Court of Chancery: Difference between revisions

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Academics estimate that the Court of Chancery formally split from and became independent of the ''[[curia regis]]'' in the mid-14th century, at which time it consisted of the lord chancellor and his personal staff, the Chancery. Initially an administrative body with some judicial duties, the Chancery experienced an explosive growth in its work during the 15th century, particularly under the [[House of York]] ({{reign | 1461 | 1485}}); academics attribute this to its becoming an almost entirely judicial body. From the time of Queen [[Elizabeth I]] ({{reign | 1558 | 1603}}) onwards the Court was severely criticised for its slow pace, large backlogs, and high costs. Those problems persisted until its dissolution, despite being mitigated somewhat by reforms, particularly during the 19th century.
 
Attempts at fusing the Chancery with the common law courts began in the 1850s, and finally succeeded with the [[Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873| 1873]] and the [[Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875| 1875 Supreme Court of Judicature Acts]], which dissolved the Chancery and created a new unified [[High Court of Justice]], with the [[Chancery Division#Chancery Division|Chancery Division]] – one of three divisions of the High Court – succeeding the Court of Chancery as an equitable body.
 
For much of its existence the court was formally led by the lord chancellor, assisted by the judges of the common-law courts. The staff of the court included a large number of clerks, led by the [[master of the rolls]], who regularly heard cases on his own. In 1813 a [[Chancellor of the High Court| vice-chancellor]] was appointed to deal with the Chancery's increasing backlogs, and two more vice-chancellors were appointed in 1841. Lord chancellors sold offices of the Chancery for much of its history, raising large amounts of money. Many of the clerks and other officials held [[sinecure]]s; the holders, in lieu of wages, charged increasingly exorbitant fees to process cases – one of the main reasons for the high cost of bringing a case to the Court of Chancery.
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[[File:Edward I - Westminster Abbey Sedilia.jpg|thumb|right|upright|alt=A pale, brown-haired man holding a sceptre and wearing a crown. He is clothed in a black and robe over a white shirt, and is wearing pale gloves|[[Edward I]], during whose reign the chancellor's jurisdiction was established]]
 
The Court of Chancery originated, as did the other Highhigh Courtscourts before 1875, in the Norman ''[[curia regis]]'' or King's Council, maintained by most early rulers of England after 1066.<ref>Marsh (1890) p. 6</ref> Under the [[feudal system]], the Council was made up of the Monarchmonarch, the [[Great Officer of State|Great Officers of the Crown]] and anyone else the Monarch allowed to attend. Its jurisdiction was virtually unlimited, with executive, judicial and legislative functions.<ref>Carne (1927) p. 391</ref> This large body contained lawyers, peers, and members of the Church, many of whom lived far from London. It soon became apparent that it was too unwieldy to deal with the nation's day-to-day business. As a result, a smaller ''curia'' was formed to deal with the regular business of the country, and this soon split into various courts: first the [[exchequer of pleas]], to deal with finance, and then the [[Court of Common Pleas (England)|Court of Common Pleas]], to deal with "common" cases.<ref>Carne (1927) p. 392</ref>
 
The Chancery started as the personal staff of the lord chancellor, described as "a great secretarial bureau, a home office, a foreign office, and a ministry of justice".<ref>Carne (1927) p. 400</ref> The earliest reference to legal issues being sent to him is from 1280, when [[Edward I of England]], annoyed with the number of cases coming to him which could have been dealt with by other elements of his administration, passed a statute saying that:
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=== Further reform ===
[[John Somers, 1st Baron Somers|Lord Somers]], following his dismissal as lord chancellor, introduced anthe [[Administration of Justice Act 1705]] ([[4 & 5 Ann.]] c. 3) in 1706 which "became the most important act of law reform which the 18th century produced". The Actact significantly amended the existing law and court procedure, and while most of it was aimed at the common-law courts, it did affect the Chancery. For equity, the Actact provided that a party trying to have his case dismissed could not do so until he had paid the full costs, rather than the nominal costs that were previously required; at the same time, the reforms the Actact made to common-law procedure (such as allowing claims to be brought against executors of wills) reduced the need for parties to go to equity for a remedy.<ref>Kerly (1890) p. 173</ref> Legal historian [[Wilfrid Prest]] writes that despite these legislative enactments, the tally of which "begins to look quite impressive", the old problems continued, albeit less frequently; one [[barrister]] of the time claimed that going to the Court with a case worth anything less than £500 was a waste of time.<ref>Horowitz (1996) p. 27</ref>
 
Under [[Philip Yorke, 1st Earl of Hardwicke|Lord Hardwicke]], Chancery procedure was further reformed with a pair of orders published in 1741 and 1747, which mandated that a claimant who brought his case to court and had it dismissed immediately should pay full costs to the other side, rather than the 40 shillings previously paid, and that parties filing [[bills of review]] should pay £50 for the privilege.<ref name=kerlrev5/> At the same time, a review of the Court's costs and fees was undertaken by a Parliamentary Committee. The Committee reported that fees and costs had increased significantly since the last review under [[Charles I of England|Charles I]], a number of expensive honorary positions had been created, and on many occasions court officers had not known what the correct fees were. At the same time, proceedings had grown to several thousand pages in length, necessitating additional expense. The Committee concluded "that the interest which a great number of officers and clerks have in the proceedings of the Court of Chancery, has been a principal cause of extending bills, answers, pleadings, examinations and other forms and copies of them, to an unnecessary length, to the great delay of justice and the oppression of the subject". They recommended that a list of permissible fees be published and circulated to the court officials.<ref name=kerlrev5>Kerly (1890) p. 178</ref>
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The first major reforms were the appointment of a vice-chancellor in 1813 to hear cases, and the extension of the Master of the Rolls' jurisdiction in 1833 to hear any and all cases. In 1824 a Chancery Commission was appointed to oversee the Court, which the political opposition maintained was simply to protect it; the membership included the lord chancellor, the master of the rolls and all senior Chancery judges.<ref>Lobban (Spring 2004) p. 409</ref> Some significant reforms were proposed; in 1829, for example, [[John Copley, 1st Baron Lyndhurst|Lord Lyndhurst]] proposed unsuccessfully that the equity jurisdiction of the [[Exchequer of Pleas|Court of Exchequer]] be merged with the Chancery, and that a fourth judge be appointed to hear the additional cases. A year later, when the common law courts were each gaining a judge, he repeated his proposal, but the bill was strongly opposed by judges who maintained that the court backlog did not justify the additional expense of a fourth judge.<ref>Lobban (Spring 2004) p. 416</ref> Eventually, two more vice-chancellors were appointed in 1841, and a decade later two [[Lord Justice of Appeal|lord justices]] were tasked with hearing appeals from the Court through the [[Court of Appeal in Chancery]].<ref>Kerly (1890) p. 272</ref> These are described by Lobban as "hasty reactions to mounting arrears" rather than the result of long-term planning.<ref>Lobban (Spring 2004) p. 390</ref>
 
As a result of the new appointments, the court backlog was significantly reduced&nbsp;– the court processed 1,700 cases in 1846–49 compared to 959 in 1819–24&nbsp;– but it rose again after the death of [[Lancelot Shadwell|Shadwell VC]] and retirement of [[James Wigram (judge)|Wigram VC]]. Shadwell, appointed under the 1831 Actact of Parliament, could be replaced, but a principal in the 1841 Actact (under which Wigram had been appointed) meant that it provided for two life appointments to the court, not two open positions; after the retirement or death of the judges, no more could be appointed. Again, the backlog became a problem, particularly since the lord chancellor was distracted with the appellate cases through the [[Court of Appeal in Chancery]] and the [[Judicial functions of the House of Lords|House of Lords]], leaving a maximum of three Chancery judges who were available to hear cases. Further structural reforms were proposed; [[Richard Bethell, 1st Baron Westbury|Richard Bethell]] suggested three more vice-chancellors and "an Appellate Tribunal in Chancery formed of two of the vice chancellors taken in rotation", but this came to nothing.<ref name=lob1>Lobban (Spring 2004) p. 422</ref>
 
[[File:Thomas Pemberton Leigh.jpg|thumb|upright|alt=A sepia cabinet photograph of a middle-aged man relaxing in an armchair. He is dressed in mid-nineteenth century clothing and holds a book in one hand.|[[Thomas Pemberton Leigh, 1st Baron Kingsdown|Thomas Pemberton]] attacked the [[Six Clerks]] in Parliament and successfully had their positions abolished.]]
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After the [[Chancery Regulation Act 1862]] had gone some way toward procedural reform, in February 1867, [[Roundell Palmer, 1st Earl of Selborne|Roundell Palmer]] again brought the problem of having two separate court systems to Parliament's attention, and in March 1870 [[William Wood, 1st Baron Hatherley|Lord Hatherley]] introduced a bill to create a single, unified High Court of Justice. The bill was a weak one, not containing any provision addressing which court would deal with the common law and which with equity, and was also silent on the structure of the court, as Hatherley believed the difference between the common law and equity was one of procedure, not substance. As a result, the bill was heavily opposed from two sides: those who opposed fusion, and those who supported fusion but felt the provisions were too weak and vague to be of any use.<ref>Lobban (Autumn 2004) p. 594</ref> As a result, the bill was eventually withdrawn.<ref>Lobban (Autumn 2004) p. 595</ref>
 
In 1873, the idea was resurrected&nbsp;– again by Palmer, who was now [[Lord Selborne]] and the new [[lord chancellor]]&nbsp;– as the [[Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873|Supreme Court of Judicature bill]]. While still cautious, Selborne's bill was far more structured than Hatherley's, and contained more detail on what was to be done. Rather than fusing the common law and equity, which he saw as impracticable since it would destroy the idea of [[English trusts law|trusts]], he decided to fuse the courts and the procedure.<ref>Lobban (Autumn 2004) p. 596</ref> The final draft provided that all of the existing superior courts would be fused into one court consisting of two levels; one of first instance, one appellate. The court of first instance, to be known as the High Court of Justice, would be subdivided into several divisions based on the old superior courts, one of which, the Chancery Division, would deal with equity cases. All jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery was to be transferred to the Chancery Division; Section 25 of the Actact provided that, where there was conflict between the common law and equity, the latter would prevail. An appeal from each division went to the appellate level, the [[Court of Appeal of England and Wales]]. These provisions were brought into effect after amendment with the [[Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875]], and the Court of Chancery ceased to exist. The [[Master of the Rolls]] was transferred to the new [[Court of Appeal (England and Wales)|Court of Appeal]], the lord chancellor retained his other judicial and political roles, and the position of vice-chancellor ceased to exist, replaced by ordinary judges. The Chancery Division remains to this day part of the [[High Court of Justice]] of England and Wales.<ref name=kerl3>Kerly (1890) p. 294</ref>
 
== Jurisdiction ==
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=== Insanity and guardianship ===
The Chancery's jurisdiction over "lunatics" came from two sources: first, the king's prerogative to look after them, which was exercised regularly by the lord chancellor, and second, the [[Lands of LunaticsLunaticks Act 1324]] (Ruffhead: [[17 Edw. 2]]. c. 10), which gave the King (and therefore the chancellor) custodianship of lunatics and their land;<ref>Carne (1928) p. 607</ref> the Lord chancellor exercised the first right directly and the second in his role as head of the Court of Chancery.<ref>Carne (1928) p. 608</ref> This jurisdiction applied to any "idiots" or "lunatics", regardless of whether or not they were British, or whether their land was within [[England and Wales]]. They were divided into two categories&nbsp;– idiots, "who have no glimmering of reason from their birth and are, therefore, by law, presumed never likely to attain any",<ref>Adams (1855) p. 653</ref> and lunatics, "who have had understanding but have lost the use of it".<ref>Adams (1855) p. 654</ref> Lunatics and idiots were administered separately by the lord chancellor under his two prerogatives; the appeal under the king's prerogative went directly to the king, and under the [[Lands of LunaticsLunaticks Act 1324]] to the [[Judicial functions of the House of Lords|House of Lords]].<ref>Adams (1855) p. 655</ref>
 
Idiots and lunatics had their land looked after by a court-appointed administrator, and any profits went into a trust fund to support the insane person. Due to the vested interest of the king (who would hold the lands) the actual lunacy or idiocy was determined by a jury, not by an individual judge.<ref>Adams (1855) p. 656</ref> Under the [[Lunacy Act 1845]] the lord chancellor had a right to appoint a commission to investigate the insanity of an individual; as part of his role as Keeper of the king's conscience, however, he would only do this when it was beneficial to the lunatic, not simply because somebody had been found insane.<ref>Adams (1855) p. 657</ref>