Improved Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Bootstrapping

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SUMMARY: Gentry's bootstrapping technique is the most famous method of obtaining fully homomorphic encryption. In previous work I proposed a fully homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping which has the weak point in the enciphering function. In this paper I propose the improved fully homomorphic ***public-key*** encryption scheme on ***non-associative*** octonion ring over finite field without bootstrapping technique. The plaintext p consists of two sub-plaintext u and v. The proposed fully homomorphic ***public-key*** encryption scheme is immune from the "p and $-p$ attack". The cipher text consists of three sub-cipher texts. As the scheme is based on computational difficulty to solve the multivariate algebraic equations of high degree while the almost all multivariate cryptosystems proposed until now are based on the quadratic equations avoiding the explosion of the coefficients. Because proposed fully homomorphic encryption scheme is based on multivariate algebraic equations with high degree or too many variables, it is against the Gröbner basis attack, the differential attack, rank attack and so on.
keywords: fully homomorphic public-key encryption, multivariate algebraic equation, Gröbner basis, non-associative ring

§1. Introduction

A cryptosystem which supports both addition and multiplication (thereby preserving the ring structure of the plaintexts) is known as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and is very powerful. Using such a scheme, any circuit can be homomorphically evaluated, effectively allowing the construction of programs which may be run on encryptions of their inputs to produce an encryption of their output. Since such a program never decrypts its input, it can be run by an untrusted party without revealing its inputs and internal state. The existence of an efficient and fully homomorphic cryptosystem would have great practical implications in the outsourcing of private computations, for instance, in the context of cloud computing.

With homomorphic encryption, a company could encrypt its entire database of e-mails and upload it to a cloud. Then it could use the cloud-stored data as desired-for example, to calculate the stochastic value of stored data. The results would be downloaded and decrypted without ever exposing the details of a single e-mail.

In 2009 Gentry, an IBM researcher, has created a homomorphic encryption scheme that makes it possible to encrypt the data in such a way that performing a mathematical operation on the encrypted information and then decrypting the result produces the same answer as performing an analogous operation on the unencrypted data[9],[10].

But in Gentry's scheme a task like finding a piece of text in an e-mail requires chaining together thousands of basic operations. His solution was to use a second layer of encryption, essentially to protect intermediate results when the system broke down and needed to be reset.

Some fully homomorphic encryption schemes were proposed until now[11], [12], [13],[14],[15].

In previous work[1],[2] I proposed a fully homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping which has the weak point in the enciphering function[17]. This paper is the revised chapter 4 of my work "Fully Homomorphic Encryption without bootstrapping" published in March, 2015 which was published by LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken/Germany [1].

In this paper I propose a fully homomorphic encryption scheme on non-associative octonion ring over finite field which is based on computational difficulty to solve the multivariate algebraic equations of high degree while the almost all multivariate cryptosystems[3], [4],[5],[6],[7] proposed until now are based on the quadratic equations avoiding the explosion of the coefficients. Our scheme is against the Gröbner basis[8] attack, the differential attack, rank attack and so on.

§2. Preliminaries for octonion operation

In this section we describe the operations on octonion ring and properties of octonion ring.

§2.1 Multiplication and addition on octonion ring *O*

Let q be a fixed modulus to be as large prime as $O\,(2^{2000})$. Let O be the octonion [16] ring over a finite field $\boldsymbol{Fq}$.

$$O=\{(a_0,a_1,...,a_7)\mid a_j\in\ \boldsymbol{Fq}\ (j=0,1,\ldots,7)\} \qquad (1)$$

We define the multiplication and addition of $A,B\in O$ as follows.

$$A=(a_0,a_1,\ldots,a_7),\ a_j\in\ \boldsymbol{Fq}\ (j=0,1,\ldots,7), \qquad (2)$$

$$B=(b_0,b_1,\ldots,b_7),\ b_j\in\ \boldsymbol{Fq}\ (j=0,1,\ldots,7). \qquad (3)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&AB \bmod q\\
&= (a_0b_0 - a_1b_1 - a_2b_2 - a_3b_3 - a_4b_4 - a_5b_5 - a_6b_6 - a_7b_7 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_1+a_1b_0+a_2b_4+a_3b_7-a_4b_2+a_5b_6-a_6b_5-a_7b_3 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_2-a_1b_4+a_2b_0+a_3b_5+a_4b_1-a_5b_3+a_6b_7-a_7b_6 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_3-a_1b_7-a_2b_5+a_3b_0+a_4b_6+a_5b_2-a_6b_4+a_7b_1 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_4+a_1b_2 - a_2b_1 - a_3b_6+a_4b_0+a_5b_7+ a_6b_3 - a_7b_5 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_5-a_1b_6+a_2b_3-a_3b_2-a_4b_7+a_5b_0+a_6b_1+a_7b_4 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_6+a_1b_5 - a_2b_7+a_3b_4 - a_4b_3 - a_5b_1+a_6b_0 +a_7b_2 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_7+a_1b_3+a_2b_6-a_3b_1+a_4b_5-a_5b_4-a_6b_2+a_7b_0 \bmod q)
\end{aligned} \qquad (4)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&A+B \bmod q\\
&=(a_0+b_0 \bmod q,\ a_1+b_1 \bmod q,\ a_2+b_2 \bmod q,\ a_3+b_3 \bmod q\ ,\\
&\quad a_4+b_4 \bmod q,\ a_5+b_5 \bmod q,\ a_6+b_6 \bmod q,\ a_7+b_7 \bmod q\ ).
\end{aligned} \qquad (5)$$

Let

$$|A|^2= a_0^{\,2}+a_1^{\,2}+\ldots+a_7^{\,2} \bmod q. \qquad (6)$$

If $|A|^2\neq 0 \bmod q$, we can have A^{-1}, the inverse of A by using the algorithm **Octinv**(A) such that

$$A^{-1}= (a_0/|A|^2 \bmod q,\ -a_1/|A|^2 \bmod q,\ldots,\ -a_7/|A|^2 \bmod q) \leftarrow \ \textbf{Octinv}(A)\,. \,(7)$$

Here details of the algorithm **Octinv**(A) are omitted and can be looked up in the **Appendix A.**

§2.2. Property of multiplication over octonion ring *O*

A,B,C etc.$\in O$ satisfy the following formulae in general where A,B and C have the inverse A^{-1} ,B^{-1} and C^{-1} mod q.

1) Non-commutative

$$AB \neq BA \bmod q. \tag{8}$$

2) Non-associative

$$A(BC) \neq (AB)C \bmod q. \tag{9}$$

3) Alternative

$$(AA)B = A(AB) \bmod q, \tag{10}$$

$$A(BB) = (AB)B \bmod q, \tag{11}$$

$$(AB)A = A(BA) \bmod q. \tag{12}$$

4) Moufang's formulae [16],

$$C(A(CB)) = ((CA)C)B \bmod q, \tag{13}$$

$$A(C(BC)) = ((AC)B)C \bmod q, \tag{14}$$

$$(CA)(BC) = (C(AB))C \bmod q, \tag{15}$$

$$(CA)(BC) = C((AB)C) \bmod q. \tag{16}$$

5) A and $B \in O$ satisfy the following lemma.

Lemma 1

$$(A^{-1}B)A = A^{-1}(BA) \bmod q. \tag{17}$$

(*Proof*)

From (12)

$$A^{-1}B = A^{-1}((BA)A^{-1}) = (A^{-1}(BA))A^{-1} \bmod q,$$

By multiplying A from right side we have

$$(A^{-1}B)A = A^{-1}(BA) \bmod q \quad \text{q.e.d.}$$

6) $A \in O$ satisfies the following lemma.

Lemma 2

$$A^{-1}(AB) = B \bmod q$$
$$(BA)A^{-1} = B \bmod q$$

(*Proof*:)

Here proof is omitted and can be looked up in the **Appendix B.**

7) $A \in O$ satisfies the following theorem.

Theorem 1

$$A^2 = w\mathbf{1} + vA \bmod q, \tag{18}$$

where

$$\exists w, v \in Fq,$$

$$\mathbf{1} = (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) \in O,$$

$$A = (a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_7) \in O.$$

(*Proof*:)

$$A^2 \bmod q$$

$$\begin{aligned}
=(& a_0a_0 - a_1a_1 - a_2a_2 - a_3a_3 - a_4a_4 - a_5a_5 - a_6a_6 - a_7a_7 \bmod q, \\
& a_0a_1 + a_1a_0 + a_2a_4 + a_3a_7 - a_4a_2 + a_5a_6 - a_6a_5 - a_7a_3 \bmod q, \\
& a_0a_2 - a_1a_4 + a_2a_0 + a_3a_5 + a_4a_1 - a_5a_3 + a_6a_7 - a_7a_6 \bmod q, \\
& a_0a_3 - a_1a_7 - a_2a_5 + a_3a_0 + a_4a_6 + a_5a_2 - a_6a_4 + a_7a_1 \bmod q, \\
& a_0a_4 + a_1a_2 - a_2a_1 - a_3a_6 + a_4a_0 + a_5a_7 + a_6a_3 - a_7a_5 \bmod q, \\
& a_0a_5 - a_1a_6 + a_2a_3 - a_3a_2 - a_4a_7 + a_5a_0 + a_6a_1 + a_7a_4 \bmod q, \\
& a_0a_6 + a_1a_5 - a_2a_7 + a_3a_4 - a_4a_3 - a_5a_1 + a_6a_0 + a_7a_2 \bmod q, \\
& a_0a_7 + a_1a_3 + a_2a_6 - a_3a_1 + a_4a_5 - a_5a_4 - a_6a_2 + a_7a_0 \bmod q)
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
=(& 2a_0^2 - L \bmod q,\ 2a_0a_1 \bmod q,\ 2a_0a_2 \bmod q,\ 2a_0a_3 \bmod q,\ 2a_0a_4 \bmod q, \\
& 2a_0a_5 \bmod q, 2a_0a_6 \bmod q,\ 2a_0a_7 \bmod q)
\end{aligned}$$

where

$$L = a_0^2 + a_1^2 + a_2^2 + a_3^2 + a_4^2 + a_5^2 + a_6^2 + a_7^2 \bmod q.$$

Now we try to obtain $u, v \in Fq$ that satisfy $A^2 = w\mathbf{1} + vA \bmod q$.

$$w\mathbf{1} + vA = w(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) + v(a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_7) \bmod q,$$

$$\begin{aligned}
A^2 = (& 2a_0^2 - L \bmod q,\ 2a_0a_1 \bmod q,\ 2a_0a_2 \bmod q,\ 2a_0a_3 \bmod q, \\
& 2a_0a_4 \bmod q,\ 2\ a_0a_5 \bmod q, 2a_0a_6 \bmod q,\ 2a_0a_7 \bmod q).
\end{aligned}$$

As $A^2 = w\mathbf{1} + vA = -L\mathbf{1} + 2\ a_0A \bmod q$, we have

$$w = -L \bmod q,$$

$$v=2a_0 \bmod q. \qquad \text{q.e.d.}$$

8) **Theorem 2**

$D \in O$ does not exist that satisfies the following equation.

$$B(AX)=DX \bmod q, \tag{19}$$

where $B,A,D \in O$ and X is a variable.

(*Proof*:)

When $X=\mathbf{1}$, we have

$$BA=D \bmod q.$$

Then

$$B(AX)=(BA)X \bmod q.$$

We can select $C \in O$ that satisfies

$$B(AC) \neq (BA)C \bmod q. \tag{20}$$

We substitute $C \in O$ to X to obtain

$$B(AC)=(BA)C \bmod q. \tag{21}$$

(21) is contradictory to (20). q.e.d.

9) **Theorem 3**

$D \in O$ does not exist that satisfies the following equation.

$$C(B(AX))=DX \bmod q \tag{22}$$

where $C,B,A,D \in O$, C has inverse C^{-1} mod q and X is a variable.

B,A and C are non-associative, that is,

$$B(AC) \neq (BA)C \bmod q. \tag{23}$$

(*Proof*:)

If D exists, we have at $X=\mathbf{1}$

$$C(BA)=D \bmod q.$$

Then

$$C(B(AX))=(C(BA))X \bmod q.$$

We substitute C to X to obtain

$$C(B(AC))=(C(BA))C \bmod q.$$

From (12)

$$C(B(AC))=(C(BA))C=C((BA)C) \bmod q$$

By multiplying C^{-1} from left side, we have

$$B(AC)=(BA)C \bmod q \tag{24}$$

(24) is contradictory to (23). q.e.d.

10) **Theorem 4**

D and $E\in O$ do not exist that satisfy the following equation.

$$C(B(AX))= E\,(DX) \bmod q$$

where C,B,A,D and $E\in O$ have inverse and X is a variable.

A,B,C are non-associative, that is,

$$C(BA)\neq(CB)A \bmod q. \tag{25}$$

(*Proof*:)

If D and E exist, we have at $X=\mathbf{1}$

$$C(BA)=ED \bmod q \tag{26}$$

We have at $X=(ED)^{-1}=D^{-1}E^{-1} \bmod q$.

$$C(B(\mathrm{A}(D^{-1}E^{-1})))= E\,(D(D^{-1}E^{-1})) \bmod q=\mathbf{1},$$

$$(C(B(A(D^{-1}E^{-1})))^{-1} \bmod q=\mathbf{1},$$

$$((ED)A^{-1})B^{-1})C^{-1} \bmod q=\mathbf{1},$$

$$ED =(CB)A \bmod q. \tag{27}$$

From (26) and (27) we have

$$C(BA) =(CB)A \bmod q. \tag{28}$$

(28) is contradictory to (25). q.e.d.

11) **Theorem 5**

$D\in O$ does not exist that satisfies the following equation.

$$A(B(A^{-1}X))=DX \bmod q$$

where $B,A,D \in O$, A has inverse $A^{-1} \bmod q$ and X is a variable.

(*Proof*:)

If D exists, we have at $X=\mathbf{1}$

$$A(BA^{-1})=D \bmod q.$$

Then

$$A(B(A^{-1}X))=(A(BA^{-1}))X \bmod q. \tag{29}$$

We can select $C \in O$ such that

$$(BA^{-1})(CA^2) \neq ((BA^{-1})C)A^2 \bmod q. \tag{30}$$

That is, (BA^{-1}), C and A^2 are non-associative.

Substituing $X=CA$ in (29), we have

$$A(B(A^{-1}(CA)))=(A(BA^{-1}))(CA) \bmod q.$$

From **Lemma 1**

$$A(B((A^{-1}C)A)))=(A(BA^{-1}))(CA) \bmod q.$$

From (16)

$$A(B((A^{-1}C)A)))=A([(BA^{-1})C]A) \bmod q.$$

By multiplying A^{-1} from left side we have

$$B((A^{-1}C)A))= ((BA^{-1})C)A \bmod q.$$

From **Lemma 1**

$$B(A^{-1}(CA))=((BA^{-1})C)A \bmod q.$$

Transforming CA to $((CA^2)A^{-1})$, we have

$$B(A^{-1}((CA^2)A^{-1}))=((BA^{-1})C)A \bmod q.$$

From (14) we have

$$((BA^{-1})(CA^2))A^{-1}=((BA^{-1})C)A \bmod q.$$

Multiply A from right side we have

$$((BA^{-1})(CA^2)=((BA^{-1})C)A^2 \bmod q. \tag{31}$$

(31) is contradictory to (30). q.e.d.

§3. Proposed fully homomorphic public-key encryption scheme

Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption which allows specific types of computations to be carried out on ciphertext and obtain an encrypted result which decrypted matches the result of operations performed on the plaintext. For instance, one person could add two encrypted numbers and then another person could decrypt the result, without either of them being able to find the value of the individual numbers.

§3.1 Definition of homomorphic public-key encryption

A homomorphic public-key encryption scheme **HPKE** := (**KeyGen; Enc; Dec; Eval**) is a quadruple of PPT (Probabilistic polynomial time) algorithms.

In this work, the medium text space M_e of the encryption schemes will be octonion ring, and the functions to be evaluated will be represented as arithmetic circuits over this ring, composed of addition and multiplication gates. The syntax of these algorithms is given as follows.

-Key-Generation. The algorithm **KeyGen**, on input the security parameter 1^λ, outputs (**sk**) ← **KeyGen**(1^λ) , where **sk** is a secret encryption/decryption key.

-Encryption. The algorithm **Enc**, on input system parameter q, secret keys(**sk**) and a plaintext $p \in Fq$, outputs a ciphertext $C=({}^1C, {}^2C, {}^3C)$←**Enc**(**sk**; p).

-Decryption. The algorithm **Dec**, on input system parameter q, secret key(**sk**) and a ciphertext C, outputs a plaintext p^*←**Dec**(**sk**;C).

-Homomorphic-Evaluation. The algorithm **Eval**, on input system parameter q, an arithmetic circuit ckt, and a tuple of n ciphertexts $(C_1,\ldots, C_n)$, outputs a ciphertext C' ←**Eval**(ckt; $C_1,\ldots, C_n$).

§3.2 Definition of fully homomorphic public-key encryption

A scheme HPKE is fully homomorphic if it is both compact and homomorphic with respect to a class of circuits. More formally:

Definition (**Fully homomorphic public-key encryption**). A homomorphic encryption scheme FHPKE :=(**KeyGen; Enc; Dec; Eval**) is fully homomorphic if it satisfies the following properties:

1. Homomorphism: Let $CR = \{CR_\lambda\}_{\lambda\in N}$ be the set of all polynomial sized arithmetic circuits. On input **sk** ←**KeyGen**(1^λ), $\forall$ ckt $\in CR_\lambda$, $\forall(p_1,\ldots,p_n)\in Fq^n$ where $n = n(\lambda)$, $\forall(C_1,\ldots,C_n)$ where $C_i=({}^1C_i,{}^2C_i,{}^3C_i)\leftarrow$ **Enc**(**sk**;p_i), it holds that:

$$\Pr[\mathbf{Dec}(\mathbf{sk};\mathbf{Eval}(\mathrm{ckt};C_1,\ldots,C_n)) \neq \mathrm{ckt}(p_1,\ldots,p_n)] = \mathrm{negl}(\lambda).$$

2. Compactness: There exists a polynomial $\mu = \mu(\lambda)$ such that the output length of **Eval** is at most μ bits long regardless of the input circuit ckt and the number of its inputs.

§3.3 Medium text

We define the medium text $M(p):=\{{}^1M(p),{}^2M(p),{}^3M(p)\}\in O^3$ which is adopted in proposed fully homomorphic public-key encryption (FHPKE) scheme as follows.

We select the element $G=(g_0,g_1,\ldots,g_7)\in O$ and $H=(h_0,h_1,\ldots,h_7)\in O$ such that,

$$[G]_0=g_0=0 \bmod q,$$

$$[H]_0=h_0=0 \bmod q,$$

$$[GH]_0= [HG]_0=g_0h_0-(g_1h_1+g_2h_2+\ldots+ g_7h_7)=0 \bmod q ,$$

$$[HG]_1=-[GH]_1=h_2g_4+h_3g_7-h_4g_2+h_5g_6-h_6g_5-h_7g_3 \neq 0 \bmod q,$$

$$L_G:=|G|^2= g_0^2+g_1^2+\ldots+g_7^2\neq 0 \bmod q ,$$

$$L_H:=|H|^2= h_0^2+h_1^2+\ldots+h_7^2=0 \bmod q ,$$

$$G^2=-L_G\mathbf{1} \bmod q ,$$

$$H^2=0 \bmod q ,$$

where we denote the i-th element of octonion $M\in O$ such as $[M]_i$.

Theorem 6

$$GHG=L_GH \bmod q,$$

$$HGH=\mathbf{0} \bmod q,$$

$$HG+GH=\mathbf{0} \bmod q.$$

(*Proof*:)

Here proof is omitted and can be looked up in the **Appendix C**.

Theorem 7

$$(GH)(HG) = \mathbf{0} \bmod q, \tag{32a}$$

$$(HG)(GH) = \mathbf{0} \bmod q. \tag{32b}$$

(*Proof*:)

From (15)

$$(GH)(HG) = (G(HH))G = (G(\mathbf{0}))G = \mathbf{0} \bmod q,$$

$$(HG)(GH) = (H(GG))H = (H(-L_G\mathbf{1}))H$$

$$= (-L_G\mathbf{1})\, H\, H = \mathbf{0} \bmod q. \qquad \text{q.e.d.}$$

Table 1 gives the multiplication table of $\{\mathbf{1},G,H,GH\}$.

Table1. multiplication table of $\{\mathbf{1},G,H,GH\}$.

	1	***G***	***H***	***GH***
1	**1**	G	H	GH
G	G	$-L_G\mathbf{1}$	GH	$-L_GH$
H	H	$-GH$	**0**	**0**
GH	GH	L_GH	**0**	**0**

Let $p \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ be a plaintext and $u,v \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ be the sub-plaintexts such that

$$p = su + tv \bmod q \in \boldsymbol{Fq},$$

where $s,t \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ are the secret constant parameters such that

$$GCD(s,q)=1 \text{ and } GCD(t,q)=1.$$

Let ${}^{i}w,{}^{i}y,{}^{i}z \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$(i=1,2,3) be random numbers.

We define the medium text $M(p)$ corresponding to the plaintext p by

$$M(p) := \{{}^{1}M(p), {}^{2}M(p), {}^{3}M(p)\} \in O^{3}$$

$${}^{1}M(p) := {}^{1}ku\mathbf{1} + {}^{1}lvG + {}^{1}wH + {}^{1}yGH \in O,$$

$^{2}M(p):= {}^{2}ku\mathbf{1}+{}^{2}lvG+{}^{2}wH+{}^{2}yGH\in O,$

$^{3}M(p):= {}^{3}ku\mathbf{1}+{}^{3}lvG+{}^{3}wH+{}^{3}yGH\in O,$

where

$^{i}k,{}^{i}l\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ are the secret constant parameters such that

$GCD\ ({}^{i}k,q)=1$ and $GCD\ ({}^{i}l,q)=1$ (i=1,2,3).

$p= su+tv \bmod q\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$

$=\alpha[{}^{1}M(p)]_0 +\beta[{}^{2}M(p)]_0 +\gamma[{}^{3}M(p)]_0$

$+\alpha[H({}^{1}M(p)-[{}^{1}M(p)]_0\mathbf{1})]_1 +\beta[H({}^{2}M(p)-[{}^{2}M(p)]_0\mathbf{1})]_1$

$+\gamma[H({}^{3}M(p)-[{}^{3}M(p)]_0\mathbf{1})]_1 \bmod q,$

$=(\alpha({}^{1}k) +\beta({}^{2}k)+\gamma\,({}^{3}k))u+(\ \alpha({}^{1}l)+\beta\,({}^{2}l)+\gamma\,({}^{3}l\,))[\ GH]_1v \bmod q,$

where $\gamma\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ is a random number and $\alpha,\beta\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ satisfy the following equations,

$$\begin{cases} (\alpha({}^{1}k) +\beta({}^{2}k)+\gamma\,({}^{3}k)) =s \bmod q, & \text{(33a)} \\ (\ \alpha({}^{1}l)+\beta\,({}^{2}l)+\gamma\,({}^{3}l\,))=t\,/[GH]_1 \bmod q, & \text{(33b)} \end{cases}$$

and $^{1}k,{}^{2}k,\ {}^{1}l$ and ^{2}l satisfy

$$GCD\ ({}^{1}k\,{}^{2}l-\,{}^{2}k\,{}^{1}l,\ q)=1 \bmod q. \tag{33c}$$

(Associativity of medium texts)

Let $M(p_1)=\{{}^{1}M(p_1),{}^{2}M(p_1),{}^{3}M(p_1)\}\in O^3$, $M(p_2)=\{{}^{1}M(p_2),{}^{2}M(p_2),{}^{3}M(p_2)\}\in O^3$ and $M(p_3)=\{{}^{1}M(p_3),{}^{2}M(p_3),{}^{3}M(p_3)\}\in O^3$ be arbitrary three medium texts where

$^{1}M(p_1):={}^{1}ku_1\,\mathbf{1}+{}^{1}lv_1G+{}^{1}w_1H+{}^{1}y_1GH \bmod q\in O,$

$^{2}M(p_1):= {}^{2}ku_1\,\mathbf{1}+{}^{2}lv_1G+{}^{2}w_1H+{}^{2}y_1GH \bmod q\in O,$

$^{3}M(p_1):= {}^{3}ku_1\,\mathbf{1}+{}^{3}lv_1G+{}^{3}w_1H+{}^{3}y_1GH \bmod q\in O,$

$^{1}M(p_2):={}^{1}ku_2\,\mathbf{1}+ {}^{1}lv_2G+{}^{1}w_2H+{}^{1}y_2GH \bmod q\in O,$

$^{2}M(p_2):= {}^{2}ku_2\,\mathbf{1}+{}^{2}lv_2\,G+{}^{2}w_2H+{}^{2}y_2GH \bmod q\in O,$

$^{3}M(p_2):= {}^{3}ku_2\,\mathbf{1}+{}^{3}lv_2\,G+{}^{3}w_2H+{}^{3}y_2GH \bmod q\in O,$

$^{1}M(p_3):={}^{1}ku_3\,\mathbf{1}+ {}^{1}lv_3G+{}^{1}w_3H+{}^{1}y_3GH \bmod q\in O,$

$^{2}M(p_3):= {}^{2}ku_3\,\mathbf{1}+{}^{2}lv_3G+{}^{2}w_3H+{}^{2}y_3GH \bmod q\in O,$

$$^3M(p_3):={}^3ku_3\,\mathbf{1}+{}^3lv_3\,G+{}^3w_3H+{}^3y_3GH \bmod q\in O.$$

As a set $\{\mathbf{1},G,H,GH\}$ has an associative property on multiplication,

for example,

$$H(G(GH))= H(-L_GH) = -L_GH^2=\mathbf{0} \bmod q$$

$$(HG)(GH) = -(GH)(GH) =\mathbf{0}= H(G(GH)) \bmod q,$$

we have that

$$({}^iM(p_1)\,{}^iM(p_2))\,{}^iM(p_3)= {}^iM(p_1)({}^iM(p_2)\,{}^iM(p_3)) \bmod q \text{(i=1,2,3)}.$$

But we notice that in general for arbitrary $N\in O$,

$$({}^iM(p_1)\,{}^iM(p_2))N \neq {}^iM(p_1)\,({}^iM(p_2)N) \bmod q.$$

That is, it is said that

though in general for arbitrary $N\in O$

$${}^iM(p_1)\,\mathbf{(}{}^iM(p_2)\mathbf{(}\ldots\mathbf{(}{}^iM(p_k)N\mathbf{)}\ldots\mathbf{))} \neq {}^iM(p_1)\mathbf{(}{}^iM(p_2)\mathbf{(}\ldots\mathbf{(}{}^iM(p_{k-1})\,{}^iM(p_k)\mathbf{)}\ldots\mathbf{))}N \bmod q \text{ (i=1,2,3)},$$

${}^iM(p_1),{}^iM(p_2),\ldots,{}^iM(p_{k-1})$ and ${}^iM(p_k)$ have the associative property such that

$${}^iM(p_1)\mathbf{(\ldots(}{}^iM(p_{k-1})\,{}^iM(p_k)\mathbf{)\ldots))}= {}^iM(p_1)\ldots{}^iM(p_{k-1})\,{}^iM(p_k) \bmod q \text{ (i=1,2,3)}.$$

§3.4 Proposed fully homomorphic public-key encyption

We propose a fully homomorphic public-key encryption (FHPKE) scheme on octonion ring over $\boldsymbol{Fq}$.

Here we define some parameters for describing FHPKE.
Let q be as a large prime as $O(2^{2000})$.
We select the element $G=(g_0,g_1,\ldots,g_7)\in O$ and $H=(h_0,h_1,\ldots,h_7)\in O$ such as defined in section **§3.3 Medium text**.

Let $p\in\boldsymbol{Fq}$ be a plaintext and $u,v\in\boldsymbol{Fq}$ be the sub-plaintexts such that

$$p=su+tv \bmod q\in\boldsymbol{Fq}.$$

Let $M(p)=\{({}^1M(p),{}^2M(p),{}^3M(p)\}\in O^3$ be the medium text where

$$^1M(p):= {}^1ku\mathbf{1}+{}^1lvG+{}^1wH+{}^1yGH\in O,$$

$$^2M(p):= {}^2ku\mathbf{1}+{}^2lvG+{}^2wH+{}^2yGH\in O,$$

$$^3M(p):= {}^3ku\mathbf{1}+{}^3lvG+{}^3wH+{}^3yGH\in O,$$

$p = su+tv \bmod q \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$

$= \alpha[{}^1M(p)]_0 + \beta[{}^2M(p)]_0 + \gamma[{}^3M(p)]_0$

$+ \alpha[H({}^1M(p)-[{}^1M(p)]_0\mathbf{1})]_1 + \beta[H({}^2M(p)-[{}^2M(p)]_0\mathbf{1})]_1$

$+ \gamma[H({}^3M(p)-[{}^3M(p)]_0\mathbf{1})]_1 \bmod q,$

$= (\alpha({}^1k) + \beta({}^2k) + \gamma({}^3k))u + (\alpha({}^1l) + \beta({}^2l) + \gamma({}^3l))[GH]_1 v \bmod q.$

Basic enciphering function $E(X,Y)$ is defined as follows.

Let $X=(x_0,\dots,x_7)\in O[X]$ and $Y=(y_0,\dots,y_7)\in O[X]$ be variables.

$$E(X,Y) := A_1(\dots(A_h(Y(A_h^{-1}(\dots(A_1^{-1}X)\dots))))\dots) \bmod q \in O[X,Y] \quad (34)$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= (e_{000}x_0y_0 + e_{001}x_0y_1 + \dots + e_{077}x_7y_7, \\ &\quad e_{100}x_0y_0 + e_{101}x_0y_1 + \dots + e_{177}x_7y_7, \\ &\quad \dots\dots \quad \dots\dots \\ &\quad e_{700}x_0y_0 + e_{701}x_0y_1 + \dots + e_{777}x_7y_7)^t, \end{aligned} \quad (35)$$

$$= \{e_{ijk}\}(i,j,k=0,\dots,7) \quad (36)$$

with $e_{ijk}\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ $(i,j,k=0,\dots,7)$ which is published in system centre.

$A_i\in O$ is selected randomly such that A_i^{-1} exists $(i=1,\dots,h)$ which is the secret key of user A.

As if $Y=\mathbf{1}$, then $E(X,Y)=X$, some e_{ijk} are fixed such that

$e_{000}=1, e_{010}=0, \dots, e_{070}=0,$

$e_{100}=0, e_{110}=1, \dots, e_{170}=0,$

$\dots \quad \dots$

$e_{700}=0, e_{710}=0, \dots, e_{770}=1.$

§3.5 Addition and multiplication of $E(X,Y)$

Let $M(p_1)=\{{}^1M(p),{}^2M(p),{}^3M(p)\}$ and $M(p_2)=\{{}^1M(p),{}^2M(p),{}^3M(p)\}$ be the medium texts corresponding to the plaintexts p_1 and p_2 ,respectively.

We define the addition and multiplication on ${}^iE(X,Y)$ (i=1,2,3) as follows.

[Addition]

$E(X,{}^iM(p_1)) + E(X,{}^iM(p_2)) \bmod q$

$= A_1(\dots(A_h({}^iM(p_1)(A_h^{-1}(\dots(A_1^{-1}X)\dots))))\dots) + A_1(\dots(A_h({}^iM(p_2)(A_h^{-1}(\dots(A_1^{-1}X)\dots))))\dots)$

$= A_1(\ldots(A_h([{}^{i}M(p_1)+ {}^{i}M(p_2)](A_h^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)\bmod q$

$= E(X,{}^{i}M(p_1)+{}^{i}M(p_2)) \bmod q$ (i=1,2,3).

[Multiplication]

$E(E(X,{}^{i}M(p_2)),{}^{i}M(p_1)) \bmod q$

$=A_1(\ldots(A_h({}^{i}M(p_1)(A_h^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}[A_1(\ldots(A_h({}^{i}M(p_2)(A_h^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)])\ldots))))\ldots)$

$=A_1(\ldots(A_h({}^{i}M(p_1)(({}^{i}M(p_2)(A_h^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots) \bmod q$ (i=1,2,3).

We denote $E(E(X,{}^{i}M(p_2)),{}^{i}M(p_1))$ by $E(X,{}^{i}M(p_1)<{}^{i}M(p_2))$.
We notice that in general

$E(X,M(p_1)M(p_2)) =A_1(\ldots(A_h([M(p_1)M(p_2)](A_h^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots) \bmod q$

$\neq A_1(\ldots(A_h(M(p_1)(M(p_2)(A_h^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots)))))\ldots) \bmod q=E(X,{}^{i}M(p_1)<{}^{i}M(p_2))$

(i=1,2,3).

Theorem 8

For arbitrary $p,p'\in O$,

if $E(X, {}^{i}M(p))= E(X, {}^{i}M(p')) \bmod q$(i=1,2,3) , then $p= p' \bmod q$,

where

$p:=su+tv \bmod q$,

$M(p):=({}^{1}M(p),{}^{2}M(p),{}^{3}M(p))\in O^3$,

${}^{1}M(p):= {}^{1}ku\mathbf{1}+{}^{1}lvG+{}^{1}wH+{}^{1}yGH\in O$,

${}^{2}M(p):= {}^{2}ku\mathbf{1}+{}^{2}lvG+{}^{2}wH+{}^{2}yGH\in O$,

${}^{3}M(p):= {}^{3}ku\mathbf{1}+{}^{3}lvG+{}^{3}wH+{}^{3}yGH\in O$,

$p':=su'+tv' \bmod q$,

$M(p'):=({}^{1}M(p'),{}^{2}M(p'),{}^{3}M(p'))\in O^3$,

${}^{1}M(p'):= {}^{1}ku'\mathbf{1}+{}^{1}lv'G+{}^{1}w'H+{}^{1}y'GH\in O$,

${}^{2}M(p'):= {}^{2}ku'\mathbf{1}+{}^{2}lv'G+{}^{2}w'H+{}^{2}y'GH\in O$,

${}^{3}M(p'):= {}^{3}ku'\mathbf{1}+{}^{3}lv'G+{}^{3}w'H+{}^{3}y'GH\in O$.

(*Proof*)

If $E(X, {}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p))= E(X, {}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p'))$ mod q , then

$$A_h^{-1}(...(A_1^{-1}(E(A_1(\ldots(A_h\,\mathbf{1})\ldots)),{}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p)) \bmod q={}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p)$$

$$=A_h^{-1}(...(A_1^{-1}(E(A_1(\ldots(A_h\,\mathbf{1})\ldots)),{}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p')) \bmod q={}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p')\ (\mathrm{i}=1,2,3) \bmod q.$$

Then we have

$${}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p)={}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p')\ (\mathrm{i}=1,2,3).$$

$$p=\alpha[{}^{1}M(p)]_0+\beta[{}^{2}M(p)]_0+\gamma[{}^{3}M(p)]_0$$
$$+\alpha[({}^{1}M(p)-[{}^{1}M(p)]_0\mathbf{1})H]_1+\beta[({}^{2}M(p)-[{}^{2}M(p)]_0\mathbf{1})H]_1$$
$$+\gamma[({}^{3}M(p)-[{}^{3}M(p)]_0\mathbf{1})H]_1 \bmod q,$$
$$=\alpha[{}^{1}M(p')]_0+\beta[{}^{2}M(p')]_0+\gamma[{}^{3}M(p')]_0$$
$$+\alpha[({}^{1}M(p')-[{}^{1}M(p')]_0\mathbf{1})H]_1+\beta[({}^{2}M(p')-[{}^{2}M(p')]_0\mathbf{1})H]_1$$
$$+\gamma[({}^{3}M(p')-[{}^{3}M(p')]_0\mathbf{1})H]_1 \bmod q,$$
$$=p' \bmod q,$$

Then we have

$$p=p' \bmod q. \qquad \text{q.e.d.}$$

§3.6 Octonion elements assumption OEA(q)

Here we describe the assumption on which the proposed scheme bases.

Octonion Elements assumption OEA(q)

Let q be a prime more than 2. Let h be a secret integer parameter. Let $\boldsymbol{A}:=\{A_1,\ldots,A_h\}\in O^h$ be secret parameters. Let $E(X,Y)=A_1(\ldots(A_h(Y(A_h^{-1}(...(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots) \bmod q\in O[X,Y]$ be the basic enciphering function where X and Y are variables.

In the **OEA**(q) assumption, the adversary $\mathrm{A_d}$ is given $E(X,Y)$ and his goal is to find a set of parameters $\boldsymbol{A}=\{A_1,\ldots,A_h\}\in O^h$ with the order of the elements $A_1,\ldots, A_h$. For parameters $h = h(\lambda)$ defined in terms of the security parameter λ and for any PPT adversary $\mathrm{A_d}$ we have

$$\Pr\,[A_1(\ldots(A_h(Y(A_h^{-1}(...(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots) \bmod q=\{e_{ijk}\}(i,j,k=0,\ldots,7): \boldsymbol{A}=\{A_1,\ldots,A_h\}\leftarrow \mathrm{A_d}(1^{\lambda},q,E(X,Y))]=\mathrm{negl}(\lambda).$$

To solve directly **OEA**(q) assumption is known to be the problem for solving the multivariate algebraic equations of high degree which is known to be NP-hard.

Next it is shown that the ciphertext $C(X,p)=\{E(X,{}^{1}M(p)), E(X,{}^{2}M(p)),E(X,{}^{3}M(p))\}$

corresponding to the plaintexts p has the property of fully homomorphism.

§3.7 Addition scheme on ciphertexts

Let

$$M(p_1):=\{{}^1M(p_1),{}^2M(p_1),{}^3M(p_1)\}\in O^{\,3},$$

$${}^1M(p_1):= {}^1ku_1\mathbf{1}+{}^1lv_1G+{}^1w_1H+{}^1y_1GH\in O,$$

$${}^2M(p_1):= {}^2ku_1\mathbf{1}+{}^2lv_1G+{}^2w_1H+{}^2y_1GH\in O,$$

$${}^3M(p_1):= {}^3ku_1\mathbf{1}+{}^3lv_1G+{}^3w_1H+{}^3y_1GH\in O,$$

$$M(p_2):=({}^1M(p_2),{}^2M(p_2),{}^3M(p_2))\in O^{\,3},$$

$${}^1M(p_2):= {}^1ku_2\mathbf{1}+{}^1lv_2G+{}^1w_2H+{}^1y_2GH\in O,$$

$${}^2M(p_2):= {}^2ku_2\mathbf{1}+{}^2lv_2G+{}^2w_2H+{}^2y_2GH\in O,$$

$${}^3M(p_2):= {}^3ku_2\mathbf{1}+{}^3lv_2G+{}^3w_2H+{}^3y_2GH\in O,$$

be medium texts to be encrypted where

$$p_1:=(su_1+ tv_1) \bmod q,$$

$$p_2:=(su_2+tv_2) \bmod q.$$

Let $C(X,p_1):=\{E(X,{}^1M(p_1)), E(X,{}^2M(p_1)), E(X,{}^3M(p_1))\}\in\{O[X]\}^3$ and

$C(X,p_2)=\{E(X,{}^1M(p_2)), E(X,{}^2M(p_2)), E(X,{}^3M(p_2))\}\in\{O[X]\}^3$ be the ciphertexts corresponding to the plaintexts p_1 and p_2 , respectively.

$$C(X,p_1)+C(X,p_2) \bmod q$$

$$:=(E(X,{}^1M(p_1))+E(X,{}^1M(p_2)),E(X,{}^2M(p_1))+E(X,{}^2M(p_2)),E(X,{}^3M(p_1))+E(X,{}^3M(p_2))).$$

$$E(X,{}^iM(p_1))+ E(X,{}^iM(p_2))$$

$$=A_1(\ldots(A_h(M_1{}^i(A_h{}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1{}^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)+A_1(\ldots(A_h({}^iM_2(A_h{}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1{}^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots) \bmod q$$

$$= A_1(\ldots(A_h([{}^iM(p_1)+{}^iM(p_2)](A_h{}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1{}^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots) \bmod q$$

$$=A_1(\ldots(A_h([{}^iku_1\mathbf{1}+{}^ilv_1G+{}^iw_1H+{}^iy_1GH+{}^iku_2\mathbf{1}+{}^ilv_2G+{}^iw_2H+{}^iy_2GH](A_h{}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1{}^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots) \bmod q$$

$$=A_1(\ldots(A_h([{}^ik(u_1+u_2)\mathbf{1}+{}^il(v_1+v_2)G+({}^iw_1+{}^iw_2)H+({}^iy_1+{}^iy_2)GH](A_h{}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1{}^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots) \bmod q$$

$$= A_1(\ldots(A_h([{}^iM(p_1+p_2)](A_h{}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1{}^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots) \bmod q$$

$= E(X, {}^{i}M(p_1+ p_2)) \bmod q$ (i=1,2,3).

We have

$$C(X,p_1)+C(X,p_2) = C(X,p_1+p_2) \bmod q.$$

It has been shown that in this method we have the additive homomorphism.

§3.8 Multiplication scheme on ciphertexts

§3.8.1 Expanded medium text and expanded plaintext

We define ${}^{1}M(p_{12})$, ${}^{2}M(p_{12})$ and ${}^{3}M(p_{12})$ as expanded medium texts as follows.

$$\begin{aligned}{}^{1}M(p_{12}) &:= d_{11}{}^{1}M(p_1){}^{1}M(p_2)+ d_{12}{}^{2}M(p_1){}^{2}M(p_2)+ d_{13}{}^{3}M(p_1){}^{3}M(p_2) \bmod q \qquad (37a)\\ &=[d_{11}({}^{1}k)^2 + d_{12}({}^{2}k)^2+ d_{13}({}^{3}k)^2]u_1u_2\mathbf{1}+\\ &\quad [d_{11}{}^{1}k{}^{1}l + d_{12}{}^{2}k{}^{2}l + d_{13}{}^{3}k{}^{3}l](u_1v_2+v_1u_2)G+\\ &\quad [d_{11}({}^{1}l)^2+ d_{12}\,({}^{2}l)^2+ d_{13}({}^{3}l)^2]v_1v_2G^2 +{}^{1}\mathrm{F}(H,GH) \bmod q\\ &=\{[d_{11}({}^{1}k)^2 + d_{12}({}^{2}k)^2+ d_{13}({}^{3}k)^2]u_1u_2- L_G[d_{11}({}^{1}l)^2+ d_{12}\,({}^{2}l)^2+ d_{13}({}^{3}l)^2]v_1v_2\}\mathbf{1}+\\ &\quad \{[d_{11}{}^{1}k{}^{1}l + d_{12}{}^{2}k{}^{2}l + d_{13}{}^{3}k{}^{3}l](u_1v_2+v_1u_2)\}G +{}^{1}\mathrm{F}(H,GH) \bmod q\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}{}^{2}M(p_{12}) &: =d_{21}{}^{1}M(p_1){}^{1}M(p_2)+ d_{22}{}^{2}M(p_1){}^{2}M(p_2)+ d_{23}{}^{3}M(p_1){}^{3}M(p_2) \bmod q \qquad (37b)\\ &=\{[d_{21}({}^{1}k)^2 + d_{22}({}^{2}k)^2+ d_{23}({}^{3}k)^2]u_1u_2- L_G[d_{21}({}^{1}l)^2+ d_{22}\,({}^{2}l)^2+ d_{23}({}^{3}l)^2]v_1v_2\}\mathbf{1}+\\ &\quad \{[d_{21}{}^{1}k{}^{1}l + d_{22}{}^{2}k{}^{2}l + d_{23}{}^{3}k{}^{3}l](u_1v_2+v_1u_2)\}G +{}^{2}\mathrm{F}(H,GH) \bmod q.\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}{}^{3}M(p_{12}) &: =d_{31}{}^{1}M(p_1){}^{1}M(p_2)+ d_{32}{}^{2}M(p_1){}^{2}M(p_2)+ d_{33}{}^{3}M(p_1){}^{3}M(p_2) \bmod q \qquad (37c)\\ &=\{[d_{31}({}^{1}k)^2 + d_{32}({}^{2}k)^2+ d_{33}({}^{3}k)^2]u_1u_2- L_G[d_{31}({}^{1}l)^2+ d_{32}\,({}^{2}l)^2+ d_{33}({}^{3}l)^2]v_1v_2\}\mathbf{1}+\\ &\quad \{[d_{31}({}^{1}k{}^{1}l)+ d_{32}({}^{2}k{}^{2}l)+ d_{33}({}^{3}k{}^{3}l)](u_1v_2+v_1u_2)\}G +{}^{3}\mathrm{F}(H,GH) \bmod q\end{aligned}$$

where

${}^{i}\mathrm{F}(H,GH)$ is the linear combination of H and GH over Fq (i=1,2,3).

We define u_{12}, v_{12} as expanded sub-plaintexts and p_{12} as expanded plaintext as follows.

$$u_{12}:= su_1u_2 +(t^2/s)v_1v_2 \bmod q\in \boldsymbol{Fq} \qquad (38a)$$

$$v_{12}:= s(u_1v_2 + u_2v_1) \bmod q\in \boldsymbol{Fq} \qquad (38b)$$

p_{12}:= $su_{12}+tv_{12}$ mod $q \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$. (38c)

We select (d_{ij}) that satisfy the following equations.

$^1M(p_{12})= d_{11}{}^1M(p_1)^1M(p_2)+ d_{12}{}^2M(p_1)^2M(p_2)+ d_{13}{}^3M(p_1)^3M(p_2)$ mod q

$={}^1ku_{12}\,\mathbf{1}+{}^1lv_{12}G+{}^1\mathrm{F}(H,GH)$ mod q

$={}^1k(su_1u_2+(t^2/s)v_1v_2)\mathbf{1}+{}^1ls(u_1v_2+u_2v_1)G+{}^1\mathrm{F}(H,GH)$ mod $q \in O$

$^2M(p_{12})= d_{21}{}^1M(p_1)^1M(p_2)+ d_{22}{}^2M(p_1)^2M(p_2)+ d_{23}{}^3M(p_1)^3M(p_2)$ mod q

$={}^2ku_{12}\,\mathbf{1}+{}^2lv_{12}G+{}^2\mathrm{F}(H,GH)$ mod q

$={}^2k(su_1u_2+(t^2/s)v_1v_2)\mathbf{1}+{}^2l\,s(u_1v_2+u_2v_1)G+{}^2\mathrm{F}(H,GH)$ mod $q \in O$

$^3M(p_{12})$:= $d_{31}{}^1M(p_1)^1M(p_2)+ d_{32}{}^2M(p_1)^2M(p_2)+ d_{33}{}^3M(p_1)^3M(p_2)$ mod q

$={}^3ku_{12}\,\mathbf{1}+{}^3lv_{12}G+{}^3\mathrm{F}(H,GH)$ mod q.

$={}^3k(su_1u_2+(t^2/s)v_1v_2)\mathbf{1}+{}^3ls(u_1v_2+u_2v_1)G+{}^3\mathrm{F}(H,GH)$ mod $q \in O$.

Then we have the following equations which a part of the public parameters, (d_{ij}) has to satisfy.

$$\begin{cases} d_{11}({}^1k)^2 + d_{12}({}^2k)^2+ d_{13}({}^3k)^2={}^1k\,s \bmod q \in \boldsymbol{Fq} \\ d_{11}({}^1l)^2+ d_{12}({}^2l)^2+ d_{13}({}^3l)^2={}^1k\,(t^2/s)/(-L_G) \bmod q \in \boldsymbol{Fq} \\ d_{11}({}^1k{}^1l) + d_{12}({}^2k{}^2l)+ d_{13}({}^3k{}^3l)={}^1l\,s \bmod q \in \boldsymbol{Fq} \end{cases} \tag{39a}$$

$$\begin{cases} d_{21}({}^1k)^2 + d_{22}({}^2k)^2+ d_{23}({}^3k)^2={}^2k\,s \bmod q \in \boldsymbol{Fq} \\ d_{21}({}^1l)^2+ d_{22}({}^2l)^2+ d_{23}({}^3l)^2={}^2k\,(t^2/s)/(-L_G) \bmod q \in \boldsymbol{Fq} \\ d_{21}({}^1k{}^1l)+ d_{22}({}^2k{}^2l)+ d_{23}({}^3k{}^3l)={}^2l\,s \bmod q \in \boldsymbol{Fq} \end{cases} \tag{39b}$$

$$\begin{cases} d_{31}({}^1k)^2 + d_{32}({}^2k)^2+ d_{33}({}^3k)^2={}^3k\,s \bmod q \in \boldsymbol{Fq} \\ d_{31}({}^1l)^2+ d_{32}({}^2l)^2+ d_{33}({}^3l)^2={}^3k\,(t^2/s)/(-L_G) \bmod q \in \boldsymbol{Fq} \\ d_{31}({}^1k{}^1l) + d_{32}({}^2k{}^2l) + d_{33}({}^3k{}^3l) ={}^3l\,s \bmod q \in \boldsymbol{Fq} \end{cases} \tag{39c}$$

where ${}^ik,{}^il$ (i=1,2,3) satisfy

GCD(Δ , q) = 1

where

$$\Delta = \begin{vmatrix} ({}^1k)^2 & ({}^2k)^2 & ({}^3k)^2 \\ ({}^1l)^2 & ({}^2l)^2 & ({}^3l)^2 \\ {}^1k\,{}^1l & {}^2k\,{}^2l & {}^3k\,{}^3l \end{vmatrix}.$$

Here we will show that

$$p_{12} = p_1p_2 \bmod q$$

$$=\alpha[{}^1M(p_{12})]_0+\beta[{}^2M(p_{12})]_0+\gamma[{}^3M(p_{12})]_0$$

$$+\alpha[\,({}^1M(p_{12})-[{}^1M(p_{12})]_0\mathbf{1})\,H]_1+\beta[\,({}^2M(p_{12})-[{}^2M(p_{12})]_0\mathbf{1})\,H]_1$$

$$+\gamma[\,({}^3M(p_{12})-[{}^3M(p_{12})]_0\mathbf{1})\,H]_1 \bmod q\in \boldsymbol{Fq}.$$

From (38c), (38a) and (38b) we have

$$p_{12}= su_{12}+tv_{12} \bmod q$$

$$= s(su_1u_2 +(t^2/s)v_1v_2)+ts(u_1v_2 + u_2v_1)$$

$$= (su_1+ tv_1)\,(su_2 + tv_2)$$

$$= p_1p_2 \bmod q\in \boldsymbol{Fq}.$$

On the other hand we have from (38c), (38a), (38b) ,(33a), (33b) ,(39a),(39b) and (39c)

$$p_{12}= su_{12}+tv_{12} \bmod q$$

$$=(\alpha({}^1k) +\beta({}^2k)+\gamma\,({}^3k))\,(su_1u_2+(t^2/s)v_1v_2)+(\,\alpha({}^1l) +\beta\,({}^2l)+\gamma\,({}^3l\,))[GH]_1\,(s(u_1v_2 + u_2v_1))$$

$$=\alpha[({}^1k)\,su_1u_2+({}^1k)\,(t^2/s)v_1v_2)] +\beta[({}^2k)\,su_1u_2+({}^2k)\,(t^2/s)v_1v_2)]+\gamma[({}^3k)su_1u_2+({}^3k)(t^2/s)v_1v_2)]$$

$$+\alpha[({}^1l)s[GH]_1\,(u_1v_2 + u_2v_1)]+\beta[\,({}^2l)s[GH]_1(u_1v_2 + u_2v_1)]+\gamma\,[({}^3l\,)s[GH]_1(u_1v_2 + u_2v_1)])$$

$$=\alpha[(d_{11}({}^1k)^2 + d_{12}({}^2k)^2+ d_{13}({}^3k)^2)\,u_1u_2- L_G(\,d_{11}({}^1l)^2+ d_{12}\,({}^2l)^2+ d_{13}({}^3l)^2)v_1v_2)]$$

$$+\beta[(d_{21}({}^1k)^2 + d_{22}({}^2k)^2+ d_{23}({}^3k)^2)\,u_1u_2- L_G(d_{21}({}^1l)^2+ d_{22}\,({}^2l)^2+ d_{23}({}^3l)^2)v_1v_2)]$$

$$+\gamma[(d_{31}({}^1k)^2 + d_{32}({}^2k)^2+ d_{33}({}^3k)^2)u_1u_2- L_G(d_{31}({}^1l)^2+ d_{32}\,({}^2l)^2+ d_{33}({}^3l)^2)v_1v_2)]$$

$$+\alpha[(d_{11}({}^1k{}^1l) + d_{12}({}^2k{}^2l\,)+ d_{13}({}^3k{}^3l))\,[GH]_1\,(u_1v_2 + u_2v_1)]$$

$$+\beta[\,(d_{21}({}^1k{}^1l\,)+ d_{22}({}^2k{}^2l\,)+ d_{23}({}^3k{}^3l))\,[GH]_1\,(u_1v_2 + u_2v_1)]$$

$+\gamma\,[(d_{31}({}^1k^1l) + d_{32}({}^2k^2l) + d_{33}({}^3k^3l))\,[GH]_1\,(u_1v_2 + u_2v_1)]$

$=\alpha[{}^1M(p_{12})]_0+\beta[{}^2M(p_{12})]_0+\gamma[{}^3M(p_{12})]_0$

$+\alpha[\,({}^1M(p_{12})-[{}^1M(p_{12})]_0\mathbf{1})\,H]_1$

$+\beta[\,({}^2M(p_{12})-[{}^2M(p_{12})]_0\mathbf{1})\,H]_1$

$+\gamma[\,({}^3M(p_{12})-[{}^3M(p_{12})]_0\mathbf{1})\,H]_1 \bmod q\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$.□

We can consider that a set of expanded medium texts, $\{{}^1M(p_{12}), {}^2M(p_{12}), {}^3M(p_{12})\}$ is the medium text of the expanded plaintext $p_{12}(= p_1p_2 \bmod q)$.

We have shown that we can obtain the plaintext p_1p_2 from $\{{}^1M(p_{12}), {}^2M(p_{12}), {}^3M(p_{12})\}$.

§3.8.2 Non-associativity of expanded medium texts

We can show easely that

$${}^iM(p_{(12)3})\neq {}^iM(p_{1(23)}) \bmod q\in O \text{ (i=1,2,3)}$$

where

$$p_{(12)3} = (p_1p_2)\,p_3=p_1p_2p_3=p_1(p_2p_3)=p_{1(23)} \bmod q\in \boldsymbol{Fq}.$$

Let

$${}^1M(p_{12}):=d_{11}{}^1M(p_1){}^1M(p_2)+ d_{12}{}^2M(p_1){}^2M(p_2)+ d_{13}{}^3M(p_1){}^3M(p_2) \bmod q\in O,$$

$${}^2M(p_{12}): =d_{21}{}^1M(p_1){}^1M(p_2)+ d_{22}{}^2M(p_1){}^2M(p_2)+ d_{23}{}^3M(p_1){}^3M(p_2) \bmod q\in O,$$

$${}^3M(p_{12}): =d_{31}{}^1M(p_1){}^1M(p_2)+ d_{32}{}^2M(p_1){}^2M(p_2)+ d_{33}{}^3M(p_1){}^3M(p_2) \bmod q\in O.$$

We calculate ${}^1M(p_{(12)3})$ and ${}^1M(p_{1(23)})$ as follows.

$${}^1M(p_{(12)3})\in O$$

$$:= d_{11}{}^1M(p_{12}){}^1M(p_3)+ d_{12}{}^2M(p_{12}){}^2M(p_3)+ d_{13}{}^3M(p_{12}){}^3M(p_3) \bmod q$$

$$= d_{11}(d_{11}{}^1M(p_1){}^1M(p_2)+ d_{12}{}^2M(p_1){}^2M(p_2)+ d_{13}{}^3M(p_1){}^3M(p_2)){}^1M(p_3)$$

$$+d_{12}(d_{21}{}^1M(p_1){}^1M(p_2)+ d_{22}{}^2M(p_1){}^2M(p_2)+ d_{23}{}^3M(p_1){}^3M(p_2)){}^2M(p_3)$$

$$+d_{13}(d_{31}{}^1M(p_1){}^1M(p_2)+ d_{32}{}^2M(p_1){}^2M(p_2)+ d_{33}{}^3M(p_1){}^3M(p_2)){}^3M(p_2) \bmod q$$

$$= d_{11}d_{11}{}^1M(p_1)\,{}^1M(p_2)\,{}^1M(p_3)+ d_{11}\,d_{12}\,{}^2M(p_1)\,{}^2M(p_2)\,{}^1M(p_3)$$

$$+ d_{11}d_{13}\,{}^3M(p_1)\,{}^3M(p_2)\,{}^1M(p_3)+ d_{12}d_{21}{}^1M(p_1){}^1M(p_2)\,{}^2M(p_3)$$

$+ d_{12}d_{22}{}^{2}M(p_1){}^{2}M(p_2)\,{}^{2}M(p_3) + d_{12}d_{23}{}^{3}M(p_1){}^{3}M(p_2){}^{2}M(p_3)$

$+d_{13}d_{31}{}^{1}M(p_1){}^{1}M(p_2)\,{}^{3}M(p_3)+ d_{13}d_{32}{}^{2}M(p_1){}^{2}M(p_2)\,{}^{3}M(p_3)$

$+ d_{13}d_{33}{}^{3}M(p_1){}^{3}M(p_2){}^{3}M(p_3) \bmod q\in O.$

${}^{1}M(p_{1(23)})\in O$

$:= d_{11}{}^{1}M(p_1){}^{1}M(p_{23})+ d_{12}{}^{2}M(p_1){}^{2}M(p_{23})+ d_{13}{}^{3}M(p_1){}^{3}M(p_{23}) \bmod q$

$= d_{11}{}^{1}M(p_1)\,(d_{11}{}^{1}M(p_2){}^{1}M(p_3)+ d_{12}{}^{2}M(p_2){}^{2}M(p_3)+ d_{13}{}^{3}M(p_2){}^{3}M(p_3))$

$+d_{12}{}^{2}M(p_1)\,(d_{21}{}^{1}M(p_2){}^{1}M(p_3)+ d_{22}{}^{2}M(p_2){}^{2}M(p_3)+ d_{23}{}^{3}M(p_2){}^{3}M(p_3))$

$+d_{13}{}^{3}M(p_1)\,(d_{31}{}^{1}M(p_2){}^{1}M(p_3)+ d_{32}{}^{2}M(p_2){}^{2}M(p_3)+ d_{33}{}^{3}M(p_2){}^{3}M(p_3)) \bmod q$

$= d_{11}d_{11}{}^{1}M(p_1)\,{}^{1}M(p_2)\,{}^{1}M(p_3)+ d_{11}\,d_{12}\,{}^{1}M(p_1)\,{}^{2}M(p_2)\,{}^{2}M(p_3)$

$+ d_{11}d_{13}\,{}^{1}M(p_1)\,{}^{3}M(p_2)\,{}^{3}M(p_3)+ d_{12}d_{21}{}^{2}M(p_1){}^{1}M(p_2)\,{}^{1}M(p_3)$

$+ d_{12}d_{22}{}^{2}M(p_1){}^{2}M(p_2)\,{}^{2}M(p_3) + d_{12}d_{23}{}^{2}M(p_1){}^{3}M(p_2){}^{3}M(p_3)$

$+d_{13}d_{31}{}^{3}M(p_1){}^{1}M(p_2)\,{}^{1}M(p_3)+ d_{13}d_{32}{}^{3}M(p_1){}^{2}M(p_2)\,{}^{2}M(p_3)$

$+ d_{13}d_{33}{}^{3}M(p_1){}^{3}M(p_2){}^{3}M(p_3) \bmod q\in O.$

Then we have in general

$${}^{1}M(p_{(12)3})\neq{}^{1}M(p_{1(23)}) \bmod q\in O.$$

In the samr manner we have in general

$${}^{i}M(p_{(12)3})\neq{}^{i}M(p_{1(23)}) \bmod q\in O\ (i=2,3)\square.$$

We notice that

$$C(X,p_{(12)3})\ \neq C(X,p_{1(23)}) \bmod q\in\{O[X]\}^3$$

where

$$p_{(12)3} = (p_1p_2)\,p_3=p_1p_2p_3=p_1(p_2p_3)=p_{1(23)} \bmod q\in \boldsymbol{Fq},$$

$$C(X,p_{(12)3})=\{E(X,{}^{1}M(p_{(12)3})), E(X,{}^{2}M(p_{(12)3})), E(X,{}^{3}M(p_{(12)3}))\}\in\{O[X]\}^3,$$

$$C(X,p_{1(23)})=\{E(X,{}^{1}M(p_{1(23)})), E(X,{}^{2}M(p_{1(23)})), E(X,{}^{3}M(p_{1(23)}))\}\in\{O[X]\}^3.$$

§3.8.3 Multiplication scheme on ciphertexts

Here we consider the multiplicative operation on the ciphertexts.

Let

$C(X,p_1):=\{E(X,{}^1M(p_1)), E(X,{}^2M(p_1)), E(X,{}^3M(p_1))\}\in\{O[X]\}^3$

and

$C(X,p_2):=\{E(X,{}^1M(p_2)), E(X,{}^2M(p_2)), E(X,{}^3M(p_2))\}\in\{O[X]\}^3$

be the ciphertexts corresponding to the plaintexts p_1 and p_2 , respectively.

Let

$C(X,p_{12}):= \{E(X,{}^1M(p_{12})), E(X,{}^2M(p_{12})), E(X,{}^3M(p_{12}))\}\in\{O[X]\}^3$

where three sub-cipher texts $E(X,{}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p_{12}))$(i=1,2,3) are given such that

$E(X,{}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p_{12}))\in O[X]$

$=d_{\mathrm{i}1}E(E(X,{}^1M(p_2)),{}^1M(p_1))+d_{\mathrm{i}2}E(E(X,{}^2M(p_2)),{}^2M(p_1))+d_{\mathrm{i}3}E(E(X,{}^3M(p_2)),{}^3M(p_1))$ mod q

$= d_{\mathrm{i}1}E(X,{}^1M(p_1)\,{}^1{<}M(p_2))+d_{\mathrm{i}2}E(X,{}^2M(p_1)\,{<}^2M(p_2))+d_{\mathrm{i}3}E(X,{}^3M(p_1)\,{<}^3M(p_2))$ mod q

(i=1,2,3).

We confirm that $C(X,p_{12})$ is the ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext p_1p_2, that is, we decipher $C(X,p_{12})$ to obtain p_1p_2 as follows.

$A_h^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}(E(A_1(\ldots(A_h\mathbf{1})\ldots),{}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p_{12})))\ldots)$

$= A_h^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}(d_{\mathrm{i}1}E(A_1(\ldots(A_h\mathbf{1})\ldots),{}^1M(p_1)\,{}^1{<}M(p_2))$

$+ A_h^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}(d_{\mathrm{i}2}E(A_1(\ldots(A_h\mathbf{1})\ldots),{}^2M(p_1)\,{<}^2M(p_2))$

$+ A_h^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}(d_{\mathrm{i}3}E(A_1(\ldots(A_h\mathbf{1})\ldots),{}^3M(p_1)\,{<}^3M(p_2))$ mod q

$=d_{\mathrm{i}1}{}^1M(p_1){}^1M(p_2)+ d_{\mathrm{i}2}{}^2M(p_1){}^2M(p_2)+ d_{\mathrm{i}3}{}^3M(p_1){}^3M(p_2)$ mod q,

$={}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p_{12})$ mod $q\in O$ (i=1,2,3) .

From **§3.8.1**

$p_{12}=\alpha[{}^1M(p_{12})]_0+\beta[{}^2M(p_{12})]_0+\gamma[{}^3M(p_{12})]_0$

$+\alpha[H({}^1M(p_{12})-[{}^1M(p_{12})]_0\mathbf{1})]_1\,[GH]_1$

$+\beta[H({}^2M(p_{12})-[{}^2M(p_{12})]_0\mathbf{1})]_1\,[GH]_1$

$+\gamma[H({}^3M(p_{12})-[{}^3M(p_{12})]_0\mathbf{1})]_1[GH]_1$ mod q,

$= p_1p_2$ mod $q\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$.

§3.9 Property of proposed fully homomorphic encryption

The syntax of proposed scheme is given as follows.

-Key-Generation. The algorithm **KeyGen**, on input the security parameter 1^{λ} and system parameter q, outputs

sk$\leftarrow$**KeyGen**(1^{λ}) where **sk**$=(h, A_j(j=1,\ldots,h), s, t, {}^{i}k, {}^{i}l(\mathrm{i}=1,2,3))$ is a secret encryption key and
pk$\leftarrow$**KeyGen**(1^{λ}) where **pk**$=(\{e_{\mathrm{ijk}}\}_{0=<\mathrm{i,j,k}=<7}\,; G, H, \alpha, \beta, \gamma)$ is a public key.

-Encryption. The algorithm **Enc**, on input system parameter q, and secret keys of user B, $\mathbf{sk_B}=(h_B, B_j(j=1,\ldots,h_B), s_B, t_B, {}^{i}k_B, {}^{i}l_B(\mathrm{i}=1,2,3))$, public key of usea A, $\mathbf{pk_A}=(\{e_{A\mathrm{ijk}}\}_{0=<\mathrm{i,j,k}=<7}\,; G_A, H_A, \alpha_A, \beta_A, \gamma_A)$ and a plaintext $p\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$, outputs a ciphertext $\boldsymbol{C}(X;\mathbf{sk_B}, \mathbf{pk_A}, p) \leftarrow \mathbf{Enc}(\mathbf{sk_B}, \mathbf{pk_A}; p)$.

-Decryption. The algorithm **Dec**, on input system parameter q, secret keys of user A, $\mathbf{sk_A}$, public key of user B, $\mathbf{pk_B}$ and a ciphertext $\boldsymbol{C}(X;\mathbf{sk_B}, \mathbf{pk_A}, p)$, outputs plaintext $\mathbf{Dec}(\mathbf{sk_A}, \mathbf{pk_B}; \boldsymbol{C}(X;\mathbf{sk_B}, \mathbf{pk_A}, p))$ where $\boldsymbol{C}(X;\mathbf{sk_B}, \mathbf{pk_A}, p) \leftarrow \mathbf{Enc}(\mathbf{sk_B}, \mathbf{pk_A}; p)$.

-Homomorphic-Evaluation. The algorithm **Eval**, on input system parameter q, an arithmetic circuit ckt, and a tuple of n ciphertexts $(C_1,\ldots, C_n)$, outputs an evaluated ciphertext $C' \leftarrow \mathbf{Eval}(\mathrm{ckt}; C_1,\ldots, C_n)$ where $C_i=\boldsymbol{C}(X;\mathbf{sk_B}, \mathbf{pk_A}, p_i)$ $(i=1,\ldots,n)$.

(**Fully homomorphic encryption**). Proposed fully homomorphic encryption =(**KeyGen; Enc; Dec; Eval**) is fully homomorphic because it satisfies the following properties:

1. Homomorphism: Let $CR = \{CR_{\lambda}\}_{\lambda\in\mathrm{N}}$ be the set of all polynomial sized arithmetic circuits. On input **sk** $\leftarrow$**KeyGen**(1^{λ}), **pk**$\leftarrow$**KeyGen**(1^{λ}), $\forall\,\mathrm{ckt} \in \mathrm{CR}_{\lambda}$, $\forall (p_1,\ldots,p_n) \in \boldsymbol{Fq}^n$ where $n = n(\lambda)$, $\forall (C_1,\ldots,C_n)$ where $C_i=\boldsymbol{C}(X;\mathbf{sk_B}, \mathbf{pk_A}, p_i) \leftarrow \mathbf{Enc}(\mathbf{sk_B}, \mathbf{pk_A}; p_i)$, $(i=1,\ldots,n)$,we have $\mathbf{Dec}(\mathbf{sk_A}, \mathbf{pk_B}; \mathbf{Eval}(\mathrm{ckt}; C_1,\ldots,C_n)) = \mathrm{ckt}(p_1,\ldots,p_n)$.
Then it holds that:

$$\Pr[\mathbf{Dec}(\mathbf{sk_A}, \mathbf{pk_B}; \mathbf{Eval}(\mathrm{ckt}; C_1,\ldots,C_n)) \neq \mathrm{ckt}(p_1,\ldots,p_n)] = \mathrm{negl}(\lambda).$$

2. Compactness: As the output length of **Eval** is at most $k\log_2 q=k\lambda$ where k is a positive integer, there exists a polynomial $\mu = \mu(\lambda)$ such that the output length of **Eval** is at most μ bits long regardless of the input circuit ckt and the number of its inputs.

§3.10 Procedure for constructing public-key encryption

For the understanding we show the procedure for constructing the public-key encryption scheme by using the cryptosystem described in above sections.

User B try to send his information to user A by using the public-key of user A $\mathbf{pk_A}$ and the secret key of user B $\mathbf{sk_B}$ through the insecure line.

1) System centre publishes the system parameter[q].
2) User A selects $\mathbf{sk_A}$=(h_A ,A_j(j=1,…,h_A),s_A,t_A ,${}^ik_A$,${}^il_A$(i=1,2,3)) which is a secret key of user A and generates the public key of user A $\mathbf{pk_A}$=($\{e_{Aijk}\}_{0=<i,j,k=<7}$; G_A,H_A, α_A, β_A, γ_A) such that
   $E_A(X,Y)$:=$A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(Y(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)$ mod $q \in O[X,Y]$
   =$\{e_{Aijk}\}$(i,j,k=0,…,7).
   User A sends $\{e_{Aijk}\}$(i,j,k=0,…,7) with G_A,H_A,α_A ,β_A ,γ_A to system centre.
3) User B selects $\mathbf{sk_B}$=(h_B ,A_{Bj}(j=1,…,h_B),s_B,t_B ,${}^ik_B$,${}^il_B$(i=1,2,3)) which is a secret key of user B and generates the public key of user B $\mathbf{pk_B}$=($\{e_{Bijk}\}_{0=<i,j,k=<7}$; G_B,H_B, α_B, β_B,γ_B) such that
   $E_B(X,Y)$:= $B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}(Y(B_{hB}^{-1}(\ldots(B_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)$ mod $q \in O[X,Y]$
   =$\{e_{Bijk}\}$(i,j,k=0,…,7).
   User B sends $\{e_{Bijk}\}$(i,j,k=0,…,7) with G_B,H_B, α_B, β_B,γ_B to system centre.
4) User B downloads $E_A(X,Y)$ =$\{e_{Aijk}\}$(i,j,k=0,…,7) from system centre.
5) User B generates the common enciphering function $E_{BA}(X,Y)$ as follows.

$E_{B1}(X,Y)$:=$E_A(E_A(X,Y),B_1)$

=$A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}[A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(Y(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)])\ldots))))\ldots)$

=$A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(Y(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots)))))\ldots)$ mod $q \in O[X,Y]$

$E_{B2}(X,Y)$:= $E_{B1}(E_A(X,Y),B_2)$

=$A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(B_2(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}[A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(Y(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)])\ldots)))))\ldots)$

= $A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(B_2(Y(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))))\ldots)$ mod $q \in O[X,Y]$

… …

$E_{BhB}(X,Y)$:= $E_{BhB-1}(E_A(X,Y),B_{hB})$

=$A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}[A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(Y(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)])\ldots)))\ldots)$

= $A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}(Y(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)))\ldots)$ mod $q \in O[X,Y]$

$E_{BhB}^{-1}(X,Y)$:= $E_{BhB}(E_A(X,B_{hB}^{-1}),Y)$

=$A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}(Y(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}[A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_{hB}^{-1}(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)])\ldots)$
$))\ldots)))\ldots)$

$= A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}(Y(B_{hB}^{-1}\ (A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots)))))\ldots)))\ldots) \bmod q \in O[X,Y]$

E_{BhB-1}^{-1} (X,Y)$= E_{BhB}^{-1}\ (E_A(X,B_{hB-1}^{-1}),Y)$

$=A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}(Y(B_{hB}^{-1}(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}[A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_{hB-1}^{-1}(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))$
$\ldots)])\ldots)))))\ldots)))\ldots)$

$=A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}(Y(B_{hB}^{-1}(B_{hB-1}^{-1}(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots)))))\ldots)))\ldots) \bmod q \in$
$O[X,Y]$

… …

$E_{BA}(X,Y) := E_{B1}^{-1}\ (X,Y) = E_{B2}^{-1}\ (E_A(X,B_1^{-1}),Y)$

$=A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}(Y(B_{hB}^{-1}(\ldots(B_2^{-1}(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}[A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1^{-1}(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)$
$\ldots))))\ldots)])\ldots)))\ldots)))\ldots)))\ldots)$

$=A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}(Y(B_{hB}^{-1}(\ B_{hB-1}^{-1}\ (\ldots(B_1^{-1}(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots)))\ldots)))))\ldots)))\ldots)$
$\bmod q \in O[X,Y]$

6) User A can generate $E_{AB}(X,Y)$ as follows.

$E_{AB}(X,Y) := A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(E_B((A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots)))),Y)))\ldots) \in O[X,Y]$
$= A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}(Y(B_{hB}^{-1}(\ B_{hB-1}^{-1}\ (\ldots(B_1^{-1}\quad(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)))\ldots)$

$= E_{BA}(X,Y) \in O[X,Y]$

7) User B enciphers the plaintext p by using $E_{BA}(X,Y)$ such that

${}^{i}C(X,p) := E_{BA}(X,{}^{i}M(p)) \in O[X,Y]$

$=A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}({}^{i}M(p)(B_{hB}^{-1}(\ldots(B_1^{-1}(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots)))\ldots))))\ldots)))\ldots) \bmod q$

$=\{{}^{i}c_{jkl}\}$ (i=1,2,3;j,k,l=0,…,7).

8) User B sends ${}^{i}C(X,p)=\{{}^{i}c_{jkl}\}$ (i=1,2,3;j,k,l=0,…,7)) to user A through the insecure line.

9) User A receives ${}^{i}C(X,p)=\{{}^{i}c_{jkl}\}$ (i=1,2,3;j,k,l=0,…,7) and deciphers such that

$({}^{i}c_0,\ldots,{}^{i}c_7) := A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}\ ({}^{i}C[A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(\mathbf{1})\ldots)]\ ))\ldots) \in O$
$= B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}({}^{i}M(p)\ (B_{hB}^{-1}(\ B_{hB-1}^{-1}\ (\ldots(B_1^{-1}\ X)\ldots))))$

$=(\ e_{000}{}^{i}m_0+e_{001}{}^{i}m_1+\ \ldots+e_{007}{}^{i}m_7,$

$e_{100}{}^{i}m_0+e_{101}{}^{i}m_1+\ \ldots+e_{107}{}^{i}m_7,$

....

$e_{700}{}^{i}m_0+e_{701}{}^{i}m_1+\ldots+e_{707}{}^{i}m_7)^t$,

where ${}^{i}M(p)=({}^{i}m_0,\ldots,{}^{i}m_7)$ (i=1,2,3) .

$({}^{i}m_0,\ldots,{}^{i}m_7)$ is obtained by solving above simultaneous equation.

10) User A downloads the public key of user B $\mathbf{pk_B}=(\{e_{Bijk}\}_{0=<i,j,k=<7}\ ; G_B,H_B,\alpha_B,\beta_B,\gamma_B)$. Then the plaintext p is recovered such that

$$p=\alpha_B[{}^{1}M(p)]_0+\beta_B[{}^{2}M(p)]_0+\gamma_B[{}^{3}M(p)]_0$$
$$+\alpha_B[H({}^{1}M(p)-[{}^{1}M(p)]_0\mathbf{1})]_1+\beta_B[H({}^{2}M(p)-[{}^{2}M(p)]_0\mathbf{1})]_1$$
$$+\gamma_B[H({}^{3}M(p)-[{}^{3}M(p)]_0\mathbf{1})]_1 \bmod q,$$
$$=\alpha_B({}^{1}m_0)+\beta_B({}^{2}m_0)+\gamma_B({}^{3}m_0)+\alpha_B[({}^{1}M(p)-{}^{1}m_0\mathbf{1})H]_1+\beta_B[({}^{2}M(p)-{}^{2}m_0\mathbf{1})H]_1$$
$$+\gamma_B[({}^{3}M(p)-{}^{3}m_0\mathbf{1})H]_1 \bmod q,$$
$$=\alpha_B({}^{1}m_0)+\beta_B({}^{2}m_0)+\gamma_B({}^{3}m_0)+\alpha_B[(0,{}^{1}m_1,\ldots,{}^{1}m_7))H]_1+\beta_B[(0,{}^{2}m_1,\ldots,{}^{2}m_7)H]_1$$
$$+\gamma_B[(0,{}^{3}m_1,\ldots,{}^{3}m_7)H]_1 \bmod q\in \boldsymbol{Fq}.$$

§4. Analysis of proposed scheme

Here we analyze the proposed fully homomorphism encryption scheme.

§4.1 Computing A_i from coefficients of $E(X,Y)$

Basic enciphering function $E(X,Y)$ is given as follows.

Let $X=(x_0,\ldots,x_7)\in O[X]$ and $Y=(y_0,\ldots,y_7)\in O[X]$ be variables.

$$E(X,Y)=A_1(\ldots(A_h(Y(A_h^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots) \bmod q\in O[X,Y] \tag{40}$$
$$=(e_{000}x_0y_0+e_{001}x_0y_1+\ldots+e_{077}x_7y_7,$$
$$e_{100}x_0y_0+e_{101}x_0y_1+\ldots+e_{177}x_7y_7,$$
$$\ldots\quad\ldots$$
$$e_{700}x_0y_0+e_{701}x_0y_1+\ldots+e_{777}x_7y_7)^t, \tag{41}$$
$$=\{e_{ijk}\}(i,j,k=0,\ldots,7).$$

$A_j\in O$ to be selected randomly such that A_j^{-1} exist (j=1,...,h) are parts of the secret keys of user A.

We try to find $A_i(i=1,...,h)$ from coefficients of $E(X,Y)$, $e_{ijk}\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ $(i,j,k=0,\ldots,7)$.

In case that h=56 the number of unknown variables ($A_j(i,j,k=1,\ldots,56)$) is 448(=64*8-64), the number of equations is 448(=64*8-64) such that

$$\left.\begin{array}{l} F_{001}(A_1,\ldots,A_{56})=e_{001} \bmod q, \\ F_{002}(A_1,\ldots,A_{56})=e_{002} \bmod q, \\ \quad\ldots \quad \ldots \\ F_{177}(A_1,\ldots,A_{56})=e_{077} \bmod q, \\ \quad\ldots \quad \ldots \\ F_{777}(A_1,\ldots,A_{64})=e_{777} \bmod q, \end{array}\right\} \tag{42}$$

where $F_{001},\ldots, F_{007}, F_{011},\ldots, F_{017},\ldots, F_{701},\ldots, F_{776},F_{777}$ are the 112(=56*2)$^{\text{th}}$ algebraic multivariate equations.

Then the complexity G required for solving above simultaneous equations by using Gröbner basis is given [8] such as

$$G>G'=({}_{448+dreg}\mathrm{C}_{dreg})^{w}=({}_{25312}\mathrm{C}_{448})^{\mathrm{w}}>>O(2^{80}), \tag{43}$$

where G' is the complexity required for solving 449 simultaneous algebraic equations with 448 variables by using Gröbner basis, where w=2.39, and

$$d_{reg}= 24864(=448*(112\text{-}1)/2 - 0\sqrt{\ }(448*(112\text{^}2\text{-}1)/6)). \tag{44}$$

The complexity G required for solving above simultaneous equations by using Gröbner basis is enough large for secure.

§4.2 Computing plaintext p and A_i, B_j from coefficients of ciphertext $E_{BA}(X,{}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p))$

Ciphertext $E_{BA}(X,{}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p))$(i=1,2,3) is generated by user B as follows.

$E_{BA}(X,{}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p))\in O[X]$

$=A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}({}^{\mathrm{i}}M(p)(B_{hB}{}^{-1}(B_{hB\text{-}1}{}^{-1}(\ldots(B_1{}^{-1}(A_{hA}{}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1{}^{-1}X)\ldots)))\ldots)))))\ldots)))\ldots)$

$=A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}([{}^{\mathrm{i}}ku\mathbf{1}+{}^{\mathrm{i}}lvG+{}^{\mathrm{i}}wH+{}^{\mathrm{i}}yGH](B_{hB}{}^{-1}(B_{hB\text{-}1}{}^{-1}(\ldots(B_1{}^{-1}(A_{hA}{}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1{}^{-1}X)\ldots)))\ldots)))))\ldots)))\ldots) \bmod q$

$=({}^{\mathrm{i}}e_{00}x_0+{}^{\mathrm{i}}e_{01}x_1+\ldots+{}^{\mathrm{i}}e_{07}x_7,$

${}^{\mathrm{i}}e_{10}x_0+{}^{\mathrm{i}}e_{11}x_1+\ldots+{}^{\mathrm{i}}e_{17}x_7,$

....

$^{i}e_{70}x_0+{}^{i}e_{71}x_1+ \ldots +{}^{i}e_{77}\, x_7)^{t} \bmod q,$

$=\{{}^{i}e_{jk}\}(j,k=0,\ldots,7;i=1,2,3)$

with ${}^{i}e_{jk}\in \boldsymbol{Fq}(j,k=0,\ldots,7;i=1,2,3),$

where $p=su+tv \bmod q$.
A_j, $B_k\in O$ to be selected randomly such that A_j^{-1} and B_k^{-1} exist ($j=1,\ldots,h_A;k=1,\ldots,h_B$) are parts of the secret keys of user A and user B respectively.

We try to find plaintext p and A_i, B_j ($i=1,\ldots,h_A$;j$=1,\ldots,h_B$) from coefficients of $E_{BA}(X,{}^{i}M(p))$(i=1,2,3), ${}^{i}e_{jk}\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ ($j,k=0,\ldots,7;i=1,2,3$).

In case that h_A =56 and h_B=56 the number of unknown variables ($u,v,s,t,{}^{i}k,{}^{i}l,A_j$, B_k, (i=1,2,3; $j,k=1,\ldots,56$)) is 906(=4+3*2+2*56*8), the number of equations is 192(=64*3) such that

$$\left.\begin{array}{l}
F_{100}(u,v,s,t,A_1,\ldots,A_{56}, B_1,\ldots,B_{56})={}^{1}e_{00} \bmod q,\\
F_{101}(u,v,s,t,A_1,\ldots,A_{56}, B_1,\ldots,B_{56})={}^{1}e_{01} \bmod q,\\
\quad\ldots \quad \ldots\\
F_{107}(u,v,s,t,A_1,\ldots,A_{56}, B_1,\ldots,B_{56})={}^{1}e_{07} \bmod q,\\
\quad\ldots \quad \ldots\\
\quad\ldots \quad \ldots\\
F_{377}(u,v,s,t,A_1,\ldots,A_{56}, B_1,\ldots,B_{56})={}^{3}e_{77} \bmod q,
\end{array}\right\} \qquad (45)$$

where $F_{100},\ldots,F_{377}$ are the 227(=56*2*2+3)$^{\text{th}}$ algebraic multivariate equations.

Then the complexity G required for solving above simultaneous equations by using Gröbner basis is given [8]such as

$$G>G'=({}_{191+dreg}C_{dreg})^{w}=({}_{21887}C_{191})^{w} >> O(2^{80}), \qquad (46)$$

where G' is the complexity required for solving 192 simultaneous algebraic equations with 191 variables by using Gröbner basis,
where w=2.39, and

$$d_{reg}= 21696(=192*(227-1)/2 - 0\sqrt{\ }(192*(227\text{^}2-1)/6)). \qquad (47)$$

The complexity G required for solving above simultaneous equations by using Gröbner basis is enough large for safety.

§4.3 Attack by using the ciphertexts of *p* and *-p*

I show that we can not easily distinguish the ciphertexts of p and $-p$.

We try to attack by using "p and $-p$ attack".We define the medium text ${}^{i}M(p)$ by

$${}^{i}M(p):={}^{i}ku\mathbf{1}+{}^{i}lvG+{}^{i}wH+{}^{i}yGH \in O, \quad (i=1,2,3) \tag{48}$$

where $u\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ is selected randomly, and $v=(p-su)t^{-1} \bmod q$, plaintext $p=su+tv \bmod q\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$.

We define the medium text ${}^{i}M\,(-p)$ by

$${}^{i}M(-p):={}^{i}ku'\mathbf{1}+{}^{i}lv'G+{}^{i}w'H+{}^{i}y'GH\in O, \quad (i=1,2,3), \tag{49}$$

where $u'\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ is selected randomly, and $v'=(p-su')t^{-1} \bmod q,-p=su'+tv' \bmod q$.

the ciphertext of p ,$E_{BA}(X,{}^{i}M(p))$(i=1,2,3),

$E_{BA}(X,{}^{i}M(p))$

$=A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}({}^{i}M(p)(B_{hB}^{-1}(B_{hB-1}^{-1}(\ldots(B_1^{-1}(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)))\ldots) \bmod q$

$=A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}([{}^{i}ku\mathbf{1}+{}^{i}lvG+{}^{i}wH+{}^{i}yGH](B_{hB}^{-1}(B_{hB-1}^{-1}(\ldots(B_1^{-1}(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)))\ldots) \bmod q,$

the ciphertext of $-p$, $E_{BA}(X,{}^{i}M(-p))$,

$E_{BA}(X,{}^{i}M(-p))$

$=A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}({}^{i}M(p)(B_{hB}^{-1}(B_{hB-1}^{-1}(\ldots(B_1^{-1}(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)))\ldots) \bmod q$

$=A_1(\ldots(A_{hA}(B_1(\ldots(B_{hB}([{}^{i}ku'\mathbf{1}+{}^{i}lv'G+{}^{i}w'H+{}^{i}y'GH](B_{hB}^{-1}(B_{hB-1}^{-1}(\ldots(B_1^{-1}(A_{hA}^{-1}(\ldots(A_1^{-1}X)\ldots))))\ldots)))\ldots) \bmod q.$

As $p=su+tv \bmod q$ and $-p=su'+t_0v' \bmod q$, we have

$p-p=0=s(u+u')+t\,(v+v') \bmod q,$

$(v+v')= -s\,t^{-1}\,(u+u') \bmod q.$

We have

$E_{BA}(X,{}^{i}M(p))+ E_{BA}(X,{}^{i}M(-p))$

$= E_{BA}(X,{}^{i}ku\mathbf{1}+{}^{i}lvG+{}^{i}wH+{}^{i}yGH + {}^{i}ku'\mathbf{1}+{}^{i}lv'G+{}^{i}w'H+{}^{i}y'GH) \bmod q$

$= E_{BA}(X, {}^{i}k(u+u')\mathbf{1}+{}^{i}l(v+v')G+({}^{i}w+{}^{i}w')H+({}^{i}y+{}^{i}y')GH) \bmod q$

$= E_{BA}(X, (u+u')({}^{i}k\mathbf{1}-{}^{i}lst^{-1}G)+({}^{i}w+{}^{i}w')H+({}^{i}y+{}^{i}y')GH) \bmod q.$

As ${}^{i}k\mathbf{1}-{}^{i}lst^{-1}G \neq \mathbf{0} \bmod q \in O$ and in general $u+u' \neq 0 \bmod q \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$, we have

$$E_{BA}(X, {}^{i}M(p))+E_{BA}(X, {}^{i}M(-p)) \neq \mathbf{0} \bmod q. \ (\mathrm{i}=1,2,3) \qquad (50)$$

We can calculate $|E_{BA}(\mathbf{1}, {}^{i}M(p))+E_{BA}(\mathbf{1}, {}^{i}M(-p))|^2$ as follows.

$E_{BA}(\mathbf{1}, {}^{i}M(p))+E_{BA}(\mathbf{1}, {}^{i}M(-p))|^2$

$=|(u+u')({}^{i}k\mathbf{1}-{}^{i}lst^{-1}G)+({}^{i}w+{}^{i}w')H+({}^{i}y+{}^{i}y')GH|^2.$

Even if $({}^{i}w+{}^{i}w')=({}^{i}y+{}^{i}y')=({}^{i}z+{}^{i}z')=0 \bmod q$,we only have

$= (u+u')^2 (({}^{i}k)^2+({}^{i}lst^{-1})^2 (g_1^2+g_2^2+\dots+g_7^2) \bmod q$

$= (u+u')^2 (({}^{i}k)^2+({}^{i}lst^{-1})^2 L_G \bmod q$

$\neq \mathbf{0} \bmod q$ (i=1,2,3) (in general).

It is said that the attack by using "p and $-p$ attack" is not efficient. Then we can not easily distinguish the ciphertexts of p and $-p$.

§5. The size of the modulus *q* and the complexity for enciphering /deciphering

We consider the size of the system parameter q. We select $q=O(2^{2000})$.

1) In case of h=56, $q=O(2^{2000})$, the size of $e_{ijk} \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ $(I,j,k=0,\dots,7)$ which are the coefficients of elements in $E(X,Y)= A_1(\dots(A_h(Y(A_h^{-1}(\dots(A_1^{-1}X)\dots))))\dots) \bmod q \in O[X,Y]$ is (448)($\log_2 q$)bits =896kbits.

2) In case of h_A=56, $q=O(2^{2000})$, the complexity to obtain $E_A(X,Y)$ from $A_1,\dots,A_{hA}$(and q is
   (55*512+55*8*512)$(\log_2 q)^2$+56*(16*$(\log_2 q)^2$+2*$(\log_2 q)^3$)= $O(2^{41})$ bit-operations, where 56*(16*$(\log_2 q)^2$+2*$(\log_2 q)^3$) is the complexiy for inverse of $\boldsymbol{A}_i^{-1}$(i=1,…,56).

3) In case of h_B=56, $q=O(2^{2000})$, the complexity to obtain $E_{BA}(X,Y)$ from $E_A(X,Y)$, $B_1,\ldots,B_{hB}$, $B_{hB}^{-1},\ldots,B_1^{-1}$ and q is

$$((512+64*8*8)*56+(512+64*8*8)*56)\ (\log_2 q)^2 = O(2^{43}) \text{ bit-operations.}$$

4) In case of h_A=56, $q=O(2^{2000})$, the complexity to obtain $E_{AB}(X,Y)$ from $E_B(X,Y)$, $A_1,\ldots,A_{hA}$, $A_{hA}^{-1},\ldots,A_1^{-1}$ and q is

$$(64*8*55+8*64*8+56*8*8*64)\ (\log_2 q)^2 = O(2^{41}) \text{ bit-operations.}$$

5) In case of $q=O(2^{2000})$, the complexity to obtain ${}^{i}C(X)= E_{BA}(X,{}^{i}M(p))$(i=1,2,3) from $E_{BA}(X, Y), p,u,{}^{i}k,{}^{i}l,{}^{i}w,{}^{i}y ,G,H,GH,s,t$ and q is

$$2*(\log_2 q)^2+2*(\log_2 q)^3+3*(1+9+8+8+64*8)\ (\log_2 q)^2 = O(2^{35}) \text{ bit-operations.}$$

6) In case of h_A=56, $q=O(2^{2000})$, the complexity for deciphering ${}^{i}C(X)=E_{BA}(X,{}^{i}M(p))$ (i=1,2,3) to obtain p from ${}^{i}C(X)= E_{BA}(X,{}^{i}M(p))$(i=1,2,3), H , $A_1,\ldots,A_{hA}$, $A_{hA}^{-1},\ldots,A_1^{-1}$ and q is

$$[64*56+3*(64*56+64+64*56+8*8+7*7+\ldots+2*2+1+1+2+\ldots+7)$$

$$+3+8*8*3+3](\log_2 q)^2+8*2*(\log_2 q)^3$$

$$= O((3584+3*7464+198)2^{22}+2^{37})= O(26174*2^{22}+2^{37}) =O(2^{38}) \text{ bit-operations.}$$

On the other hand the complexity of the enciphering and deciphering in RSA scheme is

$$O(2(\log n)^3)=O(2^{34}) \text{ bit-operations}$$

where the size of modulus n is 2048bits.

Then our scheme does not require large complexity to encipher and decipher so that we are able to implement our scheme to the mobile device.

§6. Conclusion

We proposed the fully homomorphic public-key encryption scheme based on the octonion ring over finite field. It was shown that our scheme is immune from the Gröbner basis attacks by calculating the complexity to obtain the Gröbner basis for the multivariate algebraic equations**.**The proposed scheme does not require a “bootstrapping” process so that the complexity to encipher and decipher is not large.

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Appendix A:

Octinv(*A*) ---

```
S ← a0^2+a1^2+…+a7^2 mod q.
% S^-1 mod q
    q[1] ← q div S ;% integer part of q/S
    r[1] ← q mod S ;% residue
    k ←1
    q[0] ← q
    r[0] ← S
    while r[k]  ≠  0
        begin
            k← k + 1
            q[k] ← r[k−2] div r[k−1]
            r[k] ← r[k−2] mod [rk−1]
        end
Q [k−1] ← (-1)*q[k−1]
L[ k−1] ← 1
i ← k−1
while    i > 1
    begin
        Q[ i−1] ← (-1)*Q[ i] *q[i−1] + L[ i]
        L[ i−1 ] ← Q[ i ]
        i← i−1
    end

invS ← Q[1] mod q
invA[0] ← a0*invS mod q
For i=1,…,7,
    invA[i] ← (-1)*ai*invS mod q
Return A^-1 = (invA[0], invA[1],…, invA[7])
```

Appendix B:

Lemma 2

$A^{-1}(AB)= B \bmod q$

$(BA)A^{-1}= B \bmod q$

(*Proof*:)

$A^{-1}= (a_0/|A|^2 \bmod q, -a_1/|A|^2 \bmod q,\ldots, -a_7/|A|^2 \bmod q).$

$AB \bmod q$

$$\begin{aligned}
= (& a_0b_0-a_1b_1- a_2b_2- a_3b_3-a_4b_4- a_5b_5-a_6b_6-a_7b_7 \bmod q,\\
& a_0b_1+a_1b_0+a_2b_4+a_3b_7-a_4b_2+a_5b_6-a_6b_5-a_7b_3 \bmod q,\\
& a_0b_2-a_1b_4+a_2b_0+a_3b_5+a_4b_1-a_5b_3+a_6b_7-a_7b_6 \bmod q,\\
& a_0b_3-a_1b_7-a_2b_5+a_3b_0+a_4b_6+a_5b_2-a_6b_4+a_7b_1 \bmod q,\\
& a_0b_4+a_1b_2-a_2b_1-a_3b_6+a_4b_0+a_5b_7+a_6b_3-a_7b_5 \bmod q,\\
& a_0b_5-a_1b_6+a_2b_3-a_3b_2-a_4b_7+a_5b_0+a_6b_1+a_7b_4 \bmod q,\\
& a_0b_6+a_1b_5-a_2b_7+a_3b_4-a_4b_3-a_5b_1+a_6b_0+a_7b_2 \bmod q,\\
& a_0b_7+a_1b_3+a_2b_6-a_3b_1+a_4b_5-a_5b_4-a_6b_2+a_7b_0 \bmod q).
\end{aligned}$$

$[A^{-1}(AB)]_0$

$$\begin{aligned}
=\{ & a_0(a_0b_0-a_1b_1- a_2b_2- a_3b_3-a_4b_4- a_5b_5-a_6b_6-a_7b_7)\\
& +a_1(a_0b_1+a_1b_0+a_2b_4+a_3b_7-a_4b_2+a_5b_6-a_6b_5-a_7b_3)\\
& + a_2(a_0b_2-a_1b_4+a_2b_0+a_3b_5+a_4b_1-a_5b_3+a_6b_7-a_7b_6)\\
& +a_3(a_0b_3-a_1b_7-a_2b_5+a_3b_0+a_4b_6+a_5b_2-a_6b_4+a_7b_1)\\
& +a_4(a_0b_4+a_1b_2-a_2b_1-a_3b_6+a_4b_0+a_5b_7+a_6b_3-a_7b_5)\\
& + a_5(a_0b_5-a_1b_6+a_2b_3-a_3b_2-a_4b_7+a_5b_0+a_6b_1+a_7b_4)\\
& +a_6(a_0b_6+a_1b_5-a_2b_7+a_3b_4-a_4b_3-a_5b_1+a_6b_0+a_7b_2)\\
& +a_7(a_0b_7+a_1b_3+a_2b_6-a_3b_1+a_4b_5-a_5b_4-a_6b_2+a_7b_0)\} /|A|^2 \bmod q
\end{aligned}$$

$=\{(a_0^2+a_1^2+\ldots+a_7^2)\, b_0\} /|A|^2 =b_0 \bmod q$

where $[M]_n$ denotes the n-th element of $M\in O$.

$[A^{-1}(AB)]_1$

$$\begin{aligned}
=\{ & a_0(a_0b_1+a_1b_0+a_2b_4+a_3b_7-a_4b_2+a_5b_6-a_6b_5-a_7b_3)\\
& -a_1(a_0b_0-a_1b_1- a_2b_2- a_3b_3-a_4b_4- a_5b_5-a_6b_6-a_7b_7)\\
& -a_2(a_0b_4+a_1b_2-a_2b_1-a_3b_6+a_4b_0+a_5b_7+a_6b_3-a_7b_5)\\
& -a_3(a_0b_7+a_1b_3+a_2b_6-a_3b_1+a_4b_5-a_5b_4-a_6b_2+a_7b_0)
\end{aligned}$$

$+a_4(a_0b_2-a_1b_4+a_2b_0+a_3b_5+a_4b_1-a_5b_3+a_6b_7-a_7b_6)$

$-a_5(a_0b_6+a_1b_5-a_2b_7+a_3b_4-a_4b_3-a_5b_1+a_6b_0+a_7b_2)$

$+a_6(a_0b_5-a_1b_6+a_2b_3-a_3b_2-a_4b_7+a_5b_0+a_6b_1+a_7b_4)$

$+a_7(a_0b_3-a_1b_7-a_2b_5+a_3b_0+a_4b_6+a_5b_2-a_6b_4+a_7b_1)\} /|A|^2 \bmod q$

$=\{(a_0^2+a_1^2+\ldots+a_7^2)\, b_1\} /|A|^2=\mathrm{b}_1 \bmod q.$

Similarly we have

$[A^{-1}(AB)]_i=b_i \bmod q \; (i=2,3,\ldots,7).$

Then we have

$A^{-1}(AB)= B \bmod q.$ q.e.d.

Appendix C:

Theorem 6

Let O be the octonion ring over a finite field R such that

$$O=\{(a_0,a_1,\ldots,a_7) \mid a_j\in \boldsymbol{Fq} \; (j=0,1,\ldots,7)\}.$$

Let $G,H\in O$ be the octonions such that

$$G=(g_0,g_1,\ldots,g_7),\; g_j\in \boldsymbol{Fq} \; (j=0,1,\ldots,7),$$

$$H=(h_0,h_1,\ldots,h_7),\; h_j\in \boldsymbol{Fq} \; (j=0,1,\ldots,7),$$

where

$$g_0=0 \bmod q,\; h_0=0 \bmod q,$$

$$L_G=g_0^2+g_1^2+\ldots+g_7^2\neq 0 \bmod q,$$

$$L_H=h_0^2+h_1^2+\ldots+h_7^2=0 \bmod q$$

and

$$g_1h_1+ g_2h_2+g_3h_3+{}_4h_4+ g_5h_5+g_6h_6+g_7h_7=0 \bmod q.$$

G,H satisfy the following equations.

$$(GH)G= L_GH \bmod q,$$

$$(HG)H= \mathbf{0} \bmod q,.$$

$$HG+GH=\mathbf{0} \bmod q.$$

(*Proof*:)

$GH \bmod q$

$= (g_0h_0 - g_1h_1 - g_2h_2 - g_3h_3 - g_4h_4 - g_5h_5 - g_6h_6 - g_7h_7 \bmod q,$

$g_0h_1+g_1h_0+g_2h_4+g_3h_7-g_4h_2+g_5h_6-g_6h_5-g_7h_3 \bmod q,$

$g_0h_2-g_1h_4+g_2h_0+g_3h_5+g_4h_1-g_5h_3+g_6h_7-g_7h_6 \bmod q,$

$g_0h_3-g_1h_7-g_2h_5+g_3h_0+g_4h_6+g_5h_2-g_6h_4+g_7h_1 \bmod q,$

$g_0h_4+g_1h_2 -g_2h_1 -g_3h_6+g_4h_0+g_5h_7+ g_6h_3 -g_7h_5 \bmod q,$

$g_0h_5-g_1h_6+g_2h_3-g_3h_2-g_4h_7+g_5h_0+g_6h_1+g_7h_4 \bmod q,$

$g_0h_6+g_1h_5 -g_2h_7+g_3h_4 -g_4h_3 -g_5h_1+g_6h_0 +g_7h_2 \bmod q,$

$g_0h_7+g_1h_3+g_2h_6-g_3h_1+g_4h_5-g_5h_4-g_6h_2+g_7h_0 \bmod q)$

$[(GH)G]_0 \bmod q$

$= (g_0h_0 - g_1h_1 - g_2h_2 - g_3h_3-g_4h_4 - g_5h_5-g_6h_6-g_7h_7)\, g_0$

$-(g_0h_1+g_1h_0+g_2h_4+g_3h_7-g_4h_2+g_5h_6-g_6h_5-g_7h_3)\, g_1$

$-(g_0h_2-g_1h_4+g_2h_0+g_3h_5+g_4h_1-g_5h_3+g_6h_7-g_7h_6)\, g_2$

$-(g_0h_3-g_1h_7-g_2h_5+g_3h_0+g_4h_6+g_5h_2-g_6h_4+g_7h_1)\, g_3$

$-(g_0h_4+g_1h_2 -g_2h_1 -g_3h_6+g_4h_0+g_5h_7+ g_6h_3 -g_7h_5)\, g_4,$

$-(g_0h_5-g_1h_6+g_2h_3-g_3h_2-g_4h_7+g_5h_0+g_6h_1+g_7h_4)\, g_5$

$-(g_0h_6+g_1h_5 -g_2h_7+g_3h_4 -g_4h_3 -g_5h_1+g_6h_0 +g_7h_2)\, g_6,$

$-(g_0h_7+g_1h_3+g_2h_6-g_3h_1+g_4h_5-g_5h_4-g_6h_2+g_7h_0)\, g_7) \bmod q$

As

$h_0=0 \bmod q\,,$

$L_G:=g_0^2+g_1^2+\ldots+g_7^2\neq 0 \bmod q,$

$L_H:=h_0^2+h_1^2+\ldots+h_7^2=0 \bmod q$

and

$g_1h_1+ g_2h_2+g_3h_3+{}_4h_4+ g_5h_5+g_6h_6+g_7h_7=0 \bmod q,$

we have

$$[(GH)G]_0 \bmod q$$

$$=(g_0h_0 - g_1h_1 - g_2h_2 - g_3h_3 - g_4h_4 - g_5h_5 - g_6h_6 - g_7h_7) g_0$$

$$-(g_0h_1+g_1h_0+g_2h_4+g_3h_7-g_4h_2+g_5h_6-g_6h_5-g_7h_3) g_1$$

$$-(g_0h_2-g_1h_4+g_2h_0+g_3h_5+g_4h_1-g_5h_3+g_6h_7-g_7h_6) g_2$$

$$-(g_0h_3-g_1h_7-g_2h_5+g_3h_0+g_4h_6+g_5h_2-g_6h_4+g_7h_1) g_3$$

$$-(g_0h_4+g_1h_2 -g_2h_1 -g_3h_6+g_4h_0+g_5h_7+ g_6h_3 -g_7h_5) g_4,$$

$$-(g_0h_5-g_1h_6+g_2h_3-g_3h_2-g_4h_7+g_5h_0+g_6h_1+g_7h_4) g_5$$

$$-(g_0h_6+g_1h_5 -g_2h_7+g_3h_4 -g_4h_3 -g_5h_1+g_6h_0 +g_7h_2) g_6$$

$$-(g_0h_7+g_1h_3+g_2h_6-g_3h_1+g_4h_5-g_5h_4-g_6h_2+g_7h_0) g_7$$

$$=h_1(-g_4g_2-g_7g_3+g_2g_4-g_6g_5+g_5g_6+g_3g_7)$$

$$+ h_2(g_4g_1-g_5g_3-g_1g_4+g_3g_5-g_7g_6+g_6g_7)$$

$$+ h_3(g_7g_1+g_5g_2 -g_6g_4-g_2g_5+g_4g_6-g_1g_7)$$

$$+ h_4(-g_2g_1+g_1g_2 +g_6g_3-g_7g_5-g_3g_6+g_5g_7)$$

$$+ h_5(g_6g_1-g_3g_2 +g_2g_3+g_7g_4-g_1g_6-g_4g_7)$$

$$+ h_6(-g_5g_1+g_7g_2 -g_4g_3+g_3g_4+g_1g_5-g_2g_7)$$

$$+ h_7(-g_3g_1-g_6g_2 +g_1g_3-g_5g_4+g_4g_5+g_2g_6)$$

$$=0 \bmod q,$$

$$[(GH)G]_1 \bmod q$$

$$= (g_0h_0 - g_1h_1 - g_2h_2 - g_3h_3 - g_4h_4 - g_5h_5 - g_6h_6 - g_7h_7)g_1$$

$$+(g_0h_1+g_1h_0+g_2h_4+g_3h_7-g_4h_2+g_5h_6-g_6h_5-g_7h_3)g_0$$

$$+(g_0h_2-g_1h_4+g_2h_0+g_3h_5+g_4h_1-g_5h_3+g_6h_7-g_7h_6)g_4$$

$$+(g_0h_3-g_1h_7-g_2h_5+g_3h_0+g_4h_6+g_5h_2-g_6h_4+g_7h_1)g_7$$

$$-(g_0h_4+g_1h_2 -g_2h_1 -g_3h_6+g_4h_0+g_5h_7+ g_6h_3 -g_7h_5)g_2$$

$$+(g_0h_5-g_1h_6+g_2h_3-g_3h_2-g_4h_7+g_5h_0+g_6h_1+g_7h_4)g_6$$

$$-(g_0h_6+g_1h_5 -g_2h_7+g_3h_4 -g_4h_3 -g_5h_1+g_6h_0 +g_7h_2)g_5$$

$-(g_0h_7+g_1h_3+g_2h_6-g_3h_1+g_4h_5-g_5h_4-g_6h_2+g_7h_0)g_3$

$= h_1 (-g_1^2+g_0^2+g_4^2+g_7^2+g_2^2+g_6^2+g_5^2+g_3^2)$

$+ h_2 (-g_2g_1-g_4g_0+g_0g_4+g_5g_7-g_1g_2-g_3g_6-g_7g_5+g_6g_3)$

$+ h_3 (-g_3g_1-g_7g_0 -g_5g_4+g_0g_7 -g_6g_2+g_2g_6+g_4h_5- g_1g_3)$

$+ h_4 (-g_4g_1 +g_2g_0-g_1g_4-g_6g_7-g_0g_2+g_7g_6-g_3g_5+g_5g_3)$

$+ h_5 (-g_5g_1 -g_6g_0+g_3g_4-g_2g_7+g_7g_2+g_0g_6-g_1g_5-g_4g_3)$

$+ h_6 (-g_6g_1 +g_5g_0-g_7g_4+g_4g_7+g_3g_2-g_1g_6-g_0g_5-g_2g_3)$

$+ h_7(-g_7g_1 +g_3g_0+g_6g_4-g_1g_7-g_5g_2-g_4g_6+g_2g_5-g_0g_3)$

$= h_1 (-2g_1^2+L_G)-2g_1(h_2g_2+ h_3g_3+ h_4g_4+ h_5g_5+ h_6g_6+ h_7g_7)$

$= h_1 (L_G)-2g_1(h_1g_1+h_2g_2+ h_3g_3+ h_4g_4+ h_5g_5+ h_6g_6+ h_7g_7)$

$= h_1 L_G \bmod q.$

In the same manner we have

$$[(GH)G]_i= h_i L_G \bmod q \ (i=2,\ldots,7).$$

Then we have

$$(GH)G= L_G H \bmod q.$$

In the same manner we have

$HG \bmod q$

$= (h_0g_0 - h_1g_1- h_2g_2- h_3g_3-h_4g_4- h_5g_5-h_6g_6-h_7g_7 \bmod q,$

$h_0g_1+h_1g_0+h_2g_4+h_3g_7-h_4g_2+h_5g_6-h_6g_5-h_7g_3 \bmod q,$

$h_0g_2-h_1g_4+h_2g_0+h_3g_5+h_4g_1-h_5g_3+h_6g_7-h_7g_6 \bmod q,$

$h_0g_3-h_1g_7-h_2g_5+h_3g_0+h_4g_6+h_5g_2-h_6g_4+h_7g_1 \bmod q,$

$h_0g_4+h_1g_2 -h_2g_1 -h_3g_6+h_4g_0+h_5g_7+ h_6g_3 -h_7g_5 \bmod q,$

$h_0g_5-h_1g_6+h_2g_3-h_3g_2-h_4g_7+h_5g_0+h_6g_1+h_7g_4 \bmod q,$

$h_0g_6+h_1g_5 -h_2g_7+h_3g_4 -h_4g_3 -h_5g_1+h_6g_0 +h_7g_2 \bmod q,$

$h_0g_7+h_1g_3+h_2g_6-h_3g_1+h_4g_5-h_5g_4-h_6g_2+h_7g_0 \bmod q)$.

$[(HG)H]_0$

$= (h_0g_0 - h_1g_1- h_2g_2- h_3g_3-h_4g_4- h_5g_5-h_6g_6-h_7g_7)h_0$

$-(h_0g_1+h_1g_0+h_2g_4+h_3g_7-h_4g_2+h_5g_6-h_6g_5-h_7g_3)h_1$

$-(h_0g_2-h_1g_4+h_2g_0+h_3g_5+h_4g_1-h_5g_3+h_6g_7-h_7g_6)h_2$

$-(h_0g_3-h_1g_7-h_2g_5+h_3g_0+h_4g_6+h_5g_2-h_6g_4+h_7g_1)h_3$

$-(h_0g_4+h_1g_2 -h_2g_1 -h_3g_6+h_4g_0+h_5g_7+ h_6g_3 -h_7g_5)h_4$

$-(h_0g_5-h_1g_6+h_2g_3-h_3g_2-h_4g_7+h_5g_0+h_6g_1+h_7g_4)h_5$

$-(h_0g_6+h_1g_5 -h_2g_7+h_3g_4 -h_4g_3 -h_5g_1+h_6g_0 +h_7g_2)h_6$

$-(h_0g_7+h_1g_3+h_2g_6-h_3g_1+h_4g_5-h_5g_4-h_6g_2+h_7g_0)h_7 \bmod q$

$=0\ h_0- g_0(h_1^2+ h_2^2+\ldots+ h_7^2+)$

$+ g_1(-h_4h_2- h_7 h_3+ h_2 h_4- h_6h_5+ h_5 h_6+ h_3 h_7)$

$+ g_2(h_4h_1- h_5 h_3- h_1 h_4+ h_3 h_5- h_7 h_6+ h_6 h_7)$

$+ g_3(h_7h_1+ h_5 h_2- h_6 h_4- h_2 h_5+ h_4 h_6-h_1 h_7)$

$+ g_4(-h_2h_1+ h_1 h_2+ h_6 h_3- h_7 h_5- h_3 h_6+h_5 h_7)$

$+ g_5(h_6h_1-h_3 h_2+ h_2 h_3+ h_7 h_4- h_1 h_6-h_4 h_7)$

$+ g_6(h_6h_1-h_3 h_2+ h_2 h_3+ h_7 h_4- h_1 h_6-h_4 h_7)$

$+ g_7(-h_5h_1+h_7 h_2- h_4 h_3+ h_3 h_4+ h_1 h_5-h_2 h_7) \bmod q$

$=0 \bmod q.$

$[(HG)H]_1$

$= \quad (h_0g_0 - h_1g_1- h_2g_2- h_3g_3-h_4g_4- h_5g_5-h_6g_6-h_7g_7)h_1$

$+(h_0g_1+h_1g_0+h_2g_4+h_3g_7-h_4g_2+h_5g_6-h_6g_5-h_7g_3)h_0$

$+(h_0g_2-h_1g_4+h_2g_0+h_3g_5+h_4g_1-h_5g_3+h_6g_7-h_7g_6)h_4$

$+(h_0g_3-h_1g_7-h_2g_5+h_3g_0+h_4g_6+h_5g_2-h_6g_4+h_7g_1)h_7$

$-(h_0g_4+h_1g_2 -h_2g_1 -h_3g_6+h_4g_0+h_5g_7+ h_6g_3 -h_7g_5)h_2$

$+(h_0g_5-h_1g_6+h_2g_3-h_3g_2-h_4g_7+h_5g_0+h_6g_1+h_7g_4)h_6$

$-(h_0g_6+h_1g_5 -h_2g_7+h_3g_4 -h_4g_3 -h_5g_1+h_6g_0 +h_7g_2)h_5$

$-(h_0g_7+h_1g_3+h_2g_6-h_3g_1+h_4g_5-h_5g_4-h_6g_2+h_7g_0)h_3 \bmod q$

$= g_1 (-h_1^2+h_4^2+ h_7^2+ h_2^2+ h_6^2+ h_5^2+ h_3^2)$

$+ g_2 (-h_2 h_1+ h_5 h_7- h_1 h_2- h_3 h_6- h_7 h_5+ h_6 h_3)$

$+ g_3(-h_3h_1- h_5 h_4- h_6 h_2+h_2h_6+ h_4 h_5-h_1h_3)$

$+ g_4(-h_4h_1- h_1h_4- h_6 h_7+h_7h_6-h_3 h_5+h_5h_3)$

$+ g_5(-h_5h_1+ h_3h_4- h_2 h_7+h_7h_2-h_1 h_5-h_4h_3)$

$+ g_6(-h_6h_1- h_7h_4+ h_4 h_7+h_3h_2-h_1 h_6-h_2h_3)$

$+ g_7(-h_7h_1+ h_6h_4- h_1 h_7-h_5h_2-h_4 h_6+h_2h_5) \bmod q$

$= -2(g_1h_1^2+g_2h_2h_1+ g_3h_3h_1+ g_4h_4h_1 +g_5h_5h_1+ g_6h_6h_1+ g_7h_7h_1) \bmod q$

$= -2h_1(g_1 h_1+ g_2 h_2+ g_3h_3+ g_4h_4 +g_5h_5+ g_6h_6+ g_7h_7) \bmod q$

$= -2h_1 0 =0 \bmod q,$

In the same manner we have

$[(HG)H]_i= -2 h_i 0 =0 \bmod q$ (i=2,…,7).

Then we have

$(HG)H=\mathbf{0} \bmod q.$

$[GH]_0+ [HG]_0=0+0 =0 \bmod q$,

$[HG]_1+[GH]_1$

$=(h_2g_4+h_3g_7-h_4g_2+h_5g_6-h_6g_5-h_7g_3)+(g_2h_4+g_3h_7-g_4h_2+g_5h_6-g_6h_5-g_7h_3)$

$=0 \bmod q.$

In the same manner we have

$[HG]_i+[GH]_i=0 \bmod q$ (i=2,…,7).

Then we have

$GH+GH=\mathbf{0} \bmod q.$ q.e.d.