Battle of Ongjin Peninsula

Battle of Ongjin Peninsula
Part of the Korean War Operation Pokpung (North Korea) Operation Western Region (South Korea)
Old tactical map of the Battle of Ongjin Peninsula with an error in the KPA unit.
Date 25–26 June 1950 Location Ongjin Peninsula Result KPA victory Successful ROK withdrawal Territorial changes KPA captured Ongjin and Kangryong
Belligerents
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Republic of Korea
Commanders and leaders
Choe Hyon (3rd Guard Brigade) Kim Hu-chin (1st Infantry Regiment)	Paik In-yup (17th Infantry Regiment) Kim Hui-tae  † (1st Infantry Battalion) Song Ho-rim  (WIA) (2nd Infantry Battalion) Oh Ik-gyeong (3rd Infantry Battalion) Bak Jeong-ho (7th Artillery Battalion)
Strength
3rd Guard Brigade (5 battalions) 1st Infantry Regiment	17th Infantry Regiment
Casualties and losses
South Korean claim: 581 dead 5 SU-76Ms 5 armored vehicles	7th Infantry Regiment: 113 dead 371 wounded 64 missing Total: 326 dead including attached units and police

The Battle of Ongjin Peninsula (옹진반도 전투) was a series of battles that occurred in Ongjin Peninsula between 25–26 June 1950 and was a part of the Operation Pokpung (North Korea) and Operation Western Region (South Korea) that marked the beginning of the Korean War. On 25 June, the Korean People's Army Ground Force (KPAGF) 3rd Guard Brigade, reinforced with the 1st Infantry Regiment of the 6th Infantry Division, launched a surprise attack on the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) 17th Infantry Regiment in Ongjin Peninsula, modern-day Ongjin and Kangryong. The battle ended on 26 June with a KPA victory, but many ROKs were able to escape from the peninsula.

Prelude

Ongjin Peninsula is located at the westernmost of the 38th parallel. It is surrounded by the sea, and its only land route is through North Korean territory. Port of Pupo located at the southernmost of the peninsula was the only major supply line for the ROK. The distance from Pupo to Incheon is 90 km by sea, and it took 9 hours for a ferry to make one-way travel. Therefore, Pupo must be secured at all costs for the ROK to perform safe evacuation.

There are strategic mountains at the center of the peninsula that can observe the entire peninsula and use for military encampments. Prior to the battle, the two opposing forces already had three clashes near these mountains in 1949.

North Korea

Between 10–23 June 1950, the Korean People's Army (KPA) in the western region completed its deployment for full-scale war under the disguise of military training. The KPAGF 3rd Guard Brigade repositioned its 7 battalions near Ongjin Peninsula and Yeonbaek (now Yonan) district. Meanwhile, the 1st Infantry Regiment and a Security Battalion located in Sariwon were separated from the 6th Infantry Division and moved to Chwiya to reinforce the 3rd Brigade. Its mission was to capture entire Ongjin Peninsula and Yonan Peninsula while the higher command, the I Corp, is headed for Seoul.

To achieve the goal, the 3rd Guard Brigade originally planned a full out parallel attack with 7 battalions and a regiment, and keeping the 7th Guard Battalion as a reserve unit. However, brigadier general Choe Hyon, the commander of the 3rd Brigade, adjusted the plan right before the war instead of operating each unit independently as the manpower on the frontline may get too thin. The 1st Infantry Regiment was assigned to advance to Kangryong and split the ROK 17th Infantry Regiment in half.

The KPA total troop strength in the region was 11,000 including 8,000 from the 3rd Guard Brigade and 3,000 from attached units. They were armed with 4 M-30 howitzers, 5 SU-76M self-propelled guns, 32 M1927 guns, 45 M-42 anti-tank guns, ninety-five 82-PM-41 mortars, sixteen 120-PM-43 mortars, and 8 armored vehicles.

Korean People's Army Ground Force

• 3rd Guard Brigade - Brigadier General Choe Hyon
  • (Ongjin Peninsula direction) - participants of the Battle of Ongjin Peninsula
    • 2th Guard Battalion - (at north of Ongjin)
    • 4th Guard Battalion - (at north of Ongjin)
    • 5th Guard Battalion - (at northwest of Ongjin)
    • 6th Guard Battalion - (at northwest of Ongjin)
    • 7th Guard Battalion - (reserve)
    • 1st Infantry Regiment (attached) - Colonel Kim Hu-chin (at northeast of Ongjin)
  • (Yonan Peninsula direction)
    • 1st Guard Battalion - (at north of Paechon)
    • 3rd Guard Battalion - (at north of Yonan)
    • (1) Security Battalion (attached) - (at north of Chongdan)

South Korea

The ROK 17th Infantry Regiment was tasked to defend a 45 km long border, which exceeded its capability by far—a division was normally tasked to cover 10 km. In addition, many higher mountains were located above the 38th parallel, thus created huge geological disadvantage to the regiment to set up defense line. Understanding the situation, the regiment commander Colonel Paik In-yup mobilized civilians for fortifying bases on mountains below the 38th parallel, which were the only and the last major resistance line. In return, the military provided medical and public assistances to public. 5 civilians were killed by North Korean fire during the construction. The colonel also created a paramilitary force by combining several youth clubs to protect their hometowns.

The ROK Army Headquarters had three defensive plans. The first was to hold the 38th parallel if the fights are small-scale. The second was to hold the main resistance line until reinforcement arrives, if the battle is limited to the region. Lastly, if North Korea launches a full-scale war, then the regiment would retreat to Incheon from the Port of Pupo while forcing the KPA to bleed as much as possible. The regiment and civilians conducted evacuation training for the plan 1 and 2, but not the plan 3. The military prioritized families of military and civil servants, then civilians until ships capacity allows.

One month before the war, a KPA artillery staff operations officer Major Kang Chang-nam and his liaison from the 3rd Guard Brigade defected to the ROK 17th Regiment and provided information about the KPA battle orders, locations, and training status.

Colonel Paik ordered to adjust battalion positions to focus on the sector defended by the 3rd Infantry Battalion, which includes the road connecting Chwiya and Kangryong, to prevent the KPA from splitting the regiment. Moreover, the colonel requested for additional troops as recent North Korean activity made the regiment to judge existence of an additional KPA unit in the area.

Since 20 June, many KPA vehicles and high-ranking officers have been sighted on the frontline. On the night of 22 June, a line of vehicles was identified moving from Haeju to Chwiya with the headlights off. Despite all these reports, the Army Headquarters lifted the special alert order, which was issued at the end of May, on 24:00 23 June, and allowed soldiers to take vacations or go out from the bases. Colonel Paik disobeyed the order because it was total nonsense. On the next day, five United Nations servicemen visited the regiment and complained that the regiment was "creating tensions" and told "no reason for special alert" and then went back to Seoul. As a result, Paik had to inevitably lift the emergency measures, except for the frontline troops, which ultimately weakened the defense line.

The 3rd Infantry Battalion guarded the regiment's right from the coast to Mt Noktal, and the 1st Infantry Battalion was protecting the left from Mt Noktal to Mt Turak. The 2nd Infantry Battalion acted as a reserve unit, mostly doing basic and tactical training near the regimental command at Ongjin Mine located north of Ongjin.

The ROK total troop strength in Ongjin Peninsula was 3,600 including 2,719 from the 7th Infantry Regiment, 526 from the 7th Artillery Battalion, 129 from the anti-tank company, and other supporting units. They were armed with 12 M3 howitzers, 6 M1 anti-tank guns, 12 M1 mortars, 18 M2 mortars, 60 M9A1 rocket launchers, and 25 machine guns.

Republic of Korea Army

• 17th Infantry Regiment - Colonel Paik In-yup (HQ in Ongjin Mine)
  • 1st Infantry Battalion - Major Kim Hui-tae (regiment left, HQ in Mahyon)
    • 1st Company - Captain Gang Eun-deok (battalion reserve, HQ in Mahyon)
    • 2nd Company - 1st Lieutenant Han Hyeok (Battalion left, HQ in Undong)
    • 3rd Company - (Battalion right, HQ on Hill 429)
    • 4th Company - 1st Lieutenant Son Chang-sul (weapon company)
  • 2nd Infantry Battalion - Major Song Ho-rim (regiment reserve, HQ in Ongjin Mine)
    • 5th Company - 1st Lieutenant Kim Gyo-seok
    • 6th Company
    • 7th Company
    • 8th Company - (weapon company)
  • 3rd Infantry Battalion - Major Oh Ik-gyeong (regiment right, HQ in Kangryong)
    • 9th Company - 1st Lieutenant Han Hong (battalion center, HQ on Mount Chak)
    • 10th Company - Captain An Je-hui (battalion left, HQ on Mount Noktal)
    • 11th Company - 1st Lieutenant Kim Jong-yun (battalion right, HQ in Uhyon)
    • 12th Company - Captain Jeong Gyu-han (weapon company)
  • 7th Artillery Battalion (attached) - Major Bak Jeong-ho
    • 1st Battery - (attached to the regiment HQ)
    • 2nd Battery - 1st Lieutenant Seo Jeong-seon (attached to the 3rd Battalion in Todong)
    • 3rd Battery - 1st Lieutenant Kim Won-gil (attached to the 1st Battalion in Donggokdong)
  • Anti-tank gun Company (attached) - Captain Noh Gyeong-eok (3 platoon, each platoon attached to the 1st & the 3rd Battalion and the regiment HQ)
  • (1) engineer company (attached) - 1st Lieutenant Bak Jun-hui (attached to the regiment HQ)

Timeline

At 04:00 on 25 June, red and green flares were shot in the air, and the KPA began shelling the ROK defenses for 30 minutes. At 04:40, the ROK 1st Battalion commander Maj Kim Hui-tae received a report that the 3rd Company spotted an enemy platoon approaching through a blind spot. Maj Kim wanted to handle the situation by himself, so he began moving out to Chadong (1.5 km north of Mahyon), near the 3rd Company HQ.

At 05:00, the ROK 7th Artillery Battalion was able to fire its M3 Howitzers after receiving authorization from American Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) officer Maj Frank Brown, much later since requested because the KMAG had the control of large caliber weapons to prevent South Korean preemptive strike on North Korea to avoid escalation of war involving the Soviet Union.

Around the same time, a KPA battalion overran the ROK 1st Platoon, 2nd Company. When Maj Kim arrived at Chadong, the company HQ bunker was already destroyed and gun battles were ongoing everywhere. He also learned about the death of the leader of the 2nd Platoon, 3rd Company 2nd Lt Kim Ho-kyeong from a soldier assisting a wounded. At 05:10, the ROK 1st Battalion lost communications with the 2nd and the 3rd Company, and the battalion was thought to be fighting against 3 KPA battalions. At 05:30, Maj Kim returned to Mahyon and ordered the battalion reserve 1st Company to get ready to reinforce Chadong. He also requested regiment HQ to assist his battalion with the 2nd Battalion. At 05:40, the KPA troops stormed the ROK 2nd Platoon, 2nd Company, but the platoon repelled the attack. However, the platoon witnessed a North Korean flag waving on Mount Turak, the place where the 3rd Platoon was positioned, and a KPA battalion, spearheaded by cavalries, was marching on the road to Ongjin unchallenged. The 2nd Platoon later joined the 2nd Battalion during the counterattack.

On the other hand, the ROK 3rd Battalion lost its observation post along with communication systems by the KPA artillery fire since 05:30, so it had to rely on the SCR-300 operated by the 9th Company, which brought confusion and limited its command and control between units. Fights between the ROK 3rd Battalion and the KPA 1st Infantry Regiment persisted in the fog throughout the 38th parallel. Col Paik sent out an operations officer to the 3rd Battalion to hold positions and recover communications.

Meanwhile, at the ROK 17th Infantry Regiment HQ, Col Paik hesitated to send reinforcement to the 1st Battalion, because he was expecting the main KPA offensive from the eastern front and the situation of the 3rd Battalion was more critical. However, the colonel had to change his decision after a report reached him at 06:10 about the death of Maj Kim by 82-PM-41 mortar attack. In addition, the defense of the 2nd Company, 1st Battalion began to collapse from concentrated KPA fire. The 3rd Company also allowed the KPA to break through the defense line and suffered losses including the commanding officer. Therefore, Col Paik ordered the 2nd Battalion, except the 6th Company, to reinforce the 1st Battalion; the 2nd Battalion moved out at 06:40.

The ROK 2nd Battalion rushed to Mahyon (4 km north of Ongjin), where the 1st Battalion HQ was located, and the leading vehicle found a Guard Battalion stirring up the empty compound and setting fire everywhere. At 07:00, after joining with units of the 4th Company and the 3rd Battery, the 2nd Battalion CO Maj Song Ho-rim ordered the battalion to surround the KPA by positioning the 5th Company on the right and the 7th Company on the left and fired shots from 17 heavy guns including 10 M1 mortars, 2 M1 anti-tank guns, and 5 M3 howitzers. The attack caused panic among the KPA, and the ROK took the initiative. However, at 09:00, Col Paik ordered the 2nd Battalion to redirect a company to assist the 3rd Battalion as the situation became desperate at the regiment's right defense. Maj Song did not want to reduce the manpower and lose the momentum of the counterattack, so he dispatched a mortar platoon of the 8th Company and the 3rd Battery to join with the 6th Company, the last reserve of the regiment, to be sent to the 3rd Battalion.

Since dawn, vehicles and soldiers of the KPA 1st Infantry Regiment started from Chwiya and invaded along the road to the Kangryong and Yangwon under cover of morning haze. It was only after the haze was cleared that the ROK 3rd Battalion realized the SU-76Ms, armored vehicles, and M-42 anti-tank guns were already 2 km south of the 38th parallel. These guns began firing and turned the favor to the KPA, and forced the ROK to abandon positions and retreat to the south. At 08:00, the ROK 3rd Battalion CO Maj Oh Ik-gyeong came across the operations officer 1st Lt Jo whom Col Paik sent earlier, and sent Jo back to the regiment HQ to request reinforcement. To stop the KPA from advancing further, Maj Oh set up defenses on high grounds and mountains near roads north of Kangryong the KPA would march through, and told his men to prioritize armored vehicles.

Concurrently, the ROK 1st Company, 1st Battalion, led by Cpt Gang Eun-deok, reached Chadong at 07:30, but soon the company found itself being surrounded by the KPA after the haze disappeared on the battlefield. The company was pinned down and fought for two hours until war cries of the ROK 5th Company were heard and the KPA began to run away. The 1st Company joined the counterattack under the command of Maj Song. At 10:00, Maj Song received a wound from a rifle shot that passed by his left face and pierced his ear but remained on duty. Col Paik reported the urgency of the situation to the Army HQ and asked for help, but the HQ told the colonel to "defeat the enemy and withdraw through the land". At 10:35, two L-5s carrying 5 members of the KMAG arrived in Ongjin, and Paik learned about the full-scale KPA invasion across the border from the pilots Maj Lloyd Swink and 1st Lt Brown.

At 10:40, the ROK 10th Company, at the west ridge of Mount Chima encountered the KPA 1st Infantry Regiment and destroyed 1 armored vehicle, but was dispersed by superior KPA firepower. At 11:00, the ROK 9th Company at Hill 200 ambushed the 1st Regiment, killed KPA soldiers and damaged 1 SU-76M and destroyed 2 armored vehicles using 6 M9A1 rocket launchers; the ROK also suffered many losses, and the company retreated to Kangryong.

At 11:00, knowing the help would never come, Col Paik ordered the relocation of the regiment HQ to Kangryong, the destruction of confidential documents, supplies, and facilities, and the evacuation of civilians. The streets were filled with wounded soldiers and evacuees, and the field hospital was overloaded. The colonel provided five 2.5-ton trucks to the medical team to transport the wounded, but only the first round of transportation, which prioritized severely injured ROKs, would make it out as the KPA zone of control expanded and some wounded ROKs were cut off. 1st Lt Seon U and 10 ROKs who were tasked to clean up the facilities escaped from the HQ with five 2.5-ton trucks fully loaded with 105 mm ammunition at 14:00; they drove to Sagot (13 km south of Ongjin) then landed at Pupo at 21:00 via a civilian boat carrying refugees.

At 11:30, the ROK 11th Company began to retreat after receiving attacks from the KPA SU-76Ms.

At 14:00, the KPA 1st Regiment pierced the defense set up by the ROK 3rd Battalion and was approaching to Kangryong. Col Paik decided to move the regiment HQ to Pupo as the town was not suitable for defense since it was built on a plain that would expose the ROK from the KPA attacks. Therefore, the colonel ordered every ROKs in Kangryong sector, except four M1 anti-tank guns and their gunners and assistant gunners, to set up a defense line between Chunggidong and Chukkyori (8 km southeast of Kangryong) under the command of Maj Oh. The colonel also sent out an order for retreat to the 1st and the 2nd Battalion, then led anti-tank teams to set up the guns at the east side of the river that flows through the town.

By the time the ROK 2nd Battalion received the order for retreat, the 5th Company already advanced to Chadong and the 7th Company was at Sadong. Maj Song became very furious about the order because his battalion was winning and his soldiers had high morale. However at 14:30, after realizing the situation, Maj Song sent out retreating orders to every unit under the 1st and the 2nd Battalion and ordered the 5th Company to open a path for withdrawal. The 5th Company reached Mahyon at 15:00, and 1st Lt Kim made a senior officer a commanding officer, then separated from the company with the 2nd Platoon leader and 18 others on a 2.5-ton truck. When they reached the field hospital, a civilian appeared and tried to stop the truck but was ignored. They were ambushed by the KPA right after, and 5 ROKs were killed, including 1st Lt Kim, but 15 were able to flee the scene. The survivors later escaped to Yeonpyeong Island on a fishing boat. Other platoons eventually joined the 3rd Battalion at Chunggidong at 20:00 by moving along the coastal line. The 5th Company claimed 300 KPA casualties on the 25th but also reported 20 KIA, including the company CO and the 3rd Platoon leader 1st Lt Lee Chun-man, and 30 WIA.

The ROK 7th Company was guarding the rear when the 1st and the 2nd Battalion started retreating. When its turn came, the Company assigned the 1st Platoon as a rearguard, and began pulling out one unit at a time in the order: the 8th Company, machine gun platoon, weapons platoon, the 2nd Platoon, the 3rd Platoon, and the 1st Platoon. However, the KPA attacked during the 3rd Platoon's withdrawal, and the platoon lost its leader 2nd Lt Kim Gyo-seok and platoon sergeant Sgt 1st Class Go Yong-chul during the clash. Two platoons were separated from the company and made their way to the rally point at Naengjongri.

Maj Song originally attempted to withdraw to Gangryong by breakthrough KPA-occupied Yangwon guarded by four SU-76Ms. At 15:00, after failing to destroy self-propelled guns with the M1 mortars, his troops headed back to Mahyon but met with KPA bullets that almost killed the major. He then went to Naengjongri and started reorganizing around 400 troops gathered there.

While the ROK in the western sector were regrouping, four KPA SU-76Ms were heading toward Gangryong. The KPA column stopped at the entrance of Gangryong to take extra caution due to previous ROK ambushes with anti-tank weapons. However, the KPA decision gave advantages to ROK by exposing sides of the SU-76Ms standing still to the line of sight of the anti-tank guns that Col Paik was commanding (most of the ROK munitions for the M1 anti-tank gun were high-explosives). The ROK destroyed three SU-76Ms and two armored vehicles, and escaping KPA crews were targeted by a .50 Cal machine gun mounted on the colonel's ¾-ton vehicle. The ROK anti-tank team then withdrew to Chunggidong safely, and Col Paik started giving out detailed plans at 16:00.

Col Paik tried to call the 2nd Battalion to instruct withdrawal to Sagot, but no response was heard back from the radio transceiver. During that period, Maj Song and his foot soldiers were maneuvering around Ongjin city since the KPA activity was reported in the city. Part of his force created a convoy consisting of seven 2.5-ton trucks carrying combat troops (5), wounded (1), and ammunition (1) drove through the city street at high speed while shooting at KPA in the process. The convoy drove south and dismounted troops to secure the three-way interaction next to Mount Yongun (3 km south of Ongjin) to provide cover for the retreating ROK to Sagot. At 18:00, Maj Song learned about the rescue plan and the instructions from Col Paik. By 19:30, around 700 ROKs grouped near Mount Yongun, including the 1st and the 3rd Platoon of the 7th Company. Maj Song placed the 7th Company and a weapon platoon of the 4th Company at the mount as a first rearguard, and the 1st Company at Yangmyongdong (2 km north of Sagot) as a second rearguard to provide cover for the first then the major moved to Sagot with the rest of the troops.

Several scattered ROK units in the eastern sector such as the 5th Company, around 100 men of the 3rd Battalion, and the engineer company, also made their way and joined the regiment at Pupo direction. At night, believing his force would collapse on the next KPA attack, Col Paik decided to use deception against the KPA. First, the colonel ordered Maj Oh and Maj Bak to fire every howitzer and mortar until sunrise. Next, he told the transportation officer to use the entire 85 vehicles to continuously do roundtrips from Pupo to Chunggidong but turn off headlights during return—it would make the KPA believe the ROK is receiving reinforcement from the mainland. The deception worked and the KPA did not launch any attacks until the next morning.

In the western sector, when Maj Song arrived in Sagot, the place was already filled with soldiers, policemen, and refugees in chaos. Maj Song shot a pistol in the air to control the crowd and asked for public order, but there were no ships available at the port. At 23:00, a senior inspector reported to the major that police at Yongho Island were not sending their boat due to the existing mission. Maj Song called the police station and explained that 1,300 ROKs and 700 policemen and civilians needed to evacuate. Therefore, the police chief sent out Daeseong to transport 80 people per roundtrip to Yongho Island. The ROK set fire on all of their 15 vehicles before leaving.

At 23:30, the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) ship LST-801 docked at Pupo. The Navy Cap Kim Ok-kyeong told Col Paik that the ship must depart before 08:00 due to the tide, and Col Paik left Pupo for the front line. At 00:30 on 26 June, Col Paik summoned Maj Oh and Maj Bak to withdraw one company at a time using vehicles with headlights off. The withdrawal began at 01:00, and only the 11th Company, a battery, and an anti-tank gun company were remaining at the defense line when the KPA reopened artillery fire at 05:00. The 11th Company stopped using vehicles and retreated on foot under the covering fire from anti-tank guns and howitzers. However, two KPA SU-76Ms ignored incoming ROK fire and advanced to Chochon, and stopped by the bridge that was destroyed by the ROK engineers earlier. The KPA mobilized civilians to repair the bridge, and the KPA continued the advance 3 hours later. The ROK used this time to pull out last remaining troops, and hided two anti-tank guns near the road entering Pupo. The 11th Company made a separate escape via fishing boats.

At 07:00 in Sagot, the ROK 1st Company began boarding Daeseong after other ROKs and policemen were transported. However, the ROK had to leave 500 refugees in Sagot as the number of KPA shelling started increasing in the area. Another 100 ROKs landed on Yongho Island by different boats. The ROKs on the island were provided with food for the first time since the war started. At 9:00, supply officer 1st Lt Bak Won-keun sailed out on Daeseong in an attempt to find more ships.

At 09:30, two KPA SU-76Ms were destroyed near Pupo by anti-tank guns commanded by Col Paik. When the colonel returned to Pupo, most ROKs escaped from the area, and only around 100 ROKs were waiting for their regiment commander to return. From 05:00, the LST-801 departed Pupo to avoid getting stranded and was joined by a training ship operated by the maritime university. The LST-801 continued evacuating ROK with four landing crafts and fishing boats. The colonel sent an information officer Cap Yu Chang-hun to direct the training ship to rescue the 1st and 2nd Battalion in Sagot.

At 10:30, the KPA started shelling Pupo, and Col Paik and Maj Bak returned fire with the last M3 howitzer waiting to be disassembled to provide cover. At 11:00, the colonel ordered the last remaining ship to leave without him and continuously fired the howitzer until the ship was far enough from the danger zone. They disassembled and dumped the howitzer in the ocean, and then the colonel attempted to commit suicide using his pistol but was stopped by Maj Bak. They left Pupo on a small boat that Maj Bak found and were picked up by a fishing boat after drifting on the ocean without any means of propulsion for a few hours.

At 14:00, the ROK training ship arrived near Sagot, and there were no signs of the ROK but only the KPA cavalries patrolling the area. The ship then changed the course to Incheon.

At 15:00, the ROK led by Maj Song in Yongho Island departed for Pupo on four ships that Daeseong brought to the island. They arrived near Pupo after four hours but changed the course after learning about the KPA occupation of Pupo from ten ROKs of the 3rd Battalion whom the ship picked up.

More ROKs either individually or by a group made their escape. The last known ROK group to depart Ongjin Peninsula was at 15:30 from Pupo.

At 16:00, the LST-801 carrying 1,200 ROK passengers set the course for Incheon after waiting for the regiment commander. They were commanded by Lt Col Kim Hui-jun during the absence of Col Paik, and landed in Incheon at 04:00 on 27 June. Upon landing, attached troops were ordered to return to their original units and the remaining 700 ROKs of the 17th Regiment went to a new rally point at Yeongdeungpo.

At 19:00, Col Paik arrived at Yeongpyeong Island and worked on the defenses of the island with local guards. After a few hours, the ROKN ships JMS-302 and JMS-307, commanded by Lt Yeom Bong-saeng and Capt Baek Un-gi respectively, arrived and rescued the colonel and 41 ROKs. They left the island at 02:00 on 27 June, and landed at Incheon at 08:00. The colonel reported the situation to the Chief of Staff of the Army Chae Byong-duk and the Ministry of Defense Shin Song-mo at the Army HQ, and was given a new mission to provide security for the government's relocation to Daejeon.

The ROK convoy led by Maj Song arrived at Yeonpyeong Island at 07:00 on 27 June. They left the island at 20:00 in three groups, and the first and second group docked at the Port of Incheon at 06:00 on 28 June. They waited for the third group until 20:00 and boarded the ROKN ship YMS-513, commanded by Lt Bak Gyeong-cheol, and landed at Gunsan at 07:00 on 29 June to join the regiment by train. The third group landed at Incheon at 11:00 and arrived at Daejeon on 30 June with help from the police.

Aftermath

ROK assessment

The ROK 17th Infantry Regiment mobilized residents before the war to fortify defensive positions and organized local organizations into local defense units to cooperate with the military. Together with Col Paik's decision to stay alert, the ROK was able to minimize casualties during the beginning of the KPA invasion. The regiment operated two battalions at the frontline and one battalion as a reserve. Battalions were rotated every two months, and the 2nd Battalion was undergoing intensive training on both small and heavy firearms, which allowed the Battalion to succeed during the ROK counterattack.

The regiment was not large enough to cover the entire front line. The ROK Army HQ also did not send any reinforcement despite hearing reports from the regiment including that from the defected KPA officer. The regiment was unable to actively send out patrols due to a shortage of troops, thus allowing the KPA to break through the defense line without getting spotted. Watch towers and communication systems were prioritized by the KPA, and were destroyed at an early stage of the battle. The ROK moved artilleries to the front and used to provide fire support in close range, repelling KPA attacks and causing many KPA casualties. However, the ROK frequently experienced shortages of ammunition mostly due to communication problems between units and logistics. Lack of communication also disrupted cooperation between the units, and in particular, during withdrawal, caused a lot of losses. In addition, many lives and equipment were lost due to the delay in support from the Army HQ.

Colonel Paik did not anticipate a full-scale invasion of the KPA, but he preserved the 17th Regiment against a superior force. However, the colonel made a crucial error in using the reserve battalion by assisting the ROK left defense too early, thus letting the KPA 1st Infantry Regiment crush the ROK right defense and split the ROK in half by advancing to Kangryong.

Propaganda issues

On 25 June, Choe Gi-deok, a reporter from Yonhap News Agency (not to be confused with the current Yonhap News Agency), returned from Ongjin Peninsula and told Col Kim Hyeon-su, the director of the Ministry of Defense media agency, that Colonel Paik In-yup said he "will advance to Haeju", and it was mistakenly translated to "advancing to Haeju" during the broadcast. According to Col Paik, he never said such a thing. On the other hand, reporter Choe had a record of arrest for sympathizing with and promoting communism and disrupting public order. Choe later claimed that he disputed with Col Kim over the detail, but the colonel left as it was to keep the ROK morale high. Regardless of the credibility, public media started producing fake news about ROK victories including the "capture of Haeju" between 27–28 June. However, propaganda confused commanders of the ROK to plan out tactics correctly, damaging the military rather than helping. In addition, these false reports were used to fortify North Korea's claim on South Korea's artillery attacks between 23–25 June, which never happened, and South Korea's responsibility for starting the war.

External links

• "옹진지구 전투"