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Romani ambush
Part of the Yom Kippur War/October War
Date October 7, 1973 Location Northern Sinai front, near the town of Romani Result Egyptian objectives accomplished; Commando force decimated
Belligerents
Egypt	Israel
Commanders and leaders
Hamdy Shalabi	Natke Nir
Strength
unknown	162nd Division
Casualties and losses
70 dead	30 dead, 20 injured

The Romani ambush is an engagement that took place between the Egyptian Army and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) on the morning of October 7, 1973, the second day of the Yom Kippur War, near the town of Romani in northern Sinai. It was carried out by Egyptian airborne infantry to delay the arrival of Israeli armored reserves to the Suez Canal in support of Operation Badr. The ambush succeeded in inflicting casualties and substantially delaying Israelis reserves, though the most of the Egyptian force was destroyed.

Background

On October 6, 1973, Egypt launched Operation Badr, crossing the Suez Canal into Israeli-occupied Sinai. Egyptian forces attacked the Israeli Bar-Lev Line, immediately located behind the canal. Taken by surprise, the IDF rushed its tactical and operational reserves (mainly armored forces) to the canal, most of which had been decimated by morning on October 7. Arriving on that day from Israel proper were the strategic reserves, among which was the 162nd Armored Division commanded by Major General Abraham Adan.

In support of the crossing operation, the Egyptian High Command had planned several operations to hamper the arrival of Israeli reserves until bridges could be set up, employing airborne forces to block strategic routes. Helicopters would be used to transport them, but once inserted there would be no evacuation, effectively making the operation a suicidal one. The Sa'iqa (lightening) forces, described alternatively as commandos or elite light infantry, were tasked with performing these missions, considered crucial by Egyptian commanders for the success of Operation Badr.

Prelude

The 183rd Battalion of the 139th Sa'iqa Group, commanded by Colonel Osama Ibrahim, was given a number of blocking missions on several strategic routes. One of these was the northern coastal road extending from el-Arish to Port Fouad. A reinforced company led by Captain Hamdy Shalabi was assigned to the northern road, tasked with stalling the advance of Israeli reserves between three to four hours until the Second Field Army has finished laying bridges. At 6:00 PM on October 6, the company was airlifted from Abu Soweir Airbase by six Mi-8 helicopters (each capable of ferrying 25 soldiers). The helicopters managed to safely land the company Sa'iqa at Tel el-Farma near the coastal road, the helicopters returning to base. From there the Sa'iqa advanced to Romani and at midnight the Egyptians proceeded to set up blocking positions for the company.

Captain Shalabi established his company on a single line just north of the road, the unit dispersed along a three kilometer area. Anti-tank mines were placed on and around the road. Shalabi organized his ambush force into several groups, and established a base for patrols in the rear, which the company could fall back upon. Having dug in, the Sa'iqa waited for the arrival of Israeli reserves.

Battle

At 6:00 AM on October 7, the Israeli reserve armored column began entering the Romani area on the coastal road.

Sources

• Heitan Haber, Zeev Schiff, Lexicon of the Yom Kippur War, Or Yehoda: Zemora-Bitan, Devir, 2003

References

Bibliography

• Dupuy, Trevor N. (2002). Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974. Military Book Club. ISBN 0965442802.
• Gawrych, George (2000). The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and Policy Between Egypt and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0313313024.
• Hammad, Gamal (2002). Military Battles on the Egyptian Front (First ed.). Dār al-Shurūq. ISBN 9770908665. Template:Ar icon
• O'Ballance, Edgar (1997). No Victor, No Vanquished: The Arab-Israeli War, 1973. Presidio. ISBN 0891416153.
• Rabinovich, Abraham (2004). The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East. Schocken. ISBN 0805211241.
• Gawrych, George W. (1996). The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory. Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Retrieved 15 December 2010.