Russian Armed Forces: Difference between revisions

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I don't think that I really have to prove that the NATO commander in Europe and sources like Interfax-Ukraine and Politico are not politically motivated in... supporting Russia. This information is important because the preceding text gives a picture that was true two years ago but things have changed since then. However, if you think that the text is misplaced, tell me where to put it.
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The Russian Armed Forces are the [[List of countries by number of military and paramilitary personnel|world's fifth largest military force]], with 1.15 million [[Active duty|active-duty personnel]] and close to two million [[Military reserve force|reservists]].<ref>{{cite web |last=Nichol |first=Jim |date=21 December 2022 |title=Russian military announces plan to expand, create new units |url=https://apnews.com/article/putin-finland-sergei-shoigu-ee953abf7f9bf217ccdaa61ec1b35ddd |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221221135310/https://apnews.com/article/putin-finland-sergei-shoigu-ee953abf7f9bf217ccdaa61ec1b35ddd |archive-date=21 December 2022 |access-date=21 December 2022 |work=[[The Associated Press]] |publisher= |quote=Russia expands active personnel to 1.5 million from 1.15 forces}}</ref> According to the United States [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA), "Russia plans to expand its active personnel force to 1.5 million by 2026, which will make it the third largest in the world, after China and India."<ref>{{Cite web |date=28 February 2023 |title=Russia |url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#military-and-security |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210109173026/https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#military-and-security |archive-date=9 January 2021 |access-date=20 September 2022 |publisher=Central Intelligence Agency |via=CIA.gov}}</ref> The Russian Armed Forces maintain the [[Russia and weapons of mass destruction|world's largest stockpile of nuclear weapons]].<ref>{{cite web |date=August 2020 |title=Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance |url=https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat |access-date=7 June 2021 |work=[[Arms Control Association]] |archive-date=24 January 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180124043430/https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat |url-status=live }}</ref> possess the world's second-largest fleet of [[ballistic missile submarine]]s,<ref>{{cite web |url=https://power.lowyinstitute.org/data/military-capability/signature-capabilities/ballistic-missile-submarines/ |work=[[Asia Power Index]] |publisher=[[Lowy Institute]] |date=2021 |title=Ballistic missile submarines data |access-date=25 January 2022 |archive-date=8 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220408173840/https://power.lowyinstitute.org/data/military-capability/signature-capabilities/ballistic-missile-submarines/ |url-status=live }}</ref> and are one of only three national militaries (alongside those of the [[United States Armed Forces|United States]] and [[People's Liberation Army|China]]) that operate [[strategic bomber]]s.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Paul |first1=T. V. |last2=Wirtz |first2=James J. |last3=Fortmann |first3=Michael |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9jy28vBqscQC&pg=PA332 |title=Balance of power: theory and practice in the 21st century |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |date=2004 |pages=332 |isbn=978-0-8047-5017-2 |access-date=5 December 2021 |archive-date=28 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028174352/https://books.google.com/books?id=9jy28vBqscQC&pg=PA332#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref> With certain exceptions, [[Conscription in Russia|Russian law mandates one year of military service for all male citizens aged 18–27]].<ref name="Law53-FZ"/><ref name="cia"/> In 2023, Russia had the [[List of countries by military expenditures|world's third-highest military expenditure]], at approximately {{Currency|86.4 billion|USD|passthrough=yes|linked=no}} to US$109 billion, or close to six percent of GDP.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/fs_2104_milex_0.pdf |title=Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020 |publisher=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |first1=Nan |last1=Tian |first2=Aude |last2=Fleurant |first3=Alexandra |last3=Kuimova |first4=Pieter D. |last4=Wezeman |first5=Siemon T. |last5=Wezeman |date=26 April 2021 |access-date=24 November 2021 |archive-date=17 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210817224815/https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/fs_2104_milex_0.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="SIPRI-2020" />
 
In spite of Russia's perceived military strength, as recorded in various assessments, deficiencies have been noted in the country's combat performance on both the tactical and operational scales. According to multiple reports, endemic [[Corruption#Military|corruption]] within the Russian Armed Forces has had a major impact on Russia's ability to effectively project [[hard power]].<ref>{{Cite news |title="Вывозили на КАМАЗе". Как российские солдаты и офицеры воровали у армии трусы, берцы и бронежилеты |language=ru |work=BBC News Русская служба |url=https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63177093 |access-date=17 December 2022 |archive-date=20 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221020044846/https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63177093 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Kovalev |first=Alexey |title=As War Hits the Homefront, Russia's Defeat Inches Closer |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/19/russia-ukraine-war-putin-defeat-retreat-mobilization-military-corruption/ |access-date=17 December 2022 |website=Foreign Policy |date=19 October 2022 |language=en-US |archive-date=17 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221217231239/https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/19/russia-ukraine-war-putin-defeat-retreat-mobilization-military-corruption/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=20 October 2022 |title='The army has nothing': new Russian conscripts bemoan lack of supplies |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/20/the-army-has-nothing-new-russian-conscripts-bemoan-lack-of-supplies |access-date=17 December 2022 |website=the Guardian |language=en |archive-date=25 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230225102851/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/20/the-army-has-nothing-new-russian-conscripts-bemoan-lack-of-supplies |url-status=live }}</ref> Amidst the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]], severe logistical failures have greatly impacted the operational performance of Russian troops, as different service branches have struggled to coordinate and work together. Continuous shortcomings have led Russia's war effort to suffer extensive setbacks since the initial invasion; the Russian Armed Forces have experienced successive losses of occupied/annexed territory, the large-scale destruction and squandering of their equipment, and a notably high casualty rate.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Sonne |first1=Paul |last2=Lamothe |first2=Dan |last3=Ilyushina |first3=Mary |date=13 September 2022 |title=Rapid loss of territory in Ukraine reveals spent Russian military |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/13/putin-russia-military-spent-ukraine/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220914234329/https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/13/putin-russia-military-spent-ukraine/ |archive-date=14 September 2022 |access-date=10 November 2022 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref><ref name="The Economist">{{Cite news |date=28 February 2022 |title=The woes of the Russian war machine are big and real. Are they also temporary? |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/02/28/the-woes-of-the-russian-war-machine-are-big-and-real-are-they-also-temporary |access-date=13 March 2022 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=13 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220313021041/https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/02/28/the-woes-of-the-russian-war-machine-are-big-and-real-are-they-also-temporary |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="newyorker.com0">{{Cite web |date=11 March 2022 |title=The Russian Military's Debacle in Ukraine |url=https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-russian-militarys-debacle-in-ukraine |access-date=15 March 2022 |magazine=The New Yorker |archive-date=23 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220323052142/https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-russian-militarys-debacle-in-ukraine |url-status=live }}</ref> Researchers from the U.S.-funded [[RAND Corporation]] have observed that Russia continues to struggle with military professionalization.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russia has a military professionalism problem, and it is costing them in Ukraine |last1=Posard |first1=Marek N. |last2=Holynska |first2=Khrystyna |work=Breaking Defense |date=21 March 2022 |access-date=25 August 2022 |url=https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/russia-has-a-military-professionalism-problem-and-it-is-costing-them-in-ukraine/ |archive-date=5 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220805231345/https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/russia-has-a-military-professionalism-problem-and-it-is-costing-them-in-ukraine/ |url-status=live }}</ref> However, by July 2024, according to the Supreme Commander of NATO Allied Forces Europe [[Christopher Cavoli]]: "The Russians are very cleverly adapting technologically and procedurally to many of the challenges that they run into in Ukraine".<ref>{{cite web | title=General Cavoli notes Russia's adaptation to challenges in war against Ukraine | website=Interfax-Ukraine | date=2024-07-10 | url=https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/999380-amp.html | ref={{sfnref | Interfax-Ukraine | 2024}} | access-date=2024-07-25}}</ref> Cavoli also said in April 2024 that the Russian military has replaced its troop and equipment losses and is larger than it was before the start of the conflict.<ref>{{cite web | title=Russian military replaced Ukraine battlefield losses 'far faster' than expected, general warns | website=POLITICO | date=2024-04-11 | url=https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/11/christopher-cavoli-russian-military-losses-00151718 | ref={{sfnref | POLITICO | 2024}} | access-date=2024-07-25}}</ref>
 
Directly controlled by the [[Security Council of Russia]], the Russian Armed Forces form part of the country's defence services under Russian law, fulfilling this capacity alongside the [[Border Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation|Border Guard of the Federal Security Service]], the [[National Guard of Russia|National Guard]], the [[Ministry of Internal Affairs (Russia)|Ministry of Internal Affairs]], the [[Federal Protective Service (Russia)|Federal Protective Service]], the [[Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia)|Foreign Intelligence Service]], and the [[Ministry of Emergency Situations (Russia)|Ministry of Emergency Situations]].