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Battle of Fornovo

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The Battle of Fornovo took place 30 km (19 miles) southwest of the city of Parma on 6 July 1495. It was fought as King Charles VIII of France left Naples upon hearing the news of the grand coalition assembled against him. Despite the numerical advantage of their opponents, Charles was able to break through and march his army out of Italy. The battle was a pyrrhic victory because the French abandoned all of their conquests in the Italian Peninsula and lost all the loot captured during the campaign. Fornovo was the first big battle of the Italian Wars.

Battle of Fornovo
Part of the First Italian War
Date6 July 1495
Location
Fornovo, Emilia, Italy
Result French victory[1]
Belligerents
 France League of Venice:
Republic of Venice
Duchy of Milan
Margraviate of Mantua
Commanders and leaders
Kingdom of France King Charles VIII Francesco Gonzaga, Marquess of Mantua[2]
Units involved
Stradioti
Strength
10,000–12,000 men[2][3][4][5] 14,000–20,000 men[2][3][6]
Casualties and losses
  • 2,000-3,500 killed and wounded[3][10][11][12]

    • Background

    In 1495, Charles VIII of France was king of the most powerful state in medieval Europe. A dreamer who saw himself as the saviour of Christian Europe, he believed he could stem tide of Ottoman conquest. As a base for his crusade, he was determined to seize Southern Italy. His claim on the Kingdom of Naples through his paternal grandmother, Marie of Anjou (1404–1463) presented such an opportunity. Charles made pacts with his neighbours, so they would not interfere. Henry VII of England was given cash, Ferdinand II of Aragon was given Roussillon and Emperor Maximillian was given Artois and Franche-Comté.[13] Italian armies of the late medieval period consisted of forces from the many independent towns of Italy. They were raised by establishing a contract or "condotta", between the town leaders and the chiefs of mercenary bands, who came to be called Condottieri. Military doctrines and tactics destined to establish field supremacy were developed, as were methods of capture of wealthy prisoners for ransom and astuces to minimize casualties.

    Prelude

    Charles VIII was on good terms with the two powers in northern Italy, Milan and Venice, which had encouraged his claim over the Kingdom of Naples. Charles expected their support when he moved against Alfonso II of Naples, especially as the rival claimant was Ferdinand II of Aragon, King of Spain. At the end of August 1494, in a rapid campaign, he used France's powerful modern army, reinforced by a large contingent of Swiss mercenaries, to sweep through Italy, his mobile field artillery train demolishing the towers of Italy's medieval castles. He was granted free passage through Milan but was vigorously opposed by Florence, Pope Alexander VI and Naples.

    On their way to Naples, the French defeated every army sent against them and were ruthless with any city that resisted the invasion. This shocked the Italians, who were accustomed to the relatively bloodless wars of the Condottieri. On 22 February 1495, Charles and his chief commander, Louis II de La Trémoille, entered Naples, almost without opposition. The speed and violence of the campaign left the Italians stunned. The Venetians and the new Duke of Milan, Ludovico Sforza, realised that unless Charles was stopped, Italy would soon just be another province of France. The Italian states rallied and on March 31 in Venice, the Holy League was proclaimed. The signatories were the Republic of Venice, the Duke of Milan, the Pope, the monarchs of Castile and Aragon, the King of England and the Holy Roman Emperor. The League engaged a veteran Condottiero, Francesco II of Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua to gather an army and expel the French from Italy. Upon hearing the news of the coalition assembled against him, Charles left a garrison in Naples and marched north with the remainder of his army, his artillery train and the considerable booty seized in the campaign to join a smaller army under Louis II, Duke of Orléans in Piedmont in north-western Italy. While in Naples, the French army had been swept by an outbreak of syphilis and as the army moved north, it spread throughout Italy, where it became known as the "French Disease".

    Battle

     
    The Battle of Fornovo in the Gallery of Maps (Vatican Museums)

    On 27 June the Venetians and their allies established camp near Fornovo di Taro (44°41′N 10°06′E / 44.683°N 10.100°E / 44.683; 10.100), about 30 km (19 mi) southwest of Parma, to wait for the French. The Venetian Senate was not unanimous on fighting the French. Some members wanted to attack the rear guard of the French to try to seize their loot, while others cautioned that Italy was risking too much in this battle as this was just one French army and others could be called upon.

    On 4 July, Ercole d'Este, Duke of Ferrara, Charles' most powerful Italian ally, wrote to him that the Senate had not yet decided what to do. Charles was anxious about the growing strength of his opponents, while he had no hope of quick reinforcement. An attempt to sway the undecided forces of Parma was thwarted by the Venetians and Charles sent a messenger to request free passage to France but the Venetians replied that he would have to restore all his conquests first. The messenger, having scouted the troops, reported back to Charles. The forty soldiers Charles sent to reconnoiter were attacked and quickly routed by the Stradioti, mostly Albanian mercenaries from the Balkans.[14]

    Two days later, on 6 July, Charles decided to offer battle because the French were short of provisions. South of Milan, the path of his army of about 10,000 French and Swiss troops was blocked by 20,000 Venetians and Mantuans under Gonzaga.[4] The League army took position on the right side of the Taro river and the French decided to keep to the left bank. Charles organized his army in battles. The first battle consisted of about 2,500 men and was led by Gian Giacomo Trivulzio. The second and largest was led by Charles and the last battle consisted of about 1,400 men, led by Francesco Secco. There was also a large infantry force of spearmen. The French artillery was arranged in front of the first line, as well as on the side of the Taro, protecting the second line.

    Melchiorre Trevisan promised the League soldiers the spoils of battle if they were victorious. Gonzaga divided his forces into nine lines. His battle plan was to distract the first and middle battles of the French with two lines while outflanking the rear. Once the French battles were disorganized, the rest of the Italian troops would attack.

    Instead of the usual feckless and nearly bloodless affair then common in Italian condottieri warfare, the French opened with an artillery bombardment, intending to kill as many of their opponents as possible.[15] Then they charged with their heavy cavalry, scattering the disordered Italian ranks.[10] The fight was perhaps more memorable for the ineffectiveness of artillery on either side, other than the psychological effect achieved by the French guns. One eyewitness estimated that fewer than 10 men were killed by cannon fire.[10]

    The battle began in the early afternoon with an exchange of artillery shells that generated more fear and disorder than casualties. The cavalry on the right wing led by Galeazzo Sanseverino attacked the French vanguard without suffering much damage from enemy artillery, perhaps also due to the conditions of the terrain that made the artillery difficult to maneuver. The French vanguard responded with a charge of the heavy knights led by Trivulzio. Both sides soon found themselves fighting on banks full of ditches, twigs and thorns. The French finally prevailed by sending the Swiss halberdiers against the Milanese cavalry, which was unable to fight on such an unfavorable terrain. In the meantime, Gonzaga's cavalry had attacked, followed by the infantry, the French center and there Rodolfo Gonzaga had fallen. Bernardino Fortebraccio's cavalry had bypassed the French rearguard together with Duodo's stradioti, attacking it on its side, but with a certain delay due to the unusually high water of the river. After an hour of fighting Gonzaga’s troops were repulsed, while the light cavalry of Fortebraccio, after a brief skirmish, together with the stradioti and part of the Venetian infantry, devoted themselves to plundering the enemy baggage. Fortebraccio, unable to reorganize his men, withdrew from the fray. The Count of Pitigliano conducted the last attacks with little effect. The Venetian administrators and Niccolò Orsini, who took advantage of the opportunity to free himself from the French, tried to convince many fugitives to return by saying that the battle was almost won.[16][17]

    After more than an hour of fighting, the French sought refuge on a hill. The Venetians willing to pursue them were too few, and both contenders set up camp. The French lost more than a thousand men, while the Venetians more than two thousand, but the nobles on both sides were either isolated or dead.[18]

    Charles lost all his booty, valued at more than 300,000 ducats. A one-day truce was declared to bury the dead. The dead and also the wounded were stripped by the Italian infantry and local inhabitants. Rodolfo Gonzaga, son of the Marquis of Mantua Ludovico III Gonzaga, was among the casualties. On the night after the end of the truce, Charles withdrew with his army from the battlefield, marching on into Lombardy and returning to France.[3][19]

    Aftermath

    Analysis

    Both parties strove to present themselves as the victors in the battle.[2] Due to the recapture of all the booty looted by Charles' troops and of his baggage train (among the trophies captured were Charles' personal helmet and seal, two royal flags and the French king's personal collection of erotic images), the battle was reported and celebrated in Venice as a victory.[20] The French army, however, had managed to avoid being encirled and destroyed by the League army and to march back to France, thus fulfilling its objective.[21]

    On the day of the battle, Ferdinand II of Naples appeared before Naples with a Spanish fleet and re-entered Naples the following day. He was welcomed with rejoicing by the citizens, as the French had made themselves hated through their behaviour. Pope Alexander VI denounced the French as having committed worse crimes in Italy than had the Goths. Already under threat of excommunication, Charles VIII was ordered to lay down his arms and promote the peace of Christendom by the Pope. Alexander also wrote to the Venetians to congratulate them on winning "immortal fame" by their liberation of Italy.[22]

    Subsequent events

    Charles left Italy abandoning all his conquests. He attempted in the next few years to rebuild his army but was hampered by the serious debts incurred by the campaign and he never succeeded. Charles died two-and-a-half years after his retreat, of an accident, striking his head while passing through a doorway, he succumbed to a sudden coma several hours later. Charles left France in debt and in disarray as a result of an ambition most charitably characterized as unrealistic and having lost several important provinces that it would take centuries to recover. On a more positive side, his expedition did broaden contacts between French and Italian humanists, energizing French art and letters in the latter Renaissance. Charles proved to be the last of the elder branch of the House of Valois and upon his death at Amboise the throne passed to a cousin, the Duc d'Orléans, who reigned as King Louis XII of France, who would try to make good his clearer claim to the Duchy of Milan.

    For Italy the consequences were catastrophic. Europe knew now, from Charles' expedition, of an enormously rich land, divided into easily conquerable principalities and defended only by mercenary armies that refused to fight at the slightest disadvantage. Italy was to be the scene of a dispute between the main continental powers, with the result that the Italians were left with only a secondary role in their own destiny. Only Venice, Genoa, the Papal States, Savoy and Tuscany survived as independent nations after the end of the Italian Wars, losing their original power and stability.

    See also

    Notes

    References

    1. ^ Mallett & Hale 1984, p. 56.
    2. ^ a b c d Mallett & Shaw 2012, p. 31.
    3. ^ a b c d e Tucker 2010, p. 361.
    4. ^ a b Nolan 2006, p. 303.
    5. ^ Bernardo Corio, Storia di Milano, p. 585
    6. ^ Bernardo Corio, Storia di Milano, p. 588
    7. ^ Dupuy 1993, p. 438.
    8. ^ Trevor Dupuy, Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, p. 462
    9. ^ David Nicolle, Fornovo 1495 - France's bloody fighting retreat, p. 43
    10. ^ a b c Nolan 2006, p. 304.
    11. ^ Trevor Dupuy, Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, p. 462
    12. ^ David Nicolle, Fornovo 1495 - France's bloody fighting retreat, p. 43
    13. ^ Palmer 1994, p. 19.
    14. ^ Birtachas 2018, pp. 327–328.
    15. ^ Nolan 2006, pp. 303–304.
    16. ^ Francesco Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, p. 9
    17. ^ David Nicolle, Fornovo 1495 - France's bloody fighting retreat, p. 43
    18. ^ David Nicolle, Fornovo 1495 - France's bloody fighting retreat, p. 43
    19. ^ David Nicolle, Fornovo 1495 - France's bloody fighting retreat, p. 43
    20. ^ Bradford, Sarah (1976). Cesare Borgia. New York: Macmillan. pp. 49–51
    21. ^ Setton 1978, p. 493–494.
    22. ^ Setton 1978, pp. 495–496.

    Sources

    • Dupuy, Trevor N. (1993). Harper Encyclopedia of Military History. HarperCollins. ISBN 978-0-06-270056-8.
    • Mallett, M. E.; Hale, J. R. (1984). The Military Organisation of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400 to 1617. Cambridge studies in early modern history. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-24842-6.
    • Mallett, Michael; Shaw, Christine (2012). The Italian Wars 1494–1559. Modern Wars in Perspective. Harlow: Pearson. ISBN 978-0-582-05758-6.
    • Nolan, Cathal (2006). The Age Of Wars Of Religion, 1000–1650: An Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization A-K. Vol. I. Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0-313-33733-8.
    • Palmer, William (1994). The Problem of Ireland in Tudor Foreign Policy, 1485–1603. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press. ISBN 978-0-85115-562-3.
    • Ritchie, Robert (2004). Historical Atlas of The Renaissance. Thalamus Publishing. ISBN 978-0-8160-5731-3.
    • Setton, Kenneth M. (1978). The Papacy and the Levant, 1204–1571: The Fifteenth Century. Vol. II. Philadelphia: The American philosophical society. ISBN 978-0-87169-127-9.
    • Taylor, Frederick Lewis (1921). The Art of War in Italy 1494–1529: Prince Consort Prize Essay 1920. Cambridge library collection. European History. Cambridge University Press. OCLC 967401725 – via Archive Foundation.
    • Theotokis, Georgios; Yıldız, Aysel, eds. (2018). A Military History of the Mediterranean Sea: Aspects of War, Diplomacy, and Military Elites. History of Warfare (118) (e-book ed.). Leiden/Boston: Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-36204-8.
      • Birtachas, Stathis. "Stradioti, Cappelletti, Compagnie or Milizie Greche: 'Greek' Mounted and Foot Troops in the Venetian State (Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries)". In Theotokis & Yıldız (2018).
    • Tucker, Spencer C. (2010). A Global Chronology of Conflict: From the Ancient World to the Modern Middle East: From the Ancient World to the Modern Middle East. Vol. I. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-85109-672-5.
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