S. L. A. Marshall: Difference between revisions

|birth_place= [[Catskill (town), New York|Catskill, New York]], U.S.

|death_place= [[El Paso, Texas]], U.S.

[[Brigadier general (United States)|Brigadier General]] '''Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall''', also known as '''SLAM''', (July 18, 1900 – December 17, 1977), also known as '''SLAM''', was a military journalist and historian. He served with the [[American Expeditionary Forces]] in [[World War I]], before becoming a journalist, specialisingspecializing in military affairs.

In 1940, he published ''Blitzkrieg: Armies on Wheels'', an analysis of the tactics used by the ''[[Wehrmacht]]'', and re-entered the [[U.S. Army]] as its chief combat historian during [[World War II]] and the [[Korean War]]. He officially retired in 1960 but acted as an unofficial advisor and historian during the [[Vietnam War]]. In total, Marshall wrote over 30 books, including ''Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action,'' later made into [[Pork Chop Hill (film)|a film]] of the same name, as well as ''The Vietnam Primer'', co-authored by Colonel [[David H. Hackworth]].

His most famous publication is ''Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command'', which claimed that fewer than 25% of men in combat actually fired their weapons at the enemy. While the data used to support this has been challenged, his conclusionconclusions thatand asuggested significantremedies numberto ofimprove soldierscombat doeffectiveness not fire their weapons in combat hashave been verified by multiple studies performed by other armies, going back to the 18th century and continuing into the 20thinfluential.{{sfn|Holmes|2003|p=13}}

Marshall was born in [[Catskill (town), New York|Catskill, New York]], on July 18, 1900, the son of Caleb C. and Alice Medora (Beeman) Marshall. He was raised in [[Colorado]] and [[California]], where he briefly worked as a child actor for [[Essanay Studios]]; his family relocated to [[El Paso, Texas]], where he attended [[El Paso High School|high school]].{{sfn|Burdett|2010}}

Marshall enlisted in the [[United States Army|US Army]] on November 28, 1917, joining the [[315th Engineer Battalion]], part of the [[90th Infantry Division (United States)|90th Infantry Division]]. Based initially in Camp Travis, near [[San Antonio]], [[Texas]], his division transferred to [[France]] with the [[American Expeditionary Forces]] in June 1918 and Marshall was promoted to [[Sergeant#United States|sergeant]].{{sfn|Burdett|2010}} The 315th took part in the [[Battle of Saint-Mihiel]] and [[Meuse-Argonne Offensive]].{{sfn|United States War Department|1920|p=37}} A 1921 recordhistory by of theA Company 315th Engineers from formation to the end of 1918 shows that duringfrom six22 weeksAugust ofto activethe serviceArmistice, Marshall's company lost nineeight dead and fifteen wounded out of 165 men.{{sfn|Millinder|1921}}

Marshall later claimed he did so to resolve a dispute over who had been responsible for holding off a number of Japanese counter-attacks. By interviewing individual participants, each with a slightly different perspective, he created ana overallconsiderably more detailed and accurate picture of the action considerablythan morewas detailedpossible andpreviously. accurateHis thanexperience doneas previously.a Usingjournalist, and use of standard questions, heallowed was ablehim to quickly produce large numbers of similar reports, a process helped by his journalistic experience,. whichThese were used by the Army to identify tactical lessons.; Forfor example, Marshall found that for various reasons tanks called in to support infantry often withdrew even when their help was still required;. toTo overcome this problem, they were made subordinate to the local infantry commander for the duration of the action.{{sfn|Burdett|2010}}

His interview techniques were quickly becameadopted standardthroughout the US Army, and in 1944 Marshall was transferred to Europe where he ended the war as chief combat historian.<ref>{{cite webmagazine |last1=Baum |first1=Dan |title=The Price of Valor |url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/07/12/the-price-of-valor |websitemagazine=The New Yorker Magazine|date=4 July 2004 |access-date=26 March 2022}}</ref> In 1947, he used these interviews as the basis for his best known work ''Men Against Fire'', whose most notable conclusion was that 75% of individual riflemen engaged in combat never fired at an exposed enemy for the purpose of killing, even when directly threatened.{{sfn|Burdett|2010}}{{Efn|ThisMuch shouldof bethe qualified;criticism helater concludeddirected thatat him missed an important qualification. Marshall concluded key weapons, such as [[flamethrower]]s, usually fired and crew-served weapons like [[machine gun]]s almost always fired, while the rate increased greatly if a nearby leader demanded it. WhenHis leftargument towas theirthat ownif devicesunguided, the great majority of individual combatants throughout history appear to have been unable or unwilling to kill.{{Sfn|Grossman|2004}}}} Marshall argued civilian norms against taking life were so strong many conscripts could not bring themselves to kill, even at the risk of their own lives, and suggested changes in training that would increase the percentage willing to engage the enemy with direct fire.{{sfn|Burdett|2010}} Many were incorporated by the US military; Marshall reported far more men fired weapons during the [[Vietnam War]].<ref name="historynet">{{cite web | url=https://www.historynet.com/men-against-fire-how-many-soldiers-actually-fired-their-weapons-at-the-enemy-during-the-vietnam-war.htm | title=Men Against Fire: How Many Soldiers Actually Fired Their Weapons at the Enemy During the Vietnam War | first=Russell W. | last=Glennt | date=April 2002 | work=[[Vietnam Magazine]] | via=HistoryNet | access-date=November 12, 2021}}</ref>

Less well known, but perhaps more significant, was Marshall'sa effortpost-war toproject assembleled Germanby officersMarshall afterthat theemployed warformer toGerman writeofficers historiesto andproduce analyses of all battles fought in allEurope theatresfrom of1939 theto European war1945. At theits height of the project, over 200 German officers participated, including [[Heinz Guderian]] and [[Franz Halder]]. Hundreds(who ofused his position to vet the monographs wereand writtenpromulgate basedthe on[[myth thisof datathe project,clean Wehrmacht]].<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Smelser |first1=Ronald |author-link1=Ronald Smelser |url=https://archive.org/details/mythofeasternfro0000smel |title=The Myth of whichthe threeEastern areFront: availableThe Nazi-Soviet War in commercialAmerican printPopular Culture |last2=Davies |first2=Edward J.{{citation needed|dateauthor-link2=MarchEdward J. Davies 2022}}{{efn|grouppublisher=lower[[Cambridge University Press]] |year=2008 |isbn=978-alpha0-521-83365-3 |seelocation=New York |page= |url-access=registration}}</ref>) Hundreds of monographs were written based on this data project, including the 1994 publication ''Anvil of War: German Generalship in Defense of the Eastern Front'', edited by [[Peter G. Tsouras]], 1994}}.

[[File:David Hackworth.JPG|thumb|right|upright=0.8|[[David H. Hackworth]], previouslyonce aan collaboratoradmirer and admirercollaborator of Marshall, Hackworth would later criticize Marshall as a criticliar ofand Marshall'sprofiteer {{sfn|Hackworth|1989|p=581,583-586}} methodology]]

Although his conclusions were widely accepted during his lifetime, after his death in 1977 Marshall's approach was questioned by scholars such as Roger Spiller and Kelly Jordan, who claimed the interviews used to support his ratio-of-fire theory either did not exist or were fabricated.{{sfn|Spiller|1988|pp=63–71}}{{sfn|Jordan|2002|p=137}} However, some of his original field survey notes which are held by the US Army Military History Institute were reviewed by Fred Williams in 1990. When comparing a sample of Marshall's claims from 31 pages of his books to what was written in his original notes, Williams found that while he "occasionally increased the numbers of men or the distances involved by twenty to fifty percent", in general his books followed these"the sequence of events and the vast majority of the facts faithful to the testimony as he recorded it"exactly.{{Sfn|Williams|1990|pp=28–30}} Williams said of Marshall though that "Not a true historian in the trained professional sense, Marshall would muster facts and figures in support of what were to him obvious truths."{{Sfn|Williams|1990|pp=28–30}}{{efn|Williams makes no analysis of the sources of the fire ratio number}} The official US historian of the 1944 [[Battle of the Bulge]] also wrote that Marshall's oral interviews with participants in the battle aligned with testimony from other sources.{{Sfn|Cole|1994|p=vi}}

His former collaborator, Hackworth, described Marshall as "less a "voyeurmilitary warrior",analyst forthan whoma "themilitary truthambulance neverchaser," gotand in"more thea wayvoyeur ofthan a good storywarrior",{{sfn|Hackworth|1989|p=?568}} and although Hackworth's own veracity and reliability as a witness has been questioned by reviewers, one concluded that "Others had already begun to cast doubt upon Marshall's methods. Hackworth delivers the coup de grace."{{sfn|Bacevich}} SimilarMarshall criticismsreceived weresimilar madecriticisms byfrom Harold Leinbaugh, an ex-FBI employee and WWII infantry veteran, who considered his conclusions a slur on the fighting ability of American soldiers and labelled them "absurd, ridiculous and totally nonsensical".{{sfn|Smoler|1989|p=5}} Doubts as to whether Marshall's conclusions derive from a reliable and “systematic collection of data" remain even among those who support his conclusions, {{Sfn|Holmes|2003|p=13}} while Canadian military historian Robert Engen claims Marshall "wilfully disregarded important evidence" that did not align with his preconceptions.{{sfn|Engen|2011|p=46}} [[Antony Beevor]] wrote that some of Marshall's analysis was shown to be "very dubious" even though he agreed with the overall premise that in a conscript army only a few soldiers shot at the enemy.{{sfn|Beevor|2009|pp=xxi–xxii}}

Despite this, [[Dave Grossman (author)|Grossman]] argues "Marshall's fundamental conclusion that man is not, by nature, a killer" is confirmed by data from other armies and different historical periods. These include studies conducted by the 19th century French military theorist [[Ardant du Picq]], Paddy Griffith's 1989 book ''Battle Tactics of the American Civil War'', which analyses the "extraordinarily low killing rate" among [[American Civil War]] regiments, and in ''Acts of War; The Behaviour of Men in Battle'' by British military historian [[Richard Holmes (military historian)|Richard Holmes]] of Argentine soldiers during the Falklands War.{{Efn|Though Holmes notes that for British soldiers in the Falklands, firing their weapons was demonstrative of the aggressive nature of 2 Para and all soldiers fired their weapons<ref>Holmes p235-236</ref>}} The claim was also supported by [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] studies into non-firing rates by law enforcement officers in the 1950s and 1960s.{{Sfn|Grossman|2000|pp=9-10}}

Surveys of after action reports conducted during WWII in the British and Soviet armies showed low firing rates were common in both,{{Citation toneeded|date=May the extent2024}}; Russian officers suggested inspecting rifles after combat, and court-martiallingexecuting those found with clean barrels.{{sfn|Beevor|2009|pp=xxi–xxii}} Engen argues contemporary Canadian evidence does not support Marshall's or Grossman's claims of the universality of the ratio due to an innate resistance to killing",{{sfn|Engen|2011|p=45}} although Grossman suggests this may be the result of training techniques that pioneered realistic marksmanship training.{{Sfn|Grossman|2004}}{{Efn|Engen offers several reasons why fire might be withheld - fear, fatigue, lack of opportunity, "live and let live" attitude, not wanting to bring return fire, and in the case of Canadian doctrine of the time training in fire discipline - to conserve ammunition and shoot only when it will be effective.<ref>Engen p44-45</ref>}}

In response, John Douglas Marshall, who fellwas outdisowned withby his grandfather after refusingreceiving toan servehonorable indischarge from the Army as a conscientious objector during the Vietnam War, wrote a bookmemoir about his grandfather ("Reconciliation Road") in 1993. analysingHe analyzed his grandfather's WWI service, using official army records and personal letters written during the Meuse-Argonne offensive. He also discovered a scrapbook compiled by his grandfather and dedicated to a colleague in the 315th killed in action on November 8, 1918. In the preface, the elder Marshall wrote of being present when his friend was shot near [[Bantheville]], although records show he was in fact part of a road repair gang hit by artillery fire, while Marshall himself was absent taking the [[West Point]] entrance exams that day.{{sfn|Marshall|1993|pp=181–182}} John Marshall ultimately concluded the vast majority of his grandfather's wartime experiences were independently verified by his service record and any exaggerations were minor and irrelevantdid tonot undermine the validity of his later work.{{sfn|Marshall|1993|pp=282–284}}{{Failed verification|date=May 2024|reason=Note stated on the pages given. Pages mention SLAM legacy but not with interpretation given}}

One of Marshall's suggestions for improving rates of fire was to use realistic man-shaped [[Shooting target|targets]] rather than [[Bullseye (target)|bullseyes]],{{Sfn|Williams|1990|pp=79-80}} a practice which is now standard among militaries and law enforcement agencies.{{Sfn|Grossman|2004}} Much of the ongoing discussion regarding his research centres on reasons for "non-firing" and is of continuing interest to militaries in order to determine how to optimise training and manage issues like post traumatic stress disorder.{{sfn|Engen|2011|pp=47–48}} Engen suggests Marshall's work led combat psychologists to identify the act of killing as a major factor in PTSD, not just an individual's personal experience under fire or the deaths of their comrades.{{sfn|Engen|2011|p=48}} This factor has been identified as the most significant driver of PTSD among remote drone operators, who may never directly come under fire.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Press |first1=Eyal |title=The Wounds of the Drone Warrior |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/magazine/veterans-ptsd-drone-warrior-wounds.html |access-date=11 April 2022 |work=[[The New York Times]] Magazine |date=June 13, 2018}}</ref>

In his assessment of Marshall's findings, military historian [[John Keegan]] wrote:{{Sfn|Keegan|1986|p=291}} {{blockquote|[Marshall's] ultimate purpose in writing was not merely to describe and analyse - excellent though his description and analysis is - but to persuade the American army it was fighting its wars the wrong way. [He was convinced] success in battle depended upon structuring the army correctly...In arguing his case for a new structure [andhe whilewas] undoubtedly guilty of over-emphasis and special pleading,. hisHis arguments were howeverconsonantly effective... so that he has the unusual experience, for an historian, of seeing his message not merely accepted in his lifetime but translated into practice}}

Meanwhile, military historian Roger Engen concluded the following:{{sfn|Engen|2011|pp=47–48}} {{blockquote|[C]ompelling evidence shows that Marshall was factually incorrect in his assertions that only 15-20 percent of riflemen fired their weapons in the Second World War. Even if he was wholly correct, his interpretation of the meaning of this phenomenon does not stand up well to scrutiny. .. [T]o universalize Marshall’s findings beyond the specific subjects he studied is premature.{{sfn|Engen|2011|pp=47–48}} }}

|[[Croix de guerre 1939–1945 (France)|French Croix de Guerre 1939-19451939–1945 with Palm]]

* {{cite book|title=About Face |first=David |last=Hackworth |authorlink=David Hackworth | publisher=[[Simon & Schuster]]|year=1989|isbn=0-671-52692-8}}

* {{cite book |last1=Keegan |first1=John |title=The Face Of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme|publisher=Dorset Press |date=1986|isbn=978-0880290838 |orig-date=1976}}

[[Category:HistoriansAmerican historians of World War II]]

[[Category:RecipientsAmerican recipients of the Croix de Guerre 1939–1945 (France)]]