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{{Short description|How politicians represent citizens}}
{{Democracy}}
{{Democracy}}
'''Political representation''' is the activity of making [[citizens]] "present" in [[public policy]] making processes when political actors act in the best interest of citizens.<ref name="Political Representation">{{cite book|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/#PitFouVieRep|title=Political Representation|last1=Dovi|first1=Suzanne|publisher=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition)|access-date=19 November 2019|year=2018}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite book|title=The concept of representation|last=Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel|isbn=0520021568|location=Berkeley|oclc=498382|year = 1967}}</ref> This definition of political representation is consistent with a wide variety of views on what representing implies and what the duties of representatives are.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book|title=Democracy, accountability, and representation|date=1999|publisher=Cambridge University Press|others=Przeworski, Adam., Stokes, Susan Carol., Manin, Bernard.|isbn=9781139175104|location=Cambridge, U.K.|oclc=817932765}}</ref> For example, representing may imply acting on the expressed wishes of citizens, but it may alternatively imply acting according to what the representatives themselves judge is in the best interests of citizens.<ref name=":2" /> And representatives may be viewed as individuals who have been authorized to act on the behalf of others, or may alternatively be viewed as those who will be held to account by those they are representing.<ref name=":1" /> Political representation can happen along different units such as [[social groups]] and area, and there are different types of representation such as substantive representation and descriptive representation.<ref name=":1" />
'''Political representation''' is the activity of making [[citizens]] "present" in [[public policy]]-making processes when political actors act in the best interest of citizens according to [[Hanna Pitkin|Hanna Pitkin's]] ''Concept of Representation'' (1967).<ref name="Political Representation">{{cite book|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/#PitFouVieRep|title=Political Representation|last1=Dovi|first1=Suzanne|publisher=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition)|access-date=19 November 2019|year=2018}}</ref><ref name="Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel-1967">{{Cite book|title=The concept of representation|last=Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel|isbn=0520021568|location=Berkeley|oclc=498382|year = 1967}}</ref>


This definition of political representation is consistent with a wide variety of views on what representing implies and what the duties of representatives are.<ref name="Cambridge University Press-1999">{{Cite book|title=Democracy, accountability, and representation|date=1999|publisher=Cambridge University Press|others=Przeworski, Adam., Stokes, Susan Carol., Manin, Bernard.|isbn=9781139175104|location=Cambridge, U.K.|oclc=817932765}}</ref> For example, representing may imply acting on the expressed wishes of citizens, but it may alternatively imply acting according to what the representatives themselves judge is in the best interests of citizens.<ref name="Cambridge University Press-1999" />
==Views of political representation==
Under the ''[[accountability]]'' view, a representative is an [[individual]] who will be held to account.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Concept of Representation|last=Pitkin|first=Hanna|publisher=University of California Press|year=1967|isbn=978-0520021563|location=Berkeley and Los Angeles|pages=38–39, 55}}</ref> Representatives are held accountable if citizens can judge whether the representative is acting in their best interest and sanction the representative accordingly.<ref name=":2" /> The descriptive and symbolic views of political representation describe the ways in which political representatives "stand for" the people they represent.<ref name=":1" /> ''Descriptive'' representatives "stand for" to the extent that they resemble, in their descriptive characteristics (e.g. [[Race (human categorization)|race]], [[gender]], [[social class|class]] etc.), the people they represent.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Concept of Representation|last=Pitkin|first=Hanna|publisher=University of California Press|year=1967|isbn=978-0520021563|location=Berkeley and Los Angeles|pages=63}}</ref> On the other hand, ''symbolic'' representatives "stand for" the people they represent as long as those people believe in or accept them as their representative.<ref name="Pitkin 1967 174">{{Cite book|title=The Concept of Representation|last=Pitkin|first=Hanna|publisher=University of California Press|year=1967|isbn=978-0520021563|location=Berkeley and Los Angeles|pages=174}}</ref> [[Hanna Pitkin|Hanna Fenichel Pitkin]] argues that these views of political representation give an inadequate account of political representation because they lack an account both of how representatives "act for" the represented and the [[social norm|normative]] criteria for judging representative's actions. Hence, Pitkin proposes a ''substantive'' view of representation. In this view of political representation, representation is defined as substantive "acting for", by representatives, the interests of the people they represent.<ref name="Pitkin 1967 174" />


And representatives may be viewed as individuals who have been authorized to act on the behalf of others, or may alternatively be viewed as those who will be held to account by those they are representing.<ref name="Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel-1967" /> Political representation can happen along different units such as [[social groups]] and area, and there are different types of representation such as substantive representation and descriptive representation.<ref name="Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel-1967" />
In contrast, [[Jane Mansbridge]] has identified four views of democratic political representation: promissory, anticipatory, surrogate and gyroscopic. Mansbridge argues that each of these views provides an account of both how democratic political representatives "act for" the people they represent and the normative criteria for assessing the actions of representatives.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Mansbridge|first=Jane|date=Nov 2003|title=Rethinking Representation|jstor=359302|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=97| issue = 4|pages=515–528|doi=10.1017/S0003055403000856}}</ref> ''Promissory'' representation is a form of representation in which representatives are chosen and assessed based on the promises they make to the people they represent during [[election]] campaigns. For Mansbridge, promissory representation, preoccupied with how representatives are chosen (authorized) and held to account through elections, is the traditional view of [[Democracy|democratic]] political representation. Anticipatory, surrogate and gyroscopic representation, on the other hand, are more modern views that have emerged from the work of empirical [[Political science|political scientists]]. ''Anticipatory'' representatives take actions that they believe voters (the represented) will reward in the next election. ''Surrogate'' representation occurs when representatives "act for" the interest of people outside their constituencies. Finally, in ''gyroscopic'' representation, representatives use their own judgements to determine how and for what they should act for on behalf of the people they represent.<ref name="Political Representation" />


==Views of political representation==
Under [[Andrew Rehfeld]]'s general theory of representation, a person is considered a representative as long as the particular group they represent judges them as such.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Rehfeld|first=Andrew|author-link=Andrew Rehfeld|date=2006|title=Toward a General Theory of Political Representation|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=68|pages=1–21|citeseerx=10.1.1.528.5810|doi=10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00365.x}}</ref> In any case of political representation, there are representatives, the represented, a selection agent, a relevant audience and rules by which the relevant judge whether a person is a representative.<ref name=":0" /> Representatives are those who are selected by a selection agent from a larger set of qualified individuals who are then judged to representatives by a relevant audience using particular rules of judgement. The rules by which a relevant audience judges whether a person is a representative can be either democratic or non-democratic. In a case where the selection agent, relevant audience and the represented are the same and the rules of judgment are democratic (e.g. elections), the familiar democratic case of political representation arises and where they are not, undemocratic cases arise.
Under the ''[[accountability]]'' view, a representative is an [[individual]] who will be held to account.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Concept of Representation|last=Pitkin|first=Hanna|publisher=University of California Press|year=1967|isbn=978-0520021563|location=Berkeley and Los Angeles|pages=38–39, 55}}</ref> Representatives are held accountable if citizens can judge whether the representative is acting in their best interest and sanction the representative accordingly.<ref name="Cambridge University Press-1999" /> The descriptive and symbolic views of political representation describe the ways in which political representatives "stand for" the people they represent.<ref name="Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel-1967" /> ''Descriptive'' representatives "stand for" to the extent that they resemble, in their descriptive characteristics (e.g. [[Race (human categorization)|race]], [[gender]], [[social class|class]] etc.), the people they represent.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Concept of Representation|last=Pitkin|first=Hanna|publisher=University of California Press|year=1967|isbn=978-0520021563|location=Berkeley and Los Angeles|pages=63}}</ref> On the other hand, ''symbolic'' representatives "stand for" the people they represent as long as those people believe in or accept them as their representative.<ref name="Pitkin 1967 174">{{Cite book|title=The Concept of Representation|last=Pitkin|first=Hanna|publisher=University of California Press|year=1967|isbn=978-0520021563|location=Berkeley and Los Angeles|pages=174}}</ref> [[Hanna Pitkin|Hanna Fenichel Pitkin]] argues that these views of political representation give an inadequate account of political representation because they lack an account both of how representatives "act for" the represented and the [[social norm|normative]] criteria for judging representative's actions. Hence, Pitkin proposes a ''substantive'' view of representation. In this view of political representation, representation is defined as substantive "acting for", by representatives, the interests of the people they represent.<ref name="Pitkin 1967 174" />


In contrast, [[Jane Mansbridge]] has identified four views of democratic political representation: promissory, anticipatory, surrogate and gyroscopic. Mansbridge argues that each of these views provides an account of both how democratic political representatives "act for" the people they represent and the normative criteria for assessing the actions of representatives.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Mansbridge|first=Jane|date=Nov 2003|title=Rethinking Representation|jstor=359302|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=97| issue = 4|pages=515–528|doi=10.1017/S0003055403000856|s2cid=210059562 }}</ref> ''Promissory'' representation is a form of representation in which representatives are chosen and assessed based on the promises they make to the people they represent during [[election]] campaigns. For Mansbridge, promissory representation, preoccupied with how representatives are chosen (authorized) and held to account through elections, is the traditional view of [[Democracy|democratic]] political representation. Anticipatory, surrogate and gyroscopic representation, on the other hand, are more modern views that have emerged from the work of empirical [[Political science|political scientists]]. ''Anticipatory'' representatives take actions that they believe voters (the represented) will reward in the next election. ''Surrogate'' representation occurs when representatives "act for" the interest of people outside their constituencies. Finally, in ''gyroscopic'' representation, representatives use their own judgements to determine how and for what they should act for on behalf of the people they represent.<ref name="Political Representation" />
==Units of representation==


Under [[Andrew Rehfeld]]'s general theory of representation, a person is considered a representative as long as the particular group they represent judges them as such.<ref name="Rehfeld-2006">{{Cite journal|last=Rehfeld|first=Andrew|author-link=Andrew Rehfeld|date=2006|title=Toward a General Theory of Political Representation|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=68|pages=1–21|citeseerx=10.1.1.528.5810|doi=10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00365.x|s2cid=96451393 }}</ref> In any case of political representation, there are representatives, the represented, a selection agent, a relevant audience and rules by which the relevant judge whether a person is a representative.<ref name="Rehfeld-2006" /> Representatives are those who are selected by a selection agent from a larger set of qualified individuals who are then judged to representatives by a relevant audience using particular rules of judgement. The rules by which a relevant audience judges whether a person is a representative can be either democratic or non-democratic. In a case where the selection agent, relevant audience and the represented are the same and the rules of judgment are democratic (e.g. elections), the familiar democratic case of political representation arises and where they are not, undemocratic cases arise.
=== Representation by population<!-- This section is linked from [[United States Congress]] --> ===
In this method, elected representatives will be chosen by more or less numerically equivalent blocks of [[voting|voters]]. This is not always practical for historical and current political reasons, and sometimes is impractical purely on the basis of logistics, as in regions where travel is difficult and distances are long.{{Citation needed|date=March 2018|reason=Reliable source needed for the whole sentence}} The shortened term "rep-by-pop" is used in [[United Kingdom|Britain]] but is relatively uncommon in the [[United States|U.S.]]{{Citation needed|date=March 2018|reason=Reliable source needed for the whole sentence}}


==Units of representation==
Historically rep-by-pop is the alternative to rep-by-area. However, in the [[colony|colonial countries]], the geographic realities made a necessity of low-population [[Electoral district|electoral districts]] in order to give meaningful representation to remote communities, and only in [[Urban area|urban]] and [[suburban areas]] has there been any success with applying rep-by-pop more or less evenly{{Citation needed|date=March 2018|reason=Reliable source needed for the whole sentence}}


=== Representation by population<!-- This section is linked from [[United States Congress]] --> ===
In the United States and other democracies, typically the lower house of a [[bicameral]] (two-chamber) system is based on population—more or less—while the upper House is based on area. Or, as it might be put in the United Kingdom, on title to land, as was originally the case with the old pre-Reforms [[House of Lords]]. In the [[Senate]] or the Lords, it does not matter how many people are living in a constituent's [[jurisdiction]], it matters that the constituent have the jurisdiction (by election, heredity or appointment—the US, the UK and [[Canada]] respectively).
This is the preferred (and far more common) method for democratic countries, where elected representatives will be chosen by similarly-sized groups of [[voting|voters]]. The shortened term "rep-by-pop" is used in [[Canada]]<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.oed.com/dictionary/rep-by-pop_n |title=rep by pop |author=<!--Not stated--> |date= |website=Oxford English Dictionary |publisher=Oxford University Press |access-date=7 November 2023 |quote=}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/rep-by-pop |title=Rep by Pop |author=<!--Not stated--> |date=12 December 2019 |website= The Canadian Encyclopedia|publisher= Anthony Wilson-Smith|access-date= |quote=}}</ref> whereas "[[one person, one vote]]" is more common in the [[United States|U.S.]]<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.theconstitutionproject.com/portfolio/one-person-one-vote/ |title=One Person, One Vote |author=<!--Not stated--> |date=2017 |website=The Constitution Project |publisher=the documentary group |access-date=7 November 2023 |quote=}}</ref><ref>{{caselaw source
| case = ''Gray v. Sanders'', {{ussc|372|368|1963|el=no}}
| findlaw = https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/372/368.html
| justia =https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/372/368/
| loc =http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/usrep372/usrep372368/usrep372368.pdf
| oyez =https://www.oyez.org/cases/1962/112
}}</ref>


=== Representation by area ===
=== Representation by area ===
This form of representation tends to occur as a political necessity for unifying many independent actors, such as in a federation (e.g. [[NATO]], the [[United Nations|UN]]). It's highly unusual (and controversial) where it exists within countries because of its violation of the [[One man, one vote|'one person, one vote' principle]]. Examples of representation by area within countries tend to be historical remnants of when those countries were federations before their unification. For example, the [[Constitution of the United States|American Constitution]] was not quite able to eliminate its rep-by-area features due to smaller states already holding disproportionate power in the proceedings from the [[Articles of Confederation]]. In Canada, provinces such as Prince Edward Island also have unequal representation in Parliament (in the Commons as well as the Senate) relative to Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta, largely for similar historical reasons.
The principle of rep-by-pop, when brought in and promoted publicly, removed many archaic seats in the British [[House of Commons]] although some northern and rural counties necessarily still have variably lower populations than most urban ridings. Former British colonies like Canada and [[Australia]] also have rural and wilderness areas spanning tens of thousands of square miles, with fewer voters in them than a tiny urban-core riding. In the most extreme case, one [[riding (division)|riding]] of the [[Canadian parliament]] covers more than [[1 E12 m²|2 million square kilometres]], [[Nunavut]], yet has less than one third the average number of voters for a riding, with a population of about 30,000. Making the riding larger would be difficult for the elected member, as well as for campaigning and also unfair to remotely rural constituents, whose concerns are radically different from those of the medium-sized towns that typically dominate the electorate in such ridings.

The American Constitution has built into it a series of compromises between rep-by-pop and rep-by-area: two [[United States Senate|Senators]] per state, at least one [[United States House of Representatives|representative]] per state, and representation in the [[United States electoral college|electoral college]]. In Canada, provinces such as Prince Edward Island have unequal representation in Parliament (in the Commons as well as the Senate) relative to Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta, partly for historical reasons, partly because those electoral allotments are constitutionally guaranteed, and partly because governments have simply chosen to under-represent certain voters and over-represent others. In the United States, [[Baker v. Carr]] (1962) established the "one-person/one vote" standard, that each individual had to be weighted equally in legislative apportionment.

In Canada, until recent reforms, there were still many federal and provincial electoral districts in [[British Columbia]] and other provinces that had less than a few thousand votes cast, notably [[Atlin (electoral district)|Atlin]], covering the province's far northwest, with no more than 1,500. The area of the riding was about the size of [[New Brunswick]] and [[Nova Scotia]] combined, and larger than many American states. In practicality, the voters of the tiny communities scattered across the subarctic landscape, less than the population of a city block, had as much electoral clout as two Fraser Valley municipalities totaling up to 60,000 in population. The population imbalance between largely rural areas and overwhelmingly urban areas is one reason why the realities of representation by area still have sway against the ideal of representation by population.


==Models of representation==
==Models of representation==
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=== Substantive representation ===
=== Substantive representation ===
Under representative democracy, '''{{visible anchor|substantive representation}}''' (in contrast to descriptive representation) is the tendency of elected legislators to advocate on behalf of certain groups.


Substantive representation occurs when representatives' opinions and actions reflect the wishes, needs, and interests of the people they represent.<ref>[Arnesen, Sveinung, and Yvette Peters. “The Legitimacy of Representation: How Descriptive, Formal, and Responsiveness Representation Affect the Acceptability of Political Decisions.” Comparative Political Studies 51, no. 7 (2017): 873. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017720702.]</ref> Democratic theorists often study substantive representation in terms of ideological congruence, meaning that representation is high when representatives hold the same policy positions as their constituents.<ref name="Clark, William Roberts 2019">[Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder. “Chapter 14: Consequences of Democratic Institutions.” Essay. In Foundations of Comparative Politics, 357. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2019.]</ref> Recent research shows that the ideological opinion-policy relationship is upheld for both foreign and domestic affairs, although foreign affairs and defense policy were long considered immune to public pressure.<ref>[Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. “Studying Substantive Democracy.” PS: Political Science and Politics 27, no. 1 (March 1994): 10. https://doi.org/10.2307/420450.]</ref> According to Hanna F. Pitkin's ''The Concept of Representation'' (1967), the standard for assessing the quality of substantive representation is the representative's responsiveness to the evolving needs of their citizenry.<ref>[Celis, Karen. “On Substantive Representation, Diversity, and Responsiveness.” Cambridge University Press 8, no. 4 (December 12, 2012): 525. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X12000542.]</ref> As a result, low substantive representation in representative democracies usually arises from representatives' inability to judge and act on the interests of the public rather than inactivity in office.<ref>[ Kuper, Andrew. “Representation as Responsiveness.” Essay. In Democracy beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global Institutions, 77. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004.]</ref> Pitkin also argues that substantive representation should be apparent through the nature of government action between elections.<ref>[Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. “Studying Substantive Democracy.” PS: Political Science and Politics 27, no. 1 (March 1994): 11. https://doi.org/10.2307/420450.]</ref> Thus, substantive representation is predicated on the fact that democracy is evident between elections rather than isolated to formal procedures like voting.<ref>[ Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. “Studying Substantive Democracy.” PS: Political Science and Politics 27, no. 1 (March 1994): 11. https://doi.org/10.2307/420450.]</ref>
Conflicting theories and beliefs exist regarding why constituents vote for representatives. "Rather than choosing candidates on the basis of an informed view of the incumbents' voting records, voters, it is argued, rely primarily on the policy-free 'symbols' of party identification".<ref>Stokes and Miller, 1962.</ref>{{page needed|date=September 2015}}

Recently, Pitkin's concept of substantive representation has been criticized by several political scientists on the grounds that it "assumes a static notion that interests are entities waiting to be brought into the representational process."<ref>[Celis, Karen. “On Substantive Representation, Diversity, and Responsiveness.” Cambridge University Press 8, no. 4 (December 12, 2012): 527. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X12000542.]</ref> Among these scholars is Michael Saward (2010), who argues that substantive representation should be constructed as a process of "claims-making" in which representatives "speak for" their constituents.<ref>[Severs, Eline. “Substantive Representation through a Claims-Making Lens: A Strategy for the Identification and Analysis of Substantive Claims.” Representation 48, no. 2 (2012): 171. https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2012.683491.]</ref> However, Ellie Severs (2012) disparages this logic, as she claims it obscures the interactions between representatives and the represented that are essential to the substantive representation process.<ref>[Severs, Eline. “Substantive Representation through a Claims-Making Lens: A Strategy for the Identification and Analysis of Substantive Claims.” Representation 48, no. 2 (2012): 178. https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2012.683491.]</ref>

Substantive representation is not a universally accepted concept; minimalist theorists like Adam Przeworski (1999) reject the idea that representatives can be driven to act in the best interests of the public.<ref>[Kuper, Andrew. “Representation as Responsiveness.” Essay. In Democracy beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global Institutions, 98. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004.]</ref> In contrast to substantive representation, minimalists believe that democracy is merely a system in which competitive elections select rulers and that democracies should be defended regardless of the outcomes they produce for their citizenry.<ref>[Shapiro, Ian, Casiano Hacker-Cordón, and Adam Przeworski . “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense.” Essay. In Democracy's Value, 12–17. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2005.]</ref> Nonetheless, democratic theorists often consider substantive representation to be salient due to its emphasis on action in office, particularly in relation to the interests of women and ethnic minorities.<ref name="Clark, William Roberts 2019"/>


=== Descriptive representation ===
=== Descriptive representation ===
Scholars have defined representation as "the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact".<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Concept of Representation|last=Pitkin|first=Hanna|publisher=University of California Press|year=1967|location=Berkeley and Los Angeles|pages=8}}</ref> Descriptive representation is the idea that a group elects an individual to represent them who in their own characteristics mirror some of the more frequent experiences and outward manifestations of the group.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last=Mansbridge|first=Jane|date=1999|title=Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent "Yes"|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=61|issue=3|pages=628–657|doi=10.2307/2647821|issn=0022-3816|jstor=2647821|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/efba0bb9e982cdb0c2aa6567fd8d6186762a5419}}</ref> This descriptive representation can have again different types such as "perfect over representation", "over representation", "proper representation", "under/nominal representation" & "No representation".<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Baniamin |first1=Hasan Muhammad |last2=Jamil |first2=Ishtiaq |title=Effects of representative bureaucracy on perceived performance and fairness: Experimental evidence from South Asia |journal=Public Administration |date=2021-06-13 |pages=padm.12758 |doi=10.1111/padm.12758}}</ref> In this form of representation, representatives are in their own persons and lives in some sense typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent.<ref name=":4">{{Cite book|title=The Politics of Presence|last=Phillips|first=Anne|publisher=Clarendon Press|year=1995|isbn=0-19-827942-6|location=Oxford}}</ref> For example, certain ethnic groups or gender-based groups may want to elect a leader that shares these descriptive characteristics as they may be politically relevant. Disadvantaged groups may gain benefit from descriptive representation primarily in two ways:
Scholars have defined representation as "the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact".<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Concept of Representation|last=Pitkin|first=Hanna|publisher=University of California Press|year=1967|location=Berkeley and Los Angeles|pages=8}}</ref> Descriptive representation is the idea that a group elects an individual to represent them who in their own characteristics mirror some of the more frequent experiences and outward manifestations of the group.<ref name="Mansbridge-1999">{{Cite journal|last=Mansbridge|first=Jane|date=1999|title=Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent "Yes"|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=61|issue=3|pages=628–657|doi=10.2307/2647821|issn=0022-3816|jstor=2647821|s2cid=37133536 }}</ref> This descriptive representation can have again different types such as "perfect over representation", "over representation", "proper representation", "under/nominal representation" & "No representation".<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Baniamin |first1=Hasan Muhammad |last2=Jamil |first2=Ishtiaq |title=Effects of representative bureaucracy on perceived performance and fairness: Experimental evidence from South Asia |journal=Public Administration |date=2021-06-13 |volume=101 |pages=284–302 |doi=10.1111/padm.12758|s2cid=236301887 }}</ref> In this form of representation, representatives are in their own persons and lives in some sense typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent.<ref name="Phillips-1995">{{Cite book|title=The Politics of Presence|last=Phillips|first=Anne|publisher=Clarendon Press|year=1995|isbn=0-19-827942-6|location=Oxford}}</ref> For example, certain ethnic groups or gender-based groups may want to elect a leader that shares these descriptive characteristics as they may be politically relevant. Disadvantaged groups may gain benefit from descriptive representation primarily in two ways:


# When there is mistrust: This refers to a situation where communication between the group and its representatives has been inadequate.<ref name=":3" /> In these cases, descriptive representation promotes vertical communication between representatives and their group of constituents.<ref name=":3" />
# When there is mistrust: This refers to a situation where communication between the group and its representatives has been inadequate.<ref name="Mansbridge-1999" /> In these cases, descriptive representation promotes vertical communication between representatives and their group of constituents.<ref name="Mansbridge-1999" />
# When interests are uncrystallized: In certain historical moments, citizen interests are not clearly defined. Either the issues have not been on the political agenda for long, or candidates have not taken public positions on them.<ref name=":3" /> In this case, the best way to have one's substantive interests represented is often to choose a descriptive representative whose characteristics match one's own.<ref name=":4" />
# When interests are uncrystallized: In certain historical moments, citizen interests are not clearly defined. Either the issues have not been on the political agenda for long, or candidates have not taken public positions on them.<ref name="Mansbridge-1999" /> In this case, the best way to have one's substantive interests represented is often to choose a descriptive representative whose characteristics match one's own.<ref name="Phillips-1995" />


Descriptive representation can be instituted by political parties independently where they set aside a certain number of party seats for particular groups.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last=Hughes|first=Melanie|last2=Paxton|first2=Pamela|last3=Clayton|first3=Amanda|last4=Zetterberg|first4=Par|date=2019|title=Global gender quota adoption, implementation and reform|journal=Comparative Politics|volume=51|issue=2|pages=219–238|doi=10.5129/001041519X15647434969795}}</ref> It can also be instituted through national electoral quotas either by reserving seats for office or candidate quotas for political parties.<ref name=":5" />
Descriptive representation can be instituted by political parties independently where they set aside a certain number of party seats for particular groups.<ref name="Hughes-2019">{{Cite journal|last1=Hughes|first1=Melanie|last2=Paxton|first2=Pamela|last3=Clayton|first3=Amanda|last4=Zetterberg|first4=Par|date=2019|title=Global gender quota adoption, implementation and reform|journal=Comparative Politics|volume=51|issue=2|pages=219–238|doi=10.5129/001041519X15647434969795|pmid=38549789 |pmc=10978000}}</ref> It can also be instituted through national electoral quotas either by reserving seats for office or candidate quotas for political parties.<ref name="Hughes-2019" />


Traditionally, quotas have been thought of as a way of providing adequate representation for previously disadvantaged groups such as women or oppressed ethnic groups.<ref name=":3" /> However, another way of conceptualizing quotas is to institute a maximum or ceiling quota for advantaged groups.<ref name=":6">{{Cite journal|last=Murray|first=Rainbow|date=2014|title=Quotas for Men: Reframing Gender Quotas as a Means of Improving Representation for All|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=108|issue=3|pages=520–532|issn=0003-0554|jstor=43654390|doi=10.1017/S0003055414000239|doi-access=free}}</ref> This may improve the meritocracy of the system and improve the process of candidate selection<ref name=":6" />
Traditionally, quotas have been thought of as a way of providing adequate representation for previously disadvantaged groups such as women or oppressed ethnic groups.<ref name="Mansbridge-1999" /> However, another way of conceptualizing quotas is to institute a maximum or ceiling quota for advantaged groups.<ref name="Murray-2014">{{Cite journal|last=Murray|first=Rainbow|date=2014|title=Quotas for Men: Reframing Gender Quotas as a Means of Improving Representation for All|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=108|issue=3|pages=520–532|issn=0003-0554|jstor=43654390|doi=10.1017/S0003055414000239|doi-access=free}}</ref> This may improve the meritocracy of the system and improve the process of candidate selection<ref name="Murray-2014" />


Empirically, quotas show mixed results. In Lesotho, quota-mandated female representation has had no effect or even reduced several dimensions of women's engagement with local politics.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Clayton|first=Amanda|date=2015|title=Women's Political Engagement Under Quota-Mandated Female Representation: Evidence From a Randomized Policy Experiment|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=48|issue=3|pages=333–369|doi=10.1177/0010414014548104|issn=0010-4140|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/02e821a5bbc0299d8fb21fcacadd50985462ce3b}}</ref> In Argentina, quotas have mandated negative stereotypes about women politicians.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Franceschet|first=Susan|author-link1=Susan Franceschet|last2=Piscopo|first2=Jennifer M.|date=2008|title=Gender Quotas and Women's Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina|journal=Politics & Gender|language=en|volume=4|issue=3|doi=10.1017/S1743923X08000342|issn=1743-923X}}</ref> Meanwhile, in India, women are more likely to win an election in a constituency that formerly had quotas, even when the quotas are removed,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bhavnani|first=Rikhil R.|date=2009|title=Do Electoral Quotas Work after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=103|issue=1|pages=23–35|doi=10.1017/S0003055409090029|issn=0003-0554}}</ref> and women leaders provide public goods favoured by women constituents.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Chattopadhyay|first=Raghabendra|last2=Duflo|first2=Esther|date=2004-09-01|title=Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India|journal=Econometrica|language=en|volume=72|issue=5|pages=1409–1443|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00539.x|issn=1468-0262|hdl=1721.1/39126|hdl-access=free}}</ref> Evidence also shows that while [[Caste system in India|caste]]-based quotas may not change stereotypes of how people view the oppressed caste group, they do change the social norms of interaction between caste groups<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Chauchard|first=Simon|date=2014|title=Can Descriptive Representation Change Beliefs about a Stigmatized Group? Evidence from Rural India|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=108|issue=2|pages=403–422|issn=0003-0554|jstor=43654380|doi=10.1017/S0003055414000033|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1d11f38bf663cf91f84d49a4fe2df99a326dd56f}}</ref>{{NoteTag|For data on gender quota adoption from 1947 to 2015, see the [https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/100918/version/V1/view Quota Adoption and Reform Over Time (QAROT)] data set.}}
Empirically, quotas show mixed results. In Lesotho, quota-mandated female representation has had no effect or even reduced several dimensions of women's engagement with local politics.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Clayton|first=Amanda|date=2015|title=Women's Political Engagement Under Quota-Mandated Female Representation: Evidence From a Randomized Policy Experiment|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=48|issue=3|pages=333–369|doi=10.1177/0010414014548104|s2cid=20079395 |issn=0010-4140}}</ref> In Argentina, quotas have mandated negative stereotypes about women politicians.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Franceschet|first1=Susan|author-link1=Susan Franceschet|last2=Piscopo|first2=Jennifer M.|date=2008|title=Gender Quotas and Women's Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina|journal=Politics & Gender|language=en|volume=4|issue=3|doi=10.1017/S1743923X08000342|s2cid=67759059 |issn=1743-923X}}</ref> Meanwhile, in India, women are more likely to win an election in a constituency that formerly had quotas, even when the quotas are removed,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bhavnani|first=Rikhil R.|date=2009|title=Do Electoral Quotas Work after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=103|issue=1|pages=23–35|doi=10.1017/S0003055409090029|s2cid=229169083 |issn=0003-0554}}</ref> and women leaders provide public goods favoured by women constituents.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Chattopadhyay|first1=Raghabendra|last2=Duflo|first2=Esther|date=2004-09-01|title=Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India|journal=Econometrica|language=en|volume=72|issue=5|pages=1409–1443|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00539.x|issn=1468-0262|hdl=1721.1/39126|url=http://s3.amazonaws.com/fieldexperiments-papers2/papers/00224.pdf |hdl-access=free}}</ref> Evidence also shows that while [[Caste system in India|caste]]-based quotas may not change stereotypes of how people view the oppressed caste group, they do change the social norms of interaction between caste groups<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Chauchard|first=Simon|date=2014|title=Can Descriptive Representation Change Beliefs about a Stigmatized Group? Evidence from Rural India|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=108|issue=2|pages=403–422|issn=0003-0554|jstor=43654380|doi=10.1017/S0003055414000033|s2cid=59025621 }}</ref>{{NoteTag|For data on gender quota adoption from 1947 to 2015, see the [https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/100918/version/V1/view Quota Adoption and Reform Over Time (QAROT)] data set.}}


=== Dyadic representation ===
=== Dyadic representation ===
Line 82: Line 88:
* [[Delegate model of representation|Delegate]] vs [[trustee model of representation]]
* [[Delegate model of representation|Delegate]] vs [[trustee model of representation]]
* [[Gerrymandering]]
* [[Gerrymandering]]
* [[Interactive representation]]
* [[Proportional Representation]]
* [[Representative democracy]]
* [[Representative democracy]]
* [[Taxation without representation]]
* [[Substantive representation]]
* [[Sortition]]
* [[Sortition]]
* [[Taxation without representation]]


==Notes==
==Notes==
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*[https://web.archive.org/web/20060414012819/http://cronkite.asu.edu/census/apportion.htm Analysis of reapportionment after the 1990 US census], from an [[Arizona State University]] website
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20060414012819/http://cronkite.asu.edu/census/apportion.htm Analysis of reapportionment after the 1990 US census], from an [[Arizona State University]] website
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Political Representation by Suzanne Dovi. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/
*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Political Representation by Suzanne Dovi. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/
*{{cite EB1911 |wstitle=Representation |volume=23 |pages=108–116 |first=Hugh |last=Chisholm |authorlink=Hugh Chisholm |short=1}}


[[Category:Comparative politics]]
[[Category:Comparative politics]]

Revision as of 08:47, 18 August 2024

Political representation is the activity of making citizens "present" in public policy-making processes when political actors act in the best interest of citizens according to Hanna Pitkin's Concept of Representation (1967).[1][2]

This definition of political representation is consistent with a wide variety of views on what representing implies and what the duties of representatives are.[3] For example, representing may imply acting on the expressed wishes of citizens, but it may alternatively imply acting according to what the representatives themselves judge is in the best interests of citizens.[3]

And representatives may be viewed as individuals who have been authorized to act on the behalf of others, or may alternatively be viewed as those who will be held to account by those they are representing.[2] Political representation can happen along different units such as social groups and area, and there are different types of representation such as substantive representation and descriptive representation.[2]

Views of political representation

Under the accountability view, a representative is an individual who will be held to account.[4] Representatives are held accountable if citizens can judge whether the representative is acting in their best interest and sanction the representative accordingly.[3] The descriptive and symbolic views of political representation describe the ways in which political representatives "stand for" the people they represent.[2] Descriptive representatives "stand for" to the extent that they resemble, in their descriptive characteristics (e.g. race, gender, class etc.), the people they represent.[5] On the other hand, symbolic representatives "stand for" the people they represent as long as those people believe in or accept them as their representative.[6] Hanna Fenichel Pitkin argues that these views of political representation give an inadequate account of political representation because they lack an account both of how representatives "act for" the represented and the normative criteria for judging representative's actions. Hence, Pitkin proposes a substantive view of representation. In this view of political representation, representation is defined as substantive "acting for", by representatives, the interests of the people they represent.[6]

In contrast, Jane Mansbridge has identified four views of democratic political representation: promissory, anticipatory, surrogate and gyroscopic. Mansbridge argues that each of these views provides an account of both how democratic political representatives "act for" the people they represent and the normative criteria for assessing the actions of representatives.[7] Promissory representation is a form of representation in which representatives are chosen and assessed based on the promises they make to the people they represent during election campaigns. For Mansbridge, promissory representation, preoccupied with how representatives are chosen (authorized) and held to account through elections, is the traditional view of democratic political representation. Anticipatory, surrogate and gyroscopic representation, on the other hand, are more modern views that have emerged from the work of empirical political scientists. Anticipatory representatives take actions that they believe voters (the represented) will reward in the next election. Surrogate representation occurs when representatives "act for" the interest of people outside their constituencies. Finally, in gyroscopic representation, representatives use their own judgements to determine how and for what they should act for on behalf of the people they represent.[1]

Under Andrew Rehfeld's general theory of representation, a person is considered a representative as long as the particular group they represent judges them as such.[8] In any case of political representation, there are representatives, the represented, a selection agent, a relevant audience and rules by which the relevant judge whether a person is a representative.[8] Representatives are those who are selected by a selection agent from a larger set of qualified individuals who are then judged to representatives by a relevant audience using particular rules of judgement. The rules by which a relevant audience judges whether a person is a representative can be either democratic or non-democratic. In a case where the selection agent, relevant audience and the represented are the same and the rules of judgment are democratic (e.g. elections), the familiar democratic case of political representation arises and where they are not, undemocratic cases arise.

Units of representation

Representation by population

This is the preferred (and far more common) method for democratic countries, where elected representatives will be chosen by similarly-sized groups of voters. The shortened term "rep-by-pop" is used in Canada[9][10] whereas "one person, one vote" is more common in the U.S.[11][12]

Representation by area

This form of representation tends to occur as a political necessity for unifying many independent actors, such as in a federation (e.g. NATO, the UN). It's highly unusual (and controversial) where it exists within countries because of its violation of the 'one person, one vote' principle. Examples of representation by area within countries tend to be historical remnants of when those countries were federations before their unification. For example, the American Constitution was not quite able to eliminate its rep-by-area features due to smaller states already holding disproportionate power in the proceedings from the Articles of Confederation. In Canada, provinces such as Prince Edward Island also have unequal representation in Parliament (in the Commons as well as the Senate) relative to Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta, largely for similar historical reasons.

Models of representation

Models of representation refer to ways in which elected officials behave in representative democracies. There are three main types: delegate, trustee, and politico.

Delegate model

A delegate is someone who is elected to represent and convey the views of others. The delegate model of representation suggests that representatives have little or no capacity to exercise their own judgement or preferences. They are merely elected to be the mouthpiece of their constituency and act only the way their constituents would want them to, regardless of their own opinion.

Joseph Tussman stated, "The essence of representation is the delegation or granting of authority. To authorize a representative is to grant another the right to act for oneself. Within the limits of the grant of authority one is, in fact, committing himself in advance to the decision or will of another".[13]

Trustee model

A trustee is someone who acts on behalf of others, using their knowledge, experience and intelligence upon a certain field. The trustee model contrasts with the delegate model as this time constituents "entrust" their elected representatives to represent them however they see fit, with autonomy to vote and behave in the best way for their constituents.

Edmund Burke, who formulated the model, stated in a speech, "You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him he is not member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament...your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your own opinion".[14]

Politico model

The politico model came about when theorists recognized that representatives rarely consistently act as just a delegate or just a trustee when representing their constituents. It is a hybrid of the two models discussed above and involves representatives acting as delegates and trustees, depending on the issue.

Other models

The mandate model views representatives as less independent actors. This came about after the emergence of modern political parties; now constituents rarely vote for a representative based on their personal qualities but more broadly, they vote for their party to be elected into government. A mandate is an order or instruction from a superior body therefore this model suggests representatives follow the party line and must carry out policies outlined during election campaigns.[15]

The resemblance model is less concerned about the way representatives are selected and more concerned whether they resemble the group they claim to represent. It is similar to descriptive representation, they argue that to represent a group of people such as the working class or women to its full potential you must be part of that social group yourself. Therefore, only people who have shared experiences and interests can fully identify with particular issues.[16]

Types of representation

An alternative way of considering types of representation is as follows:

Substantive representation

Substantive representation occurs when representatives' opinions and actions reflect the wishes, needs, and interests of the people they represent.[17] Democratic theorists often study substantive representation in terms of ideological congruence, meaning that representation is high when representatives hold the same policy positions as their constituents.[18] Recent research shows that the ideological opinion-policy relationship is upheld for both foreign and domestic affairs, although foreign affairs and defense policy were long considered immune to public pressure.[19] According to Hanna F. Pitkin's The Concept of Representation (1967), the standard for assessing the quality of substantive representation is the representative's responsiveness to the evolving needs of their citizenry.[20] As a result, low substantive representation in representative democracies usually arises from representatives' inability to judge and act on the interests of the public rather than inactivity in office.[21] Pitkin also argues that substantive representation should be apparent through the nature of government action between elections.[22] Thus, substantive representation is predicated on the fact that democracy is evident between elections rather than isolated to formal procedures like voting.[23]

Recently, Pitkin's concept of substantive representation has been criticized by several political scientists on the grounds that it "assumes a static notion that interests are entities waiting to be brought into the representational process."[24] Among these scholars is Michael Saward (2010), who argues that substantive representation should be constructed as a process of "claims-making" in which representatives "speak for" their constituents.[25] However, Ellie Severs (2012) disparages this logic, as she claims it obscures the interactions between representatives and the represented that are essential to the substantive representation process.[26]

Substantive representation is not a universally accepted concept; minimalist theorists like Adam Przeworski (1999) reject the idea that representatives can be driven to act in the best interests of the public.[27] In contrast to substantive representation, minimalists believe that democracy is merely a system in which competitive elections select rulers and that democracies should be defended regardless of the outcomes they produce for their citizenry.[28] Nonetheless, democratic theorists often consider substantive representation to be salient due to its emphasis on action in office, particularly in relation to the interests of women and ethnic minorities.[18]

Descriptive representation

Scholars have defined representation as "the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact".[29] Descriptive representation is the idea that a group elects an individual to represent them who in their own characteristics mirror some of the more frequent experiences and outward manifestations of the group.[30] This descriptive representation can have again different types such as "perfect over representation", "over representation", "proper representation", "under/nominal representation" & "No representation".[31] In this form of representation, representatives are in their own persons and lives in some sense typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent.[32] For example, certain ethnic groups or gender-based groups may want to elect a leader that shares these descriptive characteristics as they may be politically relevant. Disadvantaged groups may gain benefit from descriptive representation primarily in two ways:

  1. When there is mistrust: This refers to a situation where communication between the group and its representatives has been inadequate.[30] In these cases, descriptive representation promotes vertical communication between representatives and their group of constituents.[30]
  2. When interests are uncrystallized: In certain historical moments, citizen interests are not clearly defined. Either the issues have not been on the political agenda for long, or candidates have not taken public positions on them.[30] In this case, the best way to have one's substantive interests represented is often to choose a descriptive representative whose characteristics match one's own.[32]

Descriptive representation can be instituted by political parties independently where they set aside a certain number of party seats for particular groups.[33] It can also be instituted through national electoral quotas either by reserving seats for office or candidate quotas for political parties.[33]

Traditionally, quotas have been thought of as a way of providing adequate representation for previously disadvantaged groups such as women or oppressed ethnic groups.[30] However, another way of conceptualizing quotas is to institute a maximum or ceiling quota for advantaged groups.[34] This may improve the meritocracy of the system and improve the process of candidate selection[34]

Empirically, quotas show mixed results. In Lesotho, quota-mandated female representation has had no effect or even reduced several dimensions of women's engagement with local politics.[35] In Argentina, quotas have mandated negative stereotypes about women politicians.[36] Meanwhile, in India, women are more likely to win an election in a constituency that formerly had quotas, even when the quotas are removed,[37] and women leaders provide public goods favoured by women constituents.[38] Evidence also shows that while caste-based quotas may not change stereotypes of how people view the oppressed caste group, they do change the social norms of interaction between caste groups[39][note 1]

Dyadic representation

Dyadic representation refers to the degree to which and ways by which elected legislators represent the preferences or interests of the specific geographic constituencies from which they are elected. Candidates who run for legislative office in an individual constituency or as a member of a list of party candidates are especially motivated to provide dyadic representation. As Carey and Shugart (1995, 417) observe, they have "incentives to cultivate a personal vote" beyond whatever support their party label will produce. Personal vote seeking might arise from representing the public policy interests of the constituency (by way of either the delegate, responsible party, or trustee models noted above), providing it "pork barrel" goods, offering service to individual constituents as by helping them acquire government services, and symbolic actions.

The most abundant scientific scholarship on dyadic representation has been for the U.S. Congress and for policy representation of constituencies by the members of the Congress. Miller and Stokes (1963) presented the seminal research of this kind in an exploratory effort to account for when alternative models of policy representation arise. Their work has been emulated, replicated, and enlarged by a host of subsequent studies. The most advanced theoretical formulation in this body of work, however, is by Hurley and Hill (2003) and by Hill, Jordan, and Hurley (2015) who present a theory that accounts well for when belief sharing representation, delegate representation, trustee representation, responsible party representation, and party elite led representation will arise.

Collective representation

The concept of collective representation can be found in various normative theory and scientific works, but Weissberg (1978, 535) offered the first systematic characterization of it in the scientific literature and for the U.S. Congress, defining such representation as "Whether Congress as an institution represents the American people, not whether each member of Congress represented his or her particular district." Hurley (1982) elaborated and qualified Weissberg's explication of how such representation should be assessed and how it relates to dyadic representation. Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995), offer the most advanced theoretical exposition of such representation for the U.S. Congress. And the latter work was extended in Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002).

In most parliamentary political systems with strong (or ideologically unified) political parties and where the election system is dominated by parties instead of individual candidates, the primary basis for representation is also a collective, party based one. The foundational work on assessing such representation is that of Huber and Powell (1994) and Powell (2000).

See also

Notes

  1. ^ For data on gender quota adoption from 1947 to 2015, see the Quota Adoption and Reform Over Time (QAROT) data set.

References

  1. ^ a b Dovi, Suzanne (2018). Political Representation. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition). Retrieved 19 November 2019.
  2. ^ a b c d Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel (1967). The concept of representation. Berkeley. ISBN 0520021568. OCLC 498382.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  3. ^ a b c Democracy, accountability, and representation. Przeworski, Adam., Stokes, Susan Carol., Manin, Bernard. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 1999. ISBN 9781139175104. OCLC 817932765.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: others (link)
  4. ^ Pitkin, Hanna (1967). The Concept of Representation. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. pp. 38–39, 55. ISBN 978-0520021563.
  5. ^ Pitkin, Hanna (1967). The Concept of Representation. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. p. 63. ISBN 978-0520021563.
  6. ^ a b Pitkin, Hanna (1967). The Concept of Representation. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. p. 174. ISBN 978-0520021563.
  7. ^ Mansbridge, Jane (Nov 2003). "Rethinking Representation". The American Political Science Review. 97 (4): 515–528. doi:10.1017/S0003055403000856. JSTOR 359302. S2CID 210059562.
  8. ^ a b Rehfeld, Andrew (2006). "Toward a General Theory of Political Representation". The Journal of Politics. 68: 1–21. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.528.5810. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00365.x. S2CID 96451393.
  9. ^ "rep by pop". Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford University Press. Retrieved 7 November 2023.
  10. ^ "Rep by Pop". The Canadian Encyclopedia. Anthony Wilson-Smith. 12 December 2019.
  11. ^ "One Person, One Vote". The Constitution Project. the documentary group. 2017. Retrieved 7 November 2023.
  12. ^ Text of Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) is available from: Findlaw Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)
  13. ^ Tussman, Joseph (1947). The Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes. Unpul. diss. p. 117.
  14. ^ "Representation: Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol". press-pubs.uchicago.edu. Retrieved 2018-12-07.
  15. ^ Heywood, Andrew (2013). Politics. New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. p. 200.
  16. ^ Heywood, Andrew (2013). Politics. New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. pp. 201–202.
  17. ^ [Arnesen, Sveinung, and Yvette Peters. “The Legitimacy of Representation: How Descriptive, Formal, and Responsiveness Representation Affect the Acceptability of Political Decisions.” Comparative Political Studies 51, no. 7 (2017): 873. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017720702.]
  18. ^ a b [Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder. “Chapter 14: Consequences of Democratic Institutions.” Essay. In Foundations of Comparative Politics, 357. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2019.]
  19. ^ [Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. “Studying Substantive Democracy.” PS: Political Science and Politics 27, no. 1 (March 1994): 10. https://doi.org/10.2307/420450.]
  20. ^ [Celis, Karen. “On Substantive Representation, Diversity, and Responsiveness.” Cambridge University Press 8, no. 4 (December 12, 2012): 525. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X12000542.]
  21. ^ [ Kuper, Andrew. “Representation as Responsiveness.” Essay. In Democracy beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global Institutions, 77. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004.]
  22. ^ [Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. “Studying Substantive Democracy.” PS: Political Science and Politics 27, no. 1 (March 1994): 11. https://doi.org/10.2307/420450.]
  23. ^ [ Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. “Studying Substantive Democracy.” PS: Political Science and Politics 27, no. 1 (March 1994): 11. https://doi.org/10.2307/420450.]
  24. ^ [Celis, Karen. “On Substantive Representation, Diversity, and Responsiveness.” Cambridge University Press 8, no. 4 (December 12, 2012): 527. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X12000542.]
  25. ^ [Severs, Eline. “Substantive Representation through a Claims-Making Lens: A Strategy for the Identification and Analysis of Substantive Claims.” Representation 48, no. 2 (2012): 171. https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2012.683491.]
  26. ^ [Severs, Eline. “Substantive Representation through a Claims-Making Lens: A Strategy for the Identification and Analysis of Substantive Claims.” Representation 48, no. 2 (2012): 178. https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2012.683491.]
  27. ^ [Kuper, Andrew. “Representation as Responsiveness.” Essay. In Democracy beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global Institutions, 98. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004.]
  28. ^ [Shapiro, Ian, Casiano Hacker-Cordón, and Adam Przeworski . “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense.” Essay. In Democracy's Value, 12–17. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2005.]
  29. ^ Pitkin, Hanna (1967). The Concept of Representation. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. p. 8.
  30. ^ a b c d e Mansbridge, Jane (1999). "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent "Yes"". The Journal of Politics. 61 (3): 628–657. doi:10.2307/2647821. ISSN 0022-3816. JSTOR 2647821. S2CID 37133536.
  31. ^ Baniamin, Hasan Muhammad; Jamil, Ishtiaq (2021-06-13). "Effects of representative bureaucracy on perceived performance and fairness: Experimental evidence from South Asia". Public Administration. 101: 284–302. doi:10.1111/padm.12758. S2CID 236301887.
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