Jump to content

Nation Alliance (Turkey)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Porcelynne (talk | contribs) at 22:04, 5 October 2023 (Undid revision 1178759519 by Beshogur (talk) There's the Felicity Party. The Good Party emerged from a far-right background as well but this was mainly a reference to the SP.). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Nation Alliance
Millet İttifakı
LeaderCollective leadership (Table of Six)
Presidential candidateKemal Kılıçdaroğlu
Founded5 May 2018
Dissolved28 May 2023
IdeologyStrengthened parliamentary system
(ideologies vary by party)
Political positionBig tent
MembersCHP
İYİ
DEVA
GP
SAADET
DP
Slogan"United we will win!" (Birleşe birleşe kazanacağız!)
Grand National Assembly
212 / 600
Metropolitan municipalities
11 / 30
District municipalities
277 / 1,351
Provincial councillors
209 / 1,251
Municipal Assemblies
6,206 / 20,498
Website
milletittifaki.biz

The Nation Alliance (Turkish: Millet İttifakı), abbreviated as NATION (Turkish: MİLLET), was an electoral and political alliance in Turkey, made up of six opposition parties to contest the 2023 Turkish general election against its main rival, the People's Alliance.[1][2] Originally established prior to the country's 2018 general election,[3] the alliance had consisted of four opposition parties across the political spectrum, which had found common ground on withstanding Turkey's newly established presidential system.[4] The alliance dissolved in 1 June 2023 following its decisive defeat in the 2023 elections, after Good Party's announcement that they were no longer a part of it.

Although Nation had become rather inactive as a bloc following their defeat in 2018; the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Good Party (İYİ) restored the alliance for the 2019 local elections, which delivered the opposition their first major electoral successes in years.[5]

The alliance has since enlarged, welcoming two breakaway parties from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP); namely the Future Party (GP) and Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA), both of which had already announced their intention to nominate a joint candidate along with the parties of the Nation.[6] Shortly after the enlargement, Nation Alliance announced its prospective government platform, becoming the first political entity in Turkey to do so prior to an election.[7]

The Nation Alliance represents a broad political spectrum from the center-left to the far-right. Generally, the platform puts a particular emphasis on establishing a strengthened parliamentary system; reversing the current trend of democratic backsliding, reinstating rule of law and separation of powers, as well as improving Turkey's human rights record.[8][9]

The current format of the Nation Alliance features stark differences in comparison with 2018, back when all parties had nominated their individual candidates for the presidency, and the alliance had more of an electoral focus than a political one, interconnecting parties with vaguely defined precepts.[4] In contrast with the past, the parties now strive to act with consensus; laying the groundwork of a potential democratic transition in post-Erdoğan Turkey.[10][11]

History and background

2017 constitutional referendum

A constitutional referendum was held in April 2017, which transformed the political system of Turkey from a parliamentary into a presidential one. The reforms were championed by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the smaller oppositional Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).[12][13]

The constitutional referendum ultimately passed with a narrow margin of 2-3% on an 85% voter turnout.[14] Meanwhile, the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), along with MHP now-dissidents such as Meral Akşener who would go onto establish the Good Party (İYİ),[15] voiced strong opposition to the constitutional amendments which were deemed undemocratic, autocratic and seen as a threat to rule of law, democracy and separation of powers within the country.[16]

The alliance had brought together many groups with differing ideologies that had campaigned for a "No" vote against the transition into a presidential system during the referendum, and those who were already in opposition to the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan under a common and unifying banner. As a result; the alliance's supportive bases were viewed as being spread out across many differing political views and ideologies, though unifying under an opposition to Erdoğan and support of a strengthened parliamentary system.[17]

2018 elections and 2019 local election

When the new AKP-MHP government legalized the formation of pre-election alliances in order to contest the 2018 elections together, which was previously limited,[18] speculation arose over the possibility of opposition groups also establishing an alliance. After several sets of talks, the CHP announced on 1 May 2018 the formation of its alliance with Akşener's new Good Party, as well as with the extraparliamentary Felicity and Democrat parties. In order for the Good Party to compete in the election more effectively the CHP transferred 15 of its MPs to the new party so it could have a parliamentary group. Smaller transfers took place with the other two parties within the alliance, again as political support before the 2018 elections took place.[19]

During the 2018 elections, these constituent parties of the alliance contested under a common banner for the parliamentary election, while for the presidential election each individual party nominated its own candidate, though the parties stated beforehand that they would support the leading opposition presidential candidate; Muharrem İnce, if the 2018 presidential election was proponed for a head-to-head second round.[20][21][22]

On 4 July, following the alliance winning 189 seats out of the 600 seats in the Grand National Assembly, the Good Party General Secretary Aytun Çıray announced that the Nation Alliance at that point had been partially dissolved, citing the lack of a need for a post-election alliance.[23] In response, the CHP's spokesperson Bülent Tezcan expressed that the electoral alliance was no longer technically necessary, but that the unity of the member alliance parties under and in-supporting of a joint set of democratic fundamental values such as separation of powers, parliamentarianism, rule of law and human rights within Turkey were necessary and as such would continue.[24]

Though, during the 2019 local elections the alliance came together once again with prominence and achieved overwhelming success, such as winning 6 out of the 7 largest mayoral municipalities, one being İstanbul which had been under the rule of conservative parties for over 20 years, as well as the capital Ankara.

After these results, the electoral alliance this time took a less-temporary lasting stance as an electoral alliance, instead being a big tent political alliance, aiming to unify the dissident Turkish population until the future 2023-24 elections and possibly establish ground for a coalition government in the future.

Present

NATION today enjoys the support of a large and diverse section of the Turkish electorate. Though the secularist, Kemalist CHP is the de-facto leader of the alliance, it has managed to make inroads with the more religious and socially conservative portions of the populace.[17] The inclusion of the Islamist SAADET and the AKP-splinters DEVA and Future Parties, as well as the big-tent approach espoused by the CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu have been perceived as influential for this shift.

Though comprising largely parties that purport to be some form of Turkish nationalist, the alliance has also gained support within the Kurdish community.

These developments have seen the alliance gain in public support in the years since the 2018 general election, with most opinion polls and electoral projections conducted between mid-2021 and 2022 indicating that the alliance would become the largest political force in the country, with a possible majority in parliament following the 2023 elections.[25][26]

After rival People's Alliance won both the parliamentary majority and the presidency in elections held on 14 May 2023 and 28 May 2023, Good Party secretary general Uğur Poyraz stated that the alliance existed for purpose of succeeding in the election, and is now dissolved as the election is over.[27]

The Table of Six

Party leaders during one of the “Enhanced and Strengthened Parliamentary System” meetings.

From 2019 to 2023, İYİ, CHP, SP, DP, as well as DEVA and GP met as the “Table of Six” (Turkish: Altılı Masa) to formulate a post Erdoğan government. This would include a "enhanced and strengthened" parliamentary system modeled after other parliamentary European democracies, being deemed more democratic and stable from the previous parliamentary system of Turkey, including potentially a new constitution.[28][29]

On 3 March 2023, İYİ leader Meral Akşener announced that she took the decision to withdraw from the Table of Six and the Nation Alliance, and said her party would not support main opposition CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as the joint candidate in the 2023 Turkish presidential election.[30] However on 6 March, she and her party rejoined the Table of Six after intense public criticism and after it was announced that Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş would be appointed Vice-Presidents if Kılıçdaroğlu wins the presidential election.[31]

Goals and views

The Nation Alliance seeks to transform Turkey's presidential system back into a newly modeled parliamentary system, and establish a new constitution that guarantees the fundamental; separation of powers, rule of law, democracy and human rights such as freedom of speech within the country, which all are considered to have been under significant suppression ever since the AKP took power in 2003.[32] The parties within the alliance and table all have separate manifestos, economic recovery plans, proposed projects and diplomatic approaches, though still generally work collaboratively on issues regarding most of these fields.

Stance on the European Union & accession

The alliance stands in-favor of greater European integration and EU membership in a whole, thus also aiming to comply with the Copenhagen criteria for Turkey's accession into the European union-partnership. Turkey's candidate status, and accession process has been halted since 2018.[33][34][35][36]

Stance on NATO

Although the alliance and table supports Turkey's position within NATO,[37][38] it also supports the country's mediating and non-belligerent stance in the Russo-Ukrainian War,[39] and believes that Turkey should be reintegrated into the F-35 program while making use of the defensive weapons (such as the S-400) bought from and provided by Russia.[40] The parties occasionally criticize the support of some allied NATO member-states for the PKK, YPG and other armed militant groups in-conflict with the country.[41]

Unlike rest of the members, the Felicity Party is known for being the most critical towards Western countries and NATO, Temel Karamollaoğlu harshly criticized American government on many occasions, condemning assassination of Qasem Soleimani and declaring him an Islamic martyr.[42][43]

Membership

Members and political affiliations

Party Leader Position MPs (Grand National Assembly)
CHP Republican People's Party
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu Centre-left
130 / 600
İYİ Good Party
(İYİ Parti)
Meral Akşener Centre-right to right-wing
43 / 600
DEVA Democracy and Progress Party
(Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi)
Ali Babacan Centre-right
15 / 600
SAADET Felicity Party
(Saadet Partisi)
Temel Karamollaoğlu Right-wing
10 / 600
GP Future Party
(Gelecek Partisi)
Ahmet Davutoğlu Centre-right
10 / 600
DP Democrat Party
(Demokrat Parti)
Gültekin Uysal Centre-right
3 / 600

Parties providing support for the 2023 presidential election

Party Leader Position MPs (Grand National Assembly)
BTP Independent Turkey Party[44] Hüseyin Baş Centre
0 / 600
TKP Communist Party of Turkey[45] Kemal Okuyan Far-left
0 / 600
HKP People's Liberation Party[46] Nurullah Ankut Far-left
0 / 600
TİP Workers' Party of Turkey[47] Erkan Baş Left-wing to far-left
4 / 600
TDP Party for Change in Turkey[48] Mustafa Sarıgül Centre to centre-left
1 / 600
LDP Liberal Democratic Party[49] Gültekin Tırpancı Centre
0 / 600
DOĞRU True Party[50] Rifat Serdaroğlu Centre to centre-right
0 / 600
ZP Victory Party (runoff only)[51] Ümit Özdağ Right-wing to far-right
0 / 600

Support during the 2018–2019 elections

In 2018, the presidential candidate of the alliance's largest party CHP, Muharrem İnce, was supported by minor parties such as the national-conservative Homeland Party (YP),[52] liberal ANAP (Motherland)[53] alongside the feminist KP (Women's Party) and 8 more minor parties, while Meral Akşener's candidacy was supported by that of the DSP and DYP.[54]

The third largest opposition party, pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) supported the Nation Alliance in many provinces during the 2019 local elections, most significantly during re-run of the Istanbul local election, though took it a generally neutral stance for the elections throughout this period. The party collaborated with the Nation Alliance's mayoral candidates in many cities, but still put out many of its own candidates in other parts of country. The HDP formed its own electoral alliance with other left-wing parties in mid-2022, the Labour and Freedom Alliance (Turkish: Emek ve Özgürlük İttifakı).[55][56]

The HDP also stated that they would support the Nation Alliance's joint candidate even in the first round of the 2023 presidential election, if “their presidential candidate's profile fits into those political standards of the HDP voter.”[57][58][59]

Electoral history

Presidential elections

Election Candidate(s) Party Votes % Outcome
2018
Muharrem İnce
Republican People's Party 15,340,321 30.64% 2nd

Meral Akşener
Good Party 3,649,030 7.29% 4th

Temel Karamollaoğlu
Felicity Party 443,704 0.89% 5th
2023
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu
Republican People's Party 25,432,951 47.82% 2nd

Parliamentary elections

Election Parties Total alliance votes Total alliance seats Position Map
# % Rank # ±
June 2018 17,019,808 33.95% 2nd 47Increase Opposition
May 2023 19,063,781 35.04% 2nd 23Increase Opposition

Local elections

Election Parties Total number of allied votes (Mayoral) % of allied votes Number of allied municipalities Number of allied councillors Map
March 2019 17,443,229 37.57%

Re-runs

Election Candidate Party Votes % Outcome Map
June 2019
Republican People's Party 4,742,082 54.22% 1st

References

  1. ^ "Turkish Opposition to Run Joint Candidate Against President Erdogan (2023)". Balkan Insight. 22 August 2022. Retrieved 29 November 2022.
  2. ^ "Opposition parties agree to unite against People's Alliance in upcoming Turkish elections". Daily Sabah. 2 May 2018. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  3. ^ Jean Yackley, Ayla (2 May 2018). "Turkish opposition joins forces for parliament vote — AlMonitor". www.al-monitor.com. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  4. ^ a b "Seçim 2018: Millet İttifakı nasıl işleyecek?". BBC News Türkçe (in Turkish). Retrieved 8 February 2023.
  5. ^ "İttifak bu kez AKP'ye kaybettirdi, CHP'ye kazandırdı: Ankara 25 yıl sonra el değiştirdi". BBC News Türkçe (in Turkish). Retrieved 8 February 2023.
  6. ^ Büro, Ankara (21 December 2022). "2022'de Altılı Masa: Cumhurbaşkanı adayı 2023'e kaldı". Medyascope (in Turkish). Retrieved 8 February 2023.
  7. ^ Özgenç, Cansu Timur & Özgecan (31 January 2023). "Millet İttifakı, hükümet programını açıkladı: Sığınmacılara Türkçe öğretilecek". Medyascope (in Turkish). Retrieved 8 February 2023.
  8. ^ "Millet İttifakı'nın hükümet programında neler var? – DW – 30.01.2023". dw.com (in Turkish). Retrieved 8 February 2023.
  9. ^ "Opposition Alliance in Turkey: Can it Restore Democracy?". IACL-IADC Blog. 22 February 2022. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  10. ^ Esen, Berk (9 January 2022). "The Opposition Alliance in Turkey: A Viable Alternative to Erdoğan?". Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  11. ^ "Post-2023 Election Scenarios in Turkey". Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). 22 September 2022. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  12. ^ "The numbers that tell the story of Turkey's referendum". BBC News. 17 April 2017. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  13. ^ "MHP leader embraces his party's alliance with ruling AKP - Türkiye News". Hürriyet Daily News. 24 November 2020. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  14. ^ "Why did Turkey hold a referendum?". BBC News. 10 February 2017. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  15. ^ bcomert. (25 October 2017). "The IYI Party is established! What does Meral Akşener mean by IYI Party? What does GOOD mean, here is the "Kayı Beylik" connection detail… - Latest news – Sözcü" [İYİ Parti kuruldu! Meral Akşener’in İYİ Parti’nin açılımı ne? İYİ ne demek işte Kayı Boyu bağlantısı detayı… - Son dakika haberleri – Sözcü]. Sözcü Gazetesi (in Turkish). Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  16. ^ Bechev, Dimitar. "Turkey Under Erdoğan: How a Country Turned from Democracy and the West". Carnegie Europe. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  17. ^ a b "The 2023 Turkish elections: An unmarked road". Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  18. ^ "'Rushed' at midnight: 26-item "alliance law" passed in Parliament overnight". www.diken.com.tr. 13 March 2018. Retrieved 22 November 2022.
  19. ^ "15 MPs from the CHP resigned and joined the IYI Party" [CHP'den 15 milletvekili istifa edip İYİ Parti'ye katıldı]. BBC News Türkçe (in Turkish). 22 April 2018. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  20. ^ Shaheen, Kareem (18 June 2018). "Turkey elections 2018: everything you need to know". The Guardian. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  21. ^ Lyons, Kate; Bowman, Verity; Henley, Jon. "Turkey elections 2018: Erdoğan declared winner, as it happened". The Guardian. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  22. ^ "Erdogan; the first leader of the presidential government system" [Cumhurbaşkanlığı hükümet sisteminin ilk lideri Erdoğan]. BBC News Türkçe (in Turkish). 25 June 2018. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  23. ^ "Spokesperson of IYI Party: "The Nation Alliance is now dissolved"" [İYİ Parti sözcüsü açıkladı... Millet İttifakı sona erdi]. www.hurriyet.com.tr (in Turkish). 4 July 2018. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  24. ^ "CHP Spokesperson Bülent Tezcan: "There is no congress on our agenda"" [CHP Parti Sözcüsü Bülent Tezcan: Gündemimizde kurultay yok]. birgun.net (in Turkish). 4 July 2018. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  25. ^ "Turkey's 2023 elections: What do the polls say?". Middle East Institute. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  26. ^ "Upcoming Elections in Turkey: Unfair but Real and Competitive". GMFUS. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  27. ^ "Millet İttifakı bitti! İYİ Partili Poyraz ve Paçacı'dan açıklama: Seçim bitti, ittifak tamamlandı". www.hurriyet.com.tr (in Turkish). 1 June 2023. Retrieved 1 June 2023.
  28. ^ "Turkey's opposition parties to meet for talks on the reversion to a new parliamentary system". Ahval. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  29. ^ "Opposition Alliance in Turkey: Can it Restore Democracy?". IACL-IADC Blog. 22 February 2022. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  30. ^ "Akşener parts ways with 'Table of Six' - Türkiye News". Hürriyet Daily News. 3 March 2023. Retrieved 3 March 2023.
  31. ^ "Akşener altılı masaya döndü – DW – 06.03.2023". dw.com (in Turkish). Retrieved 6 March 2023.
  32. ^ Altınörs, Görkem (22 February 2022). "🌊 The authoritarian consolidation attempt in Turkey". The Loop. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  33. ^ "Kılıçdaroğlu: "Our goal is full membership in the European Union."". www.ntv.com.tr (in Turkish). Retrieved 24 November 2022.
  34. ^ (PDF) “CHP's Party Program for a civilized Turkey:”https://chp.azureedge.net/1d48b01630ef43d9b2edf45d55842cae.pdf (in Turkish)
  35. ^ (PDF) “Good Party's Party Program:”https://iyiparti.org.tr/storage/img/doc/iyi-parti-guncel-parti-program.pdf (in Turkish)
  36. ^ (PDF) “Views of political parties in Turkey regarding the European integration:” http://ataum.ankara.edu.tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/209/2017/02/Siyasi-Partilerin-Avrupa-Birligine-Bakisi.pdf
  37. ^ SU (21 February 2022). "Kılıçdaroğlu: "A system integrated with NATO is the correct way."". Sözcü Gazetesi (in Turkish). Retrieved 21 November 2022.
  38. ^ Görür, Senem (4 November 2022). "NATO membership of Sweden and Finland: what will the Nation Alliance do if it comes to power?". Medyascope (in Turkish). Retrieved 21 November 2022.
  39. ^ "Kılıçdaroğlu: "We believe that we should stand by Ukraine during the war."". soL (in Turkish). 12 October 2022. Retrieved 21 November 2022.
  40. ^ "S-400 statement from Kılıçdaroğlu draws controversy in the British media: "Why did you buy it, against whom will you use it?"". Sabah (in Turkish). Retrieved 21 November 2022.
  41. ^ "PKK / Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs". www.mfa.gov.tr. Retrieved 22 November 2022.
  42. ^ "Temel Karamollaoğlu'na göre Kasım Süleymani şehit oldu". Ensonhaber (in Turkish). 4 January 2020.
  43. ^ "Eski Saadet Partisi Genel Başkanı Kamalak: Esad'la görüştük diye bize tepki gösterenler ABD'nin ağzıyla konuşuyordu". Independent Türkçe (in Turkish). 11 January 2023.
  44. ^ ""Bütün adayların netleşmesini bekleyeceğiz. Sayın Erdoğan'ın karşısında kim kalırsa onu destekleriz."". Twitter (in Turkish). Retrieved 20 March 2023.
  45. ^ "TKP seçim tavrını açıkladı: Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu'na destek kararı". www.cumhuriyet.com.tr (in Turkish). 15 March 2023. Retrieved 26 March 2023.
  46. ^ "HKP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu'nu destekleyeceğini duyurdu". www.cumhuriyet.com.tr (in Turkish). 14 March 2023. Archived from the original on 17 March 2023. Retrieved 26 March 2023.
  47. ^ "Cumhuriyet Haber Verir - Güncel Son Dakika Haberleri". www.cumhuriyet.com.tr (in Turkish). Archived from the original on 3 June 2020. Retrieved 24 March 2023.
  48. ^ "Mustafa Sarıgül Kılıçdaroğlu'na desteğini açıkladı". www.cumhuriyet.com.tr (in Turkish). Archived from the original on 10 March 2023. Retrieved 20 March 2023.
  49. ^ "Liberal Demokrat Parti, Millet İttifakı'na desteğini açıkladı". T24 (in Turkish). Archived from the original on 8 March 2023. Retrieved 8 March 2023.
  50. ^ "Ata İttifakı'ndan ayrılmışlardı: Doğru Parti'den Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu'na destek açıklaması!". www.cumhuriyet.com.tr (in Turkish). 24 March 2023. Archived from the original on 24 March 2023. Retrieved 24 March 2023.
  51. ^ Hayatsever, Huseyin; Kucukgocmen, Ali (24 May 2023). "Turkish anti-immigrant party leader backs Erdogan's challenger in runoff". Reuters. Retrieved 1 June 2023.
  52. ^ odatv4.com. "Who does the YP support?". www.odatv4.com. Retrieved 19 November 2022.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  53. ^ "Support from ANAP to İnce, and the Nation Alliance". birgun.net (in Turkish). Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  54. ^ Mynet (22 June 2018). "Support for Muharrem İnce from 9 political parties" [9 siyasi partiden Muharrem İnce'ye destek]. Mynet Haber (in Turkish). Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  55. ^ "Turkey's left-wing alliance reveals joint roadmap". Medya News. 25 September 2022. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  56. ^ "Third alliance enters the fray ahead of Turkish elections - Al-Monitor: Independent, trusted coverage of the Middle East". www.al-monitor.com. 26 September 2022. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  57. ^ Aslan, Ferit (28 October 2022). "HDP'li Tayip Temel: "Birinci turda aday çıkarma kararı kesin değil, Kılıçdaroğlu dahil adı geçen hiçbir aday HDP ve seçmenine güven vermiyor"". Medyascope (in Turkish). Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  58. ^ "Joint-candidate proposal from the HDP". www.ntv.com.tr (in Turkish). Retrieved 19 November 2022.
  59. ^ "HDP's statements on a joint-candidate". Independent Türkçe (in Turkish). 4 August 2022. Retrieved 19 November 2022.