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{{Short description|Metric to measure the Irish economy by excluding globalisation effects}}
{{distinguish|Gross national income}}
{{distinguish|Gross national income}}
[[File:THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND (NEW HEADQUARTER BUILDING ON NORTH WALL QUAY)- ALONG BOTANIC AVENUE (JANUARY 2018)-135339 (27856990779).jpg|thumb|The [[Central Bank of Ireland]] in Dublin's [[International Financial Services Centre, Dublin|IFSC]]. Then Governor Philip Lane chaired the Economic Statistics Review Group which published a report in 2016 recommending the creation of Modified Gross National Income.]]
{{short description|Metric to replace distorted Irish GDP}}


'''Modified gross national income''' (also '''Modified GNI''' or '''GNI*''') is a metric used by the [[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]] to measure the Irish economy rather than [[Gross national income|GNI]] or GDP. GNI* is GNI minus the depreciation on Intellectual Property, depreciation on leased aircraft and the net factor income of redomiciled PLCs.
[[File:THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND (NEW HEADQUARTER BUILDING ON NORTH WALL QUAY)- ALONG BOTANIC AVENUE (JANUARY 2018)-135339 (27856990779).jpg|thumb|'''[[Central Bank of Ireland]] HQ''' (IFSC, North Wall Quay) The Central Bank of Ireland led the introduction of Modified Gross National Income (or GNI*) in February 2017 due to the distortions that Multinational (mainly US Multinational) [[BEPS]] tools were having on Irish economic data.]]


While "[[Tax haven#Inflated GDP-per-capita|Inflated GDP-per-capita]]" due to BEPS tools is a feature of [[tax havens]],<ref name="imfx"/><ref name="be"/> Ireland was the first to adjust its GDP metrics. Economists, including [[Eurostat]],<ref name="eurostat1"/> noted Irish Modified GNI (GNI*) is still distorted by Irish [[BEPS]] tools and US multinational tax planning activities in Ireland (e.g. [[contract manufacturing]]); and that Irish BEPS tools distort ''aggregate'' EU-28 data,<ref name="brad1">{{cite web|url=https://www.cfr.org/blog/ireland-exports-its-leprechaun|title=Ireland Exports its Leprechaun|publisher=[[Council on Foreign Relations]]|author=[[Brad Setser]]|quote=Ireland has, more or less, stopped using GDP to measure its own economy. And on current trends [because Irish GDP is distorting EU-28 aggregate data], the eurozone taken as a whole may need to consider something similar.|date=11 May 2018|access-date=13 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180514142152/https://www.cfr.org/blog/ireland-exports-its-leprechaun|archive-date=14 May 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and the EU-US trade deficit.<ref name="z5"/>
'''Modified gross national income''', '''Modified GNI''' or '''GNI*''' was created by the [[Central Bank of Ireland]] in February 2017 as a new way to measure the Irish economy, and Irish indebtedness, due to the increasing distortion that the [[base erosion and profit shifting]] ("BEPS") tools of U.S. [[Corporation tax in the Republic of Ireland#Multinational tax schemes|multinational tax schemes]] were having on Irish [[Gross national product|GNP]] and Irish [[Gross domestic product|GDP]]; the climax being the July 2016 [[leprechaun economics]] affair with [[Apple Inc]].<ref name="ber"/>


In August 2018, the [[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]] (CSO) restated table of Irish GDP versus Modified GNI (2009–2017) showed GDP was 162% of GNI* (EU-28 2017 GDP was 100% of GNI).<ref name="eurostat2"/> Ireland's public {{slink|#2018 Debt metrics}} differ dramatically depending on whether Debt-to-GDP, Debt-to-GNI* or Debt-per-Capita is used.<ref name="www.irishtimes.com">{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/budget-2019-who-still-owes-more-the-irish-or-the-greeks-1.3625800|title=Who still owes more, Ireland or the Greeks|date=12 September 2018|newspaper=[[Irish Times]]|author=Fiona Reddan|access-date=15 September 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180912064327/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/budget-2019-who-still-owes-more-the-irish-or-the-greeks-1.3625800|archive-date=12 September 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
While "[[Tax haven#Inflated GDP-per-capita|distortion of GDP-per-capita]]" due to BEPS tools is a feature of [[tax havens]],<ref name="imfx"/><ref name="be"/> Ireland was the first to adjust its GDP metrics. Economists, including [[Eurostat]],<ref name="eurostat1"/> noted Irish Modified GNI (GNI*) is still distorted by Irish [[BEPS]] tools and U.S. multinational tax planning activities in Ireland (e.g. [[contract manufacturing]]); and that Irish BEPS tools distort ''aggregate'' EU–28 data,<ref name="brad1">{{cite web|url=https://www.cfr.org/blog/ireland-exports-its-leprechaun|title=Ireland Exports its Leprechaun|publisher=[[Council on Foreign Relations]]|author=[[Brad Setser]]|quote=Ireland has, more or less, stopped using GDP to measure its own economy. And on current trends [because Irish GDP is distorting EU–28 aggregate data], the eurozone taken as a whole may need to consider something similar.|date=11 May 2018|access-date=13 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180514142152/https://www.cfr.org/blog/ireland-exports-its-leprechaun|archive-date=14 May 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and the EU–U.S. trade deficit.<ref name="z5"/>


== Original distortion ==
In August 2018, the [[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]] (CSO) restated table of {{slink|#Irish GDP versus Modified GNI (2009–2017)}} showed GDP was 162% of GNI* (EU–28 2017 GDP was 100% of GNI).<ref name="eurostat2"/> Ireland's public {{slink|#2018 Debt metrics}} differ dramatically depending on whether Debt-to-GDP, Debt-to-GNI* or Debt-per-Capita is used.<ref name="www.irishtimes.com">{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/budget-2019-who-still-owes-more-the-irish-or-the-greeks-1.3625800|title=Who still owes more, Ireland or the Greeks|date=12 September 2018|newspaper=[[Irish Times]]|author=Fiona Reddan|access-date=15 September 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180912064327/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/budget-2019-who-still-owes-more-the-irish-or-the-greeks-1.3625800|archive-date=12 September 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>


==Original distortion==
{{see also|Double Irish arrangement}}
{{see also|Double Irish arrangement}}


[[File:2020 EU ratio of GNI to GDP.png|thumb|The distorted GNI to GDP ratio in some EU states indicates a profound disproportionality in corporate havens as Ireland and Luxembourg.<ref>{{Cite web |title=GDP (current US$) {{!}} Data |url=https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD |access-date=2022-05-13 |website=data.worldbank.org}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) {{!}} Data |url=https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gnp.pcap.cd?year_high_desc=true |access-date=2022-05-13 |website=data.worldbank.org}}</ref>]]
[[File:2011 Ratio of GNI to GDP (EuroStat National Accounts).png|thumb|'''Ratio of GNI to GDP''' National Accounts Data (2011), [[Eurostat]].<ref name="gdpgni">{{cite web|url=http://economic-incentives.blogspot.ie/2013/04/gdp-and-international-comparisons.html|title=International GNI to GDP Comparisons|author=[[Seamus Coffey]], [[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]]|publisher=Economic Incentives|date=29 April 2013|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180319213831/http://economic-incentives.blogspot.ie/2013/04/gdp-and-international-comparisons.html|archive-date=19 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="gnx2">{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/europe-points-finger-at-ireland-over-tax-avoidance-1.3417948|title=Europe points finger at Ireland over tax avoidance|newspaper=Irish Times|date=7 March 2018|quote=Multinational companies have made such extensive use of Ireland to funnel royalties – a common way to shift profits and avoid tax – that these payments averaged 23 per cent of the country’s annual gross domestic product between 2010 and 2015, according to an EU Commission report seen by the ''Financial Times''.|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180307095256/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/europe-points-finger-at-ireland-over-tax-avoidance-1.3417948|archive-date=7 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>]]


In February 1994, tax academic [[James R. Hines Jr.]], identified Ireland as one of ''seven major tax havens'' in his [[James R. Hines Jr.#Tax haven research|1994 Hines–Rice paper]],<ref>{{cite journal|url=http://taxdoctoralseminar.web.unc.edu/files/2016/02/Hines-Rice.pdf|title=FISCAL PARADISE: FOREIGN TAX HAVENS AND AMERICAN BUSINESS|author1=[[James R. Hines Jr.]]|author2=Eric M. Rice|quote=We identify 41 countries and regions as tax havens for the purposes of U. S. businesses. Together the seven tax havens with populations greater than one million (Hong Kong, Ireland, Liberia, Lebanon, Panama, Singapore, and Switzerland) account for 80 percent of total tax haven population and 89 percent of tax haven GDP.|journal=[[Quarterly Journal of Economics]] (Harvard/MIT)|date=February 1994|volume=9|issue=1|access-date=2018-08-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170825172644/http://taxdoctoralseminar.web.unc.edu/files/2016/02/Hines-Rice.pdf|archive-date=2017-08-25|url-status=dead}}</ref> still the most cited paper in research on tax havens.<ref name="respec">{{cite web|url=https://ideas.repec.org/cgi-bin/htsearch?form=extended&wm=wrd&dt=range&ul=&q=tax+haven&cmd=Search%21&wf=4BFF&s=C&db=&de=|title=IDEAS/RePEc Database|quote=Tax Havens by Most Cited|publisher=[[Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis]]|access-date=2018-08-23|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181204123511/https://ideas.repec.org/cgi-bin/htsearch?form=extended&wm=wrd&dt=range&ul=&q=tax+haven&cmd=Search%21&wf=4BFF&s=C&db=&de=|archive-date=2018-12-04|url-status=live}}</ref> Hines noted that the ''[[BEPS|profit shifting]]'' tools of U.S. multinationals in corporate–focused [[tax havens]] distorted the national economic statistics of the haven as the scale of the ''profit shifting'' was disproportionate to haven's economy. An [[Tax haven#Inflated GDP-per-capita|elevated GDP-per-capita]] became a "[[Corporate haven#Proxy tests|proxy indicator]]" of a tax haven.<ref name="be">{{cite web|url=https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2385&context=law_and_economics|title=What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the Empirical Literature|publisher=[[University of Chicago]]|author=[[Dhammika Dharmapala]]|date=2014|access-date=2018-08-23|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180720094150/https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2385&context=law_and_economics|archive-date=2018-07-20|url-status=live}}</ref>
In February 1994, tax academic [[James R. Hines Jr.]], identified Ireland as one of ''seven major tax havens'' in his [[James R. Hines Jr.#Tax haven research|1994 Hines-Rice paper]],<ref>{{cite journal|url=http://taxdoctoralseminar.web.unc.edu/files/2016/02/Hines-Rice.pdf|title=FISCAL PARADISE: FOREIGN TAX HAVENS AND AMERICAN BUSINESS|author1=[[James R. Hines Jr.]]|author2=Eric M. Rice|quote=We identify 41 countries and regions as tax havens for the purposes of U.S. businesses. Together the seven tax havens with populations greater than one million (Hong Kong, Ireland, Liberia, Lebanon, Panama, Singapore, and Switzerland) account for 80 percent of total tax haven population and 89 percent of tax haven GDP.|journal=Quarterly Journal of Economics (Harvard/MIT)|date=February 1994|volume=9|issue=1|access-date=2018-08-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170825172644/http://taxdoctoralseminar.web.unc.edu/files/2016/02/Hines-Rice.pdf|archive-date=2017-08-25|url-status=dead}}</ref> still{{As of?|date=January 2021}} the most cited paper in research on tax havens.<ref name="respec">{{cite web|url=https://ideas.repec.org/cgi-bin/htsearch?form=extended&wm=wrd&dt=range&ul=&q=tax+haven&cmd=Search%21&wf=4BFF&s=C&db=&de=|title=IDEAS/RePEc Database|quote=Tax Havens by Most Cited|publisher=[[Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis]]|access-date=2018-08-23|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181204123511/https://ideas.repec.org/cgi-bin/htsearch?form=extended&wm=wrd&dt=range&ul=&q=tax+haven&cmd=Search%21&wf=4BFF&s=C&db=&de=|archive-date=2018-12-04|url-status=live}}</ref> Hines noted that the ''[[BEPS|profit shifting]]'' tools of US multinationals in corporate-focused [[tax havens]] distorted the national economic statistics of the haven as the scale of the ''profit shifting'' was disproportionate to haven's economy. An [[Tax haven#Inflated GDP-per-capita|elevated GDP-per-capita]] became a "[[Corporate haven#Proxy tests|proxy indicator]]" of a tax haven.<ref name="be">{{cite web|url=https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2385&context=law_and_economics|title=What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the Empirical Literature|publisher=[[University of Chicago]]|author=[[Dhammika Dharmapala]]|date=2014|access-date=2018-08-23|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180720094150/https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2385&context=law_and_economics|archive-date=2018-07-20|url-status=live}}</ref>


In November 2005, the Wall Street Journal reported that U.S. technology and life sciences multinationals (e.g. Microsoft), were using an Irish [[base erosion and profit shifting]] ("BEPS") tool called the [[double Irish]], to minimise their corporate taxes.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113132761685289706|title=Irish Subsidiary Lets Microsoft Slash Taxes in U.S. and Europe|newspaper=[[Wall Street Journal]]|quote=Round Island's legal address is in the headquarters of a Dublin law firm, Matheson Ormsby Prentice, that advertises its expertise in helping multinational companies use Ireland to shelter income from taxes.|date=7 November 2005|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180616180424/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113132761685289706|archive-date=16 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/WSJ_-_Microsoft_slashes_taxes_in_US_and_EU_through_Irish_subsidiary_-_7_NOV_2005.pdf|title=TAX JUSTICE NETWORK: Irish Subsidiary Lets Microsoft Slash Taxes in U.S. and Europe|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|date=7 November 2005|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160705151435/http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/WSJ_-_Microsoft_slashes_taxes_in_US_and_EU_through_Irish_subsidiary_-_7_NOV_2005.pdf|archive-date=5 July 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Designed by [[PwC]] (Ireland) tax partner, [[Feargal O'Rourke]],<ref name="for0">{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-28/man-making-ireland-tax-avoidance-hub-globally-proves-local-hero|title=Man Making Ireland Tax Avoidance Hub Proves Local Hero|publisher=Bloomberg News|date=28 October 2013|access-date=24 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612234526/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-28/man-making-ireland-tax-avoidance-hub-globally-proves-local-hero|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="for1">{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/controversial-tax-strategies-brainchild-of-orourkes-son-29721835.html|title=Controversial tax strategies brainchild of O'Rourke's son|newspaper=Irish Independent|date=3 November 2013|access-date=24 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180920120538/https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/controversial-tax-strategies-brainchild-of-orourkes-son-29721835.html|archive-date=20 September 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> the [[double Irish]] would become the largest [[BEPS]] tool in history, and would enable U.S. multinationals to accumulate over USD 1 trillion in untaxed offshore profits.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-real-story-behind-us-companies-off-shore-cash-reserves|title=The real story behind US companies’ offshore cash reserves|publisher=[[McKinsey & Company]]|date=June 2017|access-date=2018-08-23|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180813180122/https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-real-story-behind-us-companies-off-shore-cash-reserves|archive-date=2018-08-13|url-status=live}}</ref>
In November 2005, the Wall Street Journal reported that US technology and life sciences multinationals (e.g. Microsoft), were using an Irish [[base erosion and profit shifting]] ("BEPS") tool called the [[double Irish]], to minimise their corporate taxes.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113132761685289706|title=Irish Subsidiary Lets Microsoft Slash Taxes in U.S. and Europe|newspaper=[[Wall Street Journal]]|quote=Round Island's legal address is in the headquarters of a Dublin law firm, Matheson Ormsby Prentice, that advertises its expertise in helping multinational companies use Ireland to shelter income from taxes.|date=7 November 2005|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180616180424/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113132761685289706|archive-date=16 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/WSJ_-_Microsoft_slashes_taxes_in_US_and_EU_through_Irish_subsidiary_-_7_NOV_2005.pdf|title=TAX JUSTICE NETWORK: Irish Subsidiary Lets Microsoft Slash Taxes in U.S. and Europe|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|date=7 November 2005|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160705151435/http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/WSJ_-_Microsoft_slashes_taxes_in_US_and_EU_through_Irish_subsidiary_-_7_NOV_2005.pdf|archive-date=5 July 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Designed by [[PwC]] (Ireland) tax partner, [[Feargal O'Rourke]],<ref name="for0">{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-28/man-making-ireland-tax-avoidance-hub-globally-proves-local-hero|title=Man Making Ireland Tax Avoidance Hub Proves Local Hero|publisher=Bloomberg News|date=28 October 2013|access-date=24 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612234526/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-28/man-making-ireland-tax-avoidance-hub-globally-proves-local-hero|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="for1">{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/controversial-tax-strategies-brainchild-of-orourkes-son-29721835.html|title=Controversial tax strategies brainchild of O'Rourke's son|newspaper=Irish Independent|date=3 November 2013|access-date=24 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180920120538/https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/controversial-tax-strategies-brainchild-of-orourkes-son-29721835.html|archive-date=20 September 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> the [[double Irish]] would become the largest [[BEPS]] tool in history, and would enable US multinationals to accumulate over US$1 trillion in untaxed offshore profits.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-real-story-behind-us-companies-off-shore-cash-reserves|title=The real story behind US companies' offshore cash reserves|publisher=[[McKinsey & Company]]|date=June 2017|access-date=2018-08-23|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180813180122/https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-real-story-behind-us-companies-off-shore-cash-reserves|archive-date=2018-08-13|url-status=live}}</ref>


The accounting flows of BEPS tools can appear in national economic statistics, varying with each tool, but without contributing to the economy of the tax haven.<ref name="be"/>
The accounting flows of BEPS tools can appear in national economic statistics, varying with each tool, but without contributing to the economy of the tax haven.<ref name="be"/>


Subsequent U.S. Senate (2013), and EU Commission (2014–2016) investigations, into Apple's Irish tax structure, would show that starting in 2004, Apple's Irish subsidiary, Apple Sales International ("ASI"), would almost double the untaxed ''profits shifted'' through its [[double Irish]] BEPS tool every year, for a decade.<ref name="cof2"/>
Subsequent US Senate (2013), and EU Commission (2014–2016) investigations, into Apple's Irish tax structure, would show that starting in 2004, Apple's Irish subsidiary, Apple Sales International ("ASI"), would almost double the untaxed ''profits shifted'' through its [[double Irish]] BEPS tool every year, for a decade.<ref name="cof2"/>


{| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align:left"
{| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align:left"
|+ style="text-align: left;" | Table 1: Estimate of profits shifted through Apple's Irish subsidiary, Apple Sales International ("ASI"), 2004–2014.<ref name="cof2"/>
|+ style="text-align: left;" | Table 1: Estimate of profits shifted through Apple's Irish subsidiary, Apple Sales International ("ASI"), 2004–2014.<ref name="cof2"/>
|-
|-
!style="width:100px;text-align:left"|Year<br>
!style="width:100px;text-align:left"|Year<br />
!style="background:#cfc;width:120px;text-align:left"|ASI Profit<br>Shifted (USD m)
!style="background:#cfc;width:120px;text-align:left"|ASI profit<br>shifted (USD m)
!style="width:80px;text-align:left"|Average<br>€/$ rate
!style="width:80px;text-align:left"|Average<br />€/$ rate
!style="background:#cfc;width:125px;text-align:left"|ASI Profit<br>Shifted (EUR m)
!style="background:#cfc;width:125px;text-align:left"|ASI profit<br>shifted (EUR m)
!style="width:80px;text-align:left"|Irish Corp.<br>Tax Rate
!style="width:80px;text-align:left"|Irish corp.<br />tax rate
!style="background:#cfc;width:125px;text-align:left"|Irish Corp. Tax<br>Avoided (EUR m)
!style="background:#cfc;width:125px;text-align:left"|Irish corp. tax<br>avoided (EUR m)
|-
|-
|2004||268||.805||216||12.5%||27
|2004||268||.805||216||12.5%||27
Line 57: Line 57:
|'''Total'''||'''147,304'''|| ||'''110,821'''|| ||'''13,853'''
|'''Total'''||'''147,304'''|| ||'''110,821'''|| ||'''13,853'''
|}
|}
From 2003 to 2007, research has shown that inflated Irish GDP from US multinational [[BEPS]] tools,<ref name="ber"/> amplified the Irish [[Celtic Tiger]] period by stimulating Irish consumer optimism, who increased borrowing to OECD record levels; and global capital markets optimism about Ireland enabling Irish banks to borrow 180% of Irish deposits.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishexaminer.com/business/banks-continue-to-grow-deposits-as-loan-books-shrink-215666.html|title=Irish Banks continue to grow deposits as loan books shrink|newspaper=Irish Examiner|date=December 2012|access-date=2018-04-11|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180412082058/https://www.irishexaminer.com/business/banks-continue-to-grow-deposits-as-loan-books-shrink-215666.html|archive-date=2018-04-12|url-status=live}}</ref>


From 2003–2007, artificially inflated Irish GDP from U.S. multinational [[BEPS]] tools,<ref name="ber"/> exaggerated the Irish [[Celtic Tiger]] period by stimulating Irish consumer optimism, who increased borrowing to OCED record levels; and global capital markets optimism about Ireland, who enabled Irish banks to borrow 180% of Irish deposits.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishexaminer.com/business/banks-continue-to-grow-deposits-as-loan-books-shrink-215666.html|title=Irish Banks continue to grow deposits as loan books shrink|newspaper=Irish Examiner|date=December 2012|access-date=2018-04-11|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180412082058/https://www.irishexaminer.com/business/banks-continue-to-grow-deposits-as-loan-books-shrink-215666.html|archive-date=2018-04-12|url-status=live}}</ref>
This unwound in the economic crisis as global capital markets, who had ignored Ireland's deteriorating credit metrics and distorted GDP data when Irish GDP was rising, withdrew and precipitated an [[Post-2008 Irish economic downturn|Irish property and banking collapse in 2009–2012]].<ref name="ber"/><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16258.pdf|title=Ireland Financial System Stability Assessment 2016|publisher=International Monetary Fund|date=July 2016|access-date=2018-04-08|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180508165400/http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16258.pdf|archive-date=2018-05-08|url-status=live}}</ref>


The 2009–2012 Irish economic collapse led to a transfer of indebtedness from the Irish private sector balance sheet, the most leveraged in the OECD with household debt-to-income at 190%, to the Irish public sector balance sheet, which was almost unleveraged pre-crisis. This was done via Irish bank bailouts and public deficit spending.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ft.com/content/51a2e9bf-f654-333c-8ae8-b5155eea9ea0|title=Irish government debt four times pre-crisis level, NTMA says|date=10 July 2017|access-date=8 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180408141735/https://www.ft.com/content/51a2e9bf-f654-333c-8ae8-b5155eea9ea0|archive-date=8 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/42-of-europes-banking-crisis-paid-by-ireland-219703.html|title=42% of Europe's banking crisis paid by Ireland|date=16 January 2013|access-date=8 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180408205737/https://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/42-of-europes-banking-crisis-paid-by-ireland-219703.html|archive-date=8 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
This unwound in the economic crisis as global capital markets, who had ignored Ireland's worsening credit metrics and distorted GDP data when Irish GDP was rising, suddenly took fright. Their withdrawal, from an over-borrowed Irish credit system, precipitated a deep [[Post-2008 Irish economic downturn|Irish property and banking collapse in 2009–2012]].<ref name="ber"/><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16258.pdf|title=IRELAND FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT 2016|publisher=International Monetary Fund|date=July 2016|access-date=2018-04-08|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180508165400/http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16258.pdf|archive-date=2018-05-08|url-status=live}}</ref>


== 2009 distortion restarts ==
The 2009–2012 Irish economic collapse led to a transfer of indebtedness from the Irish private sector balance sheet, the most leveraged in the OECD with household debt-to-income at 190%, to the Irish public sector balance sheet, which was almost unleveraged pre-crisis. This was done via Irish bank bailouts and public deficit spending.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ft.com/content/51a2e9bf-f654-333c-8ae8-b5155eea9ea0|title=Irish government debt four times pre-crisis level, NTMA says|date=10 July 2017|access-date=8 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180408141735/https://www.ft.com/content/51a2e9bf-f654-333c-8ae8-b5155eea9ea0|archive-date=8 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/42-of-europes-banking-crisis-paid-by-ireland-219703.html|title=42% of Europe’s banking crisis paid by Ireland|date=16 January 2013|access-date=8 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180408205737/https://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/42-of-europes-banking-crisis-paid-by-ireland-219703.html|archive-date=8 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>


==2009 Distortion restarts==
{{see also|CAIA arrangement}}
{{see also|CAIA arrangement}}


[[File:EUROSTAT Ireland Gross Operating Surplus by Controlling Country, €million 2015.png|thumb|upright=1.0|'''Dominance of U.S. companies''': Irish corporate ''Gross Operating Surplus'' (i.e. profits), by the controlling country of the company (note: a material part of the Irish figure is also from U.S. [[Corporation tax in the Republic of Ireland#Corporate tax inversions|tax inversion]]s who are U.S.–controlled). Eurostat (2015).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://economic-incentives.blogspot.com/2018/06/who-shifts-profits-to-ireland.html|title=Who shifts profits to Ireland|publisher=Economic Incentives, [[University College Cork]]|author=[[Seamus Coffey]], [[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]]|date=18 June 2018|quote=Eurostat’s structural business statistics give a range of measures of the business economy broken down by the controlling country of the enterprises. Here is the Gross Operating Surplus generated in Ireland in 2015 for the countries with figures reported by Eurostat.|access-date=20 November 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181120221020/http://economic-incentives.blogspot.com/2018/06/who-shifts-profits-to-ireland.html|archive-date=20 November 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>]]
[[File:EUROSTAT Ireland Gross Operating Surplus by Controlling Country, €million 2015.png|thumb|upright=1.0|'''Dominance of US companies''': Irish corporate ''Gross Operating Surplus'' (i.e. profits), by the controlling country of the company (note: a material part of the Irish figure is also from US [[Corporation tax in the Republic of Ireland#Corporate tax inversions|tax inversion]]s who are US-controlled). Eurostat (2015).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://economic-incentives.blogspot.com/2018/06/who-shifts-profits-to-ireland.html|title=Who shifts profits to Ireland|publisher=Economic Incentives, [[University College Cork]]|author=[[Seamus Coffey]], [[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]]|date=18 June 2018|quote=Eurostat’s structural business statistics give a range of measures of the business economy broken down by the controlling country of the enterprises. Here is the Gross Operating Surplus generated in Ireland in 2015 for the countries with figures reported by Eurostat.|access-date=20 November 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181120221020/http://economic-incentives.blogspot.com/2018/06/who-shifts-profits-to-ireland.html|archive-date=20 November 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>]]


During the Irish financial crisis from 2009–2012, two catalysts would restart the distortion of Irish economic statistics:
During the Irish financial crisis from 2009 to 2012, two catalysts would restart the distortion of Irish economic statistics:
{{ordered list|type=lower-roman
{{ordered list|type=lower-roman
| The crisis caused the Irish State to look for new [[BEPS]] tools, and in September 2009, the ''Commission on Taxation'',<ref name="cot">{{cite web|url=https://researchrepository.ucd.ie/handle/10197/1447|title=Commission on Taxation report 2009|date=September 2009|publisher=UCD Archives|access-date=2018-08-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180613111651/https://researchrepository.ucd.ie/handle/10197/1447|archive-date=2018-06-13|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/article_1017830.shtml|title=Commission on Taxation Report Ireland 2009: Proposed property tax, a carbon tax, and domestic water charges as part of overhaul of Irish tax system|date=7 September 2009|publisher=FinFacts|access-date=22 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171210030534/http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/article_1017830.shtml|archive-date=10 December 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> recommended extending Irish [[capital allowance]]s to [[intangible assets]] and [[intellectual property]] in particular; the "[[Double Irish arrangement#Backstop of capital allowances|capital allowances for intangible assets]]" or "[[Ireland as a tax haven#Green Jersey|Green Jersey]]" BEPS tool, was created in the 2009 Finance Act; it would spur a new wave of U.S. corporate [[tax inversion]]s to Ireland;
| The crisis caused the Irish State to look for new [[BEPS]] tools, and in September 2009, the ''Commission on Taxation'',<ref name="cot">{{cite web|url=https://researchrepository.ucd.ie/handle/10197/1447|title=Commission on Taxation report 2009|date=September 2009|publisher=UCD Archives|access-date=2018-08-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180613111651/https://researchrepository.ucd.ie/handle/10197/1447|archive-date=2018-06-13|url-status=live|last1=Daly |first1=Frank |last2=Arnold |first2=Tom |last3=Burke |first3=Julie |last4=Collins |first4=Micheál |last5=Convery |first5=Frank J. |last6=Donohue |first6=Tom |last7=Fahy |first7=Eoin |last8=Hunt |first8=Colin |last9=Leech |first9=Sinead |last10=Lucey |first10=Con |last11=McCoy |first11=Danny |last12=O'Rourke |first12=Feargal |last13=O'Sullivan |first13=Mary |last14=Redmond |first14=Mark |last15=Soffe |first15=Willie |last16=Walsh |first16=Mary |last17=Taxation |first17=Ireland Commission on }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/article_1017830.shtml|title=Commission on Taxation Report Ireland 2009: Proposed property tax, a carbon tax, and domestic water charges as part of overhaul of Irish tax system|date=7 September 2009|publisher=FinFacts|access-date=22 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171210030534/http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/article_1017830.shtml|archive-date=10 December 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> recommended extending Irish [[capital allowance]]s to [[intangible assets]] and [[intellectual property]] in particular; the "[[Double Irish arrangement#Backstop of capital allowances|capital allowances for intangible assets]]" or "[[Ireland as a tax haven#Green Jersey|Green Jersey]]" BEPS tool, was created in the 2009 Finance Act; it would spur a new wave of US corporate [[tax inversion]]s to Ireland;
| Irish–based U.S. technology firms such as Apple and Google entered a stronger phase of growth; for example, in 2007, Apple's Irish ASI subsidiary was ''profit shifting'' just under USD 2 billion of untaxed global income through its hybrid–[[double Irish]] BEPS tool, however by 2012, ASI was ''profit shifting'' just under USD 36 billion of untaxed global income through Ireland, although only a small amount of this BEPS tool appeared in Irish GDP.<ref name="cof2"/>
| Irish-based US technology firms such as Apple and Google entered a stronger phase of growth; for example, in 2007, Apple's Irish ASI subsidiary was ''profit shifting'' just under USD 2 billion of untaxed global income through its hybrid-[[double Irish]] BEPS tool, however by 2012, ASI was ''profit shifting'' just under USD 36 billion of untaxed global income through Ireland, although only a small amount of this BEPS tool appeared in Irish GDP.<ref name="cof2"/>
}}
}}


In 2010, Hines published a new list of 52 global [[tax havens]], the [[James R. Hines Jr.#Hines 2010 list|Hines 2010 list]], which ranked Ireland as the 3rd largest tax haven in the world.<ref name="h1">{{cite journal|url=https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.ie/&httpsredir=1&article=1716&context=articles|title=Treasure Islands|pages=103–125|author=James R. Hines Jr.|quote=Table 2: Largest Tax Havens|journal=[[Journal of Economic Perspectives]]|volume=4|issue=24|date=2010}}</ref>
In 2010, Hines published a new list of 52 global [[tax havens]], the [[James R. Hines Jr.#Hines 2010 list|Hines 2010 list]], which ranked Ireland as the 3rd largest tax haven in the world.<ref name="h1">{{cite journal|url=https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.ie/&httpsredir=1&article=1716&context=articles|title=Treasure Islands|pages=103–125|author=James R. Hines Jr.|quote=Table 2: Largest Tax Havens|journal=[[Journal of Economic Perspectives]]|volume=4|issue=24|date=2010}}</ref>


By 2011, [[Eurostat]] showed that Ireland's ratio of [[Gross national income|GNI]] to [[GDP]], had fallen to 80% (i.e. Irish GDP was 125% of Irish GNI, or artificially inflated by 25%). Only Luxembourg, who ranked 1st on Hines' 2010 list of global tax havens,<ref name="h1"/> was lower at 73% (i.e. Luxembourg GDP was 137% of Luxembourg GNI). Eurostat's GNI/GDP table (see graphic) showed EU GDP is equal to EU GNI for almost every EU country, and for the ''aggregate'' EU–27 average.<ref name="ber">{{cite web|url=https://www.socialeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/p_imk_wp_175_2017.pdf|author=Heike Joebges|title=CRISIS RECOVERY IN A COUNTRY WITH A HIGH PRESENCE OF FOREIGN-OWNED COMPANIES: The Case of Ireland|publisher=IMK Macroeconomic Policy Institute, [[Hans-Böckler-Stiftung]]|date=January 2017|access-date=2018-04-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190412082814/https://www.socialeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/p_imk_wp_175_2017.pdf|archive-date=2019-04-12|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="gdpgni"/>
By 2011, [[Eurostat]] showed that Ireland's ratio of [[Gross national income|GNI]] to [[GDP]], had fallen to 80% (i.e. Irish GDP was 125% of Irish GNI, or artificially inflated by 25%). Only Luxembourg, who ranked 1st on Hines' 2010 list of global tax havens,<ref name="h1"/> was lower at 73% (i.e. Luxembourg GDP was 137% of Luxembourg GNI). Eurostat's GNI/GDP table (see graphic) showed EU GDP is equal to EU GNI for almost every EU country, and for the ''aggregate'' EU-27 average.<ref name="ber">{{cite web|url=https://www.socialeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/p_imk_wp_175_2017.pdf|author=Heike Joebges|title=CRISIS RECOVERY IN A COUNTRY WITH A HIGH PRESENCE OF FOREIGN-OWNED COMPANIES: The Case of Ireland|publisher=IMK Macroeconomic Policy Institute, [[Hans-Böckler-Stiftung]]|date=January 2017|access-date=2018-04-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190412082814/https://www.socialeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/p_imk_wp_175_2017.pdf|archive-date=2019-04-12|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="gdpgni">{{cite web |author=[[Seamus Coffey]], [[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]] |date=29 April 2013 |title=International GNI to GDP Comparisons |url=http://economic-incentives.blogspot.ie/2013/04/gdp-and-international-comparisons.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180319213831/http://economic-incentives.blogspot.ie/2013/04/gdp-and-international-comparisons.html |archive-date=19 March 2018 |access-date=7 April 2018 |publisher=Economic Incentives |df=dmy-all}}</ref>


In 2013–2015 several large U.S. life sciences multinationals executed [[tax inversion]]s to Ireland (e.g. Medtronic). Ireland became the largest recipient of U.S. corporate tax inversions in history.<ref name="bbb">{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/tax-inversion-tracker/|title=Tracking Tax Runaways|publisher=Bloomberg News|date=1 March 2017|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181031060724/https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/tax-inversion-tracker/|archive-date=31 October 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The Irish "Green Jersey" BEPS tool enabled U.S. multinationals to avoid almost all Irish corporate taxes, however, unlike other Irish BEPS tools, it registers fully in Irish economic statistics.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/in/rpibp/redomiciledplcsintheirishbalanceofpayments/|title=Effect of Redomiciled PLCs|publisher=Central Statistics Office (Ireland)|date=July 2017|access-date=2018-04-11|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180412082454/http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/in/rpibp/redomiciledplcsintheirishbalanceofpayments/|archive-date=2018-04-12|url-status=live}}</ref> In April 2016, the Obama Administration blocked the proposed USD 160 billion proposed Pfizer–Allergan Irish inversion.<ref name="pfizer2">{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/pfizer-pulls-out-of-140bn-irish-allergan-merger-34603518.html|title=Pfizer pulls out of €140bn Irish Allergan merger|newspaper=Irish Independent|date=6 April 2016|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180708104847/https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/pfizer-pulls-out-of-140bn-irish-allergan-merger-34603518.html|archive-date=8 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
In 2013–2015 several large US life sciences multinationals executed [[tax inversion]]s to Ireland (e.g. Medtronic). Ireland became the largest recipient of US corporate tax inversions in history.<ref name="bbb">{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/tax-inversion-tracker/|title=Tracking Tax Runaways|publisher=Bloomberg News|date=1 March 2017|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181031060724/https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/tax-inversion-tracker/|archive-date=31 October 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The Irish BEPS tool enabled US multinationals to avoid almost all Irish corporate taxes, however, unlike other Irish BEPS tools, it registers fully in Irish economic statistics.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/in/rpibp/redomiciledplcsintheirishbalanceofpayments/|title=Effect of Redomiciled PLCs|publisher=Central Statistics Office (Ireland)|date=July 2017|access-date=2018-04-11|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180412082454/http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/in/rpibp/redomiciledplcsintheirishbalanceofpayments/|archive-date=2018-04-12|url-status=live}}</ref> In April 2016, the Obama Administration blocked the proposed US$160 billion proposed Pfizer-Allergan Irish inversion.<ref name="pfizer2">{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/pfizer-pulls-out-of-140bn-irish-allergan-merger-34603518.html|title=Pfizer pulls out of €140bn Irish Allergan merger|newspaper=Irish Independent|date=6 April 2016|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180708104847/https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/pfizer-pulls-out-of-140bn-irish-allergan-merger-34603518.html|archive-date=8 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>


A 2015 EU Commission report into Ireland's economic statistics, showed that from 2010 to 2015, almost 23% of Ireland's GDP was now represented by untaxed multinational net royalty payments, thus implying that Irish GDP was now circa 130% of Irish GNI.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/europe-points-finger-at-ireland-over-tax-avoidance-1.3417948|title=Europe points finger at Ireland over tax avoidance|newspaper=[[Irish Times]]|date=7 March 2018|author=Rochelle Toplensky|quote=Multinational companies have made such extensive use of Ireland to funnel royalties a common way to shift profits and avoid tax that these payments averaged 23 per cent of the country’s annual gross domestic product between 2010 and 2015, according to a European Commission report seen by the Financial Times. The scale of the net royalty payments channelled through Ireland contrasts sharply with the average in the EU as a whole, where such payments are a fraction of one per cent of the bloc’s annual GDP.|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180307095256/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/europe-points-finger-at-ireland-over-tax-avoidance-1.3417948|archive-date=7 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> This analysis however did not capture the full effect of the "Green Jersey" BEPS tool as it uses [[capital allowance]]s, rather than [[royalty payments]], to execute the BEPS movement. The Irish media were also confused as to Ireland's state of indebtedness as Irish Debt-per-Capita diverged sharply from Irish Debt-to GDP.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/who-owes-more-money-the-irish-or-the-greeks-1.2236034|title=Who owes more money - the Irish or the Greeks?|newspaper=Irish Times|date=4 June 2015|access-date=8 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181204130246/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/who-owes-more-money-the-irish-or-the-greeks-1.2236034|archive-date=4 December 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/why-do-the-irish-still-owe-more-than-the-greeks-1.3001026|title=Why do the Irish still owe more than the Greeks?|newspaper=Irish Times|date=7 March 2017|access-date=8 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181004094602/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/why-do-the-irish-still-owe-more-than-the-greeks-1.3001026|archive-date=4 October 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.ie/business/personal-finance/latest-news/irelands-colossal-level-of-indebtedness-leaves-any-new-government-with-precious-little-room-for-manoeuvre-34633087.html|title=Ireland's colossal level of indebtedness leaves any new government with precious little room for manoeuvre|newspaper=Irish Independent|date=16 April 2016|access-date=8 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180407190423/https://www.independent.ie/business/personal-finance/latest-news/irelands-colossal-level-of-indebtedness-leaves-any-new-government-with-precious-little-room-for-manoeuvre-34633087.html|archive-date=7 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
A 2015 EU Commission report into Ireland's economic statistics, showed that from 2010 to 2015, almost 23% of Ireland's GDP was now represented by untaxed multinational net royalty payments, thus implying that Irish GDP was now circa 130% of Irish GNI.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/europe-points-finger-at-ireland-over-tax-avoidance-1.3417948|title=Europe points finger at Ireland over tax avoidance|newspaper=[[Irish Times]]|date=7 March 2018|author=Rochelle Toplensky|quote=Multinational companies have made such extensive use of Ireland to funnel royalties a common way to shift profits and avoid tax that these payments averaged 23 per cent of the country’s annual gross domestic product between 2010 and 2015, according to a European Commission report seen by the Financial Times. The scale of the net royalty payments channelled through Ireland contrasts sharply with the average in the EU as a whole, where such payments are a fraction of one per cent of the bloc’s annual GDP.|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180307095256/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/europe-points-finger-at-ireland-over-tax-avoidance-1.3417948|archive-date=7 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> This analysis, however, did not capture the full effect of the BEPS tool as it uses [[capital allowance]]s, rather than [[royalty payments]], to execute the BEPS movement. The Irish media were also confused as to Ireland's state of indebtedness as Irish Debt-per-Capita diverged sharply from Irish Debt-to GDP.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/who-owes-more-money-the-irish-or-the-greeks-1.2236034|title=Who owes more money - the Irish or the Greeks?|newspaper=Irish Times|date=4 June 2015|access-date=8 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181204130246/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/who-owes-more-money-the-irish-or-the-greeks-1.2236034|archive-date=4 December 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/why-do-the-irish-still-owe-more-than-the-greeks-1.3001026|title=Why do the Irish still owe more than the Greeks?|newspaper=Irish Times|date=7 March 2017|access-date=8 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181004094602/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/why-do-the-irish-still-owe-more-than-the-greeks-1.3001026|archive-date=4 October 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.ie/business/personal-finance/latest-news/irelands-colossal-level-of-indebtedness-leaves-any-new-government-with-precious-little-room-for-manoeuvre-34633087.html|title=Ireland's colossal level of indebtedness leaves any new government with precious little room for manoeuvre|newspaper=Irish Independent|date=16 April 2016|access-date=8 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180407190423/https://www.independent.ie/business/personal-finance/latest-news/irelands-colossal-level-of-indebtedness-leaves-any-new-government-with-precious-little-room-for-manoeuvre-34633087.html|archive-date=7 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>


==2016 Distortion climax==
== 2016 distortion climax ==
{{See also|Leprechaun economics}}


[[File:Ireland Trade Good Discrepancy (1995-2017).png|thumb|Ireland: Apple's Q1 2015 restructuring. Brad Setser & Cole Frank ([[Council on Foreign Relations]])]]
[[File:Ireland Trade Good Discrepancy (1995-2017).png|thumb|Ireland: Apple's Q1 2015 restructuring. Brad Setser & Cole Frank ([[Council on Foreign Relations]])]]


{{see also|Leprechaun economics}}
By 2012–14, Apple's Irish subsidiary, ASI, was ''profit shifting'' circa USD 35 billion per annum through Ireland, equivalent to 20% of Irish GDP, via its hybrid–[[double Irish]] BEPS tool.<ref name="cof2"/> However, this particular BEPS tool had a modest impact on Irish GDP data. In late 2014, to limit further exposure to fines from the [[EU illegal State aid case against Apple in Ireland|EU Commission's investigation into Apple's Irish tax schemes]], Apple closed its hybrid–[[double Irish]] BEPS tool,<ref name="apple">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/apple-taxes-jersey.html|title=After a Tax Crackdown, Apple Found a New Shelter for Its Profits|newspaper=New York Times|author=Jesse Drucker|author2=Simon Bowers|date=6 November 2017|access-date=24 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171106192019/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/apple-taxes-jersey.html|archive-date=6 November 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and decided to swap into the "Green Jersey" BEPS tool.<ref name="emmaclancy">{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/2018/06/25/new-report-is-apple-paying-less-than-1-tax-in-the-eu/|title=New Report on Apple's New Irish Tax Structure|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|author=Naomi Fowler|date=25 June 2018|access-date=24 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180702064405/https://www.taxjustice.net/2018/06/25/new-report-is-apple-paying-less-than-1-tax-in-the-eu/|archive-date=2 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="emma">{{cite web|url=http://src.bna.com/zNy|title=Apple’s Irish Tax Deals|publisher=[[European United Left–Nordic Green Left]] EU Parliament|author1=Martin Brehm Christensen|author2=Emma Clancy|date=21 June 2018|access-date=24 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180714041128/http://src.bna.com/zNy|archive-date=14 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> In Q1 2015, Apple Ireland purchased circa USD 300 billion of virtual IP assets owned by Apple Jersey, executing the largest BEPS action in history.<ref name="cof2">{{cite web|url=http://economic-incentives.blogspot.ie/2018/01/what-apple-did-next.html|title=What Apple did next|author=[[Seamus Coffey]], [[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]]|publisher=Economic Incentives|date=24 January 2014|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180330153810/http://economic-incentives.blogspot.ie/2018/01/what-apple-did-next.html|archive-date=30 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="cofr"/>

By 2012–14, Apple's Irish subsidiary, ASI, was ''profit shifting'' circa US$35 billion per annum through Ireland, equivalent to 20% of Irish GDP, via its hybrid-[[double Irish]] BEPS tool.<ref name="cof2"/> However, this particular BEPS tool had a modest impact on Irish GDP data. In late 2014, to limit further exposure to fines from the [[EU illegal state aid case against Apple in Ireland|EU Commission's investigation into Apple's Irish tax schemes]], Apple closed its hybrid-[[double Irish]] BEPS tool,<ref name="apple">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/apple-taxes-jersey.html|title=After a Tax Crackdown, Apple Found a New Shelter for Its Profits|newspaper=New York Times|author=Jesse Drucker|author2=Simon Bowers|date=6 November 2017|access-date=24 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171106192019/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/apple-taxes-jersey.html|archive-date=6 November 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and decided to swap into the BEPS tool.<ref name="emmaclancy">{{cite web|url=https://www.taxjustice.net/2018/06/25/new-report-is-apple-paying-less-than-1-tax-in-the-eu/|title=New Report on Apple's New Irish Tax Structure|publisher=[[Tax Justice Network]]|author=Naomi Fowler|date=25 June 2018|access-date=24 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180702064405/https://www.taxjustice.net/2018/06/25/new-report-is-apple-paying-less-than-1-tax-in-the-eu/|archive-date=2 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="emma">{{cite web|url=http://src.bna.com/zNy|title=Apple's Irish Tax Deals|publisher=[[European United Left–Nordic Green Left]] EU Parliament|author1=Martin Brehm Christensen|author2=Emma Clancy|date=21 June 2018|access-date=24 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180714041128/http://src.bna.com/zNy|archive-date=14 July 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> In Q1 2015, Apple Ireland purchased circa US$300 billion of virtual IP assets owned by Apple Jersey, executing the largest BEPS action in history.<ref name="cof2">{{cite web|url=http://economic-incentives.blogspot.ie/2018/01/what-apple-did-next.html|title=What Apple did next|author=[[Seamus Coffey]], [[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]]|publisher=Economic Incentives|date=24 January 2014|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180330153810/http://economic-incentives.blogspot.ie/2018/01/what-apple-did-next.html|archive-date=30 March 2018|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="cofr"/>


[[File:Ireland Balance of Payment Components (2012-2017).png|thumb|Ireland: Apple's Q1 2015 IP distortion of Ireland's balance of payments. Brad Setser & Cole Frank ([[Council on Foreign Relations]])]]
[[File:Ireland Balance of Payment Components (2012-2017).png|thumb|Ireland: Apple's Q1 2015 IP distortion of Ireland's balance of payments. Brad Setser & Cole Frank ([[Council on Foreign Relations]])]]


The "Green Jersey" BEPS tool is recorded like a [[tax inversion]] in the Irish national accounts.<ref name="cofr">{{cite web|url=https://www.cfr.org/blog/tax-avoidance-and-irish-balance-payments|title=Tax Avoidance and the Irish Balance of Payments|publisher=[[Council on Foreign Relations]]|author1=[[Brad Setser]]|author2=Cole Frank|date=25 April 2018|access-date=28 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180428162831/https://www.cfr.org/blog/tax-avoidance-and-irish-balance-payments|archive-date=28 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Because Apple's IP was now ''on-shored'' in Ireland, all of ASI's circa USD 40 billion in ''profit shifting'' for 2015, appeared in 2015 Irish GDP and GNP, despite the fact that new BEPS tool would limit Apple's exposure to Irish corporation tax.
The BEPS tool is recorded like a [[tax inversion]] in the Irish national accounts.<ref name="cofr">{{cite web|url=https://www.cfr.org/blog/tax-avoidance-and-irish-balance-payments|title=Tax Avoidance and the Irish Balance of Payments|publisher=[[Council on Foreign Relations]]|author1=[[Brad Setser]]|author2=Cole Frank|date=25 April 2018|access-date=28 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180428162831/https://www.cfr.org/blog/tax-avoidance-and-irish-balance-payments|archive-date=28 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Because Apple's IP was now ''on-shored'' in Ireland, all of ASI's circa US$40 billion in ''profit shifting'' for 2015, appeared in 2015 Irish GDP and GNP, despite the fact that new BEPS tool would limit Apple's exposure to Irish corporation tax.


In July 2016, the Irish Central Statistice Office announced 2015 Irish economic growth rates of 26.3% (GDP) and 18.7% (GNP), as a result of Apple's restructuring.<ref name="CSO">{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/nie/nationalincomeandexpenditureannualresults2015/|title=National Income and Expenditure Annual Results 2015|publisher=Central Statistics|date=12 July 2016|access-date=19 January 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171122004553/http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/nie/nationalincomeandexpenditureannualresults2015/|archive-date=22 November 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The announcement led to ridicule,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/leprechaun-economics-irelands-26pc-growth-spurt-laughed-off-as-farcical-34879232.html|title='Leprechaun economics' - Ireland's 26pc growth spurt laughed off as 'farcical'|newspaper=Irish Independent|date=13 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180614021337/https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/leprechaun-economics-irelands-26pc-growth-spurt-laughed-off-as-farcical-34879232.html|archive-date=14 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/concern-as-irish-growth-rate-dubbed-leprechaun-economics-1.2719676?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Frp.liu233w.com%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fconcern-as-irish-growth-rate-dubbed-leprechaun-economics-1.2719676|title=Concern as Irish growth rate dubbed 'leprechaun economics'|newspaper=Irish Times|date=13 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180319213828/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/concern-as-irish-growth-rate-dubbed-leprechaun-economics-1.2719676?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Frp.liu233w.com%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fconcern-as-irish-growth-rate-dubbed-leprechaun-economics-1.2719676|archive-date=19 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2016/0723/804214-blog-story-behind-leprechaun-economics-fiasco/|title=Blog: The real story behind Ireland's 'Leprechaun' economics fiasco|publisher=RTE News|date=25 July 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180320043640/https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2016/0723/804214-blog-story-behind-leprechaun-economics-fiasco/|archive-date=20 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="Financial Times">{{cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/8a1ebc9c-4846-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab|title=Irish tell a tale of 26.3% growth spurt|newspaper=Financial Times|date=12 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180319213733/https://www.ft.com/content/8a1ebc9c-4846-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab|archive-date=19 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="Financial Times"/><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.thejournal.ie/gdp-growth-leprechaun-economics-2876138-Jul2016/|title="Leprechaun economics" - experts aren't impressed with Ireland's GDP figures|publisher=thejournal.ie|date=13 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180413234859/http://www.thejournal.ie/gdp-growth-leprechaun-economics-2876138-Jul2016/|archive-date=13 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ireland-economy/leprechaun-economics-leaves-irish-growth-story-in-limbo-idUSKCN0ZT21K|title='Leprechaun economics' leaves Irish growth story in limbo|publisher=Reuters News|date=13 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180330012532/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ireland-economy/leprechaun-economics-leaves-irish-growth-story-in-limbo-idUSKCN0ZT21K|archive-date=30 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-13/-leprechaun-economics-earn-ireland-ridicule-443-million-bill|title='Leprechaun Economics' Earn Ireland Ridicule, $443 Million Bill|publisher=Bloomberg News|date=13 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180613210709/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-13/-leprechaun-economics-earn-ireland-ridicule-443-million-bill|archive-date=13 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and was labelled by Noble Prize economist [[Paul Krugman]] as "[[leprechaun economics]]".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://twitter.com/paulkrugman/status/752841032870551552|title=Leprechaun Economics|publisher=Paul Krugman (Twitter)|date=12 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180616095311/https://twitter.com/paulkrugman/status/752841032870551552|archive-date=16 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
In July 2016, the Irish Central Statistice Office announced 2015 Irish economic growth rates of 26.3% (GDP) and 18.7% (GNP), as a result of Apple's restructuring.<ref name="CSO">{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/nie/nationalincomeandexpenditureannualresults2015/|title=National Income and Expenditure Annual Results 2015|publisher=Central Statistics|date=12 July 2016|access-date=19 January 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171122004553/http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/nie/nationalincomeandexpenditureannualresults2015/|archive-date=22 November 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> The announcement led to ridicule,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/leprechaun-economics-irelands-26pc-growth-spurt-laughed-off-as-farcical-34879232.html|title='Leprechaun economics' - Ireland's 26pc growth spurt laughed off as 'farcical'|newspaper=Irish Independent|date=13 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180614021337/https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/leprechaun-economics-irelands-26pc-growth-spurt-laughed-off-as-farcical-34879232.html|archive-date=14 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/concern-as-irish-growth-rate-dubbed-leprechaun-economics-1.2719676?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Frp.liu233w.com%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fconcern-as-irish-growth-rate-dubbed-leprechaun-economics-1.2719676|title=Concern as Irish growth rate dubbed 'leprechaun economics'|newspaper=Irish Times|date=13 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180319213828/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/concern-as-irish-growth-rate-dubbed-leprechaun-economics-1.2719676?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Frp.liu233w.com%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fconcern-as-irish-growth-rate-dubbed-leprechaun-economics-1.2719676|archive-date=19 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2016/0723/804214-blog-story-behind-leprechaun-economics-fiasco/|title=Blog: The real story behind Ireland's 'Leprechaun' economics fiasco|publisher=RTE News|date=25 July 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180320043640/https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2016/0723/804214-blog-story-behind-leprechaun-economics-fiasco/|archive-date=20 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="Financial Times">{{cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/8a1ebc9c-4846-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab|title=Irish tell a tale of 26.3% growth spurt|newspaper=Financial Times|date=12 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180319213733/https://www.ft.com/content/8a1ebc9c-4846-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab|archive-date=19 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.thejournal.ie/gdp-growth-leprechaun-economics-2876138-Jul2016/|title="Leprechaun economics" - experts aren't impressed with Ireland's GDP figures|publisher=thejournal.ie|date=13 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180413234859/http://www.thejournal.ie/gdp-growth-leprechaun-economics-2876138-Jul2016/|archive-date=13 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ireland-economy/leprechaun-economics-leaves-irish-growth-story-in-limbo-idUSKCN0ZT21K|title='Leprechaun economics' leaves Irish growth story in limbo|publisher=Reuters News|date=13 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180330012532/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ireland-economy/leprechaun-economics-leaves-irish-growth-story-in-limbo-idUSKCN0ZT21K|archive-date=30 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-13/-leprechaun-economics-earn-ireland-ridicule-443-million-bill|title='Leprechaun Economics' Earn Ireland Ridicule, $443 Million Bill|publisher=Bloomberg News|date=13 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180613210709/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-13/-leprechaun-economics-earn-ireland-ridicule-443-million-bill|archive-date=13 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> and was labelled by Nobel Prize economist [[Paul Krugman]] as "[[leprechaun economics]]".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://twitter.com/paulkrugman/status/752841032870551552|title=Leprechaun Economics|publisher=Paul Krugman (Twitter)|date=12 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180616095311/https://twitter.com/paulkrugman/status/752841032870551552|archive-date=16 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>


[[File:Michael Noonan (crop).jpg|thumb|Finance Minister [[Michael Noonan (Fine Gael politician)|Michael Noonan]] who removed the "cap" on the Irish "capital allowances for intangibles" BEPS tool in 2015, to remove any potential Irish corporate tax liability from Apple's Q1 2015 restructuring.]]
[[File:Michael Noonan (crop).jpg|thumb|Finance Minister [[Michael Noonan (Fine Gael politician)|Michael Noonan]] who removed the "cap" on the Irish "capital allowances for intangibles" BEPS tool in 2015, to remove any potential Irish corporate tax liability from Apple's Q1 2015 restructuring]]


From July 2016 to July 2018, the Central Statistics Office refused to identify the source of leprechaun economics, and suppressed the release of other economic data to protect Apple's identity under the 1993 Central Statistics Act,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/pr_GDPexplanatorynote.pdf|title=CSO Press Release|publisher=Central Statistics Office (Ireland)|date=12 July 2016|access-date=28 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171122183804/http://cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/pr_GDPexplanatorynote.pdf|archive-date=22 November 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/leprechaun-economics-not-all-down-to-apple-move-insists-cso-35034545.html|title='Leprechaun Economics' not all down to Apple move, insists CSO|work=Irish Independent|date=9 September 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180319214126/https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/leprechaun-economics-not-all-down-to-apple-move-insists-cso-35034545.html|archive-date=19 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> in the manner of a "[[Ireland as a tax haven#Captured state|captured state]]", further damaging confidence in Ireland.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rte.ie/news/2016/0713/802059-gdp-figures-david-murphy/|title=Meaningless economic statistics will cause problems for stewardship of country|publisher=RTE News|date=13 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180404073246/https://www.rte.ie/news/2016/0713/802059-gdp-figures-david-murphy/|archive-date=4 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
From July 2016 to July 2018, the Central Statistics Office refused to identify the source of leprechaun economics, and suppressed the release of other economic data to protect Apple's identity under the 1993 Central Statistics Act,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/pr_GDPexplanatorynote.pdf|title=CSO Press Release|publisher=Central Statistics Office (Ireland)|date=12 July 2016|access-date=28 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171122183804/http://cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/pr_GDPexplanatorynote.pdf|archive-date=22 November 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/leprechaun-economics-not-all-down-to-apple-move-insists-cso-35034545.html|title='Leprechaun Economics' not all down to Apple move, insists CSO|work=Irish Independent|date=9 September 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180319214126/https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/leprechaun-economics-not-all-down-to-apple-move-insists-cso-35034545.html|archive-date=19 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> in the manner of a "[[Ireland as a tax haven#Captured state|captured state]]", further damaging confidence in Ireland.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rte.ie/news/2016/0713/802059-gdp-figures-david-murphy/|title=Meaningless economic statistics will cause problems for stewardship of country|publisher=RTE News|date=13 July 2016|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180404073246/https://www.rte.ie/news/2016/0713/802059-gdp-figures-david-murphy/|archive-date=4 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
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By early 2017, research in the [[MIT Sloan School of Management|Sloan School of Management]] in the [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]], using the limited data released by the Irish CSO, could conclude: ''While corporate inversions and aircraft leasing firms were credited for increasing Irish [2015] GDP, the impact may have been exaggerated''.<ref name="mit">{{cite web|url=https://www.slideshare.net/DanielTierney4/finding-gold-in-leprechaun-economics-an-analysis-of-irelands-recent-macroeconomic-growth-and-subsequent-market-responses|title=Finding "Gold" in Leprechaun Economics|publisher=[[MIT Sloan School of Management]]|author=Daniel Tierney|date=2017|page=5,28,30}}</ref> The same research noted that capital markets did not consider Irish macro economic statistics to be credible or meaningful, as evidenced by the lack of any reaction by the capital markets to Ireland's 26.3% GDP growth (both on the day of release, and in the subsequent days).<ref name="mit"/>
By early 2017, research in the [[MIT Sloan School of Management|Sloan School of Management]] in the [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]], using the limited data released by the Irish CSO, could conclude: ''While corporate inversions and aircraft leasing firms were credited for increasing Irish [2015] GDP, the impact may have been exaggerated''.<ref name="mit">{{cite web|url=https://www.slideshare.net/DanielTierney4/finding-gold-in-leprechaun-economics-an-analysis-of-irelands-recent-macroeconomic-growth-and-subsequent-market-responses|title=Finding "Gold" in Leprechaun Economics|publisher=[[MIT Sloan School of Management]]|author=Daniel Tierney|date=2017|page=5,28,30}}</ref> The same research noted that capital markets did not consider Irish macro economic statistics to be credible or meaningful, as evidenced by the lack of any reaction by the capital markets to Ireland's 26.3% GDP growth (both on the day of release, and in the subsequent days).<ref name="mit"/>


Where as the Obama Administration blocked the proposed USD 160 billion Pfizer-Allergan Irish inversion in 2016, Apple's larger USD 300 billion Irish inversion was ignored. It is not clear if this was due to the confusion caused by the [[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]] in protecting Apple's identity for 2 years, or other reasons.
Where as the Obama Administration blocked the proposed US$160 billion Pfizer-Allergan Irish inversion in 2016, Apple's larger US$300 billion Irish inversion was ignored. It is not clear if this was due to the confusion caused by the [[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]] in protecting Apple's identity for 2 years, or other reasons.


==2017 GNI* response==
== 2017 GNI* response ==

[[File:Paul Krugman-press conference Dec 07th, 2008-2.jpg|thumb|Nobel Prize-winning US economist [[Paul Krugman]] whose tweet on the 12 July 2016 christened the Irish "[[Leprechaun economics]]" affair and precipitated the creation of "Modified gross national income", or GNI*.]]
[[File:Paul Krugman-press conference Dec 07th, 2008-2.jpg|thumb|Nobel Prize-winning US economist [[Paul Krugman]] whose tweet on the 12 July 2016 christened the Irish "[[Leprechaun economics]]" affair and precipitated the creation of "Modified gross national income", or GNI*]]


In September 2016, as a direct result of the "leprechaun economics" affair, the Governor of the [[Central Bank of Ireland]] ("CBI"), [[Philip R. Lane]], chaired a special cross-economic steering group, the Economic Statistics Review Group ("ESRG"), of stakeholders (incl. [[Central Bank of Ireland|CBI]], [[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council|IFAC]], [[Economic and Social Research Institute|ESRI]], [[National Treasury Management Agency|NTMA]], leading academics and the [[Department of Finance (Ireland)|Department of Finance]]), to recommend new economic statistics that would better represent the true position of the Irish economy.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomicstatisticsreviewgroup/Economic_Statistics_Review_(ESRG)_Report_Dec_2016.pdf|title=REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC STATISTICS REVIEW GROUP|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=December 2016|access-date=2018-04-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171205232949/http://cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomicstatisticsreviewgroup/Economic_Statistics_Review_(ESRG)_Report_Dec_2016.pdf|archive-date=2017-12-05|url-status=live}}</ref>
In September 2016, as a direct result of the "leprechaun economics" affair, the Governor of the [[Central Bank of Ireland]] ("CBI"), [[Philip R. Lane]], chaired a special cross-economic steering group, the Economic Statistics Review Group ("ESRG"), of stakeholders (incl. [[Central Bank of Ireland|CBI]], [[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council|IFAC]], [[Economic and Social Research Institute|ESRI]], [[National Treasury Management Agency|NTMA]], leading academics and the [[Department of Finance (Ireland)|Department of Finance]]), to recommend new economic statistics that would better represent the true position of the Irish economy.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomicstatisticsreviewgroup/Economic_Statistics_Review_(ESRG)_Report_Dec_2016.pdf|title=REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC STATISTICS REVIEW GROUP|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=December 2016|access-date=2018-04-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171205232949/http://cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomicstatisticsreviewgroup/Economic_Statistics_Review_(ESRG)_Report_Dec_2016.pdf|archive-date=2017-12-05|url-status=live}}</ref>


In February 2017, a new metric, "Modified Gross National Income" (or GNI* for short) was announced. The difference between GNI* and GNI is due to having to deal with two problems (a) The retained earnings of re–domiciled firms in Ireland (where the earnings ultimately accrue to foreign investors), and (b) depreciation on foreign-owned capital assets located in Ireland, such as intellectual property (which inflate the size of Irish GDP, but again the benefits accrue to foreign investors).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomicstatisticsreviewgroup/ESRG_Presentation_-_Press_Briefing.pdf|title=ESRG Presentation and CSO Response|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=4 February 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171205233009/http://cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomicstatisticsreviewgroup/ESRG_Presentation_-_Press_Briefing.pdf|archive-date=5 December 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2017/0204/850115-leprechaun-economics/|title=Leprechaun-proofing economic data|publisher=RTE News|date=4 February 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612143155/https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2017/0204/850115-leprechaun-economics/|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
In February 2017, a new metric, "Modified Gross National Income" (or GNI* for short) was announced. The difference between GNI* and GNI is due to having to deal with two problems (a) The retained earnings of re-domiciled firms in Ireland (where the earnings ultimately accrue to foreign investors), and (b) depreciation on foreign-owned capital assets located in Ireland, such as intellectual property (which inflate the size of Irish GDP, but again the benefits accrue to foreign investors).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomicstatisticsreviewgroup/ESRG_Presentation_-_Press_Briefing.pdf|title=ESRG Presentation and CSO Response|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=4 February 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171205233009/http://cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomicstatisticsreviewgroup/ESRG_Presentation_-_Press_Briefing.pdf|archive-date=5 December 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2017/0204/850115-leprechaun-economics/|title=Leprechaun-proofing economic data|publisher=RTE News|date=4 February 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612143155/https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2017/0204/850115-leprechaun-economics/|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>


The [[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]] ("CSO") simplifies the definition of Irish modified GNI (or GNI*) as follows:
The [[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]] ("CSO") simplifies the definition of Irish modified GNI (or GNI*) as follows:


{{quote|Irish GNI less the effects of the profits of re–domiciled companies and the depreciation of intellectual property products and aircraft leasing companies.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/pressreleases/2017pressreleases/pressstatementmacroeconomicreleasesyear2016andquarter12017/|title=CSO Data Editor's Note|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=14 July 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180408073352/http://www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/pressreleases/2017pressreleases/pressstatementmacroeconomicreleasesyear2016andquarter12017/|archive-date=8 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>}}
{{quote|Irish GNI less the effects of the profits of re-domiciled companies and the depreciation of intellectual property products and aircraft leasing companies.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/pressreleases/2017pressreleases/pressstatementmacroeconomicreleasesyear2016andquarter12017/|title=CSO Data Editor's Note|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=14 July 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180408073352/http://www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/pressreleases/2017pressreleases/pressstatementmacroeconomicreleasesyear2016andquarter12017/|archive-date=8 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>}}


In February 2017, the CSO stated they would continue to calculate and release Irish GDP and Irish GNP to meet their EU and other International statistical reporting commitments.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomicstatisticsreviewgroup/ESRG_CSO_response_3_Feb_2017.pdf|title=Central Statistics Office (CSO) Response to the Main Recommendations of the Economic Statistics Review Group (ESRG)|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=3 February 2017|access-date=11 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180205100210/http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomicstatisticsreviewgroup/ESRG_CSO_response_3_Feb_2017.pdf|archive-date=5 February 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> In July 2017, the CSO estimated that 2016 Irish GNI* (€190bn) was 30% below Irish GDP (€275bn), or that Irish GDP is 143% above Irish GNI*. The CSO also confirmed that Irish Net Public Debt-to-GNI* was 106% (Irish Net Public Debt-to-GDP, post [[leprechaun economics]], was 73%).<ref name="gni1">{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/cso-paints-a-very-different-picture-of-irish-economy-with-new-measure-1.3155462|title=CSO paints a very different picture of Irish economy with new measure|newspaper=Irish Times|date=15 July 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180329185914/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/cso-paints-a-very-different-picture-of-irish-economy-with-new-measure-1.3155462|archive-date=29 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="gni2">{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/new-economic-leprechaun-on-loose-as-rate-of-growth-plunges-35932663.html|title=New economic Leprechaun on loose as rate of growth plunges|newspaper=Irish Independent|date=15 July 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180329184704/https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/new-economic-leprechaun-on-loose-as-rate-of-growth-plunges-35932663.html|archive-date=29 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
In February 2017, the CSO stated they would continue to calculate and release Irish GDP and Irish GNP to meet their EU and other International statistical reporting commitments.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomicstatisticsreviewgroup/ESRG_CSO_response_3_Feb_2017.pdf|title=Central Statistics Office (CSO) Response to the Main Recommendations of the Economic Statistics Review Group (ESRG)|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=3 February 2017|access-date=11 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180205100210/http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/newsevents/documents/reportoftheeconomicstatisticsreviewgroup/ESRG_CSO_response_3_Feb_2017.pdf|archive-date=5 February 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> In July 2017, the CSO estimated that 2016 Irish GNI* (€190bn) was 30% below Irish GDP (€275bn), or that Irish GDP is 143% above Irish GNI*. The CSO also confirmed that Irish Net Public Debt-to-GNI* was 106% (Irish Net Public Debt-to-GDP, post [[leprechaun economics]], was 73%).<ref name="gni1">{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/cso-paints-a-very-different-picture-of-irish-economy-with-new-measure-1.3155462|title=CSO paints a very different picture of Irish economy with new measure|newspaper=Irish Times|date=15 July 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180329185914/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/cso-paints-a-very-different-picture-of-irish-economy-with-new-measure-1.3155462|archive-date=29 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="gni2">{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/new-economic-leprechaun-on-loose-as-rate-of-growth-plunges-35932663.html|title=New economic Leprechaun on loose as rate of growth plunges|newspaper=Irish Independent|date=15 July 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180329184704/https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/new-economic-leprechaun-on-loose-as-rate-of-growth-plunges-35932663.html|archive-date=29 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>


In December 2017, [[Eurostat]] noted that while GNI* was helpful, it was still being artificially inflated by BEPS flows, and the BEPS activities of certain types of [[contract manufacturing]] in particular;<ref name="eurostat1">{{cite web|url=https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cros/system/files/euronaissue2-2016-art2.pdf|title=Globalisation at work in statistics — Questions arising from the ‘Irish case’|publisher=[[EuroStat]]|author1=SILKE STAPEL-WEBER|author2=JOHN VERRINDER|quote=Nevertheless the rise in [Irish] GNI* is still very substantial because the additional income flows of the companies (interest and dividends) concerned are considerably smaller than the value added of their activities|page=31|date=December 2017|access-date=2018-08-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180428205432/https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cros/system/files/euronaissue2-2016-art2.pdf|archive-date=2018-04-28|url-status=live}}</ref> a view shared by several others.<ref name="ber"/><ref name="a">{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-s-economic-figures-still-not-adding-up-1.2899681?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Frp.liu233w.com%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fireland-s-economic-figures-still-not-adding-up-1.2899681|title=Ireland’s economic figures still not adding up|newspaper=Irish Times|date=January 2017|access-date=2018-04-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180405024332/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-s-economic-figures-still-not-adding-up-1.2899681?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Frp.liu233w.com%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fireland-s-economic-figures-still-not-adding-up-1.2899681|archive-date=2018-04-05|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.finfacts-blog.com/2019/02/irish-workers-most-productive-in-world.html|title=Irish workers most productive in world or same as Italians|publisher=FinFacts|date=7 February 2019|accessdate=24 February 2019|author=Michael Hennigan|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190224173454/https://www.finfacts-blog.com/2019/02/irish-workers-most-productive-in-world.html|archive-date=24 February 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="b">{{cite web|url=http://economic-incentives.blogspot.ie/2018/03/what-is-going-on-with-gnp.html|title=What is going on with GNP (again)?|publisher=Economic Incentives|author=[[Seamus Coffey]], [[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]]|date=27 March 2018|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180405024148/http://economic-incentives.blogspot.ie/2018/03/what-is-going-on-with-gnp.html|archive-date=5 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="cantill">{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/lies-damned-lies-and-the-national-accounts-headline-figures-1.3329078|title=Lies, damned lies and the national accounts headline figures|newspaper=The Irish Times|date=16 December 2017|access-date=9 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180409233456/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/lies-damned-lies-and-the-national-accounts-headline-figures-1.3329078|archive-date=9 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="ll1">{{cite web|url=http://www.thejournal.ie/readme/column-the-leprechauns-are-at-it-again-in-the-latest-gdp-figures-for-ireland-3280962-Mar2017/|title=Column: The Leprechauns are at it again in the latest GDP figures for Ireland|publisher=thejournal.ie|date=17 March 2017|access-date=9 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180409233604/http://www.thejournal.ie/readme/column-the-leprechauns-are-at-it-again-in-the-latest-gdp-figures-for-ireland-3280962-Mar2017/|archive-date=9 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> There have been several material revisions to Irish 2015 GDP in particular (as per {{slink|#Irish GDP versus Modified GNI (2009–2017)}}.<ref name="gni3">{{cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/dd3a6f1c-6aea-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa|title=Ireland's deglobalised data to calculate a smaller economy|newspaper=Financial Times|date=17 July 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180330012312/https://www.ft.com/content/dd3a6f1c-6aea-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa|archive-date=30 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Modified GNI, or GNI*, was adopted by the IMF and OECD in their 2017 Ireland Country Reports.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/11/10/Ireland-Technical-Assistance-Report-Public-Investment-Management-Assessment-45383|title=Ireland: Technical Assistance Report-Public Investment Management Assessment|publisher=[[International Monetary Fund]]|date=November 2017|quote=Country Report No. 17/333|access-date=2018-04-12|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180413124542/http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/11/10/Ireland-Technical-Assistance-Report-Public-Investment-Management-Assessment-45383|archive-date=2018-04-13|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="oecd"/>
In December 2017, [[Eurostat]] noted that while GNI* was helpful, it was still being artificially inflated by BEPS flows, and the BEPS activities of certain types of [[contract manufacturing]] in particular;<ref name="eurostat1">{{cite web|url=https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cros/system/files/euronaissue2-2016-art2.pdf|title=Globalisation at work in statistics — Questions arising from the 'Irish case'|publisher=[[EuroStat]]|author1=SILKE STAPEL-WEBER|author2=JOHN VERRINDER|quote=Nevertheless the rise in [Irish] GNI* is still very substantial because the additional income flows of the companies (interest and dividends) concerned are considerably smaller than the value added of their activities|page=31|date=December 2017|access-date=2018-08-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180428205432/https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cros/system/files/euronaissue2-2016-art2.pdf|archive-date=2018-04-28|url-status=live}}</ref> a view shared by several others.<ref name="ber"/><ref name="a">{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-s-economic-figures-still-not-adding-up-1.2899681?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Frp.liu233w.com%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fireland-s-economic-figures-still-not-adding-up-1.2899681|title=Ireland's economic figures still not adding up|newspaper=Irish Times|date=January 2017|access-date=2018-04-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180405024332/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-s-economic-figures-still-not-adding-up-1.2899681?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Frp.liu233w.com%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fireland-s-economic-figures-still-not-adding-up-1.2899681|archive-date=2018-04-05|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.finfacts-blog.com/2019/02/irish-workers-most-productive-in-world.html|title=Irish workers most productive in world or same as Italians|publisher=FinFacts|date=7 February 2019|access-date=24 February 2019|author=Michael Hennigan|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190224173454/https://www.finfacts-blog.com/2019/02/irish-workers-most-productive-in-world.html|archive-date=24 February 2019|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="b">{{cite web|url=http://economic-incentives.blogspot.ie/2018/03/what-is-going-on-with-gnp.html|title=What is going on with GNP (again)?|publisher=Economic Incentives|author=[[Seamus Coffey]], [[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]]|date=27 March 2018|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180405024148/http://economic-incentives.blogspot.ie/2018/03/what-is-going-on-with-gnp.html|archive-date=5 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="cantill">{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/lies-damned-lies-and-the-national-accounts-headline-figures-1.3329078|title=Lies, damned lies and the national accounts headline figures|newspaper=The Irish Times|date=16 December 2017|access-date=9 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180409233456/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/lies-damned-lies-and-the-national-accounts-headline-figures-1.3329078|archive-date=9 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="ll1">{{cite web|url=http://www.thejournal.ie/readme/column-the-leprechauns-are-at-it-again-in-the-latest-gdp-figures-for-ireland-3280962-Mar2017/|title=Column: The Leprechauns are at it again in the latest GDP figures for Ireland|publisher=thejournal.ie|date=17 March 2017|access-date=9 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180409233604/http://www.thejournal.ie/readme/column-the-leprechauns-are-at-it-again-in-the-latest-gdp-figures-for-ireland-3280962-Mar2017/|archive-date=9 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> There have been several material revisions to Irish 2015 GDP in particular (as per {{slink|#Irish GDP versus Modified GNI (2009–2017)}}.<ref name="gni3">{{cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/dd3a6f1c-6aea-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa|title=Ireland's deglobalised data to calculate a smaller economy|newspaper=Financial Times|date=17 July 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180330012312/https://www.ft.com/content/dd3a6f1c-6aea-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa|archive-date=30 March 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Modified GNI, or GNI*, was adopted by the IMF and OECD in their 2017 Ireland Country Reports.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/11/10/Ireland-Technical-Assistance-Report-Public-Investment-Management-Assessment-45383|title=Ireland: Technical Assistance Report-Public Investment Management Assessment|publisher=[[International Monetary Fund]]|date=November 2017|quote=Country Report No. 17/333|access-date=2018-04-12|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180413124542/http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/11/10/Ireland-Technical-Assistance-Report-Public-Investment-Management-Assessment-45383|archive-date=2018-04-13|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="oecd"/>


Economists noted in May 2018 that distorted Irish economic data was calling into question the credibility of [[Eurostat]]'s ''aggregate'' EU–28 economic data.<ref name="brad1"/>
Economists noted in May 2018 that distorted Irish economic data was calling into question the credibility of [[Eurostat]]'s ''aggregate'' EU-28 economic data.<ref name="brad1"/>


In June 2018, tax academic [[Gabriel Zucman]], using 2015 economic data, showed Irish [[BEPS]] tools had made Ireland the world's largest tax haven ([[Gabriel Zucman#Zucman-Tørsløv-Wier 2018 list|Zucman–Tørsløv–Wier 2018 list]]).<ref name="z1">{{cite web|url=http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018.pdf|title=The Missing Profits of Nations|author1=Gabriel Zucman|publisher=[[National Bureau of Economic Research]]|author2=Thomas Tørsløv|author3=Ludvig Wier|date=8 June 2018|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180802230048/http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018.pdf|archive-date=2 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="zux">{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Frp.liu233w.com%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401|title=Ireland is the world’s biggest corporate ‘tax haven’, say academics|quote=New Gabriel Zucman study claims State shelters more multinational profits than the entire Caribbean|newspaper=Irish Times|date=13 June 2018|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180824044322/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Frp.liu233w.com%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401|archive-date=24 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Zucman also showed that Irish BEPS flows were becoming so large, that they were artificially exaggerating the scale of the EU–US trade deficit.<ref name="z5">{{cite web|url=http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018.pdf|title=The Missing Profits of Nations∗|quote=Profit shifting also has a significant effect on trade balances. For instance, after accounting for profit shifting, Japan, the U.K., France, and Greece turn out to have trade surpluses in 2015, in contrast to the published data that record trade deficits. According to our estimates, the true trade deficit of the United States was 2.1% of GDP in 2015, instead of 2.8% in the official statistics—that is, a quarter of the recorded trade deficit of the United States is an illusion of multinational corporate tax avoidance.|author1=[[Gabriel Zucman]]|author2=Thomas Tørsløv|author3=Ludvig Wier|publisher=[[National Bureau of Economic Research]], Working Papers|page=25|date=8 June 2018|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180802230048/http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018.pdf|archive-date=2 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
In June 2018, tax academic [[Gabriel Zucman]], using 2015 economic data, claimed Irish [[BEPS]] tools had made Ireland the world's largest tax haven ([[Gabriel Zucman#Zucman-Tørsløv-Wier 2018 list|Zucman-Tørsløv-Wier 2018 list]]).<ref name="z1">{{cite web|url=http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018.pdf|title=The Missing Profits of Nations|author1=Gabriel Zucman|publisher=[[National Bureau of Economic Research]]|author2=Thomas Tørsløv|author3=Ludvig Wier|date=8 June 2018|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180802230048/http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018.pdf|archive-date=2 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref name="zux">{{cite news|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Frp.liu233w.com%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401|title=Ireland is the world's biggest corporate 'tax haven', say academics|quote=New Gabriel Zucman study claims State shelters more multinational profits than the entire Caribbean|newspaper=Irish Times|date=13 June 2018|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180824044322/https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Frp.liu233w.com%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Feconomy%2Fireland-is-the-world-s-biggest-corporate-tax-haven-say-academics-1.3528401|archive-date=24 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Zucman also showed that Irish BEPS flows were becoming so large, that they were artificially exaggerating the scale of the EU-US trade deficit.<ref name="z5">{{cite web|url=http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018.pdf|title=The Missing Profits of Nations∗|quote=Profit shifting also has a significant effect on trade balances. For instance, after accounting for profit shifting, Japan, the U.K., France, and Greece turn out to have trade surpluses in 2015, in contrast to the published data that record trade deficits. According to our estimates, the true trade deficit of the United States was 2.1% of GDP in 2015, instead of 2.8% in the official statistics—that is, a quarter of the recorded trade deficit of the United States is an illusion of multinational corporate tax avoidance.|author1=[[Gabriel Zucman]]|author2=Thomas Tørsløv|author3=Ludvig Wier|publisher=[[National Bureau of Economic Research]], Working Papers|page=25|date=8 June 2018|access-date=23 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180802230048/http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/TWZ2018.pdf|archive-date=2 August 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>


Another study published in June 2018 by the IMF called into question the economic data of all [[Tax haven#Top 10 tax havens|leading tax havens]], and the artificial effect of their BEPS tools.<ref name="imfx">{{cite journal|url=http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/06/inside-the-world-of-global-tax-havens-and-offshore-banking/damgaard.htm|title=Piercing the Veil of Tax Havens|author1=JANNICK DAMGAARD|author2=THOMAS ELKJAER|author3=NIELS JOHANNESEN|journal=International Monetary Fund: [[Finance & Development|Finance & Development Quarterly]]|quote=The eight major pass-through economies—the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong SAR, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Ireland, and Singapore—host more than 85 percent of the world’s investment in special purpose entities, which are often set up for tax reasons.|volume=55|issue=2|date=June 2018|access-date=2018-06-12|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612142524/http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/06/inside-the-world-of-global-tax-havens-and-offshore-banking/damgaard.htm|archive-date=2018-06-12|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="qqtz">{{cite news|url=https://qz.com/1300880/tax-havens-mean-40-of-foreign-direct-investments-are-artificial/|title=How tax havens turn economic statistics into nonsense|work=[[Quartz (publication)]]|author=Max de Haldevang|date=11 June 2018|quote=A recent IMF article reveals a perfect example: “A stunning $12 trillion—almost 40% of all foreign direct investment positions globally—is completely artificial,” write economists Jannick Damgaard, Thomas Elkjaer, and Niels Johannesen|access-date=12 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612143908/https://qz.com/1300880/tax-havens-mean-40-of-foreign-direct-investments-are-artificial/|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
Another study published in June 2018 by the IMF called into question the economic data of all [[Tax haven#Top 10 tax havens|leading tax havens]], and the artificial effect of their BEPS tools.<ref name="imfx">{{cite journal|url=http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/06/inside-the-world-of-global-tax-havens-and-offshore-banking/damgaard.htm|title=Piercing the Veil of Tax Havens|author1=JANNICK DAMGAARD|author2=THOMAS ELKJAER|author3=NIELS JOHANNESEN|journal=International Monetary Fund: Finance & Development Quarterly|quote=The eight major pass-through economies—the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong SAR, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Ireland, and Singapore—host more than 85 percent of the world’s investment in special purpose entities, which are often set up for tax reasons.|volume=55|issue=2|date=June 2018|access-date=2018-06-12|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612142524/http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/06/inside-the-world-of-global-tax-havens-and-offshore-banking/damgaard.htm|archive-date=2018-06-12|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="qqtz">{{cite news|url=https://qz.com/1300880/tax-havens-mean-40-of-foreign-direct-investments-are-artificial/|title=How tax havens turn economic statistics into nonsense|work=[[Quartz (publication)]]|author=Max de Haldevang|date=11 June 2018|quote=A recent IMF article reveals a perfect example: “A stunning $12 trillion—almost 40% of all foreign direct investment positions globally—is completely artificial,” write economists Jannick Damgaard, Thomas Elkjaer, and Niels Johannesen|access-date=12 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612143908/https://qz.com/1300880/tax-havens-mean-40-of-foreign-direct-investments-are-artificial/|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>


==2018 Debt metrics==
== 2018 debt metrics ==
{{see |Irish Fiscal Advisory Council#Focus|Central Bank of Ireland#Criticisms}}


{{see|Irish Fiscal Advisory Council#Focus|Central Bank of Ireland#Criticisms}}
[[File:Irish Debt to GDP and GNI (2000 to 2017).png|thumb|Irish Public Debt-to-GDP and Public Debt-to-GNI* from 2000 to 2017.<ref name="dof10">{{cite web|url=https://www.finance.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/annual-taxation-report.pdf|title=ANNUAL TAXATION REPORT|publisher=[[Department of Finance (Ireland)]]|quote=Figure A.4: public debt as a share of national income, per cent|date=January 2018|page=13|access-date=2018-11-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180209104026/http://www.finance.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/annual-taxation-report.pdf|archive-date=2018-02-09|url-status=live}}</ref>]]


The issues post leprechaun economics, and "modified GNI", are captured on page 34 of the OECD 2018 Ireland survey:<ref name="oecd">{{cite web|url=http://www.finance.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/OECD-survey.pdf|title=OECD Ireland Survey 2018|publisher=[[OECD]]|page=34|date=March 2018|isbn=978-92-64-29177-5|access-date=2018-04-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180404202024/http://www.finance.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/OECD-survey.pdf|archive-date=2018-04-04|url-status=live}}</ref>
[[File:Irish Debt to GDP and GNI (2000 to 2017).png|thumb|Irish public debt-to-GDP and public debt-to-GNI* from 2000 to 2017<ref name="dof10">{{cite web|url=https://www.finance.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/annual-taxation-report.pdf|title=ANNUAL TAXATION REPORT|publisher=[[Department of Finance (Ireland)]]|quote=Figure A.4: public debt as a share of national income, per cent|date=January 2018|page=13|access-date=2018-11-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180209104026/http://www.finance.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/annual-taxation-report.pdf|archive-date=2018-02-09|url-status=live}}</ref>]]

The issues post leprechaun economics, and "modified GNI", are captured on page 34 of the OECD 2018 Ireland survey:<ref name="oecd">{{cite book|url=http://www.finance.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/OECD-survey.pdf|title=OECD Ireland Survey 2018|publisher=[[OECD]]|page=34|date=March 2018|isbn=978-92-64-29177-5|access-date=2018-04-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180404202024/http://www.finance.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/OECD-survey.pdf|archive-date=2018-04-04|url-status=dead}}</ref>
{{ordered list|type=lower-roman
{{ordered list|type=lower-roman
| On a Gross Public Debt-to-GDP basis, Ireland's 2015 figure at 78.8% is not of concern;
| On a gross public debt-to-GDP basis, Ireland's 2015 figure at 78.8% is not of concern;
| On a Gross Public Debt-to-GNI* basis, Ireland's 2015 figure at 116.5% is more serious, but not alarming;
| On a gross public debt-to-GNI* basis, Ireland's 2015 figure at 116.5% is more serious, but not alarming;
| On a Gross Public Debt-Per-Capita basis, Ireland's 2015 figure at over $62,686 per capita, exceeds every other OECD country, except Japan.<ref name="irip">{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/national-debt-now-44000-per-head-35904197.html|title=National debt now €44000 per head|newspaper=Irish Independent|date=7 July 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180407053502/https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/national-debt-now-44000-per-head-35904197.html|archive-date=7 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
| On a gross public debt-per-capita basis, Ireland's 2015 figure at over $62,686 per capita, is the second highest in the [[OECD]], after Japan.<ref name="irip">{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/national-debt-now-44000-per-head-35904197.html|title=National debt now €44000 per head|newspaper=Irish Independent|date=7 July 2017|access-date=7 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180407053502/https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/national-debt-now-44000-per-head-35904197.html|archive-date=7 April 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>
}}
}}
There is concern Ireland repeats the mistakes of the "[[Celtic Tiger]]" era, and over-leverages again, against distorted Irish economic data.<ref name ="a"/> Given the transfer of Irish private sector debt to the Irish public balance sheet from the Irish 2009–2012 financial crisis, it will not be possible to bail out the Irish banking system again.
There is concern Ireland repeats the mistakes of the "[[Celtic Tiger]]" era, and over-leverages again, against distorted Irish economic data.<ref name ="a"/> Given the transfer of Irish private sector debt to the Irish public balance sheet from the Irish 2009–2012 financial crisis, it will not be possible to bail out the Irish banking system again.


[[File:OECD Public Debt per Capita (2015).png|thumb|upright=1.6|OECD Public Debt-per-Capita table for 2015.<ref name="oecd"/>]]
[[File:OECD Public Debt per Capita (2015).png|thumb|upright=1.6|OECD Public Debt-per-Capita table for 2015<ref name="oecd"/>]]


* In June 2017, the [[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]] benchmarked Irish public debt against Irish Tax Revenues (similar to the Debt-to-EBITDA ratio used in capital markets). Ireland's 2016 Gross Public Debt-to-Tax Revenues was 282.9%, the 4th highest in the EU–28 (after Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Fiscal-Assessment-Report-June-2017-Presentation.pdf|title=Debt levels remain high following the crisis June FAR Slide 7|publisher=[[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]]|date=June 2017|access-date=2018-04-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171114080254/http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Fiscal-Assessment-Report-June-2017-Presentation.pdf|archive-date=2017-11-14|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Fiscal-Assessment-Report-June-2017-Final.pdf|title=Section 1.2.2 Recent Fiscal Context June FAR Page 14|publisher=[[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]]|date=June 2017|access-date=2018-04-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171114080236/http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Fiscal-Assessment-Report-June-2017-Final.pdf|archive-date=2017-11-14|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Website-AN5.pdf | title=Future Implications of the Debt Rule | author=John Howlin | publisher=[[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]] | date=June 2014 | access-date=2018-04-07 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171114150425/http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Website-AN5.pdf | archive-date=2017-11-14 | url-status=live }}</ref>
* In June 2017, the [[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]] benchmarked Irish public debt against Irish tax revenues (similar to the debt-to-EBITDA ratio used in capital markets). Ireland's 2016 gross public debt-to-tax revenues was 282.9%, the 4th highest in the EU-28 (after Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Fiscal-Assessment-Report-June-2017-Presentation.pdf|title=Debt levels remain high following the crisis June FAR Slide 7|publisher=[[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]]|date=June 2017|access-date=2018-04-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171114080254/http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Fiscal-Assessment-Report-June-2017-Presentation.pdf|archive-date=2017-11-14|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Fiscal-Assessment-Report-June-2017-Final.pdf|title=Section 1.2.2 Recent Fiscal Context June FAR Page 14|publisher=[[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]]|date=June 2017|access-date=2018-04-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171114080236/http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Fiscal-Assessment-Report-June-2017-Final.pdf|archive-date=2017-11-14|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Website-AN5.pdf | title=Future Implications of the Debt Rule | author=John Howlin | publisher=[[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]] | date=June 2014 | access-date=2018-04-07 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171114150425/http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Website-AN5.pdf | archive-date=2017-11-14 | url-status=live }}</ref>
* In November 2017, the [[Central Bank of Ireland]] benchmarked Irish private debt against Irish [[disposable income]]. Ireland's 2016 private debt as a % of Irish disposable income was 141.6%, the 4th highest in the EU–28 (after Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden).<ref>{{ cite web|url=https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/statistics/data-and-analysis/financial-accounts/quarterly-financial-accounts-for-ireland-q2-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=4%7C | title=Quarterly Statistical Release: November 2017|publisher=[[Central Bank of Ireland]]|date=November 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite news| url=https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/household-debt-now-at-its-lowest-level-since-2005-36296916.html| title=Household debt now at its lowest level since 2005| newspaper=Irish Independent| date=7 November 2017| access-date=7 April 2018| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180408010306/https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/household-debt-now-at-its-lowest-level-since-2005-36296916.html| archive-date=8 April 2018| url-status=live| df=dmy-all}}</ref>
* In November 2017, the [[Central Bank of Ireland]] benchmarked Irish private debt against Irish [[disposable income]]. Ireland's 2016 private debt as a % of Irish disposable income was 141.6%, the 4th highest in the EU-28 (after Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden).<ref>{{ cite web|url=https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/statistics/data-and-analysis/financial-accounts/quarterly-financial-accounts-for-ireland-q2-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=4%7C | title=Quarterly Statistical Release: November 2017|publisher=[[Central Bank of Ireland]]|date=November 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite news| url=https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/household-debt-now-at-its-lowest-level-since-2005-36296916.html| title=Household debt now at its lowest level since 2005| newspaper=Irish Independent| date=7 November 2017| access-date=7 April 2018| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180408010306/https://www.independent.ie/business/irish/household-debt-now-at-its-lowest-level-since-2005-36296916.html| archive-date=8 April 2018| url-status=live| df=dmy-all}}</ref>


These two initiatives show Ireland's high public debt levels, and Ireland's high private sector debt levels, imply that on a "total debt" basis (i.e. Irish public debt plus Irish private debt), Ireland is likey one of the most indebted of the EU–28 countries when benchmarked on a GNI*–type basis; hence the importance of a GNI* metric.
These two initiatives show Ireland's high public debt levels, and Ireland's high private sector debt levels, imply that on a "total debt" basis (i.e. Irish public debt plus Irish private debt), Ireland is likely one of the most indebted of the EU-27 countries when benchmarked on a GNI*-type basis; hence the importance of a GNI* metric.{{Citation needed|date=January 2021}}

== Irish GDP versus Modified GNI (2009–2018) ==


==Irish GDP versus Modified GNI (2009–2018)==
{| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align:left"
{| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align:left"
|+ style="text-align: left;" |Irish National Income and Expenditure 2017 (measured in 2018 euros) 2009–2017<ref name="eurostat2">{{cite web|url=https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/sdg_08_10|title=Real GDP per capita|publisher=[[Eurostat]]|access-date=26 November 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181126221404/https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/sdg_08_10|archive-date=26 November 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-nie/nie2017/mgni/|title=National Income and Expenditure 2017: Modified gross national income|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=2018|access-date=2018-08-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180821160504/https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-nie/nie2017/mgni/|archive-date=2018-08-21|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cso.ie/en/methods/nationalaccounts/din/nie2017faq/|title=National Income and Expenditure 2017 Frequently Asked Questions: Question 4, What is GNI*?|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=November 2017|access-date=2018-08-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180826214541/https://www.cso.ie/en/methods/nationalaccounts/din/nie2017faq/|archive-date=2018-08-26|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/presspages/2019/nationalincomeandexpenditurequarterlynationalaccountsandinternationalaccounts/|title=National Income and Expenditure, Quarterly National Accounts and International Accounts (2018)|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=July 2019|access-date=2019-07-11}}</ref>
|+ style="text-align: left;" |Irish National Income and Expenditure 2017 (measured in 2018 euros) 2009–2017<ref name="eurostat2">{{cite web|url=https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/sdg_08_10|title=Real GDP per capita|publisher=[[Eurostat]]|access-date=26 November 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181126221404/https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/sdg_08_10|archive-date=26 November 2018|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-nie/nie2017/mgni/|title=National Income and Expenditure 2017: Modified gross national income|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=2018|access-date=2018-08-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180821160504/https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-nie/nie2017/mgni/|archive-date=2018-08-21|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cso.ie/en/methods/nationalaccounts/din/nie2017faq/|title=National Income and Expenditure 2017 Frequently Asked Questions: Question 4, What is GNI*?|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=November 2017|access-date=2018-08-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180826214541/https://www.cso.ie/en/methods/nationalaccounts/din/nie2017faq/|archive-date=2018-08-26|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/presspages/2019/nationalincomeandexpenditurequarterlynationalaccountsandinternationalaccounts/|title=National Income and Expenditure, Quarterly National Accounts and International Accounts (2018)|publisher=[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]|date=July 2019|access-date=2019-07-11}}</ref>
Line 152: Line 156:
!colspan="2" style="width:80px;text-align:left"|Irish GDP<br>
!colspan="2" style="width:80px;text-align:left"|Irish GDP<br>
!colspan="2" style="width:80px;text-align:left"|Irish GNI*<br>
!colspan="2" style="width:80px;text-align:left"|Irish GNI*<br>
!rowspan="2" style="width:80px;background:#cfc;text-align:left"|Irish<br>GDP/GNI*<br>Ratio
!rowspan="2" style="width:80px;background:#cfc;text-align:left"|Irish<br>GDP/GNI*<br />ratio
!rowspan="2" style="width:80px;background:#cfc;text-align:left"|EU–28<br>GDP/GNI<br>Ratio
!rowspan="2" style="width:80px;background:#cfc;text-align:left"|EU-28<br>GDP/GNI<br />ratio
|-
|-
!style="width:80px;text-align:left"|(€ bn)
!style="width:80px;text-align:left"|(€ bn)
!style="width:80px;text-align:left"|YOY<br>(%)
!style="width:80px;text-align:left"|YOY<br />(%)
!style="width:80px;text-align:left"|(€ bn)
!style="width:80px;text-align:left"|(€ bn)
!style="width:80px;text-align:left"|YOY<br>(%)
!style="width:80px;text-align:left"|YOY<br />(%)
|-
|-
|2009||170.1||-||134.8||-||126% ||100%
|2009||170.1||-||134.8||-||126% ||100%
Line 178: Line 182:
|2017||294.1||7.6%||181.2||3.1%||162%||100%
|2017||294.1||7.6%||181.2||3.1%||162%||100%
|-
|-
|2018^||324.0||8.2%||197.5||-||-||100%
|2018^||324.0||8.2%||197.5||-||-||100%<!-- See 2018 related comment on talk page before you edit this line -->
|}
|}


(†) The [[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]] revised 2015 GDP higher in 2017, increasing Ireland's "[[leprechaun economics]]" 2015 GDP growth rate from 26.3% to 34.4%.<br />
(^) See 2018 related comment on talk page before you edit this line<br>
(†) The [[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]] revised 2015 GDP higher in 2017, increasing Ireland's "[[leprechaun economics]]" 2015 GDP growth rate from 26.3% to 34.4%.<br>
(‡) [[Eurostat]] show that GNI* is also still distorted by certain BEPS tools, and specifically [[contract manufacturing]], which is a significant activity in Ireland.<ref name="eurostat1"/>
(‡) [[Eurostat]] show that GNI* is also still distorted by certain BEPS tools, and specifically [[contract manufacturing]], which is a significant activity in Ireland.<ref name="eurostat1"/>


==See also==
== See also ==

{{Portal|Ireland}}
{{Portal|Ireland}}
* [[Double Irish]]
* [[Economy of the Republic of Ireland]]
* [[Corporation tax in the Republic of Ireland]]
* [[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]]
* [[Revenue Commissioners]]
* [[Central Bank of Ireland]]
* [[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]
* [[Ireland as a tax haven]]


== References ==
*[[Double Irish|Double Irish, Single Malt, Capital Allowances for Intangible Assets]]
*[[Economy of the Republic of Ireland]]
*[[Corporation tax in the Republic of Ireland]]
*[[Irish Fiscal Advisory Council]]
*[[Revenue Commissioners]]
*[[Central Bank of Ireland]]
*[[Central Statistics Office (Ireland)]]
*[[Put on the green jersey|green jersey agenda]]
*[[Ireland as a tax haven]]


{{reflist|30em}}
==References==
{{Reflist}}


==External links==
== External links ==
*[http://www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/eventsconferencesseminars/resrg/ Central Bank of Ireland ESRG Portal on Modified GNI (or GNI*)]


* [http://www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/eventsconferencesseminars/resrg/ Central Bank of Ireland ESRG Portal on Modified GNI (or GNI*)]
{{GDP country lists}}


{{GDP country lists}}
{{Authority control}}
{{Authority control}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=January 2021}}
{{EngvarB|date=February 2021}}


[[Category:Taxation in the Republic of Ireland]]
[[Category:Taxation in the Republic of Ireland]]

Latest revision as of 22:02, 4 June 2024

The Central Bank of Ireland in Dublin's IFSC. Then Governor Philip Lane chaired the Economic Statistics Review Group which published a report in 2016 recommending the creation of Modified Gross National Income.

Modified gross national income (also Modified GNI or GNI*) is a metric used by the Central Statistics Office (Ireland) to measure the Irish economy rather than GNI or GDP. GNI* is GNI minus the depreciation on Intellectual Property, depreciation on leased aircraft and the net factor income of redomiciled PLCs.

While "Inflated GDP-per-capita" due to BEPS tools is a feature of tax havens,[1][2] Ireland was the first to adjust its GDP metrics. Economists, including Eurostat,[3] noted Irish Modified GNI (GNI*) is still distorted by Irish BEPS tools and US multinational tax planning activities in Ireland (e.g. contract manufacturing); and that Irish BEPS tools distort aggregate EU-28 data,[4] and the EU-US trade deficit.[5]

In August 2018, the Central Statistics Office (Ireland) (CSO) restated table of Irish GDP versus Modified GNI (2009–2017) showed GDP was 162% of GNI* (EU-28 2017 GDP was 100% of GNI).[6] Ireland's public § 2018 Debt metrics differ dramatically depending on whether Debt-to-GDP, Debt-to-GNI* or Debt-per-Capita is used.[7]

Original distortion

[edit]
The distorted GNI to GDP ratio in some EU states indicates a profound disproportionality in corporate havens as Ireland and Luxembourg.[8][9]

In February 1994, tax academic James R. Hines Jr., identified Ireland as one of seven major tax havens in his 1994 Hines-Rice paper,[10] still[as of?] the most cited paper in research on tax havens.[11] Hines noted that the profit shifting tools of US multinationals in corporate-focused tax havens distorted the national economic statistics of the haven as the scale of the profit shifting was disproportionate to haven's economy. An elevated GDP-per-capita became a "proxy indicator" of a tax haven.[2]

In November 2005, the Wall Street Journal reported that US technology and life sciences multinationals (e.g. Microsoft), were using an Irish base erosion and profit shifting ("BEPS") tool called the double Irish, to minimise their corporate taxes.[12][13] Designed by PwC (Ireland) tax partner, Feargal O'Rourke,[14][15] the double Irish would become the largest BEPS tool in history, and would enable US multinationals to accumulate over US$1 trillion in untaxed offshore profits.[16]

The accounting flows of BEPS tools can appear in national economic statistics, varying with each tool, but without contributing to the economy of the tax haven.[2]

Subsequent US Senate (2013), and EU Commission (2014–2016) investigations, into Apple's Irish tax structure, would show that starting in 2004, Apple's Irish subsidiary, Apple Sales International ("ASI"), would almost double the untaxed profits shifted through its double Irish BEPS tool every year, for a decade.[17]

Table 1: Estimate of profits shifted through Apple's Irish subsidiary, Apple Sales International ("ASI"), 2004–2014.[17]
Year
ASI profit
shifted (USD m)
Average
€/$ rate
ASI profit
shifted (EUR m)
Irish corp.
tax rate
Irish corp. tax
avoided (EUR m)
2004 268 .805 216 12.5% 27
2005 725 .804 583 12.5% 73
2006 1,180 .797 940 12.5% 117
2007 1,844 .731 1,347 12.5% 168
2008 3,127 .683 2,136 12.5% 267
2009 4,003 .719 2,878 12.5% 360
2010 12,095 .755 9,128 12.5% 1,141
2011 21,855 .719 15,709 12.5% 1,964
2012 35,877 .778 27,915 12.5% 3,489
2013 32,099 .753 24,176 12.5% 3,022
2014 34,229 .754 25,793 12.5% 3,224
Total 147,304 110,821 13,853

From 2003 to 2007, research has shown that inflated Irish GDP from US multinational BEPS tools,[18] amplified the Irish Celtic Tiger period by stimulating Irish consumer optimism, who increased borrowing to OECD record levels; and global capital markets optimism about Ireland enabling Irish banks to borrow 180% of Irish deposits.[19]

This unwound in the economic crisis as global capital markets, who had ignored Ireland's deteriorating credit metrics and distorted GDP data when Irish GDP was rising, withdrew and precipitated an Irish property and banking collapse in 2009–2012.[18][20]

The 2009–2012 Irish economic collapse led to a transfer of indebtedness from the Irish private sector balance sheet, the most leveraged in the OECD with household debt-to-income at 190%, to the Irish public sector balance sheet, which was almost unleveraged pre-crisis. This was done via Irish bank bailouts and public deficit spending.[21][22]

2009 distortion restarts

[edit]
Dominance of US companies: Irish corporate Gross Operating Surplus (i.e. profits), by the controlling country of the company (note: a material part of the Irish figure is also from US tax inversions who are US-controlled). Eurostat (2015).[23]

During the Irish financial crisis from 2009 to 2012, two catalysts would restart the distortion of Irish economic statistics:

  1. The crisis caused the Irish State to look for new BEPS tools, and in September 2009, the Commission on Taxation,[24][25] recommended extending Irish capital allowances to intangible assets and intellectual property in particular; the "capital allowances for intangible assets" or "Green Jersey" BEPS tool, was created in the 2009 Finance Act; it would spur a new wave of US corporate tax inversions to Ireland;
  2. Irish-based US technology firms such as Apple and Google entered a stronger phase of growth; for example, in 2007, Apple's Irish ASI subsidiary was profit shifting just under USD 2 billion of untaxed global income through its hybrid-double Irish BEPS tool, however by 2012, ASI was profit shifting just under USD 36 billion of untaxed global income through Ireland, although only a small amount of this BEPS tool appeared in Irish GDP.[17]

In 2010, Hines published a new list of 52 global tax havens, the Hines 2010 list, which ranked Ireland as the 3rd largest tax haven in the world.[26]

By 2011, Eurostat showed that Ireland's ratio of GNI to GDP, had fallen to 80% (i.e. Irish GDP was 125% of Irish GNI, or artificially inflated by 25%). Only Luxembourg, who ranked 1st on Hines' 2010 list of global tax havens,[26] was lower at 73% (i.e. Luxembourg GDP was 137% of Luxembourg GNI). Eurostat's GNI/GDP table (see graphic) showed EU GDP is equal to EU GNI for almost every EU country, and for the aggregate EU-27 average.[18][27]

In 2013–2015 several large US life sciences multinationals executed tax inversions to Ireland (e.g. Medtronic). Ireland became the largest recipient of US corporate tax inversions in history.[28] The Irish BEPS tool enabled US multinationals to avoid almost all Irish corporate taxes, however, unlike other Irish BEPS tools, it registers fully in Irish economic statistics.[29] In April 2016, the Obama Administration blocked the proposed US$160 billion proposed Pfizer-Allergan Irish inversion.[30]

A 2015 EU Commission report into Ireland's economic statistics, showed that from 2010 to 2015, almost 23% of Ireland's GDP was now represented by untaxed multinational net royalty payments, thus implying that Irish GDP was now circa 130% of Irish GNI.[31] This analysis, however, did not capture the full effect of the BEPS tool as it uses capital allowances, rather than royalty payments, to execute the BEPS movement. The Irish media were also confused as to Ireland's state of indebtedness as Irish Debt-per-Capita diverged sharply from Irish Debt-to GDP.[32][33][34]

2016 distortion climax

[edit]
Ireland: Apple's Q1 2015 restructuring. Brad Setser & Cole Frank (Council on Foreign Relations)

By 2012–14, Apple's Irish subsidiary, ASI, was profit shifting circa US$35 billion per annum through Ireland, equivalent to 20% of Irish GDP, via its hybrid-double Irish BEPS tool.[17] However, this particular BEPS tool had a modest impact on Irish GDP data. In late 2014, to limit further exposure to fines from the EU Commission's investigation into Apple's Irish tax schemes, Apple closed its hybrid-double Irish BEPS tool,[35] and decided to swap into the BEPS tool.[36][37] In Q1 2015, Apple Ireland purchased circa US$300 billion of virtual IP assets owned by Apple Jersey, executing the largest BEPS action in history.[17][38]

Ireland: Apple's Q1 2015 IP distortion of Ireland's balance of payments. Brad Setser & Cole Frank (Council on Foreign Relations)

The BEPS tool is recorded like a tax inversion in the Irish national accounts.[38] Because Apple's IP was now on-shored in Ireland, all of ASI's circa US$40 billion in profit shifting for 2015, appeared in 2015 Irish GDP and GNP, despite the fact that new BEPS tool would limit Apple's exposure to Irish corporation tax.

In July 2016, the Irish Central Statistice Office announced 2015 Irish economic growth rates of 26.3% (GDP) and 18.7% (GNP), as a result of Apple's restructuring.[39] The announcement led to ridicule,[40][41][42][43][44][45][46] and was labelled by Nobel Prize economist Paul Krugman as "leprechaun economics".[47]

Finance Minister Michael Noonan who removed the "cap" on the Irish "capital allowances for intangibles" BEPS tool in 2015, to remove any potential Irish corporate tax liability from Apple's Q1 2015 restructuring

From July 2016 to July 2018, the Central Statistics Office refused to identify the source of leprechaun economics, and suppressed the release of other economic data to protect Apple's identity under the 1993 Central Statistics Act,[48][49] in the manner of a "captured state", further damaging confidence in Ireland.[50]

By early 2017, research in the Sloan School of Management in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, using the limited data released by the Irish CSO, could conclude: While corporate inversions and aircraft leasing firms were credited for increasing Irish [2015] GDP, the impact may have been exaggerated.[51] The same research noted that capital markets did not consider Irish macro economic statistics to be credible or meaningful, as evidenced by the lack of any reaction by the capital markets to Ireland's 26.3% GDP growth (both on the day of release, and in the subsequent days).[51]

Where as the Obama Administration blocked the proposed US$160 billion Pfizer-Allergan Irish inversion in 2016, Apple's larger US$300 billion Irish inversion was ignored. It is not clear if this was due to the confusion caused by the Central Statistics Office (Ireland) in protecting Apple's identity for 2 years, or other reasons.

2017 GNI* response

[edit]
Nobel Prize-winning US economist Paul Krugman whose tweet on the 12 July 2016 christened the Irish "Leprechaun economics" affair and precipitated the creation of "Modified gross national income", or GNI*

In September 2016, as a direct result of the "leprechaun economics" affair, the Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland ("CBI"), Philip R. Lane, chaired a special cross-economic steering group, the Economic Statistics Review Group ("ESRG"), of stakeholders (incl. CBI, IFAC, ESRI, NTMA, leading academics and the Department of Finance), to recommend new economic statistics that would better represent the true position of the Irish economy.[52]

In February 2017, a new metric, "Modified Gross National Income" (or GNI* for short) was announced. The difference between GNI* and GNI is due to having to deal with two problems (a) The retained earnings of re-domiciled firms in Ireland (where the earnings ultimately accrue to foreign investors), and (b) depreciation on foreign-owned capital assets located in Ireland, such as intellectual property (which inflate the size of Irish GDP, but again the benefits accrue to foreign investors).[53][54]

The Central Statistics Office (Ireland) ("CSO") simplifies the definition of Irish modified GNI (or GNI*) as follows:

Irish GNI less the effects of the profits of re-domiciled companies and the depreciation of intellectual property products and aircraft leasing companies.[55]

In February 2017, the CSO stated they would continue to calculate and release Irish GDP and Irish GNP to meet their EU and other International statistical reporting commitments.[56] In July 2017, the CSO estimated that 2016 Irish GNI* (€190bn) was 30% below Irish GDP (€275bn), or that Irish GDP is 143% above Irish GNI*. The CSO also confirmed that Irish Net Public Debt-to-GNI* was 106% (Irish Net Public Debt-to-GDP, post leprechaun economics, was 73%).[57][58]

In December 2017, Eurostat noted that while GNI* was helpful, it was still being artificially inflated by BEPS flows, and the BEPS activities of certain types of contract manufacturing in particular;[3] a view shared by several others.[18][59][60][61][62][63] There have been several material revisions to Irish 2015 GDP in particular (as per § Irish GDP versus Modified GNI (2009–2017).[64] Modified GNI, or GNI*, was adopted by the IMF and OECD in their 2017 Ireland Country Reports.[65][66]

Economists noted in May 2018 that distorted Irish economic data was calling into question the credibility of Eurostat's aggregate EU-28 economic data.[4]

In June 2018, tax academic Gabriel Zucman, using 2015 economic data, claimed Irish BEPS tools had made Ireland the world's largest tax haven (Zucman-Tørsløv-Wier 2018 list).[67][68] Zucman also showed that Irish BEPS flows were becoming so large, that they were artificially exaggerating the scale of the EU-US trade deficit.[5]

Another study published in June 2018 by the IMF called into question the economic data of all leading tax havens, and the artificial effect of their BEPS tools.[1][69]

2018 debt metrics

[edit]
Irish public debt-to-GDP and public debt-to-GNI* from 2000 to 2017[70]

The issues post leprechaun economics, and "modified GNI", are captured on page 34 of the OECD 2018 Ireland survey:[66]

  1. On a gross public debt-to-GDP basis, Ireland's 2015 figure at 78.8% is not of concern;
  2. On a gross public debt-to-GNI* basis, Ireland's 2015 figure at 116.5% is more serious, but not alarming;
  3. On a gross public debt-per-capita basis, Ireland's 2015 figure at over $62,686 per capita, is the second highest in the OECD, after Japan.[71]

There is concern Ireland repeats the mistakes of the "Celtic Tiger" era, and over-leverages again, against distorted Irish economic data.[59] Given the transfer of Irish private sector debt to the Irish public balance sheet from the Irish 2009–2012 financial crisis, it will not be possible to bail out the Irish banking system again.

OECD Public Debt-per-Capita table for 2015[66]
  • In June 2017, the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council benchmarked Irish public debt against Irish tax revenues (similar to the debt-to-EBITDA ratio used in capital markets). Ireland's 2016 gross public debt-to-tax revenues was 282.9%, the 4th highest in the EU-28 (after Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus).[72][73][74]
  • In November 2017, the Central Bank of Ireland benchmarked Irish private debt against Irish disposable income. Ireland's 2016 private debt as a % of Irish disposable income was 141.6%, the 4th highest in the EU-28 (after Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden).[75][76]

These two initiatives show Ireland's high public debt levels, and Ireland's high private sector debt levels, imply that on a "total debt" basis (i.e. Irish public debt plus Irish private debt), Ireland is likely one of the most indebted of the EU-27 countries when benchmarked on a GNI*-type basis; hence the importance of a GNI* metric.[citation needed]

Irish GDP versus Modified GNI (2009–2018)

[edit]
Irish National Income and Expenditure 2017 (measured in 2018 euros) 2009–2017[6][77][78][79]
Year
Irish GDP
Irish GNI*
Irish
GDP/GNI*
ratio
EU-28
GDP/GNI
ratio
(€ bn) YOY
(%)
(€ bn) YOY
(%)
2009 170.1 - 134.8 - 126% 100%
2010 167.7 -1.4% 128.9 -4.3% 130% 100%
2011 171.1 2.0% 126.6 -1.8% 135% 100%
2012 175.2 2.4% 126.4 -0.2% 139% 100%
2013 179.9 2.7% 136.9 8.3%‡ 131% 100%
2014 195.3 8.6% 148.3 8.3%‡ 132% 100%
2015 262.5† 34.4% 161.4 8.8%‡ 163% 100%
2016 273.2 4.1% 175.8 8.9%‡ 155% 100%
2017 294.1 7.6% 181.2 3.1% 162% 100%
2018^ 324.0 8.2% 197.5 - - 100%

(†) The Central Statistics Office (Ireland) revised 2015 GDP higher in 2017, increasing Ireland's "leprechaun economics" 2015 GDP growth rate from 26.3% to 34.4%.
(‡) Eurostat show that GNI* is also still distorted by certain BEPS tools, and specifically contract manufacturing, which is a significant activity in Ireland.[3]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b JANNICK DAMGAARD; THOMAS ELKJAER; NIELS JOHANNESEN (June 2018). "Piercing the Veil of Tax Havens". International Monetary Fund: Finance & Development Quarterly. 55 (2). Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 12 June 2018. The eight major pass-through economies—the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong SAR, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Ireland, and Singapore—host more than 85 percent of the world's investment in special purpose entities, which are often set up for tax reasons.
  2. ^ a b c Dhammika Dharmapala (2014). "What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the Empirical Literature". University of Chicago. Archived from the original on 20 July 2018. Retrieved 23 August 2018.
  3. ^ a b c SILKE STAPEL-WEBER; JOHN VERRINDER (December 2017). "Globalisation at work in statistics — Questions arising from the 'Irish case'" (PDF). EuroStat. p. 31. Archived (PDF) from the original on 28 April 2018. Retrieved 22 August 2018. Nevertheless the rise in [Irish] GNI* is still very substantial because the additional income flows of the companies (interest and dividends) concerned are considerably smaller than the value added of their activities
  4. ^ a b Brad Setser (11 May 2018). "Ireland Exports its Leprechaun". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 14 May 2018. Retrieved 13 May 2018. Ireland has, more or less, stopped using GDP to measure its own economy. And on current trends [because Irish GDP is distorting EU-28 aggregate data], the eurozone taken as a whole may need to consider something similar.
  5. ^ a b Gabriel Zucman; Thomas Tørsløv; Ludvig Wier (8 June 2018). "The Missing Profits of Nations∗" (PDF). National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Papers. p. 25. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2 August 2018. Retrieved 23 August 2018. Profit shifting also has a significant effect on trade balances. For instance, after accounting for profit shifting, Japan, the U.K., France, and Greece turn out to have trade surpluses in 2015, in contrast to the published data that record trade deficits. According to our estimates, the true trade deficit of the United States was 2.1% of GDP in 2015, instead of 2.8% in the official statistics—that is, a quarter of the recorded trade deficit of the United States is an illusion of multinational corporate tax avoidance.
  6. ^ a b "Real GDP per capita". Eurostat. Archived from the original on 26 November 2018. Retrieved 26 November 2018.
  7. ^ Fiona Reddan (12 September 2018). "Who still owes more, Ireland or the Greeks". Irish Times. Archived from the original on 12 September 2018. Retrieved 15 September 2018.
  8. ^ "GDP (current US$) | Data". data.worldbank.org. Retrieved 13 May 2022.
  9. ^ "GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) | Data". data.worldbank.org. Retrieved 13 May 2022.
  10. ^ James R. Hines Jr.; Eric M. Rice (February 1994). "FISCAL PARADISE: FOREIGN TAX HAVENS AND AMERICAN BUSINESS" (PDF). Quarterly Journal of Economics (Harvard/MIT). 9 (1). Archived from the original (PDF) on 25 August 2017. Retrieved 22 August 2018. We identify 41 countries and regions as tax havens for the purposes of U.S. businesses. Together the seven tax havens with populations greater than one million (Hong Kong, Ireland, Liberia, Lebanon, Panama, Singapore, and Switzerland) account for 80 percent of total tax haven population and 89 percent of tax haven GDP.
  11. ^ "IDEAS/RePEc Database". Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Archived from the original on 4 December 2018. Retrieved 23 August 2018. Tax Havens by Most Cited
  12. ^ "Irish Subsidiary Lets Microsoft Slash Taxes in U.S. and Europe". Wall Street Journal. 7 November 2005. Archived from the original on 16 June 2018. Retrieved 23 August 2018. Round Island's legal address is in the headquarters of a Dublin law firm, Matheson Ormsby Prentice, that advertises its expertise in helping multinational companies use Ireland to shelter income from taxes.
  13. ^ "TAX JUSTICE NETWORK: Irish Subsidiary Lets Microsoft Slash Taxes in U.S. and Europe" (PDF). Tax Justice Network. 7 November 2005. Archived (PDF) from the original on 5 July 2016. Retrieved 23 August 2018.
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