Counterintelligence: Difference between revisions

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'''Counterintelligence''' ('''counter-intelligence''') or '''counterespionage''' ('''counter-espionage''') is anany activity aimed at protecting an agency's [[Intelligence agency|intelligence program]] from an opposition's intelligence service.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: How to be a Counterintelligence Officer|last=Johnson|first=William|publisher=Georgetown University Press|year=2009|location=Washington DC|pages=2}}</ref> It includes gathering information and conducting activities to prevent [[espionage]], [[sabotage]], [[assassination]]s or other intelligence activities conducted by, for, or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons.

Many countries will have multiple organisationsorganizations focusing on a different aspect of counterintelligence, such as domestic, international, and counter-terrorism. Some states will formaliseformalize it as part of the [[police]] structure, such as the United States' [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] (FBI). Others will establish independent bodies, such as the United Kingdom's [[MI5]], others have both intelligence and counterintelligence grouped under the same agency, like the [[Canadian Security Intelligence Service]] (CSIS).

[[File:Great Game cartoon from 1878.jpg|thumb|Political cartoon depicting the Afghan [[Sher Ali Khan|Emir Sher Ali]] with his "friends" the [[Russian Bear]] and [[Lion|British Lion]] (1878). [[The [[Great Game]] saw the rise of systematic espionage and surveillance throughout the region by both powers]]

Modern tactics of espionage and dedicated government intelligence agencies developed over the course of the late-19th century. A key background to this development was the [[The Great Game]] -– the strategic rivalry and conflict between the British Empire and the Russian Empire throughout [[Central Asia]] between 1830 and 1895. To counter Russian ambitions in the region and the potential threat it posed to the British position in [[British India|India]], the [[Indian Civil Service]] built up a system of surveillance, intelligence and counterintelligence. The existence of this shadowy conflict was popularized in [[Rudyard Kipling]]'s famous [[espionage fiction|spy book]], ''[[Kim (novel)|Kim]]'' (1901), where he portrayed the Great Game (a phrase Kipling popularized) as an espionage and intelligence conflict that "never ceases, day or night".<ref>{{cite book|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=D3KIwYA_QyAC|title= Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective|author= Philip H.J. Davies|year= 2012|publisher= ABC-CLIO|isbn= 9781440802812}}</ref>

After the fallout from the [[Dreyfus Affairaffair]] of 1894–1906 in France, responsibility for French military counter-espionage passed in 1899 to the [[Sûreté générale]]—an agency originally responsible for order enforcement and public safety—and overseen by the [[Ministry of the Interior]].<ref>[http://www.aassdn.org/hsvEXhis01.html Anciens des Services Spéciaux de la Défense Nationale] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160315005343/http://aassdn.org/hsvEXhis01.html |date=2016-03-15 }} ( France )</ref>

The [[Okhrana]]<ref>"Okhrana" literally means "the guard"</ref> initially formed in 1880 to combat political terrorism and left-wing revolutionary activity throughout the [[Russian Empire]], was also tasked with countering enemy espionage.<ref>[httphttps://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9056920/Okhranka#275729.hook Okhrana] ''Britannica Online''</ref> Its main concern was the activities of revolutionaries, who often worked and plotted subversive actions from abroad. It set up a branch in [[Paris]], run by [[Pyotr Rachkovsky]], to monitor their activities. The agency used many methods to achieve its goals, including [[covert operations]], [[undercover agent]]s, and "perlustration"—the interception and reading of private correspondence. The Okhrana became notorious for its use of [[agent provocateur|agents provocateurs]], who often succeeded in penetrating the activities of revolutionary groups -– including the [[Bolsheviks]].<ref>[[Ian D. Thatcher]], Late Imperial Russia: problems and prospects, page 50.</ref>

'''Collective counterintelligence''' is gaining information about an opponent's intelligence collection capabilities whose aim is at an entity.<br>

'''Defensive counterintelligence''' is thwarting efforts by hostile intelligence services to penetrate the service.<br>

'''Offensive counterintelligence''' is having identified an opponent's efforts against the system, trying to manipulate these attacks by either "turning" the opponent's agents into double agents or feeding them false information to report.<ref>Lowenthal, M. (2003). Intelligence: From secrets to policy. Washington, DC: CQ Press.</ref>

Many governments organize counterintelligence agencies separately and distinct from their intelligence collection services. In most countries the counterintelligence mission is spread over multiple organizations, though one usually predominates. There is usually a domestic counterintelligence service, usually part of a larger [[law enforcement organization]] such as the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] in the [[United States]].<ref>{{Cite web|title=Counterintelligence|url=https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence|url-status=live|website=FBI|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160717152826/https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence |archive-date=2016-07-17 }}</ref>

The [[United Kingdom]] has the separate [[MI5|Security Service]], also known as MI5, which does not have direct police powers but works closely with law enforcement especially [[Special Branch]] that can carry out arrests, do searches with a warrant, etc.<ref>{{Cite web|title=COUNTER-ESPIONAGE|url=https://www.mi5.gov.uk/counter-espionage|url-status=live|website=Security Service MI5|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200115235849/https://www.mi5.gov.uk/counter-espionage |archive-date=2020-01-15 }}</ref>

[[Spain]] gives its Interior Ministry, with military support, the leadership in domestic counterterrorism. For international threats, the National Intelligence Center (CNI) has responsibility. CNI, which reports directly to the Prime Minister, is staffed principally by which is subordinated directly to the Prime Minister's office. After the March 11, [[2004 Madrid train bombings]], the national investigation found problems between the Interior Ministry and CNI, and, as a result, the National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Center was created. Spain's 3/11 Commission called for this Centercenter to do operational coordination as well as information collection and dissemination.<ref name=Archick>{{cite web

<{{blockquote>|Moreover, only a high-level penetration of the opposition can tell you whether your own service is penetrated. A high-level defector can also do this, but the adversary knows that he defected and within limits can take remedial action. Conducting CE without the aid of penetrations is like fighting in the dark. Conducting CE with penetrations can be like [[shooting fish in a barrel]].<ref name=Matschulat /></blockquote>}}

<{{blockquote>|The Soviet operational officer, having seen a great deal of the ugly face of communism, very frequently feels the utmost repulsion to those who sell themselves to it willingly. And when a GRU or KGB officer decides to break with his criminal organization, something which fortunately happens quite often, the first thing he will do is try to expose the hated volunteer.<ref name=Suvorov-IM-04>{{Cite book

}}</ref></blockquote>}}

| title = Field Manual 34-6034–60: Counterintelligence

<{{blockquote>|Physical security is important, but it does not override the role of force protection intelligence... Although all intelligence disciplines can be used to gather force protection intelligence, HUMINT collected by intelligence and CI agencies plays a key role in providing indications and warning of terrorist and other force protection threats.<ref>{{cite web

}}</ref></blockquote>}}

|&ndash;– Special, even unique.

&ndash;– Deserving.

&ndash;– The individual's situation is not satisfactory.

&ndash;– No other (easier) option (than to engage in espionage).

&ndash;– Doing only what others frequently do.

&ndash;– Not a bad person.

&ndash;– Performance in a government job (if presently employed) is separate from espionage; espionage does not (really) discount contribution in the workplace.

&ndash;– Security procedures do not (really) apply to the individual.

&ndash;– Security programs (e.g., briefings) have no meaning for the individual unless they connect with something with which they can personally identify.

| &ndash;– The individual sees their situation in a context in which they face continually narrowing options until espionage seems reasonable. The process that evolves into espionage reduces barriers, making it essentially "Okay" to initiate the crime.

&ndash;– They see espionage as a "Victimless" crime.

&ndash;– Once they consider espionage, they figure out how it might be done. These are mutually reinforcing, often simultaneous events.

&ndash;– Subject finds that it is easy to go around security safeguards (or is able to solve that problem). They belittle the security system, feeling that if the information was really important espionage would be hard to do (the information would really be better protected). This "Ease of accomplishment" further reinforces resolve.

|&ndash;– Anxious on initial hostile intelligence service contact (some also feel thrill and excitement).

&ndash;– After a relationship with espionage activity and HOIS develops, the process becomes much more bearable, espionage continues (even flourishes).

&ndash;– In the course of long-term activity, subjects may reconsider their involvement.

&ndash;– Some consider breaking their role to become an operative for the government. This occurs when access to classified information is lost or there is a perceived need to prove themselves or both.

&ndash;– Others find that espionage activity becomes stressful, they no longer want it. Glamour (if present earlier) subsides. They are reluctant to continue. They may even break contact.

&ndash;– Sometimes they consider telling authorities what they have done. Those wanting to reverse their role aren't confessing, they're negotiating. Those who are "Stressed out" want to confess. Neither wants punishment. Both attempt to minimize or avoid punishment.

| url =https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/05/opinion/the-mole-s-manual.html?pagewanted=print

Personnel in sensitive positions, who have difficulty getting along with peers, may become risks for being compromised with an approach based on ego. [[William Kampiles]], a low-level worker in the CIA Watch Center, sold, for a small sum, the critical operations manual on the [[KH-11]] reconnaissance satellite. To an interviewer, Kampiles suggested that if someone had noted his "problem"&mdash;constant—constant conflicts with supervisors and co-workers&mdash;andworkers—and brought in outside counseling, he might not have stolen the KH-11 manual.<ref name="Stein"/>

| title = Security Policy Advisory Board Meeting: Draft Minutes

}}</ref> While a funding cut caused the loss of impetus in the mid-nineties, there are research data used throughout the security community. They emphasize the <{{blockquote>|essential and multi-faceted motivational patterns underlying espionage. Future Slammer analyses will focus on newly developing issues in espionage such as the role of money, the new dimensions of loyalty and what seems to be a developing trend toward economic espionage.</blockquote>}}

While the concept well precedes the recognition of a discipline of [[OSINT]], the idea of [[Censorship#Censorship of stateState secrets and prevention of attention|censorship of material directly relevant to national security]] is a basic OSINT defense. In democratic societies, even in wartime, censorship must be watched carefully lest it violate reasonable freedom of the press, but the balance is set differently in different countries and at different times.

*{{cite journal|last=Ginkel|first=B. van|title=Towards the intelligent use of intelligence: Quis Custodiet ipsos Custodes?|url=https://icct.nl/publication/towards-the-intelligent-use-of-intelligence-quis-custodiet-ipsos-custodes/|publisher=The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism|location=The Hague|volume=3|issue=10|journal=Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies | date=2012 | doi=10.19165/2012.1.10|access-date=2018-04-06|archive-date=2022-12-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221203214604/http://icct.nl/publication/towards-the-intelligent-use-of-intelligence-quis-custodiet-ipsos-custodes/|url-status=dead}}

*[https://web.archive.org/web/20091026203147/https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no2/toward-a-theory-of-ci.html Toward a Theory of CI]