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The State Security Council (SSC) was formed in South Africa in 1972 to advise the government on the country's national policy and strategy concerning security, its implementation and determining security priorities. Its role changed through the prime ministership's of John Vorster and PW Botha (later State President), being little used during the formers and during the latter’s, controlling all aspects of South African public's lives by becoming the Cabinet. During those years he would implement a Total National Strategy, Total Counter-revolutionary Strategy and finally in the mid-eighties, established the National Security Management System (NSMS). After FW de Klerk's rise to the role of State President, the Cabinet would eventually regain control of the management of the country. After the 1994 elections a committee called National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee was formed to advise the South African president on security and intelligence as well as its implementation.

Early origins

In 5 September 1969, Prime Minister John Vorster formed a commission led by Justice H.J. Potgieter to establish the guidelines and mission for intelligence gathering by the Military Intelligence (later DMI) and the Bureau for State Security (BOSS).^[1]^[2]^: Chp2 The Commission to Inquire into Certain Intelligence Aspects of State Security, known better as the Potgieter Commission would investigate the clashes between the two organisations over who had primary responsibility for intelligence gathering in South Africa.^[2]^: Chp2 As the BOSS head Hendrik van den Bergh was a close ally of the Prime Minister, it was seen by Military Intelligence as a foregone conclusion that BOSS would achieve favour.^[2]^: Chp2 The Potgieter Commission reported back on the 2 February 1972 and the results were subsequently used to enact the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act 64 of 1972 on 24 May 1972.^[2]^: Chp2^[3] Part of this act established the formation of the State Security Council under the control of the cabinet and established it as the government's national centre for operational security.^[2]^: Chp2

Council membership

The Act called for the following persons to be members of the State Security Council:^[2]^: Chp2

Prime Minister
Minister of Defence
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Justice
Minster of Police
Chief of the Defence Force
Chief of the South African Police
Director-General of Bureau for State Security (BOSS) (later National Intelligence Service (NIS))
Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Secretary of Justice

and anyone one else required to aid the discussions.

Secretariat

These are three of the known secretaries of the State Security Council:^[2]^: Chp2^[4]^: 51^[5]

Lt Gen A.J. van Deventer (1975 – 1985)^[2]^: Chp2
Lt Gen Pieter Van der Westhuizen (1985 – 1988)^[2]^: Chp2
Lt Gen Charles Lloyd (1988 – 1990)^[2]^: Chp2^[6]^{: 86 (Footnote 57)}

PW Botha years and the SSC

The State Security Council (SSC) presided over the National Security Management System (NSMS) of President P W Botha's National Party Government in South Africa. Its function was to advise the government on formulating and executing national security policy. Botha himself chaired the SSC, which was served by a secretariat of 100 full-time staff seconded from other government departments. The SSC had four divisions:

strategy
strategic communications
national intelligence interpretation, and
administration

Below the SSC was a network of regional, district and local committees or Joint Management Centres (JMCs) which reported on the activities and location of political activists so as to form an overall security profile, thus enabling decisions on security action to be taken.^[7] Such action included assassination of people opposed to the apartheid government's policies, and the widespread use of abduction, arson, sabotage and torture. The SSC put pressure on the security forces to "engage robustly" against persons and organisations opposed to the government.^[8]

Joint Management Centres

The Joint Management Centres had two main roles. One, to obtain intelligence in the areas of the country they operated especially the activities of the African National Congress (ANC), Pan-African Congress (PAC) and later in the mid-eighties, the United Democratic Front (UDF) but essentially any organisation the SSC thought acted against the interests of the state.^[2]^: Chp4 Its secondary role, that was neglected to due to the overriding interests of the security and intelligence brief, was the implementation of the executive strategy and policy to improve the socio-economic and political affairs in the regions controlled by the JMC which were the three of the four pillars of the governments Total Strategy.^[2]^: Chp4 These roles could be defined as through military control, bring stability to the townships, restoring the role of the state in those communities which would legitimise the states role and finally in the long term anticipating and controlling future resistance through the implementation of political, social and economic reform.^[2]^: Chp4

Structure

There were twelve JMC's based in each province and capital city which replicated the SADF command regions, and with the exception of the Western Cape and Witwatersrand, under the command of a SADF Brigadier while the two former were under the command of South African Police (SAP) Divisional Commander.^[2]^: Chp4. There were also five external JMC's, Walvis Bay, Namibia Command, Southern Command (five Black Homelands), Northern Command (Frontline States) and Angola.^[2]^: Chp4 The internal JMC'c were broken down into further three levels. There were sixty Sub-JMC's under the control of a SAP district commander and roughly covered the country's police districts.^[2]^: Chp4 Mini-JMC's with 450 in total which covered the South African magisterial districts and represented by a local SAP commander.^[2]^: Chp4 Last level of control of South African society was through Local Management Centres (LMC) which would be based in city and towns.^[2]^: Chp4 Information would move back and forth from the lowest levels to the JMC, then SSC, its working committee and finally the cabinets and prime minister or state president.

The following seven components made up each Joint Management Centres and were replicated to a large extent in the lower levels of the Sub and Mini JMC's and was itself similar to the State Security Council's structure:^[2]^: Chp4

Executive Committee – this was made up by the head of individual JMC and the committee heads listed below
Secretariat – administration of the JMC
Security Committee (SECCOM/VEIKOM) – main aim was to plan, monitor and co-ordinate the security forces. The operational role was under the command of a SAP commander through a Joint Operations Centre. Members of this committee included the SAP, SADF, NIS, Security Police, Railway Police, Civil defence, Commandos and state and provincial officials
Joint Intelligence Committee (JICOM/GIKOM) – main aim was to provide daily intelligence to the other committees. The operational role was under the command of an Army Intelligence commander through a Joint Intelligence Centre. Members of this committee included the Directorate Military Intelligence (DMI), NIS, Security Police, Prisons Service, Kitskonstabels, private security firms and provincial, regional and local affairs
Communication Committee (COMCOM/KOMKOM) – main aim was to compile and disseminate propaganda in their area of JMC. Members of this committee consisted of the SAP, SADF and Bureau of Information
Constitutional, Economic and Welfare Committee – main aim was to implement the National Welfare Management strategy of the government. Members included civil servants from housing, finance, constitutional affairs and pensions
Liaison Committee – communication with the public sector

FW De Klerk years and the SSC

In a statement on the death of former president P W Botha in 2006, his successor, F W de Klerk, said:

Personally, my relationship with P W Botha was often strained. I did not like his overbearing leadership style and was opposed to the intrusion of the State Security Council system into virtually every facet of government. After I became leader of the National Party in February 1989 I did my best to ensure that P W Botha would be able to end his term as president with full dignity and decorum. Unfortunately, this was not to be.^[9]

In August 2007, de Klerk was challenged to say what he knew about the atrocities carried out at the behest of the SSC. The Guardian quoted de Klerk as replying that although he was a member of the cabinet it was not briefed "on clandestine operations involving murders, assassinations or the like – all of which were evidently carried out strictly on a 'need to know' basis".^[10] The same newspaper report alleged that, in his last months as president in 1994, de Klerk ordered the wholesale shredding and incineration of tons of documents, microfilm and computer tapes that dealt with matters such as the chain of command in covert operations.

TRC Investigation into the SSC

In a 1998 report on the former South African government and its security forces, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) castigated South Africa's last hardline apartheid president P W Botha and held him responsible for gross human rights violations, including all violence sanctioned by the State Security Council. The report said:

By virtue of his position as head of state and chairperson of the State Security Council (SSC), Botha contributed to and facilitated a climate in which ... gross violations of human rights did occur, and as such is accountable for such violations.^[11]

The TRC also found that the SSC had contributed to the prevailing culture of impunity by failing to recommend that action be taken against those members of the security forces who were involved in gross human rights violations.

SSC and Samora Machel

In 1996, the TRC conducted a special investigation into the 1986 aircrash in which president Samora Machel of Mozambique was killed. The investigation was unable to prove an allegation that South Africa was behind the Mozambican Tupolev Tu-134 air disaster, but the TRC stated in its report:

South Africa's State Security Council (SSC) minutes from January 1984 indicate that the Mozambican working group, including General Jac Buchner and Major Craig Williamson, discussed how to help RENAMO overthrow the FRELIMO government of Mozambique.^[12]

References

^ "Prime Minister John Vorster appoints a Commission of Inquiry under Justice H.J. Potgieter, of The Appellate Division of the Sup". South African History Online (SAHO). Retrieved 29 December 2014.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g ^h ⁱ ^j ^k ^l ^m ⁿ ^o ^p ^q ^r ^s O'Brien, Kevin A. (2011). The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005 (eBook). Studies in Intelligence Series. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-203-84061-0. Retrieved 23 December 2014.
^ "An abridged version of the security report by Justice H.J. Potgieter's Commission of Inquiry on State Security is submitted to". South African History Online (SAHO). Retrieved 29 December 2014.
^ Isaacs, Henry E. (1990). "The Dynamics of Conflict in South Africa: Routes to Peace". In Glickman, Harvey (ed.). Towards Peace and Security in Southern Africa. Gordon and Breach Science Publishers. pp. 33–52. ISBN 2-88124-381-9. Retrieved 23 December 2014.
^ Frankel, Phillip (February 1988). Reform and Counter-Revolution: South African State Strategy during the 1980's. Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence College.
^ Roherty, James Michael (1992). State Security in South Africa: Civil-military Relations Under P.W. Botha. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. ISBN 0-87332-877-9. Retrieved 23 December 2014.
^ Coleman, Max (26 August 1990). "State violence: a study in repression". CSVR. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Retrieved 29 December 2014. Paper presented at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
^ "TRC findings: P W Botha and the SSC". bbc.co.uk. British Broadcasting Company. 29 October 1998. Retrieved 29 December 2014.
^ "Statement by F W de Klerk on the death of former president P W Botha". Cape Town: Issued by the F W de Klerk Foundation. 1 November 2006.
^ "Apartheid-era murder of sleeping teenagers returns to haunt De Klerk".
^ "TRC report on the former South African government and its security forces" (pdf).
^ "Special TRC investigation into the death of President Samora Machel".

@@ Line 39: / Line 39: @@
 ===Joint Management Centres===
-The Joint Management Centres had two main roles. One, to obtain intelligence in the areas of the country they operated especially the activities of the [[African National Congress]] (ANC), [[Pan-African Congress]] (PAC) and later in the mid-eighties, the [[United Democratic Front (South Africa|United Democratic Front]] (UDF) but essentially any organisation the SSC thought acted against the interests of the state.<ref name=OBrien/>{{rp|Chp4}} Its secondary role, that was neglected to due to the overriding interests of the security and intelligence brief, was the implementation of the executive strategy and policy to improve the socio-economic and political affairs in the regions controlled by the JMC which were the three of the four pillars of the governments Total Strategy.<ref name=OBrien/>{{rp|Chp4}} These roles could be defined as through military control, bring stability to the townships, restoring the role of the state in those communities which would legitimise the states role and finally in the long term anticipating and controlling future resistance through the implementation of political, social and economic reform.<ref name=OBrien/>{{rp|Chp4}}
+The Joint Management Centres had two main roles. One, to obtain intelligence in the areas of the country they operated especially the activities of the [[African National Congress]] (ANC), [[Pan-African Congress]] (PAC) and later in the mid-eighties, the [[United Democratic Front (South Africa)|United Democratic Front]] (UDF) but essentially any organisation the SSC thought acted against the interests of the state.<ref name=OBrien/>{{rp|Chp4}} Its secondary role, that was neglected to due to the overriding interests of the security and intelligence brief, was the implementation of the executive strategy and policy to improve the socio-economic and political affairs in the regions controlled by the JMC which were the three of the four pillars of the governments Total Strategy.<ref name=OBrien/>{{rp|Chp4}} These roles could be defined as through military control, bring stability to the townships, restoring the role of the state in those communities which would legitimise the states role and finally in the long term anticipating and controlling future resistance through the implementation of political, social and economic reform.<ref name=OBrien/>{{rp|Chp4}}
 ====Structure====