Afghan Army: Difference between revisions

| image = Arms of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.svg

| caption = The emblem of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan serves as the badge for all branches of the armed forces

| country = [[Afghanistan]]

| type = [[Army]]

}}

 

 

After the resignation of [[President of Afghanistan|President]] [[Mohammad Najibullah|Najibullah]] in 1992, the army effectively dissolved. In 1996 the [[Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001)|Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan]] (Taliban regime) took power, creating their own army, which lasted until the [[United States invasion of Afghanistan]] in October–November 2001.

[[File:Afghan infantry.jpg|thumb|150px|left|Afghan infantry soldier in 1890]]

 

 

<blockquote>"..the army was virtually nonexistent. With the assistance of a liberal financial loan from the British, plus their aid in the form of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies, [Abdur Rahman] began a 20-year task of creating a respectable regular force by instituting measures that formed the long-term basis of the military system. These included increasing the equalization of military obligation by setting up a system known as the hasht nafari (whereby one man in every eight between the ages of 20 and 40 took his turn at military service); constructing an arsenal in Kabul to reduce dependence on foreign sources for small arms and other ordnance; introducing supervised training courses; organizing troops into divisions, brigades, and regiments, including battalions of artillery; developing pay schedules; and introducing an elementary (and harsh) disciplinary system.</blockquote>

{{See also|Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan}}

[[File:SCUD 2.JPG|thumb|right|250px|In 1989, the Soviet Union transferred numbers of [[Scud missile]]s, a [[tactical ballistic missile]], as seen in the footage in 2004.]]

 

The army lost much of its strength during the early stages of PDPA rule. One of the main reasons for the small size was that the Soviet military were afraid the Afghan army would defect ''[[en masse]]'' to the enemy if total personnel increased. There were several sympathisers of the [[mujahideen]] within the military.{{sfn|Isby|1986|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=k86jifnA3oYC&pg=PA18 18]}} Even so, there were several elite units under the command of the Afghan army, for instance, the 26th Airborne Battalion, 444th, 37th and [[38th Commando Brigade]]s. The 26th Airborne Battalion proved politically unreliable, and in 1979, they revolted against the PDPA government. As a result, the 26th Airborne Battalion was reformed and turned into the 37th Commando Battalion. In the same year, the 81st Artillery Regiment were given airborne training and converted into the 38th Commando Battalion.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ken Conboy |url=http://archive.org/details/elite-forces-of-india-and-pakistan |title=Elite Forces of India and Pakistan |last2=Paul Hannon |date=1992}}</ref> The Commando Brigades were, in contrast, considered reliable and were used as mobile strike forces until they sustained excessive casualties. Insurgents ambushed and inflicted heavy casualties on the 38th Commando Brigade during the [[Battles of Zhawar|Second Battle of Zhawar]] in [[Paktika Province]] in May 1983.{{sfn|Grau|Jalali|2001}} After sustaining heavy casualties the commando brigades were turned into battalions.{{sfn|Isby|1986|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=k86jifnA3oYC&pg=PA19 19]}}

Local militias were also important to the Najibullah regime's security efforts. From 1988 several new divisions were formed from former Regional Forces/militias' formations: the [[53rd Infantry Division (Afghanistan)|53rd Infantry Division]] – the "Jowzyani militia" of [[Abdul Rashid Dostum]] raised from [[Sheberghan]], the [[55th Infantry Division (Afghanistan)|55th]], 80th, 93rd, 94th, 95th, and 96th, plus, possibly, a division in [[Lashkar Gah]].{{sfn|Giustozzi|2000|page=220}}{{sfn|Davis|1993}}{{sfn|Davis|1994}}

[[File:Afghan_Army_shoulder_patch_1980.png|thumb|The shoulder patch worn by Afghan National Army soldiers under the [[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]]]]

 

=== 1992 and after ===

 

Formations in existence by the end of 2002 included the 1st Army Corps ([[Nangrahar Province|Nangarhar]]), 2nd Army Corps ([[Kandahar Province|Kandahar]], dominated by [[Gul Agha Sherzai]]), 3rd Army Corps ([[Paktia Province|Paktia]], where the US allegedly attempted to impose [[Atiqullah Ludin]] as commander), 4th Army Corps ([[Herat]], dominated by [[Ismail Khan]]), 6th Army Corps at Kunduz, 7th Army Corps (under [[Atta Muhammad Nur]] at [[Balkh Province|Balkh]]<ref>[http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/639a42fe70c4d0ca49256f1f0007f3b6 ReliefWeb ť Document ť Army develops despite militia disarmament issues] {{webarchive |url=https://archive.today/20110211182853/http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/639a42fe70c4d0ca49256f1f0007f3b6 |date=11 February 2011 }} and Mukhopadhyay, Dipali. "Disguised warlordism and combatanthood in Balkh: the persistence of informal power in the formal Afghan state." Conflict, Security & Development 9, no. 4 (2009): 535–564.</ref>), 8th Army Corps (at [[Jowzjan Province|Jowzjan]], dominated by Dostum's [[National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan]]) and the Central Army Corps around Kabul.<ref>Antonio Giustozzi, 'Military Reform in Afghanistan,' in Confronting Afghanistan's Security Dilemmas, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Brief 28, September 2003, pp. 23–31. See Jalali 2002 notes 20–25.</ref>{{sfn|Jalali|2002}}<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/militia-fac-list.htm|title=Afghanistan – Militia Facilities|website=www.globalsecurity.org}}</ref> In addition, there were divisions with strong links to the centre in Kabul. These included the 1st in Kabul, 27th in Qalat, 31st in Kabul, 34th in [[Bamiyan]] (4th Corps),{{sfn|Bhatia|Sedra|2008|p=283}} 36th in Logar, 41st in Ghor, 42nd in Wardak, 71st in Farah, and 100th in Laghman.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Afghan Military Forces [AMF]|url=https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/amf.htm|access-date=2022-12-24|website=www.globalsecurity.org}}</ref>

 

The [[International Crisis Group]] wrote:<ref>ICG, "Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan," Asia Report N°65, 30 September 2003, p.3, citing Antonio Giustozzi, "Re-building the Afghan Army", paper presented during a joint seminar on "State Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan" of the Centre for Development Research, University of Bonn, and the Crisis States Program, Development Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, 30 May-1 June 2003, Bonn.</ref>

The first deployment outside Kabul was made by 3rd Kandak ANA to [[Paktika Province]], including [[Orgun]], in January 2003.<ref>{{Cite news|author=Carlotta Gall |title=An Afghan Army Evolves From Fantasy to Slightly Ragged Reality |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/25/international/asia/25AFGH.html |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=25 January 2003}}</ref> By January 2003 just over 1,700 soldiers in five ''Kandaks'' ([[battalion]]s) had completed the 10-week training course, and by mid-2003 a total of 4,000 troops had been trained. Approximately 1,000 ANA soldiers were deployed in the US-led [[Operation Warrior Sweep]], marking the first major combat operation for Afghan troops. Initial recruiting problems lay in the lack of cooperation from regional warlords and inconsistent international support. The problem of desertion dogged the force from the outset: in the summer of 2003, the desertion rate was estimated to be 10% and in mid-March 2004, an estimate suggested that 3,000 soldiers had deserted. Some recruits were under 18 years of age and many could not read or write. Recruits who only spoke the Pashto language experienced difficulty because instruction was usually given through interpreters who spoke Dari.

 

[[File:Construction of ANA base in Herat.jpg|thumb|Construction of Camp Zafar for the ANA in [[Herat Province]] (2005)]]

In addition to the fighting units, establishment of regional structures began when four of the five planned corps commanders and some of their staff were appointed on 1 September 2004. The first regional command was established in Kandahar on 19 September; the second at Gardez on 22 September, with commands at Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat planned.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25226|title=Defense.gov News Article: Afghan National Army Activates Second Regional Command|date=30 August 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100830065614/http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25226|archive-date=2010-08-30}}</ref> The Gardez command, also referred to in the AFPS story as the [[203rd Corps (Afghanistan)|203 Corps]], was to have an initial force of 200 soldiers. Kandahar's command was the first activated, followed by Gardez and Mazar-e-Sharif. The Herat command was seemingly activated on 28 September. The next year, the ANA's numbers grew to around 20,000 soldiers, most of which were trained by the United States Army. In the meantime, the [[United States Army Corps of Engineers]] started building new military camps for the fast-growing army.

|- style="text-align:center;"

| rowspan=2| '''{{army|Afghanistan}}'''

| colspan=2| [[File:Afgn-Army-Dagarwal(Colonel).svg|50px|Colonel]]

| colspan=2| [[File:Afgn-Army-Dagarman(LtCol).svg|50px|Lieutenant Colonel]]

| colspan=2| [[File:Afgn-Army-Jagran(Major).svg|50px|Major]]

| colspan=2| [[File:Afgn-Army-Lomri Baridman(1stLt).svg|50px|First Lieutenant]]

| colspan=2| [[File:Afgn-Army-Dvahomi Baridman(2ndLt).svg|50px|Second Lieutenant]]

|- style="text-align:center;"

| colspan=2| {{lang|ps|مارشال}}<br />{{lang|ps-Latn|Marshal}}<br />{{lang|en|Marshal}}

| colspan=2| {{lang|ps|ډگرمن}}<br />{{lang|ps-Latn|Dagarman}}<br />{{lang|en|Lieutenant Colonel}}

| colspan=2| {{lang|ps|جگرن}}<br />{{lang|ps-Latn|Jagran}}<br />{{lang|en|Major}}

| colspan=2| {{lang|ps|لمړی بريدمن}}<br />{{lang|ps-Latn|Lomri baridman}}<br />{{lang|en|First Lieutenant}}

| colspan=2| {{lang|ps|دوهم بریدمن}}<br />{{lang|ps-Latn|Dvahomi baridman}}<br />{{lang|en|Second Lieutenant}}

{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armed Forces/OF/Blank}}

|}

{{Main|List of equipment of the Afghan Armed Forces}}

[[File:An Afghan National Army vehicle leads a security patrol.jpg|thumb|[[Humvee]]s of the ANA]]

 

Besides NATO, Afghanistan had increasingly turned to its regional allies, India and Russia for military aid and supplies. Both countries supported the [[Northern Alliance]], with funding, training, supplies and medical treatment of wounded fighters, against the Taliban for years prior to the US-led intervention in 2001.