Content deleted Content added
mNo edit summary |
→Patterns and trends: Add |
||
Line 115:
[[File:PikiWiki Israel 37239 The Dolphinarium.jpg|thumb|The aftermath of the PIJ suicide bombing at the [[Dolphinarium discotheque massacre|Dolphinarium discotheque]] in [[Tel Aviv]], June 2001, which killed 21 people, mostly teenagers]]
The emergence of Palestinian suicide bombings in the 1990s represented a significant escalation in violence compared to the earlier [[First Intifada]] (1987–1993).{{sfn|Horowitz|2015|p=72}} Almost all Palestinian suicide bombings targeted civilians,{{sfn|Pedahzur|2006|pp=|p=42}}{{sfn|Horowitz|2015|p=72}} and were carried out by newly recruited members.{{sfn|Horowitz|2015|p=72}} Between 1993 and early August 2002, over 135 Palestinian suicide bombers carried out attacks targeting Israeli civilians and soldiers.{{sfn|Moghadam|2003|pp=65}}
[[File:Passover massacre II.jpg|thumb|
Overall, during the [[Second Intifada]], from September 2000 to February 2005, there were approximately 116 suicide attacks carried out by 127 bombers.{{sfn|Pedahzur|2006|pp=|p=56}} Notable among these was the [[Dolphinarium discotheque massacre]] in June 2001, when a PIJ suicide bomber detonated at a [[Tel Aviv]] nightclub, killing 21 people, most of whom were teenagers.{{sfn|Siniver|2023||p=161–162}}
During the Second Intifada, the typical expense of a suicide bombing was around $150. Despite this low cost, such attacks resulted in six times more deaths and approximately twenty-six times more casualties than other forms of terrorism.{{sfn|Hoffman|2017||pp=141}}
Line 149:
Israel has preferred [[targeted assassinations]] to address suicide terrorism, believing that capturing their targets alive would result in higher Israeli casualties.{{sfn|Pedahzur|2006|pp=|p=49}} In 1995, Israel carried out assassinations of key militant leaders, such as PIJ's [[Fathi Shaqaqi|Fathi Shiqaqi]] in Malta in October 1995 and Hamas' [[Yahya Ayyash]] three months later. Ayyash, known as "the Engineer," was a master bomb maker responsible for numerous attacks and had first proposed using suicide bombings. His death, however, led to another wave of attacks.{{sfn|Hoffman|2017||pp=159}} Following a surge of suicide bombings in early 1996, the Israeli government established an extensive and costly security system to protect borders, roads, and key installations. This included new security units focused on public transport and school security.{{sfn|Ganor|2021||pp=189}}
In early 2002, a wave of terror attacks culminating in the deadly [[Passover massacre]] challenged Israeli PM [[Ariel Sharon]]'s deterrence-based strategy, as the violence intensified despite Israeli military efforts. Sharon's response evolved from targeted assassinations to a more comprehensive approach aimed at dismantling terrorist infrastructure.'''<ref name="Ganor 2021">{{harvnb|Ganor|2021|pages=216–218}}; {{harvnb|Siniver|2023|pages=161–162}}</ref>''' This led to [[Operation Defensive Shield]], which involved reoccupying areas under [[Palestinian Authority]] control to counteract terrorism.'''<ref name="Ganor 2021" />''' The operation targeted the infrastructure of Palestinian terrorism across six major cities, including [[Bethlehem]], [[Nablus]], [[Ramallah]], [[Tulkarm]], [[Qalqilya]], and [[Jenin]], with the latter—being a major source of terrorism—experiencing intense fighting.{{sfn|Siniver|2023||p=161–162}} Yasser Arafat was isolated in his [[Mukataa|Ramallah headquarters]], which remained under siege until 2004, and his authority declined.{{sfn|Siniver|2023||p=161–162
Despite Operation Defensive Shield's success in degrading terrorist capabilities, attacks continued, leading to increased public pressure for the construction of the [[Israeli West Bank barrier|West Bank barrier]], which began in 2002.{{sfn|Ganor|2021||pp=216–218}} By August 2003, the main section of the barrier was completed, significantly impacting attack patterns.{{sfn|Kliot|Charney|2006|pp=364–365}} Initially, the number of suicide bombings declined sharply, from 19 in 2003 to 6 in 2004 and 5 in 2005. Between the barrier's completion and June 2004, only three terror attacks originated from the northern West Bank and breached Israel, exploiting incomplete sections of the barrier. In contrast, from September 2000 to June 2003, 73 attacks from the same area had successfully penetrated this section.{{sfn|Kliot|Charney|2006|pp=364–365}}
The barrier has shifted the focus of attacks to less protected regions, including Gaza, southern Israel, and parts of Jerusalem, as well as areas where the barrier was not yet constructed such as the area of [[Rosh HaAyin]] and the [[Beth Shean Valley|Beth Shean valley]].{{sfn|Kliot|Charney|2006|pp=364–365}} Attackers have been forced to adopt longer and more challenging routes, leading to a decrease in successful attacks.{{sfn|Kliot|Charney|2006|pp=364–365}} Overall, by 2008, it was observed that while the barrier has not entirely halted suicide bombings, it has effectively redirected and complicated the attackers' efforts.{{sfn|Kliot|Charney|2006|pp=364–365}}
=== Political outcomes ===
| |||