United States sanctions: Difference between revisions
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[[File:US Sanctions Programs.svg|thumb|300px|Jurisdictions specifically sanctioned by the United States under an [[Office of Foreign Assets Control|OFAC]] sanctions program or [[United States State Department|State Department]] arms-related export controls |
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{{refimprove|date=May 2023}} |
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{{legend|#b70b0b|Comprehensively sanctioned jurisdiction}} |
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[[File:US Sanctions 2.png|thumb|300px|Countries sanctioned in some form by the United States (as of 2023)]] |
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{{legend|#ffc300|Targeted sanctions (individuals and entities threatening the peace, stability, and sovereignty, and/or contributing to conflict)}} |
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'''United States sanctions''' are imposed against countries that violate the interests of the United States. [[Economic sanctions|Sanctions]] are used with the intent of damaging another country's economy in response to unfavorable policy or decisions. The United States has imposed two-thirds of the world's sanctions since the 1990s.<ref name="Hunger Politics">{{cite book | author=Manu Karuka| title=Sanctions as War | chapter=Hunger Politics: Sanctions as Siege Warfare | publisher=BRILL | date=9 December 2021 | doi=10.1163/9789004501201_004 | pages=51–62| isbn=9789004501201 | s2cid=245408284 }}</ref> Numerous American unilateral sanctions against various countries around the world have been criticized by different commentators. It has imposed economic sanctions on more than 20 countries since 1998.<ref name="The Nation">{{cite journal |last1=Gordon |first1=Joy |date=4 March 1999 |title=Sanctions as Siege Warfare |url=https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/sanctions-siege-warfare/ |journal=The Nation}}</ref> |
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{{legend|#984ea3ff|Arms embargo}} |
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{{legend|#377eb8ff|Targeted sanctions and arms embargo}} |
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{{legend|#4daf4aff|United States}}]] |
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'''United States sanctions''' are financial and trade restrictions imposed against individuals, entities, and jurisdictions whose actions contradict U.S. foreign policy or national security goals. Financial sanctions are primarily administered by the [[U.S. Department of the Treasury]]'s [[Office of Foreign Assets Control]] (OFAC), while [[export controls]] are primarily administered by the [[U.S. Department of Commerce]]'s [[Bureau of Industry and Security]] (BIS). |
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Restrictions against sanctioned targets vary in severity depending on the justification behind the sanction, and the legal authorities behind the sanctions action. Comprehensive sanctions are currently in place targeting [[Cuba]], [[Iran]], [[North Korea]], [[Russia]], [[Syria]], and certain conflict regions of [[Ukraine]], which heavily restrict nearly all trade and financial transactions between U.S. persons and those regions. Targeted sanctions specifically target certain individuals or entities that engage in activities that are contrary to U.S. foreign policy or national security goals, rather than an entire country. The U.S. also implements "secondary sanctions", which risk a sanctions designation against a non-U.S. person who transacts with sanctioned parties in violation of U.S. sanctions law, even if no U.S.-nexus existed for the transaction. |
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The United States has imposed two-thirds of the world's sanctions since the 1990s.<ref name="Hunger Politics">{{cite book | author=Manu Karuka| title=Sanctions as War | chapter=Hunger Politics: Sanctions as Siege Warfare | publisher=BRILL | date=9 December 2021 | doi=10.1163/9789004501201_004 | pages=51–62| isbn=9789004501201 | s2cid=245408284 }}</ref> In 2024, the ''[[Washington Post]]'' said that the United States imposed "three times as many sanctions as any other country or international body, targeting a third of all nations with some kind of financial penalty on people, properties or organizations".<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |date=2024 |title=How four U.S. presidents unleashed economic warfare across the globe |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/interactive/2024/us-sanction-countries-work/ |website=Washington Post |language=en}}</ref> |
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== History == |
== History == |
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After the failure of the [[Embargo Act of 1807]], the [[federal government of the United States]] took little interest in imposing [[embargo]]es and [[economic sanctions]] against foreign countries until the 20th century. [[United States trade policy]] was entirely a matter of economic policy. After World War I, interest revived. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] promoted such sanctions as a method for the League of Nations to enforce peace.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |date=2016-03-02 |title=Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions |url=https://www.piie.com/commentary/testimonies/evidence-costs-and-benefits-economic-sanctions |access-date=2020-08-25 |website=PIIE |language=en}}</ref> However, he failed to bring the United States into the League and the US did not join the 1935 League sanctions against Italy.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Strang |first1=G. Bruce |year=2008 |title="The Worst of all Worlds:" Oil Sanctions and Italy's Invasion of Abyssinia, 1935–1936 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/action/cookieAbsent |journal=Diplomacy & Statecraft |volume=19 |issue=2 |pages=210–235 |doi=10.1080/09592290802096257 |access-date=2020-08-13 |s2cid=154614365}}</ref> |
After the failure of the [[Embargo Act of 1807]], the [[federal government of the United States]] took little interest in imposing [[embargo]]es and [[economic sanctions]] against foreign countries until the 20th century. [[United States trade policy]] was entirely a matter of economic policy. After World War I, interest revived. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] promoted such sanctions as a method for the League of Nations to enforce peace.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |date=2016-03-02 |title=Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions |url=https://www.piie.com/commentary/testimonies/evidence-costs-and-benefits-economic-sanctions |access-date=2020-08-25 |website=PIIE |language=en}}</ref> However, he failed to bring the United States into the League and the US did not join the 1935 League sanctions against Italy.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Strang |first1=G. Bruce |year=2008 |title="The Worst of all Worlds:" Oil Sanctions and Italy's Invasion of Abyssinia, 1935–1936 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/action/cookieAbsent |journal=Diplomacy & Statecraft |volume=19 |issue=2 |pages=210–235 |doi=10.1080/09592290802096257 |access-date=2020-08-13 |s2cid=154614365}}</ref> |
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Trends in whether the United States has unilaterally or multilaterally imposed sanctions have changed over time.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= Haymarket Books|isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=16 |oclc=1345216431 |last1=Davis |first1=Stuart }}</ref> During the Cold War, the United States led unilateral sanctions against Cuba, China, and North Korea.<ref name=":2" /> Following the [[disintegration of the Soviet Union]] and the end of the Cold War, United States sanctions became increasingly multilateral.<ref name=":2" /> During the 1990s, the United States imposed sanctions against countries it viewed as rogue states (such as Zimbabwe, Yugoslavia, and Iraq) in conjunction with multilateral institutions such as the United Nations or the [[World Trade Organization]].<ref name=":2" /> According to communications studies academic [[Stuart Davis (academic)|Stuart Davis]] and political scientist [[Immanuel Ness]], in the 2000s, and with increasing frequency in the 2010s, the United States acted less multilaterally as it imposed sanctions against perceived geopolitical competitors (such as [[Russia]] or [[China]]) or countries that, according to Davis and Ness, were the site of "[[proxy conflicts]]" (such as [[Yemen]] and [[Syria]]).<ref name=":2" /> |
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During the COVID-19 pandemic, the [[Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights|United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights]] [[Michelle Bachelet]] and some members of the United States Congress asked the United States to suspend its sanctions regimes as way to help alleviate the pandemic's impact on the people of sanctioned countries.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= Haymarket Books|isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=11 |oclc=1345216431 |last1=Davis |first1=Stuart }}</ref> Members of Congress who argued for the suspension of sanctions included [[Bernie Sanders]], [[Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez]], and [[Ilhan Omar]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=2020-04-01 |title=Bernie Sanders and AOC call on US to lift Iran sanctions as nation reels from coronavirus |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/coronavirus-us-iran-sanctions-bernie-sanders-ocasio-cortez-covid19-a9439651.html |access-date=2023-01-23 |website=[[The Independent]] |language=en}}</ref> |
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The United States applies sanctions more frequently than any other country or nation, and does so by a wide-margin.<ref name="Sanctions as Instrument of Coercion"/> According to [[American Studies]] academic [[Manu Karuka]], the United States has imposed two-thirds of the world's sanctions since the 1990s.<ref name="Hunger Politics"/> |
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Trends in whether the United States has unilaterally or multilaterally imposed sanctions have changed over time.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=16 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref> During the Cold War, the United States led unilateral sanctions against Cuba, China, and North Korea.<ref name=":2" /> Following the [[disintegration of the Soviet Union]] and the end of the Cold War, United States sanctions became increasingly multilateral.<ref name=":2" /> During the 1990s, the United States imposed sanctions against countries it viewed as rogue states (such as Zimbabwe, Yugoslavia, and Iraq) in conjunction with multilateral institutions such as the United Nations or the [[World Trade Organization]].<ref name=":2" /> According to communications studies academic [[Stuart Davis (academic)|Stuart Davis]] and political scientist [[Immanuel Ness]], in the 2000s, and with increasing frequency in the 2010s, the United States acted less multilaterally as it imposed sanctions against perceived geopolitical competitors (such as [[Russia]] or [[China]]) or countries that, according to Davis and Ness, were the site of "[[proxy conflicts]]" (such as [[Yemen]] and [[Syria]]).<ref name=":2" /> |
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On June 4, 2024, the Republican-majority United States House of Representatives passed a bill to sanction [[International Criminal Court]] officials.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Foran |first=Clare |date=2024-06-04 |title=House passes International Criminal Court sanctions bill after prosecutor seeks Netanyahu warrant {{!}} CNN Politics |url=https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/04/politics/house-vote-icc-sanctions/index.html |access-date=2024-06-06 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref> |
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During the COVID-19 pandemic, the [[Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights|United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights]] [[Michelle Bachelet]] and some members of the United States Congress asked the United States to suspend its sanctions regimes as way to help alleviate the pandemic's impact on the people of sanctioned countries.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=11 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref> Members of Congress who argued for the suspension of sanctions included [[Bernie Sanders]], [[Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez]], and [[Ilhan Omar]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=2020-04-01 |title=Bernie Sanders and AOC call on US to lift Iran sanctions as nation reels from coronavirus |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/coronavirus-us-iran-sanctions-bernie-sanders-ocasio-cortez-covid19-a9439651.html |access-date=2023-01-23 |website=[[The Independent]] |language=en}}</ref> |
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According to a 2024 analysis by [[The Washington Post]], 60% of low-income countries were under some form of U.S. financial sanction.<ref name=":1" /> The analysis also concluded that the U.S. imposes three times as many sanctions as any other country or international body.<ref name=":1" /> |
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The United States applies sanctions more frequently than any other country or nation, and does so by a wide-margin.<ref name="Sanctions as Instrument of Coercion"/> According to [[American Studies]] academic [[Manu Karuka]], the United States has imposed two-thirds of the world's sanctions since the 1990s.<ref name="Hunger Politics"/> |
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Collectively, the nations that are subject to some kind of U.S. sanction make up little more than one fifth of the world's GDP. Eighty percent of that group comes from China.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Sabatini |first1=Christopher |title=America’s Love of Sanctions Will Be Its Downfall |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/24/united-states-sanctions-debt-china-venezuela/ |agency=Foreign Policy |date=2023}}</ref> |
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==Types of sanctions imposed by the United States== |
==Types of sanctions imposed by the United States== |
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*bans on arms-related exports,<ref> |
*bans on arms-related exports,<ref>Haidar, J.I., 2017."[https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/haidar/files/haidar-sanctionsandexportdeflection-finaldraft.pdf Sanctions and Exports Deflection: Evidence from Iran]," Economic Policy (Oxford University Press), April 2017, Vol. 32(90), pp. 319-355.</ref> |
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* controls over [[dual-use technology]] exports, |
* controls over [[dual-use technology]] exports, |
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* restrictions on economic assistance |
* restrictions on economic assistance |
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* financial restrictions such as: |
* financial restrictions such as: |
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** authority to prohibit U.S. citizens from engaging in [[financial transaction]]s with the individuals, entities, or governments on the list, except by license from the U.S. government |
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** requiring the United States to oppose loans by the [[World Bank]] and other international financial institutions, |
** requiring the United States to oppose loans by the [[World Bank]] and other international financial institutions, |
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** [[diplomatic immunity]] waived, to allow families of terrorism victims to file for [[civil damages]] in U.S. courts, |
** [[diplomatic immunity]] waived, to allow families of terrorism victims to file for [[civil damages]] in U.S. courts, |
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** [[tax credit]]s for companies and individuals denied, for income earned in listed countries, |
** [[tax credit]]s for companies and individuals denied, for income earned in listed countries, |
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** [[duty-free]] goods exemption suspended for imports from those countries, |
** [[duty-free]] goods exemption suspended for imports from those countries, and |
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** authority to prohibit U.S. citizens from engaging in [[financial transaction]]s with the government on the list, except by license from the U.S. government, and |
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** prohibition of [[U.S. Defense Department]] contracts above $100,000 with companies controlled by countries on the list.<ref> |
** prohibition of [[U.S. Defense Department]] contracts above $100,000 with companies controlled by countries on the list.<ref> |
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{{cite web |date=2010-08-05 |title=Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism |url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm |access-date=2017-03-11 |work=Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 |publisher=[[United States Department of State]]}} |
{{cite web |date=2010-08-05 |title=Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism |url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm |access-date=2017-03-11 |work=Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 |publisher=[[United States Department of State]]}} |
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</ref> |
</ref> |
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* |
* visa restrictions that prevent certain individuals from entering the U.S. |
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== Targeted parties == |
== Targeted parties == |
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{{Anchor|Targeted parties}} |
{{Anchor|Targeted parties}} |
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{{ |
{{See also|Office of Foreign Assets Control#Sanctions programs}} |
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By 2021, the U.S. has sanctioned more than 9,000 individuals, companies, and sectors of the economy of target countries, according to the U.S. Treasury Department.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Sabatini |first1=Christopher |title=America’s Love of Sanctions Will Be Its Downfall |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/24/united-states-sanctions-debt-china-venezuela/ |agency=Foreign Policy |date=2023}}</ref> |
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The U.S. does not maintain a specific list of countries that U.S. persons cannot do business with because its sanctions program varies in scope depending on the sanctions program. Although some sanctions programs are broad and target entire jurisdictions ("comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions"), most are "targeted" sanctions and focus on specific entities, individuals, or economic sectors.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/where-is-ofacs-country-list-what-countries-do-i-need-to-worry-about-in-terms-of-us-sanctions|title=Where is OFAC's Country List? What countries do I need to worry about in terms of U.S. sanctions?|publisher=[[OFAC]]|access-date=2024-01-22}}</ref> Depending on the nature of the restriction, U.S. sanctions are announced and implemented by different executive departments, typically the [[U.S. Department of the Treasury|Treasury Department]] ([[OFAC]])<ref name="OFAC where">{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/|title=OFAC Homepage|access-date=2024-01-22}}</ref> or the [[U.S. Department of Commerce|Commerce Department]] ([[Bureau of Industry and Security|BIS]]),<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/sanctioned-destinations|title=Sanctioned Destinations|access-date=2024-01-22}}</ref> and sometimes in conjunction with the [[U.S. Department of State|State]], [[U.S. Department of Defense|Defense]], or [[U.S. Department of Energy|Energy]] departments.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.state.gov/economic-sanctions-policy-and-implementation/|title=Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation|access-date=2024-01-22}}</ref> |
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=== Countries === |
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{{refimprove|section|date=May 2023}} |
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===Comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions=== |
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As of November 2022, the United States has sanctions against:<ref name="sanctions">{{cite web |
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Comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions are subject to the most restrictive sanctions measures. Most transactions between a U.S. person and any person or entity "ordinarily resident" in a comprehensively sanctioned jurisdiction is restricted.<ref name="princeton">{{cite web|url=https://orpa.princeton.edu/export-controls/sanctioned-countries|title=OFAC Sanctioned Countries|publisher=Princeton Research|access-date=2024-01-22}}</ref> In addition to the general sanctions listed below, transactions involving entities or individuals from these countries on OFAC's SDN List or BIS' [[Entity List]] are also restricted. |
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| url=https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx |
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| title=Sanctions Programs and Country Information |
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| publisher=[[United States Department of the Treasury]] |
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| date=2017-03-09 |
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| access-date=2017-03-11}}</ref> |
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{| class="wikitable sortable" |
{| class="wikitable sortable" |
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! Jurisdiction/Region !! Summary of certain restrictions |
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! Country !! Year introduced !! Article !! Summary |
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| {{Flag|Cuba}}||'''Treasury''':<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/758|title=Is Cuba open for U.S. business and investment?|access-date=2022-01-22}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|North Korea}}||1950|| [[North Korea–United States relations]] and [[sanctions against North Korea]] ||Severe sanctions justified by extreme [[Human rights in North Korea|human rights abuses by North Korea]] and the [[North Korea and weapons of mass destruction|North Korean nuclear program]]. North Korea and the US currently have no diplomatic relations. |
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* Prohibition from doing business or investing in Cuba without a license |
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'''Commerce''':<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/sanctioned-destinations/cuba|title=Cuba Sanctions|access-date=2022-01-22}}</ref> |
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Country listed as Tier 3 on [[Trafficking in Persons Report]] which imposes ban on participating in [[International Military Education and Training]] (IMET), [[Foreign Military Financing]] (FMF), and [[Foreign Military Sales]] (FMS)<ref name="Belizenews" /> |
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*License required for the export or reexport of all items on the [[Export Administration Regulations]] except food, medicine, medical devices, items necessary to ensure safe civil aviation, items necessary for environmental protection, items to improve telecommunication services, and items destined to the Cuban government to benefit the Cuban people |
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'''State''': |
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*Designation as [[State Sponsors of Terrorism]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/|title=State Sponsors of Terrorism|access-date=2022-01-22}}</ref> |
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{{See also|United States embargo against Cuba}} |
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| {{Flag|Iran}}||'''Treasury''':<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ohsu.edu/sites/default/files/2019-07/Iran%20Sanctions%20Overview.pdf|title=Iran sanctions overview|date=2019-07-01}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Cuba}}||1958|| [[Cuba–United States relations]] and [[United States embargo against Cuba]] ||Reasons cited for the embargo include [[Human rights in Cuba|Cuba's poor human rights record]]. Since 1992, the [[United Nations General Assembly|UN General Assembly]] has regularly passed annual resolutions criticizing the ongoing impact of the embargo imposed by the United States. |
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* Prohibition on the importation, exportation, and reexportation of goods, services, and technology from/to Iran |
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* Prohibition on transactions with the [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps]] and their financial facilitators, such as the [[National Iranian Oil Company]] and [[National Iranian Tanker Company]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1165|title=Treasury Sanctions Key Actors in Iran's Oil Sector for Supporting Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force|date=2020-10-26}}</ref> |
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'''Commerce''': |
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* License required for the export or reexport of most items on the [[Export Administration Regulations]]<ref name="Iran sanctions">{{cite web|url=https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/sanctioned-destinations/iran|title=Iran sanctions|access-date=2024-01-22}}</ref> |
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'''State''': |
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*Designation as State Sponsors of Terrorism |
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{{See also|United States sanctions against Iran}} |
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| {{Flag|North Korea}}||'''Treasury''':<ref name="dprk treasury">{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/topic/1556|title=North Korea Sanctions|access-date=2024-01-22}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Iran}}||1979 (lifted 1981), reintroduced 1987{{efn|Temporarily lifted in 1981 during [[Iran–Iraq War]], re-introduced in 1987}} || [[Iran–United States relations]] and [[United States sanctions against Iran]]||Near total economic embargo on all economic activities began in 1979; in response to the storming of U.S. Embassy in Tehran by [[Iranian Revolution]]aries, precipitating a [[Iran hostage crisis|hostage crisis involving dozens of American diplomats]]. Though lifted in 1981, significant sanctions were again imposed in 1987 and rapidly expanded in the late 2010s due to the [[Iranian Nuclear Program]] and [[Human rights in Iran|Iran's poor human rights record]]. Iran and the US have no diplomatic relations. Iran is listed as [[State Sponsors of Terrorism|state sponsor of terrorism]]. |
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* Financial block on the [[government of North Korea]] and the [[Workers' Party of Korea]] |
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* Prohibition on the importation, exportation and reexportation of goods, services (including financial services), and technology from/to North Korea |
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Country listed as Tier 3 on [[Trafficking in Persons Report]] which imposes ban on participating in [[International Military Education and Training]] (IMET), [[Foreign Military Financing]] (FMF), and [[Foreign Military Sales]] (FMS)<ref name="Belizenews">{{Cite news|url=https://www.breakingbelizenews.com/2018/11/30/us-cuts-aid-to-belize-over-human-trafficking-tier-3-ranking/|title=US cuts aid to Belize over Human Trafficking Tier 3 ranking|first=B. B. N.|last=Staff|date=November 30, 2018}}</ref> |
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* Prohibition on new investments in North Korea |
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* Implementation of [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270]] |
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'''Commerce''':<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/sanctioned-destinations/north-korea|title=North Korea - BIS|access-date=2024-01-22}}</ref> |
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*License required for the export or reexport of all items on the [[Export Administration Regulations]] except food or medicine |
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'''State''':<ref name="dprk treasury"/> |
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* General prohibition on travel to North Korea |
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* Designation as State Sponsors of Terrorism |
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{{See also|International sanctions against North Korea#United States|l1=U.S. sanctions against North Korea}} |
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| {{flag|Russia}}||'''Treasury''':<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.winston.com/en/blogs-and-podcasts/global-trade-and-foreign-policy-insights/sanctions-summary-russia-invasion-of-ukraine|title=Sanctions Summary – Russia Invasion of Ukraine|date=2022-03-28}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Syria}}||1986|| [[Syria–United States relations]] and [[sanctions against Syria]] ||Reasons cited include [[Human rights in Syria|Syria's poor human rights record]], the [[Syrian Civil War|Civil War]], and being listed as a [[State Sponsors of Terrorism|state sponsor of terrorism]]. Syria and the US have had no diplomatic relations since 2012. |
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* Financial block on certain elements and officials of the [[Russian government]] including the [[Central Bank of Russia]], [[Ministry of Finance]], and [[Vladimir Putin]], as well as Russian financial institutions |
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* Prohibitions on the import to and export from Russia of certain items |
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Country listed as Tier 3 on [[Trafficking in Persons Report]] which imposes ban on participating in [[International Military Education and Training]] (IMET), [[Foreign Military Financing]] (FMF), and [[Foreign Military Sales]] (FMS)<ref name="Belizenews"/> |
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* Prohibitions on new investment in certain sectors of the Russian economy |
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'''Commerce''':<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/russia-belarus|title=Resources on Export Controls Implemented in Response to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine|date=2023-11-06}}</ref> |
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* License required for the export or reexport of all items on the Export Administration Regulations |
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* License required for the export or reexport of certain foreign-produced items made with U.S. inputs |
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| {{flag|Syria}}||'''Treasury''':<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/6531/download?inline|title=Syria sanctions program|date=2013-08-02}}</ref> |
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|{{Flag|Venezuela}} |
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* Prohibition on the direct or indirect exportation of services to Syria |
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|2019{{efn|In August 2019, President [[Donald Trump]] announced further sanctions on Venezuela, ordering a freeze on all Venezuelan government assets in the [[United States]] and barred transactions with US citizens or companies. Part of the ongoing [[Venezuelan presidential crisis]] which started in January 2019.}} |
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* Prohibition on the importation of petroleum products from Syria, or dealing in transactions related to Syrian petroleum |
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| [[United States–Venezuela relations]] and [[International sanctions during the Venezuelan crisis#United States|International sanctions during the Venezuelan crisis]]<ref name="Overview">{{cite web |url= https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10715.pdf |publisher= Federation of American Scientists |work= Congressional Research Service|title= Venezuela: Overview of U.S. sanctions |date= 8 March 2019 |access-date= 3 April 2019}}</ref> |
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* Prohibition of new investment in Syria |
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|Reasons cited for sanctions include [[Human rights in Venezuela|Venezuela's poor human rights record]], links with [[illegal drug trade]], high levels of [[Corruption in Venezuela|state corruption]] and [[Elections in Venezuela|electoral rigging]]. |
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'''Commerce''':<ref name="Iran sanctions"/> |
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Since 2019, Venezuela and the United States have no diplomatic relations under president [[Nicolás Maduro]].<ref name="auto">{{Cite news|url=https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/21/us-likely-to-slap-oil-sanctions-on-venezuela-after-maduro-election.html|title=US likely to slap tough oil sanctions on Venezuela — and that's a 'game changer' for Maduro|first=Sam|last=Meredith|website=[[CNBC]]|date=21 May 2018|access-date=5 October 2018}}</ref> |
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*License required for the export or reexport of all items on the [[Export Administration Regulations]] except food or medicine |
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'''State''': |
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Country listed as Tier 3 on [[Trafficking in Persons Report]] which imposes ban on participating in [[International Military Education and Training]] (IMET), [[Foreign Military Financing]] (FMF), and [[Foreign Military Sales]] (FMS)<ref name="Belizenews"/> |
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* Designation as State Sponsors of Terrorism |
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{{See also|International sanctions against Syria}} |
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| {{flag|Ukraine}} ([[Donetsk]], [[Luhansk]], and [[Crimea]] only)||'''Treasury''':<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/topic/1576|title=Ukraine-/Russia-related Sanctions|access-date=2024-01-22}}</ref> |
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|{{Flag|Russia}} |
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*Prohibition on new investment in Donetsk, Luhansk, or Crimea |
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|2022 |
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*Prohibition on the importation and exportation of any goods, services, or technology to/from Donetsk, Luhansk, or Crimea |
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| [[Russia–United States relations]] and [[International sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War|sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War]] |
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'''Commerce''':<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/15/746.6|title=Temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine and covered regions of Ukraine|access-date=2024-01-22}}</ref> |
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|On April 20, Transkapitalbank, located in Russia, and a ring of more than 40 individuals and businesses overseen by Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev are named as being involved in sanction violations. Executives with ties to Russia's Otkritie Financial Corp. Bank are among those named. |
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*License required for the export or reexport of all items on the [[Export Administration Regulations]] except food, medicine, or software necessary to enable the exchange of personal communications over the Internet |
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On May 8, Announces new sanctions against Russia, targeting executive board members of Sberbank and members of Gazprombank JSC. The latest sanctions target JSC Bank Moscow Industrial Bank. In addition, three of Russia's most prominent state-owned and controlled television networks have been sanctioned: JSC Channel One Russia, television station Russia-1, and JSC NTV Broadcasting Co. The measure is aimed at preventing the sale of equipment to broadcasters and advertising revenue generated in the United States. |
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=== |
===Targeted sanctions=== |
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{{refimprove|section|date=May 2023}} |
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In jurisdictions not subject to comprehensive sanctions measures, only transactions related to specific parties are prohibited.<ref name="princeton"/> Jurisdictions that face targeted sanctions may continue to do business with the United States, with restrictions only placed on specific categories of individuals or entities, and anyone worldwide who materially supports or provides financial, logistical, or technological support for them. |
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{| class="wikitable" |
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According to OFAC, there are approximately 12,000 names on the [[Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List]] (SDN) list,<ref name="OFAC where"/> which is the most restrictive category of targeted U.S. sanctions, targeting U.S.-designated terrorists, officials and beneficiaries of certain authoritarian regimes, and international criminals (e.g. drug traffickers) by blocking their U.S. assets and restricting U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with them.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Knights |first=Michael |date=6 December 2019 |title=Punishing Iran's Triggermen in Iraq: Opening Moves in a Long Campaign |url=https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/punishing-irans-triggermen-iraq-opening-moves-long-campaign |website=The Washington Institute}}</ref> |
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The following jurisdictions have been designated a specific sanctions program used by OFAC to determine SDN designations targeting individuals or entities engaging in sanctionable activities related to the targeted sanctions restrictions placed on that jurisdiction:<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/specially-designated-nationals-list-sdn-list/program-tag-definitions-for-ofac-sanctions-lists|title=Program Tag Definitions for OFAC Sanctions Lists|access-date=2023-01-23}}</ref> |
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{| class="wikitable sortable" |
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|- |
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! Jurisdiction/Region !! Summary of certain restrictions |
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! Polity !! Description |
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| {{flag|Belarus}}|| Persons the US government believes to be undermining Belarus' democratic processes or institutions, committing political repression activities, and/or misusing public assets and public authority<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/9216/download?inline|title=Executive Order 13405|date=2006-06-20}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Bangladesh}}|| Certain persons affiliated with the elite paramilitary force, [[Rapid Action Battalion|RAB]], along with the force itself, the US government believes to be committing serious human rights violations.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Global Magnitsky Designations; North Korea Designations; Burma-related Designations; Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies (NS-CMIC) List Update|url=https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20211210|access-date=2021-12-10|website=U.S. Department of the Treasury|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/southasiasource/us-sanctions-on-bangladeshs-rab-what-happened-whats-next/|title=US sanctions on Bangladesh's RAB: What happened? What's next?|date=2021-12-16|access-date=2022-01-18|website=[[Atlantic Council]]|last=Riaz|first=Ali}}</ref> |
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| {{flag|Central African Republic}}|| Persons the US government believes is responsible, complicit, or have engaged in actions that threaten peace, security, or stability of the Central African Republic, including actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, threaten the political transition process, target civilians, or UN and other peacekeeping operations through the commission of acts of violence, use of children in armed groups, or obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-553|title=Part 533 - Central African Republic Sanctions Regulations|date=2022-09-29}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Belarus}}|| Certain persons the US government believes to be undermining democratic processes or institutions in Belarus (including President [[Alexander Lukashenko]] and other officials). |
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Country listed as Tier 3 on [[Trafficking in Persons Report]]. However Belarus is subject to some certain exemptions.<ref name="Belizenews"/> |
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|- |
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| {{flag|Democratic Republic of the Congo}}|| Persons the US government believes is a political or military leader of an armed group operating in the DRC that impedes the peace, security, or stability of the DRC, including actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, threaten the political transition process, target civilians, or UN and other peacekeeping operations through the commission of acts of violence, use of children in armed groups, or obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-547|title=Part 547 - Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions REgulations|date=2009-05-28}}</ref> |
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|{{Flag|Cambodia}} |
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|the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two Cambodian government officials, [[Chau Phirun]] (Chau) and [[Tea Vinh]] (Tea), for their roles in corruption in Cambodia.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-06-27 |title=Treasury Targets Corrupt Military Officials in Cambodia |url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0475 |access-date=2023-07-27 |website=U.S. Department of the Treasury |language=en}}</ref> |
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|- |
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| {{flag|Ethiopia}}|| Persons the US government believes is responsible for or complicit in actions that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Ethiopia, including expanding the [[Ethiopian civil conflict (2018–present)|crisis in northern Ethiopia]] or obstructing the peace process, or engaging in actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, including corruption or serious human rights abuses, to obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance, target civilians through violence, or committing attacks against UN or [[African Union]] personnel.<br>Entities the US government believes is a military or security force operating in northern Ethiopia after November 1, 2020, or has engaged in activities that have contributed to the crisis in northern Ethiopia<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/913011/download?inline|title=Executive Order 14046|date=2021-11-17}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Central African Republic}}|| Persons the US government believes contribute to the conflict in the [[Central African Republic]]. |
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Country listed as Tier 3 on Trafficking in Persons Report which imposes ban on participating in International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Foreign Military Sales (FMS).<ref name=":0" /> |
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|- |
|- |
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| {{flag|Hong Kong}}|| Persons the US government believes is responsible for developing, adopting, or implementing the [[2020 Hong Kong national security law|Hong Kong national security law]], or be responsible or complicit in actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Hong Kong, or threaten the peace, security, stability, or autonomy of Hong Kong, including censorship, extrajudicial rendition, arbitrary detention, or torture of any person in Hong Kong<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/44826/download?inline|title=Executive Order 13936|date=2020-07-14}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|China}}|| Persons whom the US government believes are committing [[Uyghur genocide|Genocide against the Uyghurs]] in [[Xinjiang]] and persons whom the US government believes are committing human rights abuses in [[Hong Kong]] and [[Tibet]]. |
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Country listed as Tier 3 on [[Trafficking in Persons Report]] which imposes ban on participating in [[International Military Education and Training]] (IMET), [[Foreign Military Financing]] (FMF), and [[Foreign Military Sales]] (FMS)<ref name="Belizenews"/> Since 2020, [[Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Trump signed a law to punish China for its oppression of the Uighur Muslims. Uighurs say much more needs to be done |url=https://www.businessinsider.com/uighur-china-detention-centers-activists-urge-accountability-2020-2 |work=Business Insider |date=June 30, 2020}}</ref> |
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|- |
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| {{flag|Iraq}}|| Persons the US government believes has committed acts of violence that threaten the peace or stability of Iraq or the government of Iraq, undermine efforts to promote economic reconstruction and political reform in Iraq, or obstruct the provision of humanitarian assistance<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/7371/download?inline|title=Executive Order 13438|date=2007-07-19}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Democratic Republic of the Congo}}|| Certain persons the US government believes are contributing to the conflict in the [[Democratic Republic of the Congo]]. |
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|- |
|- |
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| {{flag|Lebanon}}|| Persons the US government believes has taken action to undermine Lebanon's democratic processes or institutions, contributed to the breakdown of the rule of law in Lebanon, support the assertion of Syrian control or influence in Lebanon, or infringing or undermining Lebanese sovereignty<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-549|title=Part 549 - Lebanon Sanctions Regulations|date=2010-07-30}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Eritrea}}|| Certain persons the US government believes are involved in the Ethiopian war, such as armed forces and government officials.<ref>{{Cite news | url=https://amp.dw.com/en/us-sanctions-eritrean-military-over-role-in-tigray-conflict/a-59807992 | title=US sanctions Eritrean military over role in Tigray conflict }}</ref> |
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| {{flag|Libya}}|| Persons the US government believes is responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Libya, obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede the political transition process, misappropriate state assets, or threaten state financial institutions, or planning, directing, or committing attacks on Libyan state facilities or civilian facilities, or illegally exploit and export Libyan natural resources<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/5501/download?inline|title=Executive Order 13726|date=2016-04-19}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Georgia}}|| The U.S. State Departament imposed visa restrictions on Georgian court Chairmen and members of the [[High Council of Justice of Georgia]] under Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023, barring them and their immediate family members from entering the U.S. for supposed involvement in "significant corruption". The judges criticized the decision as an attempt to subjugate the Georgian court system to foreign control.<ref>{{Cite web|title=STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ANTONY J. BLINKEN: Public Designations of Mikheil Chinchaladze, Levan Murusidze, Irakli Shengelia, and Valerian Tsertsvadze, Due to Involvement in Significant Corruption|url=https://ge.usembassy.gov/public-designations-of-four-individuals-associated-with-the-georgian-judiciary-due-to-involvement-in-significant-corruption/|access-date=2023-04-06|website=U.S. Embassy in Georgia official website|date=6 April 2023|language=en|url-status=live}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Mali}}|| Persons contributing to the Conflict in Mali including Government officials tied to [[Wagner Group]] such as Malian Defense Minister Colonel [[Sadio Camara]], Air Force Chief of Staff Colonel [[Alou Boi Diarra]], and Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Adama Bagayoko<ref name="state.gov">{{cite web | url=https://www.state.gov/imposing-sanctions-on-malian-officials-in-connection-with-the-wagner-group/ | title=Imposing Sanctions on Malian Officials in Connection with the Wagner Group }}</ref><ref name="ofac.treasury.gov">{{cite web | url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/mali-related-sanctions | title=Mali-Related Sanctions | Office of Foreign Assets Control | date=August 4, 2023 }}</ref> |
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|{{Flag|Hong Kong}} |
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|Persons the US government believes undermine Hong Kong's autonomy. This implements provision of the [[Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act]] of 2019 and the [[Hong Kong Autonomy Act]] of 2020 as well as executive order no. 13936. |
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| {{flag|Myanmar}}|| Persons the US government believes operates in the defense or other critical sectors of the Burmese economy, or are responsible for actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions or threaten the peace, security, or stability of Myanmar, or limit the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly, or arbitrary detention or torture, or is a leader of the military or security forces of Myanmar, or the government of Myanmar after February 2, 2021<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/54046/download?inline|title=Executive Order 14014|date=2021-02-10}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Iraq}}|| {{see also|Sanctions against Iraq}} Specific individuals and entities associated with the former Ba'athist regime of [[Saddam Hussein]], as well as parties the US government believes have committed, or pose a significant risk of committing acts of violence that threaten the peace or stability of [[Iraq]], undermine efforts to promote [[economic reconstruction]] and political reform in Iraq, or make it more difficult for humanitarian workers to operate in Iraq. |
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| {{flag|Nicaragua}}|| Persons the US government believes is responsible for serious human rights abuses, actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions or threaten the peace, security, or stability of Nicaragua, or engaged in corrupt transactions related to the misappropriation of public assets<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/6931/download?inline|title=Executive Order 13851|date=2018-11-27}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Lebanon}}|| Persons the US government believes undermine the sovereignty of [[Lebanon]] or its democratic processes and institutions. |
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|- |
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| {{flag|Somalia}}|| Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia including threatening the peace process, misappropriating public assets, or engaging in [[Piracy off the coast of Somalia|acts of piracy]], or obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance, engaged in acts of violence targeting civilians, recruited children in armed conflict, or imported or exported charcoal from Somalia<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-551|title=Part 551 - Somalia Sanctions Regulations}}</ref> |
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| {{flag|Liberia}}|| Sanctions Liberia’s former warlord and current senator [[Prince Johnson]].<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/us-sanctions-liberias-former-warlord-and-senator-prince-johnson/article37926010.ece/amp/ | title=U.S. Sanctions Liberia's former warlord and senator Prince Johnson | newspaper=The Hindu | date=10 December 2021 }}</ref> |
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| {{flag|South Sudan}}|| Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of South Sudan, including actions that threaten the peace process, expanding the conflict in South Sudan, committing human rights abuses and violence against civilians, or attacks against UN or other international peacekeeping operations<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/5936/download?inline|title=Executive Order 13664|date=2014-04-03}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Mali}}|| Persons contributing to the Conflict in Mali. |
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| {{ |
| {{flag|Sudan}}|| Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Sudan, including undermining the peace process and the democratic process or institutions of Sudan, or engage in censorship, corruption, misappropriation of state assets, serious human rights abuses, acts of violence against civilians, or obstruction of or attacks against UN peacekeeping missions<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931716/download?inline|title=Executive Order 14098|date=2023-05-04}}</ref> |
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| {{flag|Venezuela}}|| The Government of Venezuela,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/26786/download?inline|title=Executive Order 13884|date=2019-08-05}}</ref> those operating in the Venezuelan gold sector, or persons the US government believes is engaging in corrupt government programs,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/5516/download?inline|title=Executive Order 13850|date=2018-11-01}}</ref> engaged in actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, commit significant acts of violence, or restrict the freedom of expression or peaceful assembly<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/5906/download?inline|title=Executive Order 13692|date=2015-03-08}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Myanmar}}|| Officials associated with the [[Rohingya conflict|Rohingya crisis]]<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/year-crisis-began-us-sanctions-myanmar-military-rohingya/story?id=57242819|title=US sanctions Myanmar military over Rohingya ethnic cleansing|date=17 August 2018|website=ABC News|access-date=5 October 2018}}</ref> and the [[2021 Myanmar coup d'état]].<ref>{{Cite news|title=US sanctions on Myanmar: 5 things to know|url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Coup/US-sanctions-on-Myanmar-5-things-to-know|access-date=2021-03-01|website=Nikkei Asia|language=en-GB}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/burma|title=Burma-Related Sanctions}}</ref> |
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| [[Balkans#Western Balkans|Western Balkans]] || Persons under open indictment by the [[International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia]], or has committed actions that threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of any area in the Western Balkans, including actions that undermine the democratic processes or institutions in the Western Balkans, obstructed the peace process, engaged in serious human rights abuses, or are responsible for the misappropriation of public assets for personal gain<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-588|title=Part 588 - Western Balkans Stabilization Regulations}}</ref> |
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| {{flag|West Bank}}<br>{{flag|Israel}}|| Persons or entities the US government believes has enacted, implemented, or enforced policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of the West Bank, including [[Israeli settler violence|violence targeting civilians]], property destruction, [[Israeli_settlement|seizure or dispossession of property]], or has or is planning to commit terrorist attacks in the region<ref>{{cite web|date=2024-02-01|title=Executive Order 14115|url=https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932576/download?inline}}</ref> |
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| {{flag|Yemen}}|| Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen, including obstructing the peaceful transition of power or the political process<ref>{{cite web|date=2020-10-29|title=Part 552 - Yemen Sanctions Regulations|url=https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-552}}</ref> |
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| {{flag|Zimbabwe}}|| Persons the US government believes has engaged in actions to undermine Zimbabwe's democratic processes or institutions, engaged in human rights abuses or public corruption, as well as senior officials of the Government of Zimbabwe, or is a state-owned institution<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-541|title=Part 541 - Zimbabwe Sanctions|date=2004-07-29}}</ref> |
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====Human rights abuses/corruption==== |
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Country listed as Tier 3 on [[Trafficking in Persons Report]] which imposes ban on participating in [[International Military Education and Training]] (IMET), [[Foreign Military Financing]] (FMF), and [[Foreign Military Sales]] (FMS).<ref name="Belizenews"/> |
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Building off the [[Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act]], named after [[Sergei Magnitsky]] who died in Russian custody after uncovering corruption, the U.S. can enact sanctions against any individual or entity worldwide who engages in severe human rights abuses and corruption that degrade the rule of law, perpetuate violent conflicts, and facilitate the activities of dangerous persons.<ref name="treasuryhr"/> The following list include some jurisdictions that are frequently targeted by U.S. sanctions related to human rights abuses but are not specifically targeted under a country-specific sanctions program: |
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{| class="wikitable sortable" |
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|- |
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! Jurisdiction/Region !! Summary of targeted individuals/entities |
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| {{flag|Afghanistan}}|| Persons associated with the [[Taliban]] involved in the suppression of women's and girl's access to education, and the beating of protestors and unlawful detention of journalists.<ref name="treasuryhr">{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1972#:~:text=Today%2C%20the%20Department%20of%20the,Department%20of%20State's%20counterterrorism%20authority.|title=Treasury Designates Perpetrators of Human Rights Abuse and Commemorates the 75th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights|date=2023-12-08}}</ref><br>Former Afghani officials and their companies engaged in corrupt activities and siphoning resources from the former Afghani Armed Forces<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1973|title=Treasury Targets Transnational Corruption|date=2023-12-11}}</ref> |
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| {{flag|Cambodia}} || Targeting government officials engaged in corruption<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-06-27 |title=Treasury Targets Corrupt Military Officials in Cambodia |url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0475 |access-date=2023-07-27 |website=U.S. Department of the Treasury |language=en}}</ref> |
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| {{flag|China}}||Persons whom the US government believes are committing [[persecution of Uyghurs in China|Genocide against the Uyghurs]] in [[Xinjiang]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0070|title=Treasury Sanctions Chinese Government Officials in Connection with Serious Human Rights Abuse in Xinjiang|date=2021-03-22}}</ref><ref name="treasuryhr"/> and Chinese government officials whom the US government believes are committing human rights abuses in [[Hong Kong]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-sanctions-seven-chinese-individuals-over-hong-kong-crackdown-2021-07-16/|title=U.S. sanctions Chinese officials over Hong Kong democracy crackdown|website=[[Reuters]] |date=2021-07-16}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Eritrea}}|| Certain persons the US government believes are involved in the Ethiopian war, such as armed forces and government officials.<ref>{{Cite news | url=https://amp.dw.com/en/us-sanctions-eritrean-military-over-role-in-tigray-conflict/a-59807992 | title=US sanctions Eritrean military over role in Tigray conflict }}</ref> |
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|- |
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| {{Flag|Lebanon}}|| Persons the US government believes undermine the sovereignty of [[Lebanon]] or its democratic processes and institutions<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1384|title=Treasury Targets Two Politically Connected Brothers in Lebanon for Profiting from Public Corruption|date=2023-04-04}}</ref> |
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|- |
|||
| {{Flag|Mali}}|| Officials contributing to the Conflict in Mali including Government officials tied to [[Wagner Group]] such as Malian Defense Minister Colonel [[Sadio Camara]], Air Force Chief of Staff Colonel [[Alou Boi Diarra]], and Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Adama Bagayoko<ref name="state.gov"/><ref name="ofac.treasury.gov"/> |
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|- |
|||
| {{flag|Myanmar}}||Officials associated with ethnic cleansing related to the ongoing [[Rohingya conflict|Rohingya crisis]]<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/year-crisis-began-us-sanctions-myanmar-military-rohingya/story?id=57242819|title=US sanctions Myanmar military over Rohingya ethnic cleansing|date=17 August 2018|website=ABC News|access-date=5 October 2018}}</ref> and those associated with ethnic militias including the [[United Wa State Army]]<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Ong |first=Andrew |url= |title=Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border |date=2023 |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5017-7071-5 |doi= |jstor=10.7591/j.ctv2t8b78b}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=66–67}} |
|||
|- |
|||
| {{flag|North Korea}}||Targeting government officials associated with state-sponsored human rights abuses and censorship<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm568|title=Treasury Sanctions North Korean Officials and Entities in Response to the Regime's Serious Human Rights Abuses and Censorship|date=2018-12-10}}</ref> |
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|- |
|- |
||
| {{Flag|Nicaragua}}|| Persons associated with contributing to the repression of the [[2018–2020 Nicaraguan protests]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/05/politics/us-nicaragua-sanctions-violence-corruption/index.html|title=US slaps new sanctions on Nicaragua over violence, corruption|first=Laura |last=Koran|date=5 July 2018 |publisher=CNN|access-date=5 October 2018}}</ref> |
| {{Flag|Nicaragua}}|| Persons associated with contributing to the repression of the [[2018–2020 Nicaraguan protests]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/05/politics/us-nicaragua-sanctions-violence-corruption/index.html|title=US slaps new sanctions on Nicaragua over violence, corruption|first=Laura |last=Koran|date=5 July 2018 |publisher=CNN|access-date=5 October 2018}}</ref> |
||
|- |
|- |
||
| {{flag|Russia}}|| Persons associated with abuses against human rights activists and whistleblowers such as [[Sergei Magnitsky]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0654|title=Treasury Sanctions Russians Connected to Gross Human Rights Violations and Corrupt Leader of Belarus|date=2022-03-15}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Russia}}|| Persons believed to be responsible for the detention, abuse, and death of [[Sergei Magnitsky]] and other reported violations of human rights in [[Russia]] (see [[Magnitsky Act]] of 2012). Since 2014, [[International sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War]], since 2017 [[Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act]]. |
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|- |
|||
| {{Flag|South Sudan}}|| Persons the US government alleges have contributed to the conflict in [[South Sudan]] or committed human rights abuses<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1552|title=Treasury Sanctions Two South Sudanese Officials Responsible for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence|date=2023-06-20}}</ref> |
|||
|- |
|||
| {{Flag|Zimbabwe}}|| Persons the US government believes undermine democratic processes or institutions in [[Zimbabwe]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm935|title=Treasury Sanctions Two Individuals for Human Rights Abuse in Zimbabwe|date=2020-03-11}}</ref> |
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|} |
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====Terrorism==== |
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Country listed as Tier 3 on [[Trafficking in Persons Report]] which imposes ban on participating in [[International Military Education and Training]] (IMET), [[Foreign Military Financing]] (FMF), and [[Foreign Military Sales]] (FMS).<ref name="Belizenews"/> |
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Some of the jurisdictions whose resident individuals or entities are frequently targeted for sanctions under counter-terrorism authorities include: |
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{| class="wikitable sortable" |
|||
|- |
|- |
||
! Jurisdiction/Region !! Summary of targeted individuals/entities |
|||
| {{Flag|Somalia}}|| Certain persons the US government believes are contributing to the [[Somali Civil War|conflict in Somalia]]. |
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|- |
|- |
||
| {{flag|Gaza}}||Targeting persons and organizations tied to [[Hamas]]-affiliated groups<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2036|title=U.S., UK, and Australia Target Additional Hamas Financial Networks and Facilitators of Virtual Currency Transfers|date=2024-01-22}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|South Sudan}}|| Persons the US government alleges have contributed to the conflict in [[South Sudan]] or committed human rights abuses. |
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|- |
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| {{Flag|Lebanon}}|| Targeting [[Hizballah]]-linked facilitators and financiers<ref name="hizballah">{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0558|title=Treasury Sanctions Hizballah Financiers in Lebanon|date=2022-01-18}}</ref> |
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|- |
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| {{Flag|Iran}}||Targeting Iranian support for terrorist organizations including [[Hamas]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1907|title=United States and United Kingdom Take Coordinated Action Against Hamas Leaders and Financiers|date=2023-11-14}}</ref> [[Hizballah]],<ref name="hizballah"/> and [[Houthis]]<ref name="houthis">{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2014|title=Treasury Targets Network Financing Houthi Attacks on International Shipping|date=2023-12-28}}</ref> |
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|- |
|||
| {{Flag|Yemen}}|| Persons who the US government claims threaten peace, security, or stability in [[Yemen]]<ref name="houthis"/> |
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|} |
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====Drug trafficking/transnational criminal organizations==== |
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Country listed as Tier 3 on [[Trafficking in Persons Report]] which imposes ban on participating in [[International Military Education and Training]] (IMET), [[Foreign Military Financing]] (FMF), and [[Foreign Military Sales]] (FMS).<ref name="Belizenews"/> |
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Some of the jurisdictions whose resident individuals or entities are frequently targeted for sanctions under anti-drug trafficking or transnational criminal organizations-related authorities include: |
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{| class="wikitable sortable" |
|||
|- |
|- |
||
! Jurisdiction/Region !! Summary of targeted individuals/entities |
|||
| {{Flag|Turkey}}||After the purchase of a Russian-made [[S-400 missile system|S-400]] air defense system, the US place anticipated sanctions on the Turkish Ministry of Defense and Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB)<ref>{{Cite news|title=U.S. sanctions NATO ally Turkey over Russian defense system|website=[[NBC News]]|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-sanctions-nato-ally-turkey-over-russian-s-400-n1251228}}</ref><ref>[[Mike Pompeo|Pompeo, Mike]] [https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-turkey-under-caatsa-231/index.html The United States Sanctions Turkey Under CAATSA 231 ] ''[[US Department of State]]''</ref> |
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|- |
|- |
||
| {{flag|Italy}} || Targeting the organizational structure and prominent leaders of the [[Camorra]]<ref name="TCO"/> |
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| {{Flag|Ukraine}}<br />{{Flag|Russia}}<br />({{flag|Republic of Crimea|name=<small>Crimea</small>}}) |
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| Persons the US government believes undermine the peace, security, stability, territorial integrity and the democratic processes and institutions of [[Ukraine]]. Also persons administering areas of Ukraine without central government consent, also a number of Russian senior officials who are close to [[Vladimir Putin]]. |
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|- |
|- |
||
| {{flag|Japan}} || Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of the [[Yakuza]], such as the [[Yamaguchi-gumi]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm499|title=Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Companies Associated with Japan's Major Organized Crime Syndicate, the Yakuza|date=2018-10-02}}</ref> and [[Inagawa-kai]]<ref name="TCO">{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/TG1827|title=Treasury Targets Leading Figures of Transnational Criminal Organizations|date=2013-01-23}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Venezuela}}|| [[International sanctions during the Venezuelan crisis#Persons sanctioned|Persons who the US government believes are contributing to the ongoing crisis in Venezuela]]. |
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|- |
|- |
||
| {{flag|Laos}} || Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of [[Zhao Wei (gangster)|Zhao Wei]]'s criminal enterprise engaging in drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, bribery, and wildlife trafficking, much of which is facilitated through the Kings Romans Casino in Laos.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0272|title=Treasury Sanctions the Zhao Wei Transnational Criminal Organization|date=2018-01-30}}</ref> |
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|[[Wa State]] |
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|In 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions on 11 people associated with the [[United Wa State Army]] and 16 Thailand-based companies.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Ong |first=Andrew |url= |title=Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border |date=2023 |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5017-7071-5 |doi= |jstor=10.7591/j.ctv2t8b78b}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=66-67}} |
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|- |
|- |
||
| {{flag|Mexico}} || Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of drug cartels, including the [[Sinaloa Cartel]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1887|title=Treasury Sanctions Sinaloa Cartel Network Flush with Illicit Fentanyl on Southwest Border|date=2023-11-07}}</ref> [[Los Zetas]],<ref name="TCO"/> and [[Beltrán-Leyva Organization]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1952|title=Secretary Yellen Announces Treasury Sanctions Against New Generation of Violent Drug Trafficking Beltrán Leyva Organization|date=2023-12-06}}</ref> as well as human smuggling rings.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1545|title=Treasury Sanctions Mexico-based Transnational Human Smuggling Organization|date=2023-06-16}}</ref> |
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| {{Flag|Yemen}}|| Persons who the US government claims threaten peace, security, or stability in [[Yemen]]. |
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|- |
|- |
||
| {{flag|Russia}} || Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of the [[Brothers' Circle]]<ref name="TCO"/> |
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| {{Flag|Zimbabwe}}|| Persons the US government believes undermine democratic processes or institutions in [[Zimbabwe]], including a number of Government Officials. |
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|} |
|} |
||
===Jurisdictions subject to military/arms related export controls=== |
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Some of the countries which are listed are members of the [[World Trade Organization]], but WTO rules allow trade restrictions for non-economic purposes. |
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====Department of State Arms Embargo==== |
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Combined, the Treasury Department, the Commerce Department and the State Department list sanctions concerning these countries or territories: |
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The U.S. government maintains a policy of denial for any exports of defense articles or defense services to the following countries:<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.uab.edu/exportcontrol/exportcontrol/countries-of-concern|title=Export Control Countries of Concern|access-date=2024-01-23}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-22/chapter-I/subchapter-M/part-126/section-126.1|title=§ 126.1 Prohibited exports, imports, and sales to or from certain countries|date=2024-01-22}}</ref> |
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{{Div col|colwidth=15em}} |
|||
{| |
|||
*{{flag|Afghanistan}} |
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|- style="vertical-align:top" |
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*{{flag|Belarus}} |
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| |
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*{{flag|Burundi}} |
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*{{flag| |
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Afghanistan}}}} |
||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Belarus}}}} |
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* {{nowrap|{{flag|Cambodia}}}} |
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* {{nowrap|{{flag|Central African Republic}}}} |
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* {{nowrap|{{flag|China}}}}{{efn|Certain Chinese defense companies are also subject to Treasury Department restrictions on U.S. outbound investments<ref>{{cite web|url=https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/us-government-issues-executive-order-amending-ban-on-us-persons-purchasing-securities-of-certain-chinese-companies/|title=US Government Issues Executive Order Amending Ban on US Persons Purchasing Securities of Certain Chinese Companies|date=2021-06-10}}</ref>}} |
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* {{nowrap|{{flag|Democratic Republic of the Congo}}}} |
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* {{nowrap|{{flag|Cuba}}}} |
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|valign=top| |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Cyprus}}}} |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Eritrea}}}} |
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* {{nowrap|{{flag|Ethiopia}}}} |
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* {{nowrap|{{flag|Haiti}}}} |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Iran}}}} |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Iraq}}}} |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Lebanon}}}} |
|||
|valign=top| |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Libya}}}} |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Myanmar}}}} |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Nicaragua}}}} |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|North Korea}}}} |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Russia}}}} |
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* {{nowrap|{{flag|Somalia}}}} |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|South Sudan}}}} |
|||
|valign=top| |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Sudan}}}} |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Syria}}}} |
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* {{nowrap|{{flag|Venezuela}}}} |
|||
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Zimbabwe}}}} |
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|} |
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{{notelist}} |
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====Department of Commerce Military End Use/User Rule==== |
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The U.S. government also enforces stricter restrictions on a more expansive definition of defense items, including the export of any U.S.-origin item that "supports or contributes" to the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, refurbishing, development, or production of military items to specified countries. The same countries are also subject to additional license requirements in place for certain exports to the targeted countries' "military end users", defined as their national armed services, national police, national intelligence services, and anyone whose activities "support or contribute to military end uses."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/bis-issues-faqs-relating-to-the-military-end-use-user-rules/|title=BIS Issues FAQs Relating to the Military End Use/User Rules|date=2020-07-01}}</ref> |
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*{{flag|Cambodia}}<ref>{{cite web|url=https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/us-government-tightens-export-controls-for-cambodia/|title=US Government Tightens Export Controls for Cambodia|date=2021-12-13}}</ref> |
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*{{flag|China}} |
*{{flag|China}} |
||
*{{flag|Crimea}} |
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*{{flag|Cuba}} |
|||
*{{flag|DRC}} |
|||
*{{flag|Eritrea}} |
|||
*{{flag|Iran}} |
|||
*{{flag|Libya}} |
|||
*{{flag|Mali}} |
|||
*{{flag|Myanmar}} |
*{{flag|Myanmar}} |
||
*{{flag|Nicaragua}} |
*{{flag|Nicaragua}} |
||
*{{flag|North Korea}} |
|||
*{{PLE}} |
|||
*{{flag|Russia}} |
|||
*{{flag|Sudan}} |
|||
*{{flag|Syria}} |
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*{{flag|Ukraine}} ([[International sanctions during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine|sanctioned areas]]) |
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{{Div col end}} |
|||
*{{flag|Venezuela}} |
*{{flag|Venezuela}} |
||
*{{flag|Yemen}} |
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*{{flag|Zimbabwe}} |
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====Russia/Belarus MEU FDP Rule==== |
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===ASEAN=== |
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Russia and Belarus are subject to the same restrictions as the military end use/user rule, with a more expansive coverage that includes foreign-produced items that are produced using U.S.-origin software or technology, manufactured by plants or major components that are products of the U.S.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2022/02/us-department-commerce-bureau-industry-and-security-russia-and-belarus|title=U.S. Department of Commerce & Bureau of Industry and Security Russia and Belarus Rule Fact Sheet|date=February 24, 2022 |access-date=2024-01-23}}</ref> |
|||
Since 2023, the organization have been [[United States sanctions|sanctioned]] by [[United States]] for suspected of Terrorism sponsor and believed to help [[China]] genocide on [[Manchu]], [[Tibetan]], [[Uyghurs]] and [[Mongolian]]. Despite, it have denied numerous times. |
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*{{flag|Belarus}} |
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*{{flag|Russia}} |
|||
===Shanghai Coperation Organisation=== |
|||
Since 2023, organisation have been sanctioned by [[United States]] and [[European Union]] for sponsor of terrorism to believe in support of [[Russian invasion of Ukraine|Russia aggression]] on [[Ukraine]] and [[China]] genocide on [[Manchu]], [[Tibetan]], [[Uyghurs]], [[Mongolian]] and [[Hong Kong]]er. |
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===BRICS=== |
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Since 2023, [[United States]] have sanctioned this organization in order to "divorce" away from [[USD]], [[EURO]], [[Sterling Pound]] and [[Yen]] domination from it control. Promise on Bombing campaign in Summit to be held on any date if it occur. |
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== |
==Former sanctions== |
||
{| class="wikitable" |
|||
|- |
|||
As of February 2022, following the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], the United States has sanctions against: |
|||
! Polity !! Description |
|||
|- |
|||
====Individuals==== |
|||
| {{Flag|Burundi}}|| Persons who the US government claims threaten peace, security, or stability in [[Burundi]]. |
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=====Russia===== |
|||
Sanctions lifted on November 18 2021.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.state.gov/termination-of-burundi-sanctions-program/ | title=Termination of Burundi Sanctions Program }}</ref> |
|||
Targeted Russian elites:<ref name="U.S. Department of the Treasury 2022">{{cite web |title=Russia-related Designations; Belarus Designations; Issuance of Russia-related Directive 2 and 3; Issuance of Russia-related and Belarus General Licenses; Publication of new and updated Frequently Asked Questions |website=U.S. Department of the Treasury |date=2022-02-24 |url=https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220224 |access-date=2022-05-27}}</ref> |
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|} |
|||
{{div col|colwidth=30em}} |
|||
*[[Sergei Borisovich Ivanov]] |
|||
*Andrey Patrushev |
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*[[Nikolai Platonovich Patrushev]] |
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*[[Igor Ivanovich Sechin]] |
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*[[Alexander Vedyakhin|Alexander Aleksandrovich Vedyakhin]] |
|||
*Andrey Sergeyevich Puchkov |
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*[[Yuri Soloviev (banker)|Yuriy Alekseyevich Soloviev]] |
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*Galina Olegovna Ulyutina |
|||
{{div col end}} |
|||
== Proposed sanctions == |
|||
=====Belarus===== |
|||
Following [[International Criminal Court investigation in Palestine|arrest warrant]] for senior Israeli officials over [[Israeli war crimes]] committed during the [[Israel–Hamas war]] in the [[Gaza Strip]], US lawmakers in the House of Representatives passed legislation aimed at sanctioning the International Criminal Court (ICC).<ref>{{cite news |date=5 Jun 2024 |title=US House seeks to sanction ICC after warrant seeking for Israel's Netanyahu |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/5/us-house-seeks-to-sanction-icc-for-accusing-israel-of-gaza-war-crimes |agency=Al Jazeera}}</ref> As of June 10, 2024, bipartisan negotiations on the sanctions bill with the Senate had stalled.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Scoop: Senate's bipartisan talks on ICC sanctions break down |url=https://www.axios.com/2024/06/11/senate-bipartisan-talks-icc-sanctions-break-down |access-date=July 18, 2024 |work=[[Axios (website)|Axios]]}}</ref> |
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Leader of {{ill|Synesis Group|ru}}:<ref name="U.S. Department of the Treasury 2022b">{{cite web |title=U.S. Treasury Targets Belarusian Support for Russian Invasion of Ukraine |website=U.S. Department of the Treasury |date=2022-02-24 |url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0607 |access-date=2022-05-27}}</ref> |
|||
*Aliaksandr Yauhenavich Shatrou |
|||
==Effect of U.S. sanctions== |
|||
Belarusian Defense Officials:<ref name="U.S. Department of the Treasury 2022b"/> |
|||
*[[Viktor Khrenin]] |
|||
*Aleksandr Grigorievich Volfovich |
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*Aliaksandr Mikalaevich Zaitsau |
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==Perceptions == |
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{{essay|section|date=November 2022}} |
{{essay|section|date=November 2022}} |
||
Since 1990, the use of sanctions by the United States has significantly increased, and since 1998, the US has established economic sanctions on more than 20 countries.<ref name="The Nation"/> |
Since 1990, the use of sanctions by the United States has significantly increased, and since 1998, the US has established economic sanctions on more than 20 countries.<ref name="The Nation">{{cite journal |last1=Gordon |first1=Joy |date=4 March 1999 |title=Sanctions as Siege Warfare |url=https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/sanctions-siege-warfare/ |journal=The Nation}}</ref> |
||
A series of studies led by economist Gary Hafbauer has found destabilization of the sanctioned country is the frequent goal of US sanctions programs.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |last=Hafbauer |first=Gary |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=31 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref> Destabilization occurs when people in the sanctioned country lose confidence in their government's ability to operate the country and viable alternatives for them to consider exist.<ref name=":1" /> |
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According to [[Daniel T. Griswold]], sanctions failed to change the behavior of sanctioned countries but they have barred American companies from economic opportunities and harmed the poorest people in the countries under sanctions.<ref name="Griswold">{{cite web |last1=Griswold |first1=Daniel |title=Going Alone on Economic Sanctions Hurts U.S. More than Foes |url=http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110923164257/http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |archive-date=2011-09-23 |website=CATO Institute}}</ref> Secondary sanctions,{{efn|Secondary US sanctions prohibit any trading in US dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals or organizations under the US sanctions regime.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}}}} according to [[Rawi Abdelal]], often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the affairs and interests of the [[European Union]] (EU).{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}} Abdelal said since [[Presidency of Donald Trump|Donald Trump]] became President of the United States, sanctions have been seen as an expression of Washington's preferences and whims, and as a tool for US economic warfare that has angered historical allies such as the EU.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=133|ref=Abd}} |
According to [[Daniel T. Griswold]], sanctions failed to change the behavior of sanctioned countries but they have barred American companies from economic opportunities and harmed the poorest people in the countries under sanctions.<ref name="Griswold">{{cite web |last1=Griswold |first1=Daniel |title=Going Alone on Economic Sanctions Hurts U.S. More than Foes |url=http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110923164257/http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |archive-date=2011-09-23 |website=CATO Institute}}</ref> Secondary sanctions,{{efn|Secondary US sanctions prohibit any trading in US dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals or organizations under the US sanctions regime.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}}}} according to [[Rawi Abdelal]], often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the affairs and interests of the [[European Union]] (EU).{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}} Abdelal said since [[Presidency of Donald Trump|Donald Trump]] became President of the United States, sanctions have been seen as an expression of Washington's preferences and whims, and as a tool for US economic warfare that has angered historical allies such as the EU.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=133|ref=Abd}} |
||
===Criticisms of efficacy=== |
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The increase in the use of economic leverage as a US foreign policy tool has prompted a debate about its usefulness and effectiveness.{{sfn|Lenway|1988|p=397}} According to Rawi Abdelal, sanctions have become the dominant tool of statecraft of the US and other Western countries in the post-Cold War era. Abdelal stated; "sanctions are useful when diplomacy is not sufficient but force is too costly".{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=114|ref=Abd}} British diplomat [[Jeremy Greenstock]] said sanctions are popular because "there is nothing else [to do] between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government".<ref name="greenstock">{{cite news|last= Marcus |first= Jonathan|url= https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10742109|title= Analysis: Do economic sanctions work?|work= BBC News|date=26 July 2010|access-date= 2015-03-30}}</ref> Former CIA Deputy Director [[David S. Cohen (attorney)|David Cohen]] wrote: "The logic of coercive sanctions does not hold, however, when the objective of sanctions is regime change. Put simply, because the cost of relinquishing power will always exceed the benefit of sanctions relief, a targeted state cannot conceivably accede to a demand for regime change."<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=274 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref> |
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===Efficacy=== |
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Most international relations scholarship concludes sanctions almost never lead to overthrow of sanctioned countries' governments or compliance by those governments.<ref name=":4">{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=96 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref> More often, the outcome of economic sanctions is the entrenchment in power of state elites in the sanctioned country.<ref name=":4" /> In a study of US sanctions from 1981 to 2000, political scientist [[Dursan Peksen]] found sanctions have been counterproductive, failing to improve human rights and instead leading to a further decrese in sanctioned countries' "respect for physical integrity rights, including freedom from disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and political imprisonment".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Peksen |first=Dursun |date=2009 |title=Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343308098404 |journal=Journal of Peace Research |volume=46 |issue=1 |pages=59–77 |doi=10.1177/0022343308098404 |s2cid=110505923 |issn=0022-3433}}</ref> Economists Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot state while policymakers often have high expectations of the efficacy of sanctions, there is at most a weak correlation between economic deprivation and the political inclination to change.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Hufbauer|first1=Gary Clyde|last2=Schott|first2=Jeffrey J.|last3=Elliott|first3=Kimberly Ann|last4=Oegg|first4=Barbara |title=Economic Sanctions Reconsidered |date=2007|page=162|isbn=9780881325362|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g-uzlJDD7DwC}}</ref> Griswold wrote sanctions are a foreign policy failure, having failed to change the political behavior of sanctioned countries; they have also barred American companies from economic opportunities and harmed the poorest people in the sanctioned countries.<ref name="Griswold" /> A study by the [[Peterson Institute for International Economics]] said sanctions have achieved their goals in fewer than 20% of cases. According to Griswold, as an example, the US Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 could not stop Pakistan and India from testing nuclear weapons.<ref name="Griswold" /> |
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The increase in the use of economic leverage as a US foreign policy tool has prompted a debate about its usefulness and effectiveness.{{sfn|Lenway|1988|p=397}} According to Rawi Abdelal, sanctions have become the dominant tool of statecraft of the US and other Western countries in the post-Cold War era. Abdelal stated; "sanctions are useful when diplomacy is not sufficient but force is too costly".{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=114|ref=Abd}} British diplomat [[Jeremy Greenstock]] said sanctions are popular because "there is nothing else [to do] between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government".<ref name="greenstock">{{cite news|last= Marcus |first= Jonathan|url= https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10742109|title= Analysis: Do economic sanctions work?|work= BBC News|date=26 July 2010|access-date= 2015-03-30}}</ref> Former CIA Deputy Director [[David S. Cohen (attorney)|David Cohen]] wrote: "The logic of coercive sanctions does not hold, however, when the objective of sanctions is regime change. Put simply, because the cost of relinquishing power will always exceed the benefit of sanctions relief, a targeted state cannot conceivably accede to a demand for regime change."<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= Haymarket Books|isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=274 |oclc=1345216431 |last1=Davis |first1=Stuart }}</ref> |
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Most international relations scholarship concludes sanctions almost never lead to overthrow of sanctioned countries' governments or compliance by those governments.<ref name=":4">{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= Haymarket Books|isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=96 |oclc=1345216431 |last1=Davis |first1=Stuart }}</ref> More often, the outcome of economic sanctions is the entrenchment in power of state elites in the sanctioned country.<ref name=":4" /> In a study of US sanctions from 1981 to 2000, political scientist [[Dursan Peksen]] found sanctions have been counterproductive, failing to improve human rights and instead leading to a further decrease in sanctioned countries' "respect for physical integrity rights, including freedom from disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and political imprisonment".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Peksen |first=Dursun |date=2009 |title=Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343308098404 |journal=Journal of Peace Research |volume=46 |issue=1 |pages=59–77 |doi=10.1177/0022343308098404 |s2cid=110505923 |issn=0022-3433}}</ref> Economists Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot state while policymakers often have high expectations of the efficacy of sanctions, there is at most a weak correlation between economic deprivation and the political inclination to change.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Hufbauer|first1=Gary Clyde|last2=Schott|first2=Jeffrey J.|last3=Elliott|first3=Kimberly Ann|last4=Oegg|first4=Barbara |title=Economic Sanctions Reconsidered |date=2007|page=162|publisher=Peterson Institute |isbn=9780881325362|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g-uzlJDD7DwC}}</ref> Griswold wrote sanctions are a foreign policy failure, having failed to change the political behavior of sanctioned countries; they have also barred American companies from economic opportunities and harmed the poorest people in the sanctioned countries.<ref name="Griswold" /> A study by the [[Peterson Institute for International Economics]] said sanctions have achieved their goals in fewer than 20% of cases. According to Griswold, as an example, the US Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 could not stop Pakistan and India from testing nuclear weapons.<ref name="Griswold" /> |
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Political scientist [[Lisa Martin (political scientist)|Lisa Martin]] criticized a [[game theory]] view of sanctions, stating proponents of sanctions characterize success so broadly—applying it to a range of outcomes from "renegotiation" to "influencing global public opinion—the terminology of "winning" and "losing" overextends those concepts.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= Haymarket Books|isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=8 |oclc=1345216431 |last1=Davis |first1=Stuart }}</ref> |
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==== Efficacy of sanctions against Russia ==== |
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Political scientist [[Lisa Martin (political scientist)|Lisa Martin]] criticized a [[game theory]] view of sanctions, stating proponents of sanctions characterize success so broadly—applying it to a range of outcomes from "renegotiation" to "influencing global public opinion—the terminology of "winning" and "losing" overextends those concepts.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=8 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref> |
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The United States imposed sanctions against Russia following the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]].<ref name=":13">{{Cite book |last=Garlick |first=Jeremy |title=Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption |date=2024 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-25231-8}}</ref>{{Rp|page=145}} Asian countries, primarily China and India, absorbed an increasing amount of Russian oil and gas.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=145}} Because Russian imports from the West declined after sanctions, Russia's trade balance rose sharply, increasing cash reserves and the economy generally.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=145}} By June 2022, the [[Russian ruble]] had risen sharply and was one of the world's best performing countries.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=145}} Academic Jeremy Garlick writes that at least in the short term, sanctions against Russia has backfired economically by benefitting its economy and backfired geopolitically by bringing Russia and China closer together.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=145}} |
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=== Humanitarian |
=== Humanitarian concerns === |
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[[Daniel T. Griswold]] of the [[Cato Institute]] criticizes sanctions from a conservative Christian perspective, writing sanctions limit the possibilities of a sanctioned country's people to exercise political liberties and practice market freedom.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=10 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref> |
[[Daniel T. Griswold]] of the [[Cato Institute]] criticizes sanctions from a conservative Christian perspective, writing sanctions limit the possibilities of a sanctioned country's people to exercise political liberties and practice market freedom.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= Haymarket Books|isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=10 |oclc=1345216431 |last1=Davis |first1=Stuart }}</ref> |
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In 1997, the [[American Association for World Health]] stated the [[US embargo against Cuba]] contributed to malnutrition, poor water access, and lack of access to medicine and other medical supplies; it concluded "a humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventative medicine to all its citizens".<ref name=":6">{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=144 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref> |
In 1997, the [[American Association for World Health]] stated the [[US embargo against Cuba]] contributed to malnutrition, poor water access, and lack of access to medicine and other medical supplies; it concluded "a humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventative medicine to all its citizens".<ref name=":6">{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= Haymarket Books|isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=144 |oclc=1345216431 |last1=Davis |first1=Stuart }}</ref> |
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Economist [[Helen Yaffe]] estimates [[United States sanctions against Venezuela]] have caused the deaths of 100,000 people due to the difficulty of importing medicine and health care equipment.<ref name=":6" /> |
Economist [[Helen Yaffe]] estimates [[United States sanctions against Venezuela]] have caused the deaths of 100,000 people due to the difficulty of importing medicine and health care equipment.<ref name=":6" /> |
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According to journalist Elijah J Magnier in [[Middle East Eye]], the West—led by America and Europe—had not sent any immediate aid to Syria after the [[2023 Turkey–Syria earthquake]]. According to Magnier, some mainstream media incorrectly stated President [[Bashar al-Assad]] was preventing humanitarian aid from reach the Turkish-occupied northwestern provinces of Syria and border crossings. According to one Western diplomat; "the goal is to get the Syrian people to blame their president for western countries’ refusal to provide aid".<ref>{{cite news |last1=Magnier |first1=Elijah J |title=Turkey-Syria earthquake: Aid gap reveals western double standards |url=https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/turkey-syria-earthquake-aid-gap-western-double-standards-reveals |journal=Middle East Eye |date=February 10, 2023}}</ref> |
According to journalist Elijah J Magnier in [[Middle East Eye]], the West—led by America and Europe—had not sent any immediate aid to Syria after the [[2023 Turkey–Syria earthquake]]. According to Magnier, some mainstream media incorrectly stated President [[Bashar al-Assad]] was preventing humanitarian aid from reach the Turkish-occupied northwestern provinces of Syria and border crossings. According to one Western diplomat; "the goal is to get the Syrian people to blame their president for western countries’ refusal to provide aid".<ref>{{cite news |last1=Magnier |first1=Elijah J |title=Turkey-Syria earthquake: Aid gap reveals western double standards |url=https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/turkey-syria-earthquake-aid-gap-western-double-standards-reveals |journal=Middle East Eye |date=February 10, 2023}}</ref> |
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===Secondary sanctions=== |
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===Isolation of the United States and its markets=== |
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In 2019, the [[United States Department of State]] reported it received complaints from American telecommunications providers and television companies the sanctions against Cuba caused difficulties in incorporating the country into their grid coverage.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= Haymarket Books|isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=70 |oclc=1345216431 |last1=Davis |first1=Stuart }}</ref> |
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According to Abdelal, US sanctions on its own internal economy cost almost nothing but overuse of them could be costly in the long term. Abdelal said the biggest threat is the US's gradual isolation and the continuing decline of US influence in the context of an emerging, multi-polar world with differing financial and economic powers.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=134|ref=Abd}} Abdelal also said the US and Europe largely agree on the substance of sanctions but disagree on their implementation. The main issue is secondary US sanctions—also known as extraterritorial sanctions—{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=117|ref=Abd}}which prohibit any trading in US dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals and organizations under the US sanctions regime.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}} Primary sanctions restrict US companies, institutions, and citizens from doing business with the country or entities under sanctions.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=117|ref=Abd}} According to Abdelal, secondary sanctions often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the EU's affairs and interests. Increasing use of secondary sanctions increases their perception in the EU as a violation of national and EU sovereignty, and an unacceptable interference in the EU's independent decision-making.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}} Secondary sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia are central to these tensions,{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=114|ref=Abd}} and have become the primary tool for signaling and implementing secession from US and European political goals.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=117|ref=Abd}} |
According to Abdelal, US sanctions on its own internal economy cost almost nothing but overuse of them could be costly in the long term. Abdelal said the biggest threat is the US's gradual isolation and the continuing decline of US influence in the context of an emerging, multi-polar world with differing financial and economic powers.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=134|ref=Abd}} Abdelal also said the US and Europe largely agree on the substance of sanctions but disagree on their implementation. The main issue is secondary US sanctions—also known as extraterritorial sanctions—{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=117|ref=Abd}}which prohibit any trading in US dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals and organizations under the US sanctions regime.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}} Primary sanctions restrict US companies, institutions, and citizens from doing business with the country or entities under sanctions.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=117|ref=Abd}} According to Abdelal, secondary sanctions often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the EU's affairs and interests. Increasing use of secondary sanctions increases their perception in the EU as a violation of national and EU sovereignty, and an unacceptable interference in the EU's independent decision-making.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=118|ref=Abd}} Secondary sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia are central to these tensions,{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=114|ref=Abd}} and have become the primary tool for signaling and implementing secession from US and European political goals.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=117|ref=Abd}} |
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''[[Bloomberg L.P.|Bloomberg]]'' reported in July 2024 that Russian firms found it increasingly difficult to trade with China because of the secondary sanctions that had been applied to Chinese banks.<ref name="bbg1">{{cite news |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-17/us-sanctions-make-it-harder-for-russian-firms-to-get-paid-by-china |title=Russian Firms Find It Increasingly Harder to Get Paid by China |newspaper=Bloomberg }}</ref> At the time, China had become the destination for more than a third of Russian exports,<ref name="mt1">{{cite news |url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/24/bank-of-china-halts-payments-with-sanctioned-russian-lenders-kommersant-a85503 |title=Bank of China Halts Payments with Sanctioned Russian Lenders – Kommersant |date=June 24, 2024 }}</ref> and shadowy middleman firms had become a way of life for to support import-export trade between the two nations.<ref name="rtr1">{{cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/half-russias-payments-china-made-through-middlemen-sources-say-2024-04-26/}}</ref> |
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In 2019, the [[United States Department of State]] reported it received complaints from American telecommunications providers and television companies the sanctions against Cuba caused difficulties in incorporating the country into their grid coverage.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=70 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref> |
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==== De-dollarization efforts ==== |
==== De-dollarization efforts ==== |
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Historian [[Renate Bridenthal]] wrote; "the most looming blowback to US sanctions policy is the growing set of challenges to dollar hegemony". Bridenthal cited the use of local currencies to trade with sanctioned countries, and attempts by Russia and China to increase the gold backing of their respective currencies.<ref name="Blowback to US Sanctions Policy 2021 pp. 323–332">{{cite book | author=Renate Bridenthal|title=Sanctions as War | chapter=Blowback to US Sanctions Policy | publisher=BRILL | date=9 December 2021 | doi=10.1163/9789004501201_020 | pages=323–332|isbn=9789004501201 |s2cid=245394028 }}</ref> |
Historian [[Renate Bridenthal]] wrote; "the most looming blowback to US sanctions policy is the growing set of challenges to dollar hegemony". Bridenthal cited the use of local currencies to trade with sanctioned countries, and attempts by Russia and China to increase the gold backing of their respective currencies.<ref name="Blowback to US Sanctions Policy 2021 pp. 323–332">{{cite book | author=Renate Bridenthal|title=Sanctions as War | chapter=Blowback to US Sanctions Policy | publisher=BRILL | date=9 December 2021 | doi=10.1163/9789004501201_020 | pages=323–332|isbn=9789004501201 |s2cid=245394028 }}</ref> |
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===Sanctions as measures against opposition=== |
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[[Farrokh Habibzadeh]] of the Iranian [[Petroleum Industry Health Organization]] wrote a letter to ''[[The Lancet]]'' comparing the strategy of sanctions to [[Siege|besieging]] in ancient times, when armies that could not conquer a city that was surrounded by defensive walls would besiege the city to prevent access by residents to necessary supplies.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Habibzadeh |first1=Farrokh |title=Economic sanction: a weapon of mass destruction |journal=[[The Lancet]] |date=2018 |volume=392 |issue=10150 |pages=816–817 |doi=10.1016/S0140-6736(18)31944-5 |pmid=30139528 |s2cid=52074513 |doi-access=free }}</ref> According to Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (2008), [[regime change]] is the most-frequent foreign policy objective of economic sanctions, accounting for around 39% of cases of their imposition.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Hufbauer|first1=Gary Clyde|last2=Schott|first2=Jeffrey J.|last3=Elliott|first3=Kimberly Ann|last4=Oegg|first4=Barbara|title=Economic Sanctions Reconsidered|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=crSxDQAAQBAJ|edition=3|location=Washington, DC|publisher=Columbia University Press|date=2008|page=67|isbn=9780881324822|access-date=2018-05-10|quote=By far, regime change is the most frequent foreign policy objective of economic sanctions, accounting for 80 out of the 204 observations.}}</ref> |
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====Cuba==== |
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{{Main articles|United States embargo against Cuba}} |
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There have been 29 consecutive nearly unanimous [[United Nations General Assembly]] resolutions demanding the US end its embargo of Cuba.<ref>{{cite news |title=UN General Assembly calls for US to end Cuba embargo for 29th consecutive year |url=https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/06/1094612 |access-date=14 January 2022 |work=UN News |date=23 June 2021 |language=en}}</ref> When the US imposed its embargo in 1961, Cuba did most of its commerce with the US. Griswold said since then, the sanctions had no effect on [[Presidency of Fidel Castro|Fidel Castro's government]], which used sanctions to justify the failure of policies and to attract international compassion. Griswold said although the sanctions formerly had international backing, as of 2000, no other country supported them. [[Pope John Paul II]] stated during his visit to Cuba embargoes "are always deplorable because they harm the needy".<ref name="Griswold" /> |
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====Iran==== |
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{{Main articles|United States sanctions against Iran}} |
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In May 2018, the US government announced its withdrawal from the [[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]] (JCPOA) and launched a [[maximum pressure campaign]] against Iran, which resulted in public protests, and reproach from European political and business elites.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|pp=114-115|ref=Abd}} Excessive use of US financial sanctions has worried companies, and prompted many EU member states and institutions to limit the exposure of their economies to the US-based [[clearing system]] that creates extreme vulnerability for countries other than the US.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=130|ref=Abd}} The Trump administration reintroduced sanctions against Iran with an [[executive order]], going against the wishes of many politicians.{{sfn|Abdelal|2020|p=131|ref=Abd}} In March 2023, Treasury Secretary [[Janet Yellen]] announced the US was looking for ways to strengthen its sanctions against Iran.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/yellen-irans-actions-not-impacted-by-sanctions-extent-us-would-like-2023-03-23/|title=Yellen: Iran's actions not impacted by sanctions to the extent US would like|last1=Lawder|first1=David|last2=Singh|first2=Kanishka|date=23 March 2023|url-status=live|work=Reuters}}</ref> |
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====Iraq==== |
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{{Main articles|Sanctions against Iraq}} |
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In 1990, the Iraqi Army [[Iraqi invasion of Kuwait|invaded and occupied Kuwait]]; the invasion was met with international condemnation and brought immediate [[sanctions against Iraq]].<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Peters |first1=John E |last2=Deshong |first2=Howard |title=Out of Area or Out of Reach? European Military Support for Operations in Southwest Asia |url=https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR629.pdf |year=1995 |publisher=[[RAND Corporation]] |isbn=978-0-8330-2329-2}}</ref> The effects of sanctions on the population of Iraq have been disputed. The figure of 500,000 child deaths was widely cited for a long period but in 2017, research showed the figure was the result of survey data manipulated by the Saddam Hussein government. Three surveys conducted since 2003 all found the child mortality rate between 1995 and 2000 was approximately 40 per 1,000, meaning there was no major rise in child mortality in Iraq after sanctions were implemented.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Dyson|first1=Tim|last2=Cetorelli|first2=Valeria|title=Changing views on child mortality and economic sanctions in Iraq: a history of lies, damned lies and statistics|journal=[[The BMJ|BMJ Global Health]]|language=en|volume=2|issue=2|date=2017-07-24|pages=e000311|doi=10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000311|pmid=29225933|issn=2059-7908|pmc=5717930}}</ref> |
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===Economic engagement as an alternative=== |
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According to [[Denis Halliday]], sanctions in Iraq forced people to depend on the Iraqi government for survival and further reduced the likelihood of a constructive solution. He commented:<blockquote>We have saved [the regime] and missed opportunities for change ... if the Iraqis had their economy, had their lives back, and had their way of life restored, they would take care of the form of governance that they want, that they believe is suitable to their country.{{sfn|Chomsky|2003|p=93}}</blockquote> |
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== Implementing agencies == |
== Implementing agencies == |
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== Authorizing laws == |
== Authorizing laws == |
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Several laws delegate embargo power to the President: |
Several laws delegate embargo power to the President: |
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* [[Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917]]<ref name=":5">{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Policy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=131 |oclc=1345216431}}</ref> |
* [[Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917]]<ref name=":5">{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Policy |date=2023 |publisher= Haymarket Books|isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=131 |oclc=1345216431 |last1=Davis |first1=Stuart }}</ref> |
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* [[Foreign Assistance Act]] of 1961<ref name=":5" /> |
* [[Foreign Assistance Act]] of 1961<ref name=":5" /> |
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* [[International Emergency Economic Powers Act]] of 1977 |
* [[International Emergency Economic Powers Act]] of 1977 |
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* [[United States and state terrorism]] |
* [[United States and state terrorism]] |
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* [[Criticism of United States foreign policy]] |
* [[Criticism of United States foreign policy]] |
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* [[European Union sanctions]] |
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* [[United Kingdom sanctions]] |
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* [[United States foreign adversaries]] |
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==References== |
==References== |
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* Hufbauer, Gary C. ''Economic sanctions and American diplomacy'' (Council on Foreign Relations, 1998) [https://books.google.com/books?id=urvIo1FQWZwC&dq=International+Sanctions++Hufbauer,+Gary+C.&pg=PP9 online]. |
* Hufbauer, Gary C. ''Economic sanctions and American diplomacy'' (Council on Foreign Relations, 1998) [https://books.google.com/books?id=urvIo1FQWZwC&dq=International+Sanctions++Hufbauer,+Gary+C.&pg=PP9 online]. |
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* Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberley Ann Elliott. '' Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy'' (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1990) |
* Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberley Ann Elliott. '' Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy'' (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1990) |
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* [[Paul Krugman|Krugman, Paul]], "The American Way of Economic war: Is Washington Overusing Its Most Powerful Weapons?" (review of [[Henry Farrell (political scientist)|Henry Farrell]] and [[Abraham L. Newman|Abraham Newman]], ''Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy'', Henry Holt, 2023, 288 pp.), ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'', vol. 103, no. 1 (January/February 2024), pp. 150–156. |
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* Mulder, Nicholas. ''The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War'' (2022) also see [https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-economic-weapon-book-review-the-limits-of-sanctions-from-abyssinia-to-ukraine-11643302954?mod=djembooks online review] |
* Mulder, Nicholas. ''The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War'' (2022) also see [https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-economic-weapon-book-review-the-limits-of-sanctions-from-abyssinia-to-ukraine-11643302954?mod=djembooks online review] |
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[[Category:United States sanctions| ]] |
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[[Category:United States foreign policy]] |
[[Category:United States foreign policy]] |
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[[Category:Criticisms of political philosophy|United States foreign policy]] |
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[[Category:Criticism of the United States|Foreign policy]] |
[[Category:Criticism of the United States|Foreign policy]] |
Revision as of 20:15, 1 September 2024
United States sanctions are financial and trade restrictions imposed against individuals, entities, and jurisdictions whose actions contradict U.S. foreign policy or national security goals. Financial sanctions are primarily administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), while export controls are primarily administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).
Restrictions against sanctioned targets vary in severity depending on the justification behind the sanction, and the legal authorities behind the sanctions action. Comprehensive sanctions are currently in place targeting Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and certain conflict regions of Ukraine, which heavily restrict nearly all trade and financial transactions between U.S. persons and those regions. Targeted sanctions specifically target certain individuals or entities that engage in activities that are contrary to U.S. foreign policy or national security goals, rather than an entire country. The U.S. also implements "secondary sanctions", which risk a sanctions designation against a non-U.S. person who transacts with sanctioned parties in violation of U.S. sanctions law, even if no U.S.-nexus existed for the transaction.
The United States has imposed two-thirds of the world's sanctions since the 1990s.[1] In 2024, the Washington Post said that the United States imposed "three times as many sanctions as any other country or international body, targeting a third of all nations with some kind of financial penalty on people, properties or organizations".[2]
History
After the failure of the Embargo Act of 1807, the federal government of the United States took little interest in imposing embargoes and economic sanctions against foreign countries until the 20th century. United States trade policy was entirely a matter of economic policy. After World War I, interest revived. President Woodrow Wilson promoted such sanctions as a method for the League of Nations to enforce peace.[3] However, he failed to bring the United States into the League and the US did not join the 1935 League sanctions against Italy.[4]
Trends in whether the United States has unilaterally or multilaterally imposed sanctions have changed over time.[5] During the Cold War, the United States led unilateral sanctions against Cuba, China, and North Korea.[5] Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, United States sanctions became increasingly multilateral.[5] During the 1990s, the United States imposed sanctions against countries it viewed as rogue states (such as Zimbabwe, Yugoslavia, and Iraq) in conjunction with multilateral institutions such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization.[5] According to communications studies academic Stuart Davis and political scientist Immanuel Ness, in the 2000s, and with increasing frequency in the 2010s, the United States acted less multilaterally as it imposed sanctions against perceived geopolitical competitors (such as Russia or China) or countries that, according to Davis and Ness, were the site of "proxy conflicts" (such as Yemen and Syria).[5]
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet and some members of the United States Congress asked the United States to suspend its sanctions regimes as way to help alleviate the pandemic's impact on the people of sanctioned countries.[6] Members of Congress who argued for the suspension of sanctions included Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Ilhan Omar.[7]
The United States applies sanctions more frequently than any other country or nation, and does so by a wide-margin.[8] According to American Studies academic Manu Karuka, the United States has imposed two-thirds of the world's sanctions since the 1990s.[1]
On June 4, 2024, the Republican-majority United States House of Representatives passed a bill to sanction International Criminal Court officials.[9]
According to a 2024 analysis by The Washington Post, 60% of low-income countries were under some form of U.S. financial sanction.[2] The analysis also concluded that the U.S. imposes three times as many sanctions as any other country or international body.[2]
Types of sanctions imposed by the United States
- bans on arms-related exports,[10]
- controls over dual-use technology exports,
- restrictions on economic assistance
- financial restrictions such as:
- authority to prohibit U.S. citizens from engaging in financial transactions with the individuals, entities, or governments on the list, except by license from the U.S. government
- requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions,
- diplomatic immunity waived, to allow families of terrorism victims to file for civil damages in U.S. courts,
- tax credits for companies and individuals denied, for income earned in listed countries,
- duty-free goods exemption suspended for imports from those countries, and
- prohibition of U.S. Defense Department contracts above $100,000 with companies controlled by countries on the list.[11]
- visa restrictions that prevent certain individuals from entering the U.S.
Targeted parties
The U.S. does not maintain a specific list of countries that U.S. persons cannot do business with because its sanctions program varies in scope depending on the sanctions program. Although some sanctions programs are broad and target entire jurisdictions ("comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions"), most are "targeted" sanctions and focus on specific entities, individuals, or economic sectors.[12] Depending on the nature of the restriction, U.S. sanctions are announced and implemented by different executive departments, typically the Treasury Department (OFAC)[13] or the Commerce Department (BIS),[14] and sometimes in conjunction with the State, Defense, or Energy departments.[15]
Comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions
Comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions are subject to the most restrictive sanctions measures. Most transactions between a U.S. person and any person or entity "ordinarily resident" in a comprehensively sanctioned jurisdiction is restricted.[16] In addition to the general sanctions listed below, transactions involving entities or individuals from these countries on OFAC's SDN List or BIS' Entity List are also restricted.
Jurisdiction/Region | Summary of certain restrictions |
---|---|
Cuba | Treasury:[17]
Commerce:[18]
State:
|
Iran | Treasury:[20]
Commerce:
State:
|
North Korea | Treasury:[23]
Commerce:[24]
State:[23]
|
Russia | Treasury:[25]
Commerce:[26]
|
Syria | Treasury:[27]
Commerce:[22]
State:
|
Ukraine (Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea only) | Treasury:[28]
Commerce:[29]
|
Targeted sanctions
In jurisdictions not subject to comprehensive sanctions measures, only transactions related to specific parties are prohibited.[16] Jurisdictions that face targeted sanctions may continue to do business with the United States, with restrictions only placed on specific categories of individuals or entities, and anyone worldwide who materially supports or provides financial, logistical, or technological support for them.
According to OFAC, there are approximately 12,000 names on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN) list,[13] which is the most restrictive category of targeted U.S. sanctions, targeting U.S.-designated terrorists, officials and beneficiaries of certain authoritarian regimes, and international criminals (e.g. drug traffickers) by blocking their U.S. assets and restricting U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with them.[30]
The following jurisdictions have been designated a specific sanctions program used by OFAC to determine SDN designations targeting individuals or entities engaging in sanctionable activities related to the targeted sanctions restrictions placed on that jurisdiction:[31]
Jurisdiction/Region | Summary of certain restrictions |
---|---|
Belarus | Persons the US government believes to be undermining Belarus' democratic processes or institutions, committing political repression activities, and/or misusing public assets and public authority[32] |
Central African Republic | Persons the US government believes is responsible, complicit, or have engaged in actions that threaten peace, security, or stability of the Central African Republic, including actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, threaten the political transition process, target civilians, or UN and other peacekeeping operations through the commission of acts of violence, use of children in armed groups, or obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance[33] |
Democratic Republic of the Congo | Persons the US government believes is a political or military leader of an armed group operating in the DRC that impedes the peace, security, or stability of the DRC, including actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, threaten the political transition process, target civilians, or UN and other peacekeeping operations through the commission of acts of violence, use of children in armed groups, or obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance[34] |
Ethiopia | Persons the US government believes is responsible for or complicit in actions that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Ethiopia, including expanding the crisis in northern Ethiopia or obstructing the peace process, or engaging in actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, including corruption or serious human rights abuses, to obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance, target civilians through violence, or committing attacks against UN or African Union personnel. Entities the US government believes is a military or security force operating in northern Ethiopia after November 1, 2020, or has engaged in activities that have contributed to the crisis in northern Ethiopia[35] |
Hong Kong | Persons the US government believes is responsible for developing, adopting, or implementing the Hong Kong national security law, or be responsible or complicit in actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Hong Kong, or threaten the peace, security, stability, or autonomy of Hong Kong, including censorship, extrajudicial rendition, arbitrary detention, or torture of any person in Hong Kong[36] |
Iraq | Persons the US government believes has committed acts of violence that threaten the peace or stability of Iraq or the government of Iraq, undermine efforts to promote economic reconstruction and political reform in Iraq, or obstruct the provision of humanitarian assistance[37] |
Lebanon | Persons the US government believes has taken action to undermine Lebanon's democratic processes or institutions, contributed to the breakdown of the rule of law in Lebanon, support the assertion of Syrian control or influence in Lebanon, or infringing or undermining Lebanese sovereignty[38] |
Libya | Persons the US government believes is responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Libya, obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede the political transition process, misappropriate state assets, or threaten state financial institutions, or planning, directing, or committing attacks on Libyan state facilities or civilian facilities, or illegally exploit and export Libyan natural resources[39] |
Mali | Persons contributing to the Conflict in Mali including Government officials tied to Wagner Group such as Malian Defense Minister Colonel Sadio Camara, Air Force Chief of Staff Colonel Alou Boi Diarra, and Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Adama Bagayoko[40][41] |
Myanmar | Persons the US government believes operates in the defense or other critical sectors of the Burmese economy, or are responsible for actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions or threaten the peace, security, or stability of Myanmar, or limit the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly, or arbitrary detention or torture, or is a leader of the military or security forces of Myanmar, or the government of Myanmar after February 2, 2021[42] |
Nicaragua | Persons the US government believes is responsible for serious human rights abuses, actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions or threaten the peace, security, or stability of Nicaragua, or engaged in corrupt transactions related to the misappropriation of public assets[43] |
Somalia | Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia including threatening the peace process, misappropriating public assets, or engaging in acts of piracy, or obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance, engaged in acts of violence targeting civilians, recruited children in armed conflict, or imported or exported charcoal from Somalia[44] |
South Sudan | Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of South Sudan, including actions that threaten the peace process, expanding the conflict in South Sudan, committing human rights abuses and violence against civilians, or attacks against UN or other international peacekeeping operations[45] |
Sudan | Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Sudan, including undermining the peace process and the democratic process or institutions of Sudan, or engage in censorship, corruption, misappropriation of state assets, serious human rights abuses, acts of violence against civilians, or obstruction of or attacks against UN peacekeeping missions[46] |
Venezuela | The Government of Venezuela,[47] those operating in the Venezuelan gold sector, or persons the US government believes is engaging in corrupt government programs,[48] engaged in actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions, commit significant acts of violence, or restrict the freedom of expression or peaceful assembly[49] |
Western Balkans | Persons under open indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or has committed actions that threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of any area in the Western Balkans, including actions that undermine the democratic processes or institutions in the Western Balkans, obstructed the peace process, engaged in serious human rights abuses, or are responsible for the misappropriation of public assets for personal gain[50] |
West Bank Israel |
Persons or entities the US government believes has enacted, implemented, or enforced policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of the West Bank, including violence targeting civilians, property destruction, seizure or dispossession of property, or has or is planning to commit terrorist attacks in the region[51] |
Yemen | Persons the US government believes has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen, including obstructing the peaceful transition of power or the political process[52] |
Zimbabwe | Persons the US government believes has engaged in actions to undermine Zimbabwe's democratic processes or institutions, engaged in human rights abuses or public corruption, as well as senior officials of the Government of Zimbabwe, or is a state-owned institution[53] |
Human rights abuses/corruption
Building off the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, named after Sergei Magnitsky who died in Russian custody after uncovering corruption, the U.S. can enact sanctions against any individual or entity worldwide who engages in severe human rights abuses and corruption that degrade the rule of law, perpetuate violent conflicts, and facilitate the activities of dangerous persons.[54] The following list include some jurisdictions that are frequently targeted by U.S. sanctions related to human rights abuses but are not specifically targeted under a country-specific sanctions program:
Jurisdiction/Region | Summary of targeted individuals/entities |
---|---|
Afghanistan | Persons associated with the Taliban involved in the suppression of women's and girl's access to education, and the beating of protestors and unlawful detention of journalists.[54] Former Afghani officials and their companies engaged in corrupt activities and siphoning resources from the former Afghani Armed Forces[55] |
Cambodia | Targeting government officials engaged in corruption[56] |
China | Persons whom the US government believes are committing Genocide against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang[57][54] and Chinese government officials whom the US government believes are committing human rights abuses in Hong Kong[58] |
Eritrea | Certain persons the US government believes are involved in the Ethiopian war, such as armed forces and government officials.[59] |
Lebanon | Persons the US government believes undermine the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes and institutions[60] |
Mali | Officials contributing to the Conflict in Mali including Government officials tied to Wagner Group such as Malian Defense Minister Colonel Sadio Camara, Air Force Chief of Staff Colonel Alou Boi Diarra, and Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Adama Bagayoko[40][41] |
Myanmar | Officials associated with ethnic cleansing related to the ongoing Rohingya crisis[61] and those associated with ethnic militias including the United Wa State Army[62]: 66–67 |
North Korea | Targeting government officials associated with state-sponsored human rights abuses and censorship[63] |
Nicaragua | Persons associated with contributing to the repression of the 2018–2020 Nicaraguan protests.[64] |
Russia | Persons associated with abuses against human rights activists and whistleblowers such as Sergei Magnitsky[65] |
South Sudan | Persons the US government alleges have contributed to the conflict in South Sudan or committed human rights abuses[66] |
Zimbabwe | Persons the US government believes undermine democratic processes or institutions in Zimbabwe[67] |
Terrorism
Some of the jurisdictions whose resident individuals or entities are frequently targeted for sanctions under counter-terrorism authorities include:
Jurisdiction/Region | Summary of targeted individuals/entities |
---|---|
Gaza | Targeting persons and organizations tied to Hamas-affiliated groups[68] |
Lebanon | Targeting Hizballah-linked facilitators and financiers[69] |
Iran | Targeting Iranian support for terrorist organizations including Hamas,[70] Hizballah,[69] and Houthis[71] |
Yemen | Persons who the US government claims threaten peace, security, or stability in Yemen[71] |
Drug trafficking/transnational criminal organizations
Some of the jurisdictions whose resident individuals or entities are frequently targeted for sanctions under anti-drug trafficking or transnational criminal organizations-related authorities include:
Jurisdiction/Region | Summary of targeted individuals/entities |
---|---|
Italy | Targeting the organizational structure and prominent leaders of the Camorra[72] |
Japan | Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of the Yakuza, such as the Yamaguchi-gumi[73] and Inagawa-kai[72] |
Laos | Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of Zhao Wei's criminal enterprise engaging in drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, bribery, and wildlife trafficking, much of which is facilitated through the Kings Romans Casino in Laos.[74] |
Mexico | Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of drug cartels, including the Sinaloa Cartel,[75] Los Zetas,[72] and Beltrán-Leyva Organization,[76] as well as human smuggling rings.[77] |
Russia | Targeting the organizational structure and prominent members of the Brothers' Circle[72] |
Jurisdictions subject to military/arms related export controls
Department of State Arms Embargo
The U.S. government maintains a policy of denial for any exports of defense articles or defense services to the following countries:[78][79]
Department of Commerce Military End Use/User Rule
The U.S. government also enforces stricter restrictions on a more expansive definition of defense items, including the export of any U.S.-origin item that "supports or contributes" to the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, refurbishing, development, or production of military items to specified countries. The same countries are also subject to additional license requirements in place for certain exports to the targeted countries' "military end users", defined as their national armed services, national police, national intelligence services, and anyone whose activities "support or contribute to military end uses."[81]
Russia/Belarus MEU FDP Rule
Russia and Belarus are subject to the same restrictions as the military end use/user rule, with a more expansive coverage that includes foreign-produced items that are produced using U.S.-origin software or technology, manufactured by plants or major components that are products of the U.S.[83]
Former sanctions
Polity | Description |
---|---|
Burundi | Persons who the US government claims threaten peace, security, or stability in Burundi.
Sanctions lifted on November 18 2021.[84] |
Proposed sanctions
Following arrest warrant for senior Israeli officials over Israeli war crimes committed during the Israel–Hamas war in the Gaza Strip, US lawmakers in the House of Representatives passed legislation aimed at sanctioning the International Criminal Court (ICC).[85] As of June 10, 2024, bipartisan negotiations on the sanctions bill with the Senate had stalled.[86]
Effect of U.S. sanctions
This section is written like a personal reflection, personal essay, or argumentative essay that states a Wikipedia editor's personal feelings or presents an original argument about a topic. (November 2022) |
Since 1990, the use of sanctions by the United States has significantly increased, and since 1998, the US has established economic sanctions on more than 20 countries.[87]
According to Daniel T. Griswold, sanctions failed to change the behavior of sanctioned countries but they have barred American companies from economic opportunities and harmed the poorest people in the countries under sanctions.[88] Secondary sanctions,[a] according to Rawi Abdelal, often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the affairs and interests of the European Union (EU).[89] Abdelal said since Donald Trump became President of the United States, sanctions have been seen as an expression of Washington's preferences and whims, and as a tool for US economic warfare that has angered historical allies such as the EU.[90]
Efficacy
The increase in the use of economic leverage as a US foreign policy tool has prompted a debate about its usefulness and effectiveness.[91] According to Rawi Abdelal, sanctions have become the dominant tool of statecraft of the US and other Western countries in the post-Cold War era. Abdelal stated; "sanctions are useful when diplomacy is not sufficient but force is too costly".[92] British diplomat Jeremy Greenstock said sanctions are popular because "there is nothing else [to do] between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government".[93] Former CIA Deputy Director David Cohen wrote: "The logic of coercive sanctions does not hold, however, when the objective of sanctions is regime change. Put simply, because the cost of relinquishing power will always exceed the benefit of sanctions relief, a targeted state cannot conceivably accede to a demand for regime change."[94]
Most international relations scholarship concludes sanctions almost never lead to overthrow of sanctioned countries' governments or compliance by those governments.[95] More often, the outcome of economic sanctions is the entrenchment in power of state elites in the sanctioned country.[95] In a study of US sanctions from 1981 to 2000, political scientist Dursan Peksen found sanctions have been counterproductive, failing to improve human rights and instead leading to a further decrease in sanctioned countries' "respect for physical integrity rights, including freedom from disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and political imprisonment".[96] Economists Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot state while policymakers often have high expectations of the efficacy of sanctions, there is at most a weak correlation between economic deprivation and the political inclination to change.[97] Griswold wrote sanctions are a foreign policy failure, having failed to change the political behavior of sanctioned countries; they have also barred American companies from economic opportunities and harmed the poorest people in the sanctioned countries.[88] A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics said sanctions have achieved their goals in fewer than 20% of cases. According to Griswold, as an example, the US Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 could not stop Pakistan and India from testing nuclear weapons.[88]
Political scientist Lisa Martin criticized a game theory view of sanctions, stating proponents of sanctions characterize success so broadly—applying it to a range of outcomes from "renegotiation" to "influencing global public opinion—the terminology of "winning" and "losing" overextends those concepts.[98]
Efficacy of sanctions against Russia
The United States imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[99]: 145 Asian countries, primarily China and India, absorbed an increasing amount of Russian oil and gas.[99]: 145 Because Russian imports from the West declined after sanctions, Russia's trade balance rose sharply, increasing cash reserves and the economy generally.[99]: 145 By June 2022, the Russian ruble had risen sharply and was one of the world's best performing countries.[99]: 145 Academic Jeremy Garlick writes that at least in the short term, sanctions against Russia has backfired economically by benefitting its economy and backfired geopolitically by bringing Russia and China closer together.[99]: 145
Humanitarian concerns
Daniel T. Griswold of the Cato Institute criticizes sanctions from a conservative Christian perspective, writing sanctions limit the possibilities of a sanctioned country's people to exercise political liberties and practice market freedom.[100] In 1997, the American Association for World Health stated the US embargo against Cuba contributed to malnutrition, poor water access, and lack of access to medicine and other medical supplies; it concluded "a humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventative medicine to all its citizens".[101]
Economist Helen Yaffe estimates United States sanctions against Venezuela have caused the deaths of 100,000 people due to the difficulty of importing medicine and health care equipment.[101]
According to journalist Elijah J Magnier in Middle East Eye, the West—led by America and Europe—had not sent any immediate aid to Syria after the 2023 Turkey–Syria earthquake. According to Magnier, some mainstream media incorrectly stated President Bashar al-Assad was preventing humanitarian aid from reach the Turkish-occupied northwestern provinces of Syria and border crossings. According to one Western diplomat; "the goal is to get the Syrian people to blame their president for western countries’ refusal to provide aid".[102]
Secondary sanctions
In 2019, the United States Department of State reported it received complaints from American telecommunications providers and television companies the sanctions against Cuba caused difficulties in incorporating the country into their grid coverage.[103]
According to Abdelal, US sanctions on its own internal economy cost almost nothing but overuse of them could be costly in the long term. Abdelal said the biggest threat is the US's gradual isolation and the continuing decline of US influence in the context of an emerging, multi-polar world with differing financial and economic powers.[104] Abdelal also said the US and Europe largely agree on the substance of sanctions but disagree on their implementation. The main issue is secondary US sanctions—also known as extraterritorial sanctions—[105]which prohibit any trading in US dollars and prevent trade with a country, individuals and organizations under the US sanctions regime.[89] Primary sanctions restrict US companies, institutions, and citizens from doing business with the country or entities under sanctions.[105] According to Abdelal, secondary sanctions often separate the US and Europe because they reflect US interference in the EU's affairs and interests. Increasing use of secondary sanctions increases their perception in the EU as a violation of national and EU sovereignty, and an unacceptable interference in the EU's independent decision-making.[89] Secondary sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia are central to these tensions,[92] and have become the primary tool for signaling and implementing secession from US and European political goals.[105]
Bloomberg reported in July 2024 that Russian firms found it increasingly difficult to trade with China because of the secondary sanctions that had been applied to Chinese banks.[106] At the time, China had become the destination for more than a third of Russian exports,[107] and shadowy middleman firms had become a way of life for to support import-export trade between the two nations.[108]
De-dollarization efforts
Retired business-studies academic Tim Beal views the US's imposition of financial sanctions as a factor increasing dedollarization efforts because of responses like the Russian-developed System for Transfers of Financial Messages (SPFS), the China-supported Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), and the European Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) that followed the US's withdrawal of from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran.[8]
Historian Renate Bridenthal wrote; "the most looming blowback to US sanctions policy is the growing set of challenges to dollar hegemony". Bridenthal cited the use of local currencies to trade with sanctioned countries, and attempts by Russia and China to increase the gold backing of their respective currencies.[109]
Implementing agencies
- Bureau of Industry and Security
- Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
- Office of Foreign Assets Control
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection
- United States Department of Commerce (Export Administration Regulations, EAR)
- United States Department of Defense
- United States Department of Energy (nuclear technology)
- United States Department of Homeland Security (border crossings)
- United States Department of Justice (including ATF and FBI)
- United States Department of State (International Traffic in Arms Regulations, ITAR)
- United States Department of the Treasury
Authorizing laws
Several laws delegate embargo power to the President:
- Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917[110]
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1961[110]
- International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977
- Export Administration Act of 1979
Several laws specifically prohibit trade with certain countries:
- Cuban Assets Control Regulations of 1963
- Cuban Democracy Act of 1992[110]
- Helms–Burton Act of 1996 (Cuba)[110]
- Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
- Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (Cuba)[110]
- Iran Freedom and Support Act of 2006
- Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
Footnotes
See also
- State Sponsors of Terrorism (U.S. list) – placement on the list puts severe restrictions on trade with that nation
- Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List
- United States sanctions against China
- Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act
- Rogue state
- Economic sanctions
- 2002 United States steel tariff
- Permanent normal trade relations
- Arms Export Control Act
- United States and state terrorism
- Criticism of United States foreign policy
- European Union sanctions
- United Kingdom sanctions
- United States foreign adversaries
References
Citations
- ^ a b Manu Karuka (December 9, 2021). "Hunger Politics: Sanctions as Siege Warfare". Sanctions as War. BRILL. pp. 51–62. doi:10.1163/9789004501201_004. ISBN 9789004501201. S2CID 245408284.
- ^ a b c "How four U.S. presidents unleashed economic warfare across the globe". Washington Post. 2024.
- ^ "Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Economic Sanctions". PIIE. March 2, 2016. Retrieved August 25, 2020.
- ^ Strang, G. Bruce (2008). ""The Worst of all Worlds:" Oil Sanctions and Italy's Invasion of Abyssinia, 1935–1936". Diplomacy & Statecraft. 19 (2): 210–235. doi:10.1080/09592290802096257. S2CID 154614365. Retrieved August 13, 2020.
- ^ a b c d e Davis, Stuart (2023). Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy. Haymarket Books. p. 16. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
- ^ Davis, Stuart (2023). Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy. Haymarket Books. p. 11. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
- ^ "Bernie Sanders and AOC call on US to lift Iran sanctions as nation reels from coronavirus". The Independent. April 1, 2020. Retrieved January 23, 2023.
- ^ a b Tim Beal (December 9, 2021). "Sanctions as Instrument of Coercion: Characteristics, Limitations, and Consequences". Sanctions as War. BRILL. pp. 27–50. doi:10.1163/9789004501201_003. ISBN 9789004501201. S2CID 245402040.
- ^ Foran, Clare (June 4, 2024). "House passes International Criminal Court sanctions bill after prosecutor seeks Netanyahu warrant | CNN Politics". CNN. Retrieved June 6, 2024.
- ^ Haidar, J.I., 2017."Sanctions and Exports Deflection: Evidence from Iran," Economic Policy (Oxford University Press), April 2017, Vol. 32(90), pp. 319-355.
- ^ "Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism". Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. United States Department of State. August 5, 2010. Retrieved March 11, 2017.
- ^ "Where is OFAC's Country List? What countries do I need to worry about in terms of U.S. sanctions?". OFAC. Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- ^ a b "OFAC Homepage". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- ^ "Sanctioned Destinations". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- ^ "Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation". Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- ^ a b "OFAC Sanctioned Countries". Princeton Research. Retrieved January 22, 2024.
- ^ "Is Cuba open for U.S. business and investment?". Retrieved January 22, 2022.
- ^ "Cuba Sanctions". Retrieved January 22, 2022.
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- ^ "Iran sanctions overview" (PDF). July 1, 2019.
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(help) - ^ Renate Bridenthal (December 9, 2021). "Blowback to US Sanctions Policy". Sanctions as War. BRILL. pp. 323–332. doi:10.1163/9789004501201_020. ISBN 9789004501201. S2CID 245394028.
- ^ a b c d e Davis, Stuart (2023). Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Policy. Haymarket Books. p. 131. ISBN 978-1-64259-812-4. OCLC 1345216431.
Sources
- Abdelal, Rawi; Bros, Aurélie (2020). "The End of Transatlanticism?: How Sanctions Are Dividing the West". Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development. 16 (16). Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development: 114–135. JSTOR 48573754.
- Lenway, Stefanie Ann (1988). "Between war and Commerce: economic sanctions as a tool of statecraft". International Organization. 42 (2). Cambridge University Press: 397–426. doi:10.1017/S0020818300032860. S2CID 154337246.
Further reading
- Hufbauer, Gary C. Economic sanctions and American diplomacy (Council on Foreign Relations, 1998) online.
- Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberley Ann Elliott. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1990)
- Krugman, Paul, "The American Way of Economic war: Is Washington Overusing Its Most Powerful Weapons?" (review of Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy, Henry Holt, 2023, 288 pp.), Foreign Affairs, vol. 103, no. 1 (January/February 2024), pp. 150–156.
- Mulder, Nicholas. The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War (2022) also see online review
External links
- Sanctions Programs and Country Information (United States Department of the Treasury)
- Commerce Control List (Bureau of Industry and Security)