Battle of Sarikamish

Battle of Sarikamish Сражение при Сарыкамыше Sarıkamış Savaşı
Part of Caucasus Campaign of Middle Eastern theatre in World War I
Russian trenches in the forests of Sarikamish.
Date 22 December 1914-17 January 1915 Location Sarikamish (then in Russian Armenia) 40.3381°N 42.573°E / 40.3381; 42.573 Result Russian victory
Belligerents
Russian Empire	Ottoman Empire
Commanders and leaders
Aleksandr Myshlayevsky Nikolai Yudenich	Enver Pasha Hafız Hakkı Pasha
Strength
Russian Caucasus Army 100,000	3rd Army 118,000
Casualties and losses
~30,000 (KIA:16,000, sick 12,000)	~60,000 (KIA:32,000, sick:15,000)

The Battle of Sarikamish (Battle of Sarykamysh; Russian: Сражение при Сарыкамыше; Turkish: Sarıkamış Savaşı) between Russian and Ottoman Empire during 22 December 1914 and 17 January 1915 as part of Caucasus Campaign in the World War I that resulted with a Russian victory. The Ottoman strategy demanded troops to be highly mobile, arrive at specified objectives at the precise moments was based on both German principles and copied from Napoleon. The troops being ill-prepared for winter conditions resulted with major casualties at Allahüekber mountains.

Background

Russia viewed the Caucasus Front as secondary to the Eastern Front. Eastern Front had the Russian manpower and resources. Russia had taken the fortress of Kars from the Turks during the Russo-Turkish War in 1877 and feared a campaign into the Caucasus, a Caucasus Campaign, aimed at retaking Kars and the port of Batum.

The Ottoman generalship and organization were negligible compared to the Allies. A Caucasus Campaign would have a distracting effect on Russian forces. The plan found sympathy with German advisory that a success in this region would mean a diversion of Russian forces to this front from the Polish and Galician fronts. Germany supplied the missing resources and the Ottoman 3^rd Army's manpower was used to achieve the desired distraction. Strategic goal of the Caucasus Campaign was set to retake Artvin, Ardahan, along Kars, and the port of Batum. For a longer term goal, Enver hoped a success would facilitate opening the route to Tbilisi and beyond with a revolt of Caucasian Muslims. The Turkish — or rather German — strategic goal was to cut off Russian access to the hydrocarbon resources around the Caspian Sea. The long term goal made British vary. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was in the proposed path which had the exclusive rights to work petroleum deposits throughout the Persian Empire except in the provinces of Azerbaijan, Ghilan, Mazendaran, Asdrabad and Khorasan. In 1914, before the war, the British government had contracted with the company for the supply of oil-fuel for the navy.

Prelude

Enver & Feldmann inspecting the units

The headquarters of the 3^rd Army was located in Erzurum under the command of Hasan İzzet Pasha. On October 30 1914, the 3^rd Army headquarters was informed by High Command in Istanbul about an exchange of fire during the pursuit of Goeben and Breslau in the Black Sea. High Command expected the Russian Army to cross the Ottoman border at any time. The Bergmann Offensive (November 2, 1914 - November 16, 1914) ended with the defeat of Russian troops under the command of Bergmann. The Russian success was along the southern shoulders of the offense where Armenian volunteers visible (effective) and taken Karaköse and Doğubeyazıt Hasan İzzet Pasha managed to stabilize the front by letting the Russians 25 kilometers inside the Ottoman Empire along the Erzurum-Sarikamish axis.

The war minister, Enver Pasha, devised an operation plan while he was at the Department of War in Istanbul. His strategy based on German principles copied from Napoleon. Enver's plan involved a single envelopment using three Corps. On the right flank, XI Corps would fix the Russians in place and conduct feint attacks. In the center, IX Corps would fight in the direction of Sarikamish Pass. Hafız Hakkı’s X Corps, which was to be on the left flank, would drive to Oltu, cross the Allahüekber Mountains, cut the Kars road and drive the Russians to the Aras Valley, where the Russian forces would be destroyed by all three Corps attacking in total harmony. Meanwhile a detachment unit under Stange Bey would conduct highly visible operations to distract and pin Russian units. The success depended on these troops arriving at their specified objectives at the correct moment. The Russians fulfilled the first part of this strategy with the Bergmann Offensive by Russian forces concentrating at Sarikamish and Köprüköy.

Hasan İzzet Pasha was not in favor of an offensive action in the harsh winter conditions. He was planning to remain in defense. He wanted to pull the Russians to the Erzurum Fortress and launch a counter attack at the right time. Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel Hafız Hakkı Bey was sent to replace the commander of X Corps Ziya Pasha to energize the 3^rd Army. After initial exchanges with Hafız Hakkı, on December 18, Hasan İzzet, whose release from the command was signed on December 14 by Enver, told to Enver: “We have to consider 8 or 9 days for a large scaled encircling manoeuvre. However, during this time the XI Corps, which will remain at the front, might be jeopardized. Even if we execute the manoeuvre with two corps, they will probably face difficulties against the enemy.” Enver Pasha wanted his plan executed through a winter offense. He decided to take in the charge. He left Istanbul with General Bronsart von Schellendorf and the head of the Operations Office Lieutenant Colonel Feldmann. They arrived in Erzurum on December 21. Senior Turkish commanders opposed the forced resignation of Hasan İzzet the Commander of the 3^rd Army due to his rejection of the plan.

Battle

Battlefield

3^th Army winter gear

The total war zone was nearly 1,250-1,500 kilometers (776-932 miles) wide from Black sea to Lake Van, which made the military concentration difficult. The operation executed at a plateau averaging 1,500-2,000 meters (5,000 - 6,500 feet). The main difficulty about the region was the roads. The transportation infrastructure on the Ottoman side was far from adequate. Russia's main advantage was the railway up to Kars including a terminal at Sarikamish. The railway was 24 kilometers (15 miles) from the border. The only way for an army through the Caucasian heights was the high mountain passes in which were lied the cities Kars and Sarikamish. Beyond, the upper valleys of the Aras River and Euphrates extended westward. Everywhere else was the paths in tracks which were impenetrable to artillery. The forces were concentrated about 80 kilometers (50 miles) on each side of the border at the fortresses of Kars (Russian) and Erzurum (Ottoman).

The 3^rd Army under the command of Enver Pasha was composed of the IX, X and XI Corps. 3^rd Army's headquarter and the IX Corps were located in Erzurum. The X Corps was stationed in Sivas, whereas the XI Corps was in Elazığ (Mamuretülaziz). A detachment unit under the command of German Stange (lieutenant colonel) was established from the 3^th Infantry Division located at Erzurum Fortress to reinforce the offense and pin down the Russians. This detachment unit was originally stationed in Thrace; consisting of two battalions of the 8^th Infantry Regiment and two artillery. The fighting power included 83,000 regular troops, reserves, and personnel of the Erzurum Fortress added to 118,000. The total manpower including transportation units, depot regiments, and military police was 150,000. There were 73 machine guns and 218 artillery pieces. Ottoman forces were inadequately prepared for the campaign. Two divisions of the IX Corps began a long trek with no winter clothing and only dry bread and olives for rations.

The Russian Caucasus Army was a well-equipped 100,000 troops. The Russians redeployed almost half of the Caucasus Army to the Prussian front due to the defeats at the Battle of Tannenberg (August 23 - September 2, 1914) and the Masurian Lakes (September 9–14, 1914), leaving behind just 65,000 troops. To remedy these troop movements Count Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov consulted with the Mayor of Tbilisi Alexandre Khatsian, the primate of Tbilisi Bishop Mesrop, and the prominent civic leader Dr. Hakob Zavriev about the creation of Armenian volunteer detachments. The Russian Armenian reservists had already been drafted into the regular armed forces and sent to European theatre of World War I. The volunteer units would make up of Armenians who were not citizens of the empire or not obligated to serve. Originally, there were 4 volunteer battalions created. Along the Kars Oblast, the 3^th battalion commanded by Hamazasp (Srvandztian) and 4^th battalion by Keri (Arshak Gavafian) operated on the front facing Erzurum between Sarikamish and Oltu. The Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Military District (Caucasian Army) was Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov. Effective command laid on Inf. General Aleksandr Zakharevich Myshlayevsky who was originally a military historian graduated from Imperial General Staff Academy. General Nikolai Yudenich was the Chief of Staff of General Myshlayevsky.

Initial manoeuvres, Dec 22 - 28

Pushing the artillery at the mountain passes

Hafız Hakki was at the left flank. His order was to move the IX and X Corps to Sarikamish and Kars. He contemplated a two step plan. A sudden initial attack ("major offensive") and second step with both Corps proceeding at full speed towards the Oltu. He expected the assault at İd to be concluded by the afternoon of 22^nd. Then the Corps would march 30 kilometers a day and arrive in the Kars-Sarikamish line by 25^th. For the movement on the extreme left two divisions of the Stange regiment had been sent by sea from Constantinople to Trabzon.

On early 22^nd, Hafız Hakkı ordered his troops to move forward. They engaged in a brief skirmish against a Russian brigade commanded by General Istomin, once these divisions reached to Oltu. The skirmishes at Oltu ended the next day after 4 artillery guns, 4 machine guns, and 1000 Russian troops were taken prisoner.

On 23^rd, Istomin abandoned his position for the general direction of Ardahan. Hafız Hakkı sent 2 divisions to pursue Istomin. At the extreme left wing, the Stange Regiment, which had landed at Trabzon, was to move up the Çoruh valley towards Ardahan and across a pass of 2,4384 kilometers (8,000 feet) high.

Machine Gun unit at Allahüekber Mountains

On 24^th, Hafız Hakkı was well beyond Oltu after having marched a hard 75 kilometers in just over three days. However, they were not at Kars-Sarikamish line as it was planned.

On 25^th, Ottoman troops had been marching for 14 hours under heavy snow. The soldiers were exhausted, fatigued, hungry; the fear of frostbite and Russian machine guns were slowly being replaced by absolute indifference.

On 26^th, at the 18^th hour of this march, in the early hours of the morning, the 91^st Regiment of X Corps came under enemy fire. The Russians left the scene after nearly two hours of fighting. The regiment hit the road again. Soon a snow storm began. Under these conditions the 91^st Regiment managed to reach Kosor in 21 hours after leaving Penek, a distance of just 8 kilometers. Other units reached their destinations at a similar rate. While Enver was ordering a night attack, elements of the X Corps were spending the night in the villages of Kosor, Arsenik and Patsik, which were 40, 35 and 30 kilometers from Sarikamish respectively. The Allahüekber Mountains were in front of these units. It would take them at least 2 more days to reach Sarikamish.

4^th battalion of the Armenian volunteers engaged at Barduz Pass.

The X Corps suffered a delay of 24 hours in the Barduz Pass. This added an extra deviation from Enver's all-attack plan. In the Barduz Pass conflict 4^th battalion of the Armenian volunteers lost 600 troops. The Stange regiment looked down to Ardahan.

When the commander Malyshevsky arrived army headquarters in the Russian front line, he was almost in a complete panic. He gave the order for a general retreat. The process of withdrawing was to start on the 25^th and 26^th. The Russians evacuated Sarikamish, leaving only 2 cavalry squadrons and 1,000 railwaymen to defend it. Not all Russian commanders were in a state of panic. The Russian army headquarters maintained a solid grip on the situation, the effective command and control never lost. General Yudenich, taking command of the II Turkestan Corps, decided to put up resistance.

On 28^th the Russians held by the XI Corps at Khorasan. The IX Corps were at Sarikamish. The X Corps were threatening to pierce the Russian front along the Kars railway at east side. The Stange regiment was descending upon Ardahan at sixty miles north-east. The Enver's operational plan looked liked succeeded on the map.

The ground situation was alarming. Ottoman forces were worn out, half starved, and short of guns and ammunition, for no transport on earth could cope with such a breakneck march. Enver Pasha thought that the Russians were retreating to Kars. In fact, it was actually an encircling movement.

Assault at Sarikamish, Dec 29

Russian trenches in the forests of Sarikamish.

On 29^th, the assault took place. The IX and XI Corps, totaling 12,000 men, began to attack Sarikamish. During bitter bayonet fighting, only 300 man succeeded breaking into the city. At end of the day, they were driven off, losing 6,000 troops. Enver's positive mood replaced with disappointment when he received information that Russians were preparing to encircle his forces with a force of five regiments. This shock enabled Enver Pasha to see the truth.

On 31^st, the IX Corps was stuck in woods outside Sarikamish and down to some 2,500 men and 14 artillery guns and machine guns. On the same night bad news arrived from Bardız to Enver’s headquarters. The 32^nd Division abandoned his positions to the Russians. This mean that Barduz and Kızılkilise roads were now in Russian hands. The Ottoman forces were inside a semi-circle. Retreat through the open mouth of the circle would be the rational decision. Enver refused to lose momentum and ordered his units to continue with the plan.

On January 1^st, commander of the XI Corps pressed a frontal attack on Sarikamish lasting for the next 4 days; after that the heavy fighting began to lose momentum. Snow hindered advancing forces which were supposed to bring the relief. The IX Corps melted away on the way to Sarikamish. One of the divisions lost 40% of its strength in a snowstorm. The X Corps never come to the rescue. The 90% of X Corps was left on the slopes of Allahüekber Mountains. The XI Corps was fighting at the Aras region. A regiment entered Çerkezköy, only to be taken prisoner. According to schedule but exhausted, the Stange regiment entered Ardahan. The Russians were about to encircle the remaining forces.

Entrapped in a semi-circle, Jan 2 - 3

On 2^nd, Russian artillery fire caused severe casualties. Enver Pasha received two reports; one was from the chief of staff of the IX Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Şerif, and the other from Colonel Hafız Hakkı. Both reports were saying that they did not have any capacity to launch another attack. They were simply too weak. Enver responded to the units “the offensive is to go on at full strength.” This was later used as a sign of his denial. Later, Enver slowly accepted the truth and focused on securing the routes for retreat instead of insisting on new attacks to take Sarikamish. He combined the two corps there, renamed it the “Left Wing Army.” He promoted the Colonel Hafız Hakkı to Brigadier General and gave the command of the Left wing Army.

On 3^rd, I Corps were driven out again back to the Choruk Valley, in which direction the remnants of the X Corps were also retreating. Hafız Hakkı, who was just promoted to be a Pasha, was hoping for reinforcements. He did not order his units, Left Wing Army, to retreat. He believed it could be still possible to take Sarikamish. Meanwhile, around 40 kilometres south to Sarikamish, the XI Corps led by Galip Pasha was renewing attacks on Russian lines in an attempt to relieve the pressure on the IX and X Corps positioned in front of Sarikamish. However, the Russians were advancing now. The circle was getting narrower.

On 4^th, Hafız Hakkı Pasha toured the front line. He said to İhsan Pasha that it is over and he was hoping that some of the troops left on Allahüekber Mountains could be still alive.

Retreat, Jan 4 - 15

On 6^th, the 3^rd Army headquarters found itself under fire. The Russians captured the entire 28^th Division. The 17^th and 29^th Divisions were taken prisoner. 8 senior officers including İhsan Pasha surrendered to the Russians. Among the captives, 108 officers and 80 soldiers transferred to Sarikamish. Hafız Hakkı Pasha managed to save himself. He safely reached the headquarters of the X Corps. He found out that the IX Corps fell to the hands of Russians. He ordered a total retreat.

On 7^th, the remaining forces began their march towards Erzurum.

On 11^th, after four days of travel Enver Pasha and the German officers reached Erzurum. They stipulated in their original plan that the same route could be taken by 3^rd Army in two days. The transports dispatched from Constantinople which attempted to land troops and provisions at Trabzon were sunk by a Russian Black Sea squadron and the warships. The escorts SMS Goeben and TCG Hamidieh chased back to the Bosporus.

On 17^th, the remnants of Ottoman forces in woods outside Sarikamish were collected which signaled the end of final fighting in this front. On the other side, the Russian right wing cleared the Choruk Valley. Enver's project ended in failure after three weeks of heroic struggle amid high mountains and deep snowdrifts. For a time, at least, Russia was secure from attack in the Caucasus. Hafız Hakkı Pasha expected that the Russians use this success to capture the Erzurum Fortress. The 3rd Army immediately took reconstruction measures. This proved to be nearly impossible as all the local reserves depleted.

On February 12^th, the young and energetic Hafız Hakkı Pasha died at the helm of the Army. Otto Liman von Sanders, who was asked before, rejected the position again. Mahmut Kamil Pasha took the command of the Army. The war minister Enver Pasha never commanded troops in any other battle again.

Casualties

Russians collecting the frozen bodies of Turkish soldiers

The Ottoman 3^rd Army started with 118,000 fighting power. It was reduced to 42,000 effective in January 1915. There are conflicting figures on Ottoman Casualties. Sources do not agree on what the final sum should include. The Turkish official history states; 32,000 KIA, 15,000 died sickness, 7,000 prisoners, 10,000 wounded, some 50,000 casualty. The casualties of the conflict escalated beyond the end of active period as the most immediate problem confronting 3^rd Army became the typhus epidemic. The epidemic was so bad that the commander of the Army Hafız Hakkı Pasha died of typhus just a few weeks later in Erzurum. TAF presents a round-up 60,000 throughout all the period of operation. Russians had 7,000 POW's, which includes 200 officers. These POW's were kept under confinement for the next three three years in the small town of Varnavino, east of Moscow on the Vetluga River. After the final days of the Czarist empire, these soldiers had chance to return ailing Ottoman Empire.

Russian losses were 16,000 KIA and 12,000 died sickness, mostly due to frostbite. TAF sources report a rounded 30,000 without giving details on the breakdown of this number .

Assessment

• 
  Nikolai Yudenich
• 
  Hafız Hakkı
• 
  Ismail Enver

Operation

Enver was the strategist of the operation. Hassan Izzet was the tactician who implemented the plan and remedy the short comings. The failure was blamed on Enver. Beyond his faulty estimate on how the enveloped Russian would react, his failure was on not keeping operational reserve that matches the needs of the conditions. He did not have enough field service to factor the hardships faced by the soldiers, he analyze the operational necessities theoretically rather than contextually.

Carrying out a military plan in the winter was not the major failure of the operation. A valid question is if the plan could have executed better? It would be hard to exceed the performance of the Turkish soldiers. The IX and X Corps marched with the possible best effectiveness under the given conditions. The authority of the command over the units were undinable which extended to the human limits. The majority of the units managed to move to the right positions. In many respects, the destruction of 30,000 Russian units should be credited.

The communication and cooperation between the Ottoman units failed, forces functioned separate units rather than mutually supporting engagements as originally planned. There was not sufficient operational reserve established, for size of engagement. The conditions of the Ottoman forces could have been better, if Enver paused the operations on December 14^th, or did not moved beyond Oltu line with the artillery pieces. The decision to take heavy artillery rather than short range smaller caliber beyond the Oltu line was failure as the forces were faced detachment units with better mobility. The plan's had faulty estimate on the Russian forces. The commanders of the X and IX Corps were replaced with little or no experience at the operational level. The chief of staff of IX Corps Köprülülü Şerif Bey "..troops fought on the top of tall mountains under snowstorm against the artillery of an enemy of centuries and they were completely annihilated, but not a single Turkish soldier has ever turned his back to his nation... In Sarikamish, there was no panic.”

Light infantry

3^th battalion & cavalry unit. Commanded by Hamazasp (Srvandztian)

During the battle the light infantry was used by both sides. The detachment Armenian volunteer units on the Russian side, and the detachment I Corps unit under control of Stange Bey bey provided skirmishing screen ahead of the main body of infantry, harassing and delaying of the enemy advance or preventing them escaping.

The Ottoman detachment unit whence the Armenian volunteers operated and also those settlements left exposed by tactical withdrawals of the Russian forces and Armenian volunteer units.

The Armenian detachment units are credited no small measure of the success which attended by the Russian forces, as they were natives of the region, adjusted to the climatic conditions, familiar with every road and mountain path, and had real incentive to fierce and resolute combat. The Armenian volunteers were small, mobile, and well adapted to the semi-guerrilla warfare. They did good work as scouts, though they took part in many severe engagements. Armenian detachment battalions challenged the Ottoman operations during the critical times: "the delay enabled the Russian Caucasus Army to concentrate sufficient force around Sarikamish".

Armenians

Martin Gilbert in "The First World War" states that in search of allies against the Turks, the Tsar visited the Caucasus front on December 30^th, telling the head of the Armenian Church that "a most brilliant future awaits the Armenians". With these words, the fate of hundreds of thousands of Armenians was endangered, as Ottoman Empire saw in its own large Armenian minority a source of fifth column activity, treachery and disloyalty, and did nothing to dampen anti-Armenian feeling. The relationship between the Armenians and the Ottoman Empire had already started to deteriorate after numerous massacres in eastern Anatolia during the 1890s. The Ottoman government claimed{fact} that it had a legitimate defense by sovereign state - at the moment of its greatest danger - against an actual or projected Armenian uprising in favor of Russia and Western Allied invasion of Ottoman heartlands. On his return to Constantinople, Enver Pasha blamed his failure on the actions of the region's local Armenians, initiating the repressive measures against the empire's Armenian population that were an early stage of the Armenian Genocide .

Cultural references

• "Ballads" (Turkish: Ağıtlar) was a book (collection) published in 1943 by Yaşar Kemal. It is a compilation of folkloric themes that included accounts established with the Battle of Sarikamish.
• "Vetluga Memoir" is a historical document that describes the political and strategic mistakes made by the Ottoman Third Army - and the,final days of one corner of the Czarist empire from a young Turkish officer captured by Russians.
• "White sarrow" (Turkish: Beyaz hüzün) is a period movie about the battle.

Bibliography

• Tucker, Spencer (1998). The Great War, 1914-18. Indiana University Press. p. 272. ISBN 9780253211712.
• Erickson, Edward J. (2001). Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 256. ISBN 9780313315169.
• Muratoff, Paul (1953). Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828-1921. Cambridge University. p. 636. ISBN 0898392969.
• Hinterhoff, Eugene (1984). The Campaign in Armenia. Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of World War I, vol ii. New York: Marshall Cavendish Corporation. pp. 499–503. ISBN 0863071813.
• Pasdermadjian, Garegin (1918). Why Armenia Should be Free: Armenia's Rôle in the Present War. Hairenik Publishing Company. p. 45.
• Pollard, A. F. (1920). A Short History of the Great War. London. p. 45. ISBN 1426422482.
• Hacobian, Avetoon Pesak (1917). Armenia and the War: An Armenian's Point of View with an Appeal to Britain and the Coming Peace Conference. Hodder and Stoughton. p. 200.

External links

• The Frozen Inferno of Sarikamish