties.

Political terror is a tool of revolutionary repression of the right or left. When that repression is no longer necessary to achieve the suppression of civil liberties, political terror is replaced by implacable and well-organized but often less general and newsworthy controls. Of course, there is a certain unfathomable terror in the sealed totalitarian state, yet life can be lived with a normality in these states that is impossible in the more dramatically terrorized. It would be a mistake to dismiss this apparent anomaly as an expression of a Survey bias. For there is, with all the blood, a much wider range of organized and personal expression of political opinion and judgment in states such as Lebanon and Guatemala than in more peaceful states such as Czechoslovakia.

In making the distinction between political terror and civil liberties as a whole we do not imply that the United States should not be urgently concerned with all violations of human rights and perhaps most urgently with those of political terror. Again it must be emphasized that the Survey is not a rating of the relative desirability of societies—but of certain explicit freedoms.

A cumulative judgment of "free," "partly free," or "not free" is made on the basis of the foregoing seven-point ratings, and an understanding of how they were derived. Generally, states rated (1) and (2) will be "free"; those at (3), (4), and (5), "partly

TABLE 3
RANKING NATIONS BY POLITICAL RIGHTS

Most Free	Australia Austria Barbados Belgium Canada Costa Rica Cyprus (G) Denmark Dominican Rep.	France Germany (W) Greece Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Kiribati Luxembourg	Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal St. Kitts & N. St. Lucia Spain Sweden Switzerland	Trinidad & Tobago Tuvalu United Kingdom United States Venezuela
1				
2	Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Bahamas Belize Bolivia Botswana	Colombia Dominica Ecuador Fiji Finland Honduras India	Israel Jamaica Malta Mauritius Nauru Papua New Guinea	Peru St. Vincent Solomon Islands Vanuatu
3	Brazil El Salvador Gambia	Malaysia Mexico Nepal	Senegal Sri Lanka	Thailand Turkey
4	Cyprus (T) Egypt Kuwait	Morocco Panama Philippines	Sierra Leone Singapore Uganda	Western Samoa Zimbabwe
5	Bahrain Bhutan Comoros China (Taiwan) Djibouti Grenada Guatemala Guyana	Indonesia Iran Jordan Korea (S) Lebanon Lesotho Madagascar Maldives	Nicaragua Paraguay Qatar South Africa Swaziland Tonga Transkei	Tunisia United Arab Emirates Uruguay Yemen (N) Zambia
6	Algeria Bangladesh Brunei Cameroon Cape Verde Islands Chile China (Mainland)	Cuba Gabon Guinea-Bissau Hungary Ivory Coast Kenya Liberia Libya	Malawi Mozambique Oman Poland Rwanda Saudi Arabia Seychelles Sudan	Syria Tanzania Togo Yemen (S) Yugoslavia Zaire
7	Afghanistan Albania Angola Benin Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burma Burundi Cambodia Central African Rep.	Chad Congo Czechoslovakia Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Germany (E) Ghana Guinea Haiti Iraq	Korea (N) Laos Mali Mauritania Mongolia Niger Nigeria Pakistan Romania Sao Tome & Principe	Somalia Suriname USSR Vietnam
Least Free				




TABLE 4
RANKING NATIONS BY CIVIL LIBERTIES

Most Free	1	Australia	Costa Rica	Japan	St. Kitts & Nev.
		Austria	Denmark	Luxembourg	Sweden
		Belgium	Iceland	Netherlands	Switzerland
		Belize	Ireland	New Zealand	United Kingdom
		Canada	Italy	Norway	United States
		Argentina	France	Papua	Trinidad &
		Bahamas	Germany (W)	New Guinea	Tobago
2	Barbados	Greece	Portugal	Tuvalu	
	Cyprus (G)	Israel	St. Lucia	Venezuela	
	Dominica	Kiribati	St. Vincent		
	Ecuador	Mauritius	Spain		
	Fiji	Nauru			
	Finland				
3	Antigua and Barbuda	Colombia	India	Solomon Isls.	
	Bolivia	Cyprus (T)	Jamaica	Tonga	
	Botswana	Dominican Rep.	Panama	Western Samoa	
	Brazil	Grenada	Peru		
		Honduras			
4	Egypt	Malta	Senegal	Uruguay	
	Gambia	Mexico	Sri Lanka	Vamatu	
	Kuwait	Nepal	Thailand		
	Lebanon	Philippines			
5	Bahrain	Hungary	Morocco	Tunisia	
	Bangladesh	Ivory Coast	Nicaragua	Turkey	
	Bhutan	Jordan	Nigeria	Uganda	
	Burkina Faso	Kenya	Pakistan	United Arab	
	Chile	Korea (S)	Paraguay	Emirates	
	China (Taiwan)	Lesotho	Poland	Yemen (N)	
	Comoros	Liberia	Qatar	Yugoslavia	
	El Salvador	Malaysia	Sierra Leone	Zambia	
	Guinea	Maldives	Singapore	Zimbabwe	
	Guyana				
	6	Algeria	Djibouti	Iran	South Africa
Brunei		Equatorial	Libya	Sudan	
Burundi		Guinea	Madagascar	Swaziland	
Central		Gabon	Mali	Suriname	
African Rep.		Germany (E)	Mauritania	Tanzania	
China (Mainland)		Ghana	Niger	Togo	
Congo		Guatemala	Oman	Transkei	
Cuba		Guinea-Bissau	Rwanda	Vietnam	
Czechoslovakia		Haiti	Seychelles		
		Indonesia			
7		Afghanistan	Cameroon	Malawi	Somalia
	Albania	Cape Verde Is.	Mongolia	Syria	
	Angola	Chad	Mozambique	USSR	
	Benin	Ethiopia	Romania	Yemen (S)	
	Bulgaria	Iraq	Sao Tome &	Zaire	
	Burma	Korea (N)	Principe		
	Cambodia	Laos	Saudi Arabia		
	Least Free				

	155 Peru	160 P'rto Rico (US)	154 Paraguay	115 Macao (Port)	83 Guinea-Bissau
Free Countries	159 Portugal	165 St. Helena (UK)	156 Philippines	124 Martinique (Fr)	85 Haiti
	166 St. Kitts & Nevis	168 S.Pierre & M(Fr)	158 Poland	130 Monaco (Fr)	93 Iraq
8 Antigua & Barbuda	167 St. Lucia	170 San Marino (It)	161 Qatar	146 Norfolk Is.(Aus)	105 Korea (North)
9 Argentina	169 St. Vincent	198 Turks & C. (UK)	173 Senegal	149 Occupied Terrs.(Isr)	108 Laos
10 Australia	177 Solomon Isls.	210 Virgin Isls(US)	175 Sierra Leone	162 Reunion (Fr)	112 Libya
11 Austria	181 Spain		176 Singapore	192 Tokelau Island (New Zealand)	118 Malawi
13 Bahamas	186 Sweden	Partly Free Countries	179 So. Africa		121 Mali
16 Barbados	187 Switzerland	14 Bahrain	182 Sri Lanka		125 Mauritania
18 Belgium	195 Trinidad & Tob.	15 Bangladesh	185 Swaziland	211 Wallis and Futuna (Fr)	131 Mongolia
19 Belize	199 Tuvalu	22 Bhutan	190 Thailand		134 Mozambique
23 Bolivia	203 U. K.	26 Brazil	193 Tonga		143 Niger
25 Botswana	204 U. S. A.	40 Chile	194 Transkei		144 Nigeria
33 Canada	208 Venezuela	42 China (Taiwan)	196 Tunisia	Not Free Countries	150 Oman
45 Colombia		46 Comoros	197 Turkey	1 Afghanistan	151 Pakistan
49 Costa Rica	Related Territories	51b Cyprus (T)	200 Uganda	2 Albania	163 Romania
51a Cyprus(G)	4 Amer. Samoa (US)	54 Djibouti	202 Un. Ar. Ems.	3 Algeria	164 Rwanda
53 Denmark	7 Anguilla (UK)	59 Egypt	206 Uruguay	6 Angola	171 Sao Tome & Principe
55 Dominica	12 Azores (Port)	60 El Salvador	140 Vanuatu	20 Benin	172 Saudi Arabia
56 Dominican Republic	17 Belau (US)	71 Gambia	212 W. Samoa	28 Brunei	174 Seychelles
58 Ecuador	21 Bermuda (UK)	78 Grenada	213 Yemen (N)	29 Bulgaria	178 Somalia
65 Fiji	27 Br. Vir. Is. (UK)	81 Guatemala	215 Yugoslavia	205 Burkina Faso	183 Sudan
66 Finland	34 Canary Isls. (Sp)	84 Guyana	217 Zambia	30 Burma	184 Suriname
67 France	36 Cayman Isls. (UK)	88 Hungary	218 Zimbabwe	31 Burundi	188 Syria
73 Germany (W)	39 Channel Isls. (UK)	91 Indonesia		102 Cambodia	189 Tanzania
76 Greece	48 Cook Isls. (NZ)	92 Iran	Related Territories	32 Cameroon	191 Togo
86 Honduras	63 Falkland Isls. (UK)	98 Ivory Coast	5 Andorra (Fr-Sp)	35 Cape Verde Is.	201 USSR
89 Iceland	64 Faroe Isls. (Den)	101 Jordan	24 Bophuthatswana (South Afr.)	37 Central African Republic	209 Vietnam
90 India	75 Gibraltar (UK)	103 Kenya	43 Christmas Is. (Austral.)	38 Chad	214 Yemen (South)
94 Ireland	77 Greenland (Den)	106 Korea (South)	44 Cocos Isls. (Austral.)	41 China (Mainland)	216 Zaire
96 Israel	95 Isle of Man (UK)	107 Kuwait	57 Easter Is. (Ch)	47 Congo	Related Territories
97 Italy	113 Liechtenstein (Sw)	109 Lebanon	68 French Guiana (Fr)	50 Cuba	219 Ciskei (S.Afr.)
99 Jamaica	117 Madeira (Port)	110 Lesotho	69 French Polynesia(Fr)	52 Czechoslovakia	180 S. W. Africa (Namibia) (S.A.)
100 Japan	123 Marshall Isls.(US)	111 Liberia	79 Guadeloupe(Fr)	61 Equatorial Guinea	207 Venda (S.A.)
104 Kiribati	127 Mayotte (Fr)	116 Madagascar	80 Guam (US)	62 Ethiopia	
114 Luxembourg	129 Micronesia (US)	119 Malaysia	87 Hong Kong(UK)	70 Gabon	
126 Mauritius	132 Montserrat(UK)	120 Maldives		72 Germany (E)	
135 Nauru	138 Ne. Antilles(Ne)	122 Malta		74 Ghana	
137 Netherlands	139 New Caledonia(Fr)	128 Mexico		82 Guinea	
141 New Zealand	145 Niue (NZ)	133 Morocco			
148 Norway	147 No. Marianas(US)	136 Nepal			
153 Papua N. G.	157 P.o.S.i.N.Afr.(Sp)	142 Nicaragua			
		152 Panama			

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free"; and those at (6) and (7), "not free." A rating of (2),(3) places the country in the "free" category; a rating of (6),(5) places it in the "partly free." This automatic treatment of (6),(5), or (2),(3) ratings is an innovation this year and applies only to independent countries.

It has long been felt that the Survey has paid too little attention to the material correlates, conditions, or context of freedom or non-freedom. While we have argued elsewhere that there is no one-to-one relation between wealth and freedom, and that history has diffused freedom along with economic wealth more than one has produced the other, the relationship remains an important one to ponder.

For this year's Survey we have reprinted a measure juxtaposing the infant mortality rate to the per capita GNP. This offers three pieces of knowledge to the reader in a short compass: the health care and nutrition standard of the population as a whole, the wealth of the society, and the extent to which the wealth is shared to provide the most basic necessities. The use of infant mortality statistics to measure the modernization of a society might have been thought to be outmoded by new measures such as the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), which combines infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy rates.² However, the doubtful comparability of literacy rates introduces an element of incomparability that is likely to make a society appear relatively more modernized or "equalized" than it is. For example, in the Overseas Development Council's table (referenced above) Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand have the same GNP/capita and the same infant mortality rates. However, because Mongolia claims 95% literacy its PQLI is given as considerably higher. This suggests either that literacy in Mongolia is incomparable or that literacy in Mongolia is used for purposes of state with little connection to the life of ordinary people. In either case, if we are interested in levels of modernity or "justice," it would seem best to stay away from literacy rates. Doubtless, infant mortality rates may also be "cooked." China's, for example, appears suspiciously low, and we wonder if reported infanticide is included. Yet overall cases of this kind of error appear to be considerably rarer.

The reporting period covered by this Survey (November 1983 to November 1984) does not correspond with the calendar of short-term events in the countries rated. For this reason the yearly Survey may mask or play down important events that occur during the year.

Declines in Freedom

The civil liberties rating of **Barbados** was reduced because of its revocation of the work permit of the editor of a regional publication after his opposition to the Grenada intervention. The violent repression of a coup attempt in **Cameroon** was accompanied by the arrest of journalists and the even greater reduction of freedom of expression. Outbursts of violence and strikes in the **Dominican Republic** were followed by the arrests of union and student leaders that seemed to be more than a response to specific crimes. Consolidation of power in **Kenya** has led to expulsions and exclusions from the single party, and a requirement that all civil servants be members of the party. The ruling clique seems increasingly narrow and fearful.

In many countries in Africa military leaders or military factions increased the severity and arbitrariness of their rule. Military rule became more institutionalized in the **Central African Republic**, and the independence and expression of former political figures was even further curtailed. **Ghana's** corruption gave some justification and popularity to the initial intervention of junior officers. By 1984 the regime seemed to be moving toward gang rule and anarchy. **Liberia** is ostensibly on the road to realization of its new democratic constitution. However, the 1984 arrests and killings of political opponents, respected figures, and students (as well as the closing of the university), suggests an increasingly repressive and arbitrary military rule. It remains to be seen if the army and its leader, the now General Doe, will allow more than the hollow forms of democracy. **Malaysia** has increasingly moved to curb dissent through its security laws and controls over what publications may be distributed or printed. Opposition rallies became more than ever restricted.

Nigeria's military intervention at the beginning of the year had become thoroughly entrenched by the end. Many former politicians remain in prison, and in camera corruption trials are increasingly regarded with suspicion. Journalists and students have been jailed for their criticisms or organization. The attempt of the dictator in **Sudan** to impose a particularly harsh version of Islamic law, and to reduce the independence of southerners has led to the imprisonment of opposition leaders, police intrusions, a new guerilla war, and widespread fear. In **Burkina Faso** (formerly Upper Volta) the new military ruler has concentrated power in his person, and drastically reduced the independence of the media and the unions.

Advances in Freedom

Argentina moved more rapidly and courageously, and we hope wisely, than expected to remove the military incubus from the political system. The independence of the media, of intellectual life, and of the judiciary seems again well established. The interim government in **Grenada** partially reestablished the self-determination of a people subjected to successive and overwhelming changes. Expression was again essentially free for most citizens, although it remained guarded for a few. In **Guinea** the military intervened to reduce tyranny. While the shape of the new government is still unclear, there does seem to be a commitment to a rule of law and the establishment of a freer society. **Italy** further perfected its democracy through the emergence of a stronger, more independent, and effective judiciary.

A relatively free election in **Egypt** has been accompanied by the reestablishment of at least a varied party press and generally more open discussion. **Jordan** held an important group of by-elections and reconvened its long absent parliament. In theory the election allowed only independents, but the candidates actually represented a variety of different political positions.

The two elections in El **Salvador** were successes, and went a long way toward establishing the legitimacy of the government. The subsequent moves of the incumbent to assert authority over the system and to face the problems of death squads and guerrillas further improved the political rights of the president's supporters. The election of a constituent assembly in bloody **Guatemala** was surprisingly open and fair. The resultant assembly represented a fair cross section of all positions except the far left. This was not sufficient to stop the killing, even by rightists. In **Honduras** the civilian government found sufficient allies within its military to reestablish, at least for the moment, the principal of civilian rule. For good reasons the most significant opposition parties in **Nicaragua** failed to participate in that country's November elections. Nevertheless, an election with some choice was held; the opposition could presumably have achieved a higher percentage of the vote had more groups participated. **Panama**'s election was open to all political currents in its society. The process was hard fought, and the result close—but the army appeared to intervene in the final outcome. Still, the government that resulted marked a closer approximation to democracy than the administration it replaced.

Iran remained a very oppressive society, particularly for minorities and liberals. Yet it appeared that the electoral and parliamentary processes during the year represented a quasi-majoritarian dictatorship. As long as the individual stays within certain rather narrow ideological limits, there is a good deal of freedom and controversy. Rights to privacy have also been strengthened.

Democracy made some important gains in Asia. Political activity again revived in South **Korea**; the media were able to engage indirectly in successful campaigns against public figures. The complex jockeying of political forces in the **Philippines** led to increased opposition strength. This was demonstrated both through a partially fraudulent electoral process that nevertheless allowed the opposition to pick up a large number of seats, and an investigative and judicial process that threatened to bring down some of the leaders of the security apparatus.

Although **Turkey**'s prime minister came to power through a limited electoral process, his subsequent political successes against re-emergent political forces gave him greater legitimacy than many had granted his administration initially.

As usual there was forward movement in the related territories or dependencies. Chile's appointment of its first native governor to **Easter Island** enhanced that island's self-determination. **Greenland**'s ability to make a special arrangement to leave the EEC demonstrated its essential freedom from Denmark's domination. **Cook Islands** was able to reestablish the strength of its own institutions through coalition government. Portugal's **Macao** opened its electoral process to a greater extent than previously (a process that belatedly will be followed in Hong Kong). Women finally achieved the vote in **Liechtenstein**.

Other Significant Changes

New problems for civil liberties arose in Peru, Paraguay, Chile, South Africa, and the USSR that were nevertheless not reflected in the ratings. In the case of the USSR this was because its civil liberties rating was already a (7). In Peru the guerrilla war increasingly involved security forces in brutal repression. Yet the democratic system remained in place; parties and other critics were very active in a highly pluralist context. In the next three cases efforts to maintain repressive systems led to renewed government clampdowns on the opposition, imprisonment, and

violence. Yet the oppositions and spokesmen for those attacked remained active in the societies, and strong institutions, particularly the churches, stood against the tide.

Three countries were programmed to take decisive moves toward democracy in late 1984 and 1985. **Grenada's** election in December 1984 should return the country to parliamentary rule. Hopes are high that the outcome will be balanced enough to express the wishes of the major factions of the population, and subsequently be accepted both by the United States and the international community. **Uruguay's** presidential election in November will be followed by the assumption of civilian power in March. Again, the main parties seem thoroughly involved. Although a major candidate has been prevented from competing, his followers are participating in his name. **Brazil** will hold an indirect presidential election. However, the process has so developed that the man predicted as the winner is likely to have been a popular choice in any event. He will serve as a legitimate democratic president if he makes it. In both Uruguay and Brazil factions within the military have seemed most reluctant to allow civilian rule to actually emerge. The trials of officers in Argentina have increased military fear of democracy, particularly in Uruguay where military atrocities were comparable to those in Argentina. We can only hope that the planned return to democracy is carried through in both countries.

The reader will note a number of other changes that are listed as due more to changes of judgment than actual changes during the year. Most important of these is the listing of Hungary as "partly free." In part this was due to a decision to list all countries rated (6),(5) as partly free; in part it was due to persistent reports that the atmosphere in Hungary is much freer than that in the other "not free" societies of Eastern Europe. Even the broadcasting media are said to be surprisingly fair-minded. The elimination of fear in the public arena is an important achievement of free societies. Even if this gain is not institutionalized in Hungary, its de facto achievement in many aspects of the society should be recognized.

Readers of previous Surveys will note that the **Vatican** has been introduced for the first time as a dependency of Italy. The Vatican is in many ways anomalous, especially since it does not have citizens in the usual sense. However, because of its important international role and for the sake of completeness it seemed worthwhile to include it.

Brunei, the wealthy small neighbor of Malaysia, achieved relatively complete independence in the last year. Brunei allows no opposition voices. Its independence was marked by a decline in the position of the local Chinese.

The change in rating for the South African dependency of **Bophuthatswana** recognizes the fact that this "homeland" achieves an important measure of freedom from apartheid and other South African oppressions, at least for those of its citizens who can remain within its boundaries. This is true irrespective of the reasons behind the homelands policy that makes this artificial state possible.

The Record of Gains and Losses: 1973-1984

Table 5 relates the most important of this year's changes in country ratings to the recent record of the countries involved. In this case "important" means that there was a recorded change in behavior rather than simply a change in the analyst's judgment or method of rating.

Table 6 allows the reader to roughly trace the course of freedom since the Survey began. It should again be noted, however, that changes in information and judgment since 1973 make many ratings not strictly comparable from year to year. Nevertheless, this should not affect a general understanding of trends.

Since the Survey began, the world has experienced a number of gains and losses of freedom, either immediate or prospective. Most generally there has been an advance of Soviet communism in Southeast Asia after the fall of South Vietnam, and at least its partial institutionalization in South Yemen, Ethiopia, and the former Portuguese colonies of Africa. In the Americas there has arisen an imminent danger of the spread of communism to Nicaragua and an erstwhile danger in Grenada. Perhaps equally significant has been the amelioration of communism in many areas. While mainland China is still a repressive society, it has increased freedom through the support of private initiative, through more open discussion in some areas, and through the sending of thousands of students overseas. While Poland suggests the immediate limits of change, nearly every country in Eastern Europe is freer today than it was at the beginning of the 1970s. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the Soviet Union.

In Western Europe gains for democracy in Spain, Portugal, and Greece were critical to its continual advancement everywhere.

TABLE 5

MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGES: 1983 TO 1984

Comparison of the 1984 Rating with 1983 and the 1978-82 Average

	Not Free	Partly Free	Free
	(7-7	7-6	6-6
	6-5	5-5	5-4
	4-4	4-4	4-3
	3-3	3-2	2-2
	2-1	1-1	
Argentina			
1978-82			
1983			
1984			
Barbados			
1978-82			
1983			
1984			
Burkina Faso			
1978-82			
1983			
1984			
Cameroon			
1978-82			
1983			
1984			
Central African Rep.			
1978-82			
1983			
1984			
Dominican Republic			
1978-82			
1983			
1984			
Egypt			
1978-82			
1983			
1984			
El Salvador			
1978-82			
1983			
1984			
Ghana			
1978-82			
1983			
1984			

Comparative Survey: 1984

Not Free Partly Free Free
 (7-7 7-6 6-6 6-5 5-5 5-4 4-4 4-3 3-3 3-2 2-2 2-1 1-1)

Grenada	
1978-82	
1983	
1984	
Guatemala	
1978-82	
1983	
1984	
Guinea	
1978-82	
1983	
1984	
Honduras	
1978-82	
1983	
1984	
Iran	
1978-82	
1983	
1984	
Italy	
1978-82	
1983	
1984	
Jordan	
1978-82	
1983	
1984	
Kenya	
1978-82	
1983	
1984	
Korea (S)	
1978-82	
1983	
1984	
Liberia	
1978-82	
1983	
1984	
Malaysia	
1978-82	
1983	
1984	

Comparative Survey: 1984

Not Free Partly Free Free
 (7-7 7-6 6-6 6-5 5-5 5-4 4-4 4-3 3-3 3-2 2-2 2-1 1-1)




TABLE 6

Ratings of Countries Since 1973

Country	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Afghanistan	4	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7
	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Albania	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Algeria	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Angola ³	7		6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	6		4	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF		PF	NF*	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Antigua & Barbuda ³	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3		3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	3
	F		F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F*	F	F
Argentina	6	2	2	2	6	6	6	6	6	6	3	2
	3	2	4	4	5	6	5	5	5	5	3	2
	PF	F	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	F
Australia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Austria	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F

Notes to the Table

*. Indicates year of independence.

1. Ratings are from the Jan/Feb issues of Freedom at Issue through 1982. The ratings for 1983 and 1984 are based on the 1983-84 and (this) 1984-85 yearbooks. The three lines are political rights, civil liberties, and status of freedom.

2. Ratings for many former dependencies are not available for 1974.

3. Until 1975 Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau (formerly Portuguese Guinea) were evaluated together as Portugal Colonies (A), while Sao Tome and Cape Verde were Portugal (B). Until 1978 Antigua, Dominica, and St. Lucia were considered together as the West Indies Associated States (and Grenada until 1975). The Comoros and Djibouti (Territory of the Afars and Issas) were considered as "France: Overseas Territories" until 1975. Until 1975 Kiribati and Tuvalu were considered together as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. Cyprus was regarded as a unit until 1981.

4. 1973 ratings for South Africa were white: 2,3,F and black: 5,6,NF.

5. Ratings for North Vietnam for 1973-1976 were 7,7,NF; those for South Vietnam were 4,5,PF for 1973-75, 7,7,NF for 1976.

Comparative Survey: 1984

Table 6 (continued)

Country	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Bahamas	2 2 F	1 2 F*	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F
Bahrain	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	4 4 FF	6 4 FF	6 4 FF	6 4 FF	6 4 FF	6 4 FF	5 4 FF	5 5 FF	5 5 FF	5 5 FF
Bangladesh	2 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	7 5 NF	7 4 PF	6 4 PF	4 4 PF	3 3 PF	3 3 PF	3 4 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF
Barbados	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 2 F
Belgium	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F
Belize (Br. Hond.)	2 2 F		1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	2 1 F
Benin (Dahomey)	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF
Bhutan	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF
Bolivia	5 4 PF	5 4 PF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 4 PF	6 4 PF	5 3 PF	3 3 PF	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	2 3 F	2 3 F
Botswana	3 4 PF	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F
Brazil	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	4 4 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 4 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	3 3 PF	3 3 PF
Brunei	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 6 NF
Bulgaria	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF
Burkina Faso (Up. Volta)	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	6 4 FF	6 4 FF	5 5 PF	5 4 PF	2 3 F	2 3 F	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	7 5 NF

Comparative Survey: 1984

Table 6 (continued)

Country	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Burma	7	7	7	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Burundi	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	7
	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Cambodia (Kampuchea) (Kmer Rp.)	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Cameroon	6	6	6	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	7
	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Canada	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Cape Verde Islands ³	5		5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6		5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7
	NF		PF*	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Central African Rp.	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	5	5	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Chad	6	6	6	7	7	7	6	7	6	7	7	7
	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Chile	1	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6
	2	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	F	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
China (M)	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	5	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
China (T)	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	6	5	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Colombia	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Comoros ³	4		2	5	5	4	5	4	4	4	4	5
	4		2	2	3	3	4	4	5	5	4	5
	PF		F	PF*	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Congo	7	5	5	5	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	6	6	6
	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF

Comparative Survey: 1984

Table 6 (continued)

Country	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Costa Rica	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Cuba	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6
	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Cyprus (G) ⁴	2	2	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	1
	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	2	2
	F	F	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	F	F	F
Cyprus (T) ⁴										4	4	4
										3	3	3
										PF	PF	PF
Czechoslovakia	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Denmark	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Djibouti ³	4		4	4	3	2	2	3	3	3	5	5
	4		3	3	3	2	3	4	4	5	6	6
	PF		PF	PF	PF	F*	F	PF	PF	PF	NF	PF
Dominica ³	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3		3	3	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	2
	F		F	F	F	F	F*	F	F	F	F	F
Dominican Republic	3	3	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	1	1
	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	2	3
	F	F	PF	PF	PF	PF	F	F	F	F	F	F
Ecuador	7	7	7	7	6	6	5	2	2	2	2	2
	3	5	5	5	5	5	3	2	2	2	2	2
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	F	F	F	F	F
Egypt	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4
	6	6	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	6	5	4
	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
El Salvador	2	2	2	2	3	3	4	5	6	5	4	3
	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	4	5	5	5
	F	F	F	F	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Equatorial Guinea	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Ethiopia	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	6	6	5	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF

Comparative Survey: 1984

Table 6 (continued)

Country	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Fiji	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F
Finland	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F
France	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F
Gabon	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF
Gambia	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	3 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 4 PF
Germany (E)	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 6 NF
Germany (W)	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F
Ghana	6 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	6 5 PF	6 4 PF	4 4 PF	2 3 F	2 3 F	6 5 NF	7 6 NF
Greece	6 6 NF	7 5 NF	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F
Grenada	2 3 F		2 4 PF*	2 4 PF	2 4 PF	2 3 F	2 3 F	4 5 PF	5 5 PF	6 5 NF	7 6 NF	5 3 PF
Guatemala	2 3 F	2 2 F	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	4 4 PF	3 4 PF	3 5 PF	5 6 PF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	5 6 PF
Guinea	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 5 NF
Guinea-Bissau	7 6 NF		6 6 NF*	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	7 6 NF	6 6 NF
Guyana	2 2 F	4 2 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	3 3 PF	3 3 PF	4 3 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	5 4 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF

Comparative Survey: 1984

Table 6 (continued)

Country	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Haiti	7	6	6	6	6	7	7	6	6	7	7	7
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Honduras	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	4	3	3	2
	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	F
Hungary	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF
Iceland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
India	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3	3	3	5	5	2	2	2	3	3	3	3
	F	F	F	PF	PF	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Indonesia	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Iran	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	5	6	6	5
	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	6	5	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	PF
Iraq	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	7
	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Ireland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Israel	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Italy	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Ivory Coast	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	6
	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Jamaica	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Japan	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F

Table 6 (continued)

Country	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Jordan	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF
Kenya	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6
	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Kiribati (Gilbert Is)	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F		F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Korea (N)	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Korea (S)	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5
	6	6	6	5	6	5	5	5	6	6	6	5
	NF	PF	PF	PF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Kuwait	4	4	4	4	6	6	6	6	6	4	4	4
	4	3	3	3	5	4	3	4	4	4	4	4
	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Laos	5	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	5	5	5	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Lebanon	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5
	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	F	F	F	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Lesotho	7	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5
	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Liberia	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6
	6	5	3	4	4	4	4	5	6	6	5	5
	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	PF	PF
Libya	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Luxembourg	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Madagascar (Malagasy Republic)	5	5	5	5	6	5	5	6	6	6	5	5
	3	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6
	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF
Malawi	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF

Comparative Survey: 1984

Table 6 (continued)

Country	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Malaysia	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	5
	F	F	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Maldives	3	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5
	2	2	2	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Mali	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Malta	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	3	4	4
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	PF	PF
Mauritania	6	6	5	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Mauritius	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	2	2	2	4	4	4	3	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	PF	PF	PF	F	F	F
Mexico	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3
	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Mongolia	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Morocco	5	5	5	5	5	4	3	3	4	4	4	4
	4	5	5	5	5	3	4	4	4	5	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Mozambique ³	7		6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6
	6		6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	7
	NF		NF	NF*	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Nauru	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Nepal	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	3	3	3	3
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Netherlands	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
New Zealand	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F

Table 6 (continued)

Country	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Nicaragua	4 3 PF	5 4 PF	5 4 PF	5 4 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	5 5 PF
Niger	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF
Nigeria	6 4 PF	6 4 PF	6 4 PF	6 5 PF	6 4 PF	5 4 PF	5 3 PF	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	7 5 NF
Norway	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F	1 1 F
Oman	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF
Pakistan	3 5 PF	3 5 PF	3 5 PF	5 5 PF	4 5 PF	6 4 PF	6 5 PF	6 6 NF	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	7 5 NF
Panama	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	6 5 NF	5 5 NF	5 5 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	5 4 PF	4 3 PF
Papua New Guinea	4 2 PF		3 2 PF	3 2 PF*	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F
Paraguay	4 6 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 6 NF	5 6 NF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF
Peru	7 5 NF	7 5 NF	6 6 NF	6 4 PF	6 4 PF	6 4 PF	5 4 PF	5 4 PF	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F
Philippines	4 6 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	4 4 PF
Poland	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 4 PF	5 4 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF
Portugal	5 6 NF	5 6 NF	5 3 PF	5 3 PF	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	1 2 F	1 2 F
Qatar	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF

Comparative Survey: 1984

Table 6 (continued)

Country	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Romania	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF
Rwanda	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF	7 NF	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF	6 NF
St. Kitts & Nevis ³	2 3 F		2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F*	1 1 F
St. Lucia ³	2 3 F		2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F	2 3 F*	2 3 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	1 2 F
St. Vincent	2 2 F		2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F*	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F
Sao Tome & Principe ³	5 6 NF		5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	6 5 NF	6 5 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF
Saudi Arabia	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 7 NF	6 7 NF
Senegal	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 5 NF	6 4 PF	6 4 PF	5 3 PF	4 3 PF	4 3 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	4 4 PF	3 4 PF
Seychelles ³	3 2 PF		2 2 F	2 2 F	1 2 F*	6 3 PF	6 4 PF	6 5 PF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF	6 6 NF
Sierra Leone	4 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	6 5 PF	5 5 PF	6 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	4 5 PF
Singapore	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	5 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF
Solomon Is.	4 2 PF		4 2 PF	3 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F*	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 2 F	2 3 F
Somalia	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 6 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF	7 7 NF
South Africa ⁴		4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	4 5 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF	5 6 NF	5 6 PF	5 6 PF

Table 6 (continued)

Country	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Spain	5	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
	6	6	5	5	3	2	3	2	3	3	2	2
	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Sri Lanka	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3
	3	3	3	4	3	2	3	3	3	3	4	4
	F	F	F	PF	F	F	F	F	F	F	PF	PF
Sudan	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	6
	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	6	5	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF
Suriname	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	7	7	7	7
	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	5	5	6	6
	F		F	F*	F	F	F	F	NF	NF	NF	NF
Swaziland	4	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5
	2	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	6
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Sweden	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Switzerland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Syria	7	7	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	6	6
	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Tanzania	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Thailand	7	6	5	2	6	6	6	4	3	3	3	3
	5	3	3	3	6	5	4	3	4	4	4	4
	NF	PF	PF	F	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Togo	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6
	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Tonga	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Transkei					6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5
					5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6
					NF*	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Trinidad & Tobago	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F

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Table 6 (continued)

Country	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Tunisia	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Turkey	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	5	5	4	3
	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	5	5	5
	PF	PF	F	F	F	F	F	F	PF	PF	PF	PF
Tuvalu ³ (Ellice Is.)	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F		F	F	F	F	F*	F	F	F	F	F
Uganda	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	5	5	4	4
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	5	5	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF
USSR	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	7
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
United Arab Emirates	7	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
United Kingdom	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
United States	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Uruguay	3	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5
	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	5	4	4
	PF	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Vanuatu (N.Hebrides)	4		4	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2
	3		3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4
	PF		PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	F*	F	PF	PF
Venezuela	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Vietnam ⁵					7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
					7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6
					NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Western Samoa	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Yemen (N)	4	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5
	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	PF	PF	PF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF

Table 6 (continued)

Country	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84
Yemen (S)	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6
	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Yugoslavia	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF
Zaire	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF
Zambia	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	5
	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	4	3	3	4	4
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5
	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	NF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF	PF

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After the setback in Chile, gains have been achieved in many parts of Latin America. Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic reestablished democratic institutions. Brazil and Uruguay have moved very close, as has Panama. Several countries that the Survey listed as "free" at the beginning may now be more authentically free. Colombia is an example. (El Salvador and Guatemala probably should not have been listed as free in 1973. El Salvador may be as free today.)

African democracy has not fared well during these years. In many areas there has been a noticeable decline, especially in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Burkina Faso (Upper Volta), and Kenya in which great hopes were placed in the 1970s. In sub-Saharan Africa only Senegal seems to have made progress. Only quite recently are we seeing a resurgence of free institutions in the Middle East. The destruction of Lebanon will be hard to make up. Further to the east there has been remarkably little advance. The people of Sri Lanka have lost freedoms; those of Thailand and Nepal have made some hopeful progress.

During this period many new democratic states successfully emerged—in the South Pacific from Papua New Guinea to the east, and among the islands of the Caribbean.

Elections and Referenda

Evidence for political freedom is primarily found in the occurrence and nature of elections or referenda. Therefore, as a supplement to our ratings we have attempted in the accompanying Table 7 to summarize the national elections that we recorded for independent countries since late 1983. (Non-national elections are included only in a few instances.) The reader should assume that the electoral process appeared comparatively open and competitive unless our remarks suggest otherwise; extremely one-sided outcomes imply an unacceptable electoral process. Voter participation figures are often not comparable, even when available. Many states compel their citizens to vote, in others it is unclear whether participation is a percentage of those registered or of those of voting age.

TABLE 7
NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA

Nation and Date	Type of Election	Participation*	Results and Remarks
Algeria 1/12/84	presidential	96%	incumbent the single candidate; compulsory voting
Antigua & Barbuda 4/17/84	parliamentary	61%	incumbent party wins 16 of 17 seats with 67% of vote
Benin 6/12/84	parliamentary	93% r	98% approve single list; candi- dates preselected at public meetings
Botswana 9/8/84	parliamentary	70% r	incumbent party wins 29 of 34 elected seats; opposition gains
Burundi 8/51/84	presidential	95% r	incumbent wins with 99.6%; yes or no ballots
Cameroon 1/14/84	presidential	NA	incumbent receives 99.98% of vote; no opposition
Canada 9/5/84	parliamentary	high	opposition wins massively
China (T) 12/3/83	parliamentary	NA	inadequate campaign and organiza- tion opportunity; opposition gains votes but loses seats
Comoros 9/30/84	presidential	98%	incumbent reelected with 99.4% of vote; no opposition
Denmark 1/10/84	parliamentary	88%	slight conservative shift; coalition still required
Ecuador 1/29/84	presidential	80-85% r	open election; run-off required
5/6/84	presidential	ca. 67% r	opposition wins run-off; 10-15% blank ballots in both elections
Egypt 5/27/84	parliamentary	43% r 22% e	opposition makes gains; campaign laws and context heavily favor government, but opposition gains with 50 of 450 seats

Comparative Survey: 1984

Table 7 (continued)

El Salvador				
3/25/84	presidential	60-80% e		well contested, but without guerrilla opposition and supporters
5/6/84	presidential	60-80% e		establishment left wins with 54%
Guatemala				
7/1/84	constituent assembly	80% r		compulsory vote; 15% of votes blank or spoiled; yet well contested try all but far left
Haiti				
2/12/84	parliamentary	NA		no opposition candidates; opposition kept off ballot & attached
Iran				
4/15/84	parliamentary	NA		1100 competed for 270 positions; another 400 disqualified; liberal opposition withdrew because of campaign restrictions. Still quite open within limits
5/17/84	parliamentary (run-off)	NA		
Israel				
7/23/84	parliamentary	NA		indecisive result; grand coalition finally emerges
Jamaica				
12/15/83	parliamentary	55%		opposition boycott; government wins all seats; largely opp. fault
Japan				
12/18/83	parliamentary	67%		government plurality declines; forms quasi coalition
Jordan				
3/12/84	parliamentary (by-election)	NA		first election since 1967; 116 compete for 8 seats; first chance for women to vote; quasi parties
Maldives				
9/50/83	presidential	NA		referendum on assembly choice; 96% approve
Morocco				
9/14/84	parliamentary	67% r		relatively free; many parties; some MP's to be appointed
Nauru				
12/3/83	parliamentary	NA		variety of independents; generally support government
New Zealand				
7/14/84	parliamentary	NA		opposition wins; shift to left
Nicaragua				
11/4/84	presidential (& const. Assem.)	75% e 85% r		no serious contest; government wins 63%; opposition withdrawal justified but perhaps unwise

Comparative Survey: 1984

Table 7 (continued)

Panama				
5/16/84	general	70%+ e	government party wins by official	
			but contested count	
Philippines			partial boycott; changes approved	
1/27/84	referendum	45-70%		
5/14/84	parliamentary	NA	boycott largely fails; opposition	
			makes major gains despite	
			widespread malpractice	
Rwanda				
12/19-26/83	general	NA	99.9% approve incumbent; limited	
			choice among approved party can-	
			didates for legislature	
Seychelles				
6/17/84	presidential	50-95%	incumbent single candidate wins	
			with 93%	
Solomon Isls.				
10/24/84	parliamentary	NA	opposition forms new government	
South Africa				
8/22/84	parliamentary (Coloured)	16% e	fair within its limits; boycott	
			of this and following election	
			largely succeeds	
8/29/84	parliamentary (Indian)	20% r		
St. Kitts & Nevis				
6/21/84	parliamentary	77%	government wins overwhelmingly	
St. Vincent				
7/25/84	parliamentary	80%+	opposition wins decisively	
Switzerland				
2/26/84	referendum	52%	conscientious objection defeated	
			vehicle taxes approved	
5/20 84	referendum	42%	restrictions on land purchase and	
			bank secrecy defeated	
9/23/84	referendum	NA	reject halting nuclear construction	
Tanzania				
4/19/84	presidential (Zanzibar)	NA	sole candidate elected with 87%	
United States				
11/6/84	general	53%	president wins; but party fails	
			to make decisive gains	
USSR				
3/4/84	parliamentary	99.6%	no choice; everyone forced to	
			vote by direct contact	
Zaire				
8/4/84	presidential	NA	no choice; incumbent receives 99%	

Political-Economic Systems and Freedom

Table 8 (Political-Economic Systems) fills two needs. It offers the reader additional information about the countries we have rated. For example, readers with libertarian views may wish to raise the relative ratings of capitalist countries, while those who place more value on redistributive systems may wish to raise the ratings of countries toward the socialist end of the spectrum. The table also makes possible an analysis of the relation between political and economic forms and the freedom ratings of the Survey. Perusal of the table will show that freedom is directly related to the existence of multiparty systems: the further a country is from such systems, the less freedom it is likely to have. This could be considered a trivial result, since a publicly competitive political system is one of the criteria of freedom, and political parties are considered evidence for such competition. However, the result is not simply determined by our definitions: we searched for evidence of authentic public competition in countries without competitive parties, and seldom found the search rewarded. Both theoretical and empirical studies indicate the difficulty of effective public political opposition in one-party systems.

The relation between economic systems and freedom is more complicated and, because of our lack of emphasis on economic systems in devising our ratings of freedom, is not predetermined by our methods. Historically, the table suggests that there are three types of societies competing for acceptance in the world. The first, or **traditional** type, is marginal and in retreat, but its adherents have borrowed political and economic bits and pieces from both the other types. The second and third, the **Euro-American** and **Sino-Soviet** types, are strongest near their points of origin, but have spread by diffusion and active propagation all over the world. The Leninist-socialist style of political organization was exported along with the socialist concept of economic organization, just as constitutional democracy had been exported along with capitalist economic concepts. In this interpretation, the relation of economic systems to freedom found in the table may be an expression of historical chance rather than necessary relationships. Clearly, capitalism does not cause nations to be politically free, nor does socialism cause them to be politically unfree.³ Still, socialists must be concerned by the empirical relationship between the rating of "not free" and socialism that is found in tables such as this.

The table shows economies roughly grouped in categories from "capitalist" to "socialist." Labeling economies as capitalist or socialist has a fairly clear significance in the developed world, but it may be doubted that it is very useful to label the mostly poor and largely agrarian societies of the third world in this manner. However, third world states with dual economies, that is, with a modern sector and a preindustrial sector, have economic policies or goals that can be placed along the continuum from socialist to capitalist. A socialist third world state has usually nationalized all of the modern sector—except possibly some foreign investment—and claims central government jurisdiction over the land and its products, with only temporary assignment of land to individuals or cooperatives. The capitalist third world state has a capitalist modern sector and a traditionalist agricultural sector, combined in some cases with new agricultural projects either on family farm or agribusiness models. Third world economies that fall between capitalist and socialist do not have the high taxes of their industrialized equivalents, but they have major nationalized industries (for example, oil) in the modern sector, and their agricultural world may include emphasis on cooperatives or large-scale land reform, as well as more traditional forms.

States with **inclusive capitalist** forms are generally developed states that rely on the operation of the market and on private provision for industrial welfare. Taxes may be high, but they are not confiscatory, while government interference is generally limited to subsidy and regulation. States classified as **noninclusive capitalist**, such as Liberia or Thailand, "have not over fifty percent of the population included in a capitalist modern economy, with the remainder of the population still living traditionally. In such states the traditional economy may be individual, communal, or feudal, but the direction of change as development proceeds is capitalistic.

Capitalist states grade over into capitalist-statist or capitalist-socialist nations. **Capitalist-statist** nations are those such as Brazil, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia, that have very large government productive enterprises, either because of an elitist development philosophy or major dependence on a key resource such as oil. Government interferes in the economy in a major way in such states, but not primarily because of egalitarian motives. **Mixed capitalist** systems, such as those in Israel, the Netherlands, or Sweden, provide social services on a large scale through governmental or other nonprofit institutions, with the result that

TABLE 8

POLITICAL SYSTEM:		Multiparty				Dominant-Party				
		centralized		decentralized						
ECONOMIC SYSTEM:	Capitalist inclusive	Antigua & Barbuda	F	El Salvador ^{1/3}	PF	Australia	F	Malaysia	PF	
		Bahamas	F	Iceland	F	Belgium	F			
	non-inclusive	Barbados	F	Ireland	F	Canada	F			
		Belize	F	Japan	F	Germany(W) ³	F			
	Capitalist-Statist inclusive	Colombia ⁴	F	Korea(S) ¹	PF	Lebanon	PF			
		Costa Rica	F	Luxembourg	F	Switzerland	F			
	non-inclusive	Cyprus(G)	F	Mauritius	F	United States	F			
		Cyprus(T)	PF	New Zealand ³	F					
	Capitalist-Statist inclusive	Dominica ⁴	F	St. Kitts & N.	F					
		Dominican Republic ⁴	F	St. Lucia ³	F					
	non-inclusive		F	St. Vincent ³	F					
			F	Spain	F					
	Capitalist-Statist inclusive	Argentina	F	Sri Lanka	PF	Botswana	F	Haiti	NF	
		Italy	F	Turkey ^{1/4}	PF	Papua New Guinea	F	Lesotho	PF	
	non-inclusive	Jamaica ³	F	Venezuela	F	Solomon Islands ²	F	Transkei	PF	
		South Africa	PF							
	Mixed Capitalist inclusive	Bolivia	F			Brazil ^{1/3/4}	PF	China(Taiwan)	PF	
		Morocco ³	PF			Trinidad & Tobago	F	Grenada	PF	
	non-inclusive	Peru ⁴	F					Mexico	PF	
		Uganda ^{1/3}	PF					Panama ^{1/3/4}	PF	
	Mixed Socialist inclusive	Austria	F	Netherlands	F	India	F	Indonesia ^{1/4}	PF	
		Denmark	F	Norway	F	Vanuatu	PF	Iran ^{2/4}	PF	
	non-inclusive	Finland	F	Portugal	F			Paraguay ^{1/3/4}	PF	
		France	F	Sweden	F			Philippines	PF	
	Socialist inclusive	Greece	F	U.K. ³	F			Zimbabwe ⁴	PF	
		Israel	F							
	non-inclusive	Malta	PF							
	Socialist inclusive							Guyana	PF	
								Syria ^{1/4}	NF	
	non-inclusive							Madagascar ^{1/2}	PF	
	non-inclusive									
	Notes to the Table									
		1. Under heavy military influence or domination. (All countries in the Nonparty Military column are military dominated.)								
		2. Party relationships anomalous.								
		3. Close decision along capitalist-to-socialist continuum.								
		4. Close decision on inclusive/noninclusive dimension.								
		5. Noninclusive.								

POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

		One-Party		Non-Party			
		socialist	communist	nationalist	military	nonmilitary	
				Djibouti PF	Chile ³ PF Suriname NF	Jordan ^{2/3/4} PF Western Samoa ^{2/4} PF	
Sierra Leone PF				Cameroon ³ NF Gabon NF Ivory Coast ⁴ PF Kenya PF Malawi NF	Chad NF Guatemala ^{2/3} PF Liberia PF Niger NF Yemen (N) PF	Rhutan ³ PF Comoros PF Maldives PF Nepal ³ PF Swaziland PF Tonga PF Tuvalu F	
					Ghana NF Nigeria ^{3/4} NF	Bahrain PF Brunei NF Kuwait PF Nauru F Qatar PF S ^c di Arabia NF U.Arab Ems. PF	
				Zaire ¹ NF	Bangladesh PF Central Afr. Republic ³ NF Eq. Guinea ³ NF Mauritania NF Pakistan ² NF	Kiribati F Oman NF	
Burundi ^{1/5} NF					Uruguay ² PF		
Libya ^{1/2/3} NF S ^c helles ³ NF	China (M) ³ NF Poland ¹ PF Yugoslavia ³ PF						
Burma ¹ NF Cape VI ^{3/4} NF Congo ^{1/3} NF Guinea NF Somalia ^{1/3} NF Zambia ³ PF				Mal ¹ NF Rwanda ^{1/3} NF Sudan ¹ NF Togol NF	Burkina Faso NF		
Algeria ¹ NF Sao Tome & Prin. ^{3/4} NF	Albania NF Bulgaria NF Cuba NF Czechoslovakia NF Germany(E) NF	Hungary ³ PF Korea (N) NF Mongolia NF Romania NF USSR NF Vietnam NF					
Angola NF Benin ^{1/3} NF Guinea NF Bissau ^{1/3} NF Iraq ^{1/3/4} NF Mozambique NF Tanzania NF Yemen (S) NF	Afghanistan NF Cambodia NF Ethiopia ^{1/2/3} NF Laos NF						

private control over property is sacrificed to egalitarian purposes. These nations still see capitalism as legitimate, but its legitimacy is accepted grudgingly by many in government. **Mixed socialist** states, such as Syria or Poland, proclaim themselves to be socialist but in fact allow rather large portions of the economy to remain in the private domain. The terms **inclusive** and **noninclusive** are used to distinguish between societies in which the economic activities of most people are organized in accordance with the dominant system and those dual societies in which fifty percent or more of the population remain largely outside.

Socialist economies, on the other hand, strive programmatically to place an entire national economy under direct or indirect government control. States such as the USSR or Cuba may allow some modest private productive property, but this is only by exception, and rights to such property can be revoked at any time. The leaders of **noninclusive socialist** states have the same goals as the leaders of inclusive socialist states, but their relatively primitive economies or peoples have not yet been effectively included in the socialist system. Such states generally have a small socialized modern economy and a large preindustrial economy in which the organization of production and trade is still largely traditional. It should be understood that the characterizations in the table are impressionistic; the continuum between capitalist and socialist economies is necessarily cut arbitrarily into categories for this presentation.

Political systems range from democratic multiparty to absolutist one-party systems. Theoretically, the most democratic countries should be those with **decentralized multiparty systems**, for here important powers are held by the people at two or more levels of the political system, and dissent is legitimated and mobilized by opposition parties. More common are **centralized multiparty systems**, such as France or Japan, in which the central government organizes lower levels of government primarily for reasons of efficiency. **Dominant-party systems** allow the forms of democracy, but structure the political process so that opposition groups do not have a realistic chance of achieving power. Such limitations may be through vote fraud, imprisonment of opposition leaders, or other devices.

The now classical form of **one-party** rule is that in states such as the USSR or Vietnam that proclaim themselves to be **communist**. The slightly larger group of **socialist one-party** states are ruled by elites that use Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, organize ruling parties very much along communist lines, but either do not have

the disciplined organization of communist states or have explicitly rejected one or another aspect of communism. A final group of **nationalist one-party** states adopts the political form popularized by the communists (and the fascists in the last generation), but the leaders generally reject the revolutionary ideologies of socialist or communist states and fail to develop the totalitarian controls that characterize these states. There are several borderline states that might be switched between socialist and nationalist categories (for example, Libya). "Socialist" is used here to designate a political rather than economic system. A socialist "vanguard party" established along Marxist-Leninist lines will almost surely develop a socialist economy, but a state with a socialist economy need not be ruled by a vanguard party. It should be pointed out that the totalitarian-libertarian continuum is not directly reflected by the categorization in this table.

Nonparty systems can be democratic, as in the small island of Nauru, but generally they are not. Such systems may be **nonmilitary nonparty systems** ranging from Tonga to Saudi Arabia. Much more important are the many **military nonparty systems**, such as those in Niger or Pakistan.

Conclusion

At the end of 1984 most countries remained without working democracies. Yet the worldwide acceptance of the standards of democracy was demonstrated over and over—even by its opponents. Once again the best chance for democratic advance appeared to be in those societies that are coming increasingly to participate in the modern world. It is significant that the two most backward states in Latin America, Paraguay and Haiti, are the ones where the outlook for political rights and civil liberties is dimmest. Much of the retrogression in Africa can be seen from this standpoint. It is not that the rulers of states such as Mali, Ghana, or Ethiopia have decided that their countries cannot "afford" democracy or that they have made a conscious decision to put development ahead of freedom. It is simply that the populations of these countries are sufficiently uneducated, unorganized, and unaware of their rights that their leaders can deny them their freedoms. To deny such freedoms to the Argentines or Filipinos has been seen to be increasingly hazardous. It is significant that

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in the Middle East Egypt and Jordan, two of the more modern states, are opening up their institutions, while more primitive Sudan slides backward.

Because they live in the modern world South Africa's whites continued during the year to struggle with the problem of preserving their special power and privileges while living up to the assumptions that are universalized in the world they ascribe to. This year their attempt was to shore up their defenses and/or move part of the way toward a more just society by giving the vote and a role in parliament to the Colored and Indian communities. The general refusal of these communities to take part in the process greatly reduced the significance of the gesture. Yet it was a move; there are bound to be more.

The exception to this picture of the world is provided by ideological societies in which small minorities have an organized international belief system and international support system that make possible defense of continued elite domination. However, the examples of Poland, China, and Yugoslavia suggest that as peoples mature even under such dictation, the denial of the simple and basic rights that we define as freedom will be increasingly difficult. As in South Africa, we are likely to see repeated attempts to achieve a transition across the barrier of elitism.

N O T E S

1. For more discussion of methodology see R. D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, 1978 (New York: Freedom House and G. K. Hall, 1978), especially pp. 7-30.

2. See John P. Lewis and Valeriana Kallab, eds., *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1983* (New York: Overseas Development Council, 1983), pp. 206-222 and references cited.

3. See Lindsay M. Wright, "A Comparative Survey of Economic Freedoms," in R. D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, 1982 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 51-90.

PART II

Current Issues

Communications and UNESCO

Leonard R. Sussman

Bodies of dying children, and the outstretched arms of starving Ethiopian adults were suddenly seen in the living rooms of well-fed Europeans and North Americans in October because television cameras had entered territory long closed to Western news media. The response to stark scenes of hunger energized governments to speed aid to the stricken land.

The Ethiopian government—committed to Marxist policies while getting arms, if not alms, from the Soviet Union—faced a dilemma not unfamiliar to authoritarian and totalitarian countries: a rapid influx of Western life-supporting aid is accompanied by the planes, electronic gear, and especially the inquiring reporters of the independent news media. Inevitably, the government must decide whether—in the interest of maintaining the flow of vital aid for its people—to lift or ease stringent censorship of communications. Ethiopia eased some entry restrictions, permitted the press movement in limited areas, and, then, slowly restored press controls.

Elsewhere in the world, without a dramatic influx of newsreporters, the victimizing of journalists which inevitably results in greater self-censorship continued undiminished. Twenty-one journalists were killed in fifteen countries.¹ That number continues to rise. In 1983, fourteen newspersons were killed in nine countries; in 1982, nine died in four nations. Death threats were made against journalists in four countries.² There were ten the previous year and four times as many in 1982. Five journalists were kidnapped in three countries this year,³ a slight rise from 1983. Governments arrested seventy-two journalists in twenty-seven countries this year.⁴ There were eighty arrests in twenty-eight nations in 1983. Fourteen countries expelled twenty-two journalists, a slight increase over 1983.⁵ In thirteen

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countries, thirty-one journalists were beaten, stabbed, harassed, or their establishments attacked.⁶ General censorship in many forms increased in fourteen countries.⁷ Temporary forms of censorship increased in ninety-six incidents in thirty-three countries;⁸ a sharp rise from 1983 when such censorship was applied in forty-one cases in eighteen nations.

These diverse forms of censorship, often resulting in self-censorship by journalists, are not the sole criteria for determining the year-long comparative level of press freedom in a country. That determination (see Table 9) is based upon the actual independence of the news media as institutionalized in the relationship with the respective country's government. Such relationships, examined on a comparative basis, show that there are fifty-four countries (34%) with a free press and thirty-seven (23%) with free radios; forty (25%) partly free press, and thirty-two (20%) partly free radios; and sixty-six (41%) with the press and ninety (57%) radios regarded as not free.

In the United States, the right of the news media to perform without governmental restriction was extensively examined in two forums. A court in New York City heard the libel suit of retired General William C. Westmoreland against a CBS-TV documentary on the Vietnam War. This case would test the Supreme Court's rule that public figures may not recover for libelous acts unless it can be proven that such statements were made with "reckless disregard" for whether they were true. The lengthy courtroom spectacle drew testimony from many high-ranking military and civilian leaders of the U.S. government during the Vietnam War. Some television journalists privately criticized CBS for a biased portrayal of events and General Westmoreland in the program, "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception." It was also advertised as a "conspiracy." Yet the television industry generally regarded the \$120 million suit as a serious threat to editorial freedom. It could, however, be seen not as a challenge to press rights, but another in the continuing series of juridical definitions of the extent to which even a public figure can be subjected to attack or, as claimed, libel. The CBS/Westmoreland case should not be viewed, therefore, as an instance of arbitrary governmental restriction of the news media, though it may set a new limitation on public expression (as does, indeed, the court's restraint against shouting "fire" in a crowded theater).

The brief ban on U.S. press coverage of the American intervention in Grenada in 1983 produced a government/press consultation and the formulation of rules by the Department of Defense for

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news-media coverage of U.S. military operations. The basic principle governing the public release of military information, said the DOD rule, "is that the maximum amount of information will be made available, consistent with operational security and the safety of U.S. or friendly nations personnel." The primary obligation would be to avoid publishing information that would jeopardize American forces and lives. Deliberate violation would cause the rescinding of the correspondent's accreditation. No form of censorship was proposed. The rules did not give military commanders authority to control information other than that directly related to military operations and intelligence about enemy forces.

The Pentagon will create a national press pool of print and broadcast journalists. The small number in the pool--perhaps fifteen--would accompany the troops and share information with reporters not at the battle scene. Some 600 newsmen sought to accompany U.S. troops in Grenada.⁹ Complaints about the operation of the ground rules could be made to commanders at the battlefield or to the Pentagon.

The UNESCO Controversy

The main global press/government battlefield for a decade was at UNESCO.¹⁰ The debates and programs in UNESCO's communications sector generated strong opposition from Western journalists. They regarded the demands of developing countries for better journalistic coverage and more communications infrastructure as mainly a subterfuge for censoring or influencing the international flow of news and information. Debates over some still officially undefined "new world information and communication order" served repeatedly to exacerbate Western media.

The UNESCO story, however, became more complex on December 23, 1983, when President Reagan approved Secretary of State George P. Shultz' recommendation that the United States withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization on December 31, 1984. The approval, conveyed in a memorandum from Robert C. McFarlane, gave as one of four reasons for withdrawing, "[UNESCO's] attack upon a free flow of communications." National Security Adviser McFarlane said, "The President wishes us to continue to expend every effort to effect meaningful changes. . . . [and he] is prepared to review the decision to withdraw should concrete changes materialize."

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TABLE 9
NEWS MEDIA CONTROL BY COUNTRIES

	Generally Free ¹	Partly Free ¹	Generally Not Free ¹	Gov't News Agency ²	Civil Liberties ³
Afghanistan			PB	X	7
Albania			PB	X	7
Algeria			PB	X	6
Angola			PB	X	7
Antigua & Barbuda		PB			3
Argentina	P	B		X	2
Australia	PB			X	1
Austria	PB			X	1
Bahamas	P	B			2
Bahrain			PB	X	5
Bangladesh		PB		X	5
Barbados	P	B		X	2
Belgium	PB			X	1
Belize	P	B			1
Benin			PB	X	7
Bhutan			P		5
Bolivia	P	B		X	3
Botswana	P	B			3
Brazil	P	B		X	3
Brunei			PB		6
Bulgaria			PB	X	7
Burkina Faso			PB	X	5
Burma			PB	X	7
Burundi			PB	X	6
Cameroon			PB	X	7
Canada	PB				1
Cape Verde Isis.			PB		7
Central African Rep.			PB		6
Chad			PB	X	7
Chile		PB		X	5
China (Mainland)			PB	X	6
China (Taiwan)		PB			5
Colombia	PB			X	3
Congo			PB	X	6
Costa Rica	PB				1
Cuba			PB	X	6
Cyprus (C)	P	B		X	2

Notes to the Table

1. P designates print media; B designates broadcast (radio and TV) media. Print media refers primarily to domestic newspapers and news magazines. Countries with undeveloped media or for which there is insufficient information include: Comoros, Djibouti, Kiribati, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa.

2. X designates the presence of a government news agency, with or without the availability of private news services.

3. See Table 1, pages 13-16.

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	Generally Free ¹	Partly Free ¹	Generally Nat Free ¹	Gov't News Agency ²	Civil Liberties ³
Cyprus (T)	P	B			3
Czechoslovakia			PB	X	6
Denmark	PB			X	1
Dominica	PB				2
Dominican Rep.	P	B			3
Ecuador	PB			X	2
Egypt		P	B	X	4
El Salvador		PB			5
Equatorial Guinea			PB		6
Ethiopia			PB	X	7
Fiji	PB				2
Finland	P	B		X	2
France	P	B		X	2
Gabon			PB	X	6
Gambia	PB				4
Germany (E)			PB	X	6
Germany (W)	PB			X	2
Ghana			PB	X	6
Greece	PB			X	2
Grenada	P	B			3
Guatemala		P	B	X	6
Guinea			PB (?)		5
Guinea-Bissau			PB		6
Guyana		P	B	X	5
Haiti			PB		6
Honduras	PB				3
Hungary			PB	X	5
Iceland	PB				1
India	P	B		X	3
Indonesia		P	B	X	6
Iran			PB	X	6
Iraq			PB	X	7
Ireland	PB				1
Israel	PB				2
Italy	PB			X	1
Ivory Coast		P	B	X	5
Jamaica	P	B			3
Japan	PB			X	1
Jordan			PB	X	5
Kampuchea (Cambodia)			PB	X	7
Kenya		P	B	X	5
Korea (N)			PB	X	7
Korea (S)		P	B	X	5
Kuwait		P	B	X	4
Laos			PB	X	7
Lebanon		PB		X	4
Lesotho		PB			5
Liberia		P	B		5
Libya			PB	X	6
Luxembourg	PB				1

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	Generally Free ¹	Partly Free ¹	Generally Not Free ¹	Gov't News Agency ²	Civil Liberties ³
Madagascar			PB	X	6
Malawi			PB	X	7
Malaysia		P	B	X	5
Maldives		P	B		5
Mali			PB	X	6
Malta	P		B	X	4
Mauritania			PB	X	6
Mauritius	PB				2
Mexico		PB		X	4
Mongolia			PB	X	7
Morocco		P	B	X	5
Mozambique			PB	X	7
Nauru	PB				2
Nepal		P	B	X	4
Netherlands	PB			X	1
New Zealand	PB			X	1
Nicaragua		P	B		5
Niger			PB		6
Nigeria		PB		X	5
Norway	PB			X	1
Oman			PB		6
Pakistan			PB	X	5
Panama		PB		X	3
Papua New Guinea	PB				2
Paraguay		PB			5
Peru	PB			X	3
Philippines		P	B	X	4
Poland		P	B	X	5
Portugal	PB			X	2
Qatar			PB	X	5
Romania			PB	X	7
St. Kitts & Nevis	PB				1
St. Lucia	PB				2
St. Vincent	P	B			2
Sao Tome & Principe			PB		7
Saudi Arabia			PB	X	7
Senegal		PB		X	4
Seychelles			PB		6
Sierra Leone		P	B		5
Singapore			PB		5
Somalia			PB	X	7
South Africa		P	B		6
Spain	PB			X	2
Sri Lanka		PB		X	4
Sudan			PB	X	6
Suriname			PB		6
Swaziland			PB		6
Sweden	PB			X	1
Switzerland	PB			X	1
Syria			PB	X	7
Tanzania			PB	X	6

Current Issues: Communications

	Generally Free ¹	Partly Free ¹	Generally Not Free ¹	Gov't News Agency ²	Civil Liberties ³
Thailand		P	B	X	4
Togo			PB	X	6
Tonga		PB			3
Transkei			PB		6
Trinidad & Tobago	PB				2
Tunisia		P	B	X	5
Turkey		P	B	X	5
Uganda		P	B	X	5
USSR			PB	X	7
United Arab Emirates		P	B	X	5
United Kingdom	PB			X	1
United States	PB				1
Uruguay		PB			4
Vanuatu		PB			4
Venezuela	PB			X	2
Vietnam			PB	X	6
Yemen (N)			PB	X	5
Yemen (S)			PB	X	7
Yugoslavia			PB	X	5
Zaire			PB	X	7
Zambia		P	B	X	5
Zimbabwe			PB	X	5

Table Summary for Countries

	General Rating		Print Media		Broadcast Media	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Free	48	31	54	34	37	23
Partly free	53	34	40	25	32	20
Not free	56	36	66	41	90	57

Governments in three-fourths of the world have a significant or dominant voice in determining what does and what does not appear in the media. This definition of control does not include regulation such as that practiced by the PCC: it means control over newspaper or broadcast content. In some countries particular media (often broadcasting) may be government financed and indirectly government managed like the BBC, but are still largely free of government control of content.

In only one-fourth of the countries are both the print and broadcast media generally free: the press is generally free in one-third. Newspapers tend to be freer than radio or TV.

Nearly a half century ago there were thirty-nine national news services in twenty-eight countries. Seventy percent of these were at least nominally independent of government (Robert Desmond, *The Press and World Affairs*, Appleton-Century, 1937). Today there are 106. The number of government-operated news services has increased rapidly in the past five years in consequence of recommendations made by UNESCO. Sixty-eight percent of the countries have a government news agency: eighty-one percent of the "not free," sixty-eight percent of the "partly free," and fifty-seven percent of the "free" countries. Of nations with the lowest civil liberties rating (7), ninety-five percent operate government news agencies. National news agencies often use the world news services of the transnational Western media or TASS. They may then decide what world news may be distributed inside the country. Some national news agencies assign themselves the sole right to secure domestic news for distribution inside or outside the country.

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Throughout the year, diverse efforts were made by friendly countries in Europe and the third world, and by the Director-General of UNESCO, to secure for the United States a specific set of reforms it would deem essential in order to remain in the international organization. The United States repeatedly refused to provide such a target-list. The closest it came was in response in July to the Director-General's formal memorandum to all 161 countries to comment on his draft program for 1986-87. In reply, the United States proposed improving the decision-making process and personnel practices at UNESCO, changing the priorities of the organization, adopting a zero-growth budget, and ending "politicization" of programs in communications and human rights.

By the time the United States had sent that reply, many other steps had been taken by other countries and the Director-General to propose reforms. The United Kingdom's Minister of Overseas Development, Timothy Raison, wrote Director-General Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow on April 2 that his country was concerned about some UNESCO programs as well as other administrative and budgetary matters. "The value of UNESCO's work, and its reputation, can only be diminished," wrote Raison, "by undue attention to issues of political controversy." He gave, as an example, "UNESCO's increased involvement with communications and media issues in recent years to which my government has been obliged to give particular attention."

Indeed, until the 1983 biennial General Conference, UK delegates criticized the U.S. for not taking the lead in opposing certain communications programs. In 1983, however, the United States in company with the United Kingdom and several in the (Western) Information Group secured the withdrawal of the most onerous Soviet proposals implying press-control. The IG also introduced programs to study the "watchdog" role of the press, and gained approval for recognizing a new world information order as an "evolving process," as unobjectionable as the common reference to the "communications revolution."

Clearly, though the withdrawal of the U.S. from UNESCO would hinge on many factors, the communications issue, while submerged, was ever present. The press seemed to recognize that it was part of the story, as well as the reporter. That made U.S. journalist organizations uncomfortable. They pointedly did not support or oppose the U.S. withdrawal decision.¹²

The British public, meanwhile, read the Manchester Guardian's report of a leaked confidential memorandum that described how Gregory Newell, Assistant Secretary of State for International

Organization Affairs, would manipulate press coverage in support of the withdrawal decision. He planned to follow press releases with inspired letters to the New York Times and Washington Post, and other papers, as well as secure publication of supporting articles by "private sector individuals."¹³ The Guardian also revealed that Secretary Newell had asked thirteen U.S. federal agencies and seventy-seven American missions overseas about the value of UNESCO. Not a single U.S. agency or mission recommended that the U.S. withdraw. The National Science Foundation coordinated the response of seven science-oriented U.S. agencies.¹⁴ The NSF told Secretary Newell that the U.S. gains substantially from UNESCO science programs, and that by withdrawing the U.S. would lose significantly in influence, information gathering, and financial returns. That information was not passed on to the Secretary of State in the executive memorandum supporting withdrawal. Similar evaluations of the loss to American citizens from withdrawal from UNESCO were voiced by business, educational, civic, and other organizations.¹⁵

The process by which the United States reached its decision to withdraw from UNESCO was criticized in a 176-page report of a congressional staff study, "U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO."¹⁶ The study concluded that "the administration did not adequately take into account the view of foreign governments, that had reservations about the decision." Nor did it "adequately consult with Congress which has had a long-standing role at many levels with UNESCO . . . It also did not adequately consult with domestic interest groups, a variety of which opposed the U.S. decision." Withdrawal from UNESCO, said the Congressional study, "may signal the beginning of U.S. disengagement from the UN system."

Such disengagement from the UN system is, indeed, the objective of the Heritage foundation,¹⁷ the Washington think tank that claims to be the driving force behind the Administration's decision to leave UNESCO. Owen Harries, who served briefly as Australian Ambassador to UNESCO, has been working at the Heritage Foundation this year. He has turned out a series of strong attacks on UNESCO which were widely circulated in the Administration and elsewhere.¹⁸

Mr. Harries also attended the September-October 1984 meeting in Paris of the Executive Board of UNESCO. This was the session at which delegates of fifty-one states could produce reforms or steps toward changes that would persuade the United States to remain in the organization at least another year. Present, too, were members of the U.S. Monitoring Panel created by Secretary Shultz

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to advise him whether to reconsider withdrawal. Members of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, who would report findings to the Monitoring Panel and the State Department, were also present.

All heard recommendations for reforms from the thirteen-member Temporary Committee of the Executive Board created to produce recommendations for change, taking into account the demands of the United States and the Information Group. Hovering in the background, but never formally introduced into the debate, was the draft report of the General Accounting Office of the U.S. Congress. The GAO produced a 177-page report of its six-months' examination in Paris of UNESCO's fiscal and personnel management and program coordination. The bland businesslike report was apparently a disappointment to those who expected citations of scandal and corruption. None were listed. Indeed, the external auditors, a respected British firm, were cited for having performed well. The GAO did repeatedly report the centralization of most personnel and program controls in the Director-General, and the yielding of control and adequate oversight by the members. The first draft of the GAO's confidential memorandum was leaked to the press in Paris before UNESCO had received its copy and could comment, as requested by the GAO, before a final report was released. This tactic infuriated even friendly Western delegations. Mr. M'Bow then circulated a summary of the UNESCO report to the Executive Board. At the end of the session, U.S. Ambassador Jean Gerard, apparently to the chagrin of her American associates, further assured the isolation of her delegation.¹⁹ She asked that a special session of the board be set to examine the GAO report at the current session, or subsequently. Ms. Gerard's proposal was generally regarded as another demand that could not realistically be met.²⁰

The Executive Board on October 20 unanimously adopted a zero-growth rate budget for the 1986-87 program. This met one of the earliest and most forcefully stated demands of the United States. A wider series of reforms made by the Board and by the Director-General on his own initiative was approved. These reforms addressed administrative policies, the strengthening of UNESCO's governing bodies, improved concentration and evolution of programs, better budgeting techniques, and other technical changes.

The Board also extended the life of the Temporary Committee until October 1985 (the General Conference) to monitor the implementation of the reforms.²¹ Such a body had also been proposed by the United States, along with a drafting and

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negotiating committee. The DNC had been created by Mr. M'Bow in 1976. A small representative group met to resolve the most fractious issues on behalf of the full General Conference. The DNC has been reconstituted at succeeding General Conferences. The United States has proposed that the DNC be permanently established to arbitrate the most contentious issues.

Among these, for nearly ten years, have been the communications issues. Eight paragraphs of the Executive Board's decisions concern Major Program III: Communication in the Service of Man. A careful reading of these recommendations reveals a significant movement in the direction sought by American and other (Western) Information Group members. The recommendations are, in effect, directives to the Director-General as he prepares the draft program to be placed before the full General Conference in October 1985. This is how the rules of UNESCO provide for changes in policy and structure. Those rules did not permit the full implementation of changes before the December 31, 1984, announced date of the U.S. withdrawal. It was left to the United States, then, to decide whether movement toward significant reform was, in fact, seriously proposed by both the Executive Board and its Director-General.

The conclusions of the Board in regard to communications included the following points:

1. "High priority" be given the development of communications facilities in developing countries. This is precisely the U. S. emphasis. Indeed, the U.S. would prefer to eliminate the theoretical programs in communications. "High priority" does, however, emphasize the American objective of supporting technical transfers and training--steps which the United States has long professed to support but for which it has just begun to allocate funds.

2. Theoretical analyses of communications problems ("democratization of communication, access to and participation in communication, and the right to communicate" and the theme of a new world information and communication order) be held at the present level of analysis. Rather than advancing these concepts, the Board called for "collating the work already accomplished." Its conclusion would be analyzed, but there is a clear amber signal cautioning against developing new theory on "democratization," "access," and the "right" to communicate. All have been highly controversial concepts opposed by American and Western critics. The Board, moreover, reemphasized the 1983 decision to regard a new informa-

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tion order an "an evolving and continuous process." That formulation was introduced in 1983 by the Norwegians and the British, and welcomed by the Americans (including this writer who as an American delegate helped negotiate the communications issues at the General Conference).

3. The highly controversial issues concerning the working conditions of journalists should be left primarily to the "initiatives taken by the competent professional associations." This is a distinct change from prior programs that thrust UNESCO into direct conflict with Western news media. They assumed UNESCO had a distinct series of objectives for altering the journalists' professional procedures (as well as the content of the news products). This section of the Board's directive should be read in parallel with the subsequent commitment Mr. M'Bow made to this writer in an exchange of letters widely published in the United States and abroad since November 6, 1984 (see below).

4. The 1978 Mass Media Declaration should be further examined. This declaration is a bland statement of overwhelming pro-Western news-media concepts. The declaration in this form was introduced without the knowledge of the Soviet Union after its own draft had been killed the night before mainly through the good offices of Mr. M'Bow. The Soviets were appalled. Yet Americans continue to regard the declaration as an anti-Western statement. The better course for U.S. diplomacy would be to use the declaration as a clear statement advancing press freedom.

5. "Special importance" should be given the strengthening of the International Program for the Development of Communication. The IPDC was largely an American creation. We supported it as a trade-off for diminishing the ideological conflict over communications. For six years we welched on formal pledges to provide concrete aid for third world communications facilities and training. Now, belatedly, we are beginning to keep some promises. The Board's stress on the IPDC is directly in line with present U.S. policy.

6. The convening of a European conference on communication policies was again put off—as Westerners prefer.

7. Book-promotion programs are to be merged, as the United States wanted.

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8. And, finally, the Board hoped that nongovernmental organizations in the communications field will be more closely associated with UNESCO activities. American NGOs have already said they would increase their activity at UNESCO, and one (the World Press Freedom Committee) is seeking a better consultative status.

These eight categories of reform in communications programs move precisely in the direction set forth in official U.S. demands. These projected changes also demonstrate significant progress in meeting the explicit criticisms that this author has made for nearly ten years. Of course, these recommendations must be implemented to demonstrate actual reforms accomplished. I also recognize that the main thrust of third world expectations concerns the expanded capability of developing countries to share the values and opportunities embodied in the continuing communications revolution. That revolution will accelerate, and the expectations of the third world communicators will never be satiated--nor should they cease as long as they cannot participate adequately in the growing worldwide communications systems. It is America's advantage to help--not bar--their entrance into those systems. That is what a new world information order is mostly about.

The Western Information Group should not impose its values and procedures on all others any more than they should impose their values and procedures on us. That means that communications issues will be discussed from many standpoints at UNESCO whether the U.S. stays or leaves. But whether we are there or not, UNESCO should not seek to develop a single, universal norm for communications, domestic or international. Failure to avoid the appearance of such norm-setting has generated much opposition bordering on hatred by Western journalists. Mr. M'Bow has repeatedly denied an intention of supporting censorship, the licensing of the press, or other norm-setting. But debates and programs have, nevertheless, included speakers--mainly from press-control countries--who frightened Western journalists.

To resolve such misunderstanding, this author engaged Director-General M'Bow in frank correspondence from August 4 to October 31, 1984. That exchange clearly produced a commitment that this writer regards as a change of basic policy although one UNESCO official maintains it is only a "clarification." The reader may judge.

Mr. M'Bow had invited me to participate, July 16-20, in the consultation group he organized to advise him on reforms in the

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field of public information. The group of nineteen was chaired by Mohamed Heikal, former Minister of Information of E&ypt. From the outset, Mr. Heikal and I agreed that the main purpose of the consultation should be to discuss those basic matters that influence the global perception of UNESCO-programs and debates. The majority of the consultation, however, felt we should devote the week to recommending improvements in UNESCO's public information office. The final report includes an appendix expressing my belief that member-states must demonstrate restraint in proposing communications programs, if UNESCO is not to suffer divisive, harmful reactions.

On August 4, 1984, I met privately in New York City with Mr. M'Bow to express my concern over the specific issue of the protection of journalists. My August 8 letter to Mr. M'Bow stated:

It is unfortunate, I believe, that the understandable desire of many developing countries to participate in the Information Revolution has been termed a demand for some still undefined New World Information and Communications Order. The yearning is valid and understandable; the term NWICO is regarded as threatening statist control of news and information media. I also know some member-states do indeed seek that objective; most do not. And such an objective has never been approved at UNESCO.

Yet some debates and programs at UNESCO have lent credence to such Western fears. This despite the fact that substantial steps were taken at the last General Conference to dispel such fears.

Now, however, a disturbing sign has appeared.

I learned in Paris that a meeting was held in Geneva last month to plan a seminar in Mexico next March that will discuss, among other matters, the protection of journalists. That and related subjects also on the agenda seem to repeat the pattern of the acrimonious meeting at UNESCO in February, 1981. Many of the same nongovernmental organizations are sponsoring this as the last. And the use of identification cards for journalists--a form of licensing--already is being discussed as part of the new as the past meeting.

I regard the proposed UNESCO cosponsorship of the meeting in Mexico and elsewhere on the subject of "protection of journalists," among other matters, as

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certain to end any chance of the United States remaining inside UNESCO for years to come. I know I need not spell out the reasons, and I also know the organizational explanations for having convened the recent meeting in Geneva to plan this meeting in Mexico. All of that notwithstanding, I have absolutely no doubt that the mere planning of such a meeting with UNESCO participation will provide a completely predictable negative reaction in the United States, the United Kingdom, and perhaps elsewhere. In that renewed combatative climate, all the earnest efforts to improve the functioning of the organization will be submerged in a new emotionalized attack that will easily carry the day.

You have asked me to provide my best judgment on matters of public information. I said repeatedly at the consultation that no organization, certainly not UNESCO, can separate the content of its programs and debates from the public image it projects. Wholly deserved or not--I believe by now you know my balanced view of this matter--UNESCO is perceived in the West as using the "protection" issue to advance press controls. No Western government can ignore that issue when perceived as a challenge to basic rights. And at this moment, such a challenge would be regarded as a distinct rejection of Western concerns.

UNESCO will not avoid attack because another international agency may claim to run the "protection" segment of a trilateral meeting. UNESCO will be charged with major responsibility for the entire meeting, and this will be seen as continuing an objectionable pattern that helped bring UNESCO to its present crisis.

Director-General M'Bow replied September 29:

First let me re-state my position and of course that of Unesco, which has been and will continue to be that questions of the working conditions of journalists, including the protection of journalists, are of direct concern to the members of that profession, and it is not for us but for the journalists themselves and their non-governmental professional organizations to discuss and deliberate on them. Intergovernmental Organizations such as Unesco can only be involved in such deliberations at the request of the professional organizations concerned.

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The meeting in question will eventually be convened in 1985 by FELAP. At present, to my knowledge, this has been supported by the following organizations:

- . International Federation of Journalists (IJF);
- . International Organization of Journalists (IOJ);
- . International Catholic Journalistic Union (ICJU);
- . Union of African Journalists (UJA);

The interorganization meeting which was held at the ILO headquarters in Geneva in June 1984, requested that ILO, International Committee of the Red Cross and Unesco prepare the following information documents:

- a) ILO: Selected problems related to employment
- b) CICR: Protection and safety of journalists
- c) UNESCO: Implications of new technologies.

This meeting also expressed the wish that Unesco, the International Labour Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross co-sponsor the proposed 1985 Conference. However no formal request to this effect has been made.

Let me assure you that I am already giving the question you raised in your letter my personal attention and that I shall take the concerns you have expressed into consideration when it comes to any action relating to Unesco's involvement or participation in the proposed meeting.

I did not consider that reply adequate. The text of the letter was read to me from Paris on October 2, and telefaxed to New York a few hours later. That same day, my response to Mr. M'Bow by telefax was as follows:

You listed four organizations of journalists which support the meeting scheduled for 1985. These four NGOs do not represent the entire field of international organizations of journalists. At a meeting in Washington, September 28-29, 1984, for example, representatives of journalists organizations from several continents discussed with apprehension the proposed conference in Mexico City.

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Two responses are already available: The magazine Editor and Publisher reflecting thousands of newspapers in the United States, advised in the headline over its only editorial this week, "Don't Relax on UNESCO." The editorial was devoted entirely to the Mexico City conference in which "protection" would be discussed. The editorial warned that this meeting shows that "licensing of journalists, an imposed code of conduct, rules for the content of news . . . are all still on the UNESCO agenda."

Similarly, the American Newspaper Publishers Association passed a special resolution, September 19, saying it is "alarmed at UNESCO's participation in and support for a new meeting now scheduled in Mexico City on 'working conditions and security of journalists.'" The ANPA stated it "would welcome signs (UNESCO) will move from such controversial and confrontational activities, to constructive programs supporting UNESCO's original commitment to a free flow of information."

I deeply regret this compounding of UNESCO's problems vis-a-vis the news media in many countries at the very moment when substantive changes in administrative procedures and programs are being debated by the Executive Board. My letter of August 8 was written precisely to help avoid this development.

Even now—or should I say, particularly now?—I believe a salutary step should be taken.

You have restated your and UNESCO's position: intergovernmental organizations can be involved in such deliberations as the working conditions of journalists only at the request of the professional organizations concerned. It follows, then, that you cannot be involved in such deliberations if some professional organizations advise you not to become involved, even while others take the contrary position. Since there is no unanimity among professional organizations on this subject, UNESCO should leave it entirely to the professional organizations themselves to discuss and possibly resolve matters of working conditions of journalists.

You know my position on communications issues generally. I believe that UNESCO has the responsibility to examine many aspects of the communications revolution that affect every country and every citizen. It is particularly appropriate for UNESCO to help developing countries

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expand their communications capabilities, and their access to information in many fields, and to international dialogues in general.

I sincerely hope you will act promptly to make it clear that UNESCO will neither be involved nor participate in the proposed meeting in Mexico.

My October 2 reply was available in Paris on the third, when Mr. M'Bow addressed the Executive Board on this subject. He moved a bit closer to my recommendation that he make a clear-cut denial of participation in the forthcoming "protection" conference. But he allowed an ambiguous loophole: "we have so far received no official request" for UNESCO participation. His remarks were greeted with a mixed response in Paris.

Mr. M'Bow's letter to me of October 20 was a far clearer commitment to distance UNESCO from even the discussions of "protection" (which, in the past, have been linked to licensing, monitoring and penalizing of journalists).

Mr. M'Bow wrote:

On 5 October 1984, I made a statement at the present session of the Executive Board (document 120 EX/INF. 6 prov.) where I referred, among other things, to this matter, saying that:

"The programme and budget approved for 1984-1985 by the General Conference does not foresee the organization of such an activity and therefore contains no corresponding budgetary provision. Several leading journalists' unions announced last July, however, the convening in Mexico City in 1985 of a world conference on the working conditions and security protection of journalists, in view of the considerable danger to which pressmen are exposed in the course of their work. Three of the associations concerned - the International Federation of Journalists (IJF), the International Organization of Journalists (IQJ), and the Federation of Latin-American Journalists (FELAP), met last week to prepare this world conference. Unesco did not attend the meeting.

It is true that the international and regional journalists' associations concerned have indicated

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their desire that the world conference be placed under the joint auspices of Unesco, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), but we have so far received no official request.

I should like to take this opportunity to recall that Unesco's attitude so far in this field has been that questions concerning the working conditions of journalists should be settled by the journalists themselves. . The Organization confines itself to providing support, to the full extent that its resources allow, and as is customary, to professional organizations which have submitted a request through the usual channels. I personally hope that, on a matter which is essential to journalists' free exercise of their profession and their physical safety, the professional associations will come to an agreement among themselves."

You stated in your letter that, since there is no unanimity among the professional organizations on the subject of the proposed conference, Unesco should leave it entirely to the professional organizations themselves to discuss and possibly resolve the matters involved. Indeed, this is precisely the position taken by Unesco.

I should however point out that we have been receiving requests from several non-governmental organizations inviting us to intervene in one way or another. Some requested us to intervene in specific cases (US Committee to Protect Journalists), others wanted Unesco to co-sponsor with them meetings on the subject (International Press Institute), a third party requested Unesco to finance studies (International Federation of Journalists), and yet another solicited our participation in and contribution to meetings on the subject (Dutch Association of Journalists).

Furthermore, I have personally been approached on many occasions to contact a number of governments, so that journalists could perform their duties in better conditions. As you know, these contacts have always been carried out with complete discretion and without public announcement.

At present, Unesco finds itself in the middle of a controversy because of a decision taken by a number of

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professional organizations to convene a conference on the subject and because they expressed their wish that Unesco, together with another organization of the United Nations family (ILO) and the International Committee of the Red Cross, should co-sponsor this conference. I have been informed by my collaborators, that when the subject came up at a meeting at the ILO office in Geneva, the Unesco delegation made it quite clear that all parties concerned with the working conditions of journalists should participate in any undertaking in this field. Publishers, broadcasters and news agencies were mentioned in particular. Following the meeting, this was repeated in writing in letters sent to the Secretaries-General of FELAP, IFJ and IOJ, the members of the preparatory commission of the conference. It was also the Unesco delegation to the Geneva meeting which proposed that before a conference takes place, the commission would do well to hold one of its meetings in the United States so that contacts could more easily be established with organizations there.

You will thus realize that any decision with regard to the preparation of the conference, let alone the items on its agenda, rests in the hands of the professional organizations concerned.

On this occasion, I would like to express my concern over the alarming conditions under which journalists work in many parts of the world. I received with great distress the report of a recent meeting of the Association of Foreign Correspondents in Mexico, chaired by the CBC correspondent, which disclosed that one hundred and fifty-four journalists were killed and fifty-two disappeared in Latin America alone in the course of the last ten years. Last week, during a television interview I was asked what Unesco could do to help in the movement to free a French journalist at present prisoner in Afghanistan.

Any suggestion you may have on a possible Unesco action in this connection would be appreciated. As for the proposed conference in Mexico, the views I have expressed in this letter will be made known to all the organizations concerned; unions of journalists, employer organizations, as well as other international organizations concerned with communication problems.

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This statement breaks new ground in these ways:

1. It accepts the premise that in the absence of "unanimity" among professional organizations UNESCO should leave the matter "entirely" to the journalists themselves to discuss and possibly resolve.

2. It properly points out that Western journalists continue to ask UNESCO to aid journalists in trouble, and Mr. M'Bow has quietly sought to do so. Such efforts have brought neither him nor UNESCO the public acknowledgement of the news media.

3. UNESCO did not attend the second planning meeting for the proposed "protection" conference.

4. Mr. M'Bow, in effect, has suggested that American and other Western news media have virtual veto power over the content of future international communications conferences that UNESCO would finance and participate in. He urges that a planning meeting (for the Mexico conference) be held in the United States with the participation of "publishers, broadcasters, and news agency" representatives. These would be Westerners, and not likely to approve an agenda or content for any conference they find objectionable. That would provide a de facto veto for UNESCO's support and participation in the conference, if it is subsequently held without Western approval.

In the legalistics of UNESCO language and protocol, this represents a highly significant sign of progress—not only on the limited, though vital, protection issue, but for all the related questions in the communications sector.

Will such changes, and the administrative and other reforms mentioned above be sufficient to cause the United States to rescind its letter announcing withdrawal December 31, 1984? It may be said that actual changes—except for several-score reforms the Director-General himself has set in motion—cannot be formalized until the General Conference in October 1985. That is largely true, despite the fact that the Executive Board has clearly committed itself to many reforms, developing other changes, and monitoring the implementation of all.

It was likely that no matter how hard America's Western allies and friends in the third world had worked all year, the die to

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withdraw was cast as early as 1980. Even before the Administration came into office it had temporarily eliminated UNESCO from the first budget the Administration could submit. The funds were restored, but the decision to leave UNESCO was approved by a few officials who managed the pullout for several years. They were not likely to accept the "third alternative." That would have had the United States submit anew letter stating that because this country recognizes the reform movements under way in UNESCO, and understands that the process cannot be completed in 1984, it will extend its announcement of departure until December 1985. That would be regarded by all countries (except perhaps the Soviet Union) as a statesmanlike, reasonable act. The Administration could receive approval worldwide for having displayed the leadership that produced substantive, necessary changes in UNESCO.

Withdrawing--reforms notwithstanding--would satisfy those Americans who have little or no interest in UNESCO's value for Americans and others. Those who favor withdrawing despite significant progress at UNESCO see that organization as merely a chip in the larger game called the United Nations system. And trashing UNESCO, for them, is just a shot across the bow of the entire UN system.

The UN should be reformed. But that is another and larger issue. It should be examined frankly, openly, on its own merit.

Conclusion: UNESCO and Communications Policy

Leaving UNESCO will not end the global concern over communications, and the American dominance in many crucial aspects of worldwide systems. The United States will deprive itself of participation in one forum where communications will continue to be discussed without our intellectual contribution. Similar communications challenges will come increasingly in the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the several forums where cross-border data flows affecting multinational corporations are increasingly discussed. America's chief adversaries there are neither the Soviet Union nor the third world, but our Western friends.

As part of the process of generating domestic support for the UNESCO withdrawal, the State Department hastily sought "alternative" programs it could support in place of UNESCO's communications efforts. Some eighteen projects costing \$47.6 million were proposed, but most have little chance of being funded. These

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would provide \$1 million for the U.S. Telecommunications Training Institute, \$1.4 million for bilateral training projects through UNESCO, \$1 million for satellite communication between U.S. experts and third world counterparts, \$2 million for taped engineering lectures, and other funds for satellite projects, developing third world postal-employee training (to advance the free flow of information!), and other projects. Some are, indeed, highly desirable. They should have been initiated years ago, when America promised such support. And the better projects should be supported even if the United States remains in UNESCO.

There are belated efforts now to coordinate American responses to international communications issues. But so far the Administration has simply designated several series of coordinators, who in turn are to be coordinated. To be sure, the United States faces unique problems. We have a vast private sector of communications manufacturers, processors, and information carriers. We also have a sizeable, diversified set of governmental communication regulators. We cannot have a single "communications policy," as do most other countries. But we can do far better than we have in understanding the global communications challenges that face us as a nation.

One wonders how much more productive it would have been, these past two years, if the energies, personnel, travel time, and strategic planning consigned to the UNESCO-withdrawal campaign had been displayed instead in planning a reasonable global communications strategy for the United States in the decade ahead.

N O T E S

1. Afghanistan, Cyprus, El Salvador, Ghana, India, Italy, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, United States. This and the following country lists (Notes 1-8) are derived from the author's files of information from the daily press, press protection agencies, press associations, as well as personal reports to Freedom House.

2. El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Israel.

3. El Salvador, Guatemala, Lebanon.

4. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, India, Israel, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, USSR, Zimbabwe.

5. Bahrain, Canada, China, Ethiopia, Grenada, Honduras, Israel-occupied Lebanon, Lebanon, Morocco, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Turkey, United States, Yugoslavia.

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6. Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti, India, Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, South Africa.

7. Chile, Haiti, Israel, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Upper Volta, and Uruguay.

8. Bangladesh, Chile, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, Greece, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Israel, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, Upper Volta, Uruguay, USSR, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe.

9. For a description of the history and controversy of the brief exclusion of the press from the Grenada intervention see Leonard R. Sussman, "Press vs. Government: Adversaries or Enemies?", *Freedom at Issue*, May-June 1984, pp. 3-10.

10. For the history of UNESCO controversies in the field of international communications, particularly concerning the news media, see, Leonard R. Sussman, "Freedom of the Press: Problems in Restructuring the Flow of International News," in Raymond D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World*, 1980 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), 53; and Leonard R. Sussman, "UNESCO: Up Against the U.S. Ultimatum," *Freedom at Issue*, July-August 1984, pp. 21-22. (This article is the author's testimony on the UNESCO/communications issue.)

11. Letter, Jean Broward Shevlin Gerard, ambassador, to Director-General, UNESCO, July 13, 1984, incorporating a letter and 45-page attachment from Gregory J. Newell, assistant secretary, in response to the Director-General's letter, January 31, 1984, requesting U.S. views on the Draft Program and Budget for 1986-87 (23 C/5).

12. See American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) correspondence October 14, 1983, Joseph Rawley responding to U.S. National Committee for UNESCO.

13. *Manchester Guardian*, "Leaked U.S. Memo Reveals Split on UNESCO," Harold Jackson, January 23, 1984, p. 1.

14. Letter from Peter E. Wilkness, deputy assistant director, National Science Foundation, to Gregory J. Newell, assistant secretary of state, Department of State, October 21, 1983.

15. Nathan Weber, "UNESCO: Who Needs It?", in the Conference Board's publication, *Across the Board*, September 1984; and the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO's advisory, "What Are the Issues Concerning the Decision of the United States to Withdraw from UNESCO?"

16. U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO, report of a Staff Study Mission, February 10-23, 1984, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, April 1984, GPO.

17. See, Burton Yale Pines, ed., *A World Without A UN: What Would Happen If the United Nations Shut Down* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1984).

18. In The Backgrounder series (mimeo), see especially #298, Oct. 19, 1983, "The U.S. and UNESCO At a Crossroads," and #386, October 8, 1984, "GAO's UNESCO Report Card: A Failing Grade," both by Owen Harries, from

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the Heritage Foundation, 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Washington 20002.

19. Memorandum from Ronald Koven to the World Press Freedom Committee, October 26, 1984, "The Last-Chance Executive Board," p. 4: "(Ambassador Gerard) made an impassioned call for an extraordinary session . . . to consider (the GAO Report). She caught everyone by surprise, including Newell and the entire U.S. delegation . . . openly expressing their amazement."

20. The United States had also introduced a proposal that 85% of the states must approve a budget before it is placed to a vote of the General conference. No other country supported that proposal.

21. For the listing of the reforms approved by the Board, see Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board at its 120th Session, Part II, UNESCO/Paris, October 23, 1984.

The 1982 and 1984 Elections in El Salvador

P A R T I

The Report of the Freedom House Mission to Observe the Election in
El Salvador, March 28, 1982

Introduction

Elections are a fundamental means of achieving democracy, for they equalize as far as possible the political rights, and, through political rights, potentially all rights of a population. Both in the past and present many poor peoples have illustrated their ability to understand electoral rights and to organize to achieve their goals and interests progressively through the expansion of these rights.

The struggle for democracy in Latin America has been long and frustrating. Yet in the course of this struggle most Latin Americans have come to experience civil and political rights and to become familiar with their forms. Democratic elections in Latin America are said to be primarily of importance to the middle classes; yet the middle classes have become a progressively larger part of these societies, and workers and peasants have come to have an increasing share in the advance of democracy.

The history of El Salvador is often portrayed as a story of unrelieved oppression. There have been and may continue to be serious human rights abuses that have been the responsibility of successive governments. El Salvador has also witnessed a halting growth both in the acceptability of democratic forms and in the broadening of the basis upon which democracy can grow. Although the forms of democracy had long been present, the first democratic election had been in 1931. It was followed shortly by a military coup and repression, and from this time on the oligarchy was forced to share power with the military. Subsequently, while on the one hand the military was often oppressive, on the other hand it came to reflect the variety of class interests in the society

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and to persistently enact economic and social reforms, as incomplete as they remained. As a result, since the 1930s the governing party and its military supporters had to struggle against challenges from the right as well as the left.

In the 1960s, after proportional representation was accepted, many representatives of the less favored were elected to local and national office, and parties identified with neither the military nor the oligarchy began to share power. In the early 1970s this progress was set back politically but never entirely erased, nor did the governing party or its military supporters abandon efforts at reform. ISTA, the Agrarian Reform Institute, for example, was created in 1975.

Given this background, it was not surprising that elements of the military and some leftist elements should have seized power in a deteriorating situation in 1979, a coup that eventually led to the Christian Democrats and the military sharing power. Nor should it be surprising that together they should have attempted to greatly expand land reform and to rapidly return the country to political democracy. Nor should it be surprising that there was much criticism and no doubt much to criticize in their efforts.

The setbacks in the 1970s were accompanied by the growth of radical parties or factions and, beyond this, by the development of armed guerrilla groups operating within the country and across its borders. In turn, government security forces and rightist, legal and illegal, paramilitary groups responded with waves of repression and assassination, and limitations on civil freedoms that drove many moderate leftists into silence or exile. These developments were related in part to the internal history of El Salvador and economic conditions, and in part to developments in neighboring countries and the efforts of the international revolutionary movement. By 1982 the struggle between the guerrillas and the government was seen by some to be between Soviet-Cuban-supported communism and American-supported democracy or at least anticommunism. It was this, but it was also a reflection of El Salvador's history and the inability of its political and economic institutions to meet the rising expectations of its people.

The Task of the Observation Mission

The role of the Freedom House Mission in El Salvador was to examine in so far as possible the election and its context in

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order to make a judgment as to whether this election represented democratic progress.

In this context the critical question for the observer was whether the March 28 election represented a forward step in the institutionalization of democracy in El Salvador. This question was asked both in terms of that proportion of the society participating positively in the election and in terms of the relation of the election to the challenge represented by the guerrilla forces and their alternative conception of society.*

The Election

On March 28 El Salvador elected sixty deputies to a constituent assembly, which was to subsequently choose an interim president. This assembly will thereby directly and indirectly represent what should be the highest authority in the state.

Much of the election process was well known to the people from previous elections. However, because of the guerrilla war and the common accusations of fraud made in previous elections, certain innovations were made in the election system. Identification cards instead of voter registration were employed along with a finger marking system. Upon voting these cards were indelibly stamped. This made it possible for voters to vote outside of the area in which their identifications were issued. The recent mobility of the people, occasioned by war and economic conditions, as well as the need to leave open routes to alternative polling places, led to this innovation. Polling places were also radically centralized by the elimination of many outlying stations. This made the places easier to protect, and made the fraudulent substitution of ballots (frequently alleged in previous elections) much harder to effect. The certification of precinct counts by a variety of party observers and the multiple transmission of these results was also used to reduce the possibility of manipulating the results.

* The Freedom House mission to observe the March 1982 elections included Raymond Gastil, Bruce McColm, Bayard Rustin, and Leonard Sussman, accompanied by Frances Grant of the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom. In 1984 Bruce McColm, Leonard Sussman, and Bayard Rustin were able individually to observe the March elections; Max Kampelman and Bayard Rustin observed those in May.

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Voters were asked only to vote for the party of their choice, with the deputies to be chosen proportionately within fourteen departments on the basis of party lists. Several of the six competing parties were not well organized, yet through the media, posters, and demonstrations in major centers all were able to spread their message to some extent. The radio, at least, reached nearly all Salvadorans, yet the degree to which the people as a whole were adequately informed of party positions and allegiances was unclear. Grass roots organization beyond the urban centers seems to have been minimal, although the three major parties had or achieved considerable national organization and maintained traditional allegiances. The message that there was to be an election and that all should vote was received.

The fact the Christian Democrats were part of the ruling Junta made them on the face of it the incumbent party and the election a plebiscite on their rule. However, for a number of reasons the previous assumption of El Salvadoran history that incumbent parties cannot be voted out of power could not easily be applied. The military establishment that was also a part of the Junta had historically been close to the previous ruling party (PCN). Other major parties had ties to the military, and thus the government, that were perhaps equally close. The incumbent advantage may also have been reduced by the fact that the past experience of the Christian Democrats, as well as the attention of so much of the outside world, may have made manipulations more difficult.

Freedom House Observations

After examining the literature and information that was made available, our mission of five persons visited El Salvador on March 24-30. We saw and talked with a variety of potential voters in urban and rural settings in five departments (with over fifty percent of the population). We received a broad spectrum of impressions, although the security situation and the fears of our respondents limited the responses and explorations. In addition we met with leaders of political parties, party workers, the voting commission, labor leaders, and the leaders of the Junta.

We noted in this process extreme disparities in living conditions and status, the guerrilla presence, and general

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awareness of the election. The extent to which the issues of the election were understood, outside the middle classes of major cities and peoples directly affected by government programs, was unclear.

Voting was regarded by informants as a civil obligation. The election decree specifically spells out the compulsory nature of voting and the emphasis that officials should place on this both before and after March 28 (Decree 914 [Transitory Election Law] Articles 53, 144, 145, 146). Although in the past enforcement of similar laws has been very lax, in this election in a context of fear and anxiety these regulations might have been taken more seriously. Fears of government forces or other non-guerrilla forces if one did not vote were reported by American media. Fear of the guerrilla forces if one did vote was also evident and indirectly observed. (On the guerrilla campaign against the election, see below.) Pre-election polls and our own investigations reported voter hopes that the election would help achieve peace and employment; we do not know to what extent the voters really believed the election would achieve these goals.

Before the vote nearly all those contacted said they would vote. Still, in many cases it may have been impossible to overcome the difficulties and dangers of actually traveling to the polls in the time available. Even in the relatively secure areas we visited some people would have had to travel as much as twenty-five kilometers each way on insecure or possibly unavailable transportation; on poor roads even much shorter distances would have been very difficult. Lack of availability of vehicles due to guerrilla destruction of oil supplies, vehicles, or other causes compounded the difficulty. Thus, while the election commission believed that only five percent of the people would actually be prevented from voting because of guerrilla control of peripheral areas, problems of poll accessibility must have made voting onerous if not impossible for perhaps another quarter of the population.

Observation of a number of polls on March 28 revealed that announced procedures were generally followed and that large numbers of people were willing to devote many hours to traveling to the polls and getting through the very crowded polling places. At most polling stations voters appeared to pleasantly or even enthusiastically fulfill their obligation, although there were problems of crowd control.

The election was in part a referendum on itself and on the system it represented. Parties or political factions to the left

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of the Christian Democrats did not participate. This included guerrilla groups whose leaders traditionally reject attaining power through competitive elections and more moderate leftist groups whose leaders believed participation carried too high a risk of assassination. While political activity was and remained dangerous for all groups, their recent experience suggested particular danger. It should be noted that refusal to participate in an election has been used frequently by Salvadoran parties to express their dissatisfaction or as a tactic. In addition, those opposed to the election could have campaigned for its nullification; in Salvadoran law if a majority of the votes are blank or defaced the election is void. (The Christian Democrats, for example, campaigned for a null vote in the San Salvador department in the legislative election of 1972).¹ However, legally only the participating parties were to be allowed to raise this issue (or others) of nullification subsequent to this election (Decree 914 [Transitory Election Law] Article 131).

It is understandable that while the participating parties had open access to the media, and often free access, and could campaign within relatively fair guidelines, civil and even political freedoms were reduced to the extent that those who opposed the election had to operate in a continuing state of emergency. According to the election decree (Article 74) only competing parties were allowed political advertising during the campaign. Attempts to oppose the election might also fall under Article 86 according to which no advertising of "anarchist principles or principles contrary to representative democracy" was to be allowed. Certainly very little legal political advertising was allowed against the election, although a previously vocal segment of the population opposed it. We also noted the prohibition of political activity by religious ministers or in church (Article 85). This lack of legal opposition was to some extent compensated for by the guerrilla radios and word of mouth communication and the influence of guerrilla violence.

Analysis of the Election Results

In the early 1960s when voter registration was onerous about twenty-one percent of eligible voters participated in Salvadoran elections. The percentages steadily increased in the 1960s.² By the 1972 presidential election, the election figures of both the opposition and the government suggest that as many as 800,000

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voted.³ In the fraudulent 1977 election we can still estimate on the basis of verified returns in part of the country that as many as one million may have voted.⁴ The population in 1972 was estimated to be 3,800,000, in 1977, 4,400,000.⁵ With forty-eight percent of the population estimated to be of voting age this means the percentage of eligible voters participating in the 1970s was about forty-five percent.⁶

For the 1982 election many forecast a relatively low turnout. However, pre-election polls showed that as many as eighty percent of eligible Salvadorans planned to vote.⁷ Thus, with a population of five million⁸ or 2,400,000 potential voters, the final number of votes cast, 1,485,185, gives a sixty-two percent participation rate. This was a creditable performance. Obviously the guerrilla war in general, and the problems of poll location and transportation it posed, as well as the attacks on the day of the election made voting impossible for many who had planned to vote.

The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) received forty percent of the valid votes, which gave them twenty-four of sixty assembly seats. The new rightist and populist ARENA received twenty-nine percent for nineteen seats; the pre-1980 governing party (PCN) received nineteen percent for fourteen seats. The remaining twelve percent of valid votes were divided among three other conservative parties, with AD (Democratic Action) receiving two seats and PSP one. (Detailed results are given in the appendix.) There were also 11.4% defaced or blank ballots.

The results by party accorded fairly well with previous Salvadoran experience. In the relatively fair elections of 1968 the Christian Democrats received forty-three percent of the vote, the further left MNR nearly four percent, and the conservative parties fifty-three percent.⁹ In the 1972 presidential election the united front of Christian Democrats and parties to its left polled about forty-three percent, and the more conservative parties fifty-seven percent. Given the fact the former left allies of the Christian Democrats failed to vote or cast null votes in the 1982 election, the party's strength seems to have remained quite stable.

The pattern of departmental returns corresponds to historical experience in many respects. The Christian Democrats were strongest in the cities, PCN in rural areas, especially in the east. ARENA picked up support everywhere: its campaign organization was most vigorous. Perhaps equally important in the result was the relative uniformity of party percentages from all departments, compared to earlier "fair" elections (for example,

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1966)¹⁰ This suggests a nationalization of the political process, perhaps due in turn to greater reliance on the national radio and television in the campaign.

The strategy of the leftist civilian and military parties that opposed the election remained confused and ineffective, illustrating once again a remarkable disunity. The rebel message to the people was that the election was a farce and that it should and would be "defeated." One persistent message was that there was going to be a popular uprising that would swamp the election.¹¹ In Mexico City rebel commanders said they would defeat it "by making the war felt at all levels everywhere," but not by attacking voting booths or voters.¹² There were, however, reports that guerrillas threatened to kill or mutilate voters.¹³ We directly knew of threats to destroy private buses, and buses were destroyed. Yet, still other guerrillas told voters that if they felt compelled to participate they should cast null ballots.¹⁴

In the event many opposed to the election cast null ballots. Of the 11.4% null ballots perhaps most were cast by supporters of the far left, especially those cast in larger cities. Combined with those refusing to vote this suggests a ten to fifteen percent support for the violent left, a not surprising number considering the political history. This suggests that the ineffectiveness of opposition to the vote was not only due to disunity. Perhaps the left was not able to be sufficiently active, or to call for an insurrection, or to call for abstentions, because they knew they did not have sufficient support to succeed. They did not want to fail in another all-out attempt as they had in the "final offensive" of January 1981.¹⁵

Two aspects of the El Salvador political process that are unfamiliar to Americans deserve further comment. First, compulsory voting is not in itself undemocratic. Many democracies, such as Australia, have compulsory voting. Compulsory voting need not result in high participation rates. In the 1960s elections in some departments of El Salvador voting was compulsory, but participation remained low.¹⁶ In the 1982 Guatemalan election, in spite of compulsory voting and very repressive security services, only forty-five percent of registered voters participated.¹⁷ Secondly, in parliamentary democracies the party receiving the largest number of votes or seats is neither legally nor morally justified in assuming it will be a part of the government unless it also has a majority. For example, Sweden has been ruled in recent years by a coalition of small parties in

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spite of a very large social democrat plurality. A similar outcome might be undesirable in El Salvador, but it would not be a repudiation of the voter's mandate.

Summary and Conclusions

The election was a referendum on itself, a test of political party strength, and a mandate for peace. We have no evidence that this election was marred by gross fraud or that intimidation or violence dictated its result. The electoral mechanism was well-conceived and, from our observations, executed in a consistent and fair manner. We do not believe that the fact of guerrilla war was in itself a sufficient reason to declare the election invalid.

Far from it. The sizeable turnout demonstrated the determination of the Salvadoran voters to fulfill their civic obligation even in the face of possible danger.

A broader evaluation of the meaningfulness of the election can be attempted only within the Salvadoran context. In effect, a government installed by military coup and subsequently incorporating elements of a major political party has been able to involve a significant segment of the people in the political process through competitive party elections. Although the complete spectrum of political opinion could not be included, we conclude that the resulting government can start from a more democratic and broader base than has existed at least since the early 1970s. On this basis the process of extending democracy may be resumed. To succeed, this extension must not be limited to small political factions of the right and left but must include the active involvement of the majority of the Salvadoran people in political and economic affairs. The response of the Salvadoran people in the 1982 assembly election was evidence of their capacity for such involvement.

Despite the election, El Salvador will continue to face serious problems of human rights, security, lawlessness, and economic decline. Stability can only be achieved by a government willing and able to face these problems as a whole. Such a government can only be one that unites the Salvadoran people, and while firmly reestablishing order, strives creatively and with goodwill to reincorporate all those groups or individuals who have placed themselves outside the political process.

Whatever government emerges from this election will not please all groups in El Salvador or all democratic countries in this

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hemisphere. But it will be closer to representing the people than any government that was likely to have emerged from other means of returning the country to legality. Let us hope that all Americans--north and south--will help this government solve its problems and thus build a more secure and democratic future.

April 12, 1982

N O T E S

1. Stephen Webre, Jose Napoleon Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party in Salvadoran Politics 1960-1972 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979) 172-174.

2. Ronald H. McDonald, "Electoral Behavior and Political Development in El Salvador," *The Journal of Politics* 31 (1969), 397-419. Also, *El Salvador Election Factbook*, March 5, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1967).

3. Webre, Jose Napoleon Duarte, 171-172. Preliminary official, PDC (Christian Democrat), and official recounts show similar totals. Taking into account defaced and blank ballots, the total was 750,000 to 800,000.

4. Webre, Duarte, 197. Nine hundred twenty or twenty-six percent of the ballot boxes yielded 278,000 valid votes. Since half of these were in the San Salvador area, we can assume the count in other boxes might have been less. The government total of valid votes, apparently greatly inflated, was 1.2 million.

5. George Bowdler and Patrick Cotter, *Voter Participation in Central America 1954-1981: An Exploration* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982). Page 23 says forty-three percent of potential voters participated in the 1972 presidential election. In general this is not a judicious study.

6. All population estimates are based on those quoted in *Instituto Salvadoreño del Seguro Social, Estadísticas 1980*, San Salvador, 1981, page 12. Figures given in the 1979 *Demographic Yearbook of the United Nations 1980*, and the *Encyclopedia of the Third World (1982)* suggest that forty-eight percent of the population was eighteen or above. This was also the assumption of the Central Election Board.

7. Such polls were reported to us by the Election Board and ARENA. One was conducted by a well-known Costa Rican polling organization.

8. Because of emigration due to the war and economic downturn many projected a much smaller population. However, the vote suggests that extrapolating the official government planning figures, as here, would not be far from right. In addition some of those across nearby borders returned to vote.

9. R. H. McDonald, "Electoral Behavior and Political Development in El Salvador."

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10. El Salvador Election Factbook.
11. For example, Warren Hoge, *New York Times*, 3/16/82, or Raymond Bonner, *New York Times*, 3/19/82.
12. Alan Riding, *New York Times*, 3/2/82. See also, Marc Cooper and Ronnie Lovler, *Village Voice*, 4/6/82, p. 19.
13. Linda Schuster, *The Wall Street Journal*, 3/17/82; Richard Meislin, *New York Times*, 3/29/82.
Richard Meislin, *New York Times*, 4/1/82; Warren Hoge, *New York Times*, 3/29/82.
15. See Marvin Gettleman et al, eds., *El Salvador: Central America in the New Cold War* (New York: Grove Press, 1981), 119.
16. El Salvador Election Factbook.
17. Raymond Bonner, *New York Times*, 3/15/82.

APPENDIX A

ELECTION RESULTS BY DEPARTMENTS

	FDC	ARENA	PCN	AD	PPS	POP	Total Valid Votes	Blank & Defaced Votes*	TOTAL
Ahuachapan	26,256	22,820	12,319	3,164	-	760	65,319	10,704	76,140
Santa Ana	63,686	37,949	22,791	12,259	5,101	1,903	143,689	19,747	163,870
Sonsonate	47,420	37,502	20,737	7,434	3,515	-	116,608	14,774	132,054
La Libertad	62,840	44,015	22,806	11,376	5,156	2,168	148,361	21,782	170,976
Chalatenango	17,694	15,506	10,619	1,496	914	492	46,721	6,370	53,513
San Salvador	145,076	87,861	37,954	40,254	14,518	4,430	330,093	41,928	374,850
San Vicente	14,205	7,973	11,088	2,181	711	-	36,156	4,493	40,752
Cabañas	10,188	11,804	14,366	1,015	-	-	37,373	5,321	42,747
La Paz	26,940	17,995	14,794	3,401	1,654	-	64,784	8,646	73,994
Cuscatlan	15,902	23,517	12,148	2,620	1,062	601	55,850	8,308	64,396
Usulután	17,013	17,937	9,346	3,111	1,799	734	49,940	5,137	55,180
Morazan	13,108	7,185	7,189	1,504	456	-	29,442	3,578	33,047
San Miguel	42,049	31,834	29,170	6,315	2,336	-	111,704	12,443	124,362
La Unión	24,513	19,734	23,637	2,234	1,282	1,063	72,463	6,603	79,308
TOTAL	526,890	383,633	248,964	98,364	38,504	12,151	1,308,506	169,834	1,485,185
% of Total	35.5%	25.8%	16.7%	6.6%	2.6%	0.8%		11.4%	

* Contested ballots are not included except in grand totals.

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San Salvador, Santa Ana, and San Miguel are the departments with the larger cities. The departments most affected by the war are Chalatenango, San Vicente, Usulután, Morazan, and La Unión. The El Salvador government reported voting did not occur in 65 of 260 municipalities, presumably concentrated in these departments. It should be noted that there was a substantial vote in Usulután Department in spite of the prevention of voting in the municipality of Usulután by guerrilla activity.

The political parties running candidates in the election were:

A R E N A

(National Republican Alliance) Formed in 1981 by cashiered National Guard intelligence officer Roberto D'Aubuisson. Accused of conspiracies against the government and widely, though perhaps erroneously, believed to be involved in illegal death squads. Reputed to have substantial oligarch financial support, it was characterized by good organization, conservative economics, and the personal charisma of its leader.

P O P

(Popular Orientation Party) Founded by rightist opposition to PCN government in 1970s. Leader previously founded ORDEN, a rural anticommunist paramilitary organization. Did not have candidates in all departments.

P D C

(Christian Democratic Party) Founded chiefly by intellectuals in 1960 in the tradition of Latin American Christian Democratic parties. Stresses traditional values and economic reforms of a social democratic nature. Strong commitment to agrarian reform. Has developed relations with labor and peasant organizations. Leader, Jose Napoleon Duarte, is claimed to have been defrauded of the presidential election in 1972 (in a front including parties further to the left), and was head of the Junta at the time of the election.

A D

(Democratic Action) Middle class professional and business party led by a lawyer often felt to be a possible compromise candidate between left and right. Stresses good

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government, reconciliation of all parties and groups, and social programs in a conservative vein.

P C N

(National Conciliation Party) PCN ruled the country in collaboration with the military from 1961 to 1979. A nationalist and anticommunist party, PCN has nevertheless included many reformist elements, and in common with previous governments often developed state enterprises in preference to private. Traditional support, particularly in rural areas.

P P S

(Popular Salvadoran Party) The conservative branch of an older opposition party going back to the 1940s. Said to be supported by the wealthy. Did not have candidates in all departments.

A P P E N D I X B

Myths in the Discussion

The history of repression, inequality, and incomplete democracy in El Salvador has led to an unnuanced condemnation of Salvadoran conservatism that results in a persistent misunderstanding of recent events. This misunderstanding is at the root of the inability of so many American commentators to grant meaning to the size of the vote in this election and the division of the vote.

It is, for example, an error to simply identify the officialista, military-political parties, that have ruled El Salvador since the 1930s with the interests of the wealthy and the rejection of reform. As one authority on El Salvador wrote in the early 1970s. "The political system cannot be seen simply in terms of certain groups—the army, the oligarchy, the American Embassy—holding the power or a certain proportion of the power . . ." The author goes on to say that the PCN (the ruling party of the 1960s and 1970s) had a slight "net reformist" influence on the process.¹ More generally Duff and McCamant in their comparative study of violence and repression in Latin America wrote in 1976:

Military intervention and control has not had the negative results in El Salvador that they have in other parts of Latin America. The military has been able to retain a reformist image without unduly antagonizing the established wealthy families. It has worked in close cooperation with the well-educated and more progressive elite, has sought mass support through political parties, and has responded to the challenge of the Alliance for Progress without allowing its industries to be taken over by multinational firms. The Salvadoran military established an earlier and more moderate version of what the Peruvian military has made famous since 1968.²

Similarly, while land reform was given great impetus after the 1979 coup that replaced PCN government, and especially under the junta after the accession of Jose Napoleon Duarte, it must not be forgotten that land reform has been a persistent feature of Salvadoran politics since the 1930s, with successive governments

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proposing and, to some extent, achieving agrarian and land reform plans.³ More fundamentally the Salvadoran campesinos have apparently persisted in believing since pre-Spanish times that they had a right to use any underutilized land for their subsistence. As their numbers increased in recent years, in many areas the actual control of land by the large landholders has been preempted by numerous subsistence squatters. Their acquisitions have a validity in Salvadoran law unfamiliar to our society. By 1970 the leading authority on Salvador's land problem feared that this movement, with or without "land reform," would eventually destroy the commercial agriculture of the country.⁴

Ignoring these facts, ideologically inspired academics continue to paint a picture of El Salvador that is simply unprovable. For example, the political scientists LeoGrande and Bobbins write, "El Salvador has the most rigid class structure and worst income inequality in all of Latin America," and go on to say that a few thousand people received until recently fifty percent of national income, and that modernization has offered no improvement in equity.⁵ However, in a letter commenting on these assertions an economist points out that in fact El Salvador had one of the most equal distributions in Latin America, with the top twenty percent receiving 52.4 percent of the income in 1969, a smaller amount than, for example, Mexico. He also pointed out that in the 1960s the share of the poor and middle classes in national income was growing more rapidly than that of the wealthy.⁶

The upper middle and upper classes of El Salvador cannot in any event, be considered simply to be parasites existing on the backs of the poor. At least since the middle of the nineteenth century the relation of landlord and peasant has increasingly diverged from the relation of the ancien regime in which the lord lived luxuriously on the surplus of traditional agriculturists. The landlord (and more recently industrialist) has instead often been an innovator and investor who through private and public means built up production of new crops, such as coffee. It is these crops that made possible the roads, schools, hospitals, and other modern amenities of the country.⁷ In the process a dual economy has been created, the population has exploded, and class differences have been exacerbated; but the contribution of many of the wealthy cannot be ignored.

Another myth is that there was never a fair election in El Salvador before 1982;⁸ within this myth it is taken as gospel that the presidential election of 1972 was obviously stolen from Duarte. While there have been many fraudulent elections, inter-

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rupted ballot counts, and incumbent parties have had great advantages, careful students of El Salvador described the election of the late sixties as reasonably fair.⁹ Alastair White, for example, explains at some length why the governing party, the PCN, did so well in rural areas, and doubts that fraud or direct intimidation had a great deal to do with the results.¹⁰ In the 1972 presidential election both the figures of the government and the PDC show the race to have been very close, with the result to be decided at any rate by the PCN dominated legislature. It is suggestive that after asking for a recount, a coup in favor of the PDC occurred before the recount was completed. Fraud is not seen as decisive in the 1972 result; however, subsequent assembly elections were obviously affected by massive candidate disqualifications,¹¹ and elections in 1974-77 were questionable and/or one party.

A final myth is that some party or group represents the people or is an expression of popular desires. In terms of social origins perhaps the actors on the political stage with the most impoverished origins are the military officers, although through education even they come to be an elite. The leaders of the political parties and factions, including those of the far left and their guerrilla forces, are recruited from a very small, educated class with little psychological affiliation with, or understanding of, the average Salvadoran.¹² The far left's hero of the peasant rebellion of 1932, Farabundo Marti, was an urban-educated son of an owner of 1,250 hectares.¹³ It is our impression that none of the parties has been able, or even seriously attempted, to organize the people as a whole or to involve them in the political process. It was evident that there are many groups "out there"—labor unions, and peasant organizations as well as the unorganized—who would like to play a more active political role but who are expected instead to rally to banners created for them and in their interest. Democracy will only be firmly established in El Salvador when political communication is no longer only from the top down.

Free of these myths the results of this election should be no longer mysterious. Of course, all is not mythology. There have been fraudulent elections. There are serious problems of inequality, corruption, brutality, assassination, and war-related excess. We suspect most parties and groups have been involved in the cycle

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of violence. Overcoming hatreds engendered by the past outrages and habits of violence will remain a serious obstacle to national conciliation, reform, and the reestablishment of legality.

The election was a courageous first step in overcoming this legacy.

NOTES TO APPENDIX B

1. Alastair White, *El Salvador* (New York: Praeger, 1973), 195, 197.
2. Ernest Duff and John McCamant, *Violence and Repression in Latin America* (New York: Free Press, 1976), 144-145.
3. Stephen Webre, *Jose Napoleon Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party in Salvadoran Politics 1960-1972* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 193-195* More generally, see David Browning, *El Salvador: Landscape and Society* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971)1
4. Browning, *El Salvador*, 248-303-
5. William M. LeoGrande and Carla Anne Robbins, "Oligarchs and Officers: The Crisis in El Salvador," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1980 (58,5), 1084-1103.
6. Joseph P. Mooney, *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1980 (59,1), 180-181. Mooney's remarks are based on Hollis Chenery, *Redistribution With Growth*, World Book (Oxford University Press, 1974), 8, 42. According to the *Encyclopedia of the Third World* (Facts on File, 1982), the top five percent received 21.4% of income, the bottom twenty percent, 5.8%; the equivalent figures were 23-9% and 2.9% for Mexico.
7. Browning, *El Salvador*, 139ff.
8. For example, Lynda Schuster, *Wall Street Journal*, 3/17/82, "In a country that hasn't had a clean election in fifty years. . ."
9. Webre, *Jose Napoleon Duarte*; Ronald H. McDonald, "Electoral Behavior and Political Development in El Salvador," *The Journal of Politics* 31 (1969), 397-419; and Alastair White, *El Salvador* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1973).
10. White, *El Salvador*, 205-209.
11. White, *El Salvador*, 252-253, Webre, Duarte, 153-172.
12. See Gabriel Zaid, "Enemy Colleagues: A Reading of the Salvadoran Tragedy," *Dissent*, Winter 1982, 13-19 (translated).
13. Thomas P. Anderson, *Matanza: El Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1971) 33.

P A R T I I

The 1984 Presidential Elections in El Salvador

The 1982 election continued in and developed further the Salvadoran experience with democracy. Although there were the usual accusations by those competing within the system as to the possible inflation of the totals, and other problems, few who reported on that election believed that it was fraudulent, or that the outcome did not reflect fairly the votes that the population cast. The main point of contention was over the turnout. The turnout was facilitated by a simple method of marking the hands of those voting, so that anyone could vote anywhere. The guerrilla efforts to interfere with the election were sporadic; they controlled little of the country at the time. The feeling of the citizens that it was their "duty" to vote was also reenforced by the legal requirement that everyone vote. This might lead people to vote not so much out of fear of the small fines that might be imposed for not voting as out of the desirability of having one's official identification card stamped at the poll in case of later dealings with the police. How much such considerations actually determined the turnout was much disputed. The people seemed in fact to be interested in taking part, and many were enthusiastic.

What percentage of the population took part under these conditions was hard to determine because there was no accurate information on the size of the population. Freedom House estimated about 62%, which should be increased to 65% if the later higher vote total is to be accepted. The standard American Embassy figure has been 80%. To come up with the figure of 80% it has to be assumed that a much higher percentage of the population resides outside the country than there is documentation for. The discussion is in any event moot: over sixty percent is a very high figure under the circumstances of difficult transportation and the evident danger of voting in some areas. It is probably at least as high a percentage as has ever been attained before in El Salvador.

The result of the election was that the reformist and center-left Christian Democratic Party (PDC) received 40% of the valid votes, the far right ARENA received 29%, the right of center, establishment and pro-armed forces PCN received 19%, while the

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moderate, modernist AD took 7.5% of the vote. The remaining votes were divided among moderate rightist parties.

The percentage that would have voted for a "real left" if it had been on the ballot is impossible to determine. Historically the designation of the Christian Democrats as "center-left" is correct. They represent policies very close to those of social democratic parties elsewhere. However, in recent years defections from the party to the revolutionary parties and the dependence of the remaining Christian Democrats on collaboration with the armed forces have caused many members of the intelligentsia in El Salvador and the United States to dismiss the party's leftist credentials. It is perhaps significant that other leftist parties received very small votes in previous elections. It is also significant that there were only eleven percent blank or defaced ballots in a country quite aware of this kind of protest in the past.

The main problems with the 1982 election from the point of view of democracy were the one-sided and rather bland nature of the media. While campaigning was open, except for those outside the process, the communications media are generally highly self-censored, as a result of vicious attacks on those reporters and publications that questioned the system in the past. The second problem was the assumption of many, an assumption that seemed reinforced by subsequent experience, that the armed services were really in control of the country. If so, then the requirement of effective democracy that those elected actually rule could not be affirmed. The final problem was that a significant segment of political opinion and political organization--that of the now illegal left--did not participate in the elections. It is true that they were offered a chance, and refused it by requiring unacceptable conditions. However, the brutal executions of members of their organizations in the recent past gave an unfortunate degree of credibility to their assertion that their participation would be suicidal.

These problems of the limited freedom of the communications media, of the non-participation of the far left, and of the practical control of the country by the military continued to reduce the significance of the electoral process during the 1984 presidential elections.

The resulting constituent assembly, which operated in part--and now operates--as a legislature, was formed with sixty delegates fairly allocated among the parties in terms of the vote. The right was able to organize the assembly under ARENA'S leader,

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Major D'Aubuisson, as a result of agreement among conservative party leaders. However, the government was organized, partially because of American insistence, under the leadership of President Magaña, an independent. The constitution was completed by December; the presidential election was held under this new constitution.

The 1984 Election Process

Under the election laws governing the 1984 elections, a Central Elections Council made an intensive effort to put together an electoral registry. It was based on correlating the already existing national identity cards with local records of births and deaths since 1900. In this way duplicate cards could be eliminated and people without cards could be added. Each person was then "registered" by the system as residing in a particular community. For each community a registrar was developed by the computer and made available to the polling place in that community. People who voted outside of the community or department in which they were registered could vote at special polling places where national or departmental lists would be available. Unfortunately, these places were relatively few, hard to get to, and imperfectly known to other election officials.

In addition to the necessity of being identified on a list of registered voters, the voter also had his identity card stamped after voting, and ink was used to mark his hand. All parties were expected to have poll watchers; the parties were also directly involved in overseeing the count.

On election day there were many reports of organizational problems. In some precincts ballots did not arrive or arrived very late. Confusion was compounded by the destruction of electrical pylons with the resulting interruption of electricity in over half of the country the night before the voting. Correspondents and observers saw many confused voters who evidently did not know where to go, and who received little or confusing advice. It is possible such voters could be much in evidence and still be small in percentage. For regardless of the problems, evidently the overwhelming number of Salvadorans who wished to vote eventually voted, some after a very long wait. An attempt to change the system to the simpler 1982 process for the run-off was vetoed by President Magaña.

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The First 1984 Campaign

Eight parties presented candidates for the first round of voting. The main contenders were the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) with Jose Napoleon Duarte and the National Republican Alliance (ARENA) with Roberto D'Aubuisson. The third party of importance was the National Conciliation Party (PCN) with Francisco Jose Guerrero. Less important this time was Democratic Action (AD) which was considered to have in effect thrown its weight behind PDC. No other party was considered a serious contender; the minor parties were on the right.

Although the contest was to a large extent a replay of 1982, there were some important differences. While D'Aubuisson and Duarte had, in effect, led their two parties at that time, as the non-elected President, Duarte considered himself above the contest and did not campaign actively for his party. This time he did, and as a leader better known than his fellows this was bound to help. Most of the parliamentary delegation of PCN had defected in the interim and formed a new party with the acronym PAISA. This should have reduced the totals for PCN. However, Guerrero was an active and apparently popular figure, and the PCN seemed less willing to simply rely on its past record than had been the case in 1982.

The story of the 1984 elections was the persistent failure of the conservatives to form a coalition or work together. For the smaller conservative parties, the problem was the egos of their respective leaders, which led them to demand that D'Aubuisson step down in return for their support. Until several weeks before the elections, the negotiations between the conservative parties were frequent, chaotic, and ended in animosity. This was carried over into the Central Election Commission, where the small parties struggled to thwart any changes, no matter how minuscule, in the electoral laws and practices.

As reported in the press, the ARENA campaign used a mixture of organization, enthusiasm, threats, violent anti-communism, and appeals to the sacredness of private property to advance its cause. It appealed to all those who wanted to preserve their property and feared big government. These included some of the very wealthy, but they also included some quite poor peasants who feared the loss of their small pieces of property to land reform. For example, this seemed to be the basis of ARENA strength in Armenia, a rural town west of the capital.

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In part a conservative coalition was prevented by the resentment of PCN leaders at the defection of some of their leading members to ARENA in 1980 and at ARENA'S close links to the wealthy agricultural families. Intra-party hostilities plus the generalized feeling that D'Aubuisson was a military renegade who used his position as second-in-command of intelligence for his own political ends has created a deep rivalry between the leaders of the two parties. This became particularly acute during the campaign as wealthy Salvadorans began to switch their financial support to Guerrero out of fear that a D'Aubuisson victory would mean a cut-off of American aid.

However, the dramatic difference between the PCN platform and ARENA'S fiery brand of laissez-faire capitalism and pursuit of a military victory over the guerrillas was the major reason no coalition of conservatives could be formed. There was a wide gap between ARENA'S conservatism and the conservatism of the National Conciliation Party (PCN). Although considered the Partido Militar in El Salvador, and ruling the country for the military from 1960 until the military coup in 1979, the PCN was modeled after the Mexican PRI party and follows a statist philosophy of economic development. The original concept was of a party that would mediate between the urban-based white-collar networks, the oligarchy, the military, and the poor. But unlike Mexico the political party continued to be dominated by the military and was unable to impose civilian supremacy. For this reason its attempts at an "opening" in the late 1960s, which allowed Christian democratic control of the capital, the emergence of rival political parties in the assembly, and a contested presidential election, ultimately failed and brought on the guerrilla war.

PCN identification with the military cost it votes in 1982 and 1984, yet it may have also helped it to gain votes in rural areas in 1984. Especially in these areas the PCN is associated with a time of stability and the best years of economic growth. Some peasants told the observers that the PCN, if it formed a government, could protect them from extremists of every stripe, because it had the confidence of the military.

Running against the "two messiahs," Guerrero presented himself as a center-right populist. His political platform included: strict legislative and enforcement measures against corruption and embezzlement; modernizing the system of justice by strengthening the judicial branch, altering the investigative techniques of the security forces, providing protection for judges and developing a more practical legal system; developing new pacification programs,

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including guarantees for the safety of candidates of the National Revolutionary Front and the Nationalist Democratic Union so that they might participate in the 1985 assembly elections, and declaring a cease-fire; profit-sharing with workers; and rebuilding the agricultural and industrial infrastructure of the country.

The old white-collar network also produced a curious PCN-PDC collusion against ARENA. In areas where the PDC lacked sufficient support to challenge ARENA, the PCN would actively campaign as the anti-D'Aubuisson party. As we will see below there was some evidence in the results that this occurred.

The most important coalition building was that between the Christian Democrats and the UPD, the centrist labor federation that boasts 500,000 members. In 1982 the unions gave no endorsement, concentrating instead on getting out the vote. They felt this had led to some of their members voting for D'Aubuisson, and for his subsequent achievement of the leadership of the assembly. Death squad activities and D'Aubuisson's accusation of union collusion with the FMLN (far left) also contributed to the decision of the Unions to take a more definite position in 1984. In return for endorsement Duarte promised in a social pact to give the unions ten percent of all government positions, including twenty-four percent of high government posts. These were to include vice-president of the agricultural bank, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, and the presidency of the land reform agency. The social pact allows the peasant unions to have their own representatives in the decision-making level of the land reform program. The unions felt that the pact improved their campaigning ability with the rank and file.

The guerrillas appeared confused about what strategy to adopt toward the elections. Their political leaders said at first that the guerrillas would ignore the election. The FMLN's position appeared to be hardening, at least in their various peace proposals. The proposal of February ninth called for discarding the new constitution, dissolving the assembly, and combining the guerrilla forces with the military. The guerrillas in the field, which number 9,000 to 11,000 as opposed to 40,000 in the government forces, threatened reprisals against voters and attacked a military plane carrying ballots. During the week before the election guerrillas stole over 7,000 identification cards.

The major parties campaigned vigorously, especially through the holding of mass rallies. There were reports of coercion to attend these rallies, vote-buying, and other forms of coercion,

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especially by ARENA. It is very hard to verify such accounts, or to know how general such practices are if they occur.

The Results of the March 25, 1984 Election

In the event a little over 1,400,000 people voted, or a few less than voted in 1982. The fall-off in the voting was attributed primarily to the more complex and therefore confusing methods of polling. In a number of communities people could not vote because of guerrilla interference, confusion, the failure of ballots to arrive, or purposeful sabotage by local officials. Many people did not vote because they were not sure where to vote, or because their names had mistakenly been left off the registration lists. This was particularly true of young people whose cédulas had numbers the national computer had rejected because the former recipients of these numbers had died. For people outside of their home districts there were not enough national and departmental polling places, and those there were were often hard to get to. For security reasons little transport was available for long distances. Nevertheless, it is possible that for the majority of the population the new voting procedures actually speeded up the process.

Why was there once again such a satisfactory turn-out? Does it mean that the vast majority approve the system and the choices presented to them? No one can definitely say, but by and large those on the scene report enthusiasm. They find few who appear compelled, or say they are compelled, to participate. This does not prove that most people might not have liked a wider choice. As to the form of compulsion that did exist, it certainly was not the small schedule of fines that is sometimes imposed. A major reason for voting for some was the feeling that it would be safer in future confrontations with the police or other officials if their identification cards showed that they had voted. It was reported in both the 1982 and 1984 elections that many people asked to have their cédulas stamped even when for one reason or another they could not actually vote. Fear of not having voted was perhaps particularly strong for displaced persons.

An examination of the results by department suggests that the primary fall-off in the vote was due to guerrilla control in a larger part of the country than had been true in 1982—however, the guerrillas may have lost support in the capital. The vote increased significantly in San Salvador itself, as well as in

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Usulután. It may be recalled that the guerrillas had achieved a major disruption of the voting in parts of Usulután in the 1982 election. Voting totals in 1984 were decreased significantly in the departments in which the war was most active: Cabanas, Morazan, Cuscutlán, Chalatenango, and especially in San Miguel and La Unión (where the drop in those voting was about fifty percent).

Results by party totals paralleled the 1982 results. The ARENA, percentage was almost exactly what it had been, just under thirty percent of the valid votes. PDC increased its percentage to forty-three percent, while PCN went up slightly to a little over nineteen percent. The most notable fall-off was for AD. About half of its seven and one-half percent was lost; most commentators assumed that they would switch to support of Duarte. The other small parties did very poorly. Duarte's ability to raise the Christian Democratic figure would not have been surprising on the basis of his personal participation alone. PCN's showing was more surprising, considering that the small PAISA splinter group drew away over one percent of the party's former supporters.

If we look at the totals by department the PCN performance is again surprising. The departments returning significantly lower totals, the "front-line" departments, were mostly PCN strongholds; therefore their lower totals should have particularly hurt their totals. The exception was, of course, Usulután: the fact that its people could vote in much larger numbers this time was an important plus. For PDC the forty percent gain in its showing in San Salvador was by far the most significant. It must be remembered that Duarte was formerly the well-liked mayor of San Salvador. In spite of very heavy campaigning ARENA did not gain, again perhaps because of the reduction of number of voters in "front-line" departments where it does particularly well. It won only the small departments of Cuscutlán and Cabanas. AD lost heavily almost everywhere, but this was partly its own decision. Overall one is impressed by the steadiness of the support for the parties between the elections, patterns that carry back at least a generation.

The May 6 Presidential Run-Off

The pattern of the campaign changed little between elections. A determined effort was made by ARENA to enlist the support of PCN, but ultimately Guerrero decided to remain neutral. It was reported that President Magaña, an old friend and sometimes business partner of Guerrero, persuaded the PCN leader to remain

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neutral for the second round, but to pass the word to vote for Duarte so that the United States would not cut off military assistance. Only a very small and insignificant party gave its support to either of the two contenders, and this was to Duarte. ARENA softened its approach somewhat. It was reported that the military informed both parties of the limits of their power to change the structure of the military regardless of who won. According to these reports the military indicated that if it was let alone it could work with either of the two candidates. Duarte suggested that he would make a determined effort to end the death squads and by implication to assert civilian control.

In the event almost as many people voted in May as March. Duarte won as expected, but with less than fifty-four percent of the vote. The closeness of the outcome suggests that although the PCN leadership is closer to Duarte than D'Aubuisson ideologically, and may even have tried to swing votes to the PDC, the mass following of the PCN are traditional conservatives who saw Duarte as a dangerous leftist. As expected ARENA challenged the outcome, but there did not seem to be sufficient merit in the challenge to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the new president. More serious was the widespread allegation of CIA financial assistance to the Duarte campaign. It is, of course, possible that more than one side had undisclosed foreign financing. Whatever the case, in the end the effect of such aid must have been minimal, for the pattern of voting in 1984 reflected traditional voting patterns, particularly as they had been affected by Duarte's appeal in the past.

Assessment and the Future

In its own terms the elections appeared to be a considerable success. The guerrillas managed to deny voting in a somewhat larger area than in 1982, and they blacked out most of the country on the night immediately before the elections, yet they had relatively little impact on the process or the outcome. In both 1984 elections sixty to eighty percent of the eligible voters participated, a credible outcome considering the problems of the election. The elections affirmed the continuity of the Salvadoran electoral tradition, and the attachment or understanding of it by the people. In saying this we do not imply that the average citizen had any very high faith in what would be accomplished by his vote, or that many did not vote fearfully, out of a conviction that it was the safe thing to do under the circumstances. We

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believe that many Salvadorans felt that this was one of the few chances they would have to affect what happened to them politically or economically.

The election results do not immediately change the power balance in the country. They give an opportunity to the civilian leadership to assert an authority it has not been able to before. This is due to the American support of the process, and to the legitimizing authority of the vote with all sectors of the society. If dealt with carefully this power might be used to establish new traditions of civilian control over the military, and of an independent and more assertive judiciary. To institutionalize such a change, which contrasts with important aspects of the fundamental political culture of the region, will not be accomplished immediately and completely in the term of the new President.

The most immediate danger is that the civilian government formed after the elections will be brushed aside by a military coup. Almost equally destructive would be a contemptuous downgrading by the military of the civilian system. Unfortunately, enthusiastic American efforts to see the elections were held successfully has given an argument to all those who would undercut them, for they have in the eyes of many Salvadorans been "American elections." To nationalists this in itself offers a pretext for their dismissal. The land reform program also suffers from the same criticism. We must recognize that while both of these efforts are to be applauded, and should continue to be the focus of our policy, we must always strive to deflect or reduce the purely nationalistic opposition that our efforts inspire.

The new President's job is compounded by the need to bring peace to the country. It will be impossible to bring all elements of the highly factionalized guerrilla movement back into the society, but it should be possible to combine success in the field with conciliation and amnesty, so that major parts of the effort of the extreme left can find it possible to compete in the political process of the future. This, too, will require a delicate balancing of the requirements of the civilian and military authorities.

The Presidential and Legislative Elections in Panama

Introduction

Panama has been independent since the intervention of the United States to secure Panama's independence and America's canal at the turn of the century. Yet, until very recently its independence was incomplete. The massive presence of the United States in the Canal Zone and its treaty rights to interfere in Panamanian affairs combined with Panama's geographical situation to make the country's history quite different from that of the Central American countries to the north or Colombia to the south. Like these, Panamanian political forms had been adapted from European and especially American models, with political power often divided between two dominant parties, the liberals and conservatives. Panama did not have an army until the National Guard evolved following World War II. For this reason, until recent years Panama has not had the military interventions that were characteristic of its neighbors. Politics was largely in the hands of a small group of wealthy Panamanians until at least the 1940s. After this the new National Guard began to intervene. In 1968, after a much disputed election, and an abrupt attempt to dismiss the leading officers of the Guard, the civilian system was set aside and the National Guard took over in the person of Omar Torrijos.

In 1978, General Torrijos, the head of state, began a process of return to civilian and democratic rule that promised a return to full democracy in 1984. This presidential and legislative election was the culmination of that promise.

* Report of the mission to observe the elections, by Father Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Dr. Raymond D. Gastil, and Ambassador Jack Hood Vaughan.

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Torrijos had attempted to establish in the early 1970s a political system based on a "dominant party" that would include a broad spectrum in the manner of Mexico's Revolutionary Party (PRI). It emphasized local elections with an indirectly elected national assembly. (It is interesting that Cuba may have copied aspects of this system in its "people's power" form of directed democracy later in the decade.) Although elections to establish this system were carried out successfully in the 1970s, apparently the indirect system was not found workable or the pressures against it among the Panamanian people proved too great. As a method of governing the nation the abandonment of the indirect system was symbolized by the 1984 elections. However, in these elections the powerful government party, the PRD (Revolutionary Democratic Party) represented a continuation of Torrijos' earlier attempt to govern through a broadly based populist party.

The Panamanian election took place in an economic and social context unusual in Latin America. While Panama has the usual oligarchy, small middle class, and numerically dominant lower and lower middle classes common throughout the area, neither agriculture nor landed property has ever been of great significance. This is not a land of feudal estates and peasant "serfs." Panama has always been dominated by commercial trade and one or two major cities. Most of the land is owned by the state. The peasant population, which has long been a minority, traditionally has had more than enough land. Most peasants lived on small, untitled subsistence farms. Alongside these there have always been large estates. Many are now in the hands of the government and are worked as state farms.

The Panamanian population is mixed racially, with the usual gradation from white toward the top to black and Indian toward the bottom. Nevertheless, the population is more cosmopolitan than in much of Latin America, and the acceptance of people of different racial and cultural backgrounds is more thorough. Indian groups, for example, maintain an unusual degree of autonomy and strength.

Background on the Elections

The May 6 elections were for president, first and second vice-presidents, legislators, and their alternates. Further elections for regional and municipal positions were scheduled for June. The May 6 elections were contested by fifteen registered parties and several unregistered ones. On election day the registration and

identification card of each person was to be thoroughly checked. The voter then entered a private booth. There he chose a ballot for president and the vice-presidents. He then entered another booth and chose a party ballot for the legislature. He could simply vote by party, or he could vote for individuals by crossing out the names of those he did not want on the back of the party ballot he had chosen. Particularly in the case of the presidential ballot, he could vote for the same person under a variety of party labels. As pointed out below, the parties were remarkably important in an election where the political culture emphasizes persons rather than ideas or programs.

The election process was under the control of the government, that is, of a civilian president and an administration concededly dominated by the National Guard. The civilian electoral tribunal established for this election contained people widely approved but of still untested strength. In any event it did not have an ability to carry out its mission without involving the Guard, particularly for logistics.

It had been generally expected that the National Guard (now officially the Panama Defense Forces) would maintain its dominance through the electoral process by having its Commander retire and then run for president. However, General Paredes, who retired for this purpose, was almost immediately abandoned by the Guard and the PRD that was to be the vehicle of military control. General Paredes still was able to appear on the ballot with the backing of a small party, the Populist Nationalist Party. The PNP was organized by a former student leader.

The main party of the military, the PRD, then formed UNADE (the Democratic National Union), a coalition or front with five other parties. Some of these may have been formed in order to widen the government's base, others such as the Republicans and Liberals were old-line parties. Ideologically, the PRD and its allies represent a wide spectrum from Marxists, to labor and peasant groups, to more conservative business people. This was, of course, Torrijos' intention in following the Mexican model. For many people the difficulty with PRD and its front is that it is identified as the party of the military, and thus the party of recent corruption. The antipathy of many people to this backing is personified by their dislike of General Noriega, the rather sinister figure who is now the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

The military and the PRD chose Nicolas Ardito Barletta as their candidate. Vice-President of the World Bank, Barletta had been

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living for the past six years in Washington, D.C. A well-educated Chicago economist, Barletta had and has no independent political base in the country. Technically and personally he seems eminently well qualified for the presidency.

Opposed to the UNADE coalition was the Opposition Democratic Alliance (ADO), often referred to as the "Alianza." Its candidate was Dr. Arnulfo **Arias** Madrid. Arias has been president three times, first in the early 1940s. He never served more than two years. His last term in 1968 lasted only eleven days. Since Arias is a sworn enemy of the military, and they of him, this is truly an opposition movement. Eighty-two, ill, and obviously not strong, Arias makes very few extended public appearances. However, he symbolizes opposition to the military. For this reason his party, the Authentic Panamafista Party (PPA) was joined by the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the National Liberal Republican Movement (MOLIRENA), and the National Action Party (PAN), as well as some other smaller groups in opposition. The only two parties with a wide base throughout the country are the PPA and the PRD, but the Christian Democrats and others have considerable support in the capital. Some minor parties are intellectual groups or vehicles for individual expression.

Very important in Arias' campaign were his two vice-presidential candidates; it was assumed that they would have a large part in running the government should Arias be elected. They were Carlos Rodriques, a banker in Miami before the election, and Ricardo Arias Calderon, leader of the Christian Democratic Party, as well as a leader of the Christian Democratic movement in the Western Hemisphere. Both are able and competent leaders.

These three, Barletta, Arias, and Paredes, were the main contenders. Most important among the others was Zuñiga of the PAPO party. A leftist, he had considerable support on university campuses.

There were about sixty-seven legislators to be elected through a combination of proportional representation and single-member district representation. Most districts were to have only one representative and alternate (from the same party). But most legislators would represent the relatively few larger districts. For these districts the persons who receive, either separately or through party lists, the largest number of votes will be elected as in a proportional system. In addition, any party that received as much as three percent of the total legislative vote nation-wide was to be granted at least one seat in the legislature. For this

reason, the absolute number of potential legislators was not determined in advance.

Campaigning often emphasized the parties at the expense of the individuals. Frequently the legislators were identified without reference to the presidential candidate they were running with; often banners and posters advertised a particular political party without identifying any individual. Since such practices also characterized the parties grouped in alliances, it suggested that after the elections a two-party system was unlikely to emerge. The coalitions seemed to be marriages of convenience for the purpose of this election. The ideological diversity within the coalitions supported this assumption.

Party allegiances by class were highly diverse. The support for the PRD comes from sections of the very poor, the very wealthy, and government employees (including guardsmen). It is often remarked that the very wealthy behind the PRD include those who have benefited most from the corruption of recent years. These are the people who now have palatial estates on the resort islands and luxury cars. This group apparently includes a number of present and former National Guard officers. The PRD also had the support of some of the poorest in the cities and the countryside. This includes people directly affected by the cooperative endeavors promoted by the Torrijos land reforms (although the peasants have not actually received property). It includes Indian groups in very close relation to the Guard, as well as many blacks (who form a large part of the Guard). It is not necessarily true that such groups strongly approve of the government's actions; it may be only that they feel dependent on the Guard or the administration. For example, many of the poor living in crowded parts of Panama City fear that a new government might cut off welfare and demand rent that they are not used to paying.

Support for the Alianza is almost equally diverse. It is centered in the lower- and upper-middle classes, but also includes many campesinos, especially in Arias' home province of Chiriqui. The poor of Colon as well as other less favored areas also supported the Alianza strongly. But the unifying theme for the coalition was opposition to military rule and the gross inequality that accompanies corruption. Many are past supporters of Arias the populist leader—these are the Peronistas of Panama. But the opposition alliance also included many who were very much opposed to Arias in the past. They supported him in 1984 as the only hope to counter the military and what they considered it had brought.

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The Campaign

To a large extent the campaign was a struggle between those who were in and those who were out. The Arias campaign fed on hatred, dislike, and resentment, while the Barletta campaign fed on the desire of many to maintain the gains they had achieved. Many labor unions distrusted Arias, and the communists felt they had a better chance with the PRD. Some PRD leaders have been close to the Cubans in the recent past, and there has probably been some penetration of communists into the government and military. Far left parties were, however, outside the government front.

Even though formally all parties had a fair chance, the campaign gave advantages to the government coalition that went beyond the simple advantage of incumbency. The primary bases of inequality were money, facilities, and access to the media. Hundreds of government vehicles and over 100,000 government employees were a ready resource for promotion of the government-front campaign. Government vehicles were used for the PRD, government funds appear to have been used, government workers were pressured to go to rallies for Barletta--these were the claims that our informants generally and credibly supported. The money available to the government campaign seemed to have been considerable. A great deal was spent on alcohol for rally attendees, tee shirts, and an incredible number of banners. The government also spent more on media advertising than the opposition.

The government campaign appeared to be more of a modern media campaign than that of the opposition. Perhaps because of its possession of fewer resources, the opposition emphasized detailed political organization and word-of-mouth campaigning. Out of five or six daily newspapers, the opposition had one; another leaned toward the government; the rest were blatant and obvious in their support of the government. The opposition had no TV channel. One was neutral, presenting at least news of the opposition. The other three or four were in one way or another pro-government--one even refused opposition advertising. Most of the country's radio stations were similarly disposed to favor the government. Printing or broadcasting nothing about the opposition was the most frequent tactic. These inequalities were generally admitted; for the most part they were ascribed to the direct or indirect control of the media by the government and its prominent supporters.

The Election Process

More controversial than the foregoing problems of fairness were the accusations that there was significant unfairness and fraud on the part of the government in the election itself. The election process required that each voter prove that he was on the list of names at the individual polling place where he wished to vote. If this were not the case, it was possible to obtain official papers authorizing one to vote at another place if he had proper identification. Overwhelmingly, on voting day the people who voted were those on the lists where they expected to vote. However, there were thousands left off the lists for apparently inexplicable reasons, or placed on lists far from the precincts they actually lived in. These could have been random errors; such omissions or errors might have been purposeful.

At the polling places all parties were allowed to have representatives continually checking on the process. The process itself went very slowly. The individual had to know where to go. (Because of a more stable society this seemed less of a problem than in the March 1984 election in El Salvador.) Next he had to show that he was on the list at the entrance to the precinct voting area, and again at the individual polling station. A few were on one list but not the other. Then he had to have an up-to-date identification card. Next the identified voter consecutively entered booths to make his presidential and then legislative choices, returned to have his card stamped, and to place his sealed envelope enclosing the ballots into the box in view of the poll attendants and observers. From the time the prospective voter entered the polling station until he left, he was the only voter being processed.

On election day two members of our group visited a number of different precincts in Panama City and its environs (as did a number of other election observers from which we heard indirectly). Our third observer visited many precincts in central Panama. Our direct observations suggested few problems. Somewhere between one and five percent seemed to have been turned away. There were more problems in central Panama, but to some degree they balanced one another out. Polling officials in both areas seemed very reluctant to let people vote who were not regularly entered on their lists.

Most people arrived early to vote, standing in long lines for hours. There seemed to be little fear or violence. The National

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Guard protected the process, without carrying guns in the polling areas.

There were many reports of large-scale vote buying, particularly in rural areas--twenty to one hundred fifty dollars per vote. In some cases, it was said, the money would be given in exchange for the person's identification card, which would be returned after the elections. Whether and to what extent such practices occurred is impossible to say. They probably occurred on both sides, but the government seemed to have more money. We did not see such exchanges occurring. However, one man later contacted us to say that he would be willing to testify to large-scale vote buying by the government in his area. Although a Barletta supporter, he actually campaigned for his brother—who was running for the legislature on an opposition ticket.

There were many accusations that candidates had provided already marked ballots to people before they went into the voting areas. This would, however, primarily effect individual and not party results.

Counting and Authenticating the Tallies

More serious problems emerged at the first stage of the counting after the closing of the polls. The ballots were counted at the polling stations where they had been cast and by the same mixed group of party representatives and election board volunteers. The counting went very slowly. Each ballot had to be read off separately for the presidential election and then the legislative. Each had to be read twice: once to determine the party and once to determine which individuals had been voted for. Who actually became a legislator was determined both by the number of party votes and the number of individual votes—each person on a ballot receiving a vote unless his name was crossed out. Unfortunately, instructions to election officials apparently had not included the details on how this tallying was to be done. The result, as we observed, was that different polling stations counted and recorded in different ways. Many stations were reported not to have fully recorded both the names and the party the people had voted for.

This problem would not have been so serious if all ballots had not been burned immediately after counting. The decision to burn ballots stemmed from previous elections that had been overturned by recounts in which new ballots were "discovered" to fraudulently swing the election in favor of a particular candidate. The

parties wanted to make sure that no extra ballots could be "found" after the first ballot counting. Once the polling station counting was over the results were forwarded as they were entered on the certifications of the tallies to the next level, the district; from the precinct onward no one would be able to check back to see what the ballots had actually said. Many disputes over incomplete recording could not subsequently be resolved.

There were many other problems with the certification documents; most probably due to oversight. For example, it was decided at the last minute that every page in the certification had to be signed because the pages were not correctly stapled together. This led to some confusion, and some pages remained unsigned by one or more of those responsible.

In a burst of confidence national election officials had suggested that preliminary national results might come out the first night. However, the districts in most cases did not even receive the certifications from the polling stations until the day after the election. It was days before the districts completed their counts, and the national totals could only become available after the districts forwarded their results to the National Board of Vote Examiners. Meanwhile perhaps half of the results were being challenged even before they were known officially.

The election process on the day of the election seemed on the surface to be open to little objection. Confidence in the process continued on through the initial counting of the ballots and the preparation of official tallies--certifications--at the polling stations. However, when the results of these counts were carried to the district and national levels, and the process seemed almost to come to a stop, trouble developed. On May 7, the day after the election, the National Board of Vote Examiners received almost no certifications from the district level where tabulations were proceeding very slowly, ostensibly because of the large number of challenges. To many the unexpected delay suggested fraud was in the offing. Past experience led to accusations that, realizing it was losing, the National Guard was stalling until it could work out a plausible way to alter the results. That evening a crowd that gathered to protest the slowdown was dispersed with gunfire.

Over the next several days the process proceeded in a climate of rumor and mistrust. Since the competing parties had certifications for all the polling booths, differing party totals were printed and promoted. On May 9 tabulation was suspended again. On May 11 the National Board of Vote Examiners declared itself unable to proceed and turned the process over to the National

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Election Tribunal. The opposition continued to make serious and often credible objections to the certifications from a number of polling stations and to publicize evidence of election malpractice. Demonstrations continued. On May 16 the Tribunal declared Barletta the winner, but the head of the three-man Tribunal objected, demanding more investigation. He abstained when the final decision of the Tribunal was made on May 20 to proclaim Barletta the winner by 1,713 votes. A subsequent challenge was rejected.

Analysis

The May 6 presidential and legislative elections in Panama represented another attempt to reestablish democratic institutions after a long period of interruption. They represented the fulfillment of a promise made by the country's rulers to return the country to democracy. Yet, as in most attempts of this kind, the election also represented a threat to the established government and the interests that had developed around it over sixteen years of largely military rule.

The central question for the election observers was the extent to which the interest of the "ins" in preserving their power and perquisites would outweigh their interest in returning the country to democracy. It was obvious that the official parties would benefit from the government's domination of the media and its control over public employees, public vehicles, and other services. It was also likely that the government, as well as the opposition, would attempt in some cases or areas to employ illegal or questionable means of influencing the outcome; such means are so much a part of the political culture that they are unlikely to be suddenly eliminated. There would be fraud and unfairness. However, since there are always some irregularities, and the importance of returning to civilian rule was uppermost in the mind of most participants, the question for election observers or election analysts became to determine the point at which the illegalities and unfairness became so blatant and unforgivable, that condemning the election as a failure would become unavoidable. To give even a qualified seal of approval to a disreputable election would be to destroy hope and cause a general disillusionment with democratic processes. On the other hand, to condemn as unacceptable what was only a muddy and untidy performance might

irremediably tarnish a significant step toward a more perfect democracy.

A presidential victory by the opposition would have been adequate proof of the general fairness of the process. While its hands might not be entirely clean, the opposition's ability to influence the process in the campaign period, on election day, and in the tally and authentication of results was clearly inferior to that of the government parties. On the other hand, presidential victory by the government front could not be used as proof that the election had been "stolen." The government party (PRD) was well organized, and represented important parts of the population, ranging from some of the very wealthy to some of the very poor. The government party had been joined in this election by a number of other parties—new and old—including a section of the Liberal Party. No matter how inaccurate they might have been, the balance of available public opinion polls had predicted a government victory. Observers had seen with their own eyes that there were at least some polling places where the government party won handily.

In the event, the government candidate was announced the winner by a very narrow margin. Because of the generally accepted advantages of the government before and during the election, the credible charges of electoral misconduct in some areas, the detailed publication of alternative counts, and the surprisingly slow and highly contentious process of reaching a final verdict, the result will be considered fraudulent by many Panamanians, including some who voted for Barletta.

The Alianza opposition claims that setting aside the certifications of polling boxes favoring them at the district level and the illegitimate inclusion of others favoring Barletta gained the government more than 10,000 votes. They also have presented an analysis showing that even if the tallies they consider fraudulent are included, Arias would have won if no polling boxes had been excluded from the final count because of challenges. While we cannot determine the validity of this or other plausible claims by the opposition, a reasonable doubt is generated.

This doubt, combined with the generally accepted advantage of the government in the media and public facilities, and the narrowness of the official count, leads to the conclusion that in a fully free election Arias probably would have been the winner. This conclusion is taken in full knowledge that many Panamanians of all parties made a sincere attempt at all levels of the election process itself to insure its fairness. Over seventy

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percent of the eligible voters cast validated votes, while thousands more voted in good faith.

The results of the legislative elections appear likely to parallel those of the presidential, although many seats were not yet decided by May 29. Using the official tallies UNADE probably will have a clear majority, but the PRD by itself will have a thin margin at best. It is likely that some legislators representing the government parties will have achieved their positions through means neither free nor fair. To a lesser degree this may also be true of individuals representing the opposition. It appears likely that the opposition will achieve greater representation than they have had since the military intervention in 1968, but probably less than the voters would have desired.

The next steps that should be taken by the Panamanians and the friends of Panama are unclear. On the one hand, the hatred, fear, and disrespect for the government of at least half the population seems bound to grow, leading increasing numbers to abandon the country or to turn to nondemocratic solutions of their own. On the other hand, it may be possible for those now granted the mantle of government to work toward a greater degree of democracy in the future, to overcome through their hard work and dedication to justice, the aura of illegitimacy with which they are now surrounded. It is clear that they have the talent. It is not clear that they have the power.

For Panamanians the issue is whether it would not be preferable, in spite of the expense, to take conclusive action to clear up the problems that bedeviled the election. With the problems of the May 6 election so fresh in everyone's mind, a meeting among the major figures and their representatives might be appropriate. Such a meeting might decide on an independent audit of the certification documents of the individual polling stations by a non-Panamanian firm. Alternatively, the decision might be to hold a new election.

Whatever solution the Panamanians decide on, the United States should be generous in making it possible, and in playing any neutral role that the participants might ask of it. If there is no generally accepted solution, then the United States should be careful not to endorse the election as having been a fully free exercise. It should continue to support the extension of Panamanian civil institutions, but it should be reluctant to strengthen further a military establishment that many, perhaps most, Panamanians consider to be primarily responsible for the inequities in the recent election.

PART III

**Understanding Democracy
and Freedom**

Defining Democracy

Defining democracy and freedom are tasks that the Survey must periodically readdress. Continually appraising societies that achieve or fall away from democratic institutions provides ever new insights into what is important, while our readers and critics raise ever new questions as to the measuring of our basic concepts.

One of the most useful ways to conceptualize democracy is to begin with the theoretical approach developed by Alfred Kuhn in *The Logic of Social Systems*.¹ Organizations, for Kuhn, are means by which individuals can more effectively achieve their individual objectives. From this theoretical viewpoint, "democracy" is the name for a particular way to organize a political system. Any organization—government, corporate, or private—can be seen as consisting of Sponsors, Staff, and Recipients. The sponsors are the ones that bring the organization into being, and maintain or institutionalize it. In simple organizations and primitive communities, everyone is a sponsor. Larger organizations hire a staff that carries out the work for the sponsors. For such organizations, the recipients are the clients or customers the organization sells to, or "acts upon," whether for good or ill. In a private corporation, it is fairly easy to see that the sponsors are the stockholders, the staff, the employees, and the recipients, the customers who both receive the corporation's service or product and pay for it. In a consumers cooperative, on the other hand, the usual recipients of the product—goods or services—hire a staff to provide it. The customers of a consumers cooperative are both the sponsors and the recipients.

achieving this identity—and the reduced costs that go with it—is the reason for forming consumers cooperatives.

In these terms Alfred Kuhn helps us understand the concept of democracy by contrasting government as a cooperative organization with government as a profit-making organization. In the cooperative (or democratic) organization all citizens are both sponsors

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and recipients of the actions of government staff. They pay the costs and receive the benefits of the organization. Since the staff works for the sponsors, attempts of the staff to coerce sponsor decisions or defy sponsor control will ultimately result in staff dismissal. Sponsor members—that is, the public—pursue their personal interests in the state organization through political organizations, elections, pressure groups, educational campaigns, and other means.

Political rights may be defined as the freedom of citizens to fully exercise their sponsor function—that is, their oversight function in regard to government. Civil liberties consist of limitations on the power of staff to interfere with sponsors either in their sponsor or recipient roles. For some contexts we may say that political rights define input; civil liberties control output.

In contrast to government as a cooperative organization or democracy, Kuhn describes some governments as profit-making organizations. In this model, the sponsors of the system are a small minority of the public, but the whole public is the recipient of the output of the system. Through both positive and negative inducements, the sponsors try to get as much out of the system as they can. Here the staff works for the nonmajority sponsors. All governments use force to ensure the continuity of the state organization, but the profit-making government also uses force to keep particular leaders in power. In this model political rights are essentially nonexistent for the majority which by definition does not control the sponsoring group, while civil liberties are granted only to the extent that they do not interfere with sponsor objectives.

Kuhn applies the profit-making model to both exploitative dictatorships or oligarchies, such as that in Haiti; and the ideological dictatorships of communist or one-party socialist states. In either case society is dominated by a small group with special interests that can be fulfilled only through nonmajority rule over the population. The most important benefits for the sponsors in the ideological state are achieved through forcing the population to build the society the sponsors desire. Of course, exploitative and ideological profit-making systems become indistinguishable to the extent that ideological leaders shift from pursuing their ideals to manipulating the system for selfish personal objectives.

Both cooperative and profit-making models are pure forms: systems that actually exist in the world will lie in between. But

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these models help to make clear the essential distinction between democracy and its alternatives, a distinction too often obscured by the rhetoric of the spokesmen and apologists for nondemocratic systems. Ruhn's contrast is instructive in that it casts doubt on the assumption that the values of Western democracy are similar to those of capitalistic organization while the values of communism or one-party socialism are similar to those of cooperative institutions. If we look at the relationships involved instead of the rhetoric, we discover that the values of liberal democracy are most congruent with those of cooperatives. Communitarian values are democratic values.

One advantage of approaches such as Kuhn's is that they assume no more than that individuals will pursue their own interests, whether as leaders or followers. Kuhn assumes that leaders must be institutionally forced by threats of dismissal to consistently respond to the interests of the people they govern. Otherwise, they will soon respond primarily to their own interests. This has been a basic assumption of most social thinkers from Madison to Marx. If we define interests in the broadest sense, elected representatives will generally reflect popular interests more surely than any elite or vanguard. That voters will pursue their interests through the electoral processes of democracy, and that political parties will respond by trying to match these interests with programs has been shown by both theoretical and empirical evidence. There is a crushing burden of proof on those who assert that a small vanguard party will rule indefinitely in the interests of the majority that it excludes from rule.

The fact that the goals and values of minority sponsors may be to promote what they conceive to be the best interests of the recipients does not make a system democratic or just. The Shah of Iran, for example, conceived that a glorious modern state would be best for the Iranians. Apparently the people did not share his vision, yet for forty years they had few ways to make their wishes known. The Nazis thought that they knew what was best for the German people. But they were wrong—the few led the many to disaster. The Communist Party, which sees itself as the "vanguard party," that is, the ideological elite that shows the way to the "masses," likewise feels that it knows what is best for the people—the recipients. Wherever the Communist Party is in power, the Party is clearly the sponsor—the group that defines the goals of the people. And within the Party—in almost all, if not all,

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communist parties—a small group is in fact the sponsor. In such parties, the interests and values of average Party members have little chance of being reflected in Party decisions.

The objective of Kuhn's description of democracy is primarily scientific, to describe the relation of democracy to other forms of organization. However, from a humanistic point of view, of natural law or natural right, democracy also seems to be an intuitively required form for state organization. The reason is that states have a fundamentally different relationship to people than other organizations. Most organizations can be freely joined or abandoned. We can choose to relate to them as sponsors, recipients, staff, or not at all. For most people state organizations are not avoidable. We are born to the state we live in. This would seem to give us a prima facie right to be a sponsor of that state—as is assumed by many contract theorists, including most recently John Rawls.²

Only democracies provide institutionalized means for all adults to be the sponsors as well as the recipients of the state organization. As our model suggests, democracies provide these means in two ways. First, they provide political rights. Political rights define the relation of the sponsors—the people—to the staff or administration. In a democracy every person has a right to periodically vote for candidates representing different policy positions, and, in some cases, to vote directly on policy issues. In addition, everyone has a right to become a candidate, and thus to serve as staff—as a legislator or administrator—of the organization of which he is a recipient. Democracies provide those elected with the primary power to direct the political system.

Secondly, democracies provide civil liberties that define the relation of the staff or administration to the recipients, the people. Civil liberties are necessary if a society is to develop and propagate new ideas. Civil liberties include freedom of the press, freedom of organization, and freedom of demonstration. Democracies guarantee a neutral judicial system that mediates between the attempt of the government's staff to enforce the law and the rights of citizens to challenge the staff's interpretation of the law. Political rights without such civil liberties would have little meaning: new ideas would be stifled before larger audiences could accept or reject them, and potential leaders with new values and interests would have no way to influence the policies of the system through challenging and even defeating incumbents.

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Democracy in the cooperative organization is based on the theory of political equality, and assumes a continuing struggle to equalize the influence of each person in the determination of public policy. It does not mean that all people are equal in ability or worth, but that all people have certain fundamental rights that no one has a right to deny. It does not mean that all people have or should have equal incomes or benefits from society, but that all people have a right to help establish the political rules determining how economic or other benefits shall be attained or divided.

Democratic systems will always be imperfect. An effective equality of political power has never been achieved. Power has always varied by age, sex, ability, and personality. Theoretically, political equality might be achieved by non-representative democracy, where everyone has an equal vote in an open meeting. But such democracy is limited to small communities. Mixed systems based on elected representatives and occasional referendums are the best solution for most societies. The best democracies are those that recognize their failings and, through a variety of mechanisms, work to reduce the political inequalities that inevitably develop.

Democrats must admit the tension between the need for leadership, organization, and hierarchy in all societies and the universal intuition that each individual has an equal right to pursue his or her own interests. The more able, decisive, and popular should lead, but when a leader seems inadequate or wrong his people have a right to consider his errors, to compel him to change policy—or to change leaders.

Democracies do not depend on good will or strong ideology to control leader behavior. In successful democracies leaders are attentive to the wishes of the people because the people repeatedly demonstrate their ability to threaten their leaders through defeating them at the polls. Leaders are subject to the laws in a democracy; they may be, and often are, condemned by the very laws they write. The staff must be repeatedly reminded that as staff they are not the sponsors of the society.

Democracy requires competitive democratic processes. No group or party or theory can presume to know what the people want without an open competition of ideas. No government has the right to ensure its continuity by determining what topics are discussed in a nation's publications or broadcasts. Unless popular sovereignty is itself seriously endangered, no government has a right to prohibit the formation of groups dedicated to promoting new or

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unpopular ideas, or even the formation of groups promoting the special interests of a particular part of the population. The only test of the true popularity of an idea is when it has been challenged and not found wanting in popular opinion. The only test of the size of an interest group—and thereby its rightful share in determining a society's values—is when all groups have an equal chance to organize their potential memberships for demonstrations, elections, or other forms of nonviolent input into the system.

A democracy need be neither liberal nor conservative: it will be as liberal or conservative as its sponsors. All minorities have a right to be heard and to press for their own interests, but the majority has the right to determine the public way of life for any society: only the majority has the right to forbid obscenity on television or billboards on highways. The majority may decree land reform or do away with welfare benefits. The makeup of majorities varies from subject to subject, but at any one time and on a particular issue the majority acts as the temporary sponsor of the society for the people as a whole. But, as long as a society is democratic, it cannot forbid rational discussion or political organization in favor of any alternative for the future regulation of the society.

Democracy is social, but it is also private and individual. To preserve the generation of alternatives for discussion, and thereby the meaning of this right, all democracies must grant an arena of privacy to its individuals in which they may live as they feel best. Only such privacy allows the autonomy necessary for creativity, and thus guarantees functioning political rights for all.

A basic democratic right is that of group self-determination. The theory of the democratic state as a cooperative organization implies that in their role as sponsors—that is, as citizens—a people should have the right to decide on the state organization to which they affiliate. John Stuart Mill declared that if there was ever a political right of a group of people, it is the right to decide what larger society they are a part of.³ Yet no right has been and continues to be so flagrantly disregarded as the right of a people to the political allegiance of their choice. There may be hundreds of ethnic groups in the world with good reason to feel that they have been unjustly included within a political unit that they want no part of.

Unfortunately, the demand for "self-determination" is often made by those with no interest in democracy. For an earlier

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generation, in the idealism of President Wilson, it was self-evident that self-determination meant the right of every people to rule themselves through democratic forms. To say that under Idi Amin Uganda had self-determination, while under the British it did not, is nonsense. A nation is not a mystical entity that can be embodied in a tyrannical leader. A nation ruled by one man or a small minority is never self-determined, for the people are in no sense its sponsors. This is an obvious point that the United Nations, composed mostly of nondemocratic states, fails to acknowledge. Its leaders are not about to admit that the Palestinians of the West Bank are just as "self-determined" as the peoples of most Arab states, or that the blacks of South Africa have about as much self-determination as blacks in most African countries. But those of us who live in democratic states should know better, we should know when a people becomes the sponsor of its political system, and when it does not. Concern for democracy should cause us to look at the degree of political equality and political expression--it should have us ignore the color or religion of dictators.

Democracy is neither capitalist nor socialist. Liberal democracy is not libertarian democracy, nor is it necessarily liberal in the nineteenth century European sense of "liberal economics." The struggle between democracy and totalitarianism is not the struggle between capitalism and communism, although many people of both right and left would have us think so. This misunderstanding results in part from the materialist tendency of many of those on both ends of the ideological spectrum. They see "things" determining "ideas" rather than the other way around. In this view material changes must produce changes in society and ultimately in the ideas that guide it. Marxists argue that capitalist society in which ownership is often very unequal inevitably produces a tyrannical concentration of power in the hands of the few, while socialism that grants ownership to society as a whole inevitably produces an egalitarian distribution of power--and thereby a more "democratic" society. Capitalists, on the other hand, argue that historically political democracy and capitalism developed together because only capitalism supports a pluralistic distribution of power. The dynamism of capitalism is said to continually break down the concentrations of power that are unavoidable in noncapitalist states. Socialism, then, inevitably tends to concentrate power in the hands of the few.

There is some truth in both positions, but enough falsehood to cast doubt on the assumption of any necessary relationship.

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Unless a society has functioning, self-corrective political mechanisms, those who attain power and authority will tend toward increasing concentration and monopolization regardless of the official theory. Even in communist China, a relatively egalitarian communist state, Party leaders ride in shuttered limousines to special stores and suburban elegance in walled compounds.⁴ "Public ownership" is no more than a slogan to such leaders. Similarly, capitalist leaders will gladly use government to suppress labor leaders, force out smaller businesses, or suppress opposition news media--unless there are countervailing forces capable of exposing and eliminating the worst of these abuses.

To illustrate the point, we might distinguish between two sorts of capitalism and two sorts of socialism, with the differences within each category of economic system due to the presence or absence of adequate political mechanisms to defend or create democracy.

Capitalist-democratic states, such as those of Europe and North America, and including a range of states from Japan to Barbados, have functioning democratic systems, with a free press, competitive parties, and effective means for exposing abuses. We also find capitalist-autocratic states, such as Singapore, Haiti, Chile, or South Africa where political freedoms are quite limited or absent. Political control remains concentrated in these states by denying large sections of the population a political voice, by banning opposition parties, forcing the media into silence, or the general brutalization or even execution of those who oppose the system.

Similarly, socialist-democratic societies, such as those in Scandinavia, manage to preserve a wide variety of opposing and countervailing organized groups. Regardless of socialization, by and large they remain effective, functioning democracies. The socialist-autocratic systems of communist and socialist one-party states, such as the Soviet Union or Algeria, are associated with the denial of democratic rights. But an examination of the evidence does not suggest that the one produced the other inexorably. Rather, the political and economic systems of such states appear to have been "exported" and accepted together as a Marxist-Leninist package. The role of the Soviet Communist Party in the export of socialist ideas has probably had more to do with the nondemocratic results than the nature of the economic system that was espoused.

Finding inevitable linkages between economic and political systems is also rendered implausible by the mixed nature of all

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economic systems in the real world. The "capitalists" of the world are frequently characterized by narrow anti-market allegiances between small ruling cliques and closely related economic or military elites (and often their foreign friends). Perhaps the outstanding recent example was President Somoza of Nicaragua who controlled government, army, and large sections of the economy directly, although ostensibly his was a "capitalist" state. More general is the tendency of the governments of many "capitalist" countries to amass government holdings in transportation, communications, agriculture, and even industrial production. The state plays a decisive role in the so-called capitalist economies of Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines, as well as such capitalist states as France or Italy. This is less true of the United States, but the major role of the U.S. government in economic development since the inception of the Republic is too often ignored by the patriots of free enterprise.

A democratic economy is simply one that the people as sponsors develop, promote, or shape through their political institutions. All other things being equal, the free society will wish to allow individuals or groups the largest scope for developing their particular economic interests. However, everything else is not equal. Eventually the voters may find unlimited industrial pollution, or life-threatening differences in health care unacceptable. If so, within broad limits it will then have a democratic responsibility to exert control.

Democracy cannot legitimately be sacrificed for development. It may be that allowing popular desires to guide economic decisions through democratic political mechanisms will not allow for optimum growth. Voters may not be willing to sacrifice current consumption for future growth. A healthy society has concern for more than the present moment: it must be concerned to preserve the society's present standard of living and basic rights for the benefit of future generations. But who has the right to tell one generation it should sacrifice its present values, rights, or living standards to maintain an arbitrary growth rate? Are not present lives at least equally as significant as those of the future? For a nondemocratic leader, personally living well in the present, to tell his poor people to sacrifice current income or traditional cultural ideals to attain national growth is as great an injustice as any that could be produced by the working of democratic institutions. And, sadly, the sacrifices demanded by nondemocratic leaders frequently do not produce the promised growth.

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Democracy is not, then, a philosophy of development. Democracy is defined by a set of functioning institutions that guarantee the right of all citizens to live in freedom, to have their ideas and interests respected, and to come together regularly to test through open elections whether current leaders or programs should continue or be replaced by candidates that offer other alternatives. Democracy requires, however, more than formal institutions. To succeed it requires that certain attitudes, beliefs, or values be widely held in the politically active population.

What, then, does it mean to think like a democratic sponsor, or to think democratically?

A democrat is one who respects the right of all persons to have the greatest possible say in the management of their society. He does not naively believe that all people are emotionally or mentally equal, but that within a broad range of inequalities, inequalities do not cancel basic rights.

The democrat believes in the rights of the people, but may or may not believe in their innate tendencies toward goodness or progress, especially when organized in groups. Human history is a long record of disasters and atrocities, many of which were as much due to the character of peoples as to that of their leaders. Some democratic sponsors may believe, as Plato did, that people can be divided into classes according to relative virtue or ability, but he does not draw Plato's conclusion that only the most able and virtuous should rule. Being a philosopher does not give anyone the right to be a philosopher king.

Every society has a group of people that is regarded because of wealth, intelligence, education, or cultural level as an elite. It is the responsibility of elites to strive to lead their societies toward what they think is best. Each group, each person, should lead to the extent of his or her ability. But the interests of philosopher kings are too often not popular interests: they are philosopher-king interests. When this is so, the best that can be done is to reinforce the freedoms that allow the philosophers to pursue their interests while allowing political leadership to go to individuals whose interests are closer to those of the majority.

The democrat respects majorities as sponsors, for majority rule symbolizes the basic equality of individuals. Majorities are not things or even groups. Varying from issue to issue, majorities are artificial constructs based upon compromises among individuals and groups pursuing a wide variety of special interests or special

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interpretations of society's general interest. Most people do not want homes in general, automobiles in general, jobs in general, recreation in general. We speak of "mass markets," but in fact it is the specialty markets that flourish. Growth leads to a proliferation of wants rather than homogenization, because as individuals most people pursue a range of very particular interests and goals. Those who lead democracies must both represent the largest number of special interests and ideologies and strive for a definition of common interest that serves the community as a whole.

The democrat believes in the balance of majority and minority rights. Majorities have the right to establish the directions of society, and minorities have the right to question these directions at every step. Minorities have the right to their own ways of life, to their own beliefs and interests; a right that becomes progressively more absolute to the extent the expression of these rights is confined to the private arena.

A question such as, "Should we legislate morality?" requires us to consider two aspects: "To what extent does the majority have the right to legislate rules for social behavior?" and "Within these limits to what extent should a majority 'legislate morality'?"

Too often discussions of whether a majority should control its social environment becomes either an argument over the desirability of particular interventions, such as prohibitions on pornography or abortion, or an argument on the relative advantages of libertarian or communitarian approaches to the role of government. These issues of relative desirability are surely secondary to those of the rights of the parties involved. If a representative of the majority has no right to use government machinery to control land distribution, then the question of his philosophy as to the degree to which a government that had this right should promote land reform becomes irrelevant.

If we accept the assumptions of democracy and believe that we should live in so far as practically possible by democratic precepts, then we will accept the proposition that all competent adult citizens are politically equal in theory. This equality is to be periodically expressed through election processes in which voters decide between contrasting policy positions and personalities. Each person also has a right to participate in framing the political issues and establishing the coalitions that form around them. It is this right to political equality that leads to the conclusion that the majority should rule, for only majority rule

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counts the decisions of each person equally. Democracies vary in the extent to which minority positions also are reflected in policy, and to increase stability some laws or rules may be made particularly, difficult for a majority to change at any one time, as under the American constitution. The fundamental principle remains majority rule.

Theoretically, then, a majority might have the right to decide on any policy or any degree of government control that it wished. In fact all democracies emerged from traditional societies that understood certain rights to be the natural property of all citizens and so insulated from majority rule. For example, the assumption in our tradition that everyone has a right to a fair trial impinges on absolute parliamentary or plebiscitary sovereignty.

There are more universal reasons for restricting majority rule that emerge from reconsidering the basic rights implied by political equality. Robert Dahl suggests that in an authentic democracy the citizens potentially must be able to participate effectively and achieve an enlightened understanding of the issues.⁷ What this evidently implies is that to be operational political equality includes a process of continual formation and reformation of majorities around successive issues in which the participating citizens are potentially able to form enlightened judgments. Looked at in a different manner, every citizen in a democracy must be given a reasonable chance to form a new majority ascribing to his values, objectives, and understanding. In other words, he must at a minimum have the right to organize and publicize alternative views without fear that he will be punished by the state for the attempt. Unless every individual has this right in relation to his society's future, we cannot assume that present majorities came into being through free discussion and organization for alternatives in the past, and thus the ruling majority cannot be said to be authenticated by a democratic process.

A modern democracy assumes another type of limitation on the majority through acceptance of the principle that every individual has a right to a private realm distinct from the public realm and, thus, outside the purview of government. This right to privacy has a considerable history and stems in part from our Judeo-Christian tradition, although discussions by Alan Westin, Charles Fried, and others suggest that the status of privacy in formal law is surprisingly weak and insecure.⁸ Everyday and judicial references to "private matters" attest to the general acceptance in our

culture that there is a basic right to privacy comparable to the public right to political equality. It can also be argued that democracy as defined here requires privacy. In a totally public society those with minority views would be so quickly identified and at least subtly punished that they would find it extremely difficult to develop their minority political positions into majority positions.

In considering the boundaries of a right to privacy we must begin again with the rights of the majority. The majority has the decisive role in defining the nature of social life: defense, transportation, education, sanitation and the allocation of property are among the areas in which it achieves this definition. As long as the majority's decisions do not unduly restrict the possibility of new majorities to progressively change the definition, there is no basis to deny its right to legislate in these areas. Similarly, there is a plausible case for the majority intervening in other more subtle aspects of public life. If the majority cannot control the nature of the public places in which its members live, then its will is being thwarted quite undemocratically by minorities. For example, if on one's way to work each morning, one had to witness public whippings among those so inclined, and it was not possible for the majority to use the law to control this environment, one would justifiably think that his rights as a member of the majority were unduly restrained. A minority would be making a basic decision about the quality of public life for the majority.

Clearly, what a person believes or thinks is private; equally clearly all forms of expression cannot be considered private. The private arena includes much of what goes on in the home, "in private," but not everything that occurs there. Beyond some level, child abuse, for example, becomes a public issue no matter where it occurs. On some questions such as pornography or addictive drugs we might wish to use a commercial test: if money is exchanged, if there is a market, then the activities are to be considered public, or subject to majority control. The argument would be that where a market emerges there are inevitably buyers and sellers, and selling, or "pushing" a product alters the social environment in ways that may be of direct and legitimate concern to a majority attempting to maintain control over its world. The majority may also frown on many noncommercial activities in this area, worrying about their cumulative effects, but in its need to find a defensible or salient demarcation line it may well find the market distinction widely applicable.

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It should be noted that in outlining the majority's rights we have not said anything about what the majority should do, about the areas in which it should legislate. There are good reasons for accepting extremely restrictive views of government, based on arguments such as those of Nozick.⁹ There are also good reasons for a society to take on special responsibilities such as those toward the underprivileged and the environment. Advocates on both sides of this argument need to be more modest, to realize that their arguments are not concerned with the (natural) rights of individuals in communities to particular privileges or services, but with whether it would be morally or practically desirable for majorities to decide to allocate public attention or money to specified persons or causes. The proliferation of claims to rights (of children, refugees, disabled, poor, aged, animals, trees, religious sects, and property, for example) threatens to bring the concept of rights into disrepute in the political community. When too many claims on society are labeled rights, all rights become open to question, including those to the free discussion of such claims. When special interests are labeled "rights" their effective denial by the majority—and many such rights will be ignored or slighted in all societies—will add unnecessarily to the disaffection of those who identify with special interests.

A democrat believes in compromise, for he knows that in a democracy no one gets all he wants, and no one can make everyone else, or even most other people, see things his way. He believes in compromise because as a democrat he respects the interests of others, and their right to those interests. For example, if the democrat believes that pornography destroys the health of a society, he will nevertheless respect the right of others to enjoy pornography in private. Similarly, if he is a pornographer, he will respect the right of others to try to ban the public presentation of pornography. Of course, many in a democracy try to restrict the expression of opinion by others, but when they do they go against the constitutions they acknowledge.

Most of, all a democrat is tolerant of his fellow sponsors. He does not divide his people into the good and evil and assign the evil to oblivion. In a recent discussion V.S. Naipaul recalls his conversation with a well-educated young Iranian. At one point the Iranian tells him that true freedom had existed only once in the world--during Stalin's rule in the Soviet Union. Shocked, Naipaul asks whether he did not realize that this had been a period of great suffering, with thousands imprisoned and killed.

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"What sort of people?" was the reply.⁵ This is the critical point. When our moral judgments of a regime's political executions are prefaced with "What sort of people?" we are well on the way to sanctioning the rule of terror. Studies of modern torture indicate that the first requirement for torturers is to define those to be tortured as no longer human.⁶ Against people no longer defined as human, we can inflict the most inhumane acts with impunity.

To the democrat humanity is never dissolved by a person's ideology or even behavior. In his cooperative organization all remain fully human. Those he opposes may become enemies; if they resort to violence they may at times need to be violently resisted, but they can never be dismissed with cruel contempt, their interests, and their right to express nonviolently these interests, denied.

Unlike the ideologue the democrat believes that the course of history is not explainable in terms of any simple set of causes. While science can be applied to the understanding of some aspects of history, there is no science of history. History can be "explained" in Marxist terms of the struggle of economic classes, but it can also be explained in terms of economic and demographic growth, land use, technological change, the spread of general education and communication, or the development and diffusion of particular groups of ideas in politics, religion, science, or other fields. There is no invariant materialist or nonmaterialist explanation, for the history-making "interests" closest to the heart of communities are sometimes of one sort, and sometimes of the other. The poorest, most primitive people in the world may put their spiritual values ahead of all others, and die in their defense; the most advanced and comfortable may define their interests in the most materialistic way. Sociologists have found that the poor or the workers are frequently least supportive of change while the educated middle and upper classes that materially profit most from the status quo are likely to be most interested in changing it.

Democrats cannot be sure of the future. So without the keys to history the democrat is in no position to impose history on others.

Seeing themselves as part of a cooperative endeavor, the sponsors of a democratic state respect individuals, groups,

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traditions, and progress. They respect the full variability of human concerns. They collectively represent no ideology; they represent a set of principles through which all humane ideologies can find expression.

N O T E S

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A Historical Survey of Freedom in America

It may increase understanding of the freedoms considered by the Comparative Survey and of the struggles to move from more to less freedom that we find in many countries today to consider the growth of freedom in the United States in terms of the Comparative Survey. On first consideration this should be easily done, for surely the record of the growth of freedom in the United States has been amply recorded by historical scholars. However, while there are highly general treatments,¹ and many specific studies, there are few if any general treatments of change at the behavioral level that covers the spectrum of political and civil freedoms of the Survey. The great body of historical work is intellectual history or legalistic work concentrating on changes in constitutional law and practice. Even behaviorist historians are not specifically interested in problems of freedom. Of course useful information is available, most of it already in reliable secondary sources, but finding and organizing it in a scholarly manner is beyond the small amount of time available to the Survey. Nevertheless, the following sketchy consideration of the growth of American democracy serves the dual purposes of giving additional meaning to the Survey and providing additional understanding of the United States.

The history of political rights is relatively straightforward. It is primarily the story of the expansion of the electorate in practice and law, and the division of powers among the several levels of government. Civil liberties involves a much broader field, one in which our presentation will remain more scattered and incomplete. Emphasis will be placed on freedom of political expression, the existence of political prisoners and torture, the rule of law, freedom of religion, freedom of organization, and the freedoms of private life.

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Political Rights

The Colonies were perhaps the most democratic portion of the world prior to the Revolutionary War, although in modern terms liberties were restricted.² Governors were appointed by London. In most colonies a small group of the wealthiest families provided the members of the governor's councils. These councils acted as both courts of law and upper chambers of the legislature. The elected assemblies were much more democratic, and by the 1770s the colonial assemblies had achieved ascendancy over the London appointed governors, and no more than five percent of colonial legislation was later vetoed by parliament. It was true that property qualifications restricted the suffrage, yet as many as eighty to ninety-five percent of adult white males were eligible to vote in parts of New England, perhaps fifty percent in New Jersey, and twenty-five to fifty percent in Virginia and other parts of the South.³ It was, however, a hierarchical world in which the reelection of incumbents was seldom seriously contested.⁴

Taxes in the colonies were far lower than in the British Isles themselves. It was an attempt to force the colonies to partially pay for their own defense that led to the imposition of "taxation without representation," and ultimately to revolt. In a broader sense the Declaration of Independence in 1776 was a response to the attempt of the British government in the 1760s and 1770s to force the colonies to accept parliamentary rule. While this rule might have been acceptable a century before, by the 1760s colonial leaders conceived of themselves as subject only to the limited powers of the British king.

The Revolutionary War period and the ultimate American victory further advanced freedom. The primary advance was independence itself, freeing the colonies of control by the king, appointed governors, their appointed councils, and the claims of parliament. Suffrage and eligibility to public office became more open, with advances particularly in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. By 1796 seven out of sixteen states no longer had property qualifications for voters for the lower house of their state legislatures.

Economically and socially the Revolution also had a leveling effect. A higher percentage of the population was dispossessed for their loyalist allegiance after the Revolutionary War than after the much more egalitarian-seeming French Revolution.⁵ Economic expropriation and disestablishment of Anglicanism were very important in comparatively loyalist and feudal New York, but

of almost no significance in a state like Virginia. The Revolution caused a considerable shifting of power in Pennsylvania, but the shift was more political than economic.

In the 1790s a considerable percentage of the white population remained outside the suffrage, especially in New York and the South. Over nineteen percent of the population was black, nearly all slaves, and nearly all outside the electorate. Women could not vote or run for office. Elections were indirect for the Senate and presidency. In Survey terms, before the Revolutionary War, the colonies as a whole would score (4) on political rights; and in the 1790s this would be confirmed by further advance. (For the system of ratings see Part I, above.)

The remaining imperfections of universal white male suffrage fell away almost everywhere in the early nineteenth century. By the 1830s and '40s property qualifications were insignificant, and the election of the president was effectively direct. Every presidential election in the 1840s saw over seventy percent of the white males over twenty-one participating, and in 1840 and 1860 participation climbed to over eighty percent.⁶ Yet the change should not be exaggerated. A cross section of American opinion was expressed in elections before perfection of the suffrage.⁷ Where this was not so, as in Virginia or South Carolina it did not become so at this period either. Blacks remained excluded, although their percentage of the population was decreasing (to fourteen percent by 1860). However, local and state power was decreasing, and oppression of the now relatively large Indian population was at its height. America in the 1840s should have a rating for political rights of at least (3).

Due to reconstruction reforms in the South, political rights rose after the Civil War, only to decline again by the turn of the century, a decline that lasted until World War II.⁸ The enfranchisement of Southern negroes shortly after the Civil War led to their serious participation as both voters and elected officials for a generation. By the 1880s presidential election turnout in the South was above sixty percent (including blacks), and above seventy percent nationally. By the early 1900s this had fallen to thirty percent in the South, while remaining in the sixties elsewhere. Few blacks continued to vote in the South, and many poor whites no longer voted. Decline in voting was due partially to harassment and vote fraud, but was primarily due to specific laws enacted around the turn of the century. This included the poll tax (which had to be paid long before the election), literacy tests, difficult registration, and the white primary. These

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measures were also used with similar effect in Maryland and Delaware. Voting was also reduced by the introduction of the secret ballot which was quite deterring for the partially literate. This reform may also be responsible for a slight decline after the turn of the century in national voting percentages, where it served to reduce immigrant participation. Thus while political rights reached the level of (2) by 1876, they had retreated to (3) by 1900. It should also be remembered that in the repressive atmosphere that made possible pushing through these changes, civil liberties were also seriously infringed in Southern states.

The decline of voting connected with new suffrage and electoral laws meant that the high percentages achieved in elections before and after the Civil War, the latter with the inclusion of the Negro male population, were never again achieved. The presidential vote fell below seventy percent in 1904 and has generally remained below this level. Certainly more difficult registration procedures and the secret ballot are part of the explanation. Yet, except in the South, the effects of such changes were diffuse, primarily excluding those with simple lack of interest in politics. Perhaps the vote fraud these changes were ostensibly meant to correct had been at least as great a denial of political rights as the lower participation rates that they produced. (However, vote fraud on an organized national scale was not a major American problem—the abuses to be corrected were primarily in local elections.) The decline in the vote was counterbalanced to some extent in the 1890s and early twentieth century by the opening up of new alternatives by third parties—populists, progressives, and socialists—by the enactment of the initiative and referendum in several states, and by the direct election of the Senate, finally achieved nationwide in 1913.

The achievement of women's suffrage, achieved nationally before the 1920 election, was the largest single change in participation in our history. However, initially women's suffrage greatly depressed voter participation rates. While it greatly facilitated the enactment of prohibition, women's suffrage has generally had little effect beyond specifically women's issues. Still, this change is enough to advance the rating for political rights to (2).

The main obstacle to a rating of (1) in today's terms remained the fact that the blacks of the 1920s were overwhelmingly without the vote in the South (and low participants elsewhere). With the end of large scale immigration and the lowered white birth rate

the blacks as a percent of population were again increasing. To their number we should add members of other ethnic groups, especially American Indians and Mexican Americans, that in many places either could not vote or were pointedly discouraged from participation.

After World War II the position of these minorities steadily improved. First, it improved because the black population shifted largely to the cities and the North, with correspondingly better opportunities to vote. Indians that had been left outside now became participants, particularly in Arizona and New Mexico—and also came to have a larger voice in their own affairs. The Allwright decision of the Supreme Court in 1944 increased black participation in the confederate states sixfold by eliminating the "white primary." Hard core resistance to black registration in black majority counties was only overcome by a series of civil rights acts in the late 1950s and '60s, and finally by the Voting Rights Act of 1965.⁹ With this act and the redistricting of the 1960s suffrage was essentially equalized. (Soon it was also further extended to eighteen year-olds, but lowering an arbitrary age limit in this range is not an important gain for freedom.) By the 1970s blacks were an important political force almost everywhere in the country and, where they made up a significant percentage of the population, blacks occupied a wide variety of positions at every level of government. Although problems remained, by 1970 America had obtained a rating of (1) for political rights.

Fortunately, the political rights of Americans were never reduced by foreign control. Until recently, the importance of state and local government was declining from post-revolutionary times when these were the most important levels of government. On the surface this should imply a diminution of freedom, for everything else being equal such a change reduces an individual's ability to determine the affairs of greatest interest to him, both by increasing the distance between him and decision-making units and the information and problems they consider and by diluting his vote and voice among large numbers. However, the increasing power of the federal government meant for many parts of our population increasing protection against local and state deprivations of civil liberties; it also meant the provision or guarantee of a more meaningful right to vote. The weakness of national political parties greatly nullifies the significance of the apparent concentration of power in the federal government. It is not too far wrong to view the American Congress as a league of

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representatives for particular state and local interests; only marginally do Congressmen feel responsible for national party platforms. In any event, there has been a resurgence of state and local power in the last few years, accompanied so far by few if any of its previous drawbacks.

Political Inequality

In the 1970s electoral participation rates for many poor ethnic groups were still lower than average, and national participation lagged considerably behind comparable countries and even our earlier record (for those eligible).¹⁰ Detailed studies showed that in 1963 one-third of the eligible population was not registered. Voter drives often found their efforts were leveling off in any group once registration passed sixty percent. One can interpret the data in different ways, but the surprising fact is the degree to which nonregistration occurs at all levels of society. It is also significant that the most common reason advanced for not registering in a poll of unregistered citizens was the simple fact that they "hadn't gotten around to it."¹¹

Inequality in political weight and effectiveness is an inescapable characteristic of all political systems. Nevertheless, estimating freedom in the United States requires that a position be taken on the extent to which political rights and civil liberties have been negated by the concentration of power in the hands of a very few of the rich or powerful. Three different concepts should be distinguished: one by the upper class, the power elite, or by the establishment. The upper class includes that 0.5% of the population that is wealthy, sends their children to the best preparatory schools, belongs to the best clubs, or is listed in the social register. The power elite includes those in decision-making roles in the most powerful institutions of society—in government, business, and the military. The establishment includes those whose opinions count in the arts, foundations, and the media.¹² Surely it can be shown that there is an upper class, and that it is a "governing class" in the sense that it owns a disproportionate share of property and its members make up a disproportionate share of those in the power elite and establishment.¹³ The concept of a power elite is largely tautological, since it simply includes those who run the country, and an organized society has such a group almost by definition.

Although democratic forms were widespread before the Revolutionary War, they existed within the framework of a "deferential society" that seldom questioned oligarchic rule, especially in local affairs. The deferential society is judged by some historians to have ended in 1798, by others in 1828 or 1865.¹⁴ With the passing of deferential society, what upper-class control remained depended on their tangible social, economic, and political power.

The upper classes of the pre-revolutionary period were decimated by revolutionary events, especially in New York and Pennsylvania, but it was still true that local upper classes had a large share of power in the immediate post-revolutionary period. It was not, however, until the last half of the nineteenth century that communication made possible a truly national upper class. The nationalization of the upper class led to a withdrawal of this class from local and state politics in many localities in the early twentieth century.¹⁵ After the first years of the Republic, the peak of upper-class control over political processes probably occurred around the turn of the century; it declined steadily after 1920.

Never decisive, the upper class does not determine the nature of American politics today. The education, wealth, experience, and self-confidence of persons from this class mean that they will more often achieve leadership positions than others. But the policies represented by upper class persons that achieve these positions cover a very wide spectrum from left to right, and except in business itself, persons and policies are ultimately chosen by the general public in terms of its preferences. The upper class steadily recruits (or co-opts) members of lower classes into top positions, but with many of these recruits, such as Henry Kissinger or Dean Rusk, one wonders in the end who recruits whom to serve their purposes. Metaphorically, it can be said that the upper class is able at many junctures to defend and extend its interests through its special power in government. Much the same could be said of the large labor unions, the nation's farmers, the military services, or doctors.

Compared to other pressure groups, the interests of the upper class are far more varied. If this were not so, upper class business and foundation control of the media could be quite worrisome; it would certainly detract from the degree of effective civil liberties. However, just as foundations that have been supported by the upper classes range from the left to the right, so have journals of opinion—for example, the Nation, New Repub-

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lie, National Review, and New York Review of Books.¹⁶ At least since 1930 winning presidential candidates have often been overwhelmingly opposed by the papers.¹⁷ There is no doubt an establishment that determines elite opinion in the country, and elite opinion no doubt has a disproportionate effect on policy. Yet this intellectual establishment only involves a minority of the upper class—most of the wealthy oppose its favorite causes—and many members of the establishment are not upper class. It seems fair to say that the tyranny of this establishment is primarily oppressive to those who would like to join but cannot. The complaint of the outsider here is similar to that of the small businessman, small farmer, insurgent union leader, or small college professor. Democracy cannot and probably should not prevent accumulations of power and influence in established subcommunities of a society, but such accumulations are always unfair to those excluded.

Civil Liberties

The civil freedoms achieved under the Constitution and the Bill of Rights went beyond those available to the citizens of eighteenth century England, then considered the freest nation in the world.¹⁸ For the first time it would not be a crime to speak against the government, or to form associations. The Bill of Rights guaranteed a fair trial through rights to testify and to counsel such as England was not to enjoy for many years. It strengthened the right against government intrusion.

The Bill of Rights did not, of course, secure in practice the exercise of the rights it specified.¹⁹ For three years the Sedition Act of 1798 certainly transgressed the First Amendment as we later understood it. The Bill of Rights also failed to guarantee rights below the federal level. Although many states had enacted and were to enact bills of rights, even after the Fourteenth Amendment the national Bill of Rights has been extended only gradually to cover government actions at the state and local level. The full implications of the equality before the law enshrined in the constitution have been put into practice even more hesitantly.

The history of American civil liberties in practice parallels that of political rights. Government in the immediate pre-Revolutionary period respected a broad range of individual rights. This was based partially on the relative independence of the

judiciary and the use of juries. The right of a newspaper to freely publish critical material was established by the trial of the newspaper publisher Zenger in the 1730s.²⁰ Yet arrests of editors opposed to the government continued until the 1770s. By this time the chief danger to press freedom was the anger of the mob. In the 1770s it was dangerous for a printer to support British policy in many localities, as in the late 1780s it became dangerous to oppose ratification of the constitution.²¹ Freedom grew from the need to organize conflict. It is well to recognize that during this period only a minority had truly libertarian views, even in regard to the printing of political opinion. The First Amendment was thought only to prevent prior censorship. In this framework the Sedition Act was not a great departure from prevailing opinion even though convictions under these laws for opposing the government were reminiscent of British actions before the Revolution. The nullification of this act under Jefferson, however, led to the establishment of the modern understanding of the First Amendment. Never again was the printing of material opposed to the government to be seriously questioned in time of peace.

The nineteenth century was marked by the further democratization of newspapers and journals of opinion. There appeared to be a thorough acceptance on the national level of the right of every white man—and usually woman—to his say. The papers were often scurrilous and in the pay of one or another party. Presidents repeatedly were held up to public ridicule of a nature that many modern democracies still treat as criminal. Until Lincoln the practice developed and flourished of each president having his own more or less obedient paper.²² In the nineteenth century government actions were opened to the public scrutiny as they had never been before. In the 1780s it did not seem unusual for the Constitutional Convention to be completely closed to newspaper reporters.²³ But by 1803 newsmen had gained free access to Congress. Whether this opening of government was a gain for the Republic is debatable, but it surely increased the equality of expression.

In the nineteenth century the main inhibitor of free expression remained social sanction that at times escalated to mob rule. This was most significant in the South against the expression of abolitionist opinion. Several states backed this repression with the official if sometimes unconstitutional prohibition of abolitionist publication. Unpopular wars such as the War of 1812 and the Mexican War were accompanied, however, by active campaigning

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in some parts of the country against the wars even as they were being fought. Unexpectedly, some Southern papers continued to oppose the Civil War even behind Confederate lines, while papers opposing the war in the North were generally closed by mobs or military commanders in their jurisdictions.

Later in the century newspapers discovered they could rapidly increase their readership through the exposure of big business and government corruption. Editors of such papers incurred private danger, but seldom were suppressed by courts or police. The diversity and appeal of the written media reached a high point in 1912: never again would the country support 2,000 dailies, 12,000 weeklies, and 6,500 magazines. No doubt many of these publications were controlled by the political-economic elite, yet the number and variety of outlets were too great for effective control by any group.

The World Wars were periods of decline in civil liberties. Mob action against Germans was common in World War I. The Sedition Act of 1918 was directed against both socialists and Germans. It led to the jailing of editors, political leaders, and even a member of Congress. The Sedition Act was followed by criminal syndicalism laws in a number of states immediately after the war. The main civil rights issue in World War II was the suppression and relocation of the Japanese; this included the suppression of their papers.

The early Cold War years led to a return of the antisocialist attitudes and practices that characterized the period during and after World War I. From 1946 to 1960 many citizens were attacked for their beliefs in the courts, before political quasi-courts, and in courts of public opinion. Some lost their jobs through the simple exposure of their unpopular affiliations.²⁴ The fact that the greatest damage to free expression was not due to direct government repression but to politically inspired individual and community actions against those on the left ties in with the general history of the suppression of opinion in the country.

Since the decline of civil liberties in the "McCarthy era" has been both over- and under-evaluated, it might be well to consider more closely one presentation of what occurred in these years. David Caute's book, *The Great Fear*, documents the extensiveness of the curtailment of rights. He describes in detail the attempt to suppress the Communist Party itself, the denial of passports, the purge of the Civil Service, the armed forces, the State Department, UN employees, and state and local employees. Caute shows how teachers and librarians were affected and unions driven to

expel left-wing leaders. The attack bore especially heavily on movie, radio, and television actors and writers. This was not an aberration of a few years, as Cate points out, but a suppression started before McCarthy and lasting well beyond his death.

Cate does a creditable job of covering the evidence, but his emotions and allegiances to the intellectual community lead him into contradictions and frequent overstatements. In this he contributes to a continuation of the mythology of the fifties as much as to their understanding. His opening remarks caution the reader to remember that in fact, ". . . the repression never reached the frontiers of fascism. The concentration camps established by the McCarran Act remained empty."²⁵ Yet Cate is led by his sympathies for many of those affected by McCarthyism into those errors of identification and lack of discrimination that makes the work of the Survey necessary. For example, he writes:

Both Washington and Moscow were now committed not merely to a Manichaeian struggle for the allegiance (or subservience) of the world, but also to absolute conformity among their own citizens . . . [This] must be compared to the fanatical quest for discipline and domination that has possessed other imperial ideologies during periods of xenophobic expansion.²⁶

To speak of absolute conformity during these years or to compare internal or external repressions with those of the Soviet Union is simply nonsense. Equally nonsensical in terms of his own evidence are Cate's use of terms such as the "return of the terror" or of teachers going "to the block."²⁷

Having personally lived through this period as a Californian and a Harvard student, much of it as a pacifist, I can certainly testify that the sense of hysteria and fear generated by Cate's presentation was simply not present, no matter how oppressed we may have felt. Communist papers continued to appear legally throughout the period; the pacifist press was flourishing. The leading newspapers continually opposed McCarthy; Edward R. Murrow aired a special anti-McCarthy show.²⁸ As Cate points out in his soberer moments almost no one went to jail strictly for their beliefs, although too many were jailed for contempt of court, perjury, or related charges.

The greatest single error of the period was the inability of many who should have known better to distinguish between active Communist Party members and people with leftist views. There was

an arguable case that party members, belonging to a party supported from Moscow and fanatically adhering to its line, were engaged in a conspiracy. During much of this period the United States was engaged in war or quasi war, and few states, even democracies, extend guarantees of the right to freedom of assembly or expression to traitors or those who reject democratic means to gain power. It might have been better to not repress even Communist Party activities—certainly in the short run it would have strengthened our civil liberties—but there was an argument for the repression of these activities that was absent in the less responsible attacks in the period against leftists.

Caute's analysis is consistently misleading because while he understands this distinction, he often leads the reader into an identification of leftist and Communist such as the responsible people of the period avoided. For example, Caute writes that throughout these years the New York Times was "sensitive to the rights and liberties of certifiable anti-communist liberals, insensitive to the rights and liberties of the Left, of those who questioned the rectitude of the Truman Doctrine." ²⁹ Again he writes, "But Communism remained the mortal sin and as soon as the Senator claimed to have trodden on a nest of genuine leftists, the NYT abandoned all caution . . ." ³⁰ The New York Times certainly was sensitive to the rights of genuine leftists, figures such as Norman Thomas, A. J. Mustie, or Bayard Rustin, whether or not they opposed the Truman Doctrine; about genuine party members and spies they were less sure, for their activities often did, or had, gone far beyond what the First Amendment was designed to protect.

The inability of the economic powers of the country to successfully use the media to control public opinion is suggested by the fact that since the 1930s the democrats won repeatedly although the newspapers overwhelmingly opposed them (except in 1964).³¹ Freedom of expression appeared to be endangered when radio and television came to require government regulation and authorization such as the printed media had not experienced since the Revolutionary War. Yet these new channels of expression have generally bent over backward to achieve impartiality; regardless of their private owners or government regulation, they were the channels that the Democrats successfully used to by-pass Republican domination of the newspapers.

The 1960s saw America fight its first war under the full gaze of publicity. In the 1960s the black and Mexican community was freed from local thought control almost everywhere. In the Pentagon Papers controversy of the early 1970s the government

failed to either stop or obtain damages for the publication of secrets, an outcome unlikely in the United Kingdom, Canada, or most democracies. Revelations of past government surveillance and interference that came out during and after Watergate showed a system still far from perfection. Yet since 1960 few voices have been shown to have been stilled by such government activity. In spite of the fears, the 1970s became an era of exposure and criticism uncommon in the twentieth century. As John Kenneth Galbraith has pointed out, ". . . there never was a time when more Americans were expressing themselves more stridently and diversely with so little fear as in the Nixon years."³²

At the beginning of our Republic the average person was as concerned with religious as political freedom. Yet religious freedom had already reached such a high level before the Revolutionary War that further advance has been necessarily modest.³³ The primary issues have remained the degree to which the state is identified with a particular organized religious group, freedom of conscience, and freedom of religious or antireligious expression.

In the 1770s Pennsylvania and Rhode Island had no established churches; elsewhere established churches were weak or based on local choice, particularly in New England. The persistence of colony and local tax support of the churches was the main limitation on freedom for the average person. Gradually these were modified: the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 allowed each person to designate the church for which his taxes would be spent.³⁴ After independence the idea of established churches, of the mixture of church and state was progressively rejected. The last disestablishment, that of Massachusetts, occurred in 1833.

In the revolutionary age political leaders, such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, and many other Americans were deists. Legally the right even to be an atheist was generally accepted. The last blasphemy conviction in Massachusetts was in 1833, and then for an inflammatory attack on religion rather than rational argument against it.³⁵ Rapidly the full range of Protestant sects was placed on the same legal footing everywhere.

Acceptance of non-Protestant and non-Christian churches came more slowly. Opposition to Catholics after the early period was more social than legal, with the law sometimes standing aside, or on a local basis reserving certain jobs for Protestants. Jews during the first century of our history were very few in number, but they practiced their faith freely. In some places they suffered political disabilities until quite late (for example, Jews did not obtain the vote in New Hampshire until 1876).³⁶

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Certain majority laws connected to religion, such as Sabbath laws, or the Lord's Prayer in school, nonprofit church status, the requirement of monogamy, or even what is taught in schools are not properly considered questions of religious liberty. To say a majority must support a public school system and then not be able to determine what is taught in it takes away more freedom than it secures. For these reasons it would seem that religious freedom ranged from (1) to (3) according to state and locality in the 1770s, but reached the level of (1) in all sections by the post-Civil War period.

Many basic personal rights of Americans that were achieved very early in our history were codified, if at all, after the fact. These included the right to settle wherever one wished, to travel freely within the country (and generally outside it), the right to privacy, the right to freedom of scientific inquiry, to choose one's occupation, one's spouse, and the education of one's children.³⁷ These rights have been, of course, imperfect. In particular, laws against miscegenation restricted marriage for much of the population until recently; laws against bigamy still stand. Compulsory education, and compulsory standards for that education also limit free choice; in practice these restraints may well be stronger today than ever.

The expanding frontier and the heterogeneity of Americans made choice of occupation and residence free from the beginning of the Republic. These freedoms also supported rapid social mobility or movement between classes.³⁸ This meant, in turn, that the freedom of choice among occupations, education, locale, and level of effort were more meaningful than they could be in a more fixed society. Even professions such as medicine or law found it hard to restrict entry. Today, in the late twentieth century, with more formalized laws, requirements, and unions, the free choice of the early American male WASP is constricted. It has, however, increased choice for other Americans, and such regulation may benefit society as a whole.

The question of majority determination of social practices with religious overtones brings us to the broader questions of the extent to which government can interfere in economic and social life without diminishing essential civil liberties. Certainly the seventeenth century colonizers saw government as properly a directive force in society, a view generally accepted by the founding fathers.³⁹ Under the extreme atomism and later social Darwinism of the nineteenth century the government's role should have been greatly reduced, although the extent of this reduction

is belied by the great railroad projects, the Homestead Act, and the land grant colleges. As big business expanded the government was asked to restrain private monopoly, and the story of increasing regulation and government involvement in the twentieth century need not be recited. Nevertheless, this control has grown more slowly than in most of Euro-America. In theory one should see an expanding, positive government as enhancing the political rights of the majority and probably diminishing the rights of minorities against the majority. Yet, it may not be so. On the one hand, tax revolts suggest that majorities may feel that their right to control their own lives has been improperly diminished by expanding government. On the other hand, government control of monopoly, "truth in advertising" laws, and many other regulatory or provisioning services increase the freedom of choice for large numbers. In any event, the position of the Survey is that outside of the political arena majorities must have broad powers if their voting power is to be meaningful. In these terms we would not consider laws against pornography, drugs, or the sale of alcoholic beverages as serious infringements on civil liberties.

Voluntary associations became strong in American society very early, and their strength reflected the weakness of government.⁴⁰ The relative freedom to organize for business, agriculture, religion, ethnic, or general social purposes has been one of the glories of the country. But occasionally in some fields and contexts groups such as Standard Oil, the Teamsters, the Ku Klux Klan, or others might become so powerful as to threaten the rights of others. Individual rights might be lost unless the government could step in to restrain the operation of such free-wheeling organizations.

If we look specifically at labor, at first glance the struggle for the right to organize and strike was a significant part of the struggle for the realization of the fundamental rights to assembly and association. However, in practice this struggle has been a much more complicated one from the civil liberties viewpoint. When the striker strikes or the union organizes this generally means that other workers and employers are deprived of their rights to sell or buy labor.⁴¹ In most cases the labor violence that accompanied the development of the labor movement resulted from workers forcibly preventing other workers from working, and employers or government attempting to counter such coercion. Today organized labor has largely won its long struggle to organize and strike. It is undoubtedly true that to be effective unions need these rights, but, in so far as they rely on implicit

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and explicit, even legal, coercion, labor's gains are hardly gains for freedom. The political equalization of power that they imply and depend on is, of course, a gain for political rights. In the same way the growth of the independence of the judiciary from political control was not a gain in freedom: it was an advance for civil liberties, a decline for political rights.⁴²

Nevertheless, the story of the evolution of American labor is also the story of the parallel evolution of the equality of the American worker before the law. Before the Revolutionary War class distinctions were more important in every sphere of life than they were to be later in the more egalitarian Republic. The greatest colonial denials of rights were those inflicted upon indentured servants and especially Negro slaves. We should never forget that while slavery was quite unimportant in New England and Pennsylvania, elsewhere in the North and throughout the South it was a major fact of life. Even in New York state, where slavery was not outlawed until well after the Revolutionary War, slaves made up sixteen percent of the population and certainly were treated no better than in the South until shortly before the War.⁴³ For slaves there were no freedoms of speech, residence, occupation, or education.

For free laboring whites equality before the law was fostered in America primarily by the availability of the land: land was the bedrock of egalitarianism until the Civil War. In cities union activity began in small, restrictive groups of shop owners and workers; only gradually did workers separate their interests from their employers, or define their demands in terms of higher wages rather than the exclusion of competitors.⁴⁴ Originally often antforeign, and later anti-Negro, unions came eventually to represent blacks and immigrants against the denial of rights by the capitalists or better situated. The slowness with which equality before the law was gained by the urban or industrialized working man is suggested by the fact that politically rights to organize and strike were clearly recognized by 1860 and even earlier,⁴⁵ but business leaders continued to deny these rights and received sporadic backing for their denials at least until the 1930s. The violent labor struggles of the first half of the twentieth century were on the one hand just the violent clash of opposing interests. On the other hand, they represented a deliberate collusion of local political leaders with management to deny worker organizations expression.⁴⁶ The national government often opposed these excesses, however, and it is difficult to determine in how many localities these conditions existed.

It would be wrong to say that civil equality has been gained in all areas of life even today. The poor still find it harder to achieve justice before the law, but these are denials stemming primarily from poverty, ignorance, prejudice, and petty graft; except for isolated areas they are no longer denials based on the concept that the propertyless working people do not have the rights of others.

Looking at America's civil liberties record comparatively it would appear that the thirteen colonies before the Revolutionary War scored about (4). Religious liberty was quite imperfect; pressures on the expression of opinion were considerable both from the citizenry and the British government. With the enactment of the Bill of Rights and the elimination of British interference, liberties progressed to the level of (3) in the 1790s and by the time of Andrew Jackson to (2). By now religious freedom was essentially complete. For blacks and in the South these freedoms were often denied. It should be mentioned that the freedom of women to express their views came long before women were granted the suffrage. It is certainly wrong to assert, as in a recent essay, that the years from Jackson to Franklin Roosevelt were the "nadir of freedom in American history."⁴⁷ Many of the problems for freedom in this period existed before Jackson, and generally in more extreme forms. Civil liberties oscillated between a comparative rating of (1) and (3) for the rest of the national history until the early 1960s. Liberties declined during major wars and in the early Cold War period, and rose in times of greater peace. Expression of opinion in the South, especially among Negroes, was restricted by largely social controls until the 1960s. But after the early sixties a national rating of (1) would be appropriate in terms of the other countries that we rate at that level today.

Comparatively the civil liberties of the colonies before the Revolutionary War were comparable to those in Mexico or Taiwan today, although the areas of primary restriction were different. After the Revolutionary War the United States might be compared with Brazil today. For most of our history, conditions in the United States were equivalent to current conditions in Venezuela, Portugal, India, or even West Germany. The lack of a complete freedom of rural voters in some areas of India is reminiscent of the old American South, while the West German Berufsverbot of recent years bears some resemblance to the exclusion of the radical left from many jobs in the 1950s.

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Civil rights in America compare favorably with those of the freest major countries in Europe. However, this is not widely recognized by many Americans that are engaged in the day-to-day struggle to preserve liberties against encroachment. The combative civil libertarian approach to the story of civil liberties in the United States is well illustrated by Richard Harris' *Freedom Spent*,⁴⁸ described as a "great book!" by the Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union. The viciousness of Harris' attack may make possible gains in civil liberties that a more measured approach could not excite; but such attacks seriously mislead readers, especially young people, who are trying to obtain a balanced view of the nation's accomplishments, and of the position they should take toward the country's institutions.

Let us see how it is misleading.

First, the very title indicates that American history is the story of the destruction of freedom. The title is taken from an anonymous couplet--Freedom won/ Freedom lent/ Freedom gone/ Freedom spent. Yet the text of the book tells exactly the opposite story, the-story of the gradual increase in freedom since the Constitution was written, and indeed a particular upsurge in the realization of rights in the 1950s and 1960s.

Aside from this story of progress, the author over and over returns to two themes: the myth that there was or is freedom in America, and the proposition that the only freedom Americans have ever really been interested in is control over personal property.

On the first page of text we are told:

. . . the simple and overwhelming truth is that the most fundamental parts of the American Constitution--above all the guarantees of personal liberty contained in the Bill of Rights--have rarely been enforced. The myth of freedom has been driven into us almost from birth, but the reality of freedom eludes us to this day.⁴⁹

Harris then goes on to say:

For the first century and a half of this nation's existence, the only kind of liberty that mattered to most people, and to government on any level, was economic liberty--the unhampered freedom to acquire and protect property.⁵⁰

Harris is quick to point out later on that he believes little has changed in this attitude.

The bulk of Harris' account deals with three issues as exemplified by three cases of denial of rights, combined, paradoxically, with detailed historical accounts of how the rights trampled upon according to his accounts came to have a place in English and American law.

The first case illustrates a threatened denial of a right to symbolic free speech. A nontenured rural high school teacher at the height of the Vietnam trouble wore a black armband to class on the day of a moratorium. He was told he could wear it outside of class but must not wear it in class in the future. When he persisted, he was fired. After repeated appeals by both sides, and with considerable outside support, he won the case and was awarded back pay. Harris tries to generalize the case to suggest that Americans everywhere were forced to deny their principles because of such pressures, but in fact he mentions in passing that many teachers in nearby schools had worn such armbands at the time without so much as a reprimand.⁵¹

The second case illustrates a denial of the right to privacy from searches. A leftist organizer and his wife in Kentucky fought the seizure of their papers and arrest for sedition. They won their freedom of speech (sedition) case fairly quickly, although they experienced a bombing attack from the locals. They were then subpoenaed to testify before a Senate committee. Their refusal to testify nearly led to their jailing, but they also won this case in the end. The experience of this couple is used to exemplify that illegal searches have been a problem for the control of law enforcement personnel.

The third case illustrates the misuse of the grand jury system to compel testimony from reluctant witnesses. Two women in Connecticut were asked by a grand jury for information on two women involved in a bank holdup and killing. Even after being granted immunity they refused to testify on quite tenuous bases (such as the claim their testimony might hurt their friends). This case is incomplete because Harris does not actually know what the women knew about the criminals, if anything. For their refusal the women had to spend several months in jail, albeit a rather comfortable jail.

The cases all illustrate the difficulty that people have standing against the society. However, the fact that the oppressed eventually won in the first two cases, or that the claims of the oppressed in the third case were suspect is not

given the weight it should be in the light of the oppressions of men by government and society through history. The record seems comparatively good in relation to other free societies even today. Nor is there any attempt by Harris to balance the claims of society and those of individuals, so that what is basic and what is marginal in individual rights might be distinguished. He is dismayed that Holmes' doctrine of a "marketplace of ideas" does not place pornography under the protection of the First Amendment as it does political ideas. Harris' libertarian extremism is suggested by his belief that this downgrades individual rights in favor of those of the society. Holmes' approach seems to me thoroughly consistent with a balanced view of political and civil rights.

Unfortunately, the record suggests that under pressure the average American appears to feel that civil rights have been overemphasized in comparison with majority political rights. This conclusion from history is supported by a poll taken in 1970 indicating that the average American understanding of and respect for the guarantees of the Bill of Rights remains remarkably low.⁵² Rights still appear to be understandings accepted by a minority, ruling elite as ground rules for dealing with nonconforming minorities; perhaps this is what they were in the late eighteenth century. Such an elitist conclusion sits uncomfortably among the evidences of freedom. Paradoxically, the primary advances in America have come through a more thorough extension by elites of the concept of equality to all Americans, particularly workers, women, blacks, and other religious or ethnic minorities.

The political and civil rights of Americans are not and never will be perfect. But the record we have considered is of a country that led the way in the struggle to achieve these rights and, in a relative sense, belongs today in the highest ranks of free societies.

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N O T E S

1. Especially Oscar and Mary Handlin, *The Dimensions of Liberty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), from which the following discussion has greatly profited.
2. Discussion based on R. R. Palmer, *The Age of Democratic Revolution: Political History of Europe and America 1760-1800*, Volume I, *The Struggle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).
3. *Ibid.*, On percentages, see pages 50-51, 186-187, 190-191, 233.
4. Handlin, *Dimensions of Liberty*, 36.
5. Palmer, *Democratic Revolution*, 188-189.
6. See *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, 1975): 1067-72.
7. Joel Silbey, *Political Ideology and Voting Behavior in the Age of Jackson* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 106-107.
8. This paragraph is based primarily on J. Morgan Kousser, *The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), especially 12-13, 235.
9. Donald S. Strong, *Negroes, Ballots and Judges* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1968).
10. This paragraph is based on Penn Kimball, *The Disconnected* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
11. *Ibid.*, 87.
12. These definitions and much of the subsequent discussion are based on (although its conclusion differ from) G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967). Domhoff, in turn, bases much of his analysis on C. Wright Mills, a Digby Baltzell, and Robert Dahl. However, my definition of "establishment" has more in common with the somewhat humorous definition of Richard Rovens (*Wilson Quarterly* II, 3 (1978): 170-184).
13. Domhoff, *Who Rules America?*, 1-11, 142.
14. Michael G. Kammen, ed., *Politics and Society in Colonial America: Democracy or Deference* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967).
15. Domhoff, *Who Rules America?*, 132-137. Compare Delbert Miller, *International Community Power Structure: Comparative Studies of Four World Cities* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970).
16. See Domhoff, *Who Rules America?*, 66-71, 82-83.
17. Robert Rutland, *The Newsmonger: Journalism in the Life of the Nation, 1690-1972* (New York: Dial, 1973), 323-391.
18. This discussion is based on Bernard Schwartz, *The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights* (New York: Oxford

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University Press, 1977), 192-197.

19. Ibid., 202-225.
20. Rutland, *The Newsmonger*, 27-54.
21. Ibid., 45-63-
22. James E. Pollard, *The Presidents and the Press* (New York: Macmillan, 1947).
23. Rutland, *The Newsmonger*, 57, 90.
24. David Caute, *The Great Fear* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978).
25. Ibid., 17.
26. Ibid., 177.
27. Ibid., 434.
28. Rutland, *The Newsmonger*, 366.
29. Caute, *The Great Fear*, 447.
30. Ibid., 448.
31. Rutland, *The Newsmonger*, 342 ff.
32. Quoted in *Chronicles of Culture II*, 4: 19 (April 1978).
33. Based primarily on Gleen T. Miller, *Religious liberty in America: History and Prospects* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976).
34. Palmer, *The Age of Democratic Revolution*, 227.
35. Miller, *Religious liberty*, 103.
36. Ibid., 89.
37. Handlin, *The Dimensions of Liberty*, 60.
38. Ibid., 139-142.
39. Ibid., especially 66-88.
40. Ibid., 89-132.
41. Samuel Yellen, *American Labor Struggles* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), especially xiii.
42. Handlin, *Dimensions of Liberty*, 42-43.
43. Samuel McKee, *Labor in Colonial New York 1669-1776* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935).
44. Henry Pelling, *American Labor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).
45. Ibid., 43, 159-160.

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46. Graham Adams, Jr., *Age of Industrial Violence 1910-15: The Activities and Findings of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

47. William Preston, "American Liberty: A Post-Bicentennial Look at Our Unfinished Agenda," *The Civil Liberties Review* IV, 1 (May/June 1977): 38-51 (43).

48. Richard Harris, *Freedom Spent* (Boston: Little Brown, 1974).

49. *Ibid.*, 3.

50. *Ibid.*

51. *Ibid.*, 36.

52. Schwartz, *The Great Rights of Mankind*, 192.

A Note on Economic Freedom

The 1982 and 1983-84 editions of *Freedom in the World* contained extensive materials on the relation of political and economic freedom. These served to augment the approach to freedom that had become traditional in the Survey. They were also intended to point out that the easy identification of political and economic rights with the "West" and of economic and social rights with the "East" (or the South or the third world) was hard to sustain. However, the problem remains central enough, and the solutions offered by the Survey have been sufficiently complex that it seemed appropriate to refer to the matter again briefly, and perhaps to carry the discussion a step further.

It is important, first of all, to reiterate the distinction between economic rights and economic performance. We are not concerned in the Survey with what "works best" either politically or economically. Obviously, if a system did not work at all, if it had no historical reality, we would spend little time on it. But within very broad limits of performance our attention is on what peoples and nations have a right to have, what contributes most to the dignity of individuals and groups as human beings. This point needs to be emphasized because it is often assumed, particularly in the third world, that there is a worldwide competition among systems to show which is technically most productive.

A recent editorial in the *New Nigerian* on the likelihood of Zimbabwe moving toward the one-party socialist state conflates both the political and economic issues and the arguments from efficiency and those of principle. It says that for all the West's propaganda, "no evidence exists which suggests that multiparty government systems are inherently superior to single-party rule. In the Soviet Union, the centrally planned economies, and a host of others around the world, single-party rule is well entrenched. It seems to be serving them well."¹ The editorialist may or may not be broadly correct. Many observers would suggest that such

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systems serve primarily the elites that control them. But whether right or wrong, it must be a central purpose of the Survey to suggest the degree to which economic and political systems are not closely dependent and the importance that should be placed on human rights such as freedom regardless of technical advantage.

Economic freedom is on one level hardly separable from political freedom. It is useful in this regard to note that "socialism" in the informed discussion of the last generation has two quite different faces. On the one hand, socialism is a doctrine suggesting that all property should be held in common, or that the community is the custodian of all property, or perhaps only productive property. Its implicit assumption is that all differences in economic level, and particularly in the availability of services such as education or health, are unjust or, at the least, must be carefully justified by exception. This is an attitude or faith that sets implicit goals toward which the political community can move. Socialism in Western Europe, for example, in a country such as Sweden, has been introduced progressively through the political system by legislating ever higher taxes and ever-expanding government services.

"Socialism," or more commonly "socialist," is used in the international community today to also refer primarily to those countries that have adopted a "Marxist-Leninist" political system. This system is based on the premise that for the transformation to a more just society a single dominant political party is required to lead that society toward fundamental change. Thus, "socialist" in this sense means the one-party state with a well-organized and disciplined vanguard party—in practice a party dominated from the top down by a small ideological elite. While socialist in the first case may or may not mean direct government ownership of the means of production, in the second political sense it means that the government dominates and determines all aspects of life from the top down. Although concerned with the economy, this form of socialism is also concerned with security, religion, and family life. Its goal is the making of a "new man." This political socialism is what dominated Nazi Germany as well as what determines the nature of the Soviet Union.

With this in mind, the Survey of Freedom has published for many years a Table of Political-Economic Systems, in which "socialist" was used as a label along both the political and economic dimensions. Admittedly, states labeled "socialist" politically tended to be socialist economically, but the most obvious result was that no country with a socialist or communist political system could

rank very high on political freedom. On the other hand, a number of states with a considerable degree of socialism economically stood at the top of the ratings for political and civil freedoms. It is the way in which the decisions about the economy are arrived at that determines the presence or absence of freedom from this viewpoint.

The Survey has noted the partial correlation of capitalism and political freedom. On first appraisal, it would appear that some degree of capitalism is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. There are no states that have adopted a thorough-going economic socialism that are free, and there are many states that are largely capitalist that are free. However, there are capitalist states that are distinctly unfree. Unhappy lands such as Haiti or Malawi have little freedom, although they are certainly capitalist. Many states of the Middle East, regardless of the labels they place on themselves, are capitalist or capitalist-statist. Saudi Arabia is an example. Yet, they are not free politically or civilly. South Africa is a capitalist bastion, but there are severe problems for freedom there, as in Taiwan, South Korea, and Indonesia.

We should not expect capitalism and freedom to be closely correlated. Capitalism is a way of organizing economic production, while political liberties are a way of expressing the dominance of people over the state. Political freedom means that the dominance of the people over the state should be primary. This dominance implies, in turn, that the economic regulations the state enjoins shall be determined by popular government.

Economic organization has always been regulated by the political system. The tax farms of the ancients, the feudal estates of the Middle Ages, the guilds, the unions, and the corporations have all operated under political supervision. In democracies economics is placed under the control of majorities. Government intervention under majority rule has been characteristic rather than exceptional in modern democracies, just as it was characteristic before their emergence. Economically, socialism and communism can be thought of as systems that transfer property from private holders of capital or property not directly in use by its owners, to workers, peasants, or the state itself. A democracy could in theory establish such a system without changing its nature.

For example, on May 30, 1984, the Supreme Court decided in favor of the right of the State of Hawaii to force the division of the great estates of the islands. In its opinion the Court saw

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the purpose of the Hawaiian Land Reform Act as "[reducing] the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly." The Court added: "On this basis we have no trouble concluding that the Hawaii Act is constitutional. The People of Hawaii have attempted, much as the settlers of the original Thirteen Colonies did, to reduce the perceived social and economic evils of land oligopoly traceable to their monarchs. The oligopoly has, according to the Hawaii legislature, created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the state's residential land market and forced thousands of individual homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land underneath their homes. Regulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of the state's police powers." ²

These considerations suggest that the struggle of systems in the world, between the free and the unfree, is not between capitalism and communism. The struggle is between those free systems that let peoples decide on the degree and quality of public and private, group or individual, ownership, and those that by fiat demand the particular economic system or mix of systems that a small leadership clique prefers. Chile and China, Vietnam and Mauritania are all tyrannies from this perspective, regardless of the labels they may place on their economic arrangements.

To see the ideological struggle as one between communism and capitalism is to play by communist rules. Economic equality is identified with communism according to these rules and equality is always attractive. Unfortunately, this is a game that Western businessmen too often support, for they unwittingly carry their slogans from internal political disputes over regulations and taxes into the international arena. It is past time we consistently defined the struggle as one between political freedom and tyranny. This is a game we can win, for political equality, too, is always attractive.

In the 1983-84 Survey we included an additional table for Economic Freedom.³ The economic freedoms that went into the compilation of this measure of freedom were: freedom to have property, freedom of association, freedom of movement, and freedom of information. Initially economic freedom was then judged on the basis of ratings from high to low on these characteristics.

It may be useful to briefly describe what might be included under each heading. A country received a high rating for freedom of property if taxes were not confiscatory, or if there was not undue concentration of ownership of either land or industrial

property. Acceptable levels of taxation or concentration depends, in part, on the type of economy and level of development. On freedom of property, Spain and Australia score well, Brazil and Sri Lanka toward the middle, communist countries toward the bottom. Not all limitations on property were due to government actions. In countries such as Bangladesh or Guatemala there have been private attempts to restrict freedom and unfairly confiscate land. Thus, while government interference with land rights generally diminishes economic freedoms, often the preservation of a legal structure against private greed, or reform of the property structure may serve to increase freedom of property for most people.

Freedom of association is measured in terms of the evident ability of workers, owners, professionals, and other groups to form organizations to pursue common interests, whether these be in the form of cooperatives, business firms, labor unions, professional organizations, consumers groups, or many other economically relevant organizations. In most of the world, even the "free world" of propagandists, restrictions on union and business organization are significant, for their independent development poses a threat to local power structures. For example, the unions of Singapore have their leaders appointed by the government. Business is slightly freer, but in some areas of business, particularly newspapers, it is the Singapore government that decides on the number of companies and their composition.

Freedom of movement and information are basic civil rights that have a special meaning in the economic arena. If individuals are not free to change employment, or to seek work elsewhere, even in other countries, then they are much easier to repress or exploit. If one is unable to learn about conditions elsewhere in the country or world, or unable to know what the government is doing and contemplating, or unable to learn what others think and plan, then it will be very difficult for the individual or his group to gain control over their economic lives. Control over movement and information particularly characterizes communist states.⁴ These controls are not necessary for economic socialism, but they are necessary if one small elite is to effectively shape a society.

Few readers should be surprised to learn that the Survey has found a good correlation between economic freedom, understood in this sense, and political and civil freedom. While a country such as Sweden might not score "high" on freedom of property, the high regard of freedom of association, information, and movement in that country raises its overall freedom to a high rating. The

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correlation of economic freedom with political freedom is particularly high when we bring into consideration a supporting category of the "legitimacy" of the economic system. For an economic system to be legitimate the people must have continual opportunities to discuss it", learn about it, and vote on it through the election of representatives or more direct means. This will occur only in a system that is free politically.

Unfortunately, a serious contradiction lurks within this analysis. On the one hand, we are considering economic freedom to be analyzable in terms of a series of economic ratings such as that for freedom of property, while on the other hand we are considering economic freedom to be determinable from the extent to which the majority in a democracy decides on the rules that produce the economic ratings. If, then, a society were to vote in a free and well-debated election or referendum for the confiscation of all productive property, and there were no courts to reverse such a vote, would this represent a diminution of economic freedom? Would such a society be less free economically than one that had a Supreme Court, for example, that ruled such confiscation was illegal and unenforceable?

As phrased, there is no way to decide whether an economic system freely decided on by a majority can be called an unfree economy because of its denial of separate economic freedoms through massive taxation or the confiscation of other property. But if we divide the question we may come to a more satisfactory conclusion. To do this we need to think of rights as individual and collective, and to imagine that societies must maintain two sets of rights—two sets of books, if you will—without searching for a full resolution in favor of either. For an economy to be collectively free its economic system must be thoroughly legitimated by the political process. This includes the open right to change the system in any direction and back again. For an economy to be individualistically free the individuals must be allowed opportunities to control, for example, a fair degree of property, as well as the results of their labors. They must have not unreasonable restrictions placed on their movement or search for useful information.

When we use "collective" rights it is important to note that we refer to the rights of the majority in a free political system to determine the nature of any public system, including the economic. We are not using "collective" in the vague Marxist sense of a group desire or right that may be defined outside the political process by reference to general principles. "Individualistic"

refers to the "natural rights" that individuals may feel they have, or be taught they have, or have enshrined in particular laws, such as our Constitution and Bill of Rights, that make them, as minorities, able to curb the expression of unlimited majoritarian rights. Individualistic here does not mean "more selfish" or more limited in ethical content. Indeed, what the individual wishes to protect against the group may be more in the group's interest than what the group wants. This would certainly be the position of the conservative economist when he argues against the advocates of interventionist government.

Many would argue that economic freedoms, such as the right to property, to organize workers, or to freely make bargains for labor or products are basic rights equivalent to those to privacy and freedom of expression discussed above in the definition of democracy essay. However, the argument seems to be much the same as that made there against unduly restricting the rights of majorities to enforce regulations and laws that determine the quality of public life. It is our position here that while accepting individualistic economic rights might be good for the economy and would be desirable in many societies, as basic rights, individual economic rights should be very narrowly defined. Such a definition will not be attempted here.

Collectively, then, there is a scale for economic freedoms that is determined primarily by the extent to which the nature of the economic system has been legitimized by free democratic institutions. Individualistically, however, there is a scale for economic freedoms that is determined by the extent to which certain economic natural rights—which will be defined differently by different commentators—are protected from political attack. For private property the difference between the two scales could be considerable, but for many economic rights, such as association, information, or movement, the ratings will be very similar. Most freedoms tend to be individual and collective, economic and political, if they are to be effective.

The general picture that political and civil freedoms and economic freedoms go together in the world leads many to believe the United States should be primarily interested in supporting pluralistic, open, capitalistic economies in the third world, for these are, after all, the ones that hold values closest to our own, and the ones most likely to support rapid economic development and the achievement of freedom in all senses.

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However, the record suggests that there are many third world countries that are able to imitate the methods of capitalism and the forms of democracy, but which left to their own resources are unable to move toward effective political or civil freedoms. Indonesia and Saudi Arabia are good examples—Somoza's Nicaragua and Paraguay are "poor" ones. The tendency of business, labor, military, and political leaders to club together into a small, graft-ridden ruling clique is likely to hold back both political and economic development in the long run. The denials of rights today are the denials of rights tomorrow, and not the preparation of the ground for their development. Unfortunately, in many cases the willingness of Western representatives, whether of government or business, to find dealing with the small, stable, entrenched elites of such societies reassuring and profitable reinforces their longevity and makes further advancement difficult without painful explosions. When the comfortable relation of Americans and the Shah's court blew apart, everyone was hurt, including the Iranians. An economy without freedom of association—there were practically no free unions—without freedom of information, and without political freedoms failed through lack of organized feedback to respond to changing trends. Many Americans had been deluded into thinking of Iran as a country with economic freedoms, just as others had come to see Somoza's Nicaragua as a capitalist bastion.

Today another group of authoritarians has taken over Nicaragua, this time in the name of socialism. But just as capitalist competition did not thrive under Somoza, equitable socialist distribution has quickly failed under the Sandinistas. The specially privileged elite has rapidly been corrupted by its assumption of both military and economic power, and its unwillingness to accept or allow popular feedback.⁵

It is very difficult to have great concentrations of political power for many years without this power being transformed into economic power, and when the two are closely intertwined, all freedoms suffer. It is hard for American businessmen to deal effectively with countries with such power concentrations without themselves adding to the concentration, and thus implicating themselves and our country in a political-economic tyranny foreign to our traditions and foreign to the desires of the businessmen themselves.⁶ Unfortunately, this tends to occur as easily in China and Angola as in South Africa and Chile.

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N O T E S

1. Africa Research Bulletin, August 1984, page 7347.
2. Quoted from Robert C. Kiste, "Hawaii land: A revolution ahead?", Pacific Islands Monthly, August 1984, pages 29-30.
3. R. D. Gastil, Freedom in the World, 1983-1984, based on Lindsay M. Wright, "A Comparative Survey of Economic Freedoms," in Freedom in the World, 1982, pages 51-90.
4. The detailed rules for the censors as to what information to control in Poland, a relatively free communist state, were detailed in "Polish Censors Secret Restrictions Revealed," Freedom at Issue, March-April 1978, pages 7ff. The government was extremely sensitive to anything published on what we would call consumer issues, such as the expected prices of food or accusations of pollution dangers.
5. Robert S. Leiken, "Nicaragua's Untold Stories," The New Republic, 10/8/84, 16-23.
6. Compare, Grace Goodell, "Conservative Principles and Multinational Companies in Economic Development," in the Heritage Lectures, No. 25, The Heritage Foundation, 1983.

The Forms and Formalities of Liberty

Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.

Men living in democratic centuries do not readily understand the utility of forms; they feel an instinctive contempt for them. . . . Forms arouse their disdain and often their hatred. As they usually aspire to none but facile and immediate enjoyments, they rush impetuously toward the object of each of their desires, and the least delays exasperate them. This temperament, which they transport into political life, disposes them against the forms which daily hold them up or prevent them in one or another of their designs.

Yet it is this inconvenience, which men of democracies find in forms, that makes them so useful to liberty, their principal merit being to serve as a barrier between the strong and the weak, the government and the governed. Thus democratic peoples naturally have more need of forms than other peoples, and naturally respect them less.

—Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*

This statement is long for an epigraph but dense enough to require explanation, and deep enough to reward reflection. Speaking of "forms," Tocqueville directs our attention to institutions or practices in which the manner of action is more important than the end achieved. Why, we may ask, are democratic peoples in need of forms? And how do they undermine the forms that they need?

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To understand what these forms are, we may think, first, of manners in "society"—society not in any comprehensive sociological sense, but as the place where we are on our best behavior, the parlor or drawing-room of human life. "Society," in this sense, imposes certain forms of correct behavior on us which are neither moral duties (though manners are obviously somehow related to morals) nor simply cost-efficient methods of attaining our ends. Indeed, these forms seem designed to avoid raising moral questions directly and to prevent us from using the most efficient instrument to gain our desires; they are barriers, as Tocqueville says, between ourselves and the objects of our desires, and also between one person and another.

That we now say "living-room," rather than "parlor" or "drawing-room," illustrates the drive toward informality which Tocqueville says is in the nature of democracy; yet, as Tocqueville also indicates, democracy is not always well served by informality. Tocqueville's point was made recently by Miss Manners, a writer on etiquette for the Washington Post. Miss Manners inveighs against waiters and waitresses who have taken up the practice of introducing themselves to customers by their first names, as if to put business relationships on the level of friendships. Such a practice, she says, not only perverts friendship by using it for business, suffusing the latter with false warmth, it also hurts business by robbing the working person of his dignity. "If you and I are friends," Miss Manners asks, "how come I have to wait on you? But if I can be on equal terms with friends of my own choosing, it doesn't matter if I perform a service for wages."

The Formal Establishment of Equality

With this excellent observation we have received a lesson in democratic capitalism more valuable than much academic discussion that is more directly political or economic. We learn, first, the obvious truth that even a democratic society is not a society of friends, nor even a fraternity, because it must necessarily comprise unequal relationships. How, then, are these inequalities to be made consistent with democratic equality? The answer is that the formalities imposed on unequal relationships can preserve equality by upholding the dignity of inferiors and by restraining the pride of superiors. The fact that a customer can order a waiter to do his bidding is disguised and softened by the manner

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in which he does it. Precisely because the waiter is not his friend, the customer is limited in what he can command from him.

Forms and formalities equalize human relationships, and preserve necessary inequalities, by preventing them from being relationships of mere, unrestrained power. Freedom is maintained for inferiors: They choose friends outside their jobs, with whom to live on an equal basis, and they can choose which job to hold. Without such formal demarcations surrounding each job, either jobs would not get done--because that would be inconsistent with democratic fraternity--or jobs would be done perforce with no respect for democratic equality and liberty. In both cases, formality is overcome by informality. "If you and I are friends, how come I have to wait on you?" In our democratic age, overflowing informality is a source of tyranny and rebellion.

When we hear of "inequality," we assume that the superiority of a few is meant, and we frown. Living under democracy, we forget that democracy is a form of rule, with superiors and inferiors, in which the many are superior to the few. The example of many customers and few waiters reminds us that democracy has its menials as well as its elites. If democracy is to make use of both, while remaining true to its principle, it must find the method for raising up menials and holding down elites, while at the same time restraining the truly superior class in a democracy, the majority of the people. The adoption of forms is such a method that not only retains inequalities necessary to any society larger than a friendship, but also, on the contrary, equalizes those inequalities by confining them to formal relationships. Formal relationships keep society in a safe and free middle ground between friendship and sheer power.

The formal aspect of an action is that which can be separated from its end; and this separation is possible because the end can be achieved in more than one way. Where one means is absolutely necessary to attain the end, no formality exists; but when a choice of means is required, the one chosen (or developed unconsciously) as "correct" is formal. "Correct" reasoning is following the single most direct way to the conclusion, but "correct" behavior is following the prescribed mode in the face of many possibilities. This prescribed mode or manner has a certain look or shape that distinguishes it from other modes, and makes it recognizable as a "formality." Unlike correct reasoning, which follows its own logic and, so to speak, does not know where it is going until it gets there, correct behavior is instantly recognizable as such on its face, before the end is attained--we can

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appreciate polite eating, for example, without knowing or caring whether it leads to efficient digestion. Hence formalities depend on forms, the looks of things and actions as separable from their end or result.

Could we then recognize democratic equality in the forms or formalities of democracy without having to wait to judge the equality of result? This question, which underlies the controversy over affirmative action, suggests a connection between the formalities of manners in a democratic society and other, political and economic, forms. The latter are taken to be more formal than manners since they are prescribed by law as opposed to custom. Law is more formal than custom because the procedure by which laws are made and changed is publicly visible. To have such a procedure is to have a constitution in some sense, and one can often judge the character of a constitution more from looking at the way laws are changed than from looking at the laws that remain unchanged (just as one learns most about the state of one's property by trying to change it).

Sources of Political Informality

Such formalities are always open to challenge from democratic peoples. It is in the nature of democracy to look for results and to regard any deliberate delay in reaching them as undemocratic. To have the object of one's desire is of course a natural human inclination; but men can be finicky and fussy as well as lazy and direct, and it is a difficult question whether human nature is more democratic than aristocratic.

In our day, however, as Tocqueville might have granted, informality comes from a second source as well. The innocent waiter or waitress who wants to be friendly reveals not only the nature of democracy in general, but also reflects in small the political "populism" of the 1970s. Actually, this populism began in the 1960s, when the movement was angrier, rougher, and narrower—when it promoted "participatory democracy" and called itself the New Left. Its progress has come by dilution and through respectability, as students who once dressed down to the uniform of the working class now sport designer jeans. Respectability came easily, despite the electoral failures of the New Left and the oblivion of its early leaders, for unlike previous populisms in American history, this variety began and still thrives among the educated.

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Besides making our manners more informal, it has attacked our political institutions for serving as barriers between the people's will and its object—that is, for being too formal. President Carter, a prime beneficiary and exponent of this new populism, stated the populist principle in his demand that we make government as good as the people. Thus the power of government is to be exercised against, not through, its formal institutions, and whatever agency is available will be used to effect the people's will (as discerned or presumed by the populists), regardless of the formal character of the agency. Judicial activism was one obvious result; though "elitist" in a superficial sense, it is in a deeper sense quite populist. There also was the populist complaint against bureaucracy--not that it was too precise or overbearing, but that it "stood in the way." *

A third target of the educated populists has been private property. Although they have asserted the right to "live as you please," not so much for the pleasure of it as because each must do his own thing (thereby asserting a general right of privacy, again not so much to have fun in the dark as to defy decorum in public), they have also mounted an attack on private property. That their claims to privacy do not also support claims to private property makes sense only if one sees private property as the chief formality, after the constitution, of liberal society.

Property is a legal convention (based on a natural right, some would say) that establishes certain formalities of acquisition, maintenance, and transfer. When these are satisfied, in this view, the property is yours to use as you please; thus, the form of property is prescribed, the end is left open. Property, defined by John Locke as that which cannot be taken from you without your consent, thereby constitutes a barrier between people. Property epitomizes the nature of law in liberal society; if you stay within certain bounds, you can do as you like. One thing you may do is to set up a corporation, a legal or formal person that creates a distance between your moral and legal duties, and also between yourself and others (since your duties to them are reduced to legal correctness).

* Because of the political defeat suffered by this populism in 1980, one is tempted to speak of it in the past tense; but this would be too hasty. Some of the victors of 1980, particularly the New Right, have picked up and perfected the techniques of populism, and the techniques of populism not its left or right coloration, are its essence.

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For the populists, such freedom is purely formal, that is meaningless in itself. For them, its meaning depends on actually having property to use. Since the meaning of the right to private property is defined in terms of its actual effect, the existence of the right is also judged by its effect. Moreover, one does not have a right unless it can be exercised; and rights are not equal unless they are exercised; and rights are not equal unless they are exercised equally. So government can and should intervene to ensure rights, not as equal opportunities, but rather as equal in exercise. While it may not be necessary to abolish private property, in the populists' view, its use by private individuals and corporations must be examined from the standpoint of the public interest. This raises the question of whether any formal statement of private property is legitimate. In truth, the populists not only put human rights over property rights, they hardly speak of property rights. To hold property is, in their view, more a liability than an opportunity: You make yourself a natural target of litigation.

The distinction between formal right and its informal exercise has been most obviously dissolved in programs of affirmative action, where the change from "equality of opportunity" to "equality of result" was explicit and deliberate. More important yet is reinterpretation of voting rights in recent cases, and in the renewal of the Voting Rights Act in 1982, which seem to establish a governmental guarantee of minority representation. In this trend of intervention, the government no longer confines itself to guaranteeing the right to vote, but now looks to see how that right is exercised, in case voting by one method or another should deprive a minority of its "fair" share of representation—as calculated without reference to elections. The most fundamental right in liberal society, the right to consent to government, has become open to inspection by the very government that claims consent, in order to insure that the right to vote is the right to an effective vote. This challenge to elected governments is derived from earlier reapportionment cases concerning the "one person, one vote" principle, by which the test of legitimacy was whether each individual's vote had the same power as everyone else's. The right to vote, in this populist view, is the right to a vote that is equal in effect. One wonders: What of the right of free speech, then? Is it merely the right to whistle in the wind, or is it not the right to be listened to, equally with others, hence the "right to reply" and to be replied to? And is the right to life—in the sense of "life, liberty, and the pursuit

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of happiness"—not then an equal right to an effective, fulfilling life?

Writing Up the Self

The equality of exercise of rights, or to speak more plainly, the equality of power, comes from the idea of self-expression developed by the New Left out of a strange, selective combination of Marx and Nietzsche—a combination that would be remarkable enough in the natural history of hybrids, were it not also destined for a prominent place in American political history. To constitute the idea of self-expression, Marx's critique of "bourgeois formalism" was first invoked. In that critique, which is most evident in his early work, *On the Jewish Question*, the "rights of man" proclaimed by the liberal philosophers are shown to be, in effect, merely the rights of bourgeois man. Then, rejecting Marx's economic determinism, the New Left turned to Nietzsche's account of how the self produced itself in history by stages of "consciousness" in which the self had motive power of its own. But then, rejecting Nietzsche's call for sacrifice and aristocracy so that the self can rescue itself from nihilism, the New Left turned back to Marx's early notion of "species being," which promised effortless fulfillment for all selves.

Essential to the idea of self-expression, and common to both Marx and Nietzsche, is the belief that the self is totally produced, not at all fixed. Men do not have the defined self that is required for the liberal right of self-preservation: By nature we lack any "sense of identity," and so we must seek it out in our experience of life (or in magazines). Lacking definition, the self must assert itself (for assertion is the effectual truth of "expression"), and in its self-assertion it has no reason to respect the self-assertion of others. Others would deserve respect if they had rights, but rights attach only to selves that can be defined. If the self has no fixity, no definition even in its potentiality, then the self can be only what it becomes by its act of assertion. Its "right" is as much or as little as it can exercise; the distinction between a right and its exercise is overridden.

From the lack of a fixed "self," in the liberal sense of "self-preservation" or "self-government," it follows that liberal "equality of opportunity" is meaningless. An authentic equality of opportunity assumes the possibility of a fresh start, regard-

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less of one's past history. If the artificial restraints of social convention are removed, it is supposed, a person's natural talents will be permitted to flourish, and each will progress as far as his nature and effort allow. But if there is no fixed self, then one has no nature, no "God-given talent," to resort to; and the self must be what it has been and what it might become. In effect, the self must be what it has been, if one's will is weak, or the self will be what it can become if one's will is strong. The strength of one's expression or assertion begins to replace the language of rights (e.g., Black Power as opposed to Civil Rights) since the distinction between right and exercise has been overcome.

That such self-assertion necessarily reveals and promotes the difference between the strong and the weak has not, however, been an embarrassment to the democratic feeling of the new populism. The weak can join their wills together to become strong, forgetting liberal individuality; and when united, they can use the power of government to equalize wills, or to ensure that the exercise of liberal rights does not result in inequality. Besides, it is advantageous for these educated populists to be able to stress the weakness of human will when they want to blame the past, and the strength of human will when they want to incite change.

Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern

The populism I have described as aggressive informality is fundamentally opposed to constitutionalism, which promotes respect for forms above all. Governing in a constitutional manner is governing regularly, that is, formally. Locke wrote that the "form of government" (which we may take for the constitution) depends on where the legislative power is placed; and the legislative power must be supreme so that government can be by "settled, standing laws" and "stated rules." Such government is opposed to the rule by the arbitrary will of one, few, or many. This dissatisfies our populist informality today because it elevates the form of government over the end. Locke, to be sure, announces the end of the legislative power in the same place that he insists on its formal character: The laws must aim at the "public good," which is the "preservation" of the society. But this end is also described as the "preservation of property," and property, as we have seen, is a formality.

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As we have been traditionally taught to understand constitutional government, it is government by due process, by forms and even by technicalities, in which the form or manner of an action is raised above its end; the means are more important than the end. For example, respecting the rights of a criminal is more important than convicting him. (Those conservatives who might contest the current application of this principle would not want, we may assume, to set up lynch law, in which the end is raised above the means so that the end justifies any efficient means.) In their emphasis on forms and formalities, both ancient and modern constitutionalism are in agreement. Yet between these two kinds of constitutionalism—those of Aristotle and Locke—there is a critical difference with regard to form and end. For Locke's modification of Aristotle's constitutionalism set the terms of the problem of constitutional formalism, and opened the way for the challenge to constitutionalism today.

In Aristotle's constitutionalism, the form is united with the end because it reveals the end. Respecting the forms of a constitution is, by definition, respecting its character. The reality of a constitution, therefore, is not opposed to its form, as if its form were a "mere formality"; on the contrary, the reality of a city, Aristotle said, is especially its constitution or regime. Our liberal democracy is a certain form, but also has a certain end; and in Aristotle's view, its end is identical with itself as a form. Its end as a liberal democracy is to live by the forms of liberal democracy, and if it did not live by those forms it would not be behaving as a liberal democracy, and so could not achieve its end.

The difficulty with Aristotle's conception is evident: He provides no clear standard by which to judge among constitutions. What is the true end of a constitution, and which is its correct form? Aristotle seems to run the risk of relativism. Since each constitution has its own end in its own form, each appears to have its own reality. Aristotle is surely aware of this difficulty. In the third book of the *Politics* he turns to a discussion of the good man, who is not relative to his constitution, and of the good citizen, who is. But Aristotle himself does not claim to solve this difficulty, and the tendency of his discussion toward the absolute monarchy of the good man was unsatisfactory to Locke and to modern constitutionalism generally.

According to Locke, men have an equal right of self-preservation in a state of nature prior to civil society. Thus an original, perfect democracy of equal men existed (or must be

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supposed) in the state of nature; this is the "natural" form of a constitution which may proceed to establish itself, or any other form, in civil society. Civil constitutions exist to serve and protect the form and end that men had in the state of nature, the rights of man, not (as in Aristotle) of citizens. If there are only rights of citizens—and the trend in American constitutional law has been to expand rights of citizens to all persons—that is because the rights of man are best protected in independent communities that are obliged to prefer, as they enlist, their own citizens. It is not that the rights of man have ceased to become relevant as the standards of constitutions; man-made constitutions are conceived to secure natural rights. The man-made form is for the protection of the "natural" form and end.

Can "Forms" and "Ends" Coexist?

Modern constitutionalism, therefore, has a great advantage over Aristotle's constitutionalism. Unlike Aristotle's, where the rights of citizens are only defined by the constitution, it has a clear standard by which to judge regimes: Do they respect the rights of man? Despite all the difficulties of applying this standard—for example, in recent American foreign policy—no one has found, or even sought, a clearer one. Or do those difficulties reveal that the standard is not so clear as it seems? For we do not know whether to uphold the sanctity of constitutionalism or secure the protection of life, to focus on the form or the end, and in a pinch we sacrifice the form to the end; we find that nonconstitutional regimes must be tolerated because they better serve our end or even the end of their own peoples.

The trouble with modern constitutionalism is that civil liberties and man-made constitutional forms are made subordinate to the natural end of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. They are means to that end, not united with it; the form is not united with the end, as in Aristotle's constitutionalism. Hence we are willing to jettison our liberal constitutional forms if they do not achieve their end. Indeed, all respect for rights remains exposed to a similar judgment, whether this judgment is exercised constitutionally by an executive when there is no time for due process in an emergency, or legitimately by a people fed up with tyranny, or illegitimately by citizens who, as Tocqueville said, "rush impetuously toward the object of each of their desires." Although we know that respect for rights requires us to put the

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form (i.e., due process) ahead of the end, the liberal argument always tempts us to treat the form as a means to the end. So the status of constitutional forms is in doubt under modern constitutionalism. Precisely because the standard for judging forms is so clear, the standard tends to undermine them. Despite its nonliberal sources, the populist perversion of liberal constitutionalism is the realization of an inherent liability within liberal constitutionalism.

No better illustration of this problem can be found than in the idea of property. According to Locke, the end of government is the protection of property. By "property" he usually meant external goods in the ordinary sense, but he also used the term in an enlarged sense that includes "Life, Liberty and Estate." What justifies this enlarged sense? Property in its ordinary sense supplies the needs of life, but in its enlarged sense it protects both liberty and life. If your property is secure, your liberty is secure; and if your liberty is secure, your life is secure. It is not that property in the narrow sense is more valuable than liberty and life. Rather, property is a convention or form enlarged out of its matter so that it becomes an end in itself. We know then that if anyone's property is insecure, everyone's is insecure. Property as a whole includes all members of society as well as all the objects of their desires. It includes them formally or conventionally, not only because property is defined by laws in civil society, but also because property is considered a formality without regard to whether it is equally held. However rich or poor one may be, all profit from having a right to property; and in a sense, because liberty and life are good without regard to how they are used, all profit equally. The equality of the property right is shown in the connection between property and consent. Since property is that which cannot be taken from you without your consent (that is, the consent of a majority), the right to property becomes the visible, formal protection of the right to consent. This is the connection, so often hastily dismissed today, between property rights and human rights.

Of course, it is not wrong to question whether property rights do in fact protect human rights. Suppose property rights are exercised so unequally that the many live in misery at the mercy of a few: what then? To meet this objection, Locke does not leave his argument at the formal enlargement of property; he also promises material increase. Unequal property for some will bring more property for all. In his famous phrase, a savage king in

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America "feeds, lodges and is clad worse than a day laborer in England." Through material increase of property, everyone profits, though some profit more. Here Locke introduces a reference to the end, to a standard of performance: Are you better off? Even if the answer is yes (for now), this is still not the same as asking whether your rights are being respected. At the least, the first question ensures that liberal societies will be infested with economists as well as lawyers. At worst, we may believe it compels us to sacrifice our rights in a futile attempt to force their equal exercise.

PART IV

Developing Democracy

Will More Countries Become Democratic?

Samuel P. Huntington

What are the prospects for the emergence of more democratic regimes in the world? This question has intellectual and policy relevance for the 1980s. During the 1950s and early 1960s, scholars concerned with this issue were generally optimistic that decolonization and economic development would lead to the multiplication of democratic regimes. The history of the next decade dealt roughly with these expectations, and people became more pessimistically preoccupied with the reasons for the breakdown of democratic systems. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the prospects for democracy seemed to have brightened once again, and social scientists have responded accordingly. "Transitions to democracy became the new focus of attention. The optimists of the 1950s were rather naively optimistic; those of the 1980s have been more cautiously optimistic, but the optimism and the hope are still there. Coincidentally, the Reagan administration moved far beyond the Carter administration's more limited concern with human rights and first launched "Project Democracy" and "The Democracy Program" to promote democratic institutions in other societies, and then persuaded Congress to create a "National Endowment for Democracy" to pursue this goal on a permanent basis. In the early 1980s, in short, concern with the development of new democratic regimes has been increasing among academics and policymakers. The purpose of this article is to use social science theory and comparative political analysis to see to what extent this new, more cautious optimism may be justified.

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This issue is important for at least four reasons. First, the future of democracy is closely associated with the future of freedom in the world. Democracies can and have abused individual rights and liberties, and a well-regulated authoritarian state may provide a high degree of security and order for its citizens. Overall, however, the correlation between the existence of democracy and the existence of individual liberty is extremely high. Indeed, some measure of the latter is an essential component of the former. Conversely, the long-term effect of the operation of democratic politics is probably to broaden and deepen individual liberty. Liberty is, in a sense, the peculiar virtue of democracy; hence, if one is concerned with liberty as an ultimate social value, one should also be concerned with the fate of democracy.

Second, the future of democracy elsewhere in the world is of importance to the United States. The United States is the world's premier democratic country, and the greater the extent to which democracy prevails elsewhere in the world, the more congenial the world environment will be to American interests generally and the future of democracy in the United States in particular. Michael Doyle has argued quite persuasively that no two liberal societies have ever fought each other.¹ His concept of liberalism differs from the concept of democracy employed in this paper, but the point may well be true of democratic regimes as well as liberal ones. Other things being equal, non-democratic regimes are likely to pose more serious challenges to American interests than democratic regimes.

Third, "a house divided against itself," Abraham Lincoln said, "cannot stand. . . . This government cannot endure permanently half-slave and half-free." At present the world is not a single house, but it is becoming more and more closely integrated. Interdependence is the trend of the times. How long can an increasingly interdependent world survive part-democratic and part-authoritarian and totalitarian? For the Soviet bloc and the Western World, that point may still be some distance in the future, but tensions arising out of the growing interaction between totally different political systems are almost inevitably bound to increase. At some point, coexistence may require a slowing down or halting of the trends toward interdependence.

Fourth, the extension or decline of democracy has implications for other social values, such as economic growth, socioeconomic equity, political stability, social justice, and national independence. In societies at one level of development, progress toward

one or more of these goals may be compatible with a high level of democracy. At another level of socioeconomic development, conflicts may exist. The question of the appropriateness of democracy for poor countries is, in this context, a central issue. But even highly developed societies may achieve their democracy at some sacrifice of other important values, such as national security.

In addition, if it is desirable to extend the scope of democracy in the world, obviously it is necessary to know what conditions favor that in the late twentieth century. Empirical analysis is necessary to answer the question: What policies should governments, private institutions, and individuals espouse to encourage the spread of democracy? To what extent do efforts such as those of the Reagan administration have an impact, positive or negative, on the state of democracy in the world, and at what cost in terms of other social values and national goals?

The first step in evaluating the prospects for democracy is to define the dependent variable with which we are concerned. Definitions of democracy are legion. The term has been applied to areas and institutions far removed from politics. It has also been defined as an ideal impossible of human achievement. For Peter Bachrach, for instance, a democratic system of government has for its paramount objective "maximization of the self-development of every individual." Robert Dahl says a democratic political system is one which is "completely or almost completely responsible to all its citizens."² Such definitions may be relevant to normative political theory, but they are not very useful for comparative empirical analysis. First, they are often so vague and general that it is virtually impossible to apply them in practice. How does one judge whether a political system is attempting to maximize the self-development of individuals or is completely responsive to all its citizens? Second, democracy may also be defined in such broad terms as to make it identical with almost all civic virtues, including social justice, equality, liberty, fulfillment, progress, and a variety of other good things. Hence it becomes difficult if not impossible to analyze the relationship between democracy and other social goals.

For comparative analysis a more empirical and institutional definition is desirable, and this paper follows in the tradition of Joseph A. Schumpeter. A political system is defined as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the

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adult population is eligible to vote. So defined, a democracy thus involves the two dimensions—contestation and participation—that Dahl sees as critical to his realistic democracy or polyarchy.³

The Record of Democratic Development

The historical emergence of modern democratic regimes falls into four phases. What could reasonably be called a democratic political system at the national level of government first appeared in the United States in the early nineteenth century. During the following century democratic regimes gradually emerged in northern and Western Europe, in the British dominions, and in a few countries in Latin America. This trend, which Alexis de Tocqueville had foreseen in 1835 and which James Bryce documented in 1920, appeared to be irreversible if not necessarily universal. Virtually all significant regime changes were from less democracy to more democracy. Writing at the end of this period, Bryce could well speculate as to whether this "trend toward democracy now widely visible, is a natural trend, due to a general law of social progress." ⁴

The trend was reversing, however, even as he wrote. The year 1920 was in many aspects the peak of democratic development among the independent nations of the world.⁵ During the following two decades, democracy or democratic trends were snuffed out in Germany, Italy, Austria, Poland, the Baltic states, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Argentina, Brazil, and Japan. The war fought to make the world safe for democracy seemed instead to have brought its progress to an abrupt halt and to have unleashed social movements from the Right and the Left intent on destroying it.

The aftermath of World War II, on the other hand, marked another dramatic, if brief, spurt in the multiplication of democratic regimes. With the support of its allies, the United States imposed democracy on West Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan (where it took root), and attempted to do so in South Korea (where it did not). Coincidentally, the process of decolonization got underway with newly independent countries usually adopting at first the political forms of the imperial powers. In at least some cases, such as India, Israel, Ceylon, and the Philippines, the forms of democracy were accompanied by the substance also. Other countries, such as Turkey and some Latin American states,

moved to emulate the political systems of the victorious Western powers. By the early 1950s, the proportion of democracies among the world's independent states had reached another high.

The fourth period in the evolution of democratic regimes, from the early 1950s to the 1980s, differs from the other three. In each of them, there was an overwhelmingly dominant trend, either toward the extension of democracy (1820-1920 and 1942-1953), or toward its reduction (1920-1942). In each period there were very few, if any, significant regime shifts against the dominant trend. The thirty years from the early 1950s to the early 1980s, however, were not characterized by a strong move in either direction. The trends were mixed. As we have seen, the number of democratic regimes seemed to expand in the 1950s and early 1960s, to shrink in the middle-late 1960s and early 1970s, and then to expand again in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Overall, however, the net record of change in the state of democracy in the world was not very great. It would be difficult to argue that the world was more or less democratic in 1984 than it had been in 1954. Indicative of this relative stability, albeit for a much shorter period of time, are Freedom House's estimates of the proportion of the world's population living in "free" states. In the first such estimate, in January 1973, 32.0 percent of the world's population was found to live in "free" states. In the next year, the percentage increased to 36.0 percent. During the following ten years, except for the two years India was under emergency rule (when it was 19.8 percent and 19.6 percent), the proportion of the world's population living in free states never went above 37.0 percent and never dropped below 35.0 percent. In January 1984 it was 36.0 percent, exactly where it had been ten years earlier.⁶

The overall stability in the extent of democracy does, however, conceal some important developments in both directions. With a few notable exceptions, almost all colonies that achieved independence after World War II shifted from democratic to nondemocratic systems. In contrast, a few countries moved in the opposite direction. These include Spain, Portugal, Colombia, Venezuela, Greece, and the Dominican Republic. Several South American countries, including two with long-standing democratic systems (Chile, Uruguay) and two with less stable populist systems (Brazil, Argentina), became bureaucratic-authoritarian states, with military governments intent upon fairly sustained rule. By the end of 1983, however, Brazil had made substantial progress back towards a democratic system, and Argentina had a democratically elected government. Many other countries (including Peru,

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Ecuador, Ghana, Nigeria, and Turkey) seemed to oscillate back and forth between democratic and undemocratic systems, in a pattern traditionally characteristic of praetorian societies. In East Asia: Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines became less democratic, Taiwan remained undemocratic; the Indochinese states succumbed to a ruthless Vietnamese totalitarianism; and Thailand and Malaysia remained partially democratic. Finally, efforts to move Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland toward more democratic politics were halted directly or indirectly by Soviet action.

Any estimate of the future of democracy in the world must be rooted in an explanation of why these mixed trends prevailed between the 1950s and the 1980s, and hence whether the overall stability in the prevalence of democratic regimes in the world will continue. Ancient and modern political analysts have many theories to explain the rise and fall of democratic regimes. To what extent do these various and conflicting theories explain what happened and did not happen after World War II and what could happen in the 1980s?

Thinking about the reasons for the emergence of democratic regimes has typically had two foci. One approach has focused on the preconditions in society that favor democratic development. A second approach has focused on the nature of the political processes by which that development has occurred. Each will be considered in turn.

Preconditions of Democratization

In 1970, Dankwart Rustow published a penetrating article on "transitions to democracy," in which he criticized studies that focused on "preconditions" for democratization because they often tended to jump from the correlation between democracy and other factors to the conclusion that those other factors were responsible for democracy. They also tended, he argued, to look for the causes of democracy primarily in economic, social, cultural, and psychological, but not political, factors.⁷ Rustow's criticisms were well taken and helped to provide a more balanced view of the complexities of democratization. It would, however, be a mistake to swing entirely to the other extreme and ignore the environmental factors that may affect democratic development. In fact, plausible arguments can be and have been made for a wide variety of factors or preconditions that appear to be associated with the

emergence of democratic regimes. To a large extent these factors can be grouped into four broad categories—economic, social, external, and cultural.

Economic wealth and equality.

In his critique, Rustow gave special attention to an influential article published by Seymour Martin Lipset a decade earlier. In that piece, Lipset highlighted the seeming correlation between high levels of economic development and the prevalence of democratic political systems among European, English-speaking, and Latin American nations. The "more well-to-do a nation," he postulated, "the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy."⁸ His study stimulated a flood of further analyses that criticized, qualified, and refined his argument. Whatever the academic hairsplittings, however, his basic point seemed to make sense. "There is," as another scholar put it in 1960, "a positive correlation between economic development and political competitiveness."⁹ A quarter century later, that correlation still seemed to exist. In 1981, for instance, a comparison of the World Bank's ratings of countries in terms of economic development with Freedom House's ratings of them in terms of liberty showed these results—two of thirty-six low-income countries were classified "free" or democratic, fourteen out of sixty middle-income countries were so classified, and eighteen out of twenty-four countries with industrial economies were so classified.¹⁰ As one moves up the economic ladder, the greater are the chances that a country will be democratic.

The correlation between wealth and democracy is thus fairly strong. How can it be explained? There are three possibilities. First, both democracy and wealth could be caused by a third factor. Protestantism has, for instance, been assigned by some a major role in the origins of capitalism, economic development, and democracy. Second, democracy could give rise to economic wealth. In fact, however, high levels of economic wealth require high rates of economic growth and high rates of economic growth do not correlate with the prevalence of democratic political systems.¹¹ Hence, it seems unlikely that wealth depends on democracy, and, if a connection exists, democracy must depend on wealth.

The probability of any causal connection running from wealth to democracy is enhanced by the arguments as to why this would be a plausible relationship. A wealthy economy, it is said, makes

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possible higher levels of literacy, education, and mass media exposure, all of which are conducive to democracy. A wealthy economy also moderates the tensions of political conflict; alternative opportunities are likely to exist for unsuccessful political leaders and greater economic resources generally facilitate accommodation and compromise. In addition, a highly developed, industrialized economy and the complex society it implies cannot be governed efficiently by authoritarian means. Decision-making is necessarily dispersed, and hence power is shared and rule must be based on consent. Finally, in a more highly developed economy, income and possibly wealth also tend to be more equally distributed than in a poorer economy. Since democracy means, in some measure, majority rule, democracy is only possible if the majority is a relatively satisfied middle class, and not an impoverished majority confronting an inordinately wealthy oligarchy. A substantial middle class, in turn, may be the product of the relatively equal distribution of land in agrarian societies that may otherwise be relatively poor, such as the early nineteenth century United States or twentieth century Costa Rica. It may also be the result of a relatively high level of development, which produces greater income equality in industrial as compared to industrializing societies.

If these arguments are correct, economic development in the Communist world and the Third World should facilitate the emergence of democratic regimes. Yet one must be skeptical as to whether such an easy conclusion is warranted. In the first place, there is the question as to what level of economic development is required to make possible the transition to democracy. As Jonathan Sunshine has conclusively shown, the countries of Western Europe generally became democratic when their per capita gross domestic products were in the range of \$300-\$500 (in 1960 dollars). By 1981, perhaps two-thirds of the middle-income developing countries had reached or exceeded that level of development. Most of them, however, had not become democratic. If the economic theory holds, the level of economic development necessary to facilitate the transition to democracy must be higher in the late twentieth century than it was in the century prior to 1950.¹² In addition, different countries may still transit to democracy at widely varying levels of development. Spain, after all, did grow extremely rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s and did become democratic after the death of Francisco Franco in the mid-1970s. Could this have happened without the industrialization, urbanization, and development of the middle class that were central to

Spanish economic growth? Quite probably not. Lopez Rodo was at least partially right when he had earlier predicted that Spain would become democratic when its per capita income reached \$2,000 per head.¹³ But then what about Portugal? It made a simultaneous transition to democracy, without having experienced the massive economic development of Spain and while still at a much lower level of economic well-being.

In addition, what about the experience of the southern cone states of Latin America? They too went through major processes of economic development and yet turned away from democracy, a phenomenon that led Guillermo O'Donnell to develop his theory of bureaucratic authoritarianism that posited just the opposite of the Lipset wealth-democracy theory. Instead, O'Donnell argued that economic development and particularly the strains produced by a heavy emphasis on import substitution led to the emergence of new, stronger, and more lasting forms of authoritarian rule.¹⁴

There is also the experience of the East Asian newly industrializing countries. In the 1960s and 1970s, these countries not only had the highest economic growth rates in the world, but they also achieved those rates while in most cases maintaining very equitable systems of income distribution. Yet none became more democratic and two of the most notable economic achievers, Korea and Singapore, became less so.

At the same time, the economic theory may still serve a purpose in terms of focusing attention on those countries where transitions to democratic or other types of modern political systems are most likely to occur. As countries develop economically, they can be conceived of moving into a zone of transition or choice, in which traditional forms of rule become increasingly difficult to maintain and new types of political institutions are required to aggregate the demands of an increasingly complex society and to implement public policies in such a society. In the 1981 World Bank ordering of countries by level of economic development, the zone of choice might be conceived as comprising the top one-third of the middle-income countries, that is, those running from Number 77 (the Republic of Korea) up to Number 96 (Spain). To these should be added Taiwan, which in terms of per capita income fits in the middle of this group. Of these twenty-one countries:

7 were democracies, including 4 (Spain, Venezuela, Portugal, Greece) that transitioned to democracy after World War II, 2 that became democratic on independence (Israel,

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Trinidad and Tobago), and 1 that had sustained democracy for many years (Costa Rica);

4 were the bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) states of the southern cone (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay);

4 were the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of East Asia (the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong);

2 were Communist (Rumania and Yugoslavia);

and the remaining 4 (Algeria, Mexico, Iran, and South Africa) were resource rich, ideologically diverse, and politically undemocratic.

Two years later, this group of countries, now labeled by the World Bank as "upper middle income countries" had been reduced by the graduation of Spain into the category of "industrial market economies," but had been enlarged by the movement upward of Malaysia, Lebanon, and Panama, and by the Bank's transfer into it of Iraq from the category of "high income oil exporters."¹⁵

If the wealth theory of democracy were valid, one would predict further movement toward democracy among the twenty-odd states in this group, perhaps particularly on the part of the East Asian NICs and the B-A states of South America. Experience suggests, however, that what is predictable for these countries in the transition zone is not the advent of democracy but rather the demise of previously existing political forms. Economic development compels the modification or abandonment of traditional political institutions; it does not determine what political system will replace them. That will be shaped by other factors, such as the underlying culture of the society, the values of the elites, and external influences.

In the late 1950s, for instance, both Cuba and Venezuela were reaching the level of economic development where the traditional sort of military despotism to which each had been subjected for years (Fulgencio y Batista Zaldivar, Marcos Perez Jimenez) was no longer adequate for the needs of the society. These military despotisms came to their ends in 1958 and 1959. Batista collapsed in the face of an armed revolutionary movement that rapidly seized and consolidated power, nationalized private property, and installed a pervasive Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. The Perez Jimenez regime collapsed as a result of the withdrawal of support by virtually all the major groups of Venezuelan society. That collapse was accompanied, however, by the negotiation of a series of pacts among Venezuelan leaders representing the major political and social groups that set the framework for a democratic politi-

cal system.¹⁶ By the late 1950s, the days of traditional personalistic despotism in Cuba and Venezuela were numbered; what was not fixed was what would replace them. Fidel Castro chose to lead Cuba in one direction; Romulo Betancourt chose to lead Venezuela in a very different one. Fifteen years later in somewhat comparable circumstances King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suarez in Spain and Antonio Ramalho Eanes in Portugal made similar choices on behalf of democracy. In another case, by the mid-1970s the rapid economic development of Iran had clearly undermined the basis for the Shah's regime. The Shah did not attempt to develop a broader, more participatory set of democratic institutions. His inaction, combined with the decision or lack of decision by the military leaders and the political skill of the mullahs, opened Iran to a religious revolution. Different and earlier decisions by Iranian leaders in the 1960s and 1970s might have moved Iran in a more democratic direction.

If the concept of a transition zone is valid, economic development produces a phase in a nation's history where political elites and the prevailing political values can shape choices that decisively determine the nation's future evolution. The range of choice may be limited. In 1981, for instance, all countries with per capita gross national products of \$4,220 or more (aside from the small oil-exporting states and Singapore) were either democratic or Communist. Conceivably, transition zone countries could make other choices. Iran is obviously in the fanatic pursuit of a different course; possibly the East Asian NICs and the Latin American B-A regimes may find other alternatives. To date, however, those countries that have come through the transition zone have almost always emerged as either democracies or as Communist dictatorships.

Social structure.

A second set of often-discussed preconditions for democracy involves the extent to which there is a widely differentiated and articulated social structure with relatively autonomous social classes, regional groups, occupational groups, and ethnic and religious groups. Such groups, it is argued, provide the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control. Societies that lack autonomous intermediate groups are, on the other hand,

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much more likely to be dominated by a centralized power apparatus—an absolute monarchy, an oriental despotism, or an authoritarian or totalitarian dictatorship.¹⁷ This argument can be made on behalf of groups and pluralism in general or on behalf of particular groups or types of pluralistic structure which are singled out as playing a decisive role in making democracy possible.

According to one line of argument, pluralism (even highly stratified pluralism) in traditional society enhances the probability of developing stable democracy in modern society. The caste system may be one reason why India has been able to develop and to maintain stable democratic institutions.¹⁸ More generally, the argument is made that societies with a highly developed feudalism, including an aristocracy capable of limiting the development of state power, are more likely to evolve into democracies than those that lack such social pluralism. The record of Western Europe versus Russia and of Japan versus China suggests that there may well be something to this theory. But the theory fails to account for differences between North America and South America. Tocqueville, Louis Hartz, and others attribute democracy in the former to the absence of feudalism. The failure of democracy in South America has, conversely, often been attributed precisely to its feudal heritage, although the feudalism that existed there was, to be sure, highly centralized.¹⁹

The theory that emphasizes traditional pluralism is, in a sense, the opposite of the one that emphasizes wealth as a precondition of democracy. The latter makes democracy dependent on how far the processes of economic development and modernization have gone. The traditional pluralism theory, in contrast, puts the emphasis on where the process started, on the nature of traditional society. Was it, in Gaetano Mosca's terms, primarily a "feudal" or a "bureaucratic" society? If pushed to the extreme, of course, this theory implies societal predestination: it is all determined in advance that some societies will become democratic and others will not.

The most significant manifestation of the social structure argument, however, concerns not the existence of a feudal aristocracy, but rather the existence of an autonomous bourgeoisie. Democracy, the Marxists argue, is bourgeois democracy, reflecting the interests of that particular social class. Barrington Moore has restated the proposition succinctly in a more limited formulation: "No bourgeois, no democracy."²⁰ This argument would seem

to have much to commend it. The failure of democracy to develop in Third World countries despite their economic growth can, perhaps, be related to the nature of that growth. The leading roles have been played by the state and by multinational enterprises. As a result, economic development runs ahead of the development of a bourgeoisie. In those circumstances where a bourgeoisie has developed, however, the prospects for democracy have been greater. The move to democracy in Turkey in the 1940s coincided with the move away from the etatisme of Kemalism and the appearance of a group of independent businessmen. More significantly, the ability of a developing country to have an autonomous, indigenous bourgeoisie is likely to be related to its size. Countries with small internal markets are unlikely to be able to sustain such a class, but large ones can. This may be one factor explaining why India (with one short interlude) has sustained a democratic system, and why Brazil, which is also developing a vigorous indigenous bourgeoisie, steadily moved away from bureaucratic authoritarianism in the 1970s and early 1980s. In South Africa, businessmen have been among those most active in attempting to ameliorate apartheid and broaden democracy in that country.

The seemingly important role of an autonomous bourgeoisie for the development of democracy highlights the question of the relation between economic system and political system. Clearly political democracy is compatible with both a substantial role in the economy for state-owned enterprises and a substantial state welfare and social security system. Nonetheless, as Charles Lindblom has pointed out (in a volume that otherwise highlights the conflict between the business corporation and democracy), all political democracies have market-oriented economies, although quite clearly not all market-oriented economies are paired with democratic political systems.²¹ Lindblom's message would seem to be like Moore's—a market-oriented economy, like a bourgeoisie, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of a democratic political system.

Why should this be the case? At least two reasons suggest themselves. Politically, a market economy requires a dispersion of economic power and in practice almost invariably some form of private property. The dispersion of economic power creates alternatives and counters to state power and enables those elites that control economic power to limit state power and to exploit democratic means to make it serve their interests. Economically, a market economy appears more likely to sustain economic growth

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than a command economy (although the latter may, as the Soviet and East European cases suggest, do so for a short period of time), and hence a market economy is more likely to give rise to the economic wealth and the resulting more equitable distribution of income that provide the infrastructure of democracy.

A third source of autonomous social pressure in a democratic direction may be provided by labor unions. Historically, unions played this role in Western Europe and the United States. In the contemporary world, unions have also had a role in the struggles against the racist oligarchy in South Africa, against military rule in the southern cone, and against the Communist dictatorship in Poland. At the same time, the experience of these cases also suggests the limits on the extent to which, in the absence of affiliated political parties, labor unions can affect political change.

Under some conditions, communal (that is, ethnic, racial, or religious) pluralism may be conducive to the development of at least limited forms of democracy. In most cases of communal pluralism, democracy can operate only on a consociational rather than a majoritarian basis.²² And even when it is organized on a consociational basis, it will often break down as a result of social mobilization that undermines the power of elites or as a result of the intrusion of external political and military forces (as in Cyprus or Lebanon). Even in the best of circumstances, consociational democracy can often only remain stable by in effect becoming consociational oligarchy (as in Malaysia), that is, by sacrificing contestation in order to maintain representation.

External environment.

External influences may be of decisive importance in influencing whether a society moves in a democratic or non-democratic direction. To the extent that such influences are more important than indigenous factors, democratization is the result of diffusion rather than development. Conceivably, democracy in the world could stem from a single source. Clearly it does not. Yet it would be wrong to ignore the extent to which much of the democracy in the world does have a common origin. In 1984, Freedom House classified fifty-two countries (many of them extremely small) as "free."²³ In thirty-three of those fifty-two countries, the presence of democratic institutions could be ascribed in large part to British and American influence, either through settlement,

colonial rule, defeat in war, or fairly direct imposition (such as in the Dominican Republic). Most of the other nineteen "free" countries where democracy had other sources were either in Western Europe or in South America. The extension of democracy into the non-Western world, insofar as that has occurred, has thus been largely the product of Anglo-American efforts.

Ever since the French Revolution, armies have carried political ideologies with them. As we have indicated, where American armies went in World War II, democracy followed (in four cases enduringly, in one case temporarily). Where Soviet armies went, communism followed. Military conquest is clearly one way of extending democracy and other political systems. Historically, however, Western colonialism has been the most important means of diffusing democratic ideas and institutions. The enduring results of such colonialism have, however, been rather limited. As of 1983, no former French, U.S., Dutch, Portuguese, or Belgian colony was rated "free" by Freedom House. Several former British colonies were. Myron Weiner has, indeed, emphasized that "every single country in the third world that emerged from colonial rule since the second world war with a population of at least one million (and almost all the smaller countries as well) with a continuous democratic experience is a former British colony."²⁴ British rule seemingly has a significantly different impact from that of other colonial powers. Only six countries meet Weiner's condition, however, and a much larger number of former British colonies have not sustained democracy. The question then becomes how to distinguish among former British colonies. One possibility is that the duration of democratic institutions after independence is a function of the duration of British rule before independence. The colonies where democratic institutions appear to have taken the firmest root are those such as India, Sri Lanka, and the West Indian Anglophone states, where British rule dates from the eighteenth century. The record of former British colonies in Africa, on the other hand, where British rule dates only from the late nineteenth century, is not all that different from that of the former African colonies of other European powers.

In large measure, the rise and decline of democracy on a global scale is a function of the rise and decline of the most powerful democratic states. The spread of democracy in the nineteenth century went hand in hand with the Pax Britannica. The extension of democracy after World War II reflected the global power of the United States. The decline of democracy in East Asia and Latin America in the 1970s was in part a reflection of the waning of

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American influence.²⁵ That influence is felt both directly, as a result of the efforts of the American government to affect political processes in other societies, and also indirectly by providing a powerful and successful model to be followed.

Regional external influences can also have a significant effect on political development within a society. The governments and political parties of the European Community (EC) helped to encourage the emergence of democratic institutions in Spain and Portugal, and the desire of those two countries plus Greece to join the community provided an additional incentive for them to become democratic. Even beyond the confines of the EC, Western Europe has generally become defined as a community of democratic nations, and any significant departure by one nation from the democratic norm would clearly create a major crisis in intra-European relations. In some measure, a similar development may be taking place among the countries of the Andean Pact. The departure from the Pact of Chile and the addition of Venezuela in the mid-1970s, plus the transitions to democracy in Ecuador and Peru, then laid the basis for identifying pact membership with the adherence to democratic government.

In some regions, but most notably in Latin America, regional trends may exist. By and large, Latin American governments moved in a democratic direction in the late 1950s and early 1960s, then in an authoritarian direction in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and then once again in a democratic direction in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The reasons for these regional shifts are not entirely clear. They could be a result of four factors: simultaneous parallel socioeconomic development in Latin American societies; the triggering of a trend by the impact of one "pace-setting" Latin American society on its neighbors; the impact on Latin America of a common external influence (such as the United States); or some combination of these factors.

Cultural context.

The political culture of a society has been defined by Sidney Verba as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."²⁶ Political culture is, presumably, rooted in the broader culture of a society involving those beliefs and values, often religiously based, concerning the nature of humanity and society, the relations among human beings, and the relation of

individuals to a transcendent being. Significant differences in their receptivity to democracy appear to exist among societies with different cultural traditions.

Historically, as many scholars have pointed out, a high correlation existed between Protestantism and democracy. In the contemporary world, virtually all countries with a European population and a Protestant majority (except East Germany) have democratic governments.²⁷ The case of Catholicism, particularly in Latin countries, on the other hand, is more ambivalent. Historically, it was often argued that a natural opposition existed between Catholicism and democracy. By and large, democratic institutions developed later and less surely in European Catholic countries than in Protestant ones. By and large, however, these countries also developed later economically than the Protestant countries, and hence it is difficult to distinguish between the impact of economics and that of religion. Conceivably, the influence of the latter on politics could have been mediated through its impact on economic development and the rise of an entrepreneurial class. With economic development, however, the role of the church changed, and in most Catholic countries now the church is identified with support for democracy.

Islam, on the other hand, has not been hospitable to democracy. Of thirty-six countries with Moslem majorities, Freedom House in 1984 rated twenty-one as "not free," fifteen as "partially free," none as "free." The one Islamic country that sustained even intermittent democracy after World War II was Turkey, which had, under Mustapha Kemal, explicitly rejected its Islamic tradition and defined itself as a secular republic. The one Arab country that sustained democracy, albeit of the consociational variety, for any time was Lebanon, 40 to 50 percent of whose population was Christian and whose democratic institutions collapsed when the Moslem majority asserted itself in the 1970s. Somewhat similarly, both Confucianism and Buddhism have been conducive to authoritarian rule, even in those cases where, as in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, economic preconditions for democracy have come into being. In India and Japan, on the other hand, the traditional Hindu and Shinto cultures at the very least did not prevent the development of democratic institutions and may well have encouraged it.

How can these differences be explained? Both doctrinal and structural aspects of the religions could play a role. At the most obvious level, those cultures that are consummatory in character—that is, where intermediate and ultimate ends are

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closely connected—seem to be less favorable to democracy. In Islam, for instance, no distinction exists between religion and politics or between the spiritual and the secular, and political participation was historically an alien concept.²⁸ Somewhat similarly, Confucianism in China was generally hostile to social bodies independent of the state, and the culture was conceived as a total entity, no part of which could be changed without threatening the whole. Instrumental cultures, in contrast, are "characterized by a large sector of intermediate ends separate from and independent of ultimate ends" and hence "ultimate ends do not color every concrete act."²⁹ The Hindu tradition, for example, is relatively tolerant of diversity. S. N. Eisenstadt has written that "the basic religious and cultural orientations, the specific cultural identity of Indian civilization were not necessarily associated with any particular political or imperial framework. . . ." ³⁰

As a whole, consummatory culture is thus more resistant to change, and when change comes in one significant element of the culture, the entire culture is thrown into question or is displaced and destroyed. In the instrumental culture, on the other hand, change can come gradually and incrementally. Hence, less resistance exists to the adaptation of new political forms, such as democratic institutions, and the process of adaptation can be an extended one that in itself facilitates the development of stable democracy.

With respect to the more narrowly political culture of a society, it seems reasonable to expect that the prevalence of some values and beliefs will be more conducive to the emergence of democracy than others. A political culture that values highly hierarchical relationships and extreme deference to authority presumably is less fertile ground for democracy than one that does not. Similarly, a culture in which there is a high degree of mutual trust among members of the society is likely to be more favorable to democracy than one in which interpersonal relationships are more generally characterized by suspicion, hostility, and distrust. A willingness to tolerate diversity and conflict among groups and to recognize the legitimacy of compromise also should be helpful to democratic development. Societies in which great stress is put on the need to acquire power and little on the need to accommodate others are more likely to have authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Social scientists have attempted to compare societies along these various dimensions, but the evidence remains fragmented and difficult to systematize.³¹ In addition,

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of course, even if some beliefs and values are found to correlate with the presence of democratic institutions, the question still remains concerning the relationship among these in a developmental sense. To what extent does the development of a pro-democratic political culture have to precede the development of democratic institutions? Or do the two tend to develop more simultaneously with the successful operation of democratic institutions, possibly created for other reasons, generating adherence to democratic values and beliefs?³²

Process of Democratization

The classic model of democratization that has infused much discussion of the subject is that of Britain, with its stately progression from civic rights to political rights to social rights, gradual development of parliamentary supremacy and cabinet government, and incremental expansion of the suffrage over the course of a century. It is basically a linear model. Dankwart A. Rustow's model, based on Swedish experience—national unity, prolonged and inconclusive political struggle, a conscious decision to adopt democratic rules, habituation to the working of those rules—also involves a relatively simple linear progression. These "ingredients," he has argued, "must be assembled one at a time."³³ These linear models primarily reflect European experience during the century ending in 1920 and the experience of some Latin American countries (such as Argentina until 1930 and Chile until 1973).

Two other models have generally been more relevant than the linear model to the experience of Third World countries. One is the cyclical model of alternating despotism and democracy. In this case, key elites normally accept, at least superficially, the legitimacy of democratic forms. Elections are held from time to time, but rarely is there any sustained succession of governments coming to power through the electoral process. Governments are as often the product of military interventions as they are of elections. Such interventions tend to occur either when a radical party wins or appears to threaten the prerogatives of the armed forces, or when the government appears incapable of effectively guiding the economy and maintaining public order. Once a military junta takes over, it will normally promise to return power to civilian rule. In due course, it does so, if only to minimize divisiveness within the armed forces and to escape from its own

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inability to govern effectively. In a praetorian situation like this, neither authoritarian nor democratic institutions are effectively institutionalized. Once countries enter into this cyclical pattern, it appears to be extremely difficult for them to escape from it. In many respects, countries that have had relatively stable authoritarian rule (such as Spain and Portugal) are more likely to evolve into relatively stable democracies than countries that have regularly oscillated between despotism and democracy (such as Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Ghana, Nigeria). In the latter, neither democratic nor authoritarian norms have deep roots among the relevant political elites, while in the former a broad consensus accepting of authoritarian norms is displaced by a broad consensus on or acceptance of democratic ones. In the one case, the alternation of democracy and despotism is the political system; in the other, the shift from a stable despotism to a stable democracy is a change in political systems.

A third model is neither linear nor cyclical but rather dialectical. In this case, the development of a middle class leads to increased pressures on the existing authoritarian regimes for expanded participation and contestation. At some point, there is then a sharp break, perhaps in the form of what I have elsewhere called the "urban breakthrough," the overthrow of the existing authoritarian regime, and the installation of a democratic one.³⁴ This regime, however, finds it difficult or impossible to govern effectively. A sharp reaction occurs with the overthrow of the democratic system and installation of a (usually right-wing) authoritarian regime. In due course, however, this regime collapses and a transition is made to a more stable, more balanced, and longer-lasting democratic system. This model is roughly applicable to the history of a number of countries, including Germany, Italy, Austria, Greece, and Spain.

Most theories of political development in general and of democratization in particular see these processes as involving a number of different elements. The sequence in which those components appear may have important implications for the overall results of the process. Several theorists have suggested, for instance, that the preferable overall process of development for a country is first to define its national identity, next to develop effective institutions of authority, and then to expand political participation. The "probabilities of a political system's development in a nonviolent, nonauthoritarian, and eventually democratically stable manner are maximized," Eric Nordlinger has argued, when this sequence occurs.³⁵ In somewhat parallel

fashion, it has been argued that the development of broad-gauged political institutions for political participation, such as electoral and party systems, must coincide with or precede the expansion of political participation if instability and violence are to be avoided. Similarly, Robert A. Dahl emphasizes the greater probability of success in transitions to democracy (or polyarchy in his terms) if the expansion of contestation precedes the expansion of participation.³⁶

All these theories thus emphasize the desirability for the eventual development of stable democracy of the expansion of political participation occurring relatively late in the sequence of change. However, given the widely accepted desirability of political participation (including in totalitarian regimes) and the major increases in social mobilization (such as urbanization, literacy, and media consumption) produced by economic development, the prevailing tendencies in the contemporary world are for participation to expand early in the process of development, and before or concurrently with contestation. This may be one reason why economic development in the Third World has not stimulated the emergence of more stable democratic regimes. At present, the one notable case where contestation has clearly developed in advance of participation is South Africa. Hence, according to the Dahl thesis, the prospects for democratic development should be greater in South Africa than elsewhere in Africa.

It is often assumed that since democracy, to a greater degree than other forms of government, involves rule by the people, the people therefore play a greater role in bringing it into existence than they do with other forms of government. In fact, however, democratic regimes that last have seldom, if ever, been instituted by mass popular action. Almost always, democracy has come as much from the top down as from the bottom up; it is as likely to be the product of oligarchy as of protest against oligarchy. The passionate dissidents from authoritarian rule and the crusaders for democratic principles, the Tom Paines of this world, do not create democratic institutions; that requires James Madisons. Those institutions come into existence through negotiations and compromises among political elites calculating their own interests and desires. They are produced when, as Rustow argued, political leaders decide "to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure." The political leaders may do this because they are convinced of the ethical and political superiority of democracy and hence view democracy as a desirable goal in itself. More

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likely, however, they will view democracy as a means to other goals, such as prolonging their own rule, achieving international legitimacy, minimizing domestic opposition, and reducing the likelihood of civil violence, from which they will probably suffer. Hence, whatever institutions are agreed on will, in Rustow's words, "seem second-best to all major parties involved."³⁷ One could paraphrase Reinhold Niebuhr: The ability of elites to compromise makes democracy possible; the inclination of elites to vengeance makes democracy desirable—for the elites.

In the decades after World War II, democratic regimes have usually been introduced in independent countries through one or some combination of two processes. Replacement occurs when an authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown as a result of military defeat, economic disaster, or the withdrawal of support from it by substantial groups in the population. Its leaders are killed, imprisoned, flee the country, or withdraw from politics. The leaders of the now-dominant groups, which had not been actively involved with the authoritarian regime, agree among themselves to institute a democratic system. This agreement may be reached very quickly because of previous experience with democracy and because inauguration is seen as the "obvious" solution by the relevant political elites, as in Venezuela in 1958 and Greece in 1974. Or it may come about as a result of political struggle among elites with differing views as to the future of their country, out of which the leaders committed to democracy emerge successfully (as in Portugal in 1975-76). This process may involve, as it did in the case of Venezuela, a series of carefully negotiated pacts among the relevant groups that can cover economic policy and the role of institutions (such as the church and the army), as well as the procedures for choosing a government. One critical issue on which the constitutive elites must agree is how to treat those actively involved in the previous authoritarian regime.³⁸

The alternative process for inaugurating a democratic regime might be termed transformation. In this case, the elites within an authoritarian system conclude that, for some reason or another, that system which they have led and presumably benefited from no longer meets their needs or those of their society. They hence take the lead in modifying the existing political system and transforming it into a democratic one. In this case, while there may well be a variety of internal and external pressures favoring change, the initiative for such change comes from the rulers. Transformation involves, as Juan Linz put it, "change through

reforma rather than ruptura." ³⁹ Notable examples include, of course, Britain in the nineteenth century, and after World War II, Turkey in the 1940s, Spain in the 1970s, and Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s. The leaders of the transformation process typically confront all the problems of the political reformer, having to maneuver skillfully between the stand-patters opposed to any democratization, on the one hand, and the committed dissident and opposition groups demanding the immediate dissolution of the authoritarian system, on the other. Essential to their success is that they be seen as keeping control, acting from a position of strength and not under duress, and dictating the pace of change.

The replacement process requires compromise and agreement among elites who have not been part of the authoritarian regime. The transformation process requires skilled leadership from an agreement among the elites who are part of that regime. In neither case is agreement necessarily required between elites who are within the regime and those opposing the regime. This situation makes replacement and transformation possible, since reaching an agreement between out-groups and in-groups is far more difficult than reaching an agreement among out-groups or among in-groups. Except for Costa Rica in 1948, it is hard to think of a case where a democratic system of any duration was inaugurated by explicit agreement between the leaders of a regime and the leaders of the armed opposition to that regime.

"As long as powerful vested interests oppose changes that lead toward a less oppressive world," Barrington Moore has argued, "no commitment to a free society can dispense with some conception of revolutionary coercion." ⁴⁰ His thesis is that liberty and democracy can be inaugurated by bloody revolution and that such a course may well impose fewer costs than the alternative of gradual reform. When in world history, however, has violent revolution produced a stable democratic regime in an independent state? "Revolutionary coercion" may bring down an authoritarian regime, but, except again for Costa Rica in 1948, guerrilla insurgencies do not inaugurate democratic regimes. All revolutionary opponents of authoritarian regimes claim to be democrats; once they achieve power through violence, almost all turn out to be authoritarian themselves, often imposing an even more repressive regime than the one they overthrew. Most authoritarian regimes are thus replaced by new authoritarian regimes, and a democratic succession usually requires minimum violence. "In the future as in the past," as

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Dahl concluded his study of this issue, "stable polycrises and near-polycrises are more likely to result from rather slow evolutionary overthrow of existing hegemonies."⁴¹

The Prospects for Democracy

This brief and informal survey of the preconditions and processes conducive to the emergence of democratic regimes argues for caution in any effort to predict whether more countries will become democratic. It may, however, be useful to attempt to sum up the modest conclusions which seem to emerge from this review.

With respect to preconditions, the emergence of democracy in a society is helped by a number of factors: higher levels of economic well-being; the absence of extreme inequalities in wealth and income; greater social pluralism, including particularly a strong and autonomous bourgeoisie; a more market-oriented economy; greater influence vis-a-vis the society of existing democratic states; and a culture that is less monistic and more tolerant of diversity and compromise. No one of these preconditions is sufficient to lead to democratic development. With the possible exception of a market economy, no single precondition is necessary to produce such development. Some combination of some of these preconditions is required for a democratic regime to emerge, but the nature of that combination can vary greatly from one case to another. It is also necessary, however, to look not only at what preconditions must be present but also at the negative strength of any precondition that may be absent. The powerful absence of one favorable condition, or conversely, the presence of a powerful negative condition, that overrides the presence of otherwise favorable conditions, may prevent democratic development. In terms of cultural tradition, economic development, and social structure, Czechoslovakia would certainly be a democracy today (and probably Hungary and Poland also) if it were not for the overriding veto of the Soviet presence. In similar fashion, extreme poverty, extreme economic inequalities, or deeply ingrained Islamic and Confucian cultural traditions could have comparable effect in Africa, Central America, or the Middle East and East Asia.

With respect to the processes necessary to bring about democratic development, a central requirement would appear to be that either the established elites within an authoritarian system or the successor elites after an authoritarian system collapses see

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their interests served by the introduction of democratic institutions. The probability of stable democracy emerging will be enhanced to the extent that the transition can be a gradual one, that the introduction of contestation precedes the expansion of political participation, and that the role of violence in the transition is minimized. The probability of democratization decreases sharply to the extent that political life in a society becomes highly polarized and involves violent conflict between social forces.

Possibility of regime changes.

In terms of these generalizations, prospects for democratic development in the 1980s are probably greatest in the bureaucratic-authoritarian states of South America. Cultural traditions, levels of economic development, previous democratic experience, social pluralism (albeit with weak bourgeoisies outside Brazil), and elite desires to emulate European and North American models all favor movement toward democracy in these countries. On the other hand, the polarization and violence that has occurred (particularly in Argentina and Chile) could make such movement difficult. The prospects for a relatively stable democratic system should be greatest in Brazil. Beginning in the early 1970s, the leadership of the Brazilian regime began a process of *distensao*, gradually relaxing the authoritarian controls that had been imposed in the 1960s. By the early 1980s, Brazil had acquired many of the characteristics of a democratic system. The principal deficiency was the absence of popular elections for the chief executive, but those were generally viewed as certain to come sometime in the 1980s. The gradualness of the Brazilian process, the relative low level of violence that accompanied it, and the general recognition among elite groups of the importance of not disrupting it in any way, all seemed to enhance the prospects for democracy.

In Argentina, the economic and military failures of the authoritarian regime led to a much more dramatic and rapid transit to democracy in 1983. The probabilities of this replacement being sustained would seem to depend on three factors: the ability of the Alfonsin government to deal with the economic problems it confronted; the extent to which Peronista, as well as Radical, elites were willing to abide by democratic rules; and the extent to which military leadership was effectively excluded from power

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or came to identify its interests with the maintenance of a democratic regime. The two other southern cone countries with bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, Chile and Uruguay, are the two South American countries that did have the strongest democratic traditions. As of 1984, however, in neither country had authoritarian rule lost its legitimacy and effectiveness to the point where it could no longer be maintained and a replacement process could occur (as in Argentina). Nor had the leaders of either regime embarked on a meaningful transformation process to democratize their system (as in Brazil). The Brazilian and Argentine changes, however, cannot fail to have impact on political development in the smaller countries.

The probability of movement in a democratic direction in the East Asian newly industrializing countries is considerably less than it is among the Latin American B-A states. The economic basis for democracy is clearly coming into existence, and if their economic development continues at anything like the rates it did in the 1960s and 1970s, these states will soon constitute an authoritarian anomaly among the wealthier countries of the world. The East Asian countries generally have also had and maintained a relatively equal distribution of income. In addition, the United States, Britain, and Japan are the principal external influences on these societies. All these factors favor democratic development. On the other side, cultural traditions, social structure, and a general weakness of democratic norms among key elites all impede movement in a democratic direction. In some measure, the East Asian states dramatically pose the issue of whether economics or culture has the greater influence on political development. One can also speculate on whether the spread of Christianity in Korea may create a cultural context more favorable to democracy.

Among other less economically developed East Asian societies, the prospects for democracy are undoubtedly highest but still not very high in the Philippines. The Marcos government is not likely to attempt to transform itself, and hence efforts to create a democratic system must await its demise. At that time, American influence, previous experience with democracy, social pluralism (including the influence of the Catholic Church), and the general agreement among opposition political leaders on the desirability of a return to democracy, should all provide support for movement in that direction. On the other hand, military leaders may not support democratic norms, and the existence of a radical insurgency committed to violence, plus a general proclivity to the use of violence in the society, might make such a transition diffi-

cult. Conceivably, Philippine development could follow the lines of the dialectical model referred to earlier, in which (as in Venezuela) an initial experience with democracy is broken by a personalistic authoritarian interlude that then collapses and a new, more stable democratic regime is brought into existence by agreement among political leaders. The Philippine Betancourt, however, may well have been gunned down at the Manila airport.

Among Islamic countries, particularly those in the Middle East, the prospects for democratic development seem low. The Islamic revival, and particularly the rise of Shi'ite fundamentalism, would seem to reduce even further the likelihood of democratic development, particularly since democracy is often identified with the very Western influences the revival strongly opposes. In addition, many of the Islamic states are very poor. Those that are rich, on the other hand, are so because of oil, which is controlled by the state and hence enhances the power of the state in general and of the bureaucracy in particular. Saudi Arabia and some of the smaller Arab oil-rich Gulf countries have from time to time made some modest gestures toward the introduction of democratic institutions, but these have not gone far and have often been reversed.

Most African countries are, by reason of their poverty or the violence of their politics, unlikely to move into a democratic direction. Those African and Latin American countries that have adhered to the cyclical pattern of alternating democratic and authoritarian systems in the past are not likely to change this basic pattern, as the example of Nigeria underlines, unless more fundamental changes occur in their economic and social infrastructure. In South Africa, on the other hand, the relatively high level of economic development by African standards, the intense contestation that occurs within the minority permitted to participate in politics, the modest expansion of that minority to include the Coloureds and Asians, and the influence of Western democratic norms, all provide a basis for moving in a more democratic direction. However, that basis is countered on the other side by the inequalities, fears, and hatreds that separate blacks and whites.

In some small countries, democratic institutions may emerge as a result of massive foreign effort. This did happen in the Dominican Republic; in 1984 it was, presumably, happening in Grenada; it could, conceivably, happen at extremely high cost in El Salvador.

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The likelihood of democratic development in Eastern Europe is virtually nil. The Soviet presence is a decisive overriding obstacle, no matter how favorable other conditions may be in countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Democratization could occur in these societies only if either the Soviet Union were drastically weakened through war, domestic upheaval, or economic collapse (none of which seems likely), or if the Soviet Union came to view Eastern European democratization as not threatening to its interests (which seems equally unlikely).

The issue of Soviet intervention apart, a more general issue concerns the domestic pattern of evolution within Communist states, for almost four decades after World War II, no democratic country, with the dubious possible exception of Czechoslovakia in 1948, became Communist and no Communist country became democratic through internal causes. Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, were frequently replaced by either democratic or Communist regimes, and democratic regimes were replaced by authoritarian ones. In their early phase, Communist states usually approximated the totalitarian model, with ideology and the party playing central roles and massive efforts being made to indoctrinate and mobilize the population and to extend party control throughout all institutions in the society. Over time, however, Communist regimes also tend to change and often to become less totalitarian and more authoritarian. The importance of ideology and mobilization declines, bureaucratic stagnation replaces ideological fervor, and the party becomes less a dedicated elite and more a mechanism for patronage. In some cases, military influence increases significantly. The question thus arises: Will Communist authoritarian regimes, absent Soviet control, be more susceptible to movement toward democracy than Communist totalitarian regimes?

The answer to that question may well depend on the extent to which Communist authoritarian regimes permit the development of a market-oriented economy. The basic thrust of communism suggests that such a development is unlikely. Communism is not, as Karl Marx argued, a product of capitalist democracy; nor is it simply a "disease of the transition" to capitalist democracy, to use Rostow's phrase.⁴² It is instead an alternative to capitalist democracy and one whose guiding principle is the subjection of economic development to political control. Even if it becomes more authoritarian and less totalitarian, the Communist political

system is likely to ensure that economic development neither achieves a level nor assumes a form that will be conducive to democracy.

The United States and global democracy.

The ability of the United States to affect the development of democracy elsewhere is limited. There is little that the United States or any other foreign country can do to alter the basic cultural tradition and social structure of another society or to promote compromise among groups of that society that have been killing each other. Within the restricted limits of the possible, however, the United States could contribute to democratic development in other countries in four ways.

First, it can assist the economic development of poor countries and promote a more equitable distribution of income and wealth in those countries. Second, it can encourage developing countries to foster market economies and the development of vigorous bourgeois classes. Third, it can refurbish its own economic, military, and political power so as to be able to exercise greater influence than it has in world affairs. Finally, it can develop a concerted program designed to encourage and to help the elites of countries entering the "transition zone" to move their countries in a more democratic direction.

Efforts such as these could have a modest influence on the development of democracy in other countries. Overall, however, this survey of the preconditions for and processes of democratization leads to the conclusion that, with a few exceptions, the prospects for the extension of democracy to other societies are not great. These prospects would improve significantly only if there were major discontinuities in current trends—such as if, for instance, the economic development of the Third World were to proceed at a much faster rate and to have a far more positive impact on democratic development than it has had so far, or if the United States reestablished a hegemonic position in the world comparable to that which it had in the 1940s and 1950s. In the absence of developments such as these, a significant increase in the number of democratic regimes in the world is unlikely. The substantial power of anti-democratic governments (particularly the Soviet Union), the unreceptivity to democracy of several major cultural traditions, the difficulties of eliminating poverty in large parts of the world, and the prevalence of high levels of

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polarization and violence in many societies all suggest that, with a few exceptions, the limits of democratic development in the world may well have been reached.

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3. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 4-9' See also Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Bros. 1947), 269: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.

4. James Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 1:24.

5. The proportion of independent states that were democratic was roughly 19 percent in 1920, 32 percent in 1929-30, and 24 percent in 1960. See G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 238.

6. See "The Comparative Survey of Freedom" compiled annually for Freedom House by Raymond II Gastil, particularly *Freedom at Issue*, no. 17 (1973): 2-3; no. 70 (1983): 4; no. 76 (1984): 5- Freedom House classifies a state as "free" if it rates in first or second place on a seven-place scale for both political rights and civil liberties. The countries so classified all have the minimum features of a democratic political system, at least at the time of classification. While recognizing the importance of institutionalization, the Freedom House survey does not attempt to measure the extent to which democracy has become institutionalized. Thus, its 1984 survey, published at the very beginning of 1984, rated both New Zealand and Nigeria as "free," although the latter had presumably left the category as a result of the coup on New Year's Day.

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Analyzing the Democratic Struggle in Central America

The Problem

Since World War II the United States has striven to support democracy as well as to maintain its other interests in the world. On the one hand, this has been a part of our general commitment to the extension of human rights of every kind, including the simple provision of enough food for the starving. It has often been considered a part of our "missionary" tendency, but whatever its origins it remains admirable. Support of democracy could not, however, become an important part of our foreign policy if it was only an expression of our commitment to human welfare. Americans also believe that supporting democracy and development is the best way of assuring the peaceful transition of the poor and oppressed of the world to a better life, and thus to avoid the growth of international communism that has threatened to engulf the world. Unfortunately, defeating communism has often seemed to have precedence over the longer term objective of promoting human rights. This precedence is said to characterize the Reagan Administration, particularly in regard to Central America.

The task here is not to analyze whether anticommunism has been particularly characteristic of one administration or another. One reason emphasis often has been placed on the essentially negative goal of containing communism has been the repeated failure of attempts to support democracy in so much of the third world. There is no doubt that democracy recently has made progress in certain areas, notably Europe, but equally little doubt that its record has been disappointing in much of the rest of the world despite often heroic American attempts to defend and develop it. This has led some to believe that democracy is only acceptable in certain cultures, and that elsewhere it will take generations if it is ever to be accepted. Containing communism directly appears to be a more attainable goal.

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Central America is a very good example of this problem. Today we are promoting democracy. Yet, if we go back a few years and look at a book such as Mario Rodriguez's *Central America*,¹ we notice that this is not the first time around. In the 1960s America was involved in the same quest as today, but apparently with little result. The hopefulness of Rodriguez in describing the progress that had been made in supporting democracy since the Second World War would be hard to match in the writing of authorities on the area of either right or left in the 1980s. Democracy has not progressed in the region since 1965. The only way that some of the more hopeful authors today can make it seem that there has been progress is to devalue, often unfairly, what was accomplished in the earlier period.

The problem in Central America is that the people and their leaders are very familiar with democracy as we know it, have tried repeatedly for over a century to establish working democracies, and, except for Costa Rica, have not yet institutionalized democratic systems. If the experiments of this generation, backed in most cases by the goodwill and support of the United States, are to be given a better chance to succeed perhaps we need to analyze from a variety of angles what the problems of democracy in the area have been. This essay is an attempt to discuss these problems, and if possible to move beyond them.

Central American Political History

The expert opinion on northern Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua) is in agreement on the characteristics of the political systems, that is, the quasi-democracies, in the region during the last half-century.² Costa Rica came from the same political tradition as its neighbors, but certain fortunate aspects of its situation allowed for its escape from the undemocratic regional patterns.³ Panama is often not considered a part of Central America, particularly by its people. Yet geopolitically in the modern world it is a part of the region. Much the same political analysis could be applied to Panama, in spite of the quite different particulars of its economic, social, and political history.⁴ As in the rest of the Americas, the Central American states adopted as they separated from Spain, and then from one another, the formal institutions of liberal democracy, which generally meant a president and legislature on the American model. However, the course of politics was frequently

disrupted by coups, countercoups, and rebellions. Such disruptions, combined with frequent extra-legal dictatorships, became a norm, a part of the system as surely as the numerous and generally ignored constitutions they displaced.

The pattern of rule in the nineteenth century was essentially aristocratic. The main participants in politics were wealthy hacienda owners, accompanied by their private armies. Supporting roles were played by the urban elites, military commanders, and foreign interlopers. The societies were rural and feudal; state administrations were weak. Political parties were organized ostensibly along ideological lines as "liberal" or "conservative," but frequently the political contest was simply between factions of the local aristocracy.

Slowly the area became urbanized, even though the basis of the urbanization was generally agricultural crops such as bananas or coffee. Urban elites increasingly played a part as the middle classes grew. New leftist ideologies also came into the region, at least by the 1920s. The Mexican model had considerable influence on the political ideas of the region, but later European ideologies of both right and left spawned local movements.

The worldwide depression of the 1930s brought the right and left into sharp conflict over ideological issues for the first time. In Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua this clash brought to power military strongmen who could effectively counter the twin threats of anarchy and socialism. In El Salvador the cost of stemming a partly communist and partly Indian revolution was the execution of over ten thousand of the participants; an episode that helped to bring to an end the independent existence of Indian culture in the country. Honduras spent the depression under elected and enlightened leadership—but, unwilling to step down, its leader later allowed his administration to degenerate into corruption. The struggle with ideology and military rule reached Costa Rica and Panama in the 1940s, and Honduras in the 1950s.

As a result of this struggle the oligarchs, the old aristocracy, lost a large measure of control over their societies to the new breed of military officers—except in Costa Rica. Temporary stability was achieved at the cost of institutionalizing and greatly expanding the armed forces. The states now had national armies that far overshadowed the private forces of the haciendas or political parties. This was the price of growth. However, the weakness of the state mechanisms within which the armed forces were caused to develop meant that to a greater or lesser extent

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they quickly themselves became the state. The victory of the armed forces was most complete in Nicaragua and Guatemala, least in Panama. From now on when the oligarchs wished to enlist the state in defense of their interests they dealt not with civilian bureaucrats but directly with the generals. Of course, they had dealt similarly with the leaders of their own forces in the past, but now the balance of power had decisively shifted. The generals became identified with the government rather than the reverse; they became at least the equals of the aristocrats that had created them. Once in power military leaders have increasingly used their new power to become personally wealthy. In Nicaragua this process reached its apotheosis: by the 1970s the military leader had displaced the economic position of the oligarchy almost completely.

In Costa Rica the story turned out differently, in spite of the essential similarity of much of its history and culture to those of its neighbors. In the 1940s the government attempted serious reforms, to move in a leftist and statist direction while maintaining its weak military institution. But the struggle of left and right was soon displaced by the autocracy of the government into a struggle of democracy versus tyranny. The insurgent forces of democracy were slightly to the right of the government. Unlike most such movements they were also antimilitary, and thus failed to incorporate any military factions as would have been the traditional regional pattern. The victory of this insurgency allowed the Costa Ricans to call for the abolition of a separate military institution and the establishment of a truly pluralistic-check and balance-governmental structure for the first time in the region. At the same time the broad ideological base of the insurgents permitted the welfarism of the left to be incorporated peacefully into a working consensual democracy.

Politics and military rule have been almost synonymous in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua since 1930, a pattern that was extended to Honduras and Panama in the 1940s and 1950s. Although there were often coups, the forms of the system remained those of liberal democracy, and elections of assemblies and presidents continued to be the norm. However, it was not expected that the generals would allow such forms to interfere with their rule, an outcome often assured by recruiting all candidates from the military. The occasional civilian president might reign, but he did not rule. This is not to say that the ever-growing modern middle class and more politically conscious lower class did not

play a role or had no influence on the evolution of the national system, at least marginally.

Although each national officer corps held power as a group, and often supported the local oligarchs or powerful foreign companies (still rare in El Salvador) because of the immediate economic benefits these wealthy groups could provide, the armed forces of no country were monolithic. Successive military "generations" could be very thin, often only two or three years in depth; as one generation displaced the one before, sometimes with bloodshed, the common coin of legitimacy for the new ruling coalition was that of reform, justice, or redistribution. Armies frequently had left and right factions. It is often forgotten that the left that achieved power briefly in the early 1950s in Guatemala was primarily a military faction. Panama's flirtation with Cuba and its revolutionary model in the early 1970s occurred during a period of military rule. Panama's socialist experiments also echoed contemporaneous socialist military experiments in Peru.⁵

The origin of Central American military officers has in recent years seldom been aristocratic; some have had quite modest social origins. Within their own experience there was certainly an echo of the popular desire for more justice. Where peasant and worker organizations were powerful, as in Honduras, officers might well see it to their advantage to support the cause of the poor against foreign or local wealth. It was also true that the military officers were often some of the most educated persons in the society, and were by that fact often more aware than the average citizens of the events and the movements of the rest of the world, and of the significance these might have for their own country.

The states of Central America have developed at different rates and to some degree in different directions, and their military structures reflect these differences. In Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras the military developed into strongly rooted and inward looking institutions. Leaders came and went with little affect on the structure. While there were many divisions within the officer corps, it generally showed a united front vis-a-vis the rest of the society. At the beginning of the process, however, in Nicaragua the Somozas were able to organize the armed forces as a personal or family power base, and to run the country on the basis of personal loyalty to a particular line of military leaders until their overthrow at the end of the 1970s. The Somoza organization of the armed forces based on personalism was no doubt more brittle and less open to change than that in the other states of the region.

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Against military domination of politics, the civilian middle classes, with ever-growing numbers and self-confidence, have continued to struggle. They have been emboldened by the example and occasional help of the Costa Ricans. Political parties have arisen that are more than the vehicles for private ambition that characterized the past. Nevertheless, the efforts of such parties to achieve actual control over their societies have been repeatedly frustrated. Hopeful elections have taken place repeatedly since the 1930s, but they have never led to the kind of stable democratic evolution that occurred after 1948 in Costa Rica. The 1970s had a less democratic regional record than any decade since the twenties.

By the early 1980s, the entire leadership of the civilian parties of Guatemala has been liquidated or driven out of the country. Still the parties existed and in 1984 were revived for yet another round of elections and return to "civilian rule." In Honduras civilian rule was supposedly reestablished in the early 1980s: almost immediately it was undercut by an ambitious officer. With his recent ejection from the country by his colleagues, there is another chance for civilian rule and the beginning of a constitutional tradition. In El Salvador a succession of military presidents was brought to an end by a military coup that eventually put into "power" the popular civilian leader of the country's largest party. Subsequent elections have provided the country with an assembly and now a civilian president; yet there still remains the serious question as to whether the civilian government can achieve institutional freedom from military dominance. The inability of recent governments to bring to trial members of the armed forces, even for obvious and egregious crimes, will need to be clearly repudiated by civilian political and judicial action before observers will believe that a civilian administration really runs the country.

Nicaragua is a special case. Yet in the Central American context the Sandinista leaders may be viewed as yet another armed junta, operating under yet another ideological cover. It is significant that their most obvious achievement has been a massive expansion of the army. The election held in November 1984 did not come up to the standards for competition of elections this year in El Salvador or even Guatemala. The lack of serious competition was not entirely the fault of the government. Without being compelled by force of arms, whether the Sandinistas would ever allow another group to come to power is disputable. In Panama the May 1984 presidential and legislative election suffered from

considerable and successful military intervention to influence the result--thereby laying the groundwork for a continuation of the military's mixture of welfarism and corruption.

Power balances vary from country to country. In Guatemala today the balance is very much on the side of the armed forces, with civilian parties, oligarchs, and guerrillas playing lesser roles. In El Salvador and Honduras the forces are more balanced, but at least in the former the military appears dominant. In El Salvador other major forces are the participating political parties, the elected civilian government, the "disloyal right" (with its death squads), the unions and peasant organizations, the church, the non-participating left, and the guerrillas. The opposing coalitions in Panama are analogous to those in Costa Rica in 1948. Many on the left are allied with the military and the very wealthy; the opposition represents the several middle classes, some of the poor, and the old oligarchy. The outside role of the United States in El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama is unusually strong. This is due to the amount of American aid, the degree of American concern, and the willingness of many groups within these societies to lean on and expect help and advice from the United States and its emissaries to business, labor, military, and political leaders. We seem often to act as an umpire. Like an umpire we are often detested; much can be accomplished in any group within these societies by appealing to anti-American feelings.

How, then, with these expectations and these experiences do we effectively help to establish and maintain democratic institutions? Perhaps it would help to answer this question if we thought back over some rather commonsense theories of the nature of government and of the distinction of democracy from other types of government, and considered some of the motives of those involved in political competition.

Understanding Democracy as a Political System

In Part III the theoretical approach to democracy of Alfred Kuhn was outlined. Organizations are seen to consist of sponsors (those who establish or come into possession of the organization for their own benefit), staff (those hired to carry out the work of the organization) and recipients (those who pay the expenses of the organization--although as customers they may also receive benefits in return for payment).⁶ An organization is established

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by one man or a group of sponsors; they employ a staff to obtain their goals or serve their values, and then establish a "market" or group of recipients that is used both as the resource and consumer for these goals or values.

A government is a particularly comprehensive, multipurpose organization. The recipients of a governmental organization pay the taxes and receive those benefits the system allocates them. The business organization analogy is useful for understanding different forms of government. A "profit-making" government is one in which there is a complete separation of the sponsors—the investors—from the recipients. A cooperative government is, on the other hand, analogous to a producer or consumer cooperative in the United States, in which the recipients and the sponsors are identical, at least in law. Cooperative governments may be seen most clearly in those small town governments where the entire population comes together to decide on hiring the town's staff for the year, as well as on the tax rate that they will apply to themselves.

Democracy is a cooperative political system; monarchies and other autocracies more closely approximate profit-making governments. There are many examples in history of small groups conquering whole societies, displacing the government and establishing a new government as sponsors, owners, or rulers. In the Spanish conquest of empires such as the Aztec and the Inca, as well as in the Norman conquest of England, we can identify definite small groups of sponsors—the nobles, knights, or conquistadors. The Normans, and the Anglo-Saxons they employed to manage their domains, had responsibility to the lords of the land and not to the general populace. Below this staff there was the overwhelming majority of the population, generally of a different race or ethnic group, that were controlled, exploited, and protected from outsiders. In England over a period of centuries the group of people accepted as sponsors was extended until finally a liberal democracy emerged in which at least all middle class males became through elections the sponsors of the governmental system; finally liberal democracy made all adults sponsors if they cared to make the effort.

In the special language of political life, the group of sponsors actually determining policy at any one time is the "ruling coalition." The ruling coalition is that group of people or political group that has, through force or other means, a decisive influence in the affairs of the state. Ruling coalitions in democracies are made up of the leaders of politically active

subgroups that command more than fifty percent of the voting population.

Governments in which the ruling coalition represents only a small minority, or even essentially only one individual, must be ruled by unjust force, although in times of peace and tranquillity this fact will often be masked. For a time the individual or small group sponsor may rule with the consent of the majority, but inevitably a time comes when the interests of the ruler and the majority diverge. Then he must either step aside, or use force to maintain his position.

Class Analysis and Democracy

Since rulers seldom are equally representative of all segments of their society, we need to add to our model a conception of social class. The role of classes in governing or in establishing the "ruling coalition" has historically been an important one. The upper class generally represents only one or two percent of a population. However, since it controls a greatly disproportionate part of the material, political, and spiritual power of the society, its members often feel that they have an inherited and indefinitely extended right to rule over others. This claim can be maintained in a democracy only as long as the majority feels it is in its interest to have aristocratic leaders. During a transition phase, as at the beginning of the American political system, the representatives of the upper class can maintain their position through suasion and aligning their interests with those of other groups. However, in a democracy aristocratic leaders must eventually legitimize their position through bringing into the dominant coalition representatives of larger and larger segments of the population. This process must end with upper class loss of control over the dominant coalition, or upper class leaders must turn to repression. In the American case control of the system was rapidly lost by our fledgling aristocracy.

The upper class consists of those with the most power and wealth per person. A member of the upper class is expected to be able on his own to influence the political or economic system. The middle class consists of those with much less power and wealth per person than members of the upper class, but still a respectable amount in terms of the society. In modern societies the middle class has more power collectively than the upper class. The lower class (often referred to in the third world as "peasants

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and workers") contains those persons with little or no individual power or wealth. In traditional societies the vast majority is lower class; this is no longer true in modern society.

The upper class is the group whose individual family heads are powerful. They can by themselves "get things done." The middle class is the group whose family heads are independent, generally through the possession of property. They have a stake in the society such that they can defend their interests against others in normal times. The lower class family heads are typically dependent. They do not individually have power to defend their interests, and generally own no property. They are also unlikely to belong to permanently organized interest groups.

The lines between the classes are bound to be indefinite: many more classes can be identified for special purposes. Traditionally the upper class is both very small and the ruling class; the middle class is larger and more diverse. The upper middle class of professionals and bureaucrats may be the most refined and educated group. Generally urban, in many societies its members feel, like the upper class, that they are superior to any form of hand labor. The lower middle class of independent artisans and small farmers may actually do the same work as members of the lower class, yet their possessions give this work a different meaning. Lower class members are manual laborers, or hold other low-status jobs, receive low wages, and own little or nothing. Small shopkeepers, artisans, and peasants owning small amounts of land may or may not be placed in the lower class. It is partially a matter of how they identify themselves and how they are looked on by the rest of the society. A Guatemalan Indian with a small plot is lower class; a Hindu peasant in India with an equivalent piece of land may be lower-middle class.

Members of the upper classes may be motivated by a sense of social service. But to continue ruling they have to either serve society in the way that people outside their class want, or they must massively and continuously coerce the rest of the society directly by means of their hired staff, including most prominently the security forces, and indirectly through control of the media and education.

For upper-class leaders to continue to rule democratically they will have to extend their class basis of support to form a dominant coalition. This extension may be to the class closest to them, the middle class, to the lower class, or to a powerful quasi-class such as the military. If a coalition with the middle class develops, not only the interests but also the members of the

middle class will have to be incorporated into the dominant coalition, so that they too can achieve the material benefits and power associated with political rule. This occurred in the United States by the 1820s. Since the middle class is always much the larger, the end result of this process will be the transfer of rule to the middle classes, with their standards and values. Individuals of the former ruling class may still play an important part in government, but they will no longer rule as a class. The United Kingdom is a good example of this relationship in recent years.

In a democracy the middle class rules by right in those societies in which the majority feels itself to be middle class, as in the United States. Where this is not true, the middle class may still rule politically because of the relative indifference or ignorance of a large segment of the lower class. If this does not suffice, if the lower class threatens to actually take power, then the middle class will be faced with the same dilemma as formerly faced the upper classes: it can maintain democracy but lose control to the lower class, or resort to oppressive measures to avoid such a transfer. The dilemma is largely avoided if the advance of education and technology is rapid enough to expand the middle class to over fifty percent of the total population. In this case the middle class will be willing to incorporate the lower classes fully into the political system as part of, but not dominant in, the ruling coalition.

Without this transition to general lower class participation, however, the attempt to "use" the lower class as a part of the political system is likely to run counter to the development of institutionalized democracy. This is particularly true when the dominant coalition consists of a few of the wealthy and a majority of the very poor. There are a number of contributory causes, including the lower-class' minimal education and acquaintance with the problems of the society as a whole, and a poverty so severe that small payments or promises of jobs can successfully influence votes. Blind loyalties can be produced by the offer of relatively low status and plentiful jobs, especially in the security services, because such jobs greatly increase the individual wealth or power of any lower-class member. Lower class members are also more likely than members of other classes to have an acceptance of, or experience in violence.⁷ Their fear or willingness to resort to violence can be used by whoever manipulates them. In

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elections, for example, it is relatively easy to employ pervasive fear in lower class areas to induce abstention or directed voting.

A primary problem for democracy within working- or lower-class movements is the characteristic relationship of leaders to followers that develops over time. In a non-aristocratic society, that is a society that has been to a considerable extent socially "democratized," the level of material and cultural life accepted as standard is that of the middle or upper-middle classes. The working-class political or labor leader quickly gravitates to, and is expected by his followers to work at, a level of at least middle-class comfort, housing, and transportation. No longer is such a leader expected to do manual labor or any low-status job. It is often felt—or rationalized—that a working-class representative cannot be accepted as an equal by those he negotiates with unless he adopts their class standards of material life. The result is a leader whose position in life—power and wealth—depends on a group with a markedly different position. This engenders a distance between leaders and led. It also makes lower-class leaders and their coteries passionately opposed to all those forces or persons within or without the lower classes who would displace them. There is no alternative status to which such leaders can imagine returning. To the upper-class leader leaving politics often means returning on a day-to-day basis to a better level of living and a "superior" class of companions than is available while in a political position. To a middle-class leader, to a Harry Truman for example, losing a position in government often means returning to head the family business, going back to a law practice, or a professorship, perhaps to a comfortable retirement. Politics for people in these classes becomes a game in which fair and just rules can apply, because it can be lost without personal disaster. Such is not the case for the lower-class leader, a reason persuasively shown to account for the lack of true democracy in most American labor unions.⁸

More generally, class differences between leaders and led are not likely in the long run to support democracy. This is particularly true where a leader or small group makes a claim for the support of the lower classes when that claim is based on nothing more than a theoretical or outsiders view of what the lower classes should want the political system to produce. This claim was often made in the past by monarchs or other upper-class leaders who wished to get around the opposition of those immediately below them. Today it is characteristic of leaders of the

extreme left who typically are from the middle classes. Their assumption of leadership of the classes below them proceeds from theory rather than personal experience or true identification of interests. The assumption is without any testing procedure through voting or other means. Once such pseudo-class leaders achieve power they are generally unwilling to test that power through a democratic means. They have not developed their positions out of the give and take of a democratic political career, so they are unlikely to either understand or want to step aside to allow a more authentic expression of lower-class desires.

Although this class analysis was intentionally kept quite simple, it does need to be complicated at least in one regard. Many economies and societies in the developing world have both a traditional and a modern sector. A country such as Iran, for example, may have both modern and traditional middle classes, and to some extent modern and traditional lower classes. The hostility between these sectors may become intense in that their objectives, their standards of success, of right and wrong, are quite different.

Traditional middle classes have property and follow traditional professions little affected by the outside world. They generally feel at home with the practices of their inherited religion or cult. The modern middle class has received training in modern schools and modern subjects. Its models of behavior are generally international. Members of this class may still regard themselves as religious believers, but their beliefs are greatly modified by compromises that make possible full participation in a larger world.

The traditional lower class is comprised of people in the lowest status positions, often people with no property. They do, however, have a status in the older system, and may be fundamentally conservative. The modern lower class may actually be better off materially, but since it is more aware of what it lacks, it is more likely to demand its rights. It has less security, and is more painfully hurt by modern phenomena such as unemployment than its traditional counterpart. It is the lower class most likely to be recruited into the armies of both the left and the right.

In Central America and elsewhere the fundamental split in the lower class may be between the politically involved and uninvolved. While, for example, plantation workers are obviously more inclined than most lower class groups to be organized and politically active, on occasion even comparatively isolated lower class groups, such as some of the Amerindians, may be very politically

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active and traditional. Since nondemocratic rule is often based on the noninvolvement of the majority, it is characteristic of guerrilla war and counterinsurgency campaigns that they increasingly bring larger and larger portions of the lower classes into the national political process—thereby in many cases shifting the political balance against the "ruling coalition," no matter what the outcome of day-to-day battles in the field might be.

Another very important class cleavage in Central America is that between small farmers, even peasant farmers, with enough land to live on, perhaps with the help of a tenant or laborer, and those with nothing, or not enough to live on without hiring themselves out. In El Salvador there is good reason to see much of the support of ARENA and other conservative groups coming from lower-middle-class farmers. The conservatism of this small-holder class is, of course, a general phenomenon of developing societies, such as India.

With much oversimplification we can say that members of the educated middle class in Central America have three political tendencies: to hold on to what they have against change (and especially the threat of lower class or governmental usurpation), to expand the power and size of their class (particularly in relation to the wealthy, the military, or the foreigners), or to expand their personal power through giving leadership to the poor majority. Generally politically involved individuals will fall into one or the other category—but there is much overlap.

The tragedy of a seriously divided middle class is that the fractions are not large enough to rule individually, and yet are unwilling to accept the legitimacy of the others' claim to rule. As a result, for any faction of the middle class to rule, as a minority it must resort to oppression, which means either the use of violence or accepting dependence on either the upper or lower classes for additional strength, and the contradictions such involvement is bound to produce.

In *El Salvador in Transition*, Enrique Baloyra makes the point that the factions of El Salvador's seriously split middle class must depend on the armed forces of those much more radical than they.⁹ Thus, the intellectual left must depend on the guerrillas, while the more conservative middle classes must depend on the army. Each risks, thereby, losing control of the political process should it win in the security struggle.

If united, the natural ally of democratic development, both because of its greater exposure to such systems elsewhere and the fact democracy would clearly increase the class' power over what

it had been, is the middle class. Unfortunately, in Central America the middle class has generally been too small to rule by itself, even if the political systems were effectively democratic. It has also been unable to compete with the power of the armed forces without itself making alliances with the upper class. The result has been a partially compelled and partially willed acceptance of highly imperfect or incomplete democratic forms.

The sponsors in any governmental system must employ a staff to administer or enforce order. There is always a danger that the staff will come to usurp the role of the sponsors, and come themselves to determine the values that the new order represents and the distribution of those values. This occurs in all governmental systems, but differences of degree make for qualitative distinctions. When the staff has the guns, when it has control over the defense and internal security of the country, the problem is most obvious. The lack of continuity of many ruling classes, their frequent "renewal" often results from staff usurpation. Particularly in Central America the upper classes have been largely replaced in the last fifty years by military "classes," which in some cases they helped to bring to power. At best they have been able to maintain an uneasy alliance with the military, an alliance that allows neither group--old oligarchy or new military--to spend much of their efforts on serving the general public interest. One result of this narrowing of the sense of service by those in government has been the very high level of disaffection of all other classes.

The armed forces are most likely to come under the control of democratic political systems when the leaders of those forces identify with and come from the middle classes that are in control of a functioning democratic system. Unfortunately, the incomplete control of the democratic system by the middle classes has forced the military to look to other sources of support, and therefore further estranged them from the middle class. The weakness of the Central American middle class has engendered a vicious spiral that maintains its weakness.

For their part, in addition to serving and dominating upper class representatives, military leaders have been tempted to reinforce their legitimacy by periodic claims to represent the interests of the workers and peasants. However, because of their historic role in oppression, because of their function more as police than soldiers in an area with few recent international wars, they have seldom been able to overcome their distance from the rest of society. In the crunch most armed forces in the

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region have seen their salvation primarily in terms of reinforcing their own solidarity in the face of their alienation from all classes in the society. They have become, in effect, a quasi-class. This new class incorporates into it middle (and occasionally lower class) persons interested in wealth or power, and then recruits generally by force much larger numbers of lower-class persons who are expected to remain a part of the military or veteran class for the rest of their lives. Once established this military "class" is not threatened by the forms of democracy, but it is threatened by any attempt to express control over it through democratic or other institutions.

The class relationships of regional guerrilla forces are in some respects analogous to those of the government's armed forces. They too recruit their officers from the middle class and forcibly recruit from the lower classes in the areas in which they operate. They too exist in such small numbers that they must achieve and preserve their power through the power of the gun. They ostensibly serve the lower classes—many of those involved certainly have had social service in mind, probably a much higher percentage than in the government's armed forces. But as guerrilla forces succeed the achievement or maintenance of power and (later) material standards becomes increasingly important in the life of guerrilla leaders and their immediate entourages.

Political Culture and Democracy

It may be useful to try to understand the region's politics in terms of the region's "political culture." To have a different culture means to have different expectations about the world and therefore different means of adjusting to or overcoming it. Just because two Central Americans face one another in a political contest that is formally similar to those in the United States does not imply that the individuals involved will employ the same means we commonly expect politicians to employ in our culture.

Cultures develop as the result of experiences, as these are reinforced generation after generation by the transmission of ideas and history. While the people of Central America have received from the outside world certain cultural items, such as democracy, free elections, and Marxism-Leninism, these are incorporated into their lives alongside a much longer list of historically determined local items. Politics and ideas have been

reacted to, and manipulated, in the Central American manner long before the current contest among imported ideas on governance.

The regional concept of political life centers around that of leaders and followers. It is understood that politics would benefit from a balance of powers, from pluralism, and yet there is a desire for, or acceptance of, the strong leader that makes the achievement of democracy as we understand it particularly difficult. As in most of Latin America, the political systems chosen by the Central Americans have been characterized by a strong executive, a strength that is usually enhanced in practice far beyond its constitutional role. Even in Costa Rica it has been noted that the pluralistic, uncharacteristically pro-legislature constitution adopted by the generation of 1948 has been repeatedly overridden by executive orders, apparently with the general acceptance of the society.¹⁰

The most outstanding characteristic of Central American political culture has been the fragility of institutions and the instability of political life. Historically this has been symbolized by a century and a half of repeated attempts to establish or maintain Central American confederation, and the repeated frustration of these efforts. For Panama this period has witnessed a perpetual struggle for independence, first from Colombia, and then from the United States. No one in Central America, outside of Costa Rica, is likely to believe that those in power today will be in power tomorrow. The assumption of instability reinforces the instability. Associated with instability is the undeveloped idea of legitimacy. At least since the time of the Spanish, few governments in the area must have seemed legitimate to those who lived under them. Constitutions have been continually set aside, revised, or replaced. Leaders have been at least as likely to come to power by sheer force as by any other means. In a history in which fraudulent elections have been commonplace, fair elections are also believed to be fraudulent by the losers. Similarly, if one believes that elections are characteristically fraudulent there will be little incentive not to falsify results, stuff ballots, buy voters, or drive off opposition supporters whenever one is in a position to do so.

Where governments and authority historically have been weak, or if strong, illegitimate, the relation of citizen to state or to authority has been one of avoidance, dislike, hatred, fear, and superficial compliance. To achieve power in such a system has often meant to accept the fact of this relationship of ruler to

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citizen, and thus to exploit one's power for all it is worth. There will be little love in any case, and tenure is likely to be short.

When political rule is the result of control over physical force and little else, it should not be surprising that the military should control the state. In most of the region no one is surprised by military rule, one expects it, and is dubious when civilians claim instead to be the real authorities.

It should not be surprising that the region exhibits a very high level of violence, even among supposedly civilian politicians. Murder is a common fact of life, and often the murders are political. Anderson tells us that to be "macho" in the region has less to do with sex than it has to do with a fatalistic attitude toward death.¹¹ To be macho is to be willing to face death, to be careless of danger; this reflects the facts of existence in the region, and particularly of political existence.

North Americans are easily led to assume that there are the peaceful "good guys" and the hateful killers. To an extent this is so, but such assumptions should be treated with care. The regional culture accepts lethal violence, although this may be less so in Costa Rica and Panama. We cannot ignore the fact that the assemblymen killed in the last couple of years in El Salvador have been on the right rather than the left. When we remember the editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro in Managua we should recall that he earlier led two armed attempts to overthrow Somoza. It was against this background that he was gunned down years later as a newspaper editor. It should not have been surprising that the top lieutenant of a communist guerrilla faction of El Salvador should have been murdered recently by her fellows for her views. Much the same happened a few years earlier to a well-known Salvadoran poet who had taken a leading role in another guerrilla faction. Should D'Aubuisson or Duarte be assassinated we should not be surprised, nor should we be too quick to draw conclusions as to who has committed the deed.

When we consider the death squads, the massacres of the army, the planned executions by the guerrillas and the Sandinistas, we should not condone these activities. People bleed in Central America just as much when they are shot as they do anywhere else. But we should realize that the effect on the society is not what it would be in the United States. At least in the northern part of the region, condemnation of such killings is not as universal as we might find natural—although for those directly affected or

politically opposed, every killing deepens their intent to get even at some future date.

It is characteristic of peasant based societies that elites and urbanites regard the peasants as almost another race, as capable of being treated as though they were not human beings, certainly not citizens of one's own country. The feeling is often, one can suppose, reciprocated. In Central America the development of dual economies, of a great chasm between those oriented to the modern world and those left in another, exacerbates this cleavage, as does the existence of non-Spanish ethnic groups, particularly in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Panama. The ability to treat a whole section of the population as if it was inhuman was certainly a major blot on our own society, particularly in the South, until recently. It was this attitude more than anything else that made possible lynching. This is still the attitude of many in power in Central America.

When such attitudes about others exist in one relationship, they may be extended to new relationships. So it is that the oligarchs detest the military officers, the officers the conscripts, the middle class the peasants. In recent years, with ideology opening a new cleavage, this sense of utter contempt that degenerates into willingness to kill without remorse affects members of political parties as well. To go back to our discussion of political motives, it should be expected that in Central America hate will play a more crucial motivating role—and that it will have positive feedback.

With all this, there is a place in Central American culture for elections and assemblies, for the idea that the people should rule, for the ideas of a division of powers, or checks and balances, and pluralism. These ideas are also a part of the culture; these too have long historical roots.

Modern observers frequently go too far in denigrating the character of democracy in Central America over the last century. There were reasonably free elections open to the population at large before the turn of the century. To succeed in elections in this era political leaders had to weld together a variety of interest groups representing many classes and regions. For example, in speaking of the rise to power through elections of Belisario Porres (elected to the presidency in Panama in 1912 and 1920) Ropp describes how Porres based his campaign on three social groupings: the urban and rural business communities, the urban working class (predominantly black), and the relatively white cattlemen and small holders of the interior. People from all

these groups would achieve positions in his administrations. In this general approach Belisario Porres was particularly successful, but not unique.¹²

Nevertheless, in more troubled times the will of the people has often been overridden, either through the falsification of election results or direct usurpation of power. The attitude toward elections and the role the populace believes they play in political life cannot be the same as our own. Let me suggest the ways in which two groups in regional society may evaluate electoral forms.

The first is that for the elites—social, military, economic, or professional—the ideas of competitive democracy, of fair elections, an independent judiciary, and social justice are important. They respect these newer, more external ideas, just as they are aware of the unfortunate consequences of continuing to hold to those ideas they would replace in their own culture. Sometimes out of nationalism local leaders disparage democratic ideas or forms as merely American imports, but few really accept any other standard than that of modern liberal democracies. They desperately want to be part of the modern world. Some elite leaders have striven, for example, to imitate the institutions that have provided what they see as the comparative stability and democracy of Mexico (which they probably view as more ideal than they actually are). Others may look with favor to Venezuela or Western Europe for models. Within the region Costa Rica becomes the model. The American need to see itself as promoting democracy is understood and taken seriously by a wide spectrum of leaders in the area. Yet in spite of our interest and theirs in such imported models, in their actual activities, because of motives and needs that are closer to home, regional leaders regularly ignore the imported models for those culturally more familiar.

The second explanation for persisting interest in elections and similar institutions is that for the workers and peasants, the forgotten people who traditionally are only the recipients of governmental forms and actions, elections provide one of the few channels for the expression of their feelings if not their power. No matter how often disappointed in the value of their vote, no matter how many coups have occurred, voting still offers them a legitimate means of expression in a society with so few means. These people spend most of their lives too scared of one or another group to express an opinion. But sometimes when they are alone with their ballot they can at least for a few seconds have their say. To read most American journalistic and expert analysis

of the recent elections in El Salvador, one would think that the far right, in the form of Arena, the security services, the death squads, the remnants of ORDEN, and for their part the guerrillas, would have scared the average person, defenseless in his land, into either abstaining, defacing his ballot, or voting for ARENA or some other army candidate. Yet the people voted for Duarte to the same extent in 1984 as for his party in 1982, and, indeed, as in the early seventies. Duarte may not be the popular idol he was in the early 1970s in San Salvador, he may be little more than another tool of the armed forces, but to many he was the best they had, and in 1984 they expressed that conviction. Of course, the voting shows that many other workers and peasants had equally strong tendencies to vote as they had in the past. Whatever their ideas, they were not to be coerced, they would vote as they had learned to vote, for what they thought was best, at least for their families. They would have to leave it up to others to decide how the power would actually be apportioned.

The Personal Motives of Political Participants

There are many ways to look at political systems. We have looked at their relation to class structure and political culture. The necessity to introduce the question of personal motives into the discussion of class relationships suggests that it would be useful to construct alongside Rutin's model of government, as a special kind of organization, a model of political organization based on an analysis of the plausible motives of the participants. For this purpose let us consider "the participants" to be the active sponsors (those who become the leaders of the dominant coalition, for example) and at least the higher levels of their staffs. In our model those who participate in politics will be considered to have four motives or goals: wealth or material plenty, power over others, service to society, and the elimination or defeat of those who oppose their attainment of the first three. These four motives are closely interrelated. Wealth is a means to power, and power a means to wealth. Both, and certainly power, will greatly facilitate service to society. The attainment of the first three goals will be impossible unless those people and structures that stand in the way are neutralized or eliminated. Each of these motives can be aided by rationality, but all can be and often are deeply emotional. Serving society is generated in part by love, while defeating enemies is accompanied by hate.

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Serving society is the output of the motivational structure that makes possible benefits to the group as a whole, and therefore legitimizes to some degree the other three motives. Frequently an aspiring political leader sees himself primarily in terms of service: he wants to make a better world. Yet as his career progresses, for a variety of reasons, including the example of those around him and the exercise of the very power that makes possible the service, he comes to be dominated more and more by the desire to attain, and then to preserve, power and material comfort (or wealth where that is possible), while hatred of those who would block his progress or take these goods from him comes to assume a larger role than his more generalized love for his people.

The audience of the aspiring politician is the people, they are his ultimate sponsors—to a degree even in a tyranny. The people support or accept his rise in so far as he seems able to provide more effective and desired services than others—be it only the maintenance of order in some societies—or he is more to be feared than others. The primary difference between a tyranny and a modern, civil society with effective democratic mechanisms is that in a civil society the majority's acceptance is based on the amount of given or expected service from the government rather than the degree of expected pain or coercion. While the physical elimination of opponents is not unknown in modern democracies, it is certainly rare. Preventing blacks from voting by threats of physical coercion or other means is the last large-scale example of such coercion in our society. However, in authoritarian and totalitarian societies, and many imperfectly developed democracies, competing for office through service may not be as important as the use of threats or the physical destruction of opponents.

A word on love and hate. While service is to some extent the goal of all political leaders—they could not begin their careers unless this was or appeared to be so—as these careers come up against the intransigencies of the power relationships in Central America, as they are faced in other words with the tenuousness of their individual careers, the role of hatred in politics is likely to increase. All who stand in the way of one's career or are even potential threats to it become mortal enemies. Killing becomes the coin of politics. In such a society, and with so much at stake for the participants, it is very hard for any of the major groups to actually accept a voting process as the arbiter of their fate.

What "Causes" Change Toward, or Away From, Democracy?

It is incumbent on any analysis of systems to consider the moving forces in their change. In the long sweep of history there must have been many forces for change in the nature of political systems. Most important of these may have been economic development. Certainly the particular forms of tyranny or democracy appropriate or possible in the primitive hunting group are no longer possible in modern society. Yet, it is important to reflect that the record shows that all of the Aristotelian forms from dictatorship and monarchy through oligarchy and "timocracy," to democracy in its several forms, have existed at all levels of political-economic organization. There seems to be a universal human desire for a cooperative form of government, for everyone to have his say; there is also a universal tendency for those who can to accumulate power in their own hands and force others to obey them. Only the pretexts for such usurpations of political power change.

In the accompanying review of the causes for the success or failure of democracy Samuel Huntington considered the arguments advanced over the last generation by social scientists.¹³ He finds none of the economic arguments for preconditions very persuasive. He particularly notes that many countries have in recent years apparently reached decision points through the collapse of the previous system. In Spain and Portugal the collapse was followed by a rapid transition to democracy; in Iran it was followed by a demagogic theocracy with some democratic forms; in Cuba it was followed by communism. Huntington notes correctly that in the Cuban case Castro "chose" communism.

Huntington further suggests that market economies seem to foster democracy because they represent alternative power centers and thereby force pluralism on society, a pluralism that can only be ordered nonviolently through democracy. His analysis suggests that a strong middle class is a necessary but not sufficient basis for democracy. However, this is also a reflection of the need for a relatively equal distribution of incomes, a point that we have dealt with above in considering class structure and Central America. It also suggests that the important determinant is not so much the equality of incomes but the relative equality of economic and political power. The problem with the statist or oligarchic regime is not so much that the middle class is weak or that the distribution of incomes is unequal—it may be relatively

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equal as in Bulgaria or South Korea—but that the distribution of power is so heavily skewed toward a relatively small group.

Democracy, then, succeeds when the powerful elites of a society, and the powerful classes that grant them their power, accept democracy as the only legitimate form of government. If these elites have a great deal to lose from the maintenance or establishment of democracy, they will oppose democracy by force as long as they are able. They will be able to persist in their opposition if there is a political culture unfavorable to democracy (that is, the supporting ideas of democracy have not been sufficiently diffused), if there is an organizing ideology that delegitimizes democracy (that is, if there is an alternative tradition being promoted in the society such as Islam or communism that gives special power to the few), and if those politically involved interests that would profit from democracy remain weak and unorganized.

If the dominant elites of a society are not willing and able to incorporate in the give-and-take of the political process all of the society's significant interest groups or classes, those groups left out will be forced to resort to nondemocratic methods. For such groups the "system" rather than a particular ruling coalition becomes the enemy, and radical solutions such as communism become attractive. Communism in Central America is not so much valued for itself as for its ability to mobilize; it seems to represent all those groups and interests that the ruling system excludes. It was the inability of the quasi-democratic parties and factions of Nicaragua to reject convincingly identification with the system of Somoza that laid the groundwork for the (at least temporary) rejection of democracy by the Sandinistas and many of their followers. As Marxist-Leninists many Sandinista leaders would have opposed democracy in any event, but they would not have been able to maintain this opposition if most of the rest of the political spectrum had not been remembered as part of the "system" of the 1970s.

This suggests that the primary determinant of the presence or absence of democracy is the diffusion and incorporation in successive generations of the ideas of democracy. For a society to institutionalize democracy successfully requires understanding of the methods and forms of democratic government that are appropriate to modern life, belief that these forms can be imposed on the power holders of the society, and belief among those with access to power that holding on to political power irrespective of democratic forms is illegitimate and will not be accepted by their

fellows. It also implies that those who believe in democracy will be willing to stand for it, and against tyranny, even when it would be easier to acquiesce in those tyrannies that serve their personal or class interest.

The problem becomes, then, one of the struggle of ideas, on the one hand, and of the intensity with which competing ideas are held, on the other. The education of a society in political ideas is always a combination of what is learned from books and the news media with what is learned of the possibilities of democracy and its alternatives from experience. For democracy to endure there must be a positive balance of feedback for those who form, or are powerful enough to form, the dominant coalitions of the political system.

American Support for Central American Democracy

What then do we do as outside supporters of democracy? We try as best we can to support those aspects of the Central American situation that are conducive to democracy, and to weaken those that repeatedly have derailed it. We work to build those class structures and structures of government-citizen relations that make democracy probable. We try to work with the culture and the motivations of Central Americans as far as possible, but also try to alter the experiences of the actors in a way that will make possible their evolution and that of their societies in a democratic direction.

Given the steady diffusion of democratic ideas from the developed democracies to the peoples of Central America, most important in the long run for democracy is the development and strengthening of the middle classes. Only when this level of society provides most of the leaders and the followers in the political systems of the region will democracy be secure. To achieve this growth means, more than anything else, the strengthening of the economies, the expansion of education, and the return in so far as possible of members of the Central American middle classes that are now resident outside the region. It also means bringing to power and keeping in power for as long as possible people who represent the middle classes, such as Duarte in El Salvador, Suazo Cordoba in Honduras, Arias Calderon in Panama, and the avoidance of those who represent or cause others to believe they represent primarily the upper or lower classes. The recent presidents of Costa Rica have generally been middle class.

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This goal requires economic aid, aid that strengthens the inherited economies of the area, but, more important, creates new bases for their economies. Agriculture may remain the basis of most regional economies, but for El Salvador at least the models are Holland, Denmark, and Taiwan, not Iowa or Argentina. Panama is essentially a commercial, entrepreneurial society, its countryside more valuable for tourism than agriculture. Panamanians are educated people who need little beyond encouragement to continue to invest in their own country.

Second in importance, and somewhat contradictory to the first, is the strengthening of pluralistic forces in the societies. Outside Costa Rica the dominance of the military in the region has become next to complete—in terms of regional traditions the Sandinistas in Nicaragua can be interpreted as yet another form of primarily military rule. Military predominance is countered by lower class movements among workers and peasants, middle class movements such as those among students and intellectuals, journalists, professional and businessmen, and the clergy, as well as the independent forces of the oligarchs and the far left. Only a section of the middle class and its press are likely to be committed under all conditions to democracy, but in the present situation each of these groups has a role to play in forcing a compromise upon the actors so that they will learn to live with one another as coalition partners or loyal oppositionists.

America and its representatives should try to build up the importance, coherence, and training of worker and peasant unions, teachers unions, student organizations, even religious organizations. Perhaps we can do most to develop the power of the media. It might make sense to develop a Central American radio and television network independent of any particular country or government. Such a "Voice of Central America" should express a neutral, informed view on the area, laying particular stress upon its interconnections. It should also emphasize the position and problems of the local television and radio services. It could operate from ships at sea, Costa Rica, or other locations. Its goal would be the dissemination of unbiased information, especially where local media fail to do so. For example, during political campaigns in El Salvador or Nicaragua, if the opposition does not have a fair chance to express its views, the station should see filling this void to be a major responsibility.

A major barrier to pluralism has been the regional pattern of one unified armed force for each country. The checks and balances afforded by several services, or independent police and national

defense establishments, have been lacking. The United States would do well to encourage the evolution of separate police forces or constabularies. These countries need greater stability and a reliable rule of law. Ideally police can contribute to this, especially when there is a separate national army outside the local scene that can in the last eventuality control local police activities. An independent police force might also see it in its interest to support civilian leaders in stopping death squad activity—or the army might be used if the police were involved, and vice-versa. Today, in most of Central America the civilian leadership has no institutionalized armed groups that it can rely on to carry out its wishes. Only with such a force can there be a truly independent judiciary. Devising means of supporting the growth of a judiciary free of political control and free of the fear of dismissal or assassination is critical.

The third point stems from the second. It is to emphasize to all parties the role that compromise plays in democratic politics. No one can be allowed to win all the values in the society, or in the end there is no game for anyone. Colombia may be a model for what can be accomplished through pacts and compromise; it offers a far better model than Mexico's one-party corporatism. In reaching a compromise ending their civil war, the Colombians erected in the 1950s and 1960s a largely two-party structure, that eventually allowed a true popular victory by the smaller of the two major parties. The Colombian President and leader of this party is now leading a movement for compromise with the long-lived guerrilla movements, with some hope for success. Whether or not he succeeds, his efforts will go a long way toward convincing his people of the good intentions of the governmental system. If this effort succeeds, democracy can get along very well without the guerrillas.

Fourth, we need to civilianize the societies. American aid should as far as possible, and even farther, be channeled through civilians and the civilian leadership. Since civilian aid tends for obvious reasons to be more closely monitored than military aid this means more rather than less involvement of the American Congress and press in the American effort. In the long run this would develop a larger and more powerful U.S. constituency in favor of continued aid to the region than would military and CIA aid that is bound to be plagued by recurrent revelations. We should avoid dealing directly and publicly with Central American

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military officers; we should never undercut in any way civilian authority, even when we believe that the "real power" lies elsewhere.

The United States might strive for the demilitarization of the region by acting as a shield for the region against outside military intervention, while at the same time promising that the United States would not invade any country in the region that does not maintain a battalion or more of the armed forces of an outside power. As part of such an overall regional security agreement the armed forces of Central American countries might be reduced, so that foreign and local money available for the region could be spent in larger part on the civilian sector.

Fifth, we should condemn persistently and uncompromisingly assassination, execution, torture, and imprisonment wherever and whenever they occur. We should make it clear that such cruelty does not and cannot "pay" in our eyes. Aid should be cut off cold, such as it was for a time in Guatemala, to military leaders that are clearly implicated in a persistent pattern of abuses. At the same time we should make an effort to distinguish between legitimate governmental use of force and violence in defense of the state, and indiscriminate state or private terror to repress vague and imperfectly established individual and group threats to general or private interests. The United States government, through the State Department and CIA, should make persistent and coherent efforts to know what is going on in the human rights area, both in urban and rural areas; public reports of these findings and how they are affecting the official American response should be made available to both the American people and the peoples of the countries concerned. (This would be a useful task for the Voice of Central America.) Not making these facts public weakens support at home—and these countries need our consistent and long-term support—and weakens the position of those Central Americans who would condemn human rights violations in their own countries.

The United States should strive to strengthen both private and public human rights organizations in the countries involved. It might be useful to have such organizations linked together in a confederation of Central American human rights groups that would report on the offenses of the left and right equally, and that would by its combined presence and its American backing be hard to suppress in any one country.

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7. See Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, *The Subculture of Violence* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1967).
8. See Seymour Lipset et al, *Union Democracy*, (1956).
9. Enrique Baloyra, *El Salvador in Transition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
10. Biesanz, and Biesanz, *The Costa Ricans*, 193-194.
11. Anderson, *Politics in Central America*.
12. Ropp, *Panamanian Politics*, 18-19.
13. See the accompanying essay by Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?"

The Diffusion of Democracy and Liberal Modernism

The discussion in Part III of the expansion of democratic freedom in the United States suggests an expansion of freedoms that, once enunciated, became irresistible. To make this case clearer the American experience should be generalized by extending it to the world as a whole.¹ In the course of this examination we will consider two processes: the immanent progress of democratic ideas and behavior within societies, as well as the diffusion or communication of this progress among democracies, and from democracies to the peoples of all countries.

As pointed out in Part III, prior to the Revolutionary War the American colonies had already achieved a high level of political freedom, perhaps the highest in the world. It was the threat to such freedoms by the reimposition of parliamentary rule that more than any other single factor precipitated the secession. Most colonies were governed by London-appointed governors, governor's councils, and elected assemblies. By the 1770s the elected assemblies had achieved ascendancy, and very few of their laws were vetoed by parliament. For assembly elections property qualifications restricted suffrage, but far less than is often imagined. Percentages of adult white males eligible to vote varied from more than eighty percent in parts of New England to as low as twenty-five percent in parts of the South. Nineteen percent of the population was black, and very few blacks were allowed to vote.

In the middle of the eighteenth century, the semi-independent American colonies with ratings of about (4) for political rights and civil liberties were probably the most democratic political units in the world. Arguably England had attained a level close to the American. Parliament had achieved considerable independence before 1750. The first transfer of political power between parties as the result of an election occurred in 1710. Yet the power that was transferred was quite limited. The level of political rights remained considerably below that in the colonies

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in three respects. First, the nonelected House of Lords held legislative power in parallel with the House of Commons. Secondly, the power of the monarch was still considerable. Third, the electorate for the House of Commons was very restricted. Perhaps less than a tenth of the male population could vote, and half of the seats in the Commons were not open to a fair electoral choice even by this small number. Democratic rights on the local level were similarly restricted. In civil liberties the same struggle for journalistic freedom was going on as in the United States, but not until 1768 was it established that a man could not be permanently barred from Commons because he had attacked the government or monarch in print. Nevertheless, the concept of a bill of rights had long been institutionalized.

The situation in France during this period suggests a (6) for political rights and perhaps a (4) for civil liberties. It was an age of absolutism, but also of enlightened despotism. The French law courts began to challenge the absolutism of the monarch, and relatively free discussion flowered. A similar situation was found in Sweden where absolutism was repeatedly reestablished, yet absolute denial of popular political rights went along with improvements in civil liberties.

If France and England were the exemplars of the development of democracy out of the feudal memories of centralized monarchies, Switzerland was the exemplar of the development of democracy from memories of peasant independence and self-government. By the eighteenth century the Swiss state had almost ceased to exist. The individual units, the cantons, were often under relatively undemocratic oligarchic rule similar to that which had intermittently characterized Italian city-states. However, liberal ideas were widely discussed, particularly in Geneva, and a rating of the level of democracy must reflect the wide dispersion of power. This offered a more direct role in governance to at least the rich peasants of rural cantons and the rich merchants of urban centers than characterized most of Europe. About a (5) for political rights and a (4) or (5) for civil liberties would be reasonable for the Swiss Confederacy in 1750.

Outside of Western Europe and North America civil and political rights were little developed. While the claim is sometimes made that there was significant political and civil liberty in the nonwestern world before its conquest by the West, evidence of anything resembling a predictable rule of law or of individual rights to conscience outside of the West is minimal. In Islamic countries, for example, there were developed legal systems and

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courts, but these were seldom if ever able to shield citizens from the arbitrary acts of governments. Peasant or local community democracy was practiced to some extent in a few places—as it always had been—but such democracy was nowhere extended to the national level.

The French Revolution convulsed Europe. Nevertheless, in 1800, democracy was little advanced in France over what it was in 1750. But the Revolution and the conquests it spawned helped to advance the idea of democracy throughout Europe, and those parts of the world it influenced.

In the next half century critical gains were made in most European countries. Yet there were almost as many setbacks as gains. In England one-sixth of the male population gained the vote by the 1830s; in 1867 it became one-third. Voting districts were made more equal in population, so that most of the House of Commons came to be honestly elected. Property qualifications for Members of Parliament were set aside after 1858. The power of the monarch had become essentially symbolic by the middle of the century, though the veto power of the lords did not end until 1910. Freedom of the press and rights of unions to freely organize were gradually accepted. Disabilities on Catholics and Jews were set aside. It would seem reasonable to give England a (4) for political rights by 1840, and a (3) by the 1870s.

Progress in France was more intermittent. The century started off with attempts to copy the political and civil rights of the British, but despotism repeatedly returned. Another cycle of restriction on the press and political organization, as well as the misuse of democratic conventions, took place after 1848. By the laws of 1852, the Minister of the Interior appointed editors and could suspend publications at any time. Yet gradually unions, the press, and independent organizations of all kinds became accepted. The power of parliament became institutionalized only in the latter part of the century; universal male suffrage was established in 1875. Writers could, however, still be imprisoned for opinions. With the ending of monarchical pretensions we could say that France had achieved a (3) in political rights and a (3) for civil liberties by the end of the century.

The democratic standards achieved in the United States and England were in the process of being accepted throughout Europe. In the first half of the nineteenth century Switzerland achieved the political rights enjoyed by Americans in this period, and then surpassed the American level. Freedom of the press and universal male suffrage had been attained in several cantons before 1830.

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This progress was universalized in the Constitution of 1848, and even further extended by the enactment of the initiative and referendum in 1874. Switzerland would have received a (2), (2) rating before the end of the century.

In the nineteenth century the power of the kings was steadily lowered and suffrage extended in the low countries. Upper houses tended everywhere to become more democratic. Denmark became a constitutional monarchy in 1849. There were significant declines in popular power later: not until the twentieth century was parliamentary government fully institutionalized. The Swedish government gave up the right to abrogate periodicals in 1845. It achieved a still limited but essentially popular form of government in 1864.

Outside of Europe the main arenas of democratization were the British colonies and the former colonies of Spain in Latin America. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all moved toward democracy in the nineteenth century, quickly passing up their homeland, except in so far as the United Kingdom was still able to exert a vestige of colonial control. Universal male suffrage came more quickly to these colonies than to England. New Zealand introduced female suffrage in 1893.

Following their independence from Spain early in the nineteenth century, the new states of Latin America made vigorous but generally failed attempts to introduce one or another version of North American or European democracy. Yet traditions were established of independence of religion, of the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and of the rights of freedom of the press and assembly that gradually came to be considered the norm. Elections involving a large proportion of the male population and with meaningful results occurred in countries such as Costa Rica and Panama before the end of the century. Oligarchical control persisted, but in many countries effective political rights were certainly no more limited than they had been in England in the earlier part of the century.

The twentieth century began with a burst of enthusiasm for democracy. Democracy was now in place in most of Western Europe. Female suffrage was introduced in nearly all "democracies" between 1900 and 1928. Male suffrage became universal almost everywhere there was voting. We should find many (2)'s for political rights in this period. Even in Russia, with the Duma elections of 1905-07, some power was given to a popularly elected assembly. In Iran at almost the same time democracy was spreading into an entirely different world. For a couple of heady years Iran too

had constitutional monarchy. Germany instituted direct, equal, and secret suffrage in the midst of World War I (1917).

The 1920s began with further democratic progress but ended with decline. Democratic development in countries such as Germany, Italy, and Japan had been steady until this time. The European colonies began to have at least advisory councils with some representative quality. Although Egypt was still essentially a British protectorate, by 1923 it had gained a parliament with considerable power, and universal suffrage had been instituted. Democracies arose in many parts of Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States that had been carved out of the Soviet Union.

What followed was a quick and severe recession in the fortunes of democracy. Imitating the model of the new Soviet Union, first Italy, then Japan and Germany, instituted authoritarian or totalitarian systems that denied democratic rights in the name of the people. In Eastern Europe and the Balkans other copies arose. Spain achieved democracy in the early thirties only to see it quickly shattered by another fascist experiment. Democracy nevertheless advanced in much of the colonial world during this period. Its first appearance in Thailand was in the 1930s.

Democracy made a rapid comeback after World War II. By the mid-1950s democracy was in a stronger, more institutionalized position than it had ever been before in history. Not only were most of the countries in Europe outside the Soviet orbit fully functioning democracies, with performances equivalent to those of countries with ratings of (1) and (2), but democracy was also functioning in India, and to a lesser extent in much of Latin America. Subsequent decolonization at first added many countries to the democratic list, but, as new states emerged from colonialism, most quickly reverted to nondemocratic forms, often by copying aspects of Marxism-Leninism.

In the current generation the struggle for democracy can be considered on three fronts: the developed noncommunist world, the communist world, and the noncommunist third world.

In the noncommunist developed world the level of political and civil rights has slowly but steadily improved since the 1950s. Women finally achieved the franchise in Switzerland; in the United States the effective political equalization of races removed the main obstacle to making the system function for all. Throughout the West, marginal ethnic groups, whether in America, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, or Spain, have been accorded a larger degree of self-determination. Controls over the media and over organizational and assembly activity of all kinds have been brought more

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into harmony with democratic principles. The intrusions of the FBI in the United States and of government police in Germany have been largely corrected.

Since 1950 the borders of this developed, westernized, democratic world have been expanded, particularly into Spain and Portugal, and they have been confirmed in Greece. Democracy in Japan seems to have been institutionalized, although it has not yet been thoroughly tested. Japan's Liberal party continues to operate more like a dominant party than is true of governing parties in other democracies.

At first glance this story would appear to suggest that the fortunes of democracy have been on a sharply rising, long-term upward curve, in spite of temporary setbacks. Consideration of the communist world, and the noncommunist third world, however, suggests serious obstacles in the way of the continuation of this trend. It is not obvious that events in these two areas might not substantially cut short or reverse the progress of the last two and a half centuries.

Outside the developed democracies, the three major dangers to democracy are Communism, radical Islam, and modern authoritarianism. Those nondemocratic states that do not fit into these categories should best be viewed as passing phenomena. For example, some states, such as Oman, are not democracies because they still maintain traditional forms. Others are not democracies because democracies have been swept away by military leaders or anarchy. Others are crude personal dictatorships. States such as Haiti or Ghana do not represent direct challenges to democracy, although they do suggest the difficulty of its institutionalization in many countries in the near future.

Of the three challenges, modern authoritarianism can easily be underrated. After a strong upsurge in the 1970s, it has failed in most of Latin America. Its retreat in Argentina has been most dramatic, but the retreat is hemisphere-wide. Its most tenacious strongholds are likely to be places such as Singapore or South Korea that see themselves as highly modern and successful. The danger is that other countries in Asia may be attracted by their example. Leaders are always looking for a legitimate way to ensure their continuation in power, and the general acceptance in western circles of a leader such as Lee Kuan Yew seems to offer an alternative to the dangers of real democracy. Sri Lanka may have already moved into this camp. Other countries such as Thailand, India, or even Japan could possibly join it in the future under a label such as "Asian democracy." Perhaps one of

the most significant struggles over the legitimacy of modern authoritarianism in Asia is being fought out today on a variety of battlefields in the Philippines. Still, the assumptions of the democracies remain the coin of the discussion in such societies—their elites profess to be variants of those that govern our world, and so are responsive to both our criticism and applause.

The greatest substantial losses for democracy during this period were occasioned by the advance of communism, which is often not distinguishable from Soviet expansionism. The complete incorporation of Indochina into the Soviet communist world is certainly an example. Alongside it we must place South Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia (although now anti-Soviet), the smaller former Portuguese colonies, and the partial success in Nicaragua. Angola and Mozambique, faced with grave internal and external challenges, may be edging away from Soviet domination. Afghanistan may be in the process of direct incorporation into the Soviet Union, at least to the same extent as Mongolia. Many other states such as Guyana have moved closer to this world; others, such as Guinea, have moved away. The limits of communist expansion are hotly debated, but the phenomenon is nevertheless the most challenging for the democratic world. Against the fact of this loss to a rival form of legitimization we must place the evident democratization of communism itself in both Eastern Europe and China. The more the peoples of these areas feel themselves a part of the modern world, the more they seem to draw away from the harsh outlines of Marxist-Leninist rule, the more they come to regard free elections and open discussion the necessary basis for even Marxist legitimization. While it is still true that a state actually ruled by a Marxist-Leninist Party has never left communism except by external force (such as was used in Grenada), it is not true that some democratic evolution is not possible. Paradoxically, the modern authoritarian states deplored above may offer a transitional model for the elites of such communist states to adopt as a way station on the road to democracy.

An additional danger for democracy is the growth of Soviet military power, power which now balances that of the United States, and thereby represents far more than an ideological challenge.

The Iranian challenge is of quite a different character. It symbolizes the continuing ability of essentially retrogressive political movements to inspire loyalty in a modernizing people. In this sense it is the modern equivalent of fascism or the mystical Japanese nationalist doctrines of World War II. Where

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the Iranian Revolution differs from the many other attempts of recent years is its success in effectively organizing and carrying through a counter-modernist program. Iran's leaders have not abandoned the employment of many of the devices of modernism, including the forms of democratic election, but their appeal to special knowledge of extra-terrestrial intent as the ultimate legislator narrowly circumscribes the ostensible democracy.

The reader will note that the discussion of future possibilities of democracy is in terms of a struggle of ideas. The rise of democracy since the eighteenth century is primarily explained by the expansion of education in the possibilities of democracy, together with the widening acceptance of democracy as the only legitimate form of governance. This approach appears to go against more than a generation of political scientists that have stressed cultural and situational factors in the ability of peoples to accept or institutionalize democracy. ^ However, there may be less difference of opinion than appears from the written record. The political scientists that have stressed the sociological or economic "preconditions" of democracy may have simply assumed that the historical record of democratic diffusion was well-known, and that it was their job to go on from there. The approach taken here is the reverse. It is admitted that the preconditions and context are important in the acceptance of democracy; certainly favorable economic conditions, for example, can help make a democratic system succeed. Yet these should be regarded as the secondary factors in a more general process of the diffusion of democracy.

What the sociological or economic approaches to understanding the successes and failures fail to emphasize is the fact that the achievements of democracy in the world today are largely the result of the successful expansion of European societies—and, as a result, cultures—that were by and large, and for reasons quite separate from those fueling the expansion, institutionalizing democratic political forms and assumptions. Where a society failed to adopt democratic institutions internally, as in Russia, its colonial expansion also failed to increase the area of democracy. Interestingly enough, when Russia seemed to be getting on the democratic train in the first decade of this century, neighboring Iran also made a surprising move toward constitutionalism. What was achieved through the European expansion was nailed down by the defeat of Germany, Japan, and Italy, and their subsequent forced democratization after World War II. Democratic setbacks have been due to the fact that the victors in World War

II were not all democracies, and nondemocratic systems were forced on those countries that had not been conquered by democracies. The retreat of democracy in the third world subsequent to decolonization can be ascribed to the sharp reduction in diffusionist pressure that followed independence in most of the former colonies.

In order to reduce the impreciseness in the concept of diffusion it is useful to consider a number of subforms. Democracy may be diffused in isolation or in linkage with other cultural items; it may be actively promoted, or may expand through a form of passive osmosis. If we look at the history of the movement of democratic ideas we can see that there has been "concept diffusion," or the diffusion of the basic ideas and institutions of democracy, as well as "context diffusion," or the diffusion of the ideas of mankind, law, and society in which democracy can thrive. When these came out of order, when people knew more of the ideas than the context, democracy was likely to fail. This would surely be the explanation for the failures in Central America in the early nineteenth century or in Iran in 1905-10.

"Linked diffusion" refers to the tendency of democratic ideas to never come to a society in pure form. The fact that democratic ideas usually come bundled with a variety of other cultural ideas and practices has led to mistaken assumptions, such as those that democracy is necessarily Christian or necessarily capitalist or necessarily colonialist because of the linkage in the minds of both advocates and enemies of democracy with these other aspects of culture. In particular, it is impossible to conclude from the close behavioral relationship of capitalism and democracy that democracy requires capitalism: the relationship could easily be due to the fact that the spread of democracy was so often in the hands of, or related to, liberal capitalists. Correlation analyses are meaningful only if the factors correlated have had an opportunity to be independently distributed.³ The recent evolution of catholicism and democracy in southern Europe suggests that the assumption of a necessary relation between protestantism and democracy was in error, as we will probably learn in time is the assumption of the relation between the Eastern Orthodox churches and authoritarianism.

Democracy has been advanced by both "active" and "passive" diffusion. Active diffusion was most notable when the allies enforced the democratization of Germany, Italy, and Japan after World War II. This "imposed active" diffusion should be distinguished from the "self-imposed active diffusion" in which the

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elites of countries such as Thailand, Japan, or even Afghanistan (in the 1920s) actively went out into the world, learned aspects of democracy, and tried to impose these concepts on as yet unenlightened populations. The story of colonialism was one of both active and passive diffusion. Ideas of democracy and the context of democracy flowed irresistibly from the homelands to the colonies, sometimes with the active encouragement of colonial officials, but often against their wishes. While active diffusion is generally intermittent, passive diffusion goes on all the time, and among most countries of the modern world with accelerating intensity.

It is one thing to have the ideas of democracy and another to develop the context it requires. For a democracy to "work," in the sense that all incumbent leaders or aspirants for power are willing to more or less fairly use its procedures and abide by their results, requires a population thoroughly familiar with their democratic rights and with the possibility of banding together to enforce them, as well as elites and power holders that do not believe in their right or ability to deny such rights. The historical record suggests that achieving such a firm institutionalization of democracy requires generations if not centuries of exposure and experience with democratic institutions. It also implies that the elites of institutionalizing democracies require faith that their interests on the international scene will be forwarded by sticking with democratic institutions, and belief that their interests will be damaged internationally by any attempt to reverse democratic trends. This suggests a different dimension to the concept of diffusionist pressure.

The development and diffusion of democracy began with the enlightenment, the modern descendent of which is "liberal modernism." Today the growth of liberal modernism appears irresistible and worldwide. Its symbol may be the near universalization of English as a lingua franca, even among leaders that may be bitterly opposed to American or British policies. In spite of the evident problems of adjustment it engenders, and recurrent setbacks such as occurred in Iran, the open, liberal belief system is the common denominator of educated people everywhere. It is the only ideology or intellectual stance capable of accommodating the pace of technological change with its ever-changing moral and social requirements. Communist and authoritarian governments are

faced with increasingly resentful, sullen, and restive populations. Growing segments of their populations no longer accept the arbitrary, outmoded ideologies used to justify their oppression.

Liberal modernism teaches the value and autonomy of the individual, and the relativity and transitoriness of national and sectarian symbols and ideologies. The happiness of the individual and his right to decide in what happiness consists are central values. Equality and justice are the major goals of the community at every level, particularly equality in access to political participation, the news media, and basic services. To deny life and health, or freedom of expression and choice of life style are simply not legitimate in the liberal modern world that assumes and pursues affluence.

It is the liberal modern world that is developing wealth, technology, and the good life, and extending these worldwide. This is both the free world and the freeing world.

Unfortunately, liberal modernism is not easily accommodated to the demands of persistent individual and community sacrifice, such as those required by national defense. Lives are seen both individually and collectively as too valuable to sacrifice in war, certainly war to maintain what must in the long run be seen as temporary national or international arrangements. They are even too valuable to sacrifice to several years of military service. Liberal modernists also feel that they have more life-affirming uses for their money or that of the community than expenditures on military forces. In a world of flux there is no longer automatic support for the arguments of defense.

The Soviet Union remains a powerful world power that does not allow the unrestricted expression in policy or print or life of liberal modernist values. This enables it to spend proportionately greater sums on military equipment and to maintain large numbers under arms. It can threaten to attack or engage in military actions without the strong internal checks present in modern liberal states. By force it has accumulated and maintained an empire denied to other wealthy states by the assumptions of the modern world. Realizing this advantage of the relatively illiberal society, committed ideologists and self-absorbed leaders throughout the world join with the Soviet Union in rejecting liberalism and in constraining its growth both at home and among their neighbors. Because they lack a liberal modernist check on their designs, such states remain and will remain a threat to

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peace regionally and globally. Ultimately, they will be overthrown by liberal modernism, but until then they remain a threat both to themselves and others. The millenium of a world at peace will only be obtainable in a free world.

We are engaged, then, in a race between the future and the past. The militant forces of the past are becoming increasingly powerful militarily and organizationally at the same time as they are decaying and failing in the face of the inescapable demands of modern life. They may precipitate war, destroy countless millions, and poison or enslave continents before their final disintegration.

In this context the only security for free peoples is to work for the steady development and perfection of liberal modernist ideas and ways of life within all countries, so that their extension may as quickly as possible break down the remaining barriers to the penetration of this modern culture into the remaining autocracies, and thus sweep away from within the military threat that hangs over us all. The ideological challenge lies in many directions. It includes the support of democratic dissidents and their efforts on every continent. Since America stands for liberal modernism, as well as democracy, it includes overcoming through argument and support of improved American behavior the fashionable identification in many countries of national interests with anti-Americanism that plays into the hands of illiberal forces everywhere.

If we see the history of the expansion of democracy in these terms, then the setbacks for democracy that have occurred in recent years in particular countries, and especially on the African continent, can be seen as the inevitable result of insufficient time for the diffusion of the critical ideas to the populations concerned. Few people realize how short the process of colonialization was. Zimbabwe, for example, was only colonized in the 1890s, and never had more than a thin layer of Europeans. Many African areas had little if any experience with European culture and institutions. Literacy that would make possible such transmission is painfully low in Africa. In many of the smaller countries newspapers hardly exist. (Remember, it is not literacy that makes democracy possible, but a means for the transmission of the ideas of democracy, as well as the list of still undefined contextual ideas that are necessary for it to work. One hundred percent literacy in North Korea, with communication channels to the West effectively cut, has little value for democracy.)

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Diffusionist counter-pressures, such as we would find in the Middle East or communist countries compound the basic problem of insufficient democratic diffusion.

In all areas trying to institutionalize democracy we should expect generations of struggle, of familiarization, of need for outside material or spiritual support. We should also expect generations of leaders searching for alternatives to democracy that will ensure their power or facilitate the accomplishment of their objectives (or at least seem to in the short run). But we should expect democratic success. Unless the future of democracy is decided by major war between the superpowers, the momentum behind the spread of democratic ideas will be unstoppable. The only states in which democracy is not an issue today are the closed hermit states such as Albania, North Korea, Mongolia, and to a lesser extent the USSR, Vietnam, and other semi-closed societies. To this group we should add Iran, and, for other reasons, Saudi Arabia. The leaders of all of these societies realize that democracy and the preconditions of democracy can only be kept at bay by a vigorous effort to prevent contact with the democratic world and its assumptions. It seems unlikely that force will be enough to prevent the universalization of democracy in the next century--this conclusion implies little more than the extrapolation of the trend line of the recent past.

N O T E S

1. For the purpose of the following survey, general impressions have been checked against William Langer, editor, *An Encyclopedia of World History* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1972). The American historical record has been considered in greater detail: the assessment of American history in terms of the Survey is reported above (pages 145-167), along with the documentation.

2. This general approach is most recently summarized by Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?," *Political Science Quarterly*, volume 99, no. 2, Summer 1984, 193-218, reprinted above, pp. 193-225.

3. See numerous discussions of this point in the *Freedom in the World* series, especially the discussions of economic freedom by Lindsay M. Wright in the 1982 edition.

PART V

Country Summaries

Introduction

The following country descriptions summarize the evidence that lies behind our ratings for each country. They first bring together for each country most of the tabular material of Part I. Then, political rights are considered in terms of the extent to which a country is ruled by a government elected by the majority at the national level, the division of power among levels of government, and the possible denial of self-determination to major subnationalities, if any. While decentralization and the denial of group rights are deemphasized in our rating system, these questions should not be ignored. The summaries also contain consideration of civil liberties, especially as these include freedom of the media and other forms of political expression, freedom from political imprisonment, torture, and other forms of government reprisal, and freedom from interference in nonpublic group or personal life. Equality of access to politically relevant expression is also considered. Economic conditions and organization are also considered in their relation to freedom. In some cases the summaries will touch on the relative degree of freedom from oppression outside of the government arena, for example, through slavery, labor bosses, capitalist exploitation, or private terrorism: this area of analysis is little developed at present.

At the beginning of each summary statement the country is characterized by the forms of its economy and polity. The meanings of the terms used in this classification may be found in Part I, "The Relation of Political-Economic Systems to Freedom," and its accompanying Table 8. The classification is highly simplified, but it serves our concern with the developmental forms and biases that affect political controls. As in Table 8 the terms inclusive and noninclusive are used to distinguish between societies in which the economic activities of most people are organized in accordance with the dominant system and those dual

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societies in which they remain largely outside. The system should be assumed to be inclusive unless otherwise indicated.

Each state is categorized according to the political positions of the national or ethnic groups it contains. Since the modern political form is the "nation-state," it is not surprising that many states have a relatively homogeneous population. The overwhelming majority in these states belong to roughly the same ethnic group; people from this group naturally form the dominant group in the state. In relatively homogeneous states there is no large subnationality (that is, with more than one million people or twenty percent of the population) residing in a defined territory within the country: Austria, Costa Rica, Somalia, and West Germany are good examples. States in this category may be ethnically diverse (for example, Cuba or Colombia), but there are no sharp ethnic lines between major groups. These states should be distinguished from ethnically complex states, such as Guyana or Singapore, that have several ethnic groups, but no major group that has its historic homeland in a particular part of the country. Complex states may have large minorities that have suffered social, political, or economic discrimination in the recent past, but today the governments of such states treat all peoples as equals as a matter of policy. In this regard complex states are distinguishable from ethnic states with major nonterritorial subnationalities, for the governments of such states have a deliberate policy of giving preference to the dominant ethnic group at the expense of other major groups. Examples are Burundi or China (Taiwan).

Another large category of states is labeled ethnic states with (a) major territorial subnationalities(y). As in the homogeneous states there is a definite ruling people (or Staatsvolk) residing on its historic national territory within the state. But the state also incorporates other territories with other historic peoples that are now either without a state, or the state dominated by their people lies beyond the new border. As explained in *Freedom in the World 1978* (pp. 180-218), to be considered a subnationality a territorial minority must have enough cohesion and publicity that their right to nationhood is acknowledged in some quarters. Often recent events have forged a quasi-unity among quite distinct groups—as among the peoples of Southern Sudan. Typical countries in this category are Burma and the USSR. Ethnic states with major potential territorial subnationalities fall into a closely related category. In such states—for example, Ecuador or Bolivia—many individuals in pre-

national ethnic groups have merged, with little overt hostility, with the dominant ethnic strain. The assimilation process has gone on for centuries. Yet in these countries the new consciousness that accompanies the diffusion of nationalistic ideas through education may reverse the process of assimilation in the future, especially where the potential subnationality has preserved a more or less definable territorial base.

There are a few truly multinational states in which ethnic groups with territorial bases coexist in one state without an established ruling people of *Staatsvolk*. In such states the several "nations" normally have autonomous political rights, although these do not in law generally include the right to secession. India and Nigeria are examples. One trinational and a few binational states complete the categories of those states in which several "nations" coexist.

The distinction between truly multinational states and ethnic states with territorial subnationalities may be made by comparing two major states that lie close to the margin between the categories—the ethnic Russian USSR and multinational India. In the USSR, Russian is in every way the dominant language. By contrast, in India Hindi speakers have not achieved dominance. English remains a unifying lingua franca, the languages of the several states have not been forced to change their script to accord with Hindi forms, and Hindi itself is not the distinctive language of a "ruling people"—it is a nationalized version of the popular language of a portion of the population of northern India. (The pre-British ruling class used a closely related language with Arabic, Persian, and Turkish infusions; it was generally written in Persian-Arabic script.) Unlike Russians in the non-Russian Soviet Republics, Hindi speakers from northern India do not have a special standing in their own eyes or those of other Indians. Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras are non-Hindi speaking cities, and their pride in their identities and cultures is an important aspect of Indian culture. By contrast, many Soviet Republics are dominated by Russian speakers, a situation developing even in Kiev, the largest non-Russian city.

Finally, transethnic heterogeneous states, primarily in Africa, are those in which independence found a large number of ethnically distinct peoples grouped more or less artificially within one political framework. The usual solution was for those taking over the reins of government to adopt the colonial approach of formally treating all local peoples as equal, but with the new objective of integrating all equally into a new national framework (and new

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national identity) as and when this would be possible. Rulers of states such as Senegal or Zaire may come from relatively small tribes, and it is in their interest to deemphasize tribalism. In some cases the tribes are so scattered and localistic that there is no short-term likelihood of secession resulting from tribalism. However, in other cases portions of the country have histories of separate nationhood making the transethnic solution hard to implement. In a few countries recent events have placed certain ethnic groups in opposition to one another or to ruling circles in such a way that the transethnic state remains only the formal principle of rule, replaced in practice by an ethnic hierarchy, as in Congo, Sierra Leone, or Ghana.

The descriptive paragraphs for political and civil rights are largely self-explanatory. Subnationalities are generally discussed under a subheading for political rights, although the subject has obvious civil liberties aspects. Discussion of the existence or nonexistence of political parties may be arbitrarily placed in one or the other section. These paragraphs only touch on a few relevant issues, especially in the civil liberties discussion. An issue may be omitted for lack of information, because it does not seem important for the country addressed, or because a particular condition can be inferred from the general statement of a pattern. It should be noted that we have tried where possible to incorporate the distinction between a broad definition of political prisoners (including those detained for violent political crimes) and a narrow definition that includes those arrested only for nonviolent actions--often labeled "prisoners of conscience." Obviously we are primarily concerned with the latter.

Under civil liberties there is often a sentence or two on the economy. However, this is primarily a survey of politically relevant freedoms and not economic freedoms. In addition our view of economic freedom depends less on the economic system than the way in which it is adopted and maintained. (See Lindsay M. Wright, "A Comparative Survey of Economic Freedoms," in *Freedom in the World 1982*, pp. 51-90.)

At the end of each country summary we have included an overall comparative statement that places the country's ratings in relation to those of others. Countries chosen for comparison are often neighboring or similar ones, but juxtaposing very different countries is also necessary for tying together the system.

The following summaries take little account of the oppressions that occur within the social units of a society, such as family and religious groups, or that reflect variations in the nonpoliti-

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cal aspects of culture. In particular, the reader will note few references in the following summaries to the relative freedom of women. This may be a serious gap in the Survey, but with limited resources we felt that it was better to omit this range of issues than to only tangentially include it. We suspect that including the freedom of women would not affect the ratings a great deal. Democracies today have almost universally opened political and civic participation to women on at least a formal basis of equality, while most nondemocratic societies that deny these equal rights to women also deny effective participation to most men. In such societies granting equal rights has limited meaning. There is little gain for political and most civil rights when women are granted equal participation in a totalitarian society. However, it is hoped that future annuals will be able to look specifically at denials of freedom to women, as well as other examples of rank disparity in the treatment of social groups, classes, races, or religions.

Country Summaries

A F G H A N I S T A N

Economy: noninclusive socialist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: communist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 7
Population: 14,400,000* **Status of Freedom:** not free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities.

Political Rights. Afghanistan is now ruled by a communist party under the tutelage and direct control of the Soviet Union. The rule of this very small party has no electoral or traditional legitimization. Soviet forces control the major cities but their control is contested by a variety of resistance movements throughout the country. Subnationalities: The largest minority is the Tajik (thirty percent), the dominant people of the cities and the western part of the country. Essentially lowland Persians, their language remains the lingua franca of the country. The Persian speaking Hazaras constitute five to ten percent of the population. Another ten percent belong to Uzbek and other Turkish groups in the north.

Civil Liberties. The media are primarily government owned and under rigid control. Antigovernment organization or expression is forbidden. Conversation is guarded and travel is restricted. In a condition of civil war and foreign occupation, political imprisonment, torture and execution are common, in addition to war deaths and massacres. There have been reports of both prisoners and pre-college students being sent to the USSR. Resources have been diverted to the Soviet Union as payment for its military "assistance." The modern sectors of the economy are controlled; much of the agricultural economy has been destroyed. The objectives of the state are totalitarian; their achievement is limited by the continuing struggle for control.

Comparatively: Afghanistan is as free as Mongolia, less free than Iran.

A L B A N I A

Economy: socialist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: communist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 7
Population: 2,900,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

* Population estimates for all countries are generally derived from the 1984 World Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C.

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Albania has been a communist dictatorship under essentially one-man rule since 1944. While there are a number of elected bodies, including an assembly, the parallel government of the communist party (4.5 percent of the people) is decisive at all levels; elections offer only one list of candidates. Candidates are officially designated by the Democratic Front, to which all Albanians are supposed to belong. In recent years extensive purges within the party have apparently been designed to maintain the power of the top leaders.

Civil Liberties. Press, radio, and television are completely under government or party control, and communication with the outside world is minimal. Media are characterized by incessant propaganda, and open expression of opinion in private conversation is rare. Political imprisonment is common; torture is frequently reported. All religious institutions were abolished in 1967; religion is outlawed; priests are regularly imprisoned. Apparently there are no private organizations independent of government or party. Economic disparities are comparatively small: all people must work one month of each year in factories or on farms, and there are no private cars. Attempting to leave the state is a major crime. Private economic choice is minimal.

Comparatively: Albania is as free as Cambodia, less free than Yugoslavia.

A L G E R I A

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 21,400,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a potential subnationality

Political Rights. Algeria has combined military dictatorship with one-party socialist rule. Elections at both local and national levels are managed by the party; they allow little opposition to the system, although individual representatives and specific policies may be criticized. However, the pragmatic, puritanical, military rulers are probably supported by a fairly

Country Summaries

broad consensus. Subnationalities: Fifteen to twenty percent of the people are Berbers, who have demonstrated a desire for enhanced self-determination.

Civil Liberties. The media are governmental means for active indoctrination; opposition expression is controlled and foreign publications are closely watched. Private conversation appears relatively open. Although not fully independent, the regular judiciary has established a rule of law in some areas. Prisoners of conscience are detained for short periods, but no long-term political prisoners are now held. Appeals from the decisions of special courts for state security and economic crimes are not allowed. Land reform has transformed former French plantations into collectives. Although government goals are clearly socialist, small farms and businesses have been encouraged recently. Travel is generally free. Eighty percent of the people are illiterate; many are still very poor, but extremes of wealth have been reduced. Unions have slight freedom. Islam's continued strength provides a counterweight to governmental absolutism. There is freedom of religious worship.

Comparatively: Algeria is as free as Tanzania, freer than Iraq, less free than Morocco.

A N G O L A

Economy: noninclusive socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 7,800,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with major subnationalities

Political Rights. Angola is ruled by a very small communist-style socialist party in which military commanders may wield considerable power. The ruling party has relied heavily on Soviet equipment and Cuban troops to dominate the civil war and to stay in power. There is an elected parliament but essentially no choice in the elections. Subnationalities: The party is not tribalist, but is opposed by groups relying on particular tribes or regions—especially in Cabinda, the northeast, and the south-central areas. The UNITA movement, strongest among the Ovimbundu people, actively controls much of the south and east of the country.

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Civil Liberties. The nation remains in a state of war, with power arbitrarily exercised, particularly in the countryside. The media in controlled areas are government owned and do not deviate from its line. Political imprisonment and execution are common; repression of religious activity is reported. Travel is tightly restricted. Private medical care has been abolished, as has much private property—especially in the modern sectors. Strikes are prohibited and unions tightly controlled. Agricultural production is held down by peasant opposition to socialization and lack of markets.

Comparatively: Angola is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Zambia.

A N T I G U A A N D B A R B U D A

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 79,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Antigua is a parliamentary democracy with an elected house and appointed senate. The secessionist island of Barbuda has achieved special rights to limited self-government.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are published by opposing political parties, but an opposition paper has been repeatedly harassed, especially by libel cases. Radio is government and private and reports fairly. There is freedom of organization and demonstration. Unions are free and have the right to strike. The rule of law is guaranteed in the British manner.

Comparatively: Antigua and Barbuda is as free as Jamaica, freer than Malta, less free than Dominica.

A R G E N T I N A

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 29,100,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

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Political Rights. Argentina has a fully functioning parliamentary system under a strong president. The president is elected by electors, but it is essentially a process of direct election. In 1983 the president elected was from neither the previously dominant military nor the largest political party. He subsequently moved rapidly to destroy what vestiges of military interference in the political system remained, and to allow trials of many of the military leaders involved in recent events, particularly the disappearances and tortures of the 1970s. Potentially, the military remains a threat to democracy.

Civil Liberties. Private newspapers and both private and government broadcasting stations operate. The media freely express varying opinions. Political parties organize dissent, and public demonstrations are frequent. Courts are independent. The church and trade unions play a strong political role. Human rights organizations are active. For non-Catholics religious freedom is curtailed. The economy includes a large government sector.

Comparatively: Argentina is as free as Finland, freer than Uruguay, less free than Venezuela.

A U S T R A L I A

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 15,500,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population with small aboriginal groups

Political Rights. Australia is a federal parliamentary democracy with strong powers retained by its component states. With equal representation from each state, the Senate provides a counterbalance to the nationally representative House of Representatives. The British appointed Governor-General retains some power in constitutional deadlocks. Trade unions (separately and through the Labour Party) and foreign investors have great economic weight. The states have separate parliaments and premiers, but appointed governors. There are recurrent attempts to improve the condition and degree of self-determination of the aborigines.

Civil Liberties. All the newspapers and most radio and television stations are privately owned. The Australian Broadcasting Commission operates government radio and television stations on a basis similar to BBC. Although Australia lacks many formal guarantees of civil liberties, the degree of protection of these

liberties in the common law is similar to that in Britain and Canada. Freedom of assembly is generally respected, although it varies by region. Freedom of choice in education, travel, occupation, property, and private association are perhaps as complete as anywhere in the world. Relatively low taxes enhance this freedom.

Comparatively: Australia is as free as the United Kingdom, freer than India.

A U S T R I A

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized,multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 7,600,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Austria's parliamentary system has a directly elected lower house and an upper (and less powerful) house elected by the provincial assemblies. The president is directly elected, but the chancellor (representing the majority party in parliament) is the center of political power. The two major parties have alternated control since the 1950s but the government often seeks broad consensus. The referendum is used on rare occasions. Provincial legislatures and governors are elective. **Subnationalities:** Fifty thousand Slovenes in the southern part of the country have rights to their own schools.

Civil Liberties. The press in Austria is free and varied; radio and television are under a state-owned corporation that by law is supposed to be free of political control. Its geographical position and constitutionally defined neutral status places its media and government in a position analogous to Finland, but the Soviets have put less pressure on Austria to conform to Soviet wishes than on Finland. The rule of law is secure, and there are no political prisoners. Banks and heavy industry are largely nationalized.

Comparatively: Austria is as free as Belgium, freer than Greece.

Country Summaries

B A H A M A S

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 200,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The Bahamas have a parliamentary system with a largely ceremonial British Governor-General. The House is elective and the senate appointed. The ruling party has a large majority, but there is an opposition in parliament. Government power is maintained in part by discrimination in favor of supporters and control over the broadcast media. There has not been a change in government since independence. Most islands are administered by centrally appointed commissioners. There is no army.

Civil Liberties. There are independent newspapers and no censorship. Radio and television are government owned and not free of government influence. Labor and business organization are free; there is a right to strike. A program of Bahamianization is being promoted in several sectors of the economy. Rights of travel, occupation, education, and religion are secure. Corruption is widely alleged.

Comparatively: Bahamas is as free as Fiji, freer than Honduras, less free than Barbados.

B A H R A I N

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: traditional nonparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 400,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

The citizenry is relatively homogeneous

Political Rights. Bahrain is a traditional shaikhdom with a modernized administration. Direct access to the ruler is encouraged. The legislature is dissolved, but powerful merchant and religious families place a check on royal power. There are local councils. Subnationalities: The primary ethnic problem has been the struggle between the Iranians who once ruled and the Arabs who now rule; in part this is reflected in the opposition of the Sunni and majority Shi'a Muslim sects.

Civil Liberties. The largely private press seldom criticizes government policy. Radio and television are government owned. There is considerable freedom of expression in private, but informers are feared. Rights to assembly and demonstration are limited. The legal and educational systems are a mixture of traditional Islamic and British. Short-term arrest is used to discourage dissent, and there are long-term political prisoners. In security cases involving violence, fair and quick trials are delayed and torture occurs. Rights to travel, property, and religious choice are secured. There is a record of disturbances by worker groups, and union organization is restricted. Many free social services are provided. Citizenship is very hard to obtain; there is antipathy to foreign workers (but unlike neighboring shaikhdoms most people in the country are citizens).

Comparatively: Bahrain is as free as China (Taiwan), freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than India.

B A N G L A D E S H

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 99,600,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnically and religiously complex state

Political Rights. Bangladesh alternates between military and parliamentary rule. In 1982 military rule was reintroduced; local elective institutions are functioning. Political parties are active, but intransigence on both sides has thwarted an expected return to parliamentary rule. **Subnationalities:** Fighting with minor tribal groups along the border continues. The Bihari minority suffers discrimination.

Civil Liberties. The press is largely private and party. The papers are intermittently censored, and there is pervasive self-censorship through both government support and pressure. Radio and television are government controlled, but are not actively used for mobilization. In a violent context there have been recurrent executions and imprisonments, and considerable brutality. Political imprisonment continues to occur, but there are now few prisoners of conscience. Political parties organize and mobilize the expression of opposition, and large rallies are held.

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Many trials have been before military courts. The civilian courts can decide against the government. In spite of considerable communal antipathy, religious freedom exists. Travel is generally unrestricted. Although they do not have the right to strike, labor unions are active and strikes occur. Over half of the rural population are laborers or tenant farmers; some illegal land confiscation by local groups has been reported. Corruption remains a major problem.

Comparatively: Bangladesh is as free as Poland, freer than Burma, less free than Malaysia.

BARBADOS

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 300,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Barbados is governed by a parliamentary system, with a ceremonial British Governor-General. Elections have been fair and well administered. Power alternates between the two major parties. Public opinion has a direct and powerful effect on policy. Local governments are also elected.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private and free of censorship. The government has, however, revoked the work permit of the editor of a leftist publication because of his criticism of the US intervention in Grenada. Both the private and government radio stations are largely free; the only television station is organized on the BBC model. There is an independent judiciary, and general freedom from arbitrary government action. Travel, residence, and religion are free. Although both major parties rely on the support of labor, private property is fully accepted.

Comparatively: Barbados is as free as France, freer than Jamaica, less free than Costa Rica.

BELGIUM

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 9,900,000	Status of Freedom: free

A binational state

Political Rights. Belgium is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament. Elections lead to coalition governments, generally of the center. Linguistic divisions have produced considerable instability. Subnationalities: The rise of nationalism among the two major peoples—Flemish and Walloon—has led to increasing transfer of control over cultural affairs to the communal groups. However, provincial governors are appointed by the national government.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are free and uncensored. Radio and television are government owned, but independent boards are responsible for programming. The full spectrum of private rights is respected; voting is compulsory. Property rights, worker rights, and religious freedom are guaranteed.

Comparatively: Belgium is as free as Switzerland, freer than France.

B E L I Z E

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 160,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Belize is a parliamentary democracy with an elected house and indirectly elected senate. The governor-general retains considerable power. Elections are competitive and fair, but the same person has retained power since 1961. Competitive local elections are also a part of the system. A small British military force remains because of non-recognition by Guatemala.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and varied. Radio is government controlled but presents opposition viewpoints. Organization and assembly are guaranteed, as is the rule of law. The opposition is well organized. Private cooperatives have been formed in several agricultural industries. Unions are independent; strikes have been used to gain benefits.

Comparatively: Belize is as free as Trinidad and Tobago, freer than Honduras, less free than Costa Rica.

Country Summaries

B E N I N

Economy: noninclusive socialist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: socialist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 7
(military dominated)
Population: 3,900,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Benin is a military dictatorship buttressed by a one-party organization. Regional and tribal loyalties may be stronger than national. Elections are single list, with no opposition. local assemblies are closely controlled.

Civil Liberties. All media are rigidly censored; most are owned by the government. Opposition is not tolerated; criticism of the government often leads to a few days of reeducation in military camps. There are few long-term political prisoners, but the rule of law is very weak. Detainees are mistreated. Private schools have been closed. Although there is general freedom of religion, some sects have been forbidden. Independent labor unions are banned. Permission to leave the country is closely controlled. Economically, the government's interventions have been in cash crops and external trade, and industries have been nationalized; control over the largely subsistence and small entrepreneur economy remains incomplete. Widespread corruption aggravates already large income disparities.

Comparatively: Benin is as free as Iraq, less free than Upper Volta.

B H U T A N

Economy: preindustrial **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 1,400,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

An ethnic state with a significant subnationality

Political Rights. Bhutan is a hereditary monarchy in which the king rules with the aid of a council and an indirectly elected National Assembly. There are no legal political parties and the Assembly does little more than approve government actions. Villages are traditionally ruled by their own headmen, but districts

are directly ruled from the center. The Buddhist hierarchy is still very important in the affairs of the country. In foreign policy Bhutan's dependence on India has been partially renounced; it is still dependent for defense. Subnationalities: The main political party operates outside the country, agitating in favor of the Nepalese minority (about twenty-five percent) that is restricted to one part of the country, and in favor of a more modern political system.

Civil Liberties. The only paper is the government weekly. There are many small broadcasting stations. Outside media are freely available. There are few if any prisoners of conscience. No organized opposition exists within the country. The legal structure exhibits a mixture of traditional and British forms. There is religious freedom and freedom to travel. Traditional agriculture, crafts, and trade dominate the economy.

Comparatively: Bhutan is as free as Bahrain, freer than Bangladesh, less free than Nepal.

B O L I V I A

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 6,000,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with major potential subnationalities

Political Rights. In 1982 Bolivia returned to parliamentary democracy. Temporarily the traditional power of the military and security services was greatly reduced, although not yet eliminated. Quarrels between Parliament and president have imperiled the system. Union power expressed through massive strikes has become a major challenge. Provincial and local government is controlled from the center. Subnationalities: Over sixty percent of the people are Indians speaking Aymara or Quechua; these languages have been given official status alongside Spanish. The Indian peoples remain, however, more potential than actual subnationalities. The Spanish-speaking minority still controls the political process.

Civil Liberties. The press and most radio stations are private and are now largely free. In mid-1982 all restrictions on political and union activity were officially removed and a complete

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amnesty announced. But fear remains in the presence of private security forces, and torture has occurred. The Catholic Church retains a powerful and critical role. The people are overwhelmingly post-land-reform, subsistence agriculturists. The major mines and much of industry are nationalized; the workers have a generous social welfare program, given the country's poverty.

Comparatively: Bolivia is as free as India, freer than Guyana, less free than Venezuela.

B O T S W A N A

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 1,000,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The republican system of Botswana combines traditional and modern principles. The assembly is elected for a fixed term and appoints the president who rules. There is also an advisory House of Chiefs. Nine districts, led either by chiefs or elected leaders, have independent power of taxation, as well as traditional control over land and agriculture. Elections continue to be won overwhelmingly by the ruling party as they were before independence, yet there are opposition members in parliament and the opposition controls town councils. There is economic and political pressure from both black African and white neighbors. Subnationalities: The country is divided among several major tribes belonging to the Batswana people, as well as minor peoples on the margins. The latter include a few hundred relatively wealthy white farmers.

Civil Liberties. The radio and the main daily paper are government owned; a private newspaper began in 1982. There is no censorship, and opposition party and foreign publications offer alternative views. Rights of assembly, religion, and travel are respected but regulated. Passport controls may be restrictive, and have been applied in the past to the opposition. Prisoners of conscience are not held. Unions are independent, but under pressure. In the modern society civil liberties appear to be guaranteed, but most people continue to live under traditional rules.

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Comparatively: Botswana is as free as India, freer than Gambia, less free than Barbados.

B R A Z I L

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: decentralized multiparty (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 134,400,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population with many very small, territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Brazil is currently governed by a president elected by the military and a popularly elected assembly. Party activity is increasingly competitive. The Communist Party remains banned, but even the CP held a congress in 1984. Rapid political evolution has diffused political power among factions of the opposition. There are independently organized elected governments at both state and local levels. Subnationalities: The many small Indian groups of the interior are under both private and governmental pressure on their lands, culture, and even lives.

Civil Liberties. The media are private, except for a few broadcasting stations. The powerful and critical press is now free of overt censorship; however, government control of most industry, and thus advertising, limits freedom to criticize government. Radio and television practice limited self-censorship. There is a general right of assembly and organization, and few if any prisoners of conscience. Massive opposition demonstrations have become a recent feature of political life. Private violence against criminals, suspected communists, peasants, and Indians continues outside the law; police brutality remains common. Opposition voices are regularly heard—including parliamentarians, journalists, and church officials. Union organization is powerful and strikes are widespread, though sometimes repressed. There is considerable large-scale government industry, but rights to property, religious freedom, travel, and education of one's choice are generally respected. Growth policy has favored modern and relatively wealthy sectors.

Comparatively: Brazil is as free as Malta, freer than Uruguay, less free than Colombia.

Country Summaries

B R U N E I

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: monarchy	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 200,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a major nonterritorial subnationality

Political Rights. Brunei is ruled as an absolute *monarchy* with little delegation of authority. In the 1960s an opposition party appeared to have overwhelming support before it was banned. There continues to be considerable reliance on the military forces and advice of the **United Kingdom** and Singapore.

Civil Liberties. Little or no dissent is allowed in the nation's media. Radio and television and a major paper are government owned. However, many students attend schools overseas, and foreign media of all kinds are widely available. The only political party is outlawed and long quiescent. A few dissidents remain in jail. Formally the judicial system is patterned on the English model. The position of the Chinese non-citizens (many long-term residents) has declined since independence. All land is government owned, as is most of the oil wealth.

Comparatively: Brunei is as free as Tanzania, freer than Burma, less free than Indonesia.

B U L G A R I A

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 9,000,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Bulgaria is governed by its Communist Party, although the facade of a parallel government and two-party system is maintained. The same man has essentially ruled over the system since 1954; elections at both national and local levels- have little meaning. Soviet influence in the security services is decisive. Subnationalities: Muslim minorities numbering about, one million are discriminated against.

Civil Liberties. All media are under absolute control by the government or its Party branches. Citizens have few if any rights

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against the state. There are hundreds or thousands of prisoners of conscience, many living under severe conditions. Brutality and torture are common. Those accused of opposition to the system may also be banished to villages, denied their occupations, or confined in psychiatric hospitals. Believers are subject to discrimination. Citizens have little choice of occupation or residence. Political loyalty is required to secure many social benefits. The most common political crimes are illegally trying to leave the country, criticism of the government, and illegal contacts with foreigners. However, there have been openings through a new spirit of independence and attempts at deconcentration in the economic sphere.

Comparatively: Bulgaria is as free as Mongolia, less free than Hungary.

BURKINA FASO
(UPPER VOLTA)

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 6,700,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. The government is directed by a radical and increasingly dictatorial military leader. Burkina Faso has suffered a succession of relatively nonviolent military coups; the latest has been followed by executions and the reduction of regional chiefly power.

Civil Liberties. Media are both government and private; self-censorship is the rule. Private criticism is common. As a result of successive coups there are prisoners of conscience; freedom of assembly or of political organization is denied. At least until recently there has been a rule of law; within traditional limits private rights are respected. Trade unions are under strong government pressure; they have a limited right to strike. External travel is restricted; internal movement is free. The economy remains dependent on subsistence agriculture, with the government playing the role of regulator and promoter of development.

Comparatively: Burkina Faso is as free as Nigeria, freer than Burundi, less free than Sierra Leone.

Country Summaries

B U R M A

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 38,900,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Burma is governed by a small military elite as a one-party socialist state. The government's dependence on the army makes its strengths and weaknesses more those of a military dictatorship than those of a communist regime. Elections are held at both national and local levels: the Party chooses the slate of candidates. **Subnationalities:** The government represents essentially the Burmese people that live in the heartland of the country. The Burmese are surrounded by millions of non-Burmese living in continuing disaffection or active revolt. Among the minorities on the periphery are the Karens, Shan, Kachins, Mon, and Chin. Many Muslims have been expelled or encouraged to leave.

Civil Liberties. All media are government owned, with alternative opinions expressed obliquely if at all; both domestic and foreign publications are censored. The media are expected to actively promote government policy. Organized dissent is forbidden; even private expression is dangerous. Prisoners of conscience have been common, and torture reported. However, few ethnic Burmans now seem to be detained for reasons of conscience. The regular court structure has been replaced by "people's courts." Racial discrimination has been incorporated in government policy. Emigration or even travel outside the country is very difficult. Although the eventual goal of the government is complete socialization, areas of private enterprise remain, subject to control by government marketing monopolies.

Comparatively: Burma is as free as Cambodia, less free than Bangladesh.

B U R U N D I

Economy: noninclusive mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 4,700,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a major, nonterritorial subnationality

Political Rights. Burundi is ruled by a self-appointed military president with the assistance of a Party Central Committee and Politburo. The assembly elections allow only the narrowest choice of pre-selected candidates from the one party; presidential elections allow no choice. Subnationalities: The rulers continue to be from the Tutsi ethnic group (fifteen percent) that has traditionally ruled; their dominance was reinforced by a massacre of Hutus (eighty-five percent) after an attempted revolt in the early 1970s.

Civil Liberties. The media are all government controlled and closely censored, as are often the foreign media. Lack of freedom of political speech or assembly is accompanied by political imprisonment and reports of brutality. Under current conditions there is little guarantee of individual rights, particularly for the Hutu majority. However, in recent years the exclusion of the Hutu from public services, the Party, and other advantages has been relaxed. There are no independent unions, but short wildcat strikes have been reported. Religion is closely regulated, especially in the areas of education and missionary activity. Traditional group and individual rights persist on the village level: Burundi is not a highly structured modern society. Travel is relatively unrestricted. Although officially socialist, private or traditional economic forms predominate.

Comparatively: Burundi is as free as Cameroon, freer than Somalia, less free than Kenya.

C A M B O D I A

Economy: noninclusive socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 6,100,000	Status of Freedom: not free

Country Summaries

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Cambodia is divided between the remnants of the Pol Pot tyranny and the less tyrannical, imposed Vietnamese regime. The people have little part in either regime. Other more democratic rebel groups are increasing in strength.

Civil Liberties. The media continue to be completely controlled in both areas; outside publications are rigorously controlled. Political execution has been a common function of government. Reeducation for war captives is again practiced by the new government. There is no rule of law; private freedoms are not guaranteed. Cambodians continue to be one of the world's most tyrannized peoples. At least temporarily much of economic life has been decollectivized.

Comparatively: Cambodia is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Thailand.

C A M E R O O N

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 9,400,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with a major subnationality

Political Rights. Cameroon is a one-party state ruled by the same party since independence in 1960. The government has steadily centralized power. Referendums and other elections have little meaning; voters are given no alternatives, although a legislative candidate is occasionally rejected. Provincial governors are appointed by the central government. An attempt has been made to incorporate all elements in a government of broad consensus. Subnationalities: The most significant opposition has come from those opposing centralization. Politics is largely a struggle of regional and tribal factions.

Civil Liberties. The largely government-owned media are closely controlled; censorship and self-censorship are common; works of critical authors are prohibited, even university lectures are subject to censorship. A number of papers have been closed, and journalists arrested. Freedom of speech, assembly, and union organization are limited, while freedom of occupation, education, and property are respected. Prisoners of conscience are detained

without trial and may be ill-treated. Over one hundred suspects may have been executed after secret trials following a bloody coup attempt. Allegations have been made of torture and village massacres. Internal travel and religious choice are relatively free; foreign travel may be difficult. Labor and business organizations are closely controlled. Although still relatively short on capital, private enterprise is encouraged wherever possible.

Comparatively: Cameroon is as free as Vietnam, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Burkina Faso.

C A N A D A

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 25,100,000	Status of Freedom: free

A binational state

Political Rights. Canada is a parliamentary democracy with alternation of rule between leading parties. A great effort is made to register all eligible voters. The provinces have their own democratic institutions with a higher degree of autonomy than the American states. Subnationalities: In an attempt to prevent the breakup of Canada, the government has moved toward granting French linguistic equality; French has become the official language in Quebec. In addition, Quebec has been allowed to opt out of some national programs and maintains its own representatives abroad.

Civil Liberties. The media are free, although there is a government-related radio and television network. The full range of civil liberties is generally respected. In Quebec rights to choose English education and language have been infringed. There has been evidence of the invasion of privacy by Canadian security forces in recent years, much as in the United States. Many judicial and legal structures have been borrowed from the United Kingdom or the United States, with consequent advantages and disadvantages. Some provinces limit employment opportunities for nonresidents.

Comparatively: Canada is as free as the United States of America, freer than France.

Country Summaries

September 1981 coup. The judiciary is not independent. Movement is occasionally hampered by highway security checks. Most economic activity is private with limited government involvement. Corruption is particularly widespread.

Comparatively: Central African Republic is as free as Mali, freer than Somalia, less free than Kenya.

C H A D

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: military decentralized **Civil Liberties:** 7
Population: 5,000,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A transitional collection of semi-autonomous ethnic groups

Political Rights. Central government has been reestablished except in the far north where Libyan interference continues. The victorious leader rules with the more or less willing cooperation of other groups. France's participation in the defense of the present government has seriously reduced its independence, at least in inter-state relations. Subnationalities: Ethnic struggle pits the southern negroes (principally the Christian and animist Sara tribe) against a variety of northern Muslim groups (principally nomadic Arabs). Political factionalism is only partly ethnic.

Civil Liberties. Media are government owned and controlled. There is little chance for free expression. In recent years many have been killed or imprisoned without due process; in 1984 mass killings were again reported. Labor and business organizations exist with some independence. Religion is relatively free. Not an ideological area, traditional law is still influential. The economy is predominantly subsistence agriculture with little protection of property rights.

Comparatively: Chad is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Tanzania.

C H I L E

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: military nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 11,900,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

Country Summaries

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Chile is a military dictatorship. Although a 1980 plebiscite confirming government policy allowed an opposition vote of thirty percent, all power is concentrated at the center; there are no elective positions. An appointive Council of State is supposed to represent most sectors of society.

Civil Liberties. All media have both public and private outlets; newspapers are primarily private. The media, although censored and often threatened with closure, express a considerable range of opinion, occasionally including direct criticism of government policy. Limited party activity is tacitly allowed, and human rights organizations operate under pressure. Students, church leaders, and former political leaders regularly express dissent, sometimes massively and in the face of violent government repression. While one can win against the government, the courts are under government pressure. Prisoners of conscience are still commonly taken for short periods, torture occurs; political expulsions and internal exile continue. Violent confrontation lead repeatedly to repressions, only to be followed by new periods of relaxation. Such a period of repression began in the fall of 1984. Unions are restricted but have some rights, including a limited right to strike and organize at plant levels. Many nationalized enterprises have been resold to private investors, with government intervention in the economy now being limited to copper and petroleum.

Comparatively: Chile is as free as Guatemala, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Peru.

C H I N A (Mainland)

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 1,034,500,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with peripheral subnationalities

Political Rights. China is a one-party communist state under the collective leadership of the Politburo. A National People's Congress is indirectly elected within party guidelines, but does not function as a competitive parliament. National policy strug-

gles are obscured by secrecy; choices are sharply limited. There has been competition in some local elections. Party administration has been decentralized. Subnationalities: There are several subordinated peripheral peoples such as the Tibetans, Uygurs, Mongols, and the much acculturated Zhuang. These are granted a very limited degree of separate cultural life. Amounting to not more than six percent of the population, non-Chinese ethnic groups have tended to be diluted and obscured by Chinese settlement or sinification.

Civil Liberties. The mass media remain closely controlled tools for mobilizing the population. While the underground and wall-poster literature of 1978-79 has been suppressed, there is limited non-political cultural freedom. Many local papers not entirely under government control have recently developed. Although there is movement toward "socialist legality" on the Soviet model, court cases are often decided in political terms. There are unknown thousands of political prisoners, including those in labor-reform camps; the government has forced millions to live indefinitely in undesirable areas. Political executions are still reported. Millions of Chinese have been systematically discriminated against because of "bad class background," but such discrimination has recently been curtailed. Political-social controls at work are pervasive.

Compared to other communist states popular opinions and pressures play a considerable role. Occasional poster campaigns, demonstrations, and evidence of private conversation shows that pervasive factionalism has allowed elements of freedom and consensus into the system; recurrent repression, including imprisonment, equally shows the government's determination to keep dissent from becoming a threat to the system or its current leaders. Rights to travel and emigration are limited, as are religious freedoms. Rights to marry and have children are perhaps more closely controlled than in any other country in the world. Economic pressures have forced some, not wholly successful, rationalization of economic policy, including renunciation of guaranteed employment for youth. Introduction of private sector incentives has increased economic freedom, especially for small entrepreneurs and farmers. Small local strikes and slowdowns have been reported concerning wage increases and worker demands for greater control over choice of employment. Inequality derives from differences in political position and location rather than direct income.

Comparatively. China (Mainland) is as free as Algeria, freer than Mongolia, less free than China (Taiwan).

Country Summaries

C H I N A (Taiwan)

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: centralized dominant-party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 19,200,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A quasi-ethnic state with a majority nonterritorial subnationality

Political Rights. Taiwan is ruled by a single party organized according to a communist model (although anticommunist ideologically). There is a parliament to which representatives from Taiwan are elected; a few members oppose the regime but no effective opposition party is tolerated. The campaigns of non-government candidates are highly limited, particularly because the media are nearly uniformly pro-government. Most parliamentarians are still persons elected in 1947 as representatives of districts in China where elections could not be held subsequently because of communist control. The indirect presidential election is pro forma. Some local and regional positions are elective, including those in the provincial assembly that are held by Taiwanese. Subnationalities: The people are eighty-six percent native Taiwanese (speaking two Chinese dialects); opposition movements in favor of transferring control from the mainland immigrants to the Taiwanese are repressed. The vice-president is Taiwanese. The small group of pre-Chinese kao-shan people is discriminated against.

Civil Liberties. The media include government or party organs, but are mostly in private hands. Newspapers and magazines are subject to censorship or suspension, and practice self-censorship. Television is one sided. Rights to assembly are limited, but are sporadically granted. There are several hundred political prisoners, including prominent leaders of the moderate opposition. Union activity is restricted; strikes are forbidden. Other apolitical groups are free to organize. Private rights to property, education, and religion are generally respected; there is no right to travel to the mainland.

Comparatively: China (Taiwan) is as free as South Korea, freer than Burma, less free than Malaysia.

C O L O M B I A

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 28,200,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population with scattered minorities

Political Rights. Colombia is a constitutional democracy. The president is directly elected, as are both houses of the legislature. The opposition won the 1982 presidential election in which participation rose to over fifty percent. Members of the two principal parties are included in the government and the list of departmental governors. Both of the leading parties have well-defined factions; among the minor parties several are involved in revolutionary activity. The provinces are directly administered by the national government. The military has recently been put more firmly under government control.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, with most papers under party control, and quite free. Radio includes both government and private stations; television is a government monopoly. All media have been limited in their freedom to report subversive activity. Personal rights are generally respected; courts are relatively strong and independent. Riots and guerrilla activity have led to periodic states of siege in which these rights are limited. Assemblies are often banned for fear of riots. In these conditions the security forces have infringed personal rights violently, especially those of leftist unions, peasants, and Amerindians in rural areas. Many persons are rounded up in antiguerrilla or antiterrorist campaigns, and may be tortured or killed. However, opponents are not given prison sentences simply for the nonviolent expression of political opinion, and the government and courts have attempted to control abuses. The 1984 accommodation of government and guerrillas may help. Human rights organizations are active. The government encourages private enterprise where possible; union activity and strikes for economic goals are legal.

Comparatively: Colombia is as free as India, freer than Brazil, less free than Venezuela.

Country Summaries

C O M O R O S

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: decentralized nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 500,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The present Comoran leader returned to power with the aid of mercenaries in 1978, and they continue to protect him. Subsequently the voters have at least formally approved the new presidential system. The majority probably support the new system—the previous ruler had become very oppressive and the new president was prime minister in the past. There is only one party but independents contest elections. Elections may be manipulated. Each island has an elected governor and council. (The island of Mayotte is formally a part of the Comoros, but it has chosen to be a French dependency.)

Civil Liberties. Radio is government owned. There is no press, but some outside publications are available. There are few if any long-term prisoners of conscience. Pressure is reported against the opposition, but public criticism is allowed. There is a new emphasis on Islamic customs. The largely plantation economy has led to severe landlessness and concentrated wealth; emigration to the mainland for employment is very common. There have been no strikes.

Comparatively: Comoros is as free as China (Taiwan), freer than Kenya, less free than Mauritius.

C O N G O

Economy: noninclusive mixed **Political Rights:** 7
 socialist
Polity: socialist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 6
 (military dominated)
Population: 1,700,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A formally transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Congo is a military dictatorship with a very small ruling party. One-party elections allow no opposition, but criticism is aired in parliament.

Country Summaries

Civil Liberties. The press and all publications are heavily censored. Radio is government owned. Criticism may lead to imprisonment, yet there is some private discussion and limited dissent. Executions and imprisonment of political opponents have occurred, but conditions have improved. The only union is state sponsored; strikes are illegal. Religious groups are limited but generally free. There is little judicial protection; passports are difficult to obtain. At the local and small entrepreneur level private property is generally respected; most large-scale commerce and industry are either nationalized or controlled by expatriates. Literacy is high for the region.

Comparatively: Congo is as free as Syria, freer than Iraq, less free than Kenya.

C O S T A R I C A

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 2,500,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. A parliamentary democracy, Costa Rica has a directly elected president and several important parties. No parties are prohibited. This structure is supplemented by an independent tribunal for overseeing elections. Elections are fair; rule alternates between parties. Provinces are under the direction of the central government.

Civil Liberties. The media are notably free, private, and varied; they serve a society ninety percent literate. The courts are fair, and private rights, such as those to movement, occupation, education, religion, and union organization, are respected.

Comparatively: Costa Rica is as free as Ireland, freer than Colombia.

C U B A

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 9,900,000	Status of Freedom: not free

Country Summaries

A complex but relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Cuba is a one-party communist state on the Soviet model. Real power lies, however, more in the person of Fidel Castro and in the Russian leaders upon whom he depends than is the case in other noncontiguous states adopting this model. Popular election at the municipal level is closely supervised. Provincial and national assemblies are elected by municipalities but can be recalled by popular vote. The whole system is largely a show: political opponents are excluded from nomination by law, many others are simply disqualified by Party fiat; no debate is allowed on major issues; once elected the assemblies do not oppose Party decisions.

Civil Liberties. All media are state controlled and express only what the government wishes. Thousands of political prisoners have been released in recent years, mostly into exile; many remain. Torture has been reported in the past, but hundreds who have refused to recant continue to be held in difficult conditions, and new arrests are frequent. There are hundreds of thousands of others who are formally discriminated against as opponents of the system. There is freedom to criticize policy administration through the press and the institutions of "popular democracy," but writing or speaking against the system, even in private is severely repressed. There are reports of psychiatric institutions also being used to incarcerate. Freedom to choose work, education, or residence is greatly restricted; new laws force people to work harder. It is generally illegal to leave Cuba, but some have been forced to leave. The practice of religion is discouraged by the government.

Comparatively: Cuba is as free as Guinea-Bissau, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than El Salvador.

C Y P R U S

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: (G) 1, (T) 4
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: (G) 2, (T) 3
Population: 650,000	Status of Freedom: (G) free (T) partly free

A binational state

Political Rights. At present Cyprus is one state only in theory. Both the Greek and Turkish sectors are parliamentary democracies, although the Turkish sector is in effect a protecto-

rate of Turkey. Elections have seemed reasonably fair in both sectors, but in the violent atmosphere pressure has been applied to all nonconforming groups or individuals. Greek Cypriots in the north are denied voting rights. Nationalities: Greeks and Turks now live almost exclusively in their own sectors. Eighty percent of the population is Greek; sixty percent of the land is in the Greek sector.

Civil Liberties. The newspapers are free and varied in both sectors, but overwhelmingly support the governments of their sectors. Radio and television are under the respective governments or semigovernmental bodies. The usual rights of free peoples are respected in each sector, including occupation, labor organization, and religion, although somewhat more circumscribed in the Turkish sector. Because of communal strife and invasion, property has often been taken from members of one group by force (or abandoned from fear of force) and given to the other. Under these conditions rights to choose one's sector of residence or to travel between sectors have been greatly restricted.

C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 15,500,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A binational state

Political Rights. Czechoslovakia is a Soviet style, one-party communist state, reinforced by the presence of Soviet troops. Elections are noncompetitive and there is essentially no legislative debate. **Subnationalities:** The division of the state into separate Czech and Slovak socialist republics has only slight meaning since the Czechoslovak Communist Party continues to rule the country (under the guidance of the Soviet Communist Party). Although less numerous and poorer than the Czech people, the Slovaks are granted their rightful share of power within this framework.

Civil Liberties. Media are government or Party owned and rigidly censored. However, some relatively free private and literary expression, as well as serious underground publications, occurs. Freedoms of assembly, organization, and association are denied. Heavy pressures are placed on religious activities,

Country Summaries

especially through holding ministerial incomes at a very low level and curtailing religious education. There are a number of prisoners of conscience; exclusion of individuals from their chosen occupations and short detentions are more common sanctions. The beating of political suspects is common, and psychiatric detention is employed. Successful defense in political cases is possible, but lawyers may be arrested for overzealous defense. Human rights groups are persecuted. Travel to the West and emigration are restricted. Independent trade unions and strikes are forbidden. Rights to choice of occupation and to private property are restricted.

Comparatively: Czechoslovakia is as free as East Germany, freer than Bulgaria, less free than Poland.

D E N M A R K

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 5,100,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Denmark is a constitutional monarchy with a unicameral parliament. Elections are fair. Since a wide variety of parties achieve success, resulting governments are based on coalitions. Districts have governors appointed from the center and elected councils; local officials are under local control.

Civil Liberties. The press is free (and more conservative politically than the electorate). Radio and television are government owned but relatively free. Labor unions are powerful both socially and politically. All other rights are guaranteed. The very high tax level constitutes more than usual constraint on private property in a capitalist state, but has provided a fairly equitable distribution of social benefits. Religion is free but state supported.

Comparatively: Denmark is as free as Norway, freer than Finland.

D J I B O U T I

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: nationalist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 300,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A binational state with subordination

Political Rights. Djibouti is formally a parliamentary democracy under French protection. Only one party is allowed, and in recent elections there has been little if any choice. Although all ethnic groups are carefully included in the single-party lists, one group is clearly dominant. A large French garrison continues to play a role.

Civil Liberties. The media are mostly government owned and controlled and there is no right of assembly. There are prisoners of conscience and torture. Unions are under a degree of government control, but there is a right to strike. There is extreme poverty and the market economy is still dominated by French interests.

Comparatively: Djibouti appears to be as free as South Africa, freer than Somalia, less free than North Yemen.

D O M I N I C A

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 100,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population with a minority enclave

Political Rights. Dominica is a parliamentary democracy with competing political parties. An opposition party came to power in highly competitive 1980 elections. There have been several violent attempts to overthrow the government, and the military has subsequently been disbanded. The rights of the native Caribs may not be fully respected.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and the radio public. The press is generally free and critical and the radio presents alternative views. Rights of assembly and organization are guaranteed. There is rule of law and no prisoners of conscience. States of emergency have recurrently limited rights to a small

Country Summaries

extent. Personal rights to travel, residence, and property are secured, as are the union rights of workers.

Comparatively: Dominica is as free as Nauru, freer than Guyana, less free than Barbados.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 6,300,000	Status of Freedom: free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The Dominican Republic is a presidential democracy on the American model. Elections are free and competitive. Military influence is greatly reduced. Provinces are under national control, municipalities under local.

Civil Liberties. The media are generally privately owned, free, and diverse. Communist materials are restricted. Broadcasting is highly varied, but subject to government review. Public expression is generally free; the spokesmen of a wide range of parties quite openly express their opinions. There are no prisoners of conscience. The courts appear relatively independent and human rights groups are active. labor unions operate under moderate constraints. Travel overseas is sometimes restricted. State-owned lands are slowly being redistributed.

Comparatively: Dominican Republic is as free as Ecuador, freer than Colombia, less free than Barbados.

ECUADOR

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 9,100,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with a potential subnationality

Political Rights. Ecuador is governed by an elected president and parliament. 1984 witnessed a change of government by electoral process, an event rare in the country's history. There have been minor restrictions on party activity and nominations.

Country Summaries

Provinces and municipalities are directly administered, but there are elected local and provincial councils. Subnationalities: Forty percent of the population is Indian, most of whom speak Quechua. This population at present does not form a conscious subnationality in a distinct homeland.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are under private or party control and quite outspoken; there is no censorship. Radio and television are mostly under private control. There are no long-term prisoners of conscience, but persons are detained for criticizing government officials. Human rights organizations are active. The court system is not strongly independent, and imprisonment for belief may occur. Land reform has been hampered by resistance from landed elites. Although there are state firms, particularly in major industries, Ecuador is essentially a capitalist and traditional state.

Comparatively: Ecuador is as free as Mauritius, freer than Colombia, less free than Venezuela.

E G Y P T

Economy: mixed socialist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: centralized dominant-party	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 47,000,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population with a communal religious minority

Political Rights. Egypt is a controlled democracy. Within limits political parties may organize: communist and religious extremist parties are forbidden. The ruling party won about seventy-five percent of the vote in 1984 parliamentary elections, but opposition parties achieved increased representation. Participation rates were very low; electoral laws favored the government. Subnationalities: Several million Coptic Christians live a distinct communal life.

Civil Liberties. The Egyptian press is mostly government owned, but weekly party papers are relatively free and increasingly influential. Radio and television are under governmental control. A fairly broad range of literary publications has recently developed. There is limited freedom of assembly. Severe riot laws and a variety of laws restricting dissent have led to large-

Country Summaries

scale imprisonment or banning from political or other organizational activity. Many prisoners of conscience have been held in the last few years, but very seldom for long periods. Women's rights have improved. In both agriculture and industry considerable diversity and choice exists within a mixed socialist framework. Unions have developed some independence from the government, but there is no right to strike. The predominance of state corporations contributes to the acquiescence of unions in official policy. Travel and other private rights are generally free.

Comparatively. Egypt is as free as Malaysia, freer than Algeria, less free than Brazil.

EL SALVADOR

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: centralized multiparty (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 4,800,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. El Salvador is ruled by an elected president and parliament. The 1984 election was fair, but the armed opposition did not participate. In the countryside a bloody struggle between government and guerrilla forces continues. On the government side armed killers have prevented the establishment of normal political or civil relationships. The 1984 election appears to have legitimized the power of the civil, elected government.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers and radio are largely in private hands. Under strong pressure from all sides the media have been self-censored, but are showing more independence. Legal and illegal opposition papers and broadcasts appear. The rule of law is weak; assassination has been common. This situation improved in 1984 after the elections. Conscription by both sides has been a major rights problem. Atrocities have been committed by both sides in the conflict, probably frequently without the authorization of leaders. These are beginning to be investigated. Human rights organizations are active. The Catholic Church remains a force. The university has been reopened. Although still a heavily agricultural country, rural people are to a large extent

involved in the wage and market economy. Banking and foreign trade of export crops have been nationalized; land reform has had limited success.

Comparatively: El Salvador is as free as Malaysia, freer than Guatemala, less free than Mexico.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 340,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a territorial minority

Political Rights. Equatorial Guinea is a military dictatorship. The coup that replaced the former dictator was popular, but the population as a whole played and plays little part. A several-hundred-man Moroccan bodyguard protects the incumbent at Spanish expense.

Civil Liberties. The media are very limited, largely government owned, and do not report opposition viewpoints. The rule of law is tenuous; there are political prisoners, but perhaps none of conscience. Compulsory recruitment for the plantations occurs. Opposition parties are not tolerated. Religious freedom was reestablished in 1979, and private property is recognized. Plantation and subsistence farming is still recovering from near destruction under the previous government.

Comparatively: Equatorial Guinea appears to be as free as Congo, freer than Somalia, less free than Tanzania.

ETHIOPIA

Economy: noninclusive socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 32,000,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Country Summaries

Political Rights. Ethiopia is ruled by a military committee that has successively slaughtered the leaders of the ancien regime and many of its own leaders. A spectrum of mass organizations has been established on the model of a one-party socialist state. Establishing locally elected village councils has been the primary effort to mobilize the people. In late 1984 a national communist (workers) party was established. Subnationalities: The heartland of Ethiopia is occupied by the traditionally dominant Amhara and acculturated subgroups of the diffuse Galla people. In the late nineteenth century Ethiopian rulers united what had been warring fragments of a former empire in this heartland, and proceeded to incorporate some entirely new areas. At that time the Somali of the south came under Ethiopian rule; Eritrea was incorporated as the result of a UN decision in 1952. Today Ethiopia is cross cut by linguistic and religious conflicts: most important is separatism due "to historic allegiances to ancient provinces (especially Tigre), to different experiences (Eritrea), and to the population of a foreign nation (Somalia).

Civil Liberties. The media are controlled, serving the mobilization needs of the government. Individual rights are unprotected under conditions of despotism and anarchy. Political imprisonment, forced confession, execution, disappearance, and torture are common. There are no rights to assembly. Many thousands have been killed aside from those that died in civil war. Education is totally controlled. What freedom there was under the Ethiopian monarchy has been largely lost, but land reform has benefited many. Choice of residence and workplace is often made by the government; there have been reports of forced transport to state farms. Religious groups have been persecuted, and there is limited religious freedom. Peasant and worker organizations are closely controlled. Travel outside the country is strictly controlled; hostages or guarantors are often required before exit. The words and actions of the regime indicate little respect for private rights in property. The economy is under increasing government control through nationalizations, state-sponsored peasant cooperatives, and the regulation of business licenses. Starvation has been a recurrent theme, with government ineffectiveness playing a part both before and after the accession of the radicals.

Comparatively: Ethiopia is as free as Cambodia, less free than Sudan.

F I J I

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 700,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A binational state

Political Rights. Fiji has a complex political structure designed to protect the interests of both the original Fiji people and the Indian people, who now form a slight majority. The lower House is directly elected on the basis of both communal and national rolls. The Upper House is indirectly elected by a variety of electors (including the council of chiefs, the prime minister, and the opposition leader). Local government is organized both by the central government and by a Fijian administration headed by the council of chiefs. Although the opposition has ruled only briefly since independence, the 1982 general election illustrated the vitality of the election process, albeit with some unfair practices.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and private (but government positions must sometimes be published); government radio is under a separate and independent commission. Libel laws can restrict the media's political discussion. Freedom to assemble is not impeded. The full protection of the rule of law is supplemented by an ombudsman to investigate complaints against the government. Some rights to property may have been sacrificed to guarantee special rights of inalienability of land granted the Fijians. Strong unions have full rights. Religion, travel, and other personal rights are secured. The nation may be about evenly divided between a subsistence economy, based on agriculture and fishing, and a modern market economy.

Comparatively: Fiji is as free as Papua New Guinea, freer than Tonga, less free than New Zealand.

F I N L A N D

Economy: mixed capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 4,900,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

An ethnic state with a small territorial subnationality

Country Summaries

Political Rights. Finland has a parliamentary system with a strong, directly elected president. Since there are many relatively strong parties, government is almost always by coalition. Elections have resulted in shifts in coalition membership. By treaty foreign policy cannot be anti-Soviet, but the 1982 presidential election indicated a weakening of a more general Soviet veto on the political process. The provinces have centrally appointed governors. Subnationalities: The rural Swedish minority (seven percent) has its own political party and strong cultural ties to Sweden. The Swedish-speaking Aland Islands have local autonomy and other special rights.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, diverse, and uncensored. Government press relations can be so hostile as to restrict communications. Most of the radio service is government controlled, but there is an important commercial television station. The government network has been manipulated at times. Discussion in the media is controlled by a political consensus that criticism of the Soviet Union should be circumspect. There is a complete rule of law; private rights are secured. Freedom of religion, business, and labor. Private rights are secured.

Comparatively: Finland is as free as Mauritius, freer than Malta, less free than Sweden.

F R A N C E

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 54,800,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. France is a parliamentary democracy. However, the directly elected president has more power than the premier and assembly. There is also a constitutional council that oversees elections and passes on the constitutionality of assembly or executive actions on the model of the United States Supreme Court. Regional and local power has recently been greatly increased. **Subnationalities:** Territorial subnationalities continue to have limited rights as ethnic units. At present the Alsatian minority seems well satisfied, but there is a demand for greater autonomy among many Bretons, Corsicans, and Basques. New regional governments help to meet these demands.

Civil Liberties. The French press is generally free. There is government involvement in financing and the registration of journalists, and press laws restrict freedom more than in other Western states. Criticism of the president and top officials may be muted by government threats and court actions. The news agency is private. Radio is now free and plural; television is still a government monopoly and is generally thought pro-administration. In spite of recent changes there is still an authoritarian attitude in government-citizen relations, publications may be banned at the behest of foreign governments, and arrest without explanation still occurs, particularly of members of subnationalities. Police brutality is commonly alleged. Information and organization about conscientious objection is restricted. France is, of course, under the rule of law, and rights to occupation, residence, religion, and property are secured. Both through extensive social programs and the creation of state enterprises France is quite far from a pure capitalist form.

Comparatively: France is as free as West Germany, freer than India, less free than the United Kingdom.

G A B O N

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 1,200,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Gabon is a moderate dictatorship operating in the guise of a one-party state, with controlled elections characteristic of this form. Candidates must be party approved but there may be limited competition. Major cities have elected local governments; provinces are administered from the center.

Civil Liberties. All media are government owned and controlled; few legitimate opposition voices are raised; journalists may be arrested for expression. Some critical items appear in local or available foreign media. There are prisoners of conscience and mistreatment. There is no right of political assembly; only one labor union is sanctioned. The authoritarian government generally does not care to interfere in private lives, and respects religious freedom, private property, and the right to

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travel. The government is taking a more active role in the economy and is gradually replacing foreign managers with Gabonese.

Comparatively: Gabon is as free as Sudan, freer than Angola, less free than Tunisia.

G A M B I A

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 3
Polity: dominant party **Civil Liberties:** 4
Population: 700,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. This is a parliamentary democracy in which the same party and leader have been in power since independence in 1965; they always win with substantial electoral margins. In a recent election the opposition candidate campaigned from prison. There is local, mostly traditional autonomy, but not regional self-rule. The state is now in confederation with Senegal, and the system is protected by Senegalese troops.

Civil Liberties. The private and public newspapers and radio stations are generally free, but are subject to self-censorship. Arrests for antigovernment pamphlets occur. Although opposition leaders have been jailed following a major insurrection, the independent judiciary maintains the rule of law. The state of emergency was again extended in 1984. Labor unions operate within limits. The agricultural economy remains traditionally organized and is largely dependent on peanuts, the export of which is a state monopoly. Internal travel is limited by document checkpoints.

Comparatively: Gambia is as free as Mexico, freer than Sierra Leone, less free than Botswana.

G E R M A N Y , E A S T

Economy: socialist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: communist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 16,700,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. East Germany is in practice a one-party communist dictatorship. No electoral competition is allowed that involves policy questions; all citizens are compelled to vote for a government-selected list of candidates. In addition, the presence of Soviet troops and direction from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union significantly reduces the sovereignty (or group freedom) of the East Germans.

Civil Liberties. Media are government-owned means of indoctrination. Dissidents are repressed by imprisonment and exclusion; the publication or importation of materials with opposing views is forbidden. One may be arrested for private criticism of the system, but complaints about policy implementation occur in all the media; a few favored dissidents have managed to exist and publish outside the country. Among the thousands of prisoners of conscience, the most common offense is trying to leave the country illegally (or in some cases even seeking permission to leave), or propaganda against the state. Prisoners of conscience may be severely beaten or otherwise harmed. Political reeducation may be a condition of release. The average person is not allowed freedom of occupation or residence. Once defined as an enemy of the state, a person may be barred from his occupation and his children denied higher education. Particularly revealing has been the use of the "buying out scheme" by which West Germany has been able intermittently to obtain the release of prisoners in the East through cash payments and delivering goods such as bananas and coffee. There is considerable religious freedom, with the Catholic and Protestant hierarchies possessing some independence, as does the peace movement at times. Freedom exists within the family, although there is no right to privacy or the inviolability of the home, mail, or telephone. Agriculture is highly collectivized and virtually all industry is state controlled. Membership in unions, production cooperatives, and other associations is compulsory.

Comparatively: East Germany is as free as Cameroon, freer than Bulgaria, less free than Poland.

G E R M A N Y , W E S T

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 61,543,000	Status of Freedom: free

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A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. West Germany is a parliamentary democracy with an indirectly elected and largely ceremonial president. Both major parties have ruled since the war. The weak Senate is elected by the assemblies of the constituent states and loyally defends states' rights. Successive national governments have been based on changing party balances in the powerful lower house. The success of the "Greens" at all levels suggests the openness of the system to change. The states have their own elected assemblies; they control education, internal security, and culture.

Civil Liberties. The papers are independent and free, with little governmental interference. Radio and television are organized in public corporations under the usually neutral direction of the state governments. Generally the rule of law has been carefully observed, and the full spectrum of private freedoms is available. Terrorist activities have led to tighter security regulations, invasions of privacy, and less acceptance of nonconformity. Arrests have been made for handling or producing inflammatory literature, for neo-Nazi propaganda, or for calling in question the courts or electoral system. Government participation in the economy is largely regulatory; in addition, complex social programs and mandated worker participation in management have limited certain private freedoms while possibly expanding others.

Comparatively: West Germany is as free as France, freer than Finland, less free than the United States of America.

G H A N A

Economy: mixed socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 14,300,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with subnationalities

Political Rights. A small military faction rules with the support of radical organizations. On the local level traditional sources of power are minimal. Local councils are elected, but under close government supervision. Subnationalities: The country is composed of a variety of peoples, with those in the South most self-conscious. The latter are the descendants of a number

of traditional kingdoms, of which the Ashanti are the most important. A north-south, Muslim-Christian opposition exists but is weakly developed, because of the numerical and economic weakness and incomplete hold of Islam in the north. In the south and center of the country a sense of Akan identity is developing among the Ashanti, Fanti, and others; since they include forty-five percent of the people, this amounts to strengthening the ethnic core of the nation. The one million Ewe in the southeast (a people divided between Ghana and Togo) play a major role in the new revolutionary government.

Civil Liberties. Radio and television and most of the press are government owned. All are under close government scrutiny. Private opinion is restrained. There have been hundreds of political arrests and political trials; many professionals have been murdered, apparently for "revolutionary" reasons. Soldiers are reported out of control. Papers and universities have been closed. Peoples' courts have been used to counter the previous judicial system. There has been a great deal of government control in some areas of the economy—especially in cocoa production, on which the economy depends, and in modern capital intensive industry. The assets of many businesses have been frozen. Some groups, including the strong women's marketing associations, have resisted government attempts to impose price ceilings on all goods. Labor unions are controlled. Like Senegal, Ghana has a relatively highly developed industry and its agriculture is dependent on world markets. There is religious freedom; travel is controlled.

Comparatively: Ghana is as free as Vietnam, freer than Romania, less free than Ivory Coast.

G R E E C E

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 10,000,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. Greece is a parliamentary democracy with a theoretically strong, but indirectly elected, president. The stabilization of free institutions is proceeding rapidly; recent elections have been competitive and open to the full spectrum of

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parties. Provincial administration is centrally controlled; there is local self-government.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private and the judiciary is independent. Broadcast media are government owned and controlled, but opposition opinions are frequently aired. Government interference in journalism, broadcasting, and universities has recently been reported. There are no known prisoners of conscience. Because of the recent revolutionary situation all views are not freely expressed (a situation similar to that in post-fascist Portugal). One can be imprisoned for insulting the authorities or religion. The courts are not entirely independent. Pressures have been reported against the Turkish population in Western Thrace, particularly in regard to education, property, and free movement. Union activity is under government influence, particularly in the dominant public sector. Private rights are respected.

Comparatively: Greece is as free as France, freer than Finland, less free than Netherlands.

G R E N A D A

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: centralized dominant-party	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 118,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The interim government that ruled with American assistance in 1984 was appointed by the constitutionally selected Governor-General. The previous nonelected government had been set aside by the American intervention. Elections due in December 1984 promised to be free and fair, including all major political forces. The subsequent legislature will rule. There is no local government.

Civil Liberties. The newspapers are independent and largely free. Radio and television are government owned but relatively free. There are a number of political prisoners at least most of whom are accused of violent crimes. The economy is largely private.

Comparatively: Grenada is as free as El Salvador, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Panama.

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A formally transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Guinea is under transitional military rule.

Civil Liberties. A free press is being reestablished. Political prisoners have been freed, but all members of the former government and the leaders of its political party are in prison. Industry is heavily nationalized.

Comparatively: Guinea is as free as Nigeria, freer than Ghana, less free than Senegal.

G U I N E A - B I S S A U

Economy: noninclusive socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 800,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Guinea-Bissau is administered by one party; all other parties have been illegal. Regional council elections lay the basis for indirect election of the assembly. Local economic control under party guidance is emphasized.

Civil Liberties. The media are government controlled; criticism of the system is forbidden. There are prisoners of conscience. Union activity is government directed. Land ownership is public or communal. The small industrial sector remains mixed, but the continuing economic crisis has virtually halted all private sector activity. An additional block to further decollectivization is the Soviet and Cuban presence. Religion is relatively free, as are travel and other aspects of private life.

Comparatively: Guinea-Bissau is as free as Libya, freer than Mali, less free than Senegal.

G U Y A N A

Economy: mixed socialist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 800,000	Status of freedom: partly free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Guyana is a parliamentary democracy with a strong executive and an increasingly dominant ruling party. In recent elections the government has been responsibly charged with irregularities that resulted in its victory. The 1980 parliamentary elections were criticized by both foreign and local observers for lack of adequate controls. Opposition parties are denied equal access to the media, and their supporters are discriminated against in employment. Administration is generally centralized but there are some elected local officials.

Civil Liberties. Radio is now government owned. Several opposition newspapers have been nationalized; the opposition press has been nearly forced out of existence. However, a variety of foreign news media are still available. There is a right of assembly, but harassment occurs. Opposition parties remain well organized. There is an operating human rights organization. All private schools have been nationalized, and the government has interfered with university appointments. It is possible to win against the government in court; there are no prisoners of conscience, though torture of convicts may be practiced. Art and music are under considerable government control. The independence of unions has been greatly abridged. The private sector is stagnating under official intimidation and extensive state control of productive property, although a black market thrives. The opposition is terrorized by armed gangs and the police; the general public suffers under arbitrary and severe controls. Political patronage is extensive and some social benefits are allocated on a preferential basis. Internal exile has been used against political opponents.

Comparatively: Guyana is as free as North Yemen, freer than Guatemala, less free than Colombia.

H A I T I

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: dominant quasi-one-party **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 5,500,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Haiti is a dictatorship with an ephemeral ruling party. Elections allow little if any opposition. Small

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parties have been organized, but are repeatedly harassed or eliminated. The latest goal seems to be a one-party state. Non-voters are beaten by government toughs.

Civil Liberties. The media are both private and public. Censorship is legal for all media, including films and theatre; attempts at independence in journalism are frequently repressed. Rights of assembly and organization are restricted, but a private human rights organization has been active. A government-sponsored militia has suppressed opposition; political murders, imprisonment without trial, exile, and torture characterize the system. Yet repeated attempts to political expression are made. An acceptable rule of law has been in abeyance during a prolonged "state of siege"; property has been seized indiscriminately by security forces. Many people attempt to flee the country illegally every year; several dozen opponents have been forcibly expelled. The church has been increasingly critical of the system. Union activity is restricted. Corruption and extreme poverty seriously infringe rights to political equality.

Comparatively: Haiti is as free as Burundi, freer than Mongolia, less free than Nicaragua.

H O N D U R A S

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 4,200,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The government is a parliamentary democracy with an elected president. Military leaders have retained influence, but civilian government has been able to assert its dominance. Provincial government is centrally administered; local government is elected.

Civil Liberties. The media are largely private and free of prior censorship. Human rights organizations are active. Militant peasant organizations are quite active, and the struggle of peasants for land often leads to violence. The spreading of guerrilla war from neighboring countries has led to repressions of refugees and others. Most private rights are respected—in so far as government power reaches. Private killings, especially of leftists and with the involvement of security forces, have become

common. Labor unions have suffered oppression, but are relatively strong, especially in plantation areas. There is freedom of religion and movement.

Comparatively: Honduras is as free as Colombia, freer than Panama, less free than Venezuela.

H U N G A R Y

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 10,700,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Hungary is ruled as a one-party communist dictatorship. Although there is an elective national assembly as well as local assemblies, all candidates must be approved by the party, and the decisions of the politburo are decisive. Within this framework recent elections have allowed little or no choice among candidates. The group rights of the Hungarian people are diminished by the government's official acceptance of the right of the Soviet government to interfere in the domestic affairs of Hungary by force.

Civil Liberties. Media are under government or party control. Basic criticism of top leaders, communism, human rights performance, or the Soviet presence is inadmissible, but some criticism is allowed; this is expressed through papers, plays, books, the importation of foreign publications, or listening to foreign broadcasts. Radio and television give relatively balanced presentations, even of news. Informally organized dissident groups are allowed to exist. Individuals are regularly detained for reasons of conscience, though usually for short periods. Control over religious affairs is more relaxed than in most communist states. Although private rights are not guaranteed, in practice there is considerable private property, and permission to travel into and out of the country is easier to obtain than in most of Eastern Europe. The border with Austria is essentially open. Unions are party directed and have no right to strike; however, workers have gained some control over enterprise management and operations.

Comparatively: Hungary is as free as Yugoslavia, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Efeypt.

mostly territorially distinct peoples united by historical experience and the predominance of Hinduism. India's dominant peoples are those of the north central area that speak as a first language either the official language, Hindi (Hindustani), or a very closely related dialect of Sanskrit origin. The other major subnational peoples of India may be divided into several groups: (1) peoples with separate states that are linguistically and historically only marginally distinct from the dominant Hindi speakers (for example, the Marathi, Gujerati, or Oriya); (2) peoples with separate states that are of Sanskrit background linguistically, but have a relatively strong sense of separate identity (for example, Bengalis or Kashmiris); (3) peoples with separate states that are linguistically and to some extent racially quite distinct (for example, Telegu or Malayalam); and (4) peoples that were not originally granted states of their own, and often still do not have them. These peoples, such as the Santali, Bhuti-Lepcha, or Mizo, may be survivors of India's pre-Aryan peoples. With the partial exception of the last group, the Indian federal system accords a fair amount of democratic rights to all peoples. Several peoples from groups (2), (3), and (4) have shown through legal (especially votes) and illegal means a strong desire by a significant part of the population for independence or greater autonomy (notably Kashmiris, Nagas, and Mizos). This accounting leaves out many nonterritorial religious and caste minorities, although here again the system has granted relatively broad rights to such groups to reasonable self-determination. In 1984 Indian attempts to deal with a serious problem of Sikh unrest in the Punjab were unsuccessful in spite of government agreement to some demands. The Northeast is enflamed by hatred of encroaching Bengalis from both Indian Bengal and Bangladesh.

Civil Liberties. The Indian press is diversified, independent, but often not strongly critical or investigative. Radio and television are government controlled in this largely illiterate country, and they serve government interests. There is freedom of organization and assembly, but there have been illegal arrests, questionable killings, and reports of torture by the police, which have often been out of control. The judiciary is generally responsive, fair, and independent. The problem of extreme trial delay has recently been addressed. The frequent approach to anarchy in Indian society offers many examples of both freedom and repression. There are few if any prisoners of conscience, but there are hundreds imprisoned for real or "proposed" political violence, and demonstrations often lead to fatalities and large-

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scale jailings. Due to the centralized political structure there is a great deal of regional variation in the operation of the security laws. Kashmir has especially repressive security policies in relation to the press and political detention; Sikkim is treated as an Indian colony and the same might be said for some other border areas. Assam is necessarily under stricter supervision. Indians enjoy freedom to travel, to worship as they please, and to organize for mutual benefit, especially in unions and cooperatives. Lack of education, extreme poverty, and surviving traditional controls reduce the meaning of such liberties for large numbers.

Comparatively: India is as free as Colombia, freer than Malaysia, less free than Japan.

I N D O N E S I A

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: centralized dominant- party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 161,600,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A transethnic complex state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Indonesia is a controlled parliamentary democracy under military direction. Recent parliamentary elections allowed some competition but severely restricted opposition campaigning and organization. The number and character of opposition parties are carefully controlled, parties must refrain from criticizing one another, candidates of both government and opposition require government approval, and the opposition is not allowed to organize in rural areas. All parties must accept the broad outline of state policy and the state ideology. All civil servants are expected to vote for the government. In any event parliament does not have a great deal of power. Regional and local government is under central control. local assemblies are elected.

Subnationalities: Indonesia includes a variety of ethnic groups and is divided by crosscutting island identities. Although the island of Java is numerically dominant, the national language is not Javanese, and most groups or islands do not appear to have strong subnational identifications. There is discrimination

against Chinese culture. Both civilian and military elites generally attempt to maintain religious, ethnic, and regional balance, but government-sponsored settlement of Javanese on outer islands results in the destruction of minority cultures and the denial of self-determination. Groups demanding independence exist in Sulawesi, the Moluccas, Timor, West Irian, and northern Sumatra, and continue to mount revolts against the government.

Civil Liberties. Most newspapers are private. All are subject to fairly close government supervision; there is heavy self-censorship and censorship in some areas. Criticism of the system is muted by periodic suppressions. Radio and television are government controlled. Freedom of assembly is restricted, but citizens are not compelled to attend meetings. There continue to be prisoners of conscience, but most are now detained only for short periods. Thousands of released prisoners remain in a second-class status, especially in regard to residence and employment. In this area the army rather than the civilian judiciary is dominant. Torture has been infrequent recently; the army has been responsible for many thousands of unnecessary deaths in its suppression of revolt in, or conquest of, East Timor. Recently there have been many murders of nonpolitical criminals, apparently at the hands of "hit squads" allied to the security services. Union activity is closely regulated, but labor organization is widespread and strikes occur. Many people are not allowed to travel outside the country for political reasons. Movement, especially to the cities, is restricted; other private rights are generally respected. The Indonesian bureaucracy has an unenviable reputation for arbitrariness and corruption, practices that reduce the effective expression of human rights. There are many active human rights organizations. Much of industry and commercial agriculture is government owned; sharecropping and tenant farming are relatively common, particularly on Java.

Comparatively: Indonesia is as free as South Africa, freer than Burma, less free than Singapore.

I R A N

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: quasi-dominant party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 43,800,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

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An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Iran has competitive elections, but the direction of the nonelective, theocratic leadership narrowly defines the alternatives. Those who oppose the overall system on fundamentals are silenced or eliminated. Political parties are poorly defined. Subnationalities: Among the most important non-Persian peoples are the Kurds, the Azerbaijani Turks, the Baluch, and a variety of other (primarily Turkish) tribes. Many of these have striven for independence in the recent past when the opportunity arose. The Kurds are in active revolt.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are semi-private or factional, and all are closely controlled. The other media are largely government-owned propaganda organs. The right of assembly is denied to those who do not approve of the new system. There are many prisoners of conscience and executions for political offenses, often nonviolent, have been frequent. Unions have been suppressed. Vigilante groups compete with the official security system; many private rights have become highly insecure, as the goal of the Islamic system is control over most aspects of life. This is especially so for the Bahais and other religious minorities. Legal emigration is quite difficult. Education is subject to religious restrictions; the freedom and equality of women is radically curtailed. However, privacy has recently been reemphasized and there appears to be a good deal of freedom in the home. Diversity and choice still characterize economic activity.

Comparatively: Iran is as free as Hungary, freer than Iraq, less free than Egypt.

I R A Q

Economy: noninclusive socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: socialist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 15,000,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Iraq is a one-party state under military leadership, with control in the hands of a small minority faction. Elections allow some choice of individuals, but all candidates are carefully selected and no policy choices are involved in the

process. Resulting parliaments have little if any power. Provinces are governed from the center. Subnationalities: If kept, recent agreements with the large Kurdish minority will grant them a large degree of regional and cultural autonomy. At last report these agreements were again breaking down.

Civil Rights. Newspapers are public or party and are closely controlled by the government; foreign and domestic books and movies are censored. Radio and television are government monopolies. The strident media are emphasized as governmental means for active indoctrination. Political imprisonment, brutality, and torture are common, and execution frequent. Poisoning on release from prison is reported. The families of suspects are often imprisoned. Rights are largely de facto or those deriving from traditional religious law. Religious freedom or freedom to organize for any purpose is very limited. Education is intended to serve the party's purposes. Iraq has a dual economy with a large traditional sector. The government has taken over much of the modern petroleum-based economy; land reform is, however, now expanding private choice.

Comparatively: Iraq is as free as Bulgaria, less free than Lebanon.

I R E L A N D

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 3,600,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Ireland is a parliamentary democracy that successively shifts national power among parties. The bicameral legislature has an appointive upper house with powers only of delay. Local government is not powerful, but is elective rather than appointive. Referendums are also used for national decisions.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and private, and radio and television are under an autonomous corporation. Strong censorship has always been exercised over both publishers and the press, but since this is for social rather than political content, it lies within that sphere of control permitted a majority in a free democracy. The rule of law is firmly established and private rights are guaranteed.

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Comparatively: Ireland is as free as Canada, freer than France.

I S R A E L

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 4,200,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with microterritorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Israel is governed under a parliamentary system. Recent elections have resulted in increasingly uneasy or unstable coalitions. Provinces are ruled from the center, although there are important local elective offices in the cities. Subnationalities: National elections do not involve the Arabs in the occupied territories, but Arabs in Israel proper participate in Israeli elections as a minority grouping. Arabs both in Israel and the occupied territories must live in their homeland under the cultural and political domination of twentieth century immigrants.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private or party, and free of censorship except for restrictions relating to the always precarious national security. Radio and television are governmentally owned. In general the rule of law is observed, although Arabs in Israel are not accorded the full rights of citizens, and the orthodox Jewish faith holds a special position in the country's religious, customary, and legal life. Detentions, house arrest, and brutality have been reported against Arabs opposing Israel's Palestine policy. Because of the war, the socialist-cooperative ideology of its founders, and dependence on outside support, the role of private enterprise in the economy has been less than in most of Euro-America. Arabs are, in effect, not allowed to buy land from Jews, while Arab land has been expropriated for Jewish settlement. Unions are economically and politically powerful and control over twenty-five percent of industry. Freedom House's rating of Israel is based on its judgment of the situation in Israel proper and not that in the occupied territories.

Comparatively: Israel is as free as Ecuador, freer than India, less free than France.

I T A L Y

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 57,000,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population with small territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Italy is a bicameral parliamentary democracy. Elections are free. Since the 1940s governments have been dominated by the Christian Democrats, with coalitions shifting between dependence on minor parties of the left or right. Recently premiers have often been from these smaller parties. The fascist party is banned. Referendums are used to supplement parliamentary rule. Opposition parties gain local political power, but regional and local power are generally quite limited. Regional institutions are developing, and the judiciary's moves against mob influence at this level should improve the legitimacy of the system.

Civil Liberties. Italian newspapers are free and cover a broad spectrum. Radio and television are both public and private and provide unusually diverse programming. Laws against defamation of the government and foreign and ecclesiastical officials exert a slight limiting effect on the media. Freedom of speech is inhibited in some areas and for many individuals by the violence of extremist groups or criminal organizations. Since the bureaucracy does not respond promptly to citizen desires, it represents, as in many countries, an additional impediment to full expression of the rule of law. The judiciary has recently shown strong independence and determination. Detention may last for years without trial. Unions are strong and independent. Catholicism is no longer a state religion but remains a favored religion. Major industries are managed by the government, and the government has undertaken extensive reallocations of land.

Comparatively: Italy is as free as the United Kingdom, freer than Greece.

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I V O R Y C O A S T

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: nationalist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 9,200,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Ivory Coast is ruled by a one-party, capitalist dictatorship in which a variety of political elements have been integrated. Assembly elections have recently allowed choice of individuals, including nonparty, but not policies. Provinces are ruled directly from the center. Contested mayoralty elections occur.

Civil Liberties. Although the legal press is party or government controlled, it presents a limited spectrum of opinion. Foreign publications are widely available. While opposition is discouraged, there is no ideological conformity. Radio and television are government controlled. Short-term imprisonment and conscription are used to control opposition. Travel and religion are generally free. Rights to strike or organize unions are quite limited. Economically the country depends on small private or traditional farms; in the modern sector private enterprise is encouraged.

Comparatively: Ivory Coast is as free as Transkei, freer than Guinea, less free than Senegal.

J A M A I C A

Economy: capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 2,400,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Jamaica is a parliamentary democracy in which power changes from one party to another. However, political life is violent; previous elections have been accompanied by hundreds of deaths in the pre-election period. The general neutrality of the civil service, police, and army preserves the system. Responses by both parties to the anomolous one-party parliament has been excellent (more open debate in parliament and

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a mock opposition parliament taking its arguments to the people). Regional or local administrations have little independent power, although there are elected parish councils.

Civil Liberties. The press is largely private; the broadcasting media largely public, although the only major daily supports the government. Critical media are widely available to the public. Freedom of assembly and organization are generally respected. The judiciary and much of the bureaucracy retain independence, although the police and legal system have been accused of countenancing brutality and severe punishments. Some foreign companies have been nationalized, but the economy remains largely in private hands. Labor is both politically and economically powerful.

Comparatively: Jamaica is as free as Colombia, freer than Panama, less free than Dominica.

J A P A N

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil liberties: 1
Population: 119,900,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Japan is a bicameral, constitutional monarchy with a relatively weak upper house. The conservative-to-centrist Liberal Democratic Party ruled with solid majorities from independence in the early 1950s until the mid-1970s. Although the Liberal Democrats have lost considerable support in recent elections, through coalitions with independents they have maintained control at the national level and have recently showed increased strength at the local level. Concentrated business interests have played a strong role in maintaining Liberal Party hegemony through the use of their money, influence, and prestige. In addition, a weighting of representation in favor of rural areas tends to maintain the Liberal Party position. Opposition parties are fragmented. They have local control in some areas, but the power of local and regional assemblies and officials is limited. Democracy within the Liberal Party is increasing.

Civil Liberties. News media are generally private and free, although many radio and television stations are served by a public broadcasting corporation. Television is excellent and quite free.

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Courts of law are not as important in Japanese society as in Europe and America; both the courts and police appear to be relatively fair. Travel and change of residence are unrestricted. By tradition public expression and action are more restricted than in most modern democracies. Japanese style collectivism leads to strong social pressures, especially psychological pressures, in many spheres (unions, corporations, or religious-political groups, such as Soka Gakkai). Human rights organizations are very active. Discrimination against Koreans and other minority groups remains a problem.

Comparatively: Japan is as free as Australia, freer than France.

J O R D A N

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: limited monarchy	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 3,500,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Formally a constitutional monarchy, for the last several years parliament was not called. In 1984 the reestablishment of parliament and limited by-elections may herald a new opening. Provinces are ruled from the center; elected local governments have limited autonomy. The king and his ministers are regularly petitioned by citizens.

Civil Liberties. Papers are mostly private but self-censored and occasionally suspended. Television and radio are government controlled. Free private conversation and mild public criticism are allowed. Under a continuing state of martial law normal legal guarantees for political suspects are suspended, and organized opposition is not permitted. There are prisoners of conscience and instances of torture. Labor has a limited right to organize and strike. Private rights such as those of property, travel, or religion appear to be respected. The government has partial control over many large corporations.

Comparatively: Jordan is as free as South Korea, freer than South Yemen, less free than Egypt.

Country Summaries

Political Rights. Although there are not formal parties, both the legislature and president are elected in a fully competitive system. Local government is significant.

Civil Liberties. The press is private; radio government owned. Public expression appears to be free and the rule of law guaranteed. The modern economy is dominated by investments from the now virtually depleted government-run phosphate industry. A free union operates, and most agriculture is small private subsistence; land cannot be alienated to non-natives.

Comparatively: Kiribati is as free as France, freer than Western Samoa, less free than Australia.

K O R E A , N O R T H

Economy: socialist

Political Rights: 7

Polity: communist one-party

Civil Liberties: 7

Population: 19,600,000

Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. North Korea is a hard-line communist dictatorship in which the organs and assemblies of government are merely a facade for party or individual rule. National elections allow no choice. The politburo is under one-man rule; the dictator's son is the dictator's officially anointed successor. Military officers are very strong in top positions.

Civil Liberties. The media are all government controlled, with glorification of the leader a major responsibility. External publications are rigidly excluded and those who listen to foreign broadcasts severely punished. No individual thoughts are advanced publicly or privately. Individual rights are minimal. Everyone is given a security rating that determines future success. Opponents are even kidnapped overseas. Rights to travel internally and externally are perhaps the most restricted in the world: tourism is unknown—even to communist countries. Social classes are politically defined in a rigidly controlled society. There are thousands of long-term prisoners of conscience; torture is reportedly common. There are also reeducation centers and internal exile. There is no private business or agriculture.

Comparatively: North Korea is as free as Albania, less free than South Korea.

K O R E A , S O U T H

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 42,000,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. South Korea is under a military regime with the support of a partly free legislature. Recent elections of both president and assembly have given the opposition a restricted right to compete. Public campaigns can significantly affect government. There is no independent local government.

Civil Liberties. Although most newspapers are private, as well as many radio stations and one television station, they have been reorganized by government fiat. Freedom to express differing opinion has been repeatedly restricted only to reemerge, and the mobilization of public opinion by the opposition directly affects government policy. Because of government pressure, self-censorship is the rule. Special laws against criticizing the constitution, the government, or its policies have resulted in many prisoners of conscience and the use of torture. However, political parties were able in 1984 to reorganize as a powerful lobby to reestablish democracy, and the numbers of those banned from politics were greatly reduced. The courts have not been able to effectively protect the rights of political suspects or prisoners. Many political opponents have been denied travel permits, but freedom of internal and external travel is otherwise unabridged. There is religious freedom (but not freedom of religious groups to criticize the government). Human rights organizations are active, but have been under heavy pressure. Outside this arena, private rights have been generally respected. Rapid capitalistic economic growth has been combined with a relatively egalitarian income distribution. Government controls most heavy industry; other sectors are private. Union activity remains severely curtailed under the 1980 labor law. Overall civil liberties seemed comparable in 1984 to those in Poland or Nicaragua.

Comparatively: South Korea is as free as Paraguay, freer than China (Mainland), less free than Thailand.

Country Summaries

K U W A I T

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 4
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 4
Population: 1,600,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

The citizenry is relatively homogeneous*

Political Rights. Kuwait is a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy with a limited franchise and concentration of power in the monarch. Citizens have access to the monarch. More than half the population are immigrants: their political, economic, and social rights are inferior to those of natives, and they very seldom achieve citizenship for themselves or their children.

Civil Liberties. Although the private press presents diverse opinions and ideological viewpoints, papers are subject to suspension for "spreading dissension," or for criticism of the monarch, Islam, or friendly foreign states. Radio and television are government controlled. Imported media are censored. Freedom of assembly is curtailed. Public critics may be detained, expelled, or have their passports confiscated. Formal political parties are not allowed. Private discussion is open, and few, if any, political prisoners are held. Private freedoms are respected, and independent unions operate. There is a wide variety of enabling government activity in fields such as education, housing, and medicine that is not based on reducing choice through taxation.

Comparatively: Kuwait is as free as Senegal, freer than Qatar, less free than Nepal.

L A O S

Economy: noninclusive socialist **Political Rights:** 7
Polity: communist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 7
Population: 3,700,000 **Status of freedom:** not free

An ethnic state with active or potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Laos has established a traditional communist party dictatorship in which the party is superior to the external government at all levels. The government is subservient to the desires of the Vietnamese communist party, upon which the present leaders must depend. Vietnam continues to maintain five divisions

in the country. There is continued resistance in rural areas, where many groups have been violently suppressed. Subnationalities: Pressure on the Among people has caused the majority of them to flee the country.

Civil Liberties. The media are all government controlled. There are many political prisoners; large numbers remain in reeducation camps at least until 1984. There are few accepted private rights, but there is relaxed opposition to traditional ways, particularly Buddhism. Collectivization has been halted since 1979 because of peasant resistance; most farmers continue to be small, individual owners. The limited industry is nationalized. Travel within and exit from the country is highly restricted.

Comparatively: Laos is as free as Mongolia, less free than China (Mainland).

L E B A N O N

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 2,600,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A complex, multinational, microterritorial state

Political Rights. In theory Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy with a strong but indirectly elected president. In spite of the calamities of the last few years the constitutional system still functions to varying degrees in some parts of the country. The parliament is elected, although the last general election was in 1972. Palestinians, local militias, Syrian, and Israeli forces have all but erased national sovereignty in much of the country. Subnationalities: Leading administrative and parliamentary officials are allocated among the several religious or communal groups by complicated formulas. These groups have for years existed semi-autonomously within the state, although their territories are often intermixed.

Civil Liberties. Renowned for its independence, the press still offers a highly diverse selection to an attentive audience. Most censorship is now self-imposed, reflecting the views of locally dominant military forces. Radio is government and party; television is part government and now officially uncensored. Widespread killing in recent years has inhibited the nationwide expression of most freedoms and tightened communal controls on

Comparatively: Lesotho is as free as North Yemen, freer than South Africa, less free than Botswana.

L I B E R I A

Economy: noninclusive capitalism
Political Rights: 6
Polity: military nonparty
Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 2,200,000
Status of Freedom: partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. In theory, Liberia is moving from a military dictatorship to constitutional democracy. The new constitution has gone through a review process that included examination by an assembly of the representatives of most sectors. However, control has not been transferred to elected representatives. There is some traditional local government.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, exercises self-censorship, but represents a variety of positions. Radio and television are largely government controlled. Lack of legal protection continues to characterize the country. Disappearances are reported. In 1984 the university was closed and several leading political figures arrested on vague charges of sedition. Travel and other private rights are generally respected. Only blacks can become citizens. Religion is free. Union organization is partly free; illegal strikes have occurred, often without government interference. Most industry is government or foreign owned.

Comparatively: Liberia is as free as Ivory Coast, freer than Togo, less free than Senegal.

L I B Y A

Economy: mixed socialist
Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist quasi one-party
(military dominated)
Civil liberties: 6
Population: 3,700,000
Status of freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. Libya is a military dictatorship effectively under the control of one person. Although officially there is no

Country Summaries

party, the effort to mobilize and organize the entire population for state purposes follows the socialist one-party model. The place of a legislature is taken by the direct democracy of large congresses, but elections held at local levels reflect local interests and are relatively fair. Whatever the form, no opposition is allowed on the larger questions of society. Institutional self-management has been widely introduced in the schools, hospitals, and factories. Sometimes the system works well enough to provide a meaningful degree of decentralized self-determination.

Civil Liberties. The media are government-controlled means for active indoctrination. Political discussion at the local level is relatively open. There are many political prisoners; the use of military and people's courts for political cases suggests little respect for the rule of law, yet acquittals in political cases occur. All lawyers must work for the state. Torture and mistreatment are frequent; executions for crimes of conscience occur—even in foreign countries through assassination. Although ideologically socialist some of the press remains in private hands. Oil and oil-related industries are the major areas of government enterprise. Socialization tends to be announced at the top and imposed rather anarchically and sporadically at the bottom. Most private associations and trade organizations are being integrated into or replaced by state organizations. Employment is increasingly dependent on political loyalty. Respect for Islam provides some check on arbitrary, government.

Comparatively: Libya is as free as Algeria, freer than Afghanistan, less free than Tunisia.

L U X E M B O U R G

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 365,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy on the Belgian model, in which the monarchy is somewhat more powerful than in the United Kingdom or Scandinavia. The legislature is bicameral with the appointive upper house having only a delaying function. Recent votes have resulted in important shifts in the nature of the dominant coalition.

Civil Liberties. The media are private and free. The rule of law is thoroughly accepted in both public and private realms. Rights of assembly, organization, travel, property, and religion are protected.

Comparatively: Luxembourg is as free as Iceland, freer than France.

M A D A G A S C A R

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: dominant party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 9,800,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Madagascar is essentially a military dictatorship with a very weak legislature. Legislative elections have been restricted to candidates selected by the former political parties on the left grouped in a "national front"; resulting parliaments appear to play a very small part in government. The presidential election in late 1982 allowed vigorous opposition. Although the opposition candidate was later arrested, he subsequently won a seat in the 1983 parliamentary elections. Emphasis has been put on developing the autonomy of local Malagasy governmental institutions. The restriction of local elections to approved front candidates belies this emphasis, but contests are genuine. Although tribal rivalries are very important, all groups speak the same language.

Civil Liberties. There is a private press, but papers are carefully censored and may be suspended. Broadcasting is government controlled. Movie theaters have been nationalized. There is no right of assembly; still, election processes allow periods of intense criticism, and vocal, organized opposition persists. There are few long-term prisoners of conscience; short-term political detentions are common, often combined with ill-treatment. The rule of law is weak, but political prisoners may be acquitted. Labor unions are not strong and most are party-affiliated. Religion is free, and most private rights are respected. Public

An ethnic state with major nonterritorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Malaysia is a parliamentary democracy with a weak, indirectly elected and appointed senate and a powerful lower house. The relatively powerless head of state is a monarch; the position rotates among the traditional monarchs of the constituent states. A multinational front has dominated electoral and parliamentary politics. By such devices as imprisonment or the banning of demonstrations, the opposition is not given an equal opportunity to compete in elections. The states of Malaysia have their own rulers, parliaments, and institutions, but it is doubtful if any state has the power to leave the federation. Elected local governments have limited power. Subnationalities: Political, economic, linguistic, and educational policies have favored the Malays (forty-four percent) over the Chinese (thirty-six percent), Indians (ten percent) and others. Malays dominate the army. Traditionally the Chinese had been the wealthier and better educated people. Although there are Chinese in the ruling front, they are not allowed to question the policy of communal preference.

Civil Liberties The press is private and highly varied. However, nothing that might affect communal relations negatively can be printed, and editors are constrained by the need to renew their publishing licenses annually to follow government advice on many issues. "Undesirable" publications, defined in the broadest terms, may not be printed or distributed. Foreign journalists are closely controlled. Radio is mostly government owned, television entirely so. Academics are restrained from discussing sensitive issues. There have been reports of an atmosphere of fear in both academic and opposition political circles, as well as widespread discrimination against non-Malays. An attempt to establish a private university for Chinese-language students was blocked. About three hundred political suspects are detained, generally on suspicion of communist activity. Some are clearly prisoners of conscience; several have held responsible political positions. Confessions are often extracted. Nevertheless, significant criticism appears in the media and in parliament. Unions are permitted to strike and have successfully opposed restrictive legislation. Although the government has begun to assume control of strategic sectors of the economy, economic activity is generally free, except for government favoritism to the Malays.

Comparatively: Malaysia is as free as Egypt, freer than Indonesia, less free than India.

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M A L D I V E S

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 160,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. The Maldives have a parliamentary government in which a president (elected by parliament and confirmed by the people) is predominant. The elected parliament has gained some freedom of discussion. Regional leaders are presidentially appointed, but there are elected councils. Both economic and political power are concentrated in the hands of a very small, wealthy elite. Islam places a check on absolutism.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers present some diversity of views but are under pressure to conform; the radio station is owned by the government. Foreign publications are received; political discussion is limited. Several persons have been arrested for their political associations since a coup attempt. The legal system is based on traditional Islamic law. No unions have been formed. Most of the people rely on a subsistence economy; the small elite has developed commercial fishing and tourism.

Comparatively: Maldives is as free as Qatar, freer than Seychelles, less free than Mauritius.

M A L I

Economy: noninclusive mixed **Political Rights:** 7
 socialist
Polity: nationalist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 6
 (military dominated)
Population: 7,600,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Mali is a military dictatorship with a recently constructed political party to lend support. The regime appears to function without broad popular consensus. National elections allow no choice, though there is some at the local

level. Subnationalities: Although the government is ostensibly transethnic, repression of northern peoples has been reported.

Civil Liberties. The media are nearly all government owned and closely controlled. Antigovernment demonstrations are forbidden. Private conversation is relatively free. There are prisoners of conscience, and reeducation centers are brutal. Student protests are controlled by conscription and detention. Religion is free; unions are controlled; travelers must submit to frequent police checks. There have been reports of slavery and forced labor. Private economic rights in the modern sector are minimal, but collectivization has recently been deemphasized for subsistence agriculturists—the majority of the people. Corruption, particularly in the state enterprises, is widespread and costly.

Comparatively: Mali is as free as Ghana, freer than Somalia, less free than Liberia.

M A L T A

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 4
Population: 400,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Malta is a parliamentary democracy in which the governing party has become increasingly antidemocratic. The most recent election resulted in a government victory in spite of an opposition majority in the popular vote. Opposition response has been to boycott parliament. There is little local government.

Civil Liberties: The press is free, but foreign and domestic journalists are under government pressure. Radio and television are government controlled and partial. The government has tried to prevent the opposition use of Italian stations and to forbid criticism of the system to foreigners. Although the rule of law is generally accepted, the government foments gang violence against its opponents. The government has concentrated a great deal of the economy in its hands in a manner that reduces freedom by reducing pluralism. The most recent attack has been against the independence of church schools. The governing party and major union have been amalgamated; one union confederation remains independent but subdued.

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Comparatively: Malta is as free as Brazil, freer than Turkey, less free than Cyprus(G).

M A U R I T A N I A

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 1,800,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Mauritania has been ruled by a succession of military leaders without formal popular or traditional legitimation. Subnationalities: There is a subnational movement, in the non-Arab, southern part of the country.

Civil Liberties. The media are government owned and censored, but foreign publications and broadcasts are freely available. There are few if any long-term prisoners of conscience. Conversation is free; no ideology is imposed, but no opposition organizations or assemblies are allowed. Travel may be restricted for political reasons. Internal exile has been imposed on some former officials. Union activity is government controlled. There is religious freedom within the limits of an Islamic country. The government controls much of industry and mining, as well as wholesale trade, but there have been recent moves to reduce government involvement. The large rural sector remains under tribal or family control. Only in 1980 was there a move to abolish slavery.

Comparatively: Mauritania is as free as Mali, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Algeria.

M A U R I T I U S

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 1,000,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Mauritius is a parliamentary democracy. Recent elections have shifted control from one party to another.

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A variety of different racial and religious communities are active in politics, although they are not territorially based. There are guarantees in the electoral system to make sure no major group is unrepresented in parliament. There are elected local governing bodies.

Civil Liberties The press is private or party and without censorship. Nevertheless, there has been a struggle between journalists and the government over proposed restrictions, and rights of reply on television. Broadcasting is government owned, but opposition views are aired. Opposition parties campaign freely and rights are guaranteed under a rule of law. The labor union movement is quite strong, as are a variety of communal organizations. Strikes are common. There is religious and economic freedom; social services are financed through relatively high taxes.

Comparatively: Mauritius is as free as St. Lucia, freer than India, less free than France.

MEXICO

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: decentralized dominant-party	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 77,700,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Mexico is ruled by a governmental system formally modeled on that of the United States; in practice the president is much stronger and the legislative and judicial branches much weaker. The states have independent governors and legislatures, as do local municipalities. The ruling party has had a near monopoly of power on all levels since the 1920s. Political competition has been largely confined to factional struggles within the ruling party. Party conventions are controlled from the top down. In 1979 new parties participated, and the new election law gave twenty-five percent of the seats to minor parties by proportional representation; the resulting congress showed unusual independence. Further progress in opening the system to other parties was reflected in the 1982 elections. Voting and campaign irregularities have been common, particularly on the local level. Small parties are said to be bought off. The clergy are not

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allowed to participate in the political process. Subnationalities: There is a large Mayan area in Yucatan that has formerly been restive; there are also other smaller Indian areas.

Civil Liberties. The media are mostly private, but operate under a variety of direct and indirect government controls (including subsidies and take-overs). Free of overt censorship, papers are subject to government "guidance." Literature and the arts are free. The judicial system is not strong. However, decisions can go against the government; it is possible to win a judicial decision that a law is unconstitutional in a particular application. Religion is free. Widespread bribery and lack of control over the behavior of security forces greatly limits freedom, especially in rural areas. Disappearances occur, detention is prolonged, torture and brutality have been common. Private economic rights are respected; government ownership predominates in major industries, graft is legendary. Access to land continues to be a problem despite reform efforts. Nearly all labor unions are associated with the ruling party. There is a right to strike. Some union and student activity has been repressed. Critical human rights organizations exist.

Comparatively: Mexico is as free as Nepal, freer than Nicaragua, less free than Colombia.

M O N G O L I A

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 1,900,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. A one-party communist dictatorship, Mongolia has recently experienced a change of leader through a mysterious politburo shift of power. Power is organized at all levels through the party apparatus. Those who oppose the government cannot run for office. Parliamentary elections offer no choice and result in 99.9% victories. Mongolia has a subordinate relationship to the Soviet Union; 25,000 Soviet troops are maintained in the country. It must use the USSR as an outlet for nearly all of its trade, and its finances are under close Soviet supervision.

Civil Liberties. All media are government controlled. Religion is restricted; Lamaism is nearly wiped out. Freedom of travel, residence, and other civil liberties are denied. As in many communist countries all typewriting and duplicating machines must be registered annually. Employment is assigned; workers committees are extensions of the party.

Comparatively. Mongolia is as free as Bulgaria, less free than China (Mainland).

M O R O C C O

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 23,600,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Morocco is a constitutional monarchy in which the king has retained major executive powers. Recent elections at both local and national levels have been well contested. Many parties participated; the moderate center was the chief victor. The autonomy of local and regional elected governments is limited. Subnationalities: Although people in the newly acquired land of the Western Sahara participate in the electoral process, it has an important resistance movement. In the rest of the country the large Berber minority is a subnationality whose self-expression is restricted.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are private or party, and quite diverse. Recently there has been no formal censorship, but government guidance is common, and backed up with the confiscation of particular issues and the closing of publications. Monarchical power must not be criticized. Broadcasting stations are under government control, although they have recently been opened to the parties for campaign statements. In the past the use of torture has been quite common and may continue; the rule of law has also been weakened by the frequent use of prolonged detention without trial. There are many political prisoners; some are prisoners of conscience. Private organizational activity is vigorous and includes student, party, business, farmer, and human rights groups. There are strong independent labor unions in all sectors;

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religious and other private rights are respected. State intervention in the economy is increasing, particularly in agriculture and foreign trade.

Comparatively: Morocco is as free as Sierra Leone, freer than Algeria, less free than Spain.

M O Z A M B I Q U E

Economy: noninclusive socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 13,400,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Mozambique is a one-party communist dictatorship in which all power resides in the "vanguard party." All candidates are selected by the party at all levels, but there is some popular control of selection at local levels. Discussion in party congresses and other meetings can be quite critical. Regional administration is controlled from the center. Southerners and non-Africans dominate the government.

Civil Liberties. All media are rigidly controlled. Rights of assembly and foreign travel do not exist. There are no private lawyers. Secret police are powerful; thousands are in reeducation camps, and executions occur. Police brutality is common. Unions are prohibited. Pressure has been put on several religions, especially the Catholic clergy and Jehovah's Witnesses. Villagers are being forced into communes, leading to revolts in some areas. However, the socialization of private entrepreneurs has been partially reversed. The emigration of citizens is restricted, although seasonal movement of workers across borders is unrecorded. Pressure on religion has been relaxed recently.

Comparatively: Mozambique is as free as Malawi, freer than Somalia, less free than Tanzania.

N A U R U

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: traditional nonparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 9,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Nauru is a parliamentary democracy in which governments change by elective and parliamentary means. All **MP**'s are elected as independents, although there are informal alignments. The cabinet currently represents a coalition of factions. The country is under Australian influence.

Civil Liberties. The media are free of censorship but little developed. The island's major industry is controlled by the government under a complex system of royalties and profit-sharing. No taxes are levied; phosphate revenues finance a wide range of social services. The major cooperative and union are independent.

Comparatively: Nauru is as free as Fiji, freer than Maldives, less free than New Zealand.

N E P A L

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: traditional nonparty	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 16,600,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. Nepal is a constitutional monarchy in which the king is dominant. A relatively free referendum held in 1980 rejected a move toward party government, but the new constitution opened the system to direct parliamentary elections. However, candidates must belong to certain "class" organizations, the king continues to appoint many members and has essentially unchecked power to intervene. Parliament acts independently, and is able to change governments. Subnationalities: There are a variety of different peoples, with only fifty percent of the people speaking Nepali as their first language. Hinduism is a unifying force for the majority. Historically powerful Hindu castes continue to dominate.

Civil Liberties. Principal newspapers are public; private journals carry criticism of the government but not the king. Some offending publications have been suspended in the recent past. Radio is government owned. Private contacts are relatively open. Political detention is common, sometimes probably for little more than expression of opinion. Parties are banned as the result of the referendum, but human rights organizations function. Unions exist only informally, but their activity has been increasing.

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The judiciary is not independent. Religious proselytizing and conversion is prohibited, and the emigration of those with valuable skills or education is restricted. The population is nearly all engaged in traditional occupations; sharecropping and tenant farming is common. Illiteracy levels are very high.

Comparatively; Nepal is as free as Thailand, freer than Bhutan, less free than Mauritius.

N E T H E R L A N D S

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 14,400,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy in which nearly all the power is vested in a directly elected legislature. The results of elections have periodically transferred power to coalitions of the left and right. There is some diffusion of political power below this level, but not a great deal. The monarch retains more power than in the United Kingdom both through the activity of appointing governments in frequently stalemated situations, and through the advisory Council of State.

Civil Liberties. The press is free and private. Radio and television are provided by private associations under state ownership. Commercial services have been introduced. A wide range of views is broadcast. The courts are independent, and the full spectrum of private rights guaranteed. The burden of exceptionally heavy taxes limits economic choice.

Comparatively: The Netherlands is as free as Belgium, freer than Portugal.

N E W Z E A L A N D

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 3,200,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state with a native subnationality

Political Liberties. New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy in which power alternates between the two major parties. There is elected local government, but it is not independently powerful. Subnationalities: About eight percent of the population are Maori, the original inhabitants.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and free. Television and most radio stations are government owned, but without reducing their independence significantly. The rule of law and private rights are thoroughly respected. Since taxes (a direct restriction on choice) are not exceptionally high, and industry is not government owned, we label New Zealand capitalist. Others, emphasizing the government's highly developed social programs and penchant for controlling prices, wages, and credit, might place New Zealand further toward the socialist end of the economic spectrum.

Comparatively: New Zealand is as free as the United States, freer than France.

N I C A R A G U A

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: dominant-party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 2,900,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Government is in the hands of the Sandinista political-military movement. Major opposition parties chose not to participate in the November 1984 elections because of Sandinista controls on the media and harassment of the opposition campaigns. Still, there is now a small, legal, elected opposition. Subnationalities: Several thousand Miskito Indians have been forcibly resettled from the Atlantic Coast to the interior.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers and radio stations are mostly under government control; private television is not allowed. There is pressure on dissident or radical journalists. A radio station and a paper have been closed. However, papers and private persons still vocally oppose the new system. No organizations representing previous Somoza movements are allowed to exist; government gangs regularly break up opposition rallies. Political activity by parties outside the Sandinista movement is restricted. There are thousands of political prisoners: most are former

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national guardsmen; many detainees including labor leaders are clearly prisoners of conscience. Neighborhood watch committees have been established. Killing and intimidation occur, especially in rural areas. Thousand of disappearances have been reported. The independence of the judiciary is not well developed, but the government does not always win in the courts. Foreign travel is restricted for some political opponents. Internal travel is restricted in much of the country. Unions are under pressure to join a new government-sponsored federation; strikes have been banned. A private human rights organization is active, but it has been intermittently harassed and oppressed. Some enterprises and farms have been nationalized; sixty percent of the economy remains formally private, though supplies must generally be bought from and products sold to the government.

Comparatively: Nicaragua is as free as Tunisia, freer than Cuba, less free than El Salvador.

N I G E R

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 6,300,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Niger is a military dictatorship with no elected assembly or legal parties. A civilian "development assembly" has recently been appointed. All districts are administered from the center.

Civil Liberties. Niger's very limited media are government owned and operated, and are used to mobilize the population. Dissent is seldom tolerated, although ideological conformity is not demanded. There is little overt censorship, but also no barrier to censorship. A military court has taken the place of a suspended Supreme Court; a few political prisoners are held under severe conditions. Unions and religious organizations are relatively independent but nonpolitical. Foreign travel is relatively open; outside of politics the government does not regulate individual behavior. The economy is largely subsistence farming based on communal tenure; direct taxes on the poor have been abolished; agriculture has been honestly supported.

Comparatively: Niger is as free as Mali, freer than North Korea, less free than Liberia.

N I G E R I A

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 88,100,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A multinational state

Political Rights. Nigeria is under the direct rule of the military since a coup at the beginning of 1984. The full spectrum of political positions has been replaced by the military command. Subnationalities: Nigeria is made up of a number of powerful subnational groupings. Speaking mainly Hausa, the people of the north are Muslim. The highly urbanized southwest is dominated by the Yoruba; and the east by the Ibo. Within each of these areas and along their borders there are other peoples, some of which are conscious of their identity and number more than one million persons. Strong loyalties to traditional political units—lineages or kingdoms—throughout the country further complicate the regional picture.

Civil Liberties. Television and radio are now wholly federal or state owned, as are all but two of the major papers, in part as the result of a Nigerianization program. The media have limited editorial independence; journalists have been arrested. Political organization, assembly, and publication are largely eliminated. The universities, secondary schools, and trade unions are under close government control or reorganization the last few years. The national student association has been banned. Many members of the previous government are imprisoned; their trials for corruption have generally been held in secret. Harsh punishments have been decreed for many crimes. Police are often brutal, and military riot control has led to many deaths. There is freedom of religion and travel, but rights of married women are quite restricted. The country is in the process of moving from a subsistence to industrial economy—largely on the basis of government-controlled oil and oil-related industry. Government intervention elsewhere in agriculture (cooperatives and plantations) and industry has been considerable. Since private business and

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industry are also encouraged, this is still far from a program of massive redistribution. General corruption in political and economic life has frequently diminished the rule of law. Freedom is respected in most other areas of life.

Comparatively: Nigeria is as free as Tanzania, freer than Benin, less free than Senegal.

N O R W A Y

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 4,100,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population with a small Lapp minority

Political Rights. Norway is a centralized, constitutional monarchy. Labor remains the strongest party, but other parties have formed several governments since the mid-1960s. There is relatively little separation of powers. Regional governments have appointed governors, and cities and towns their own elected officials.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers are privately or party owned; radio and television are state monopolies, but are not used for propaganda. This is a pluralistic state with independent power in the churches and labor unions. Relatively strong family structures have also been preserved. Norway is capitalistic, yet the the government's control over the new oil resource and general reliance on centralized economic plans reduce the freedom of economic activity.

Comparatively: Norway is as free as the United Kingdom, freer than West Germany.

O M A N

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: centralized nonparty	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 1,000,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Oman is an absolute monarchy with no political parties or elected assemblies. There is an appointed consultative assembly. Regional rule is by centrally appointed governors, but the remaining tribal structure at the local and regional level gives a measure of local autonomy. British influence remains strong. Subnationalities: The people of Dhofar constitute a small subnationality in periodic revolt.

Civil Liberties. Broadcasting is government owned; the daily papers are government owned, weeklies are subsidized. There is little or no criticism. Foreign publications are censored regularly. Although the preservation of traditional institutions provides a check on arbitrary action, the right to a fair trial is not guaranteed in political cases. Freedom of assembly is curtailed, and there are no independent unions. With all this there are few if any prisoners of conscience. There is freedom of travel; private property is respected. Proselytizing for non-Muslim faiths is illegal. The population is largely involved in subsistence agriculture.

Comparatively: Oman is as free as Algeria, freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than the United Arab Emirates.

P A K I S T A N

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 97,300,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A multinational state

Political Rights. Pakistan is under centralized military dictatorship. The political parties, religious leaders, and judiciary (and bar association) continue to be factors in the situation but consensus has progressively withered. The former prime minister was executed following a political trial. Political parties have been officially disbanded and promised elections put off indefinitely; local elections of limited significance have been held. **Subnationalities:** Millions of Pathans, Baluch, and Sindis have a long record of struggle for greater regional autonomy or independence. Provincial organization has sporadically offered a measure of self-determination, but at least the Baluch and Sindis continue to feel oppressed.

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Civil Liberties. Newspapers are censored; the frequent detention of journalists and closing of papers lead to strict self-censorship. Radio and television are government controlled. For crime punishments are often severe; torture is alleged, and executions have been common. Thousands of members of the opposition have been imprisoned or flogged in the violent political climate. The officially dissolved parties retain considerable de facto organization, but the parties are not to be mentioned in the media. Rights of assembly are limited, as well as travel for political persons. Courts preserve some independence. Union activity is restricted but strikes and demonstrations occur; student unions are banned. Emphasis on Islamic conservatism curtails private rights, especially freedom of religion and women's rights: religious minorities suffer discrimination. Prayer wardens attempt to ensure general observance of five prayers a day. Private property is respected; some basic industries have been nationalized. Over half the rural population consists of sharecroppers and tenant farmers.

Comparatively: Pakistan is as free as Algeria, freer than the USSR, less free than Bangladesh.

P A N A M A

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: centralized multiparty (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 2,100,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population with small subnationalities

Political Rights. Panama is formally organized as a democracy on the American model. The 1984 election that was to return power to a civilian government was only partly successful. The election was close, but the military saw to it that their party and candidate won through bribery, a doubtful vote count, and unfair campaign practices. The National Guard retains major political power. The provinces are administered by presidential appointees, with elected councils; there is considerable local power in Indian areas.

Civil Liberties. There are opposition papers, and critical opposition positions are reported in the news media. Through regulation, sanctions, and special arrangements, the government

ensures a preponderance of pro-government reporting in all media. Political parties maintain their opposition role, and rights to organization and assembly are generally respected. The judiciary is not independent; the rule of law is weak in both political and nonpolitical areas. There are few if any prisoners of conscience. Labor unions are under some restrictions. There is freedom of religion, although foreign priests are not allowed. In general travel is free and private property respected. Major firms are state owned; land reform has been largely ineffective in reducing inequities in land ownership.

Comparatively: Panama is as free as Mexico, freer than Nicaragua, less free than Colombia.

P A P U A N E W G U I N E A

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: decentralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 3,400,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with many subnationalities

Political Rights. Papua New Guinea is an independent parliamentary democracy, although it remains partially dependent on Australia economically, technically, and militarily. Elections are fair and seats are divided among a number of major and minor parties. Since party allegiances are still fluid, there is considerable party-switching after elections. Because of its dispersed and tribal nature, local government is in some ways quite decentralized. Elected provincial governments with extensive powers have been established. Subnationalities: The nation is being created from an amalgam of small tribal peoples with similar racial and cultural backgrounds. Development of provincial governments seems to have lessened secessionist sentiments in Bougainville, Papua, and elsewhere.

Civil Liberties. The press is not highly developed but apparently free. Radio is government controlled but presents critical views; Australian stations are also received. There are no political prisoners. Rights to travel, organize, demonstrate, and practice religion are legally secured. The legal system adapted from Australia is operational, but a large proportion of the

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population lives in a preindustrial world with traditional controls, including violence, that limit freedom of speech, travel, occupation, and other private rights.

Comparatively: Papua New Guinea is as free as St. Vincent, freer than Vanuatu, less free than Australia.

P A R A G U A Y

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: centralized dominant- party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 3,600,000	Status of freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous state with small Indian groups

Political Rights. Paraguay has been ruled as a modified dictatorship since 1954. In addition to an elected president there is a parliament that includes members of opposition parties. Presidential election results determine parliamentary representation. Elections are regularly held, but they have limited meaning: the ruling party receives about ninety percent of the vote, a result guaranteed by direct and indirect pressures on the media, massive government pressure on voters, especially in the countryside, interference with opposition party organization, and perhaps electoral fraud. The most important regional and local officials are appointed by the president. Subnationalities: The population represents a mixture of Indian (Guarani) and Spanish peoples; ninety percent continue to speak Guarani as well as Spanish. Several small tribes of primitive forest people are under heavy pressure from both the government and the public.

Civil Liberties. There is a private press, and a combination of private, government, and church radio and television. In spite of censorship and periodic suppression of publications, dissenting opinion is expressed, especially by the church hierarchy. The main opposition paper was closed in 1984. Opposition political organization continues, as do human rights organizations, but there is open discrimination in favor of members of the ruling party in education, government, business, and other areas. Imprisonment, torture, and execution of political opponents, particularly peasants, have been and to a limited extent still are an important part of a sociopolitical situation that includes general

corruption and anarchy. Political opponents or dissident writers may also be refused passports or exiled. There are now few if any long-term prisoners of conscience, but the rule of law is very weak. Most unions are dominated by the ruling party. Beyond the subsistence sector, private economic rights are restricted by government intervention, control, and favoritism. A large proportion of peasants work their own land, partly as a result of government land reform.

Comparatively: Paraguay is as free as Maldives, freer than Cuba, less free than Brazil.

P E R U

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 19,200,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with a major potential territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Peru is ruled by an elected multiparty parliamentary system. Provincial administration is not independent, but local elections are significant. Subnationalities: Several million people speak Quechua in the highlands, and it is now an official language. There are other important Indian groups.

Civil Liberties. The media are largely private. Censorship has been abolished. Essentially all positions are freely expressed, but there is still the shadow of the military and the recent past. There is little if any imprisonment for conscience, but many are killed or imprisoned in the course of antiguerrilla and antiterrorist campaigns; torture occurs. However, as many as 2,000 members of the security forces have been censored or arrested for excesses. Periodic states of emergency reduce freedoms, especially in certain areas. The government moved violently against a large human rights rally in 1984. Travel is not restrained, and rights to religion and occupation are generally respected. Labor is independent and politically active; strikes are common. The public sector remains dominant, but private property has regained governmental acceptance.

Comparatively: Peru is as free as India, freer than Brazil, less free than Ecuador.

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P H I L I P P I N E S

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: dominant party	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 54,500,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with active and potential subnationalities

Political Rights. The Philippines is ruled as a plebiscitory family dictatorship with the aid of a relatively powerless assembly. The present ruler was elected in a fair election in the early 1970s, but more recent referendums and elections affirming his rule and his constitutional changes have not been conducted with acceptable voting procedures. 1984 assembly elections were not fairly conducted. Yet they led to massive opposition gains and a real advance for democracy. There is some decentralization of power to local assemblies. Many provincial and local officials are centrally appointed. **Subnationalities:** The Philippines includes a variety of different peoples of which the Tagalog speaking are the most important (although a minority). A portion of the Muslim (Moro) subnationality is in active revolt along the front of Christian-Muslim opposition. There are several major potential subnationalities that may request autonomy in the future on the basis of both territorial and linguistic identity.

Civil Liberties. Newspapers and broadcasting are largely private but under indirect government control. Certain topics are off-limits. Only minor opposition papers are allowed to exist, but diverse foreign publications are available. Access to radio and television for the opposition is restricted, as are rights of assembly. Nevertheless, there is considerable opposition political organization, and opposition leaders regularly hold public meetings. Demonstrations have been massive. A private electoral monitoring organization has operated extensively and effectively. The courts have retained some independence, although it is much reduced. Hundreds of prisoners of conscience have been held; torture is used, but it is also sporadically condemned by the top levels of government and torturers have been punished. Unions have only limited independence, but strikes occur. Military actions against insurgents have led to many unnecessary arrests, killings, and destruction. Disappearances occur, as do private, progovernment killings. The Catholic Church maintains its inde-

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pendence. The private economy is marginally capitalist, but rapid growth in government intervention, favoritism, and direct ownership of industries by government and government favorites brings the economy closer to capitalist-statist.

Comparatively: The Philippines is as free as E&ypt, freer than Burma, less free than Panama.

P O L A N D

Economy: mixed socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: communist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 36,900,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Poland is a one-party communist and military dictatorship with noncompetitive, one-list elections. However, in recent years a few nonparty persons gained election to the assembly and some sessions have evidenced more than pro forma debate. There are elected councils at provincial levels. Although party and military hierarchies operating from the top down are the loci of power, the Catholic Church, academics, peasants, and workers must be considered by any government. The Soviet Union's claim to a right of interference and continual pressure diminishes Poland's independence.

Civil Liberties. The Polish newspapers are both private and government; broadcasting is government owned. Censorship is pervasive, but there have been anti-Marxist publications with limited circulations. Private expression is relatively free. There are no formal rights of assembly or organization, nor concept of an independent judiciary. The church remains a major independent voice as do the leaders of the formally disallowed Solidarity. Short imprisonment, beating, and harassment are common means of restricting opposition. Under the "state of war" declared by the government in December, 1981, and recently rescinded in name, thousands were imprisoned. Nearly all have now been released. Illegal attempts to leave Poland have frequently led to arrest; while others have been forced into exile. Most agriculture and considerable commerce remain in private hands; industry is fully nationalized.

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Comparatively: Poland is as free as South Africa, freer than Czechoslovakia, less free than Mexico.

P O R T U G A L

Economy: mixed capitalist **Political Rights:** 1
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 10,100,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Portugal is a parliamentary democracy. Although the president was a general, the separate power of the military is now minimal. There is vigorous party competition over most of the spectrum (except the far right), and fair elections. Elections are competitive and power is shared by several groups. Provincial government is centrally directed.

Civil Liberties. In spite of government or party ownership of most major papers, journalism is now quite free. Radio and television are government owned, except for one Catholic station. They are both relatively free editorially. The government has restored the rule of law. There are few if any prisoners of conscience, yet one can be imprisoned for insult to the military or government. Long periods of detention without trial occur in isolated instances. Imprisonment for "fascist" organization or discussion was promulgated in 1978. The Catholic Church, unions, peasant organizations, and military services remain alternative institutions of power. Although there is a large nationalized sector, capitalism is the accepted form for much of the economy.

Comparatively: Portugal is as free as France, freer than Jamaica, less free than United Kingdom.

Q A T A R

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 300,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous citizenry

Political Rights. Qatar is a traditional monarchy. The majority of the residents are recently arrived foreigners; of the native population perhaps one-fourth are members of the ruling family. Open receptions are regularly held for the public to present grievances. Consensus plays an important role in the system.

Civil Liberties. The media are public or subsidized private, and loyalist. Discussion is fairly open; foreign publications are controlled. Political parties are forbidden. This is a traditional state still responsive to Islamic and tribal laws that moderate the absolutism of government. The family government controls the nation's wealth through control over oil, but there are also independently powerful merchant and religious classes. There are no income taxes and many public services are free. There are no organized unions or strikes. The rights of women and religious minorities are quite limited: only native Muslim males have the full rights of citizens.

Comparatively: Qatar is as free as the United Arab Emirates, freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than Lebanon.

R O M A N I A

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 22,700,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Romania is a now-traditional communist state. Assemblies at national and regional levels are subservient to the party hierarchy. Although the party is not large, all decisions are made by a small elite and especially the dictator. Elections involve only candidates chosen by the party; for some assembly positions the party may propose several candidates. Soviet influence is relatively slight. **Subnationalities:** The Magyar and German minorities are territorially based. If offered self-determination one Magyar area would surely opt for rejoining neighboring Hungary; many of the Germans evidently wish to migrate to Germany, and many have. In Romania the cultural rights of both groups are narrowly limited.

Civil Liberties. The media include only government or party organs; self-censorship committees replace centralized censorship.

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Private discussion is guarded; police are omnipresent. Dissenters are frequently imprisoned. Forced confessions, false charges, and psychiatric incarceration are characteristic. Treatment may be brutal; physical threats are common. Marty arrests have been made for attempting to leave the country or importing foreign literature (especially bribes and material in minority languages). Contacts with foreigners must be reported if not given prior approval. Religious and other personal freedoms are quite restricted. Outside travel and emigration are not considered rights; potential emigrants may suffer economic discrimination. Private museums have been closed. Independent labor and management rights are essentially nonexistent. Attempts to form a trade union in 1979 were crushed, as was a major coal strike in 1981. Central planning is pervasive throughout the highly nationalized economy.

Comparatively: Romania is as free as the USSR, less free than Hungary.

R U A N D A

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 5,800,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with a minor nonterritorial subnationality

Political Rights. Rwanda is a military dictatorship with an auxiliary party organization. Elections are not free and candidates are pre-selected, but voters have some choice. Districts are administered by the central government. However, everyone belongs to the party, and party elections and deliberations have some competitive and critical aspects. There are elected local councils and officials. Subnationalities: The former ruling people, the Tutsi, have been persecuted and heavily discriminated against, but the situation has improved.

Civil Liberties. The weak press is religious or governmental; radio is government owned. Only the mildest criticism is voiced. Political prisoners are held, and beating of prisoners and suspects may be common. The courts have some independence. Considerable religious freedom exists. Travel is restricted both within

the country and across its borders. Labor unions are very weak. There are no great extremes of wealth. The government is socialist in intent, but missionary cooperatives dominate trade, and private business is active in the small nonsubsistence sector. Traditional ways of life rather than government orders regulate the lives of most.

Comparatively: Rwanda is as free as Tanzania, freer than Burundi, less free than Zambia.

ST. KITTS AND NEVIS

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 42,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. St. Kitts and Nevis has a fully functioning parliamentary system in which the smaller Nevis has a relatively large share of power and internal self-government, and has a continuing optical to secede.

Civil Liberties. The media are free; there is a constitutional rule of law.

Comparatively: St. Kitts and Nevis is as free as Costa Rica, freer than Jamaica.

ST. LUCIA

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 115,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. This is a functioning parliamentary democracy in which power alternates between parties, most recently in 1982. There are elected local governments.

Civil Liberties. The papers are largely private or party controlled, and uncensored. Broadcasting is government and private. Organization and assembly are free, but harassment and violence accompany their expression. There are strong business, labor, and religious organizations. Massive strikes in part

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forced the resignation of the prime minister in early 1982. Personal rights are secured.

Comparatively: St. Lucia is as free as Barbados, freer than Jamaica, less free than the United States.

S T . V I N C E N T A N D T H E G R E N A D I N E S

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 123,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. St. Vincent is an operating multiparty state. In a 1984 election the ruling party was defeated.

Civil Liberties. Weekly papers present a variety of uncensored opinion, although there may be some government favoritism. Radio is government owned and has been accused of bias. Foreign media are readily available. There is a full right to assembly and organization; effective opposition to government policies is easily organized and often successful. There is a rule of law. Much of economic activity is based on agriculture.

Comparatively: St. Vincent is as free as Finland, freer than Colombia, less free than Barbados.

S A O T O M E A N D P R I N C I P E

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 85,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Sao Tome and Principe are governed under strongman leadership by the revolutionary party that led the country to independence. There is an indirectly elected assembly. Popular dissatisfaction and factional struggles occasionally appear, but no public opposition is allowed. There are local elections. Angolan troops have been used to maintain the regime.

Civil Liberties. The media are government owned and controlled; opposition voices are not heard; there is no effective

right of political assembly. Labor unions are not independent. The rule of law does not extend to political questions; there are few known political prisoners, but many opponents are in exile. There is little evidence of brutality or torture. The largely plantation agriculture has been socialized, as has most of the economy. Illiteracy is particularly high.

Comparatively: Sao Tome and Principe appear to be as free as Angola, less free than Comoros.

S A U D I A R A B I A

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: traditional nonparty	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 10,800,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Saudi Arabia is a traditional family monarchy ruling without representative assemblies. Political parties are prohibited. The right of petition is guaranteed, and religious leaders provide a check on arbitrary government. Regional government is by appointive officers; there are some local elective assemblies.

Civil Liberties. The press is both private and governmental; strict self-censorship is expected. Radio and television are mostly government owned, although ARAMCO also has stations. Private conversation is relatively free; there is no right of political assembly or political organization. Islamic law limits arbitrary government, but the rule of law is not fully institutionalized. There are political prisoners, and torture is reported; there may be prisoners of conscience. Citizens have no freedom of religion—all must be Muslims, and must observe Muslim rites. Strikes and unions are forbidden. Private rights in areas such as occupation or residence are generally respected, but marriage to a non-Muslim or non-Saudi is closely controlled. Women may not marry non-Muslims, and suffer other special disabilities, particularly in the right to travel. The economy is overwhelmingly dominated by petroleum or petroleum-related industry that is directly or indirectly under government control. The commercial and agricultural sectors are private.

Comparatively: Saudi Arabia is as free as Mauritania, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Bahrain.

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S E N E G A L

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: centralized dominant-party	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 6,500,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Although elections are fairly open and parties represent a variety of positions, one party continues to dominate elections, and not without help from the government. Opposition parties are not allowed to form coalitions. Contested elections occur on the local level. Subnationalities: Ethnically eighty percent are Muslims; the Wolof people represent thirty-six percent of the population, including most of the elite, the urban population, and the more prosperous farmers. However, regional loyalties, both within and outside of this linguistic grouping, seem to be at least as important as communal groupings in defining potential subnationalities. Rapid assimilation of rural migrants in the cities to Wolof culture has reduced the tendency toward ethnic cleavage, but a separatist movement in the far south has shown increasing activity.

Civil Liberties. The press is predominantly public; the independence of private publications is somewhat constrained, although opposition papers and journals appear. Radio and television are under an autonomous government body, but not fully impartial. There are at least some separatist prisoners of conscience. Unions have gained increasing independence. Religion, travel, occupation, and other private rights are respected. The government sometimes loses in the courts. Although much of the land remains tribally owned, government-organized cooperatives, a strong internal private market, and dependence on external markets have transformed the preindustrial society. Many inefficient and corrupt state and quasi-public enterprises are now being dismantled.

Comparatively: Senegal is as free as Mexico, freer than Ivory Coast, less free than Botswana.

S E Y C H E L L E S

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 65,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Seychelles is a one-party state allowing little political competition for parliament and none for president. The former ruling party is said to have "simply disappeared." Tanzanian military support has largely been replaced by North Korean. There is no local government.

Civil Liberties. Aside from an occasionally mildly critical Catholic publication, there is no independent opinion press; radio is government owned. No opposition in publication or even conversation is legal. Individuals have little judicial protection. There is no right of political assembly, and the security services have broad powers of arrest. Opposition party activities are banned; people have frequently been arrested on political charges. Critics are often urged to leave, exiled, or refused permission to leave. labor and government are interconnected. Private rights, including private property, are generally respected. Religious institutions maintain some independence. Quasi-government enterprises are being established; state monopolies control the marketing of all export crops. Government services in this largely impoverished country are extensive.

Comparatively: Seychelles is as free as Tanzania, freer than Somalia, less free than Maldives.

S I E R R A L E O N E

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 3,900,000	Status of freedom: partly free

A formally transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Sierra Leone's one-party system has coopted many members of the previous opposition. The 1982 competitive one-party election was marked by widespread violence. There are some elected and traditional local governments.

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Civil Liberties. The press is private and governmental. Radio is government controlled. There is occasional independence in the press, but it is under heavy pressure; still there is considerable freedom of private speech. The courts do not appear to be very powerful or independent. Special emergency powers have sporadically given the government untrammelled powers of detention, censorship, restriction of assembly, and search. There may now be no prisoners of conscience. Identity cards have recently been required of all citizens. Labor unions are relatively independent, and travel is freely permitted. The largely subsistence economy has an essentially capitalist modern sector. Corruption is pervasive and costly.

Comparatively: Sierra Leone is as free as Zimbabwe, freer than Gabon, less free than Senegal.

S I N G A P O R E

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: centralized dominant-party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 2,500,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Singapore is a parliamentary democracy in which the ruling party traditionally won all legislative seats. Economic and other pressures against all opposition groups (exerted in part through control of the media) make elections very unfair. Opposition leaders have been sentenced and bankrupted for such crimes as defaming the prime minister during the campaign. The opposition still obtains thirty percent of the vote. In 1981 an opponent's victory in a by-election was regarded with great alarm, and court cases were soon launched against him. There is no local government.

Civil Liberties. The press is nominally free, but owners of shares with policy-making power must be officially approved—in some cases the government owns the shares. Broadcasting is largely a government monopoly. By closing papers and imprisoning editors and reporters, the press is kept under close control. University faculties are also under considerable pressure to conform. Most opposition is treated as a communist threat and, therefore, treasonable. Prisoners of conscience are held; in

internal security cases the protection of the law is weak—prosecution's main task appears to be obtaining forced confessions of communist activity. Torture is alleged. Trade union freedom is inhibited by the close association of government and union. Private rights of religion, occupation, or property are generally observed, although a large and increasing percentage of manufacturing and service companies are government owned. Many youths have reportedly been forcibly drafted into construction brigades.

Comparatively: Singapore is as free as Sierra Leone, freer than Indonesia, less free than Malaysia.

S O L O M O N I S L A N D S

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 2
Polity: decentralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 230,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

A relatively homogeneous state with subnational strains

Political Rights. The Solomon Islands are a parliamentary democracy under the British monarch. Elections are intensely contested; party discipline is weak. There is some decentralization of power at the local level; further decentralization to the provincial level is planned.

Civil Liberties. Radio is government controlled; the very limited press is both government and private. There is no censorship. The rule of law is maintained in the British manner alongside traditional ideas of justice. Published incitement to inter-island conflict has led to banishment for several persons. Union activity is free. The government is involved in major businesses. Most land is held communally but farmed individually.

Comparatively: The Solomon Islands are as free as Jamaica, freer than Vanuatu, less free than New Zealand.

S O M A L I A

Economy: noninclusive mixed **Political Rights:** 7
 socialist
Polity: socialist one-party **Civil Liberties:** 7
 (military dominated)
Population: 5,700,000 **Status of Freedom:** not free

Country Summaries

A relatively homogeneous state

Political Rights. The Somali Republic is under one-man military rule combining glorification of the ruler with one-party socialist legitimization. 1979 elections with ninety-nine percent approval allowed no choice, but even the assembly elected on this basis was suspended in 1980. Ethnically the state is homogeneous, although until the military coup in 1969 the six main clan groupings and their subdivisions were the major means of organizing loyalty and power. While politics is still understood in lineage terms, in its centralizing drive the government has tried to eliminate both tribal and religious power.

Civil Liberties. The media are under strict government control, private conversation is controlled, and those who do not follow the government are considered to be against it. There are many political prisoners, including prisoners of conscience. There have been jailings for strikes and executions for reasons of conscience. Travel is restricted. Some state farms and industries have been established beyond the dominant subsistence economy. A large black market circumvents official distribution channels; corruption is widespread in government and business.

Comparatively: Somalia is as free as Ethiopia, less free than Kenya.

S O U T H A F R I C A

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 31,700,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with major territorial and nonterritorial subnationalities

Political Rights. South Africa is a parliamentary democracy in which the black majority is excluded from participation in the national political process because of race. Recent constitutional changes add over ten percent more to the politically accepted population although the great majority black population remains excluded. For the nonblack population elections appear fair and open. There is a limited scope for blacks to influence affairs within their own communities. **Subnationalities:** Most of the black majority is ascribed to a variety of "homelands" that they

may or may not live in, although increasingly they have been forced to move to these limited areas. Several of these have become independent states in the eyes of South Africa but they have not received such recognition elsewhere. Except for Transkei we see these as dependent territories. Because of their close integration into South Africa politically and economically we treat these states as part of South Africa for most purposes. The dependent governments of these states are generally unpopular and tyrannical, although this seems not to be the case in Bophuthatswana. We feel that geographically and historically Transkei does have a reasonable claim to statehood, in spite of the reasons that may have brought it into being. It is in many ways comparable to Lesotho, Swaziland, or further afield states such as Bhutan or Mongolia. In the several homelands that have not yet separated from the country officially, black leaders have some power and support from their people. Most black political parties are banned, but operating political parties among Indians and people of mixed blood represent the interests of their peoples. Regionally, government within the white community includes both central government officials and elected councils.

Civil Liberties. The white South African press is private and quite outspoken, although pressures have been increasing, especially on reporters. Freedom for the nonwhite press is closely restricted. Broadcasting is under government control. The courts are independent on many issues, including apartheid, but have not effectively controlled the security forces. There are political prisoners and torture—especially for black activists, who live in an atmosphere of terror. Nevertheless, black organizations regularly denounce the government's racial and economic policies, hold conferences, and issue statements. Private rights are generally respected for whites. Rights to labor organization have improved for blacks recently. Legal separation of the races remains, but has been relaxed in a number of ways. Rights to choice of residence and occupation are legally circumscribed for nonwhites. Hundreds of thousands are arrested or forcibly moved every year as a result of discriminatory laws and the government homelands policy. This includes large-scale deportations from one rural area to another. Human rights organizations are quite active in both white and black communities. Church organizations have become centers of opposition to apartheid.

Comparatively: South Africa is as free as Yugoslavia, freer than Tanzania, less free than Morocco.

Country Summaries

S P A I N

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights:** 1
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 38,400,000 **Status of Freedom:** free

An ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. Spain is a constitutional monarchy. 1982 elections were fair, resulting in a dramatic shift of control to the moderate left. For the time being military influence has been largely eliminated. Elected regional and local governments are of increasing importance. Subnationalities: The Basque and Catalan territorial subnationalities have had their rights greatly expanded in the last few years. The process has now been extended to many other parts of the country.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and is now largely free. The television network and some radio stations are government owned. Television is controlled by an all-party committee. There are few prisoners of conscience; imprisonment still threatens those who insult the security services, the courts, the state, or the flag. Short detention periods are often used with little legal redress. Police brutality and torture are still alleged, but offenders are punished. Criticism of the government and of suspected human rights violators are quite freely expressed both publicly and privately. Private freedoms are respected. Continued terrorism and reactions to terrorism affect some areas. Union organization is free and independent.

Comparatively: Spain is as free as France, freer than Mexico, less free than Norway.

S R I L A N K A

Economy: mixed capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 3
Polity: centralized multiparty **Civil liberties:** 4
Population: 16,100,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

An ethnic state with a major subnationality

Political Rights. Sri Lanka is a parliamentary democracy in which opposition groups have been under increasing pressure. A number of individuals have been barred from government for breach

of trust, and the main opposition party is close to being ruled illegal. In late 1982 the government used its then current popularity to guarantee a six-year extension of its rule. The referendum on this issue was held under a state of emergency restricting opposition campaigning. Regional government is centrally controlled, but local government is by elected councils. Subnationalities: Receiving a large vote in the most recent election, the Tamil minority movement constitutes a serious secessionist tendency. There has been increasing private violence against the Tamils, and the government has been unable to protect them or even remain neutral.

Civil Liberties. The press has been strong, both private and governmental. However, all journalists seem to be under increasing governmental pressure. Broadcasting is under government control and presents a relatively narrow range of views. Limited censorship has been applied to prevent violence at particular places and times. The rule of law has been threatened by this communal violence, as well as by the use and misuse of states of emergency powers to detain political opponents. Courts remain independent of the government; an important human rights movement supports their independence. However, their decisions can be overruled by parliament. A few prisoners of conscience have been arrested, at least for advocating Tamil independence; and torture and brutality is alleged. There is freedom of assembly but not demonstration. Private rights to movement, residence, religion, and occupation are respected in theory, but gangs and even the army have been guilty of widespread looting, destruction, and killing in Tamil areas. Strikes in public services are restricted, but unions are well-developed and politically influential. There has been extensive land reform; the state has nationalized a number of enterprises in this largely plantation economy. The system has done an excellent job in providing for basic nutrition, health, and educational needs within a democratic framework.

Comparatively: Sri Lanka is as free as Mexico, freer than Indonesia, less free than India.

Country Summaries

S U D A N

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 21,100,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnic state with major but highly diverse subnationalities

Political Rights. Sudan is a military dictatorship with a supportive single party and legislature. Legislative elections have allowed the participation and frequent victory of individuals from de facto opposition groups. All opposition has, however, again been repressed. Subnationalities: Southern separatism has been inflamed by the imposition of Islamic law on non-Christians. The national government remains overwhelmingly northern, and southern politicians can be quickly jailed for verbal opposition to new arrangements. A war for southern independence is again underway. There are also major ethnic groups in the north for which regional arrangements are being developed.

Civil Liberties. The press is weak and nationalized. Radio and television are government controlled. The media have been used for active indoctrination; fear has now replaced criticism for most. There are many prisoners of conscience, reports of torture, and detention without trial. Islamic law has been cruelly imposed in much of the country. Leaders of major political-religious groups have been jailed. Strikes are illegal but occur. Some force has been used to reduce urban migration. Sudan is socialist theoretically, but in business and agriculture the private sector has recently been supported by denationalizations. Bureaucratic corruption is costly.

Comparatively: Sudan is as free as Algeria, freer than Ethiopia, less free than Egypt.

S U R I N A M E

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: military nonparty	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 350,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Suriname is ruled by a military council without legitimization by elections or other means. Power shifts among factions of noncommissioned officers seem to have been replaced by the emergence of one dominant leader.

Civil Liberties. The press is under strong pressure. Political organization or assembly is forbidden. The leaders of all major opposition groups (of former political parties, unions, journalists, and academia) were executed without trial in late 1982. Prisoners of conscience have been detained and treated brutally. Courts and unions retain some independence. Houses are searched at will. The state is increasing its control over industry, but business groups continue to publicly express opposition to economic policy.

Comparatively: Suriname is as free as Haiti, freer than Albania, less free than Guyana.

S W A Z I L A N D

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 6
Population: 600,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Swaziland is ruled by a king (or regent council of nobles). Indirect elections for part of an advisory legislature are held, but only one party is allowed. Local councils invite popular participation. South African political and economic influence is pervasive.

Civil Liberties. Private media exist alongside the dominant government media; little criticism is allowed; South African and other foreign media provide an alternative. Opposition leaders have been repeatedly detained, and partisan activity is forbidden. Criticism is common in parliament and other councils, but public assemblies are restricted, unions limited, emigration difficult. Religious, economic, and other private rights are maintained. The traditional way of life is continued, especially on the local level. Several thousand whites in the country and in neighboring Transvaal own the most productive land and business.

Country Summaries

Comparatively: Swaziland is as free as South Africa, freer than Mozambique, less free than Botswana.

S W E D E N

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 8,300,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Sweden is a parliamentary democracy in which no party monopolizes power. Referendums are held. Although there are some representative institutions at regional and local levels, the system is relatively centralized. The tendency of modern bureaucracies to regard issues as technical rather than political has progressed further in Sweden than elsewhere.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or party; broadcasting is by state-licensed monopolies. Although free of censorship; the media are accused of presenting a narrow range of views, but this may be changing as politics become polarized. There is the rule of law. The defense of those accused by the government may not be as spirited as elsewhere, but, on the other hand, the ombudsman office gives special means of redress against administrative arbitrariness. Most private rights are respected. State interference in family life is unusually strong, with many children unjustly taken from their parents. The national church has a special position. In many areas, such as housing, individual choice is restricted more than in other capitalist states—as it is of course by the very high tax load. Unions are a powerful part of the system. The state intervenes in the economy mainly through extensive business regulation rather than direct ownership.

Comparatively: Sweden is as free as Denmark, freer than West Germany.

S W I T Z E R L A N D

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 6,500,000	Status of Freedom: free

A trinational state

Political Rights. Switzerland is a parliamentary democracy in which all major parties are given a role in government determined by the size of the vote of each party. Parties that increase their vote above a certain level are invited to join the government, although such changes in party strength rarely occur. The lack of a decisive shift in power from one party to another in the last fifty years is a major limitation on the democratic effectiveness of the Swiss system. However, its dependence on the grand coalition style of government is a partial substitute, and the Swiss grant political rights in other ways that compensate for the lack of a transfer of power. Many issues are decided by the citizenry through national referendums or popular initiatives. After referendums, in keeping with the Swiss attitude even the losing side is given part of what it wants if its vote is sufficiently large. Subnationalities: The three major linguistic groups have separate areas under their partial control. Their regional and local elected governments have autonomous rights and determine directly much of the country's business. National governments try to balance the representatives of the primary religious and linguistic groups; this is accomplished in another way by the upper house that directly represents the cantons (regions) on an equal basis.

Civil Liberties. The high quality press is private and independent. Broadcasting is government operated, although with the considerable independence of comparable West European systems. Unions are free but there are few strikes. The rule of law is strongly upheld; as in Germany it is against the law to question the intentions of judges. Private rights are thoroughly respected.

Comparatively: Switzerland is as free as the United States, freer than West Germany.

S Y R I A

Economy: mixed socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: centralized dominant-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 10,100,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Country Summaries

Political Rights. Syria is a military dictatorship assisted by an elected parliament. The election of the military president is largely pro forma; in assembly elections a variety of parties compete within the National Front, organized under the leadership of the governing party. The independence of these groups has progressively eroded. Because of its position in the army the Alawite minority (ten percent) has a very unequal share of national power. Provinces have little separate power, but local elections are contested.

Civil Liberties. The media are in the hands of government or party. Broadcasting services are government owned. The media are used as governmental means for active indoctrination. Medical, bar, and engineering associations have been dissolved. Thousands have been arrested and many executed. Other thousands have been killed in punitive expeditions. The courts are neither strongly independent nor effective in political cases where long-term detention without trial occurs. Political prisoners are often arrested following violence, but there are also prisoners of conscience. Political opponents may even be killed overseas. Torture has frequently been employed in interrogation. Religious freedom is restricted. Rights to choice of occupation or residence are generally respected; foreign travel and emigration are closely controlled for certain groups. Much of industry has been nationalized; the commercial sector remains private. Land reform has successfully expanded private ownership. There is no independent labor movement.

Comparatively: Syria is as free as Cameroon, freer than Somalia, less free than Kuwait.

T A N Z A N I A

Economy: noninclusive socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 21,200,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous nation in union with Zanzibar

Political Rights. Tanzania is a union of the paternalistic socialist mainland with the radical socialist Zanzibar. The single parties of each state have joined to form one all-Tanzanian party. Elections offer choice between individuals, but no issues are to be discussed in campaigns; all decisions come down from

above, including the choice of candidates. Over half of the MP's are appointed. The resulting parliament is not, however, simply a rubber stamp. Local government is an extension of party government. Subnationalities: Ethnically, the country is divided into a large number of peoples (none larger than thirteen percent); most are not yet at the subnational level. The use of English and Swahili as national languages enhances national unity. Recently resistance by some Zanzibar leaders to continued association with the mainland has been repressed and the dissidents imprisoned.

Civil Liberties. Civil liberties are subordinated to the goals of the socialist leadership. No contradiction of official policy is allowed to appear in the media, nearly all of which is government owned, or in educational institutions; private and limited criticism of implementation appears. The people learn only of those events the government wishes them to know. There is no right of assembly or organization. Millions of people have been forced into communal villages; people from the cities have been abruptly transported to the countryside; forced labor on the farms is still a problem. Thousands have been detained for political crimes. There are prisoners of conscience. Lack of respect for the independence of the judiciary and individual rights is especially apparent in Zanzibar. Union activity is government controlled. Neither labor nor capital have legally recognized rights—strikes are illegal. Most business and trade and much of agriculture are nationalized. Religion is free, at least on the mainland; overseas travel is restricted.

Comparatively: Tanzania is as free as Algeria, freer than Malawi, less free than Zambia.

T H A I L A N D

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: centralized multiparty (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 51,700,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnic state with a major territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with continuing military influence. Both parties and parliament are, however, significant. The politics are those of consensus. Provincial government is under national control; there are elected and traditional institutions at the local level. Subnatio-

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nalities: There is a Muslim Malay community in the far south, and other small ethnic enclaves in the north.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, but periodic suppressions and warnings lead to self-censorship. Casting doubt on the monarchy is illegal. Most broadcasting is government or military controlled. Some books are banned as subversive. There are few long-term prisoners of conscience, but many are periodically detained for communist activity. In rural areas arrest may be on vague charges and treatment brutal. Human rights and other public interest organizations are active. Labor activity is relatively free; a ban on strikes was lifted in early 1981. Private rights to property, choice of religion, or residence are secure; foreign travel or emigration is not restricted. However, corruption limits the expression of all rights. Government enterprise is quite important in the basically capitalist modern economy.

Comparatively: Thailand is as free as Senegal, freer than the Philippines, less free than India.

T O G O

Economy: noninclusive mixed	Political Rights: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 2,900,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Togo is a military dictatorship ruled in the name of a one-party state. In this spirit there is a deliberate denial of the rights of separate branches of government, including a separate judiciary, or even of private groups. National elections allow little or no choice. But essentially everyone can join the party and there is some discussion in parliament and party organs. Below the national level only the cities have a semblance of self-government. Subnationalities: The southern Ewe are culturally dominant and the largest group (twenty percent), but militant northerners now rule.

Civil Liberties. No criticism of the government is allowed in the government or church media, and foreign publications may be confiscated. There are long-term prisoners of conscience. Jehovah's Witnesses are banned. There is occasional restriction of foreign travel. Union organization is closely regulated. In this

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ference, including the jailing of opposition leaders. chiefs and the balancing of tribal interests remain very important in the system, but beyond that there is little decentralization of power. South Africa has a great deal of de facto power over the state, particularly because of the large number of nationals that work in South Africa. However, Transkei is at least as independent as several Soviet satellites; it has had continuing public disputes with South Africa.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, but under strong government pressure. Broadcasting is government controlled. Many members of the opposition have been imprisoned; new retroactive laws render it illegal to criticize Transkei or its rulers. Freedom of organization is very limited, although an opposition party still exists. Private rights are respected within the limits of South African and Transkei custom. Capitalist and traditional economic rights are diminished by the necessity of a large portion of the labor force to work in South Africa.

Comparatively: Transkei is as free as Swaziland, freer than Mozambique, less free than Zimbabwe.

T R I N I D A D A N D T O B A G O

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 1,200,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex state

Political Rights. Trinidad and Tobago is a parliamentary democracy in which one party has managed to retain power since 1956 (in part due to the division of the electorate among ethnic groups). However, there has been a decentralization of power and elections have been vigorously contested by a variety of parties. There is elected local government. Tobago has an elected regional government.

Civil Liberties. The private or party press is generally free of restriction; broadcasting is under both government and private control. Opposition is regularly voiced, although the government-owned television is said to favor the government. There is a full spectrum of private rights. Violence and communal feeling reduce the effectiveness of such rights for many, as does police viol-

ence. Many sectors of the economy are government owned. Human rights organizations are active. Labor is powerful and strikes frequent.

Comparatively: Trinidad and Tobago is as free as Venezuela, freer than Guyana, less free than Belgium.

T U N I S I A

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: dominant party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 7,000,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Tunisia has a dominant party system but is essentially under one-man rule. Elections to the assembly are contested primarily within the one-party framework, but opposition parties played a minor role in 1981 elections. Regional government is centrally directed; there is elected local government.

Civil Liberties. The private, party, and government press is under government pressure. Although frequently banned or fined, opposition papers are published. Broadcasting is government controlled. Private conversation is relatively free, but there is no right of assembly. Organizational activity is generally free, including that of the Tunisian Human Rights League. The courts demonstrate only a limited independence, but it is possible to win against the government. Unions have been relatively independent despite periods of repression. There are few if any long-term prisoners of conscience, but arrests for unauthorized political activity or expression occur. The unemployed young are drafted for government work. Overseas travel is occasionally blocked. Most private rights seem to be respected, including economic freedoms since doctrinaire socialism was abandoned and much of agriculture returned to private hands.

Comparatively: Tunisia is as free as Jordan, freer than Algeria, less free than Egypt.

Political Rights. Tuvalu is a parliamentary democracy under the British monarch. Each island is represented; seats are contested individually. Opposition blocs have been formed in the assembly and have been able to achieve power. There are local councils for each island. Continued dependence on the United Kingdom is self-chosen.

Civil Liberties. Media are government owned but little developed. The rule of law is maintained in the British manner, alongside traditional ideals of justice. The economy is largely subsistence farming; much of the labor force is employed overseas.

Comparatively: Tuvalu is as free as Belize, freer than Mauritius, less free than New Zealand.

U G A N D A

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: multiparty (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 14,300,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A trans ethnic heterogeneous state with major subnationalities

Political Rights. Uganda is a violent parliamentary democracy. The 1980 election was not entirely free or fair, but parties opposed to the ruling group received a substantial number of seats. Since then many opposition leaders have been forced into violent opposition, imprisoned, or co-opted into the ruling party. Subnationalities: The population is divided among a wide variety of peoples, some of which are subnationalities based on kingdoms that preceded the present state. The most important of these was Buganda. Its Ganda people suffer from recurrent repression.

Civil Liberties. The largest circulation newspaper and radio and television are government owned. Political violence and an incomplete rule of law inhibit all expression. Critical newspapers have suffered recurrent pressure, but opposition leaders speak out. Assembly and travel are restricted within the country. Unions are weak and government influenced. Arbitrary arrests are frequent; opposition politicians are killed by the government or murdered by unknown assailants. Massacres accompany anti-guerrilla campaigns. Torture is widely reported. The courts have some independence. Religious freedom has been partially reestab-

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lished, and the churches play a balancing role to a limited extent. The economy has suffered severe dislocation: property is not secure, corruption is pervasive and costly, a black market flourishes.

Comparatively: Uganda is as free as Zimbabwe, freer than Tanzania, less free than Brazil.

U N I O N O F
S O V I E T S O C I A L I S T R E P U B L I C S

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 274,000,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A complex ethnic state with major territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. The Soviet Union is ruled by parallel party and governmental systems: the party system is dominant. Elections are held for both systems, but in neither is it possible for the rank and file to determine policy. Candidacy and voting are closely controlled, and the resulting assemblies do not seriously question the policies developed by party leaders (varying by time or issue from one individual to twenty-five). The Soviet Union is in theory elaborately divided into subnational units, but in fact the all-embracing party structure renders local power minimal.

Subnationalities. Russians account for half the Soviet population. The rest belong to a variety of subnational groupings ranging down in size from the forty million Ukrainians. Most groups are territorial, with a developed sense of subnational identity. The political rights of all of these to self-determination, either within the USSR or through secession, is effectively denied. In many cases Russians or other non-native peoples have been settled in subnational territory in such numbers as to make the native people a minority in their own land (for example, Kazakhstan). Expression of opinion in favor of increased self-determination is repressed at least as much as anticommunist opinion. Most of these peoples have had independence movements or movements for enhanced self-determination in the years since the founding of the USSR. Several movements have been quite strong since World War II (for example, in the Ukraine or Lithuania); the blockage of communication by the Soviet government makes it very

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difficult to estimate either the overt or latent support such movements might have. In 1978 popular movements in Georgia and Armenia led to the retention of the official status of local languages in the Republics of the Caucasus.

Civil Liberties. The media are totally owned by the government or party and are, in addition, regularly censored. Elite publications occasionally present variations from the official line, but significant deviations are found only in underground publications, which have been very rare recently. Recent cases of arrests and exile have silenced nearly all criticism. Crimes against the state, including insanity (demonstrated by perverse willingness to oppose the state), are broadly defined; as a result political prisoners are present in large numbers both in jails and insane asylums. Nearly all imprisonment and mistreatment of prisoners in the Soviet Union are now carried out in accordance with Soviet security laws—even though these laws conflict with other Soviet laws written to accord with international standards. Since the Bolshevik Revolution there has never been an acquittal in a political trial. Insofar as private rights, such as those to religion, education, or choice of occupation, exist, they are de facto rights that may be denied at any time. Travel within and outside of the USSR is highly controlled; many areas of the country are still off-limits to foreigners—especially those used as areal prisons for dissidents. Nearly all private entrepreneurial activity is outside the law; there are rights to nonproductive personal property. Other rights such as those to organize an independent labor union are strictly denied. Literacy is high, few starve, and private oppression is no more.

Comparatively: The USSR is as free as Romania, less free than Hungary.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: decentralized nonparty	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 1,500,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous citizenry

Political Rights. The UAE is a confederation of seven shaikhdoms in which the larger are given the greater power both in the appointed assembly and the administrative hierarchy. There is a

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great deal of consultation in the traditional pattern. Below the confederation level there are no electoral procedures or parties. Each shaikhdom is relatively autonomous in its internal affairs. The majority of the people are recent immigrants and noncitizens.

Civil Liberties. The press is private or governmental. There is self-censorship, but some criticism is expressed. Broadcasting is under federal or shaikhdom control. There are no political assemblies, but there are also few, if any, prisoners of conscience. The courts dispense a combination of British, tribal, and Islamic law. Labor unions are prohibited, but illegal strikes have occurred. Private rights are generally respected; there is freedom of travel. As in most Muslim countries there is freedom of worship for established religions, but only the favored Muslims may proselytize. Many persons may still accept the feudal privileges and restraints of their tribal position. The rights of the alien majority are less secure: "troublemakers" are deported. Private economic activity exists alongside the dominance of government petroleum and petroleum-related activities.

Comparatively: United Arab Emirates are as free as Bahrain, freer than Saudi Arabia, less free than Kuwait.

UNITED KINGDOM

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 56,500,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnic state with major subnationalities

Political Rights. The United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy with a symbolic monarch. Fair elections are open to all parties, including those advocating secession. There are elected local and regional governments, and their limited powers are gradually being increased. **Subnationalities:** Scots, Welsh, Ulster Scots, and Ulster Irish are significant and highly self-conscious territorial minorities. In 1978 parliament approved home rule for Scotland and Wales, but the Welsh and (more ambiguously) the Scots voters rejected this opportunity in 1979. Northern Ireland's home rule has been in abeyance because of an ethnic impasse, but is being reestablished. Ulster Scot and Irish live in intermixed territories in Northern Ireland. Both want more self-determination—the majority Ulster Scots as an auton-

mous part of the United Kingdom, the minority Ulster Irish as an area within Ireland.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and powerful; broadcasting has statutory independence although it is indirectly under government control. British media are comparatively restrained because of strict libel and national security laws, and a tradition of accepting government suggestions for the handling of sensitive news. In Northern Ireland a severe security situation has led to the curtailment of private rights, to imprisonment, and on occasion to torture and brutality. However, these conditions have been relatively limited, have been thoroughly investigated by the government, and improved as a result. Elsewhere the rule of law is entrenched, and private rights generally respected. Unions are independent and powerful. In certain areas, such as medicine, housing, inheritance, and general disposability of income, socialist government policies have limited choice for some while expanding the access of others.

Comparatively: The United Kingdom is as free as the United States, freer than West Germany.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: decentralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 236,300,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex state with minor territorial subnationalities

Political Rights. The United States is a constitutional democracy with three strong but separate centers of power: president, congress, and judiciary. Elections are fair and competitive. Parties are remarkably weak: in some areas they are little more than temporary means of organizing primary elections. States, and to a less extent cities, have powers in their own rights; they often successfully oppose the desires of national administrations. Each state has equal representation in the upper house, which in the USA is the more powerful half of parliament.

Subnationalities. There are many significant ethnic groups, but the only clearly territorial subnationalities are the native peoples. The largest Indian tribes, the Navaho and Sioux, number 100,000 or more each. About 150,000 Hawaiians still reside on

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their native islands, intermingled with a much larger white and oriental population. Spanish-speaking Americans number in the millions; except for a few thousand residing in an area of northern New Mexico, they are mostly twentieth-century immigrants living among English-speaking Americans, particularly in the large cities. Black Americans make up over one-tenth of the U.S. population; residing primarily in large cities, they have no major territorial base. Black and Spanish-speaking Americans are of special concern because of their relative poverty; their ethnic status is quite comparable to that of many other groups in America, including Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Italians, or Jews.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and free; both private and public radio and television are government regulated. There are virtually no government controls on the content of the printed media (except in nonpolitical areas such as pornography) and few on broadcasting. There are no prisoners of conscience or sanctioned uses of torture; some regional miscarriages of justice and police brutality have political and social overtones. Widespread use of surveillance techniques and clandestine interference with radical groups or groups thought to be radical have occurred; as a reduction of liberties the threat has remained largely potential; in recent years these security excesses have been greatly attenuated if not eliminated. A new threat is control over the expression of former government employees. Wherever and whenever publicity penetrates, the rule of law is generally secure, even against the most powerful. The government often loses in the courts. Private rights in most spheres are respected, but rights to travel to particular places, such as Cuba, are circumscribed. Unions are independent and politically influential. Although a relatively capitalistic country, the combination of tax loads and the decisive government role in agriculture, energy, defense, and other industries restricts individual choice as it increases majority power.

Comparatively: The United States is as free as Australia, freer than West Germany.

U R U G U A Y

Economy: mixed capitalist
Polity: military nonparty
Population: 3,000,000

Political Rights: 5
Civil Liberties: 4
Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Uruguay is a military dictatorship in planned transition to democracy. The leading parties are now very active and hold de facto power in the streets. Elections are expected to return the country to democracy in 1985.

Civil Liberties. The press is private, and broadcasting private and public. Both are under censorship and the danger of confiscation or closure, as are books and journals. However, criticism has become increasingly open, and foreign media are also generally available. The right of assembly is restricted, and the independence of the judiciary and the civil service has been curtailed. Many prisoners of conscience have been released. Torture has been routinely used in the past, and may continue in some instances; convictions generally have been based on written confessions. The political parties effectively organize dissent. All organizations, including unions, are under close government supervision. There is no inviolability of the home. Private rights are generally respected. The tax load of an overbuilt bureaucracy and emphasis on private and government monopolies in major sectors have also restricted choice in this now impoverished welfare state.

Comparatively: Uruguay is as free as Morocco, freer than Paraguay, less free than Brazil.

V A N U A T U

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: decentralized mutiparty	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 120,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous society with geographical subnationalities

Political Rights. Vanuatu has a parliamentary system with an indirectly elected president. Elections have been freely contested by multiple parties. Opposition exists between islands and between the French and English educated. Local government is elected; a decentralized federal system of regional government is being developed.

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Civil Liberties. News media are limited and largely government owned; the only critical paper was closed by government order in 1983; radio is not wholly free. The full spectrum of civil freedoms is observed, but in the aftermath of the suppression of a secessionist (largely French supported) movement at independence, many political arrests and trials occurred; mistreatment was reported. The judiciary is independent. Rights to political economic, and union organization are observed. There is a general right to travel.

Comparatively: Vanuatu is as free as Malta, freer than Maldives, less free than Belize.

V E N E Z U E L A

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 18,600,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Venezuela is a parliamentary democracy in which power has alternated between major parties in recent years. Campaigns and voting are fair and open. Regional and local assemblies are relatively powerful, but governors are centrally appointed. Each state has equal representation in the upper house.

Civil Liberties. The press is private and free; most broadcasting is also in private hands. Censorship occurs only in emergencies, but television scripts on certain subjects must be approved in advance, and there are recurrent attempts at government control. The rule of law is generally secured, except occasionally in areas of guerrilla actions. On rare occasions members of parliament have been arrested. However, there are no prisoners of conscience, and the government has taken steps to prevent torture. The court can rule against the government and charges are brought against the security forces. Most private rights are respected; government involvement in the petroleum industry has given it a predominant economic role. Human rights organizations are very active. Unions are well organized and powerful.

Comparatively: Venezuela is as free as France, freer than Ecuador, less free than Costa Rica.

V I E T N A M

Economy: socialist	Political Rights: 7
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 58,300,000	Status of freedom: not free

An ethnic state with subnationalities

Political Rights, Vietnam is a traditional communist dictatorship with the forms of parliamentary democracy. Actual power is in the hands of the communist party; this is in turn dominated by a small group at the top. Officially there is a ruling national front as in several other communist states, but the noncommunist parties are facades. Administration is highly centralized, with provincial boundaries arbitrarily determined by the central government. The flow of refugees and other evidence suggest that the present regime is very unpopular, especially in the South which is treated as an occupied country. Subnationalities: Continued fighting has been reported in the Montagnard areas in the South. Combined with new resettlement schemes non-Vietnamese peoples are under pressure in both North and South Vietnam. Many Chinese have been driven out of the country.

Civil Liberties The media are under direct government, party, or army control; only the approved line is presented. While the people have essentially no rights against the state, there continues to be some public criticism and passive resistance, especially in the South. Arbitrary arrest is frequent. Repression of religious groups has eased, at least in the South. Perhaps one-half million persons have been put through reeducation camps, hundreds of thousands have been forced to move into new areas, or to change occupations; thousands are prisoners of conscience or in internal exile. Former anticommunist and other groups are regularly discriminated against in employment, health care, and travel. There are no independent labor union rights, rights to travel, or choice of education; many have been forced into collectives.

Comparatively: Vietnam is as free as Syria, freer than Cambodia, less free than China (Mainland).

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WESTERN SAMOA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 4
Polity: traditional nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 3
Population: 160,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. Western Samoa is a constitutional monarchy in which the assembly is elected by 9,500 "family heads." There have been important shifts of power within the assembly as the result of elections, although there are no political parties. A recent election was voided in the courts on a corruption issue. Village government has preserved traditional forms and considerable autonomy; it is also based on rule by "family heads."

Civil Liberties. The press is private and government; radio is government owned; television is received only from outside. Government media have limited independence. There is general freedom of expression, organization, and assembly. The judiciary is independent and the rule of law and private rights are respected within the limits set by the traditional system; Most arable land is held in customary tenure. Health and literacy standards are very high for a poor country.

Comparatively: Western Samoa is as free as Mexico, freer than Indonesia, less free than Nauru.

YEMEN, NORTH

Economy: noninclusive capitalist **Political Rights:** 5
Polity: military nonparty **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 5,900,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. North Yemen is a military dictatorship supplemented by an appointive and elected advisory assembly. Leaders are frequently assassinated. The tribal and religious structures still retain considerable authority, and the government must rely on a wide variety of different groups in an essentially nonideological consensual regime. Recent local elections have allowed some competition. Political parties are forbidden. The

country is divided between city and country, a variety of tribes, and two major religious groupings, and faces a major revolutionary challenge.

Civil Liberties. The weak media are largely government owned; the papers have occasional criticisms—the broadcast media have none. Foreign publications are routinely censored. Yet proponents of both royalist and far left persuasions are openly accepted in a society with few known prisoners of conscience. There is no right of assembly. Politically active opponents may be encouraged to go into exile. The traditional Islamic courts give some protection; many private rights are respected. There is no right to strike or to engage in religious proselytizing. Unions and professional associations are government sponsored. Economically the government has concentrated on improving the infrastructure of Yemen's still overwhelmingly traditional economy. Most farmers are tenants; half the labor force is employed abroad.

Comparatively: North Yemen is as free as Bhutan, freer than South Yemen, less free than Efypt.

Y E M E N , S O U T H

Economy: noninclusive socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 2,100,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous population

Political Rights. South Yemen considers itself a communist country governed according to the communist one-party model. It is doubtful that the party retains the tight party discipline of its exemplars; it is government by coup and violence. Parliamentary elections follow the one-party model; they allow some choice among individuals. Soviet influence in internal and external affairs is powerful.

Civil Liberties. The media are government owned or controlled, and employed actively as means of indoctrination. Even conversation with foreigners is highly restricted. In the political and security areas the rule of law hardly applies. Political imprisonments, torture, and "disappearances" have instilled a pervasive fear in those who would speak up. Death sentences against protesting farmers have been handed down by people's courts. Independent private rights are few, although some tradi-

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tional law and institutions remain. Unions are under government control. Industry and commerce have been nationalized, some of the land collectivized.

Comparatively: South Yemen is as free as Malawi, freer than Somalia, less free than Oman.

Y U G O S L A V I A

Economy: mixed socialist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: communist one-party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 23,000,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A multinational state

Political Rights. Yugoslavia is governed on the model of the USSR, but with the addition of unique elements. These include: the greater role given the governments of the constituent republics; and the greater power given the assemblies of the self-managed communities and industrial enterprises. The Federal Assembly is elected indirectly by those successful in lower level elections. The country has been directed by a small elite of the communist party, but measures to increase in-party democracy seem genuine. No opposition member is elected to state or national position, nor is there public opposition in the assemblies to government policy on the national or regional level.

Subnationalities. The several peoples of Yugoslavia live largely in their historical homelands. The population consists of forty percent Serbs, twenty-two percent Croats, eight percent Slovenes, eight percent Bosnian Muslims, six percent Macedonians, six percent Albanians, two percent Montenegrins, and many others. The Croats have an especially active independence movement; Albanians have agitated for more self-determination. Yet there is a degree of authentic defense of cultural differences.

Civil Liberties. The media in Yugoslavia are controlled directly or indirectly by the government, although there is ostensible worker control. The range of ideas and criticism of government policy in domestic and available foreign publications is greater than in most communist states. There is no right of assembly, but some assemblies are allowed outside of government direction. Hundreds have been imprisoned for ideas expressed verbally or in print that deviated from the official line (primarily through subnationalist enthusiasm, anticommunism, or communist deviatio-

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nism). Dissidents are even pursued overseas. Torture and brutality occur; psychiatric hospitals are also used to confine prisoners of conscience. As long as the issue is not political, however, the courts have some independence; there is a realm of de facto individual freedom that includes the right to seek employment outside the country. Travel outside Yugoslavia is often denied to dissidents, and religious proselytizing is forbidden. Labor is not independent, but has rights through the working of the "self-management" system; local strikes are common. Although the economy is socialist or communalist in most respects, agriculture in this most agricultural of European countries remains overwhelmingly private.

Comparatively: Yugoslavia is as free as Poland, freer than Romania, less free than Morocco.

Z A I R E

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: nationalist one-party (military dominated)	Civil Liberties: 7
Population: 32,200,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A transethnic heterogeneous state with subnationalities

Political Rights. Zaire is under one-man military rule, with the ruling party essentially an extension of the ruler's personality. Elections at both local and parliamentary levels are restricted to one party, but allows for extensive choice among individuals. Regions are deliberately organized to avoid ethnic identity: regional officers all are appointed from the center, generally from outside of the area, as are officers of the ruling party.

Subnationalities. There are such a variety of tribes or linguistic groups in Zaire that no one group has as much as twenty percent of the population. The fact that French remains the dominant language reflects the degree of this dispersion. Until recently most of the Zaire people have seen themselves only in local terms without broader ethnic identification. The revolts and wars of the early 1960s saw continually shifting patterns of affiliation, with the European provincial but not ethnic realities of Katanga and South Kasai being most important. The most self-

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conscious ethnic groups are the Kongo people living in the west (and Congo and Angola) and the Luba in the center of the country. In both cases ethnicity goes back to important ancient kingdoms. There is continuing disaffection among the Lunda and other ethnic groups.

Civil Liberties. Private newspaper ownership remains only in name. Broadcasting is government owned and directed. Censorship and self-censorship are pervasive. There is no right of assembly, and union organization is controlled. Government has been arbitrary and capricious. The judiciary is not independent; prisoners of conscience are numerous, and execution and torture occurs. Ethnic organizations are closely restricted. Arrested conspirators have been forbidden their own lawyers. There is relative religious freedom; the Catholic church retains some power. Through the misuse of government power, the extravagance and business dealings of those in high places reduces economic freedom. Nationalization of land has often been a prelude to private development by powerful bureaucrats. Pervasive corruption and anarchy reduce human rights. There is also considerable government enterprise.

Comparatively: Zaire is as free as Vietnam, freer than Benin, less free than Zambia.

Z A M B I A

Economy: noninclusive mixed socialist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: socialist one-party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 6,600,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A transethnic heterogeneous state

Political Rights. Zambia is ruled as a one-party dictatorship, although there have been elements of freedom within that party. Party organs are constitutionally more important than governmental. Although elections have some meaning within this framework, the government has suppressed opposition movements within the party. Expression of dissent is possible through abstention or negative votes. There are some town councils with elected members.

Civil Liberties. All media are government controlled. A considerable variety of opinion is expressed, but it is a crime to criticize the president, the parliament, or the ideology. Foreign publications are censored. There is a rule of law and the courts have some independence; cases have been won against the government. Political opponents are often detained, and occasionally tortured, yet most people talk without fear. Traditional life continues. The government does not fully accept private or traditional rights in property or religion; important parts of the economy, especially copper mining, have been nationalized. Union, business, and professional organizations are under government pressure but retain significant independence.

Comparatively: Zambia is as free as Guyana, freer than Angola, less free than Morocco.

Z I M B A B W E

Economy: noninclusive capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: centralized dominant party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 8,300,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnically complex state with a territorial subnationality

Political Rights. Zimbabwe is a parliamentary democracy. The ruling party came to power in 1980 through elections marked by considerable coercion of the electorate. The whites retain special minority political rights in a transitional phase. All military forces are still not controlled. Pressure to form a one-party state is growing with the increasing repression of the main opposition party. Subnationalities: The formerly dominant white, Indian, and colored populations (five percent altogether) are largely urban. The emerging dominant people are the majority Shona-speaking groups (seventy-four percent). The Ndebele (eighteen percent) are territorially distinct and politically self-conscious. Their allegiance to a minority party is being violently reduced.

Civil Liberties. The press is indirectly government owned and follows the government line except occasionally in the letters columns. The government-owned broadcast media are active organs of government propaganda. The rule of law is increasingly threat-

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ened; opposition politicians have been forced into exile or imprisoned. Acquittals are regularly followed by rearrests. Racial discrimination is officially outlawed, especially in residence, occupation, and conscription. Many citizens live in fear of the nationalist parties and their former guerrilla forces. Unions and private associations retain some independence, but are increasingly being unified under government direction. The economy has capitalist, socialist, and statist aspects. The white population still wields disproportionate economic power.

Comparatively: Zimbabwe is as free as Singapore, freer than South Africa, less free than Botswana.

PART VI

Related Territory Summaries

Related Territory Summaries

Summaries for related territories are introduced for the first time. Using the same format as the Country Summaries, the dependent territories of each superordinate country are discussed as a group. Exceptions to the general pattern are pointed out. It is often unclear whether a political unit should be regarded as a territory or an integral unit of its ruling state. For example, only the history of the Survey explains why the "independent" homelands of South Africa are considered dependent territories while the Republics of the USSR are not. In general, if a unit is considered a full equal of the units of the superordinate state, it is not a territory.

A U S T R A L I A

CHRISTMAS ISLAND

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: agent	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 3,300	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnically complex territory

COCOS ISLANDS

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: agent and council	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 600	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

Territory Summaries

NORFOLK ISLAND

Economy: capitalist **Political Rights:** 4
Polity: council & administrator **Civil Liberties:** 2
Population: 2,200 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

Australia apparently follows democratic practices in so far as possible. Christmas Island is essentially a state-run phosphate mine, which is soon to be depleted. The population is Chinese and Malay. Formerly a personal fiefdom, Cocos Islands has been placed under Australian administration, with the assistance of a local council. In 1984 the people voted in a UN supervised referendum to be integrated with Australia. Yet distance, the Malay population, and the plantation economy may make this difficult in more than theory. There appears to be free expression and a rule of law, but in neither are communications media developed.

Norfolk Island has a freely elected legislative assembly. It is in large measure self-governing; the wish of some residents for more independence is currently under consideration. An Australian "administrator" remains appointed. At least one lively free newspaper is published, and other rights of organization and law appear to be guaranteed.

C H I L E

EASTER ISLAND

Economy: capitalist-statist **Political Rights:** 6
Polity: governor **Civil Liberties:** 5
Population: 2,000 **Status of Freedom:** partly free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

The Island is granted a limited autonomy within the generally repressive Chilean context. In 1984 the appointed governor was for the first time a native of the island. Discussion at least of local problems seems to be quite open.

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D E N M A R K

FAROE ISLANDS

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 44,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

GREENLAND

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 51,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex population (nonwhite majority)

Both territories have elected parliamentary governments responsible for internal administration. In addition they elect representatives to the Danish parliament. They also have considerable freedom in international affairs—such as Greenland's ability to opt out of the European Economic Community (as of 1985). On major issues referendums are also held. Full freedoms of expression and organization are recognized. The local languages are dominant in both territories.

F R A N C E

FRENCH GUIANA

Economy: noninclusive capitalist- statist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: dependent multiparty (limited)	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 58,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnically complex state (nonwhite majority)

Territory Summaries

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: dependent multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 148,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population (few French)

GUADELOUPE

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: dependent multiparty (limited)	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 324,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

Relatively homogeneous with a small, dominant French minority

MARTINIQUE

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: dependent multiparty (limited)	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 342,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

Relatively homogeneous with a small, dominant French minority

MAHORE (formerly MAYOTE)

Economy: noninclusive capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: dependent multiparty (limited)	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 47,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (non-French)

Territory Summaries

WALLIS AND FUTUNA

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: dependent assembly	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 9,200	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population (non-French)

The territories of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion, and St. Pierre and Miquelon are considered overseas departments of France. They have elected representatives in the French parliament and local councils. However, French law applies; a French administrator is the chief executive. Open advocacy of independence in such integral parts of France has led to arrest in the past. St. Pierre and Miquelon chose department status by referendum. There are also local elected governments. The governance of Mahore (Mayotte) is similar. However, two recent referendums have confirmed the desire of the people that their island remain a part of France (because the Christian population would otherwise be ruled by the Muslim Comoros). Beyond the special colonial position, French law and its civil guarantees are maintained in the group.

The overseas territories of French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna in the South Pacific are more traditional colonies in theory. In practice, the administrative structure is similar to that of the overseas departments. Assemblies have limited powers, although in the large territories perhaps as great as those in the overseas departments since there is not the automatic application of French law. Independence appears here to be a lively and accepted issue. However, French reluctance to grant full freedom led to New Caledonia threatening an election boycott and an alternative government in 1984. Wallis and Futuna chose territorial status by referendum in 1959.

Monaco is not normally considered a dependent territory. However, by treaty with France, Monacan policy must conform to French security, political, and economic interests; the head minister must be acceptable to the French government, and France controls foreign relations. The hereditary ruler appoints the government, but shares legislative power with an elected council. There is also elected local government. Foreign publications are freely available. Civil freedoms approximate those in France. The government owns the casino and major hotels.

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Of the traditional colonial powers only France retains a grip on its colonies that seems to be resented by important segments of their populations. For example, independence movements in Guadeloupe and New Caledonia have not had the opportunity for fair electoral tests of their desires that those in American and British colonies have had. France does not allow such electoral tests of independence sentiment in its overseas departments, and seldom elsewhere.

I S R A E L

OCCUPIED AREAS

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 5
Polity: external administration; local government	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 1,150,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A complex population with a dominant minority

The Gaza Strip and the West Bank both have elected local governments, although the decisive power is in the hands of the occupying force. Opposition to the occupation is expressed in local elections and the media, but heavy pressure against any organized opposition is applied in an atmosphere of violence on both sides. There is censorship as well as other controls on the media and on movement. Settlement by the occupying people has steadily infringed upon the rights of the Arab majority.

I T A L Y

SAN MARINO

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: dependent multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 19,380	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (white)

Territory Summaries

VATICAN

Economy: statist	Political	Rights: 4
Polity: elected monarchy	Civil	Liberties: 2
Population: 860	Status of Freedom:	partly free

A relatively homogeneous population

San Marino is ruled by a multiparty parliamentary government with active elected local governments. The media are independent; in addition, Italian media are available. Although often considered independent, the influence of Italy is overwhelming. Defense and many foreign relations areas are handled by the Italian government; major court cases are tried in Italian courts; the political parties are essentially branches of the respective Italian parties.

The political situation of the Vatican is anomalous. On the one hand, the Vatican is ostensibly an independent state under absolutist rule, with the ruler chosen for life by a small international elite, which also has advisory functions. On the other hand, the international relations of the state are actually based on its ruler's status as head of a church rather than as head of a state. The people of the Vatican live more as Italian citizens than as citizens of the Vatican, regardless of their formal status. Vatican media represent the views of the church, yet Italian media and avenues of expression are fully available, and the dissatisfied can leave the context of the Vatican with minimal effort.

N E T H E R L A N D S

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: multiparty internal	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 270,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex territory (few Dutch)

The Antilles consist of two groups of islands in the Caribbean. Although the governor is appointed the islands are largely self-governing at both the territory and island level. The parliament

is freely elected. The Netherlands has been urging the islands to accept independence, but the smaller islands have resisted independence in federation with the dominant island, Curacao. Aruba desires separate independence. Full freedom of party organization, expression, and abstention are fully recognized.

NEW ZEALAND

COOK ISLANDS

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: multiparty internal	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 18,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

NIUE

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: internal parliamentary	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 3,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

TOKELAU ISLANDS

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: limited assembly	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 1,600	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

The Cook Islands and Niue are largely self-governing territories with elected parliaments. There is, however, some continuing oversight by New Zealand, particularly in defense, foreign affairs, and justice. Tokelau is administered by appointed officials with the help of an elected assembly. Political life, particularly in the Cook Islands, has been vigorous and free.

Territory Summaries

P O R T U G A L

AZORES

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: internal multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 292,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

MACAO

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: limited internal assembly	Civil Liberties: 4
Population: 260,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnically complex population (majority Chinese)

MADEIRA

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: internal multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 266,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex but relatively homogeneous population

The Azores and Madeira are considered "autonomous regions," whose parliamentary, multiparty governments have a large degree of internal self-rule, including the right to issue their own stamps. The islands also have elected representatives in the Portuguese parliament. They have the same civil freedoms as on the mainland. Both regions have independence movements. Land holding has traditionally been very concentrated on Madeira. With populations made up largely of Portuguese settlers of past centuries, neither island group has been seen as a colony. Macao is administered by a Lisbon-appointed governor with the help of an elected local assembly. Peking and its supporters affect all levels of government and constrain the news media, as well as rights of assembly and organization. However, democratic institutions are much more developed here than in Hong Kong.

S O U T H A F R I C A

BOPHUTHATSWANA

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: dependent dominant party	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 1,400,00	Status of Freedom: partly free

An ethnically complex population

CISKET

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: dependent dominant party	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 740,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnically homogeneous territory

SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA)

Economy: capitalist-traditional	Political Rights: 6
Polity: outside administrator- traditional	Civil Liberties: 5
Population: 1,100,000	Status of Freedom: not free

An ethnically heterogeneous territory

VENDA

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 6
Polity: dependent multiparty	Civil Liberties: 6
Population: 550,000	Status of Freedom: not free

A relatively homogeneous territory

South West Africa, or Namibia, is ruled as a colony of South Africa, its internal elected administration having been dismissed in 1983. There is considerable freedom of the press, of discussion, and organization—although with occasional

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interventions. The judiciary is relatively free. Native chiefs and councils play political and judicial roles in their home areas.

The other territories are homelands that have accepted formal independence—except for Transkei, which the Survey accepts as independent. Characteristically, most wage earners ascribed to these states work in South Africa proper; the states receive extensive South African aid, and they are not viable units geographically. South Africa exerts considerable control over their foreign affairs and security. Although formally governed by parliamentary systems, the control of political organization and expression, the large number of appointed parliamentarians, and the violent atmosphere makes them more dictatorial than democratic. Expression of opinion in regard to the existence of the state is especially perilous. There are arrests for reasons of conscience and reports of torture. Nevertheless, these territories do protect their peoples from many of the worst insults of apartheid, and, in Bophuthatswana, a much closer approximation to justice exists for blacks than in South Africa itself.

S P A I N

CANARY ISLANDS

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: centralized multiparty	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 1,375,000	Status of Freedom: free

A complex but relatively homogeneous population

PLACES OF SOVEREIGNTY IN NORTH AFRICA

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: multiparty	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: ca. 175,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex population

Spain has no official colonies. Its outposts in North Africa, ruled as parts of the Spanish provinces across from them, remain anomalies. Their populations are much more "African" than those

Territory Summaries

of Spain itself, and their status as "garrison towns" restricts their freedoms. The Canary Islands are governed as two provinces. Although the people are of diverse origins and preserve many pre-Spanish customs, the culture today is largely Hispanic. There is an independence movement, but the development of internal self-determination on a regional basis may help to reduce the desire for separation. Spanish law guarantees rights as in Spain itself.

S W I T Z E R L A N D

LIECHTENSTEIN

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: constitutional monarchy	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 124,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population

Foreign affairs, defense, and some economic regulations are controlled by Switzerland. Swiss money is used, as is the Swiss postal service. The government is responsible both to the hereditary monarch and an elected parliament. There is local government. Women have recently attained the right to vote; the media are mostly Swiss, although there are local papers.

U N I T E D K I N G D O M

ANGUILLA

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: dependent limited assembly	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 6,500	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

Territory Summaries

BERMUDA

Economy: mixed capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: multiparty	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 55,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex state (largely nonwhite)

BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS

Economy: mixed socialist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: limited internal assembly	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 11,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

CAYMAN ISLANDS

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: limited internal assembly	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 17,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically mixed population (largely white)

CHANNEL ISLANDS

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: traditional parliamentary	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 132,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically mixed population (white)

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: limited representative	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 1,800	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (white)

Territory Summaries

GIBRALTAR

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: internal parliamentary	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 30,000	Status of Freedom: free

An ethnically complex population

HONG KONG

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 4
Polity: colonial	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 5,000,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population (Chinese)

ISLE OF MAN

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 1
Polity: parliamentary	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 65,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (white)

MONTserrat

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: colonial legislative	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 12,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

ST. HELENA

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: colonial legislative	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 5,200	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (white)

Territory Summaries

TURKS AND CAICOS

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: colonial legislative	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 7,400	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

The dependencies of the United Kingdom all have the civil rights common to the homeland. Nearly all have expressed through elections, elected representatives, or just lack of controversy in a free atmosphere a desire to stay a dependency of the United Kingdom under present arrangements. For example, the party winning decisively in 1984 in Turks and Caicos ran on an anti-independence stand. The people of Gibraltar have often affirmed their desire to remain a colony. For the other colonies, there is little evidence of a significant denial of political or civil liberties.

Constitutionally the dependencies may be divided into three groups. The first consists of those units with essentially full internal autonomy, expressed through freely elected parliaments. The second group is administered by a strong appointed governor and a largely elected assembly or council. The third group consists of colonies with little if any power in elected assemblies or officials. The first group includes the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and possibly Bermuda. Midway between the first and second group are the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, and possibly Montserrat. In the second group are Anguilla, Falkland Islands, St. Helena, and Turks and Caicos. The last group consists only of Hong Kong, whose political development, and to some extent even civil liberties have been arrested by the presence of communist China. However, in preparation for the turning back of sovereignty to China in 1997 legislative institutions are being developed.

Territory Summaries

MARSHALL ISLANDS

Economy: capitalist-statist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: parliamentary self-governing	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 31,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

NORTHERN MARIANAS

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: parliamentary self-governing	Civil Liberties: 2
Population: 17,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (nonwhite)

PUERTO RICO

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: self governing quasi-state	Civil Liberties: 1
Population: 3,200,000	Status of Freedom: free

A relatively homogeneous population (Spanish speaking)

VIRGIN ISLANDS

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 2
Polity: appointed governorship	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 97,000	Status of Freedom: free

A complex population (mostly nonwhite)

America's dependent territories are now either internally self-governing or have accepted in free referenda their present status. The territories have elected institutions including in most cases an elected governor or chief administrator. There have been a number of recent referenda approving free association with the

Territory Summaries

United States in the Micronesian territories. Full independence was not, however, discussed fully by either the United States or the islanders. The heavy American military presence in Guam may reduce its independence. Traditional chiefs have special powers in most other Pacific territories. Overdependence on American largesse is arguably the greatest hindrance to complete freedom in the Pacific territories. Freedom of expression, assembly, and organization are recognized in all territories.

FRANCE-SPAIN CONDOMINIUM

ANDORRA

Economy: capitalist	Political Rights: 3
Polity: limited multiparty	Civil Liberties: 3
Population: 31,000	Status of Freedom: partly free

A relatively homogeneous population (Catalan)

Andorra has a parliamentary government overseen by the representatives of the French President and the Bishop of Urgel. There has been agitation for more self-determination. External relations are handled primarily by France, a responsibility France has insisted on in recent discussions with the EEC. Papers freely circulate from both sides; an independent weekly is published. Only recently has the Andorra Council been able to regulate its own radio stations.

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