11th Army Group: Difference between revisions
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{{Infobox military unit |
{{Infobox military unit |
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|unit_name=11th Army Group |
|unit_name=11th Army Group |
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|dates=November 1943 to November 1944 |
|dates=November 1943 to November 1944 |
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|country= |
|country= |
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|allegiance={{flagicon|UK}} United Kingdom |
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|branch= |
|branch= |
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|type=[[Army group]] |
|type=[[Army group]] |
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|role=Army Group [[Headquarters#Military|Headquarters]] |
|role=Army Group [[Headquarters#Military|Headquarters]] |
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|size= |
|size=One [[field army]] and additional forces |
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|command_structure=[[South East Asia Command]] |
|command_structure=[[South East Asia Command]] |
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|current_commander= |
|current_commander= |
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==Formation== |
==Formation== |
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[[File:General_Sir_George_J_Giffard.png|135px|thumb|right|1943/44. General [[George Giffard]], commander of 11th Army Group.]] |
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⚫ | 11th Army Group was activated in November 1943 to act as the land forces HQ for the newly formed [[South East Asia Command]] (SEAC), Admiral Lord [[Louis Mountbatten|Mountbatten]], Supreme Commander of SEAC. The commander of 11th Army Group was [[General]] [[George Giffard]], who had formerly been Commander-in-Chief [[West Africa Command]] and Commander of Eastern Army (part of [[GHQ India]]). The headquarters was first situated in [[New Delhi]], eventually moving to [[Kandy]], [[Ceylon]]. Its responsibilities were limited to the handling of operations against Japanese forces. GHQ India remained responsible for the rear areas and the training of the [[Army in India]], although there was often overlap between the headquarters' responsibilities and (in the first year of Eleventh Army Group's existence) conflicts between their planners. |
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Eleventh Army Group's main subordinate formations were [[Fourteenth Army (United Kingdom)|British Fourteenth Army]] and the [[British Army in Ceylon|Ceylon Army]]. The [[XXXIII Corps (British India)|Indian XXXIII Corps]], training in Southern India for amphibious operations, also came under Eleventh Army Group for some purposes. It would have been logical for the Army Group to have the American-led [[Northern Combat Area Command]], under General [[Joseph Stilwell]], under its control also, so that the whole front in Burma would have been under a single commander. The initial idea was that as General Stilwell would be commanding several Chinese divisions which advancing from [[Ledo, Assam|Ledo]] in India to [[Myitkyina]] in Burma to cover the construction of the [[Ledo Road]] and had loose control over the large but amorphous Chinese forces attacking out of [[Yunnan]] province from the East, he would be commanding a large army. If his command were placed under the Army Group at the same level as the Fourteenth Army, the attacks could then be co-ordinated at Army Group level. |
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The main subordinate formations of 11th Army Group were [[Fourteenth Army (United Kingdom)|Fourteenth Army]] (under General [[William Slim]]) and the [[British Army in Ceylon|Ceylon Army Command]]. The [[XXXIII Corps (British India)|Indian XXXIII Corps]], training in Southern India for amphibious operations, also came under Eleventh Army Group for some purposes. |
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Stilwell however refused to submit to control by Eleventh Army Group. He and Giffard were very different personalities and found it almost impossible to work together. Stilwell objected to taking Giffard's orders as, among other grounds, Stilwell was also Deputy Supreme Commander of SEAC and therefore Giffard's superior. |
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[[File:Mountbatten_conferrring_with_Stilwell.jpg|195px|thumb|left|General [[Joseph Stilwell]] (left) and [[Louis Mountbatten|Lord Mountbatten]] (Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia) conferring during 1944.]] |
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{{quote|Stilwell, however bitterly resisted it,...To watch Stilwell, when hard pressed, shift his opposition from one of the several strong-points he held by virtue of his numerous Allied, American and Chinese offices, to another was a lesson in mobile offensive-defence.{{sfn|Slim|1956|pp=205–207}} }} |
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It seemed logical that 11th Army Group should incorporate all Allied land forces, across the whole front in Burma, under a single command structure, including [[Northern Combat Area Command]] (NCAC), which was made up mostly of [[National Revolutionary Army|Republic of China Army]] divisions under General [[Joseph Stilwell]], the most senior officer among [[China Burma India Theater|US forces in China, Burma and India]]. Stilwell controlled significant |
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At a meeting to solve the problem of command, Stilwell, under intense pressure from the Admiral Lord [[Louis Mountbatten|Mountbatten]], Supreme Commander of SEAC, astonished everyone by saying "I am prepared to come under General [[William Slim|Slim]]'s [officer commanding Fourteenth Army] operational control until I get to [[Kamaing]]".{{sfn|Slim|1956|pp=205–207}} Rather than sack him, Mountbatten reluctantly agreed to this, but it was a dangerous compromise. It created a complicated chain of command whereby Slim theoretically had to report to two different commanders; Giffard for Fourteenth Army actions and Mountbatten for Stilwell's formations. However, Slim was able to work with Stilwell and "this illogical command set-up worked surprisingly well".{{sfn|Slim|1956|pp=205–207}} |
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forces: while NCAC units were to advance from [[Ledo, Assam|Ledo]] (India), towards [[Myitkyina]] (Burma), to cover the construction of the [[Ledo Road]], Stilwell also commanded the [[Chinese Expeditionary Force]] (CEA), which would advance into Burma from the north-east, out of [[Yunnan]]. If both of Stilwell's commands were placed under the 11th Army Group at the same level as the Fourteenth Army, the attacks could then be co-ordinated at Army Group level. As Stilwell was also Deputy Supreme Commander of SEAC and, technically, already Giffard's superior, this would have meant Stilwell relinquishing day-to-day field control of NCAC and CEA forces. However, Stilwell rejected this suggestion; he and Giffard had very different personalities and a poor relationship in general. Slim later commented wryly: "Stilwell ... bitterly resisted... To watch Stilwell ... shift his opposition [to Gifford] from one of ... his numerous Allied, American and Chinese offices, to another was a lesson in mobile offensive-defence."{{sfn|Slim|1956|pp=205–207}} At a meeting organized by Mountbatten, to solve the problem, Stilwell surprised the others present by agreeing that, while he would direct NCAC and CEA in the field, "I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to [[Kamaing]]".{{sfn|Slim|1956|pp=205–207}} In effect, Stilwell would both temporarily become Slim's deputy and, ''de facto'', temporarily vacate his role as Deputy Commander of SEAC. That is, Slim would continue to report to Giffard in regard to Fourteenth Army, but would report directly to Mountbatten in regard to NCAC/CEA. Mountbatten accepted this temporary command structure. |
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Once Stilwell's forces reached Kamaing on |
In practice, Slim found that he was able to work well with Stilwell and "this illogical command set-up worked surprisingly well".{{sfn|Slim|1956|pp=205–207}} Once Stilwell's forces reached Kamaing on 20 May 1944, the arrangement ceased and Stilwell again took orders only from Mountbatten. |
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==Allied Land Forces South East Asia==<!--A change in this section heading will break the redirect to this section from "Allied Land Forces South East Asia"--> |
==Allied Land Forces South East Asia==<!--A change in this section heading will break the redirect to this section from "Allied Land Forces South East Asia"--> |
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On |
On 12 November 1944, Eleventh Army Group was redesignated '''Allied Land Forces South East Asia''' (ALFSEA). General Sir [[Oliver Leese]] succeeded Giffard in command. (Mountbatten's [[Chief of Staff]], Lieutenant General [[Henry Royds Pownall|Pownall]], had been lobbying for some time for Leese to be appointed, but Leese could not be relieved of command of [[Eighth Army (United Kingdom)|Eighth Army]] for several months).{{sfn|Allen|1984|p=277}} |
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Many of the land command problems in South East Asia had been relieved when General Stilwell was recalled to Washington on |
Many of the land command problems in South East Asia had been relieved when General Stilwell was recalled to Washington on 19 October, at the behest of Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]]. His replacement as commander of NCAC and the administrative HQ [[China Burma India Theater of World War II|U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater]] (USFIBT) was Lieutenant General [[Daniel Isom Sultan|Sultan]]. (Stilwell's replacements for his other responsibilities were Lieutenant General [[Albert Coady Wedemeyer|Wedemeyer]] as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek and General [[Raymond Wheeler|Wheeler]] as Deputy Supreme Commander, SEAC.) |
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As part of the reorganisation, NCAC was placed directly under ALFSEA,{{sfn|Moreman|2013|p=177}} although they were also subject to directives from Chiang.{{citation needed|date=February 2015}} [[XV Corps (British India)|Indian XV Corps]], commanded by Lieutenant General [[Philip Christison|Christison]], was removed from command of Fourteenth Army and subordinated directly to ALFSEA.{{sfn|Warwick|2007|p=184}} The Corps was responsible for operations in Burma's coastal [[Arakan Province]], and had its own separate lines of communication and supply.{{sfn|Warwick|2007|p=184}} Fourteenth Army, still under Slim's command, was the largest component of ALFSEA, making the main attack into Central Burma. |
As part of the reorganisation, NCAC was placed directly under ALFSEA,{{sfn|Moreman|2013|p=177}} although they were also subject to directives from Chiang.{{citation needed|date=February 2015}} [[XV Corps (British India)|Indian XV Corps]], commanded by Lieutenant General [[Philip Christison|Christison]], was removed from command of Fourteenth Army and subordinated directly to ALFSEA.{{sfn|Warwick|2007|p=184}} The Corps was responsible for operations in Burma's coastal [[Arakan Province]], and had its own separate lines of communication and supply.{{sfn|Warwick|2007|p=184}} Fourteenth Army, still under Slim's command, was the largest component of ALFSEA, making the main attack into Central Burma. |
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After Japan surrendered in August 1945, ALFSEA was responsible for deploying troops into Malaya, the [[Dutch East Indies]], [[Thailand]] and [[French Indo-China]] to disarm Japanese forces and repatriate Allied prisoners of war. The headquarters was closed down later in the year. |
After Japan surrendered in August 1945, ALFSEA was responsible for deploying troops into Malaya, the [[Dutch East Indies]], [[Thailand]] and [[French Indo-China]] to disarm Japanese forces and repatriate Allied prisoners of war. The headquarters was closed down later in the year. |
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==See also== |
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* [[List of British Empire divisions in the Second World War]] |
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==Notes== |
==Notes== |
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==References== |
==References== |
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*{{citation |last=Slim |first=William |authorlink=William Slim |year=1956 |title=Defeat into Victory|location=London |publisher=Cassell }} |
*{{citation |last=Slim |first=William |authorlink=William Slim |year=1956 |title=Defeat into Victory|location=London |publisher=Cassell }} |
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*{{citation |last=Warwick |first=Nigel W. M. |year=2007 |title=Constant Vigilance: The RAF Regiment in the Burma Campaign |edition=illustrated |publisher=Casemate Publishers |isbn=9781844155002 |page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=EO92mkDr_YEC |
*{{citation |last=Warwick |first=Nigel W. M. |year=2007 |title=Constant Vigilance: The RAF Regiment in the Burma Campaign |edition=illustrated |publisher=Casemate Publishers |isbn=9781844155002 |page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=EO92mkDr_YEC&dq=Indian%20XV%20Corps%20fourteenth%20Army&pg=PA184 184]}} |
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{{refend}} |
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==Further reading== |
==Further reading== |
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*{{citation|ref=none |last=Latimer |first=Jon |authorlink=Jon Latimer |title=Burma: The Forgotten War |location=London |publisher=John Murray |date=2004 |isbn=978-0-7195-6576-2}} |
*{{citation|ref=none |last=Latimer |first=Jon |authorlink=Jon Latimer |title=Burma: The Forgotten War |location=London |publisher=John Murray |date=2004 |isbn=978-0-7195-6576-2}} |
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[[Category:Army groups of the British Army]] |
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{{British armies, commands, and corps during the Second World War}} |
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[[Category:Military units and formations established in 1943]] |
[[Category:Military units and formations established in 1943]] |
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[[Category: |
[[Category:Army groups of the British Army in World War II]] |
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[[Category:Military units and formations disestablished in 1944]] |
[[Category:Military units and formations disestablished in 1944]] |
Latest revision as of 04:03, 19 March 2024
This article needs additional citations for verification. (January 2015) |
11th Army Group | |
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Active | November 1943 to November 1944 |
Type | Army group |
Role | Army Group Headquarters |
Size | One field army and additional forces |
Part of | South East Asia Command |
Commanders | |
Notable commanders | George Giffard |
The 11th Army Group was the main British Army force in Southeast Asia during the Second World War. Although a nominally British formation, it also included large numbers of troops and formations from the British Indian Army and from British African colonies, and also Nationalist Chinese and United States units.
Formation
[edit]11th Army Group was activated in November 1943 to act as the land forces HQ for the newly formed South East Asia Command (SEAC), Admiral Lord Mountbatten, Supreme Commander of SEAC. The commander of 11th Army Group was General George Giffard, who had formerly been Commander-in-Chief West Africa Command and Commander of Eastern Army (part of GHQ India). The headquarters was first situated in New Delhi, eventually moving to Kandy, Ceylon. Its responsibilities were limited to the handling of operations against Japanese forces. GHQ India remained responsible for the rear areas and the training of the Army in India, although there was often overlap between the headquarters' responsibilities and (in the first year of Eleventh Army Group's existence) conflicts between their planners.
The main subordinate formations of 11th Army Group were Fourteenth Army (under General William Slim) and the Ceylon Army Command. The Indian XXXIII Corps, training in Southern India for amphibious operations, also came under Eleventh Army Group for some purposes.
It seemed logical that 11th Army Group should incorporate all Allied land forces, across the whole front in Burma, under a single command structure, including Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC), which was made up mostly of Republic of China Army divisions under General Joseph Stilwell, the most senior officer among US forces in China, Burma and India. Stilwell controlled significant forces: while NCAC units were to advance from Ledo (India), towards Myitkyina (Burma), to cover the construction of the Ledo Road, Stilwell also commanded the Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEA), which would advance into Burma from the north-east, out of Yunnan. If both of Stilwell's commands were placed under the 11th Army Group at the same level as the Fourteenth Army, the attacks could then be co-ordinated at Army Group level. As Stilwell was also Deputy Supreme Commander of SEAC and, technically, already Giffard's superior, this would have meant Stilwell relinquishing day-to-day field control of NCAC and CEA forces. However, Stilwell rejected this suggestion; he and Giffard had very different personalities and a poor relationship in general. Slim later commented wryly: "Stilwell ... bitterly resisted... To watch Stilwell ... shift his opposition [to Gifford] from one of ... his numerous Allied, American and Chinese offices, to another was a lesson in mobile offensive-defence."[1] At a meeting organized by Mountbatten, to solve the problem, Stilwell surprised the others present by agreeing that, while he would direct NCAC and CEA in the field, "I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to Kamaing".[1] In effect, Stilwell would both temporarily become Slim's deputy and, de facto, temporarily vacate his role as Deputy Commander of SEAC. That is, Slim would continue to report to Giffard in regard to Fourteenth Army, but would report directly to Mountbatten in regard to NCAC/CEA. Mountbatten accepted this temporary command structure.
In practice, Slim found that he was able to work well with Stilwell and "this illogical command set-up worked surprisingly well".[1] Once Stilwell's forces reached Kamaing on 20 May 1944, the arrangement ceased and Stilwell again took orders only from Mountbatten.
Allied Land Forces South East Asia
[edit]On 12 November 1944, Eleventh Army Group was redesignated Allied Land Forces South East Asia (ALFSEA). General Sir Oliver Leese succeeded Giffard in command. (Mountbatten's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Pownall, had been lobbying for some time for Leese to be appointed, but Leese could not be relieved of command of Eighth Army for several months).[2]
Many of the land command problems in South East Asia had been relieved when General Stilwell was recalled to Washington on 19 October, at the behest of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. His replacement as commander of NCAC and the administrative HQ U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater (USFIBT) was Lieutenant General Sultan. (Stilwell's replacements for his other responsibilities were Lieutenant General Wedemeyer as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek and General Wheeler as Deputy Supreme Commander, SEAC.)
As part of the reorganisation, NCAC was placed directly under ALFSEA,[3] although they were also subject to directives from Chiang.[citation needed] Indian XV Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Christison, was removed from command of Fourteenth Army and subordinated directly to ALFSEA.[4] The Corps was responsible for operations in Burma's coastal Arakan Province, and had its own separate lines of communication and supply.[4] Fourteenth Army, still under Slim's command, was the largest component of ALFSEA, making the main attack into Central Burma.
After the capture of Rangoon in May 1945, British Twelfth Army was formed in Burma, and became part of ALFSEA. Indian XV Corps reverted to the command of Fourteenth Army, which was preparing amphibious operations to recover Malaya. NCAC had previously ceased active operations. Leese was relieved and replaced as commander of ALFSEA by General Slim.
After Japan surrendered in August 1945, ALFSEA was responsible for deploying troops into Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Thailand and French Indo-China to disarm Japanese forces and repatriate Allied prisoners of war. The headquarters was closed down later in the year.
See also
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ a b c Slim 1956, pp. 205–207.
- ^ Allen 1984, p. 277.
- ^ Moreman 2013, p. 177.
- ^ a b Warwick 2007, p. 184.
References
[edit]- Allen, Louis (1984), Burma: The Longest War, Dent Paperbacks, ISBN 0-460-02474-4
- Moreman, Tim (2013), The Jungle, Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War, 1941-45, Routledge, p. 177
- Slim, William (1956), Defeat into Victory, London: Cassell
- Warwick, Nigel W. M. (2007), Constant Vigilance: The RAF Regiment in the Burma Campaign (illustrated ed.), Casemate Publishers, p. 184, ISBN 9781844155002
Further reading
[edit]- Latimer, Jon (2004), Burma: The Forgotten War, London: John Murray, ISBN 978-0-7195-6576-2