Battlespace: Difference between revisions

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=== From "Old" to "New" Battlespace ===
As competition and conflict evolved during the industrial age, so has the ability to militarily compete in the information age. Thinking and fighting in the [[Industrial Age|industrial age]] could best be conceptualized as the "Old Battlespace" because battlefield lines were more distinct and pronounced in the more tangible domains of land, sea, and air. However, as economies and technologies change, so do the ways countries and militaries compete and conduct warfare. Hence, in the [[Information Age|information age]], the tangible domains (land, sea, and air) remain a constant, however, with the advent of (and prominence) of cyber, outer-space, civil society, and social media (human or cognitive domain), such intangible realms of competition and conflict have taken on greater prominence in the way non-kinetic and kinetic forms of warfare are pursued. Such a "New Battlespace" means that traditional barriers (e.g. vast distances, oceans, laws, etc.,) that used to prevent targeting are no longer an obstacle.<ref>{{Cite book |lastlast1=Matisek, |first1=Jahara & |last2=Jayamaha, |first2=Buddhika |title=Old and New Battlespaces: Society, Military Power, and War |publisher=Lynne Rienner |year=2022 |isbn=978-1-62637-996-1}}</ref> Thus, emergent domains enable everything to be weaponized and the globe becomes a competitive space for any state or non-state actor. Anything and everything will be weaponized, as everyone becomes a combatant in global contestation whether they like it or not.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Galeotti |first=Mark |title=The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War |publisher=Yale University Press |year=2022}}</ref> Such changes do not mean the nature of war has changed between Old and New Battlespaces, but instead points to the continuously changing character of war due to the modifications of economies, technologies, and military adaptation. This means the "New Battlespace" presents more complex problems to strategists and policymakers as the internet, deep interdependencies, and hyper-connectivity, make it difficult for armies built around an industrial age mindset to compete, and even more difficult when it comes to defending one's Homeland.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Matisek |first=Jahara |date=8 April 2022 |title=The New Battlespace is Here: The American Homeland is No Longer Safe |url=https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/new-battlespace/ |website=War Room (US Army War College)}}</ref>
 
===Battle-space agility===
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They affect fire support in two ways:<ref>[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/6-20-40/Appe.htm U.S. Field Manual 6-20-40; Appendix E: Fire Support Coordinating Measures]</ref>
 
* '''Restrictive'''—Restrictive control that is established in conjunction with a host nation to preclude damage or destruction to a national asset, population center, or religious structure. Its key role is the protection of an element of tactical importance, such as a fuel storage area.
**Restrictive fire area (RFA) is an area with specific restrictions and in which fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters, or higher echelon; occasionally, it may be established to operate independently.
**No-fire area (NFA) is a designated area which no fire support may be delivered for fires or effects. When the establishing headquarters allows fires on a mission-by-mission basis. When a friendly force is engaged by an enemy located within the NFA and the commander returns fire to defend their forces, the amount of return fire should not exceed that sufficient to protect the force and continue the mission.
* '''Permissive'''—Permissive control that gives the maneuver commander the liberty to announce and engage fire support at their will, unless it otherwise is restricted by a higher echelon. Most cases, a commander will deny the use of Fire Support Coordinating Measures (FSCM).
**There are free-fire areas (FFA) which fire support can commence without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters. Normally, it is established on identifiable terrain by division or higher headquarters.
 
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==See also==
{{Portal|War}}
* [[List of command and control abbreviations]]
* [[Command and control]]
* [[Fog of war]]
* [[Network-centric warfare]]
* [[Psychological warfare]]
 
==References==
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==Further reading==
*Owens Blackmore, WT. (20022005). ''DominantWar X: Human Extensions in Battle-space Knowledge''. University Press of theToronto PacificPress. {{ISBN|10-41028020-04138791-84}}
 
*Blackmore Galeotti, TM. (20052022). ''WarThe Weaponisation of XEverything: HumanA ExtensionsField inGuide Battle-spaceto the New Way of War''. Yale University of Toronto Press. {{ISBN|978-0-8020300-879125344-43}}
*Galeotti Matisek, J. and Jayamaha, MB. (2022). ''TheOld Weaponisationand ofNew EverythingBattlespaces: ASociety, FieldMilitary GuidePower, to the New Way ofand War''. YaleLynne University PressRienner. <nowiki>{{ISBN |978-01-3002562637-344996-3</nowiki>1}}
* Mitchell, W. (2013). ''Battle-space Agility 101''. Royal Danish Defense College Publishing House. {{ISBN|978-87-7147-006-2}}
*Matisek, J. and Jayamaha, B. (2022). ''Old and New Battlespaces: Society, Military Power, and War''. Lynne Rienner. ISBN 978-1-62637-996-1
* Mitchell, W. (2013). ''Battle-space Agility 101201''. Royal Danish Defense College Publishing House. {{ISBN|978-87-7147-006018-25}}
* Mitchell, W. (20132012). ''Battle-space Agility 201Intelligence''. Royal Danish Defense College Publishing House. {{ISBN|978-87-7147987720-0186-54}}
* Mitchell, W. (2012). ''Battle-space IntelligenceAgility in Helmand''. Royal Danish Defense College Publishing House. {{ISBN|9788798772064978-87-987720-5-7}}
* Mitchell, W. (20122008). ''Battle-spaceComprehensive AgilityApproach inCapacity HelmandBuilding''. Royal Danish Defense College Publishing House. {{ISBN|9788798772057978-87-91421-52-5}}
*Mitchell Owens, W. (20082002). ''ComprehensiveDominant Approach CapacityBattle-space BuildingKnowledge''.Royal DanishUniversity DefensePress Collegeof Publishingthe HousePacific. {{ISBN|978-871-91424102-1520413-58}}
*Owens, W. (2002). ''Dominant Battle-space Knowledge''. University Press of the Pacific. {{ISBN|1-4102-0413-8}}
 
==External links==
{{wiktionary}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070714132531/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/mcdp10.pdf ''Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0: Marine Corps Operations''']
* [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/gansler.htm ''Achieving Dominant Battlespace Awareness'']
* [http://www.dodccrp.org/events/8th_ICCRTS/pdf/005.pdf ''Joint Synthetic Battlespace: Cornerstone for Predictive Battlespace Awareness'']
* [http://www.dodccrp.org/events/1999_CCRTS/pdf_files/track_1/062beaut.pdf ''Battlespace Digitization - Coping With Uncertainty In The Command Process'']
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20110517202722/http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFulltext/RTO/MP/RTO-MP-049/MP-049-06.pdf ''Challenges for Joint Battlespace Digitization (JBD)'']
 
[[Category:Command and control]]