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'A '''device fingerprint''' or ''machine fingerprint'' is information collected about the software and hardware of a remote computing device for the purpose of identification. The information is usually assimilated into a brief identifier using a [[fingerprinting algorithm]]. A '''browser fingerprint''' is information collected specifically by interaction with the [[web browser]] of the device.{{r|1=Laperdrix2016|p1=878|2=Eckersley2010|p2=1}} Device fingerprints can be used to fully or partially identify individual devices even when [[persistent cookie]]s (and also [[zombie cookie]]s) can't be read or stored in the browser, the client [[IP address]] is hidden, and even if one switches to another browser on the same device.{{r|yao2017}} This may allow a service provider to detect and prevent [[identity theft]] and [[credit card fraud]],{{r|Alaca2016|p=299|Steinberg2014|infoworld|simility}} but also to compile long-term records of individuals' browsing histories (and deliver [[targeted advertising]]{{r|1=Nikiforakis2015|p1=821|2=Acar2013|p2=9}} or targeted [[exploit (computer security)|exploit]]s{{r|1=Abgrall2012|p1=8|2=Nikiforakis2013|p2=547}}) even when they're attempting to [[Anonymous web browsing|avoid tracking]], raising a major concern for [[internet privacy]] advocates.{{r|eff12ways}} Some [[computer security]] experts consider the ease of bulk parameter extraction offered by web browsers to be a [[security hole]].{{r|email}} ==History== {{Update|section|date=March 2020}} Basic [[web browser]] configuration information has long been collected by [[web analytics]] services in an effort to measure real human [[web traffic]] and discount various forms of [[click fraud]]. And since its introduction in the late 1990s, [[JavaScript|client-side scripting]] has gradually enabled the collection an increasing amount of diverse information. In 2005, researchers at [[University of California, San Diego]] showed how [[Transmission Control Protocol| TCP]] timestamps could be used to estimate the [[clock skew]] of a device, and consequently to remotely obtain an hardware fingerprint of the device.{{r|Kohno}} In 2010, [[Electronic Frontier Foundation]] launched a website where visitors can test their browser fingerprint.{{r|aboutPanop}} After collecting a sample of 470161 fingerprints, they measured at least 18.1 bits of [[Entropy (information theory)|entropy]] possible from browser fingerprinting,{{r|uniquePanop}} but that was before the advancements of [[canvas fingerprinting]], which claims to add another 5.7 bits. In 2012, Keaton Mowery and Hovav Shacham, researchers at [[University of California, San Diego]], showed how the [[HTML5]] [[canvas element]] could be used to create digital fingerprints of web browsers.{{r|Angwin|Mowery2012}} In 2013, at least 0.4% of Alexa top 10,000 sites were found to use fingerprinting scripts provided by a few known third parties.{{r|Nikiforakis2013|p=546}} In 2014, 5.5% of Alexa top 10,000 sites were found to use canvas fingerprinting scripts served by a total of 20 domains. The overwhelming majority (95%) of the scripts were served by [[AddThis]], which started using canvas fingerprinting in January that year, without the knowledge of some of its clients.{{r|1=Acar2014|p1=678|2=Davis|3=Angwin|4=Knibbs|5=Steinberg2014}} In 2015, a feature to protect against browser fingerprinting was introduced in [[Firefox]] version 41,<ref>{{cite web |url=https://github.com/ghacksuserjs/ghacks-user.js/issues/7 |title=meta: tor uplift: privacy.resistFingerprinting |accessdate=2018-07-06}}</ref> but it has been since left in an experimental stage, not initiated by default.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/firefox-protection-against-fingerprinting |title=Firefox's protection against fingerprinting |accessdate=2018-07-06}}</ref><br> The same year a feature named ''Enhanced Tracking Protection'' was introduced in Firefox version 42 to protect against tracking during private browsing<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/42.0/releasenotes/|title=Firefox 42.0 release notes}}</ref> by blocking scripts from third party domains found in the lists published by the company Disconnect. At [[WWDC 2018]] [[Apple Inc.|Apple]] announced that [[Safari (web browser)|Safari]] on [[macOS Mojave]] "presents simplified system information when users browse the web, preventing them from being tracked based on their system configuration."<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2018/06/apple-introduces-macos-mojave/ |title=Apple introduces macOS Mojave |accessdate=2018-07-06}}</ref><br> A 2018 study revealed that only one-third of browser fingerprints in a French database were unique, indicating that browser fingerprinting may become less effective as the number of users increases and web technologies convergently evolve to implement fewer distinguishing features.{{r|Gómez-Boix2018}} In 2019, starting from Firefox version 69, ''Enhanced Tracking Protection'' has been turned always on by default for all users.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/69.0/releasenotes/|title=Firefox 69.0 release notes}}</ref> The feature was first introduced to protect private browsing in 2015 and then it was extended to standard browsing as an opt-in feature in 2018. ==Diversity and stability== Motivation for the device fingerprint concept stems from the [[forensic science|forensic]] value of [[fingerprint|human fingerprints]]. In order to uniquely distinguish over time some devices through their fingerprints, the fingerprints must be both sufficiently diverse and sufficiently stable. In practice neither diversity nor stability is fully attainable, and improving one has a tendency to adversely impact the other. For example, the assimilation of an additional browser setting into the browser fingerprint would usually increase diversity, but it would also reduce stability, because if a user changes that setting, then the broser fingerprint would change as well.{{r|Eckersley2010|p=11}} [[Entropy (information theory)|Entropy]] is one of several ways to measure diversity. ==Sources of identifying information== Applications that are locally installed on a device are allowed to gather a great amount of information about the software and the hardware of the device, often including unique identifiers such as the [[MAC address]] and [[serial number]]s assigned to the machine hardware. Indeed, programs that employ [[digital rights management]] use this information for the very purpose of uniquely identify the device. Even if they aren’t designed to gather and share identifying information, local applications might unwillingly expose identifying information to the remote parties with wich they interact. The most prominent example is that of web browsers, which have been proved to expose diverse and stable information in such an amount to allow remote identification, see {{Section link||Browser fingerprint}}. Diverse and stable information can also be gathered below the application layer, by leveraging the protocols that are used to transmit data. Sorted by [[OSI model]] layer, some examples of such protocols are: * OSI Layer 7: [[Server Message Block|SMB]], [[FTP]], [[HTTP]], [[Telnet]], [[Transport layer security|TLS/SSL]], [[DHCP]]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://chatteronthewire.org/download/chatter-dhcp.pdf |title=Chatter on the Wire: A look at DHCP traffic |accessdate=2010-01-28 |url-status=live |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20140811092914/http://chatteronthewire.org/download/chatter-dhcp.pdf |archivedate=2014-08-11 }}</ref> * OSI Layer 5: [[Simple Network Management Protocol|SNMP]], [[NetBIOS]] * OSI Layer 4: [[Transmission Control Protocol|TCP]] (see [[TCP/IP stack fingerprinting]]) * OSI Layer 3: [[IPv4]], [[IPv6]], [[Internet Control Message Protocol|ICMP]], [[IEEE 802.11]]{{r|sandia2006}} * OSI Layer 2: [[Cisco Discovery Protocol|CDP]]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://chatteronthewire.org/download/OS%20FingerPrint.pdf |title=Chatter on the Wire: A look at excessive network traffic and what it can mean to network security. |accessdate=2010-01-28 |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20140828085807/http://chatteronthewire.org/download/OS%20Fingerprint.pdf |archivedate=2014-08-28 }}</ref> Passive fingerprinting techniques merely require the fingerprinter to observe traffic originated from the target device, while active fingerprinting techniques require the fingerprinter to initiate connections to the target device. Techniques that require to interact with the target device over a connection initiated by the latter are sometimes addressed as semi-passive.{{r|Kohno}} == Browser fingerprint == The collection of large amount of diverse and stable information from web browsers is possible thanks for most part to [[client-side scripting]] languages, which have been introduced in the late '90s. === Browser version === {{Main|Browser sniffing}} Browsers provide their name and version, together with some compatibility information, in the User-Agent request header.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/User-Agent|title=User-Agent}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://webaim.org/blog/user-agent-string-history/|title= History of the browser user-agent string|author=Aaron Andersen}}</ref> Being a statement freely given by the client, it shouldn't be trusted when assessing its identity. Instead, the type and version of the browser can be inferred from the observation of quirks in its behavior: for example, the order and number of [[List of HTTP header fields|HTTP header fields]] is unique to each browser family{{r|1=Unger2013|p1=257|2=Fiore2014|p2=357}} and, most importantly, each browser family and version differs in its implementation of [[HTML5]],{{r|1=Abgrall2012|p1=1|2=Unger2013|p2=257}} [[CSS]]{{r|1=Takei2015|p1=58|2=Unger2013|p2=256}} and [[JavaScript]].{{r|1=Nikiforakis2013|p1=547,549-50|2=Mulazzani2013|p2=2|3=Mowery2011|4=Upathilake2015}} Such differences can be remotely tested by using JavaScript. A [[Hamming distance]] comparison of parser behaviors has been shown to effectively fingerprint and differentiate a majority of browser versions.{{r|Abgrall2012|p=6}} {| class="wikitable" |+ JavaScript object manipulation is specific to each browser family |- ! Browser family ! Property deletion (of navigator object) ! Reassignment (of navigator/screen object) |- | Google Chrome | allowed | allowed |- | Mozilla Firefox | ignored | ignored |- | Opera | allowed | allowed |- | Internet Explorer | ignored | ignored |} === Browser extensions === A browser unique combination of [[browser extension|extensions]] or [[Plugin (computing)|plugins]] can be added to a fingerprint directly.{{r|Nikiforakis2013|p=545}} Extensions may also modify how any other browser attributes behave, adding additional complexity to the user's fingerprint.{{r|1=Starov2017|p1=954|2=Sanchez-Rola2017|p2=688|3=Acar2013|p3=1131|4=Kaur2017|p4=108}} [[Adobe Flash]] and [[Java (software platform)|Java]] plugins were widely used to access user information before their deprecation.{{r|1=Fiore2014|p1=3|2=Nikiforakis2013|p2=553|3=Upathilake2015}} === Hardware properties === User agents may provide [[computer hardware|system hardware]] information, such as phone [[Product (business)#Product model|model]], in the HTTP header.{{r|1=Kaur2017|p1=107|2=Al-Fannah2017|p2=111}} Properties about the user's [[operating system]], [[screen size]], [[screen orientation]], and [[display aspect ratio]] can be also retrieved by observing with [[JavaScript]] the result of [[CSS]] media queries.{{r|Takei2015|p=59-60}} === Browsing history === The fingerprinter can determine which sites the browser has previously visited within a list he provides, by querying the list using JavaScript with the CSS selector {{code|:visited}}.{{r|Olejnik2012|p=5}} Typically, a list of 50 popular websites is sufficient to generate a unique user history profile, as well as provide information about the user's interests.{{r|Olejnik2012|p=7,14}} === Font metrics === The letter bounding boxes differ between browsers based on [[Spatial anti-aliasing|anti-aliasing]] and [[font hinting]] configuration and can be measured by JavaScript.{{r|Fifield2015|p=108}} === Canvas and WebGL === [[File:Typical Tor Browser notification of a canvas read attempt.png|thumb|300px|Typical Tor Browser notification of a website attempting a canvas read.]] Canvas fingerprinting uses the HTML5 [[canvas element]], which is used by [[WebGL]] to render 2D and 3D graphics in a browser, to gain identifying information about the installed [[Device driver|graphics driver]], [[video card|graphics card]], or [[graphics processing unit]] (GPU). Canvas-based techniques may also be used to identify installed [[Computer font|font]]s.{{r|Al-Fannah2017|p=110}} Furthermore, if the user does not have a GPU, [[CPU]] information can be provided to the fingerprinter instead. A canvas fingerprinting script first draws text of specified font, size, and background color. The image of the text as rendered by the user's browser is then recovered by the ToDataURL Canvas API method. The hashed text-encoded data becomes the user's fingerprint.{{r|1=Acar2014|2=Mowery2012|p2=2-3,6}} Canvas fingerprinting methods have been shown to produce 5.7 bits of entropy. Because the technique obtains information about the user's GPU, the information entropy gained is "orthogonal" to the entropy of previous browser fingerprint techniques such as screen resolution and JavaScript capabilities.{{r|Mowery2012}} === Hardware benchmarking === [[Benchmark (computing)|Benchmark tests]] can be used to determine whether a user's CPU utilizes [[AES instruction set|AES-NI]] or [[Intel Turbo Boost]] by comparing the [[CPU time]] used to execute various simple or [[encryption|cryptographic algorithms]].{{r|Saito2016|p=588}} Specialized [[Application programming interface|APIs]] can also be used, such as the Battery API, which constructs a short-term fingerprint based on the actual battery state of the device,{{r|Olejnik2016|p=256}} or OscillatorNode, which can be invoked to produce a waveform based on user entropy.{{r|Englehardt2016|p=1399}} A device's hardware ID, which is a [[cryptographic hash function]] specified by the device's [[vendor]], can also be queried to construct a fingerprint.{{r|Al-Fannah2017|p=109,114}} ==Mitigation methods for browser fingerprinting== ===Offering a simplified fingerprint=== {{Update|section|date=March 2020}} Users may attempt to reduce their [[wikt:en:fingerprintability|fingerprintability]] by selecting a [[web browser]] which minimizes availability of identifying information such as browser fonts, device ID, [[canvas element]] rendering, [[WebGL]] information, and [[local IP address]].{{r|Al-Fannah2017|p=117}} As of 2017 [[Microsoft Edge]] is considered to be the most fingerprintable browser, followed by [[Firefox]] and [[Google Chrome]], [[Internet Explorer]], and [[Safari (web browser)|Safari]].{{r|Al-Fannah2017|p=114}} Among [[mobile browser]]s, Google Chrome and [[Opera Mini]] are most fingerprintable, followed by [[Firefox#Firefox for mobile|mobile Firefox]], mobile Edge, and mobile Safari.{{r|Al-Fannah2017|p=115}} [[Tor (anonymity network)#Tor Browser|Tor Browser]] disables fingerprintable features such as the canvas and WebGL API and notify users of fingerprint attempts.{{r|Acar2014}} ===Offering a spoofed fingerprint=== [[wikt:spoof#Verb|Spoofing]] some of the information exposed to the fingerprinter (e.g. the [[user agent]]) may allow to reduce diversity.{{r|Yen2012|p=13}} The contrary could be achieved if the mismatch between the spoofed information and the real browser information differentiates the user from all the others who do not use such strategy.{{r|Nikiforakis2013|p=552}} Spoofing the information differently at each site visit allow to reduce stability.{{r|Nikiforakis2015|p=820,823}} Different browsers on the same machine would usually have different fingerprints, but if both browsers aren't protected against fingerprinting, then the two fingerprints could be identified as originating from the same machine.{{r|yao2017|Newman}} ===Blocking scripts=== Blindly blocking client-side scripts served from third-party domains, and possibly also first-party domains (e.g. by disabling JavaScript or using [[NoScript]]) would usually render websites unusable. The preferred approach is to block only third-party domains that seem to track people, either because they're found on a blacklist of tracking domains (the approach followed by most [[ad blocker]]s) or because the intention of tracking is inferred by past observations (the approach followed by [[Privacy Badger]]).{{r|Merzdovnik2017|Davis|Kirk2|Adblock}} ==See also== * [[Anonymous web browsing]] * [[Web tracking]] * [[Evercookie]] * [[Internet privacy]] * [[Fingerprint (computing)]] * [[Browser security]] * [[Browser sniffing]] ==References== {{Reflist|refs= <ref name="Adblock">{{cite web|last1=Smith |first1=Chris |title=Adblock Plus: We can stop canvas fingerprinting, the ‘unstoppable’ new browser tracking technique |url=http://bgr.com/2014/07/23/how-to-disable-canvas-fingerprinting/ |website=BGR |publisher=PMC |url-status=dead 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|url=https://panopticlick.eff.org/static/browser-uniqueness.pdf |title=How Unique Is Your Web Browser? |last1=Eckersley |first1=Peter |date=17 May 2010 |website=eff.org |publisher=Electronic Frontier Foundation |accessdate=13 Apr 2016 |url-status=live |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160309230205/https://panopticlick.eff.org/static/browser-uniqueness.pdf |archivedate=9 March 2016 }}</ref> <ref name=sandia2006>{{cite web |url=http://www.sandia.gov/news/resources/releases/2006/images/wireless-fingerprinting.pdf |title=Wireless Device Driver Fingerprinting |accessdate=2010-01-28 |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090512005501/http://www.sandia.gov/news/resources/releases/2006/images/wireless-fingerprinting.pdf |archivedate=2009-05-12 }}</ref> }} ==Further reading== * {{Cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704679204575646704100959546|title=Race Is On to 'Fingerprint' Phones, PCs|last=Angwin|first=Julia|date=2010-11-30|work=Wall Street Journal|access-date=2018-07-10|last2=Valentino-DeVries|first2=Jennifer|language=en-US|issn=0099-9660}} * {{Cite web|url=https://www.akamai.com/uk/en/multimedia/documents/white-paper/passive-fingerprinting-of-http2-clients-white-paper.pdf|title=Passive Fingerprinting of HTTP/2 Clients|last=Segal|first=Ory|last2=Fridman|first2=Aharon|date=2017-06-05|website=Akamai|access-date=2018-07-10|last3=Shuster|first3=Elad}} ==External links== * [https://panopticlick.eff.org/ Panopticlick], by the [[Electronic Frontier Foundation]], gathers some elements of a browser's device fingerprint and estimates how identifiable it makes the user * [https://amiunique.org/ Am I Unique], by INRIA and INSA Rennes, implements fingerprinting techniques including collecting information through WebGL. * *[https://multiloginapp.com/sites-track-canvas/ Partial database of websites that have used canvas fingerprinting] {{DEFAULTSORT:Device Fingerprint}} [[Category:Computer network security]] [[Category:Internet privacy]] [[Category:Internet fraud]] [[Category:Fingerprinting algorithms]] [[Category:Web analytics]]'