

# Direct Construction of Recursive MDS Diffusion Layers using Shortened BCH Codes

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**Abstract.** MDS matrices allow to build optimal linear diffusion layers in block ciphers. However, MDS matrices cannot be sparse and usually have a large description, inducing costly software/hardware implementations. Recursive MDS matrices allow to solve this problem by focusing on MDS matrices that can be computed as a power of a simple companion matrix, thus having a compact description suitable even for constrained environments. However, up to now, finding recursive MDS matrices required to perform an exhaustive search on families of companion matrices, thus limiting the size of MDS matrices one could look for. In this article we propose a new *direct* construction based on shortened BCH codes, allowing to efficiently construct such matrices for whatever parameters. Unfortunately, not all recursive MDS matrices can be obtained from BCH codes, and our algorithm is not always guaranteed to find the best matrices for a given set of parameters. Linear diffusion, recursive MDS matrices, BCH codes.

## 1 Introduction

Diffusion layers are a central part of most block cipher constructions. There are many options when designing a diffusion layer, but linear diffusion is usually a good choice as it can be efficient and is easy to analyze. The quality of a linear diffusion layer is connected to its *branch number* [3]: the minimum over all possible nonzero inputs of the sum of the Hamming weights of the input and the corresponding output of this diffusion layer. A high branch number implies that changing a single bit of the input will change the output a lot, which is exactly what one expects from a good diffusion layer. Before going into more details on how to build linear diffusion with a high branch number, let us recall some elements of coding theory.

**Linear diffusion and coding theory.** A linear code  $\Gamma$  of dimension  $k$  and length  $n$  over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  (denoted as an  $[n, k]_q$  code) is a vectorial subspace of dimension  $k$  of  $(\mathbb{F}_q)^n$ . Elements of  $\Gamma$  are called code words. The minimal distance  $d$  of a code is the minimum over all nonzero code words  $c \in \Gamma$  of the Hamming weight of  $c$ . A  $[n, k]_q$  code of minimal distance  $d$  will be denoted as an  $[n, k, d]_q$  code. A generator matrix  $G$  of a code is any  $k \times n$  matrix over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  formed by a basis of

the vectorial subspace  $\Gamma$ . We say a generator matrix is in systematic form when it contains (usually on the left-most positions) the  $k \times k$  identity matrix  $I_k$ . The non-systematic part (or redundancy part) of  $G$  is the  $k \times (n - k)$  matrix next to this identity matrix.

Now, suppose a linear diffusion layer of a block cipher is defined by an invertible matrix  $M$  of size  $k \times k$  over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ , so that an input  $x \in (\mathbb{F}_q)^k$  yields an output  $y \in (\mathbb{F}_q)^k$  with  $y = x \times M$ . Then, the  $k \times 2k$  generator matrix  $G_M$  having  $M$  as its non-systematic part (the matrix defined as the concatenation of the  $k \times k$  identity matrix  $I_k$  and of  $M$ , as  $G_M = [I_k \mid M]$ ) generates a  $[2k, k]_q$  code  $\Gamma_M$  whose minimal distance is exactly the branch number of  $M$ . Indeed, a code word  $c = x \times G_M$  in  $\Gamma_M$  is the concatenation of an input  $x$  to the diffusion layer and the corresponding output  $y = x \times M$ . So the Hamming weight of every code word is the sum of the Hamming weights of an input and its output.

Optimal linear diffusion can thus be obtained by using codes with the largest possible minimal distance, namely maximum distance separable (MDS) codes. A  $[n, k]_q$  code is called MDS if its minimal distance is  $d = n - k + 1$ . By extension, we will say that a matrix  $M$  is MDS when its concatenation with the identity matrix yields a generating matrix  $G_M$  of an MDS code  $\Gamma_M$ . In the context of diffusion where  $n = 2k$  being MDS means that  $d = k + 1$ : changing a single element in the input of the diffusion layer will change all the elements in its output.

We also recall the MDS conjecture: if there exists an  $[n, k]_q$  MDS code, meaning an MDS code of length  $n$  and dimension  $k$  over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ , then  $n \leq q + 1$ , except for particular cases which are not relevant to our context. All along this article we will assume that this conjecture holds [8].

*Note on Vector Representation.* In coding theory, vectors are usually represented as rows (with  $y = x \times M$ ), as we have done for the moment. In cryptography, however, they are more often represented as columns (with  $y = M^T \times x$ ). Luckily, the transposed of an MDS matrix is also MDS, so if  $G_M$  defines an MDS code, both  $M$  and  $M^T$  can be used as MDS diffusion matrices. In the rest of the article we will use the column representation, which people used to the AES and the MixColumns operation are more familiar with: the diffusion layer defined by a matrix  $M$  computes  $y = M \times x$ . This way, the branch number of  $M$  is the minimal distance of the code generated by  $G_{M^T} = [I_k \mid M^T]$ . However, in order to avoid matrix transpositions, we will rather check whether  $G_M = [I_k \mid M]$  generates an MDS code or not.

**Recursive MDS matrices.** MDS matrices offer optimal linear diffusion, but in general, they do not allow for a very compact description. Indeed, the non-systematic part  $M$  of an MDS generator matrix cannot contain any 0 element<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> If the non-systematic part  $M$  of an MDS generator matrix contained a 0, then the line of  $G_M$  containing this zero would have Hamming weight  $\leq k$ , which is in contradiction with the minimal distance of the code. More generally, for an MDS code  $\Gamma_M$ , for any  $i \leq k$  all the  $i \times i$  minors of  $M$  must be non-zero.

These matrices can never be sparse and applying such a matrix to its input requires a full matrix multiplication for the diffusion. Several different techniques have been studied to obtain *simpler* MDS matrices, a well known example being circulant matrices (or modifications of circulant matrices) as used in the AES [4] or FOX [7]. Recently a new construction has been proposed: the so-called *recursive* MDS matrices, that were for example used in Photon [5] or LED [6]. These matrices have the property that they can be expressed as a power of a companion matrix  $C$ . For example, in Photon, using the same decimal representation of elements of  $\mathbb{F}_{256}$  as in [5]:

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 & 1 & 4 \\ 4 & 9 & 6 & 17 \\ 17 & 38 & 24 & 66 \\ 66 & 149 & 100 & 11 \end{pmatrix} = C^4, \text{ with } C = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 1 & 4 \end{pmatrix} = \text{Companion}(1, 2, 1, 4).$$

The advantage of such matrices is that they are particularly well suited for lightweight implementations: the diffusion layer can be implemented as a linear feedback shift register that is clocked 4 times (or more generally  $k$  times), using a very small number of gates in hardware implementations, or a very small amount of memory for software. The inverse of the diffusion layer also benefits from a similar structure, see Eq. (1) for a particular case.

**Outline.** In the next section, we will present previous methods that have been used to find recursive MDS matrices. Then, in Section 3, we will introduce BCH codes and shortened BCH codes, show that they too can yield recursive MDS matrices, and give a direct construction of such matrices. In Section 4 we will then describe an algorithm to explore all BCH codes and the MDS diffusion layers they yield for given parameters. We will conclude with a few experimental results.

## 2 Exhaustive Search for Recursive MDS Matrices

Exhaustive search for recursive MDS matrices can be quite straightforward:

- pick some parameters: the matrix size  $k$  and the field size  $q = 2^s$ ,
- loop through all companion matrices  $C$  of size  $k$  over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ ,
- for each  $C$ , computes its  $k$ -th power and check if it is MDS.

However, this technique is very expensive as there are many companion matrices ( $2^{ks}$ , which could be  $2^{128}$  for an 128-bit cipher) and checking if a matrix is MDS is also expensive (the number of minors to compute is exponential in  $k$ ). Also, it does not specially explore the most efficient matrices first. In the Photon example, the matrix uses very sparse coefficients (the field elements represented by 1, 2 and 4) to make the implementation of their operations on inputs even more efficient. Exhaustive search should focus on such matrices.

Following this idea, Sajadieh *et al.* [9] proposed to split the search in two. Their companion matrices are symbolic matrices  $C(X)$  which have coefficients in the polynomial ring  $\mathbb{F}_q[X]$  where  $X$  is an indeterminate, which will be substituted later by some  $\mathbb{F}_2$ -linear operator  $L$  of  $\mathbb{F}_q$ . Then their search space is reduced to symbolic companion matrices  $C(X)$  whose coefficients are small degree polynomials in  $X$  (small degree polynomials will always yield a rather efficient matrix). Once  $C(X)$  is raised to the power  $k$ , to get  $D(X) = C(X)^k$ , the matrix  $D(X)$  will give an MDS matrix  $D(L)$  when evaluated at a particular  $L$ , if for all  $i \leq k$ , all its  $i \times i$  minors evaluated at  $L$  are invertible matrices (non-zero is enough in a field, but now the coefficients are  $\mathbb{F}_2$ -linear operators). Indeed, for a symbolic matrix  $D(X)$ , the minors are polynomials in  $X$ , and their evaluation at a particular linear operator  $L$  needs to be invertible matrices.

This way, for each matrix  $C(X)$  explored during the search, the minors of all sizes of  $D(X) = C(X)^k$  are computed: some matrices have minors equal to the null polynomial and can never be made MDS when  $X$  is substituted by a linear operator  $L$ , for the others this gives (many) algebraic polynomials in  $X$  which must not vanish when evaluated at  $L$ , for the  $k$ -th power  $D(L)$  to be MDS. Then, the second phase of the search of Sajadieh *et al.* is to look for efficient operators  $L$  such that all the above minors are non zero when evaluated at  $L$ . The advantage of this technique is that it finds specially efficient recursive MDS matrices, but the computations of the minors of symbolic matrices can be pretty heavy, because of the growth of the degree of the intermediate polynomials involved. In the case of Photon, the matrix could be found as  $C = \text{Companion}(1, L, 1, L^2)$  where  $L$  is the multiplication by the field element represented by 2.

Continuing this idea and focusing on hardware implementation, Wu, Wang, and Wu [11] were able to find recursive MDS matrices using an impressively small number of XOR gates. They used a technique similar to Sajadieh *et al.*, first searching for symbolic matrices with a list of polynomials having to be invertible when evaluated in  $L$ , then finding an  $\mathbb{F}_2$ -linear operator  $L$  using a single XOR operation and with a minimal polynomial not among the list of polynomials that have to be invertible.

Then, looking for larger recursive MDS matrices, Augot and Finiasz [1] proposed to get rid of the expensive symbolic computations involved in this technique by choosing the minimal polynomial of  $L$  *before* the search of companion matrices  $C(X)$ . Then, all computation can be done in a finite field (modulo the chosen minimal polynomial of  $L$ ), making them much faster. Of course, assuming the MDS conjecture holds, the length of the code cannot be larger than the size of the field plus one, so for an  $L$  with irreducible minimal polynomial of degree  $s$ , the field is of size  $q = 2^s$ , and  $k$  must verify  $2k \leq 2^s + 1$ . Larger MDS matrices will require an operator  $L$  with a higher degree minimal polynomial. Also, in the case where the bound given by the MDS conjecture is almost met (when  $k = 2^{s-1}$ ), Augot and Finiasz noted that all companion matrices found had some kind of symmetry: if the  $k$ -th power of  $\text{Companion}(1, c_1, c_2, \dots, c_{k-1})$  is MDS, then  $c_i = c_{k-i}$  for all  $1 \leq i \leq \frac{k-1}{2}$ .

## 2.1 An Interesting Example

One of the *symmetric* MDS matrices found by Augot and Finiasz [1] for  $k = 8$  and  $\mathbb{F}_q = \mathbb{F}_{16}$  is

$$C = \text{Companion}(1, \alpha^3, \alpha^4, \alpha^{12}, \alpha^8, \alpha^{12}, \alpha^4, \alpha^3)$$

with  $\alpha^4 + \alpha + 1 = 0$ . As we will see later, there is a strong link between companion matrices and the associated polynomial, here

$$P_C(X) = 1 + \alpha^3 X + \alpha^4 X^2 + \alpha^{12} X^3 + \alpha^8 X^4 + \alpha^{12} X^5 + \alpha^4 X^6 + \alpha^3 X^7 + X^8.$$

In this example, this polynomial factors into terms of degree two:

$$P_C(X) = (1 + \alpha^2 X + X^2)(1 + \alpha^4 X + X^2)(1 + \alpha^8 X + X^2)(1 + \alpha^9 X + X^2),$$

meaning that  $P_C(X)$  is split in a degree-2 extension of  $\mathbb{F}_{16}$ , the field  $\mathbb{F}_{256}$ .

If we now consider  $P_C(X)$  in  $\mathbb{F}_{256}[X]$ , which we can, since  $\mathbb{F}_{16}$  is a subfield of  $\mathbb{F}_{256}$ , and look for its roots in  $\mathbb{F}_{256}$ , we find that there are 8 roots in  $\mathbb{F}_{256}$ , which, for a certain primitive 255-th root of unity  $\beta \in \mathbb{F}_{256}$ , are

$$[\beta^5, \beta^6, \beta^7, \beta^8, \beta^9, \beta^{10}, \beta^{11}, \beta^{12}].$$

This indicates a strong connection with BCH codes that we will now study.

## 3 Cyclic Codes, BCH Codes, and Shortening

Before jumping to BCH codes, we must first note a few things that are true for any cyclic code and not only BCH codes. For more details on the definition and properties of cyclic codes, the reader can refer to [8].


### 3.1 A Systematic Representation of Cyclic Codes

An  $[n, k]_q$  code is said to be cyclic if a cyclic shift of any element of the code remains in the code. For example, the code defined by the following generator matrix  $G$  over  $\mathbb{F}_2$  is cyclic:

$$G = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

A cyclic shift to the right of the last line of  $G$  gives  $(1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1)$  which is the sum of the first, third and last lines of  $G$ , thus remains in the code:  $G$  indeed generates a cyclic code.

Cyclic codes can also be defined in terms of polynomials:  $(1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)$  corresponds to  $1 + X^2 + X^3$  and a cyclic shift to the right is a multiplication by  $X$  modulo  $X^n - 1$ . This way, cyclic codes can be seen as ideals of  $\mathbb{F}_q[X]/(X^n - 1)$ ,



**Fig. 1.** An LFSR corresponding to the companion matrix  $C$  of polynomial  $g(X) = X^k + c_{k-1}X^{k-1} + \dots + c_0$ . Clocking it  $k$  times is equivalent to applying  $C^k$  to its internal state.

meaning that each cyclic code  $\Gamma$  can be defined by a generator polynomial  $g(X)$  such that  $\Gamma = \langle g(X) \rangle$  and  $g(X)$  divides  $X^n - 1$ . Then, the code defined by  $g(X)$  has dimension  $k = n - \deg(g)$ . In our example,  $g(X) = 1 + X^2 + X^3$ , which divides  $X^7 - 1$ , and the code is indeed of dimension 4.

Any multiple of  $g(X)$  is in the code, so for any polynomial  $P(X)$  of degree less than  $n$ , the polynomial  $P(X) - (P(X) \bmod g(X))$  is in the code. Using this property with  $P(X) = X^i$  for  $i \in [\deg(g), n - 1]$ , we obtain an interesting systematic form for any cyclic code generator matrix:

$$G = \left( \begin{array}{c|cccc} -X^3 \bmod g(X) & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -X^4 \bmod g(X) & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -X^5 \bmod g(X) & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ -X^6 \bmod g(X) & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \right) = \left( \begin{array}{ccc|cccc} 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \right).$$

This form is exactly what we are looking for when searching for powers of companion matrices. Indeed, if we associate the companion matrix  $C = \text{Companion}(c_0, \dots, c_{k-1})$  to the polynomial  $g(X) = X^k + c_{k-1}X^{k-1} + \dots + c_0$ , then the successive powers of  $C$  are (continuing with our example where  $k = 3$ ):

$$C = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \\ -X^3 \bmod g(X) \end{pmatrix}, \quad C^2 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 \\ -X^3 \bmod g(X) \\ -X^4 \bmod g(X) \end{pmatrix}, \quad C^3 = \begin{pmatrix} -X^3 \bmod g(X) \\ -X^4 \bmod g(X) \\ -X^5 \bmod g(X) \end{pmatrix}.$$

To build recursive MDS matrices we thus simply need to build MDS cyclic codes with suitable parameters and their corresponding  $g(X)$ .

Note that a multiplication by a companion matrix can also be expressed in terms of LFSR. Initializing the LFSR of Fig. 1 with a vector and clocking it once corresponds to the multiplication of this vector by  $C$ . Clocking it  $k$  times corresponds to the multiplication by  $M = C^k$ . We will continue using the matrix representation in the rest of the paper, but most results could also be expressed in terms of LFSR.

### 3.2 BCH Codes and Shortened BCH Codes

In general, given a generator polynomial  $g(X)$ , computing the minimal distance of the associated cyclic code is a hard problem. For instance, the code generated by  $g(X) = 1 + X^2 + X^3$  in the example of the previous section has minimal

distance 3, but even for such small examples it is not necessarily immediate to find the minimum distance. Nonetheless, lower bounds exist for some specific constructions. This is the case for BCH codes, as described for example in [8].

**Definition 1 (BCH codes).** A BCH code over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  is defined using an element  $\beta$  in some extension  $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$  of  $\mathbb{F}_q$ . First, pick integers  $\ell$  and  $d$  and take the  $(d-1)$  consecutive powers  $\beta^\ell, \beta^{\ell+1}, \dots, \beta^{\ell+d-2}$  of  $\beta$ , then compute  $g(X) = \text{lcm}(\text{Min}_{\mathbb{F}_q}(\beta^\ell), \dots, \text{Min}_{\mathbb{F}_q}(\beta^{\ell+d-2}))$ , where  $\text{Min}_{\mathbb{F}_q}(\beta^\ell)$  is the minimal polynomial of  $\beta^\ell$  over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .

The cyclic code over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  of length  $\text{ord}(\beta)$  defined by  $g(X)$  is called a BCH code, it has dimension  $(\text{ord}(\beta) - \deg(g))$  and has minimal distance at least  $d$ . We write this as being an  $[\text{ord}(\beta), \text{ord}(\beta) - \deg(g), \geq d]_q$  code.

For such a BCH code to be MDS,  $g(X)$  must have degree exactly  $d-1$  (for a cyclic code  $\deg(g(X)) = n-k$  and for an MDS code  $d = n-k+1$ , so an MDS BCH code necessarily verifies  $\deg(g(X)) = d-1$ ). Seeing that  $g(X)$  already has  $d-1$  roots over  $\mathbb{F}_{q^m}$ , it cannot have any other roots. This means that the powers  $\beta^{\ell+j}$ ,  $j = 0, \dots, d-2$ , must all be conjugates of each other.

**The need for shortening.** When building diffusion layers, the input and output of the diffusion generally have the same size (otherwise inversion might be a problem), so we need codes of length  $2k$  and dimension  $k$ . In terms of BCH codes, this translates into using  $k$  consecutive powers of an element  $\beta$  of order  $2k$ , and having  $g(X)$  of degree  $k$ . Of course, elements of even order do not exist in extensions of  $\mathbb{F}_2$ , so this is not possible. Instead of using full length BCH codes, we thus use *shortened* BCH codes.

**Definition 2 (Shortened code).** Given a  $[n, k, d]_q$  code  $\Gamma$ , and a set  $I$  of  $z$  indices  $\{i_1, \dots, i_z\}$ , the shortened code  $\Gamma_I$  of  $C$  at indices from  $I$  is the set of words from  $\Gamma$  which are zero at positions  $i_1, \dots, i_z$ , and whose zero coordinates are deleted, thus effectively shortening these words by  $z$  positions. The shortened code  $\Gamma_I$  has length  $n-z$ , dimension  $\geq k-z$  and minimal distance  $\geq d$ .

If  $\Gamma$  is MDS, then  $d = n-k+1$  and  $\Gamma_I$  will necessarily be an  $[n-z, k-z, d]_q$  MDS code, as neither the dimension nor the minimal distance can increase without breaking the Singleton bound [10].

We can thus look for  $[2k+z, k+z, k+1]_q$  BCH codes and shorten them on  $z$  positions to obtain our MDS codes. However, shortened BCH codes are no longer cyclic, so the shortening has to be done in a way that conserves the recursive structure. This is easy to achieve by using the previous systematic representation and shortening on the last positions. Starting from  $g(X)$  of degree  $k$ , which divides  $X^{2k+z} - 1$ , we get a generating matrix:

$$G = \left( \begin{array}{c|ccc} X^k \bmod g(X) & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ X^{k+1} \bmod g(X) & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ \dots & & & \dots & \\ X^{2k+z-1} \bmod g(X) & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \right).$$

size  $k+z$

Shortening the code on the  $z$  last positions will maintain the systematic form and simply remove the  $z$  last lines to obtain:

$$G_I = \left( \begin{array}{c|ccc} X^k \bmod g(X) & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ X^{k+1} \bmod g(X) & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ \dots & & & \dots & \\ X^{2k-1} \bmod g(X) & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \right).$$

size  $k$

As said above, when  $G$  generates an MDS code, then  $G_I$  also generates an MDS code, and this is (up to a permutation of the two  $k \times k$  blocks, that will not affect the MDS property) exactly what we are looking for: a recursive MDS matrix defined by the companion matrix associated to the polynomial  $g(X)$ .

### 3.3 Direct Construction of Recursive MDS Matrices

From this result, in the case where  $q = 2^s$ , we can deduce a direct construction of recursive MDS matrices based on MDS BCH codes that were already described in [8], Chapter 11, §5. We first pick a  $\beta$  of order  $q + 1$ . As  $q + 1$  divides  $q^2 - 1$ ,  $\beta$  is always in  $\mathbb{F}_{q^2}$ , the degree-2 extension of  $\mathbb{F}_q$ . Then, apart from  $\beta^0 = 1$ , all powers of  $\beta$  have minimal polynomials of degree 2: since  $\beta$  is of order  $q + 1$ , each  $\beta^i$  has a conjugate  $\beta^{qi} = \beta^{-i}$  which is the second root of  $\text{Min}_{\mathbb{F}_q}(\beta^i)$ . From there, it is easy to build a  $[q + 1, q + 1 - k, k + 1]_q$  MDS BCH code for any value of  $k \leq \frac{q}{2}$ .

- If  $k$  is even, we need to select  $k$  consecutive powers of  $\beta$  that are conjugates by pairs: if  $\beta^i$  is selected,  $\beta^{q+1-i}$  is selected too. We thus select all the powers  $\beta^i$  with  $i \in [\frac{q-k}{2} + 1, \frac{q+k}{2}]$ , grouped around  $\frac{q+1}{2}$ .
- If  $k$  is odd, we need to select  $\beta^0$  as well. We thus select all the powers  $\beta^i$  with  $i \in [-\frac{k-1}{2}, \frac{k-1}{2}]$ , grouped around 0.

In both cases, we get a polynomial  $g(X)$  of degree  $k$  defining an MDS BCH code of length  $q + 1$ . We can then shorten this code on  $z = (q + 1 - 2k)$  positions and obtain the  $[2k, k, k + 1]_q$  MDS code we were looking for. The non-systematic part of the generator matrix of this code is the  $k$ -th power of the companion matrix defined by  $g(X)$ .

Also, as the conjugate of  $\beta^i$  is its inverse,  $g(X)$  enjoys the same symmetry as the example of Section 2.1:  $X^k g(X^{-1}) = g(X)$ . This explains the symmetry observed in [1]. Furthermore, the companion matrix associated to  $g(X)$  thus has at most  $\frac{k}{2}$  different coefficients and can be implemented with at most  $\frac{k}{2}$  multiplications.

Finally, by cycling over all  $\beta$  of order  $q + 1$ , in the case where  $2k = q$  we were able to recover with this direct construction all the solutions found in [1] through exhaustive search. We conjecture that when  $2k = q$ , the only recursive MDS matrices that exist come from these shortened BCH codes.



## 4 An Algorithm to Find All MDS BCH Codes

We have seen that shortened BCH codes allow to directly build recursive MDS matrices. However, when building a block cipher, the designer usually has some parameters in mind (say, a diffusion layer on  $k$  symbols of  $s$  bits each) and wants the *best* diffusion layer matching these parameters. Our direct construction gives good solutions, but cannot guarantee they are the best. So the designer needs an algorithm that will enumerate all possible matrices and let him pick the most suitable one. For this, we will consider BCH codes where  $\beta$  is a  $(2k + z)$ -th root of unity and not only a  $(2k + 1)$ -th root of unity as in the direct construction. First, there are a few constraints to consider.

*Field Multiplication or  $\mathbb{F}_2$ -linearity?* The designer has to choose the type of linearity he wants for his diffusion layer. If he wants (standard) linearity over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^s}$ , then the BCH code has to be built over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^s}$  (or a subfield of  $\mathbb{F}_{2^s}$ , but the construction is the same). However, as in the Sajadieh *et al.* [9] or the Wu *et al.* [11] constructions, he could choose to use an  $\mathbb{F}_2$ -linear operator  $L$ . Assuming  $L$  has an irreducible minimal polynomial of degree  $s' \leq s$  (see [1] for how to deal with non-irreducible minimal polynomials), then he needs to build a BCH code over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^{s'}}$ . This choice is up to the designer but does not change anything to the rest of the algorithm, so we will assume  $s' = s$ .

*The MDS Conjecture.* Our shortened BCH construction starts by building an MDS code of length  $2k + z$  over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^s}$ . The MDS conjecture tells us that  $2k + z \leq 2^s + 1$  must hold. When  $k = 2^{s-1}$ ,  $z = 1$  is the only choice. In general, we can choose any  $z \in [1, 2^s + 1 - 2k]$ , so the algorithm will need to try all these possibilities.

*Minimal Polynomials of Roots of Unity.* The  $\beta$  involved in the BCH construction is a  $(2k + z)$ -th root of unity, and  $g(X)$  is formed as the product of minimal polynomials of powers of  $\beta$ . First,  $(2k + z)$ -th roots of unity must exist, meaning  $2k + z$  must be odd (or more generally coprime with  $q$  when  $q$  is not  $2^s$ ). Then, when factorizing  $X^{2k+z} - 1$ , the minimal polynomials of the  $\beta^i$  are factors of this decomposition, and  $g(X)$  is the product of some of these factors. It must thus be possible to obtain a polynomial of degree  $k$  this way. This is not always possible: for example,  $X^{23} - 1$  decomposes over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$  in a factor of degree 1 and two factors of degree 11 and very few values of  $k$  can be obtained. However, this last condition is rather complex to integrate in an algorithm and it will be easier to simply not take it into account.

### 4.1 A Simple Algorithm

For given parameters  $k$  and  $q = 2^s$  we propose to use Algorithm 1 to enumerate all possible recursive MDS matrices coming from shortened BCH codes. This algorithm explores all code lengths from  $2k + 1$  to  $q + 1$ , meaning that the number of shortened columns can be much larger than the final code we are

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**Algorithm 1:** Search for Recursive MDS Matrices
 

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**Input:** parameters  $k$  and  $s$   
**Output:** a set  $\mathcal{S}$  of polynomials yielding MDS matrices

```

1  $q \leftarrow 2^s$ 
2  $\mathcal{S} \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
3 for  $z \leftarrow 1$  to  $(q + 1 - 2k)$ , with  $z$  odd do
4    $\alpha \leftarrow$  primitive  $(2k + z)$ -th root of unity of  $\mathbb{F}_q$ 
5   forall the  $\beta = \alpha^i$  such that  $\text{ord}(\beta) = 2k + z$  do
6     for  $\ell \leftarrow 0$  to  $(2k + z - 2)$  do
7        $g(X) \leftarrow \prod_{j=0}^{k-1} (X - \beta^{\ell+j})$ 
8       if  $g(X) \in \mathbb{F}_q[X]$  then    (we test if  $g$  has all its coefficients in  $\mathbb{F}_q$ )
9          $\mathcal{S} \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \cup \{g(X)\}$ 
10      end
11    end
12  end
13 end
14 return  $\mathcal{S}$ 

```

---

**Fig. 2.** Algorithm searching for MDS BCH codes

aiming for. Instead of computing minimal polynomials and their least common multiple as in the definition of BCH codes we directly compute  $\prod_{j=0}^{k-1} (X - \beta^{\ell+j})$  and check if it is in  $\mathbb{F}_q[X]$ . This allows the algorithm to be more efficient and also makes upper bounding its complexity much easier. The following lemma shows that the two formulations are equivalent.

**Lemma 1.** *A BCH code over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  defined by the  $d - 1$  roots  $[\beta^\ell, \dots, \beta^{\ell+d-2}]$  is MDS, if and only if  $P(X) = \prod_{j=0}^{d-2} (X - \beta^{\ell+j})$  is in  $\mathbb{F}_q[X]$ . In this case,  $g(X) = \text{lcm}(\text{Min}_{\mathbb{F}_q}(\beta^\ell), \dots, \text{Min}_{\mathbb{F}_q}(\beta^{\ell+d-2}))$  is equal to  $P(X)$ .*

*Proof.* We have seen that a BCH code is MDS if and only if  $g(X)$  is of degree  $d - 1$  exactly. Also,  $g(X)$  is always a multiple of  $P(X)$ .

First, assume we have an MDS BCH code. Then  $g(X)$  is of degree  $d - 1$  and is a multiple of  $P(X)$  which is also of degree  $d - 1$ . So, up to a scalar factor,  $g(X) = P(X)$  and  $P(X) \in \mathbb{F}_q[X]$ .

Conversely, assume we have a BCH code such that  $P(X) \in \mathbb{F}_q[X]$ . Then, for any  $j \in [0, d - 2]$ ,  $P(X)$  is a polynomial in  $\mathbb{F}_q[X]$  having  $\beta^{\ell+j}$  as a root, so  $P(X)$  is a multiple of  $\text{Min}_{\mathbb{F}_q}(\beta^{\ell+j})$ . Therefore,  $g(X)$  divides  $P(X)$  and, as  $P(X)$  also divides  $g(X)$ , we have  $g(X) = P(X)$ .  $g(X)$  thus has degree  $d - 1$  and the code is MDS.  $\square$

## 4.2 Complexity

The previous algorithm simply tests all possible candidates without trying to be smart about which could be eliminated faster. It also finds each solution several

times (typically for  $\beta$  and  $\beta^{-1}$ ), and finds some *equivalent* solutions (applying  $\alpha \mapsto \alpha^2$  on all coefficients of the polynomial preserves the MDS property, so each equivalence class is found  $s$  times).

The product at line 7 does not have to be fully recomputed for each value of  $\ell$ . It can be computed once for  $\ell = 0$ , then one division by  $(X - \beta^\ell)$  and one multiplication by  $(X - \beta^{\ell+k})$  are enough to update it at each iteration. This update costs  $O(k)$  operations in the extension of  $\mathbb{F}_q$  containing  $\alpha$ . The whole loop on  $\ell$  can thus be executed in  $O((2k+z)k)$  operations in the extension field.

The number of  $\beta$  for which the loop has to be done is Euler's phi function  $\varphi(2k+z)$  which is smaller than  $(2k+z)$ , itself smaller than  $q$ , and there are  $\frac{q-2k}{2} + 1$  values of  $z$  to test. This gives an overall complexity of  $O(q^2k(q-2k))$  operations in an extension of  $\mathbb{F}_q$ . This extension is of degree at most  $2k+z$ , so operations are at most on  $q \log q$  bits in this extension and cost at most  $O(q^2(\log q)^2)$ . This gives an upper bound on the total complexity of  $O(q^4k(q-2k)(\log q)^2)$  binary operations, a degree-6 polynomial in  $k$  and  $q$ . This is a quite expensive, but as we will see in the next section, this algorithm runs fast enough for most practical parameters. It should also be possible to accelerate this algorithm using more elaborate computer algebra techniques.

## 5 Experimental Results

We implemented Algorithm 1 in Magma [2] (see the code in Appendix A) and ran it for various parameters.

### 5.1 The Extremal Case: $2k = 2^s$ .

First, we ran the algorithm for parameters on the bound given by the MDS conjecture, that is, when  $2k = 2^s$ . These are the parameters that were studied by Augot and Finiasz in [1]. It took their algorithm 80 days of CPU time to perform the exhaustive search with parameters  $k = 16$  and  $s = 5$  and find the same 10 solutions that our new algorithm finds in a few milliseconds. The timings and number of solutions we obtained are summarized in Table 1. We were also able to find much larger MDS diffusion layers. For example, we could deal with  $k = 128$  elements of  $s = 8$  bits, which maybe is probably too large to be practical, even with a recursive structure and the nice symmetry. Below are the logs in base  $\alpha$  (with  $\alpha^8 + \alpha^4 + \alpha^3 + \alpha^2 + 1 = 0$ ) of the last line of the companion matrix of an example of such 1024-bit diffusion:

[0, 83, 25, 136, 62, 8, 73, 112, 253, 110, 246, 156, 53, 1, 41, 73, 5, 93, 190, 253, 149, 98, 125, 124, 149, 94, 100, 41, 37, 183, 81, 6, 242, 74, 252, 104, 57, 117, 55, 224, 153, 130, 77, 156, 192, 176, 52, 133, 218, 59, 158, 18, 228, 89, 218, 126, 146, 210, 217, 18, 84, 209, 30, 123, **97**, 123, ... [ symmetric ] ... , 83]

**Table 1.** Experimental results for parameters on the bound given by MDS conjecture. The value “diff. bits” is the size in bits of the corresponding diffusion layer. The number of solutions is given as both the raw number and the number of distinct equivalence classes.

| $k$ | $s$ | diff. bits | solutions |         | time   |
|-----|-----|------------|-----------|---------|--------|
|     |     |            | num.      | classes |        |
| 4   | 3   | 12         | 3         | 1       | <0.01s |
| 8   | 4   | 32         | 8         | 2       | <0.01s |
| 16  | 5   | 80         | 10        | 2       | <0.01s |
| 32  | 6   | 192        | 24        | 4       | ~0.02s |
| 64  | 7   | 448        | 42        | 6       | ~0.07s |
| 128 | 8   | 1024       | 128       | 16      | ~0.52s |
| 256 | 9   | 2304       | 162       | 18      | ~1.71s |

**Table 2.** Experimental results for other interesting parameters. The reg. solutions refer to regular solutions where the constant term of the polynomial is 1.

| $k$ | $s$ | diff. bits | solutions |      | time   |
|-----|-----|------------|-----------|------|--------|
|     |     |            | num.      | reg. |        |
| 4   | 4   | 16         | 68        | 12   | ~0.02s |
| 4   | 8   | 32         | 20180     | 252  | ~37s   |
| 8   | 8   | 64         | 20120     | 248  | ~44s   |
| 16  | 8   | 128        | 19984     | 240  | ~55s   |
| 32  | 8   | 256        | 19168     | 224  | ~80s   |

## 5.2 The General Case

We also ran some computations for other interesting parameters, typically for values of  $k$  and  $s$  that are both powers of 2 as it is often the case in block ciphers. The results we obtained are summarized in Table 2. Note that for these solutions the number of shortened positions is sometime huge: for  $k = 4$  and  $s = 8$  one can start from a  $[257, 253, 5]_{256}$  BCH code and shorten it on 249 positions to obtain a  $[8, 4, 5]_{256}$  code. We counted both the total number of solutions we found and the number of regular solutions where the constant term of the polynomial is 1. Regular solutions are particularly interesting as the diffusion and its inverse share the same coefficients:

$$\text{Companion}(1, c_1, \dots, c_{k-1})^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & & 0 \\ & & \ddots & \\ 0 & 0 & & 1 \\ 1 & c_1 & & c_{k-1} \end{pmatrix}^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix} c_1 & c_{k-1} & 1 \\ 1 & & 0 & 0 \\ & \ddots & & \\ 0 & & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}. \quad (1)$$

In the case of symmetric solutions (like those from Section 3.3), encryption and decryption can even use the exact same circuit by simply reversing the order of the input and output symbols. Here are some examples of what we found:

- for parameters  $k = 4$  and  $s = 4$ , with  $\alpha$  such that  $\alpha^4 + \alpha + 1 = 0$ , the matrices  $\text{Companion}(1, \alpha^3, \alpha, \alpha^3)^4$  and  $\text{Companion}(\alpha^3 + \alpha, 1, \alpha, \alpha^3)^4$  are MDS.

- for parameters  $k = 4$  and  $s = 8$ , with  $\alpha$  such that  $\alpha^8 + \alpha^4 + \alpha^3 + \alpha^2 + 1 = 0$ , the matrices  $\text{Companion}(1, \alpha^3, \alpha^{-1}, \alpha^3)^4$ ,  $\text{Companion}(1, \alpha^3 + \alpha^2, \alpha^3, \alpha^3 + \alpha^2)^4$ , and  $\text{Companion}(\alpha + 1, 1, \alpha^{202} + 1, \alpha^{202})^4$  are MDS.

The reader might note the absence of larger fields in Table 2. One could for example want to obtain a 128-bit diffusion layer using  $k = 8$  symbols of  $s = 16$  bits. However, going through all the possible values of  $z$  and  $\ell$  takes too long with  $q = 2^{16}$ . Our algorithm is too naive, and an algorithm enumerating the divisors of  $X^{2k+z} - 1$  of degree  $k$  and checking if they correspond to BCH codes could be faster in this case. Otherwise, it is always possible to use the direct construction given in Section 3.3.

### 5.3 Further Work

As we have seen, for most parameters, this algorithm runs fast enough to find all recursive MDS matrices coming from BCH codes. However, not all recursive MDS matrices come from a BCH code.

- First, there are other classes of cyclic codes that are MDS and could be shortened in a similar way. Any such class of codes can directly be plugged into our algorithm, searching for polynomials  $g(X)$  having another structure than roots that are consecutive powers of  $\beta$ .
- Then, there also are cyclic codes which are not MDS, but become MDS once they are shortened. These will be much harder to track as they do not have to obey the MDS conjecture and can have a much larger length before shortening.

For this reason, we are not always able (yet) to find the most efficient matrices with our algorithm. For example, the matrix used in Photon corresponds to a cyclic code of length  $2^{24} - 1$  over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$  which is not MDS. We know that this code has minimum distance 3, and its distance grows to 5 when shortened from the length  $2^{24} - 1$  to the length 8.

However, for some parameters, our algorithm is able to find very nice solutions. For  $k = 4$  and  $\alpha$  verifying  $\alpha^5 + \alpha^2 + 1 = 0$  (a primitive element of  $\mathbb{F}_{2^5}$ , or an  $\mathbb{F}_2$ -linear operator with this minimal polynomial), the matrix  $\text{Companion}(1, \alpha, \alpha^{-1}, \alpha)$  found by Algorithm 1 yields an MDS diffusion layer. This is especially nice because it is possible to build simple  $\mathbb{F}_2$ -linear operators that also have a simple inverse, and this solution is symmetric meaning the inverse diffusion can use the same circuit as the diffusion itself.

## 6 Conclusion

The main result of this article is the understanding that recursive MDS matrices can be obtained directly from shortened MDS cyclic codes. From this, we derive both a direct construction and a very simple algorithm, based on the enumeration of BCH codes, that allows to efficiently find recursive MDS matrices for any

diffusion and symbol sizes. These constructions do not always find all existing recursive MDS matrices and can thus miss some interesting solutions. As part of our future works, we will continue to investigate this problem, trying to understand what properties the other solutions have and how we can extend our algorithm to find them all. A first step is to elucidate the Photon matrix in terms of cyclic codes which are not BCH codes, hopefully finding a direct construction of this matrix. However, in the same way as computing the minimal distance of a cyclic code is difficult, it might turn out that finding all recursive MDS matrices of a given size is a hard problem.

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## A Magma Code

Here is the Magma code for Algorithm 1. Simply run `BCH(k,s)` to get the set of all polynomials of degree  $k$  over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^s}$  that yield MDS diffusion layers on  $ks$  bits.

Of course, these polynomials have to be written as companion matrices which then have to be raised to the power  $k$  to obtain the final MDS matrices.

```
BCH := function(k,s)
  q := 2^s;
  F := GF(q);
  P := PolynomialRing(F);
  S := { };
  for z:=1 to q+1-2*k by 2 do
    a := RootOfUnity(2*k+z, F);
    Pext<X> := PolynomialRing(Parent(a));
    for i:=0 to 2*k+z-1 do
      b := a^i;
      if Order(b) eq (2*k+z) then
        g := &*[(X-b^l): l in [-1..k-2]];
        for l in [0..2*k+z-2] do
          g := (g*(X-b^(l+k-1))) div (X-b^(l-1));
          if IsCoercible(P,g) then
            Include(~S, P!g);
          end if;
        end for;
      end if;
    end for;
  end for;
  return S;
end function;
```