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{{Short description|Distribution of power within an organisational structure}}
{{Short description|Distribution of power within an organisational structure}}
{{Communism sidebar|expanded=Concepts}}


In [[communist]] and [[socialist]] theory, '''collective leadership''' is a shared distribution of power within an organizational structure.
In [[communist]] and [[socialist]] theory, '''collective leadership''' is a shared distribution of power within an organizational structure.


==Communist examples==
==Communist / Marxist–Leninist examples==
{{Communism sidebar|expanded=Concepts}}
{{Socialism sidebar}}

===China===
===China===
{{See also|Generations of Chinese leadership}}
{{See also|Generations of Chinese leadership}}
Collective leadership in the [[People's Republic of China]] (PRC) and the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) is generally considered to have begun with reformist [[Deng Xiaoping]] in the late 1970s during the same time period as the [[Chinese economic reform]], who tried to encourage the [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Politburo Standing Committee]] to rule by consensus in order to prevent a resurgence of [[autocracy]] under [[Maoism|Maoist rule]]. [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP general secretary]] [[Jiang Zemin]] formally established himself as the "[[Primus inter pares|first among equals]]". Some political analysts has alleged that this era of collective leadership has been said to end with [[Xi Jinping]], following the abolition of [[term limits]] in 2018 under his tenure.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Holtz |first1=Michael |title=Xi for life? China turns its back on collective leadership. |url=https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2018/0228/Xi-for-life-China-turns-its-back-on-collective-leadership |access-date=23 June 2018 |work=Christian Science Monitor |date=28 February 2018}}</ref>
{{Politics of China |expanded = Leadership }}
Collective leadership in [[China]] and [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) is generally considered to have begun with [[Deng Xiaoping]] in the late 1970s, who tried to encourage the [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Politburo Standing Committee]] to rule by consensus in order to prevent the authoritarianism of [[Mao Zedong|Maoist rule]]. [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP general secretary]] [[Jiang Zemin]] formally established himself as the "[[Primus inter pares|first among equals]]". This era of collective leadership has been said to end with [[Xi Jinping]], following the abolition of [[term limits]] in 2018 under his tenure.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Holtz |first1=Michael |title=Xi for life? China turns its back on collective leadership. |url=https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2018/0228/Xi-for-life-China-turns-its-back-on-collective-leadership |access-date=23 June 2018 |work=Christian Science Monitor |date=28 February 2018}}</ref>


Xi has taken deliberate steps to establish his personal dominance within the Chinese political system, effectively rising above his peers in the Politburo Standing Committee. He has done so by creating key bodies such as the National Security Commission, which holds sway over party, state, and military organizations. Furthermore, Xi heads the Small Leadership Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reform, a pivotal entity responsible for designing and executing various reform initiatives. His leadership of this group underscores his intention to personally oversee institutional reforms. Xi has also made it clear that he will have the final say in economic and financial matters, foregoing the tradition of shared responsibility with the Premier. Consequently, Xi's purview now extends to encompass military affairs, security, foreign policy, economic reform, state-building, economic policymaking, and social governance.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wang, Zeng |first1=Zhengxu, Jinghan |title=Xi Jinping: the game changer of Chinese elite politics? |journal=Contemporary Politics |date=April 28, 2016 |volume=22 |issue=4 |page=469 |doi=10.1080/13569775.2016.1175098}}</ref> This concentration of power has led to concerns that Xi's actions might be undermining essential party norms and pushing China toward a more personalistic dictatorship, a notion reinforced by the party machine and state media's vigorous promotion of his image and authority through various channels such as publishing his speeches and writings, public appearances, and the creation of cartoons portraying him as a strong leader.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Osnos |first1=Evan |title=Born Red |url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red |website=Profiles |publisher=The New York Times}}</ref>
Xi has taken deliberate steps to establish his personal dominance within the Chinese political system, effectively rising above his peers in the Politburo Standing Committee. He has done so by creating key bodies such as the National Security Commission, which holds sway over party, state, and military organizations.{{cn|date=July 2024}} Furthermore, Xi heads the Small Leadership Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reform, a pivotal entity responsible for designing and executing various reform initiatives. His leadership of this group underscores his intention to personally oversee institutional reforms.{{cn|date=July 2024}}


Xi has also made it clear that he will have the final say in economic and financial matters, foregoing the tradition of shared responsibility with the Premier. Consequently, Xi's purview now extends to encompass military affairs, security, foreign policy, economic reform, state-building, economic policymaking, and social governance.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wang, Zeng |first1=Zhengxu, Jinghan |title=Xi Jinping: the game changer of Chinese elite politics? |journal=Contemporary Politics |date=April 28, 2016 |volume=22 |issue=4 |page=469 |doi=10.1080/13569775.2016.1175098}}</ref> This concentration of power has led to concerns that Xi's actions might be undermining essential party norms and pushing China toward a more personalistic dictatorship, a notion reinforced by the party machine and state media's vigorous promotion of his image and authority through various channels such as publishing his speeches and writings, public appearances, and the creation of cartoons portraying him as a strong leader.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Osnos |first1=Evan |title=Born Red |url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red |website=Profiles |publisher=The New York Times}}</ref>
Currently, the central authority of the [[Government of China|Chinese government]] and CCP is concentrated in the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, which is composed of seven members of the Communist Party and headed by the CCP general secretary.<ref>[http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20121018000019&cid=1101 "New Politburo Standing Committee decided: Mingjing News"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130115173111/http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20121018000019&cid=1101 |date=2013-01-15 }}. ''Want China Times''. 18 October 2012. Retrieved 2 January 2013.</ref>


The position of CCP general secretary has become more powerful in Xi Jinping's [[Xi Jinping Administration|administration]].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Economy|first=Elizabeth C.|title=The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State|date=2018-04-04|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-086608-2|language=en|oclc=1048621221}}</ref>
Currently, the central authority of the [[Government of China|Chinese government]] and CCP is concentrated in the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, which is composed of seven members of the Communist Party and headed by the CCP general secretary.<ref>[http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20121018000019&cid=1101 "New Politburo Standing Committee decided: Mingjing News"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130115173111/http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20121018000019&cid=1101 |date=2013-01-15 }}. ''Want China Times''. 18 October 2012. Retrieved 2 January 2013.</ref> Nevertheless, while the CCP ''[[de jure]]'' maintains collective leadership of government, the position of the CCP general secretary has palpably become more powerful under [[Xi Jinping Administration|Xi's administration]], with him being the most powerful paramount leader since [[Mao Zedong]].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Economy|first=Elizabeth C.|title=The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State|date=2018-04-04|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-086608-2|language=en|oclc=1048621221}}</ref>


===Vietnam===
===Vietnam===
In [[Vietnam]], when the country was ruled by [[Lê Duẩn]], collective leadership involved powers being distributed from the office of [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam|General Secretary of the Communist Party]] and shared with the Politburo Standing Committee while still retaining one ruler.
In the [[Socialist Republic of Vietnam]] (SRV) under the [[Communist Party of Vietnam]] (CPV), when the country was ruled by [[Lê Duẩn]], collective leadership involved powers being distributed from the office of [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam|General Secretary of the Communist Party]] and shared with the Politburo Standing Committee while still retaining one ruler.{{cn|date=July 2024}}


Nowadays, in [[Vietnam]] there is not one paramount leader, and power is shared by the General Secretary, [[President of Vietnam|President]] and the [[Prime Minister of Vietnam|Prime Minister]] along with collegial bodies such as the [[Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam|Politburo]], [[Secretariat of the Communist Party of Vietnam|Secretariat]] and the [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam|Central Committee]].
Today, there is not one paramount leader in Vietnam; power is shared between the General Secretary, [[President of Vietnam|President]] and the [[Prime Minister of Vietnam|Prime Minister]] along with collegial bodies such as the [[Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam|Politburo]], [[Secretariat of the Communist Party of Vietnam|Secretariat]] and the [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam|Central Committee]].{{cn|date=July 2024}}


===Soviet Union===
===Soviet Union===
{{main|Collective leadership in the Soviet Union}}
{{main|Collective leadership in the Soviet Union}}
Collective leadership ({{lang-ru|коллективное руководство}}, ''{{transliteration|ru|kollektivnoye rukovodstvo}}'') or Collectivity of leadership ({{lang-ru|коллективность руководства}}, ''{{transliteration|ru|kollektivnost rukovodstva}}''), was considered an ideal form of governance in the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]] (USSR). Its main task was to distribute powers and functions among the [[Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Politburo]], the [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Central Committee]], and the [[Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union|Council of Ministers]] to hinder any attempts to create a [[Autocracy|one-man dominance]] over the Soviet political system by a Soviet leader, such as that seen under [[Joseph Stalin]]'s [[Stalin era|rule]]. On the national level, the heart of the collective leadership was officially the Central Committee of the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Communist Party]], but in practice, was the Politburo. Collective leadership is characterized by limiting the powers of the [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary]] and the [[Premier of the Soviet Union|Chairman of the Council of Ministers]] (Premier) as related to other offices by enhancing the powers of collective bodies, such as the Politburo.
Collective leadership ({{lang-ru|коллективное руководство}}, ''{{transliteration|ru|kollektivnoye rukovodstvo}}'') or Collectivity of leadership ({{lang-ru|коллективность руководства}}, ''{{transliteration|ru|kollektivnost rukovodstva}}''), was considered an ideal form of governance in the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]] (USSR) under the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU). Its main task was to distribute powers and functions among the [[Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Politburo]], the [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Central Committee]], and the [[Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union|Council of Ministers]] to hinder any attempts to create a [[Autocracy|one-man dominance]] over the Soviet political system by a Soviet leader, such as that seen under [[Joseph Stalin]]'s [[Stalin era|rule]]. On the national level, the heart of the collective leadership was officially the Central Committee of the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Communist Party]], but in practice, was the Politburo. Collective leadership is characterized by limiting the powers of the [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary]] and the [[Premier of the Soviet Union|Chairman of the Council of Ministers]] (Premier) as related to other offices by enhancing the powers of collective bodies, such as the Politburo.{{cn|date=July 2024}}


[[Lenin]] was, according to [[Russian literature#20th century|Soviet literature]]{{Broken anchor|date=2024-06-02|bot=User:Cewbot/log/20201008/configuration|target_link=Russian literature#20th century|reason= The anchor (20th century) [[Special:Diff/1224719212|has been deleted]].}}, the perfect example of a leader ruling in favour of the collective. Stalin was also claimed to embody this style of ruling, with most major policy decisions involving lengthy discussion and debate in the politburo and/or central committee; after [[Stalin's death|his death]] in 1953, [[Nikita Khrushchev]] [[On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences|accused Stalin]] of [[Cult of personality|one-man dominance]], leading to controversy surrounding the period of his rule. At the [[20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|20th Party Congress]], Stalin's reign was criticized by Khrushchev as a "personality cult". As Stalin's successor, Khrushchev supported the ideal of collective leadership but [[Khrushchev's USSR|increasingly ruled in an autocratic fashion]], his anti-Stalin accusations followed by much the same behaviour which led to accusations of hypocrisy. In 1964, Khrushchev was ousted and replaced by [[Leonid Brezhnev]] as General Secretary and by [[Alexei Kosygin]] as Premier. Collective leadership was strengthened during the [[Brezhnev's USSR|Brezhnev years]] and the [[History of the Soviet Union (1982–1991)#Leadership transition|later reigns]] of [[Yuri Andropov]] and [[Konstantin Chernenko]]. [[Mikhail Gorbachev]]'s [[History of the Soviet Union (1982–1991)#Ousting the old guard|reforms]] helped spawn factionalism within the Soviet leadership, and members of Gorbachev's faction openly disagreed with him on key issues. The factions usually disagreed on how little or how much reform was needed to rejuvenate the [[Politics of the Soviet Union|Soviet system]].
[[Vladimir Lenin]] was, according to [[Russian literature#20th century|Soviet literature]]{{Broken anchor|date=2024-06-02|bot=User:Cewbot/log/20201008/configuration|target_link=Russian literature#20th century|reason= The anchor (20th century) [[Special:Diff/1224719212|has been deleted]].}}, the perfect example of a leader ruling in favour of the collective. Stalin was also claimed to embody this style of ruling, with most major policy decisions involving lengthy discussion and debate in the politburo and/or central committee; after [[Stalin's death|his death]] in 1953, [[Nikita Khrushchev]] [[On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences|accused Stalin]] of [[Cult of personality|one-man dominance]], leading to controversy surrounding the period of his rule. At the [[20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|20th Party Congress]], Stalin's reign was criticized by Khrushchev as a "personality cult". As Stalin's successor, Khrushchev supported the ideal of collective leadership but [[Khrushchev's USSR|increasingly ruled in an autocratic fashion]], his anti-Stalin accusations followed by much the same behaviour which led to accusations of hypocrisy. In 1964, Khrushchev was ousted and replaced by [[Leonid Brezhnev]] as General Secretary and by [[Alexei Kosygin]] as Premier. Collective leadership was strengthened during the [[Brezhnev's USSR|Brezhnev years]] and the [[History of the Soviet Union (1982–1991)#Leadership transition|later reigns]] of [[Yuri Andropov]] and [[Konstantin Chernenko]]. [[Mikhail Gorbachev]]'s [[History of the Soviet Union (1982–1991)#Ousting the old guard|reforms]] helped spawn factionalism within the Soviet leadership, and members of Gorbachev's faction openly disagreed with him on key issues. The factions usually disagreed on how little or how much reform was needed to rejuvenate the [[Politics of the Soviet Union|Soviet system]].{{cn|date=July 2024}}


==Other examples in left-wing parties==
==Other examples in left-wing to far-left parties==
[[Green party|Green]] and [[Socialism|socialist]] parties often practice collective leadership, either through male and female co-leaders or through several co-spokespersons. This practice is often justified by the Green movement's emphasis on [[consensus decision making]] and gender balance.
Aside from [[Marxist–Leninist state]]s, [[left-wing]] to [[far-left]] [[Green party|green]] and [[Socialism|socialist]] parties in [[liberal democracies]] often also practice collective leadership under socialist ideals, either through male and female co-leaders or through several co-spokespersons. For green parties, this practice is often justified by their movement's emphasis on [[consensus decision making]] and [[gender equality]].
* [[Alliance 90/The Greens]]: the Federal Executive is divided between two co-equal spokespersons, a political director, treasurer, and two vice-chairs.
* [[Alliance 90/The Greens]]: the Federal Executive is divided between two co-equal spokespersons, a political director, treasurer, and two vice-chairs.
* [[Québec solidaire]] divides its leadership among its president, secretary-general, and male and female spokespersons
* [[Québec solidaire]] divides its leadership among its president, secretary-general, and male and female spokespersons
* [[Green Party of England and Wales]]: from 1990 to 1991, the GPE&W practiced co-leadership among six spokespersons, and from 1991-2008, the GPEW practiced it through a male and female spokesperson. After Caroline Lucas was elected the party's first sole leader and deputy leader in 2008, collective leadership was in hiatus until 2016, when the party leadership was once again divided between male and female co-leaders under a job-share agreement while retaining a deputy leader.
* [[Green Party of England and Wales]]: from 1990 to 1991, the GPE&W practiced co-leadership among six spokespersons, and from 1991 to 2008, the GPEW practiced it through a male and female spokesperson. After Caroline Lucas was elected the party's first sole leader and deputy leader in 2008, collective leadership was in hiatus until 2016, when the party leadership was once again divided between male and female co-leaders under a job-share agreement while retaining a deputy leader.
* [[Left Bloc (Portugal)]]: formally, it has always had a collective leadership as provided for in its by-laws and no one-person office has ever been recognised. However, in practice, there has always been a single prominent figure (''coordinator'', 1999-2012 and 2016-; ''spokesperson'', 2014-2016), except for between 2012 and 2014, when it had a de facto co-leadership between a male and a female apart from the legal structures. From 2014 to 2016, there was an informal collective and gender-balanced leadership of six people on top of the existing bodies, with a member serving as the party's spokesperson.
* [[Left Bloc (Portugal)]]: formally, it has always had a collective leadership as provided for in its by-laws and no one-person office has ever been recognised. However, in practice, there has always been a single prominent figure (''coordinator'', 1999-2012 and 2016-; ''spokesperson'', 2014–2016), except for between 2012 and 2014, when it had a de facto co-leadership between a male and a female apart from the legal structures. From 2014 to 2016, there was an informal collective and gender-balanced leadership of six people on top of the existing bodies, with a member serving as the party's spokesperson.
* [[Scottish Green Party]]: began to practice collective leadership in 2004 with the election of a male and a female co-convenor.
* [[Scottish Green Party]]: began to practice collective leadership in 2004 with the election of a male and a female co-convenor.
* [[New Popular Front]]: A broad left-wing electoral alliance of political parties in France.
* [[New Popular Front]]: A broad left-wing electoral alliance of political parties in France.

Revision as of 02:28, 9 July 2024

In communist and socialist theory, collective leadership is a shared distribution of power within an organizational structure.

Communist / Marxist–Leninist examples

China

Collective leadership in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is generally considered to have begun with reformist Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s during the same time period as the Chinese economic reform, who tried to encourage the CCP Politburo Standing Committee to rule by consensus in order to prevent a resurgence of autocracy under Maoist rule. CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin formally established himself as the "first among equals". Some political analysts has alleged that this era of collective leadership has been said to end with Xi Jinping, following the abolition of term limits in 2018 under his tenure.[1]

Xi has taken deliberate steps to establish his personal dominance within the Chinese political system, effectively rising above his peers in the Politburo Standing Committee. He has done so by creating key bodies such as the National Security Commission, which holds sway over party, state, and military organizations.[citation needed] Furthermore, Xi heads the Small Leadership Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reform, a pivotal entity responsible for designing and executing various reform initiatives. His leadership of this group underscores his intention to personally oversee institutional reforms.[citation needed]

Xi has also made it clear that he will have the final say in economic and financial matters, foregoing the tradition of shared responsibility with the Premier. Consequently, Xi's purview now extends to encompass military affairs, security, foreign policy, economic reform, state-building, economic policymaking, and social governance.[2] This concentration of power has led to concerns that Xi's actions might be undermining essential party norms and pushing China toward a more personalistic dictatorship, a notion reinforced by the party machine and state media's vigorous promotion of his image and authority through various channels such as publishing his speeches and writings, public appearances, and the creation of cartoons portraying him as a strong leader.[3]

Currently, the central authority of the Chinese government and CCP is concentrated in the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, which is composed of seven members of the Communist Party and headed by the CCP general secretary.[4] Nevertheless, while the CCP de jure maintains collective leadership of government, the position of the CCP general secretary has palpably become more powerful under Xi's administration, with him being the most powerful paramount leader since Mao Zedong.[5]

Vietnam

In the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) under the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), when the country was ruled by Lê Duẩn, collective leadership involved powers being distributed from the office of General Secretary of the Communist Party and shared with the Politburo Standing Committee while still retaining one ruler.[citation needed]

Today, there is not one paramount leader in Vietnam; power is shared between the General Secretary, President and the Prime Minister along with collegial bodies such as the Politburo, Secretariat and the Central Committee.[citation needed]

Soviet Union

Collective leadership (Russian: коллективное руководство, kollektivnoye rukovodstvo) or Collectivity of leadership (Russian: коллективность руководства, kollektivnost rukovodstva), was considered an ideal form of governance in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Its main task was to distribute powers and functions among the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Council of Ministers to hinder any attempts to create a one-man dominance over the Soviet political system by a Soviet leader, such as that seen under Joseph Stalin's rule. On the national level, the heart of the collective leadership was officially the Central Committee of the Communist Party, but in practice, was the Politburo. Collective leadership is characterized by limiting the powers of the General Secretary and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier) as related to other offices by enhancing the powers of collective bodies, such as the Politburo.[citation needed]

Vladimir Lenin was, according to Soviet literature[broken anchor], the perfect example of a leader ruling in favour of the collective. Stalin was also claimed to embody this style of ruling, with most major policy decisions involving lengthy discussion and debate in the politburo and/or central committee; after his death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev accused Stalin of one-man dominance, leading to controversy surrounding the period of his rule. At the 20th Party Congress, Stalin's reign was criticized by Khrushchev as a "personality cult". As Stalin's successor, Khrushchev supported the ideal of collective leadership but increasingly ruled in an autocratic fashion, his anti-Stalin accusations followed by much the same behaviour which led to accusations of hypocrisy. In 1964, Khrushchev was ousted and replaced by Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary and by Alexei Kosygin as Premier. Collective leadership was strengthened during the Brezhnev years and the later reigns of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms helped spawn factionalism within the Soviet leadership, and members of Gorbachev's faction openly disagreed with him on key issues. The factions usually disagreed on how little or how much reform was needed to rejuvenate the Soviet system.[citation needed]

Other examples in left-wing to far-left parties

Aside from Marxist–Leninist states, left-wing to far-left green and socialist parties in liberal democracies often also practice collective leadership under socialist ideals, either through male and female co-leaders or through several co-spokespersons. For green parties, this practice is often justified by their movement's emphasis on consensus decision making and gender equality.

  • Alliance 90/The Greens: the Federal Executive is divided between two co-equal spokespersons, a political director, treasurer, and two vice-chairs.
  • Québec solidaire divides its leadership among its president, secretary-general, and male and female spokespersons
  • Green Party of England and Wales: from 1990 to 1991, the GPE&W practiced co-leadership among six spokespersons, and from 1991 to 2008, the GPEW practiced it through a male and female spokesperson. After Caroline Lucas was elected the party's first sole leader and deputy leader in 2008, collective leadership was in hiatus until 2016, when the party leadership was once again divided between male and female co-leaders under a job-share agreement while retaining a deputy leader.
  • Left Bloc (Portugal): formally, it has always had a collective leadership as provided for in its by-laws and no one-person office has ever been recognised. However, in practice, there has always been a single prominent figure (coordinator, 1999-2012 and 2016-; spokesperson, 2014–2016), except for between 2012 and 2014, when it had a de facto co-leadership between a male and a female apart from the legal structures. From 2014 to 2016, there was an informal collective and gender-balanced leadership of six people on top of the existing bodies, with a member serving as the party's spokesperson.
  • Scottish Green Party: began to practice collective leadership in 2004 with the election of a male and a female co-convenor.
  • New Popular Front: A broad left-wing electoral alliance of political parties in France.
  • Green Party of the United States: the Green National Committee's steering committee is a collective leadership of seven co-chairs, as well as a secretary and a treasurer.
  • The Left (Germany): the party executive consists of an elected 44-member committee, headed by a 12-member executive board comprising two party chairpeople, four deputy chairs, a national secretary, treasurer, and four other members.
  • International Socialist Alternative: The leading body of the ISA is the World Congress, which elects an International Committee (IC) to govern between congresses. The IC then appoints an International Executive (IE) body which is responsible for the day-to-day work of the International.
  • Several Irish left-wing parties have collective leadership:

Directorial government

The Directorial system is a system of government in which executive power is held by a group of people who operate under a system of collegiality.[10] While there may be a nominal leader, the post is considered to be ceremonial or a first among equals and it typically rotates among its members.

References

  1. ^ Holtz, Michael (28 February 2018). "Xi for life? China turns its back on collective leadership". Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 23 June 2018.
  2. ^ Wang, Zeng, Zhengxu, Jinghan (April 28, 2016). "Xi Jinping: the game changer of Chinese elite politics?". Contemporary Politics. 22 (4): 469. doi:10.1080/13569775.2016.1175098.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  3. ^ Osnos, Evan. "Born Red". Profiles. The New York Times.
  4. ^ "New Politburo Standing Committee decided: Mingjing News" Archived 2013-01-15 at the Wayback Machine. Want China Times. 18 October 2012. Retrieved 2 January 2013.
  5. ^ Economy, Elizabeth C. (2018-04-04). The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-086608-2. OCLC 1048621221.
  6. ^ "Party Profiles: People Before Profit/Solidarity". Ireland Elects. Archived from the original on 2022-11-27. Retrieved 2022-12-29.
  7. ^ Ireland Mineral, Mining Sector Investment and Business Guide Volume 1 Strategic Information and Regulations. Lulu.com. February 7, 2007. ISBN 9781433025129 – via Google Books.
  8. ^ Agency, Central Intelligence (May 8, 2018). The CIA World Factbook 2018-2019. Simon and Schuster. ISBN 9781510740280 – via Google Books.
  9. ^ "Ireland".
  10. ^ Popović, Dragoljub (2019-08-30). Directorial government. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78990-075-0.

Further reading