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{{Voting}}
'''Electronic voting''' is [[voting]] that uses [[Electronics|electronic]] means to either aid or take care of casting and counting [[ballot]]s
Depending on the particular implementation, e-voting may use standalone ''[[electronic voting machine]]s'' (also called EVM) or computers connected to the Internet ('''online voting'''). It may encompass a range of
A worthy e-voting system must perform most of these tasks while complying with a set of standards established by regulatory bodies, and must also be capable to deal successfully with strong requirements associated with [[Computer security|security]], [[accuracy]],
Electronic voting technology can include [[punched card]]s, [[optical scan voting system]]s and specialized voting kiosks (including self-contained [[#Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting system|direct-recording electronic voting systems]], or DRE). It can also involve transmission of [[ballot]]s and votes via telephones, private [[computer network]]s, or the
In general, two main types of e-voting can be identified:
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* remote e-voting via the Internet (also called i-voting) where the voter submits his or her vote electronically to the election authorities, from any location.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://e-estonia.com/component/i-voting/|title=i-Voting|work=e-Estonia|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170211005750/https://e-estonia.com/component/i-voting/|archive-date=11 February 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://nea.gov.ph/issuances/memorandum-to-ecs/category/41-2013?download=750%3Amemo-2013-006-comelec-resolution-no.-9597-promulgated-on-december-21_2012|title=Res. 9597 Philippines concerning grid power requirements for various needs including i-voting|website=nea.gov.ph|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130702042632/http://www.nea.gov.ph/issuances/memorandum-to-ecs/category/41-2013?download=750%3Amemo-2013-006-comelec-resolution-no.-9597-promulgated-on-december-21_2012|archive-date=2 July 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.electoralpractice.ch/2014/02/switzerlands-new-legislation-on-internet-voting/#sthash.FoF0XF9m.i6VEjuJm.dpbs|title=Switzerland's new legislation on internet voting|work=electoralpractice.ch|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402091803/http://www.electoralpractice.ch/2014/02/switzerlands-new-legislation-on-internet-voting/#sthash.FoF0XF9m.i6VEjuJm.dpbs|archive-date=2 April 2015|access-date=5 February 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Buchsbaum|first=T.|title=E-voting: International developments and lessons learnt|journal=Proceedings of Electronic Voting in Europe Technology, Law, Politics and Society. Lecture Notes in Informatics. Workshop of the ESF TED Programme Together with GI and OCG |year=2004}}</ref><ref name="Zissis&Lekkas">{{cite journal|last=Zissis|first=D.|author2=Lekkas|title=Securing e-Government and e-Voting with an open cloud computing architecture|journal=Government Information Quarterly|date=April 2011|volume=28|issue=2|pages=239–251|doi=10.1016/j.giq.2010.05.010}}</ref>
Many countries have used electronic voting for at least some elections, including [[Argentina]], [[Australia]], [[Bangladesh]], [[Belgium]], [[Brazil]], [[Canada]], [[France]], [[Germany]], [[India]], [[Italy]], [[Japan]], [[Kazakhstan]], [[South Korea]], [[Malaysia]], the [[Netherlands]], [[Norway]], the [[Philippines]], [[Spain]], [[Switzerland]], [[Thailand]], the [[United Kingdom]] and the [[United States]]. {{As of|2023}}, Brazil is the only country in which all elections are conducted through electronic voting.<ref>{{cite news|url = https://www.ft.com/content/07533564-2231-47a6-a7b8-2c7ae330efc5|title = The discreet US campaign to defend Brazil's election|last1 = Stott|first1 = Michael|last2 = Pooler|first2 = Michael|last3 = Harris|first3 = Bryan|date = June 22, 2023|accessdate =
==Benefits==
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Voters save time and cost by being able to vote independently from their location. This may increase overall voter turnout. The citizen groups benefiting most from electronic elections are the ones living abroad, citizens living in rural areas far away from polling stations and the disabled with mobility impairments.<ref>https://Anwar{{Dead link|date=January 2020 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}, N. K. (n.d.). Advantages and Disadvantages of e-Voting: The Estonian Experience. ''Academia.edu''. Retrieved 10 June 2019 from www.academia.edu/35246981/Advantages_and_Disadvantages_of_e-Voting_The_Estonian_Experience</ref><ref name="auto">Cook, T. (7 December 2016). How Electronic Voting Works: Pros and Cons vs. paper Voting. ''MUO''. Retrieved 10 June 2019 from https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/how-electronic-voting-works/ {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201117150350/https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/how-electronic-voting-works/ |date=17 November 2020 }}</ref>
==Concerns and improvements==
{{Further|Vote counting#Errors in optical scans|Vote counting#Errors in direct-recording electronic voting}}
Several major reforms took place after the 2016 U.S. election, including the widespread adoption of voting machines that produce [[voter-verified paper audit trail]]s (VVPATs). These paper records allow election officials to conduct audits and recounts, significantly enhancing transparency and security. Congress provided $380 million in funding through the [[Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018|Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018]] under the framework of the [[Help America Vote Act]] to replace old machines with more secure models with modern cybersecurity protections. By 2020, 93% of U.S. votes had a paper record, and only 0.5 percent of jurisdictions reported using electronic voting machines without paper audit trails.<ref>{{Cite web |date=October 6, 2021 |title=Election Audits Across the United States |url=https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/bestpractices/Election_Audits_Across_the_United_States.pdf |access-date=September 14, 2024 |website=US Election Assistance Commission}}</ref> This reduced the risk of undetected cyber interference or machine malfunction by enabling verification through physical ballots.
▲Critics of electronic voting, including security analyst [[Bruce Schneier]], note that "computer security experts are unanimous on what to do (some voting experts disagree, but it is the computer security experts who need to be listened to; the problems here are with the computer, not with the fact that the computer is being used in a voting application)... DRE machines must have a voter-verifiable paper audit trails... Software used on DRE machines must be open to public scrutiny"<ref>Schneier, Bruce (September 2004), {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070609085245/http://opendemocracy.net/ |date=9 June 2007 }} [http://www.opendemocracy.net/media-voting/article_2213.jsp What’s wrong with electronic voting machines?] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080522033511/http://www.opendemocracy.net/media-voting/article_2213.jsp |date=22 May 2008 }}</ref> to ensure the accuracy of the voting system. Verifiable ballots are necessary because computers can and do malfunction, and because voting machines can be compromised.
In collaboration with the [[United States Department of Homeland Security|U.S. Department of Homeland Security]] and other organizations, election officials also took steps to harden voting systems against potential cyberattacks. This included training election officials, sharing threat intelligence, and establishing secure systems for vote transmission and counting.<ref>{{Cite journal |date=2016-09-13 |title=Protecting the 2016 Elections from Cyber and Voting Machine Attacks |url=https://www.nist.gov/speech-testimony/protecting-2016-elections-cyber-and-voting-machine-attacks |journal=NIST |language=en}}</ref>
▲Many insecurities have been found in commercial voting machines, such as using a default administration password.<ref name="An Incredibly Insecure Voting Machine">{{cite web|last1=Schneier|first1=Bruce|title=An Incredibly Insecure Voting Machine|url=https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/04/an_incredibly_i.html|website=Schneier on Security|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208112521/https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/04/an_incredibly_i.html|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref><ref name="Feldman, Halterman & Felten">{{cite web|last1=Feldman, Halterman & Felten|title=Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine|url=http://usenix.org/legacy/event/evt07/tech/full_papers/feldman/feldman_html/index.html|website=[[Usenix]]|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208094204/http://usenix.org/legacy/event/evt07/tech/full_papers/feldman/feldman_html/index.html|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref> Cases have also been reported of machines making unpredictable, inconsistent errors. Key issues with electronic voting are therefore the openness of a system to public examination from outside experts, the creation of an authenticatable [[Voter-verified paper audit trail|paper record]] of votes cast and a chain of custody for records.<ref name="What's Wrong With Electronic Voting Machines?">{{cite web|last1=Schneier|first1=Bruce|title=What's Wrong With Electronic Voting Machines?|url=https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2004/11/whats_wrong_with_ele.html|website=Schneier on Security|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208155348/https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2004/11/whats_wrong_with_ele.html|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref><ref name="Wichita State mathematician says Kansas voting machines need to be audited to check accuracy">{{cite web|title=Wichita State mathematician says Kansas voting machines need to be audited to check accuracy|url=http://cjonline.com/news/2015-07-20/wichita-state-mathematician-says-kansas-voting-machines-need-be-audited-check|website=Topeka Capital-Journal|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=live|archive-url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20151203222538/http://cjonline.com/news/2015-07-20/wichita-state-mathematician-says-kansas-voting-machines-need-be-audited-check|archive-date=3 December 2015}}</ref> And, there is a risk that commercial voting machines results are changed by the company providing the machine. There is no guarantee that results are collected and reported accurately.<ref name="auto"/>
Moreover, people without internet
Expenses for the installation of an electronic voting system are high. For some governments they may be too high so that they do not invest. This aspect is even more important if it is not sure whether electronic voting is a long-term solution.<ref name="auto"/>
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===Electronic voting machines{{anchor|Machines}}===
[[File:2018 Ballots being counted in Santa Clara County.webm|thumb|Counting ballots by an optical scanner, San Jose, California, 2018]]▼
{{main|Electronic voting machine}}
▲[[File:2018 Ballots being counted in Santa Clara County.webm|thumb|Counting ballots by an optical scanner, San Jose, California, 2018]]
Electronic voting systems for electorates have been in use since the 1960s when [[Voting machine#Punched card voting|punched card]] systems debuted. Their first widespread use was in the US where 7 counties switched to this method for the 1964 presidential election.<ref>Saltman, Roy (NBS), [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/NBS_SP_500-30.pdf EFFECTIVE USE OF COMPUTING TECHNOLOGY IN VOTE-TALLYING] {{webarchive|url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20160211104652/http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/NBS_SP_500-30.pdf|date=11 February 2016}}. ''NIST''.</ref> The newer [[optical scan voting system]]s allow a computer to count a voter's mark on a ballot. [[DRE voting machine]]s which collect and tabulate votes in a single machine, are used by all voters in all elections in
====Paper-based electronic voting system====
{{Further|Vote counting#Optical scan counting|Voting machine#Optical scan (marksense)|Electronic voting in the United States#Optical scan counting}}
[[File:ES&S M100 Automark cart.jpg|thumb|A cart holding an [[ES&S]] M100 [[optical scan voting system|ballot scanner]] and an AutoMARK [[assistive device]], as used in [[Johnson County, Iowa]],
[[Voting#Paper-based methods|Paper-based voting systems]] originated as a system where votes are cast and [[Vote counting system#Manual counting|counted by hand]], using paper ballots. With the advent of [[Vote counting system#Optical scan counting|electronic tabulation]] came systems where paper cards or sheets could be marked by hand, but counted electronically. These systems included [[Voting machine#Punched card voting|punched card voting]], [[optical scan voting system#Marksense systems|marksense]] and later [[optical scan voting system#Digital pen voting systems|digital pen voting systems]].<ref>{{cite book |author1=Douglas W. Jones |author2=Lorrie Faith Cranor |author3=Rebecca T. Mercuri |author4=Peter G. Neumann |editor1-last=A. Gritzalis |editor1-first=Dimitris |title=Secure Electronic Voting |date=2003 |series=Advances in Information Security |volume=7 |doi=10.1007/978-1-4615-0239-5 |url=https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-4615-0239-5 |publisher=Springer New York, NY |isbn=978-1-4613-4981-5 |s2cid=1866859 |url-access=subscription |access-date=16 August 2022 |archive-date=16 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220816131750/https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-4615-0239-5 |url-status=live }}</ref>
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====Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting system====
{{main|DRE voting machine}}
{{further|Voting machine#Direct-recording electronic (DRE)|Vote counting#Direct-recording electronic counting|Electronic voting in the United States#Direct-recording electronic counting|Electronic voting in India}}
A direct-recording electronic (DRE) [[voting machine]] records votes by means of a [[ballot]] display provided with mechanical or electro-optical components that can be activated by the voter (typically buttons or a [[touchscreen]]); that processes data with computer software; and that records voting data and ballot images in [[computer memory|memory components]]. After the election it produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and as a printed copy. The system may also provide a means for transmitting individual ballots or vote totals to a central location for consolidating and reporting results from precincts at the central location. These systems use a precinct count method that tabulates ballots at the polling place. They typically tabulate ballots as they are cast and print the results after the close of polling.<ref>{{cite web|author=U.S. Election Assistance Commission |author-link=Election Assistance Commission |url=http://www.eac.gov/voting%20systems/docs/vvsgvolumei.pdf/attachment_download/file |title=2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines |format=PDF |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080207185930/http://www.eac.gov/voting%20systems/docs/vvsgvolumei.pdf/attachment_download/file |archive-date=7 February 2008 }}</ref>
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Security experts have found security problems in every attempt at online voting,<ref name="appel-dem">{{Cite web |last=Appel |first=Andrew |date=8 June 2020 |title=Democracy Live internet voting: unsurprisingly insecure, and surprisingly insecure |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2020/06/08/democracy-live-internet-voting-unsurprisingly-insecure-and-surprisingly-insecure/ |access-date=23 June 2020 |website=Princeton University |archive-date=19 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210119052854/https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2020/06/08/democracy-live-internet-voting-unsurprisingly-insecure-and-surprisingly-insecure/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="vv-int">{{Cite web |title=Internet Voting |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/ |access-date=20 June 2020 |website=Verified Voting |language=en-US |archive-date=23 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200723080825/https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="nas-sec">"Secure Internet voting will likely not be feasible in the near future... At the present time, the Internet (or any network connected to the Internet) should not be used for the return of marked ballots" {{Cite book |last=National Academies of Sciences |date=6 September 2018 |title=Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy |doi=10.17226/25120 |isbn=978-0-309-47647-8 |s2cid=158434942 |url=https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy |access-date=23 June 2020 |language=en |archive-date=9 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210309004452/https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="eac-nist">"Electronic ballot return faces significant security risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of voted ballots. These risks can ultimately affect the tabulation and results and, can occur at scale... Even with ... technical security considerations, electronic ballot return remains a high-risk activity." {{Cite web |last=Election Assistance Commission, National Institute of Standards and Technology, FBI, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency |date=11 May 2020 |title=RISK MANAGEMENT FOR ELECTRONIC BALLOT DELIVERY, MARKING, AND RETURN |url=http://s3.amazonaws.com/ftt-uploads/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/07210015/Final_-Risk_Management_for_Electronic-Ballot_05082020-1.pdf |access-date=23 June 2020 |archive-date=10 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200710215909/http://s3.amazonaws.com/ftt-uploads/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/07210015/Final_-Risk_Management_for_Electronic-Ballot_05082020-1.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> including systems in Australia,<ref name="aust">{{Cite conference |last=Halderman |first=J. Alex, and Vanessa Teague |title=E-Voting and Identity |date=13 August 2015 |chapter=The New South Wales iVote System: Security Failures and Verification Flaws in a Live Online Election |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |volume=9269 |pages=35–53 |doi=10.1007/978-3-319-22270-7_3 |conference=International Conference on E-Voting and Identity |arxiv=1504.05646 |isbn=978-3-319-22269-1 }}</ref><ref name="teague">{{Cite web |last=Teague |first=Vanessa |date=28 June 2022 |title=How NOT to Assess an E-voting System |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2022/06/28/how-not-to-assess-an-e-voting-system/ |access-date=1 July 2022 |website=Princeton University |archive-date=8 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220708192401/https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2022/06/28/how-not-to-assess-an-e-voting-system/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Estonia,<ref name="estan">{{citation|last1=Springall|first1=Drew|last2=Finkenauer|first2=Travis|last3=Durumeric|first3=Zakir|last4=Kitcat|first4=Jason|last5=Hursti|first5=Harri|last6=MacAlpine|first6=Margaret|last7=Halderman|first7=Alex|title=Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security|chapter=Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System|year=2014|pages=703–715|doi=10.1145/2660267.2660315|isbn=9781450329576|s2cid=1985090|access-date=3 December 2017|chapter-url=https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2660315|url=https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ivoting-ccs14.pdf|archive-date=12 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170812232217/https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ivoting-ccs14.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="osce-est">"The OSCE/ODIHR EAM was made aware of a program that could, if it was running on a voter’s computer, change the vote without the possibility for the voter to detect it. The case was brought to the attention of the project manager who assessed this threat to be theoretically plausible but nearly impossible to implement in reality." {{Cite web |date=6 March 2011 |title=ESTONIA PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report |url=https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/9/77557.pdf |access-date=20 June 2020 |website=OSCE |archive-date=16 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210116153304/https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/9/77557.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Switzerland,<ref name="appel-switz">{{Cite web |last=Appel |first=Andrew |date=27 June 2022 |title=How to Assess an E-voting System |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2022/06/27/how-to-assess-an-e-voting-system/ |access-date=1 July 2022 |website=Princeton University, Center for Information Technology Policy |archive-date=8 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220708192300/https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2022/06/27/how-to-assess-an-e-voting-system/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="swiss-sctyl">{{Cite web |last=Zetter |first=Kim |date=12 March 2019 |title=Researchers Find Critical Backdoor in Swiss Online Voting System |url=https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/zmakk3/researchers-find-critical-backdoor-in-swiss-online-voting-system |access-date=20 June 2020 |website=Vice |language=en |archive-date=2 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200902043649/https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/zmakk3/researchers-find-critical-backdoor-in-swiss-online-voting-system |url-status=live }}</ref> Russia,<ref>{{Cite news|last=Gupta|first=Manhar|title=Russia's Blockchain Voting Turned Into A Fiasco|work=Cryptotrends|url=https://cryptotrends.in/russias-blockchain-voting-turned-into-a-fiasco/|access-date=25 June 2020|archive-date=19 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201019232828/https://cryptotrends.in/russias-blockchain-voting-turned-into-a-fiasco/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="moscow">{{Cite conference |last=Gaudry |first=Pierrick, and Alexander Golovnev |date=10 February 2020 |title=Breaking the Encryption Scheme of the Moscow Internet Voting System |url=http://fc20.ifca.ai/preproceedings/178.pdf |conference=Financial Cryptography 2020 |via=International Financial Cryptography Association}}</ref><ref name="risks-moscow">{{Cite journal |title=Electronic voting systems |last=Anderson |first=Ross |date=21 February 2020 |url=http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/31/59#subj2.1 |journal=The RISKS Digest |volume=31 |issue=59 |language=en |via=Newcastle University |access-date=23 June 2020 |archive-date=19 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201019205036/http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/31/59#subj2.1 |url-status=live }}</ref> and the United States.<ref name="vice-mit">{{Cite news |last=Zetter |first=Kim |date=13 February 2020 |title='Sloppy' Mobile Voting App Used in Four States Has 'Elementary' Security Flaws |language=en |work=VICE |url=https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/akw7mp/sloppy-mobile-voting-app-used-in-four-states-has-elementary-security-flaws |access-date=23 June 2020 |archive-date=20 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200920040721/https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/akw7mp/sloppy-mobile-voting-app-used-in-four-states-has-elementary-security-flaws |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="appel-dem"/>
It has been argued political parties that have more support from less-wealthy voters—who tend to have less access to and familiarity with the Internet—may suffer in the elections due to e-voting, which tends to increase participation among wealthier voters.{{Citation needed|date=July 2024}} It is unsure as to whether narrowing the [[digital divide]] would promote equal voting opportunities for people across various social, economic, and ethnic backgrounds.<ref name=":0" />
The effects of internet voting on overall voter turnout are unclear. A 2017 study of online voting in two Swiss cantons found that it had no effect on turnout,<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Germann|first1=Micha|last2=Serdült|first2=Uwe|date=1 June 2017|title=Internet voting and turnout: Evidence from Switzerland|url=https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/136119/1/1-s2.0-S026137941630453X-main.pdf|journal=Electoral Studies|volume=47|pages=1–12|doi=10.1016/j.electstud.2017.03.001|s2cid=157177069|access-date=24 August 2020|archive-date=18 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018221258/https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/136119/1/1-s2.0-S026137941630453X-main.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> and a 2009 study of Estonia's national election found similar results.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Alvarez|first1=R. Michael|last2=Hall|first2=Thad E.|last3=Trechsel|first3=Alexander H.|date=July 2009|title=Internet Voting in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Estonia|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/abs/internet-voting-in-comparative-perspective-the-case-of-estonia/8A8BCDACE0F361D1623D6F013025E624|journal=PS: Political Science & Politics|language=en|volume=42|issue=3|pages=497–505|doi=10.1017/S1049096509090787|s2cid=155061911|issn=1537-5935|access-date=7 January 2021|archive-date=12 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210312141309/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/abs/internet-voting-in-comparative-perspective-the-case-of-estonia/8A8BCDACE0F361D1623D6F013025E624|url-status=live}}</ref> To the contrary, however, the introduction of online voting in municipal elections in the Canadian province of [[Ontario]] resulted in an average increase in turnout of around 3.5 percentage points.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Goodman|first1=Nicole|last2=Stokes|first2=Leah C.|date=July 2020|title=Reducing the Cost of Voting: An Evaluation of Internet Voting's Effect on Turnout|journal=British Journal of Political Science|language=en|volume=50|issue=3|pages=1155–1167|doi=10.1017/S0007123417000849|issn=0007-1234|doi-access=free}}</ref> Similarly, a further study of the Swiss case found that while online voting did not increase overall turnout, it did induce some occasional voters to participate who would have abstained were online voting not an option.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=12 November 2020|title=Does E-Voting matter for turnout, and to whom?|journal=Electoral Studies|language=en|pages=102245|doi=10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102245|issn=0261-3794|doi-access=free|last1=Petitpas|first1=Adrien|last2=Jaquet|first2=Julien M.|last3=Sciarini|first3=Pascal|volume=71}}</ref>
A paper on “remote electronic voting and turnout in the Estonian 2007 parliamentary elections” showed that rather than eliminating inequalities, e-voting might have enhanced the [[digital divide]] between higher and lower socioeconomic classes. People who lived greater distances from polling areas voted at higher levels with this service now available. The 2007 Estonian elections yielded a higher voter turnout from those who lived in higher income regions and who received formal education.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Bochsler|first=Daniel|date=26 May 2010|title=Can Internet voting increase political participation?|url=http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO-PublicOpinion/Documents/bochslere-voteeui2010.pdf|journal=Centre for the Study of Imperfection in Democracies|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160918221247/http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO-PublicOpinion/Documents/bochslere-voteeui2010.pdf|archive-date=18 September 2016}}</ref> Still regarding the Estonian Internet voting system, it was proved to be more cost-efficient than the rest of the voting systems offered in 2017 local elections.<ref>Krimmer R., Duenas-Cid D., Krivonosova I., Vinkel P., Koitmae A. (2018) How Much Does an e-Vote Cost? Cost Comparison per Vote in Multichannel Elections in Estonia. In: Krimmer R. et al. (eds) Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11143. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4_8</ref><ref name="Kramer 2020">{{cite journal |first1=Robert |last1=Krimmer
{| class="wikitable sortable"
|+ Cost range per ballot (in euro) for the 2017 local elections<ref name="Kramer 2020"/>
|-
! Voting system !! Minimum !! Maximum
|-
| Advance voting in county centres || 5.48 || 5.92
|-
| Advance voting in ordinary polling stations || 16.24 || 17.36
|-
| Early voting in county centres || 5.83 || 6.30
|-
| Election day voting in county centres || 4.97 || 5.58
|-
| Election day voting in ordinary polling stations || 2.83 || 3.01
|-
| Internet voting || 2.17 || 2.26
|}
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In fact one company uses an individual's past votes for research,<ref name="brav">{{Cite web |last=Brav |first=Alon, Matthew D. Cain, Jonathon Zytnick |date=November 2019 |title=Retail Shareholder Participation in the Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting |url=http://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/GOVERNANCEPROFESSIONALS/a8892c7c-6297-4149-b9fc-378577d0b150/UploadedImages/Retail.pdf |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=European Corporate Governance Institute |archive-date=18 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018042104/http://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/GOVERNANCEPROFESSIONALS/a8892c7c-6297-4149-b9fc-378577d0b150/UploadedImages/Retail.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> and to target ads.<ref name="broad-target">{{Cite web |title=Proxy Services for Mutual Funds and ETF Providers |url=https://www.broadridge.com/financial-services/asset-management/mutual-funds-etf/drive-a-successful-proxy-outcome/proxy-services |access-date=29 July 2020 |website=www.broadridge.com |language=en |archive-date=31 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210131141900/https://www.broadridge.com/financial-services/asset-management/mutual-funds-etf/drive-a-successful-proxy-outcome/proxy-services |url-status=live }}</ref>
Corporations and organizations routinely use Internet voting to elect officers and board members and for other proxy elections. Internet voting systems have been used privately in many modern nations and publicly in the United States, the
==== Sybil attacks ====
{{Main|Sybil attack}}
One of the biggest weaknesses of online voting is the difficulty of dealing with fake identities, especially when voting is implemented using software without the cooperation of some kind of government agency.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Nebulas |date=2018-09-21 |title=Liberal Radicalism: Can Quadratic Voting Be the Perfect Voting System? |url=https://medium.com/nebulasio/liberal-radicalism-can-quadratic-voting-be-the-perfect-voting-system-e958408567b2 |access-date=2020-11-03 |website=Medium |language=en}}</ref> These attacks use sybils—fake or duplicate identities—to influence community decisions. Since a single vote has the potential to tilt a group decision, prevention of sybil attacks is an important priority in ensuring the security of voting.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Shahaf |first1=Gal |title=Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence |last2=Shapiro |first2=Ehud |last3=Talmon |first3=Nimrod |date=August 2019 |publisher=International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization |isbn=978-0-9992411-4-1 |location=California |pages=572–579 |chapter=Sybil-Resilient Reality-Aware Social Choice |doi=10.24963/ijcai.2019/81 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Sybil attacks are a common issue with implementations on open, peer-to-peer networks, as the system must have a way to prevent fake identities to prevent gaming of the vote.<ref name="Lalley2017-1">{{Cite SSRN |title=Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy |last1=Lalley |first1=Steven |last2=Weyl |first2=E. Glen |date=24 December 2017 |language=en |ssrn=2003531}}</ref>
Some future possible avenues of inquiries include to investigate more intersectional [[proof of personhood]] systems that aren't directly blockchain-based.<ref name=":6">{{cite arXiv |eprint=2008.05300 |class=cs.CR |first1=Divya |last1=Siddarth |first2=Sergey |last2=Ivliev |title=Who Watches the Watchmen? A Review of Subjective Approaches for Sybil-resistance in Proof of Personhood Protocols |date=2020-10-13 |last3=Siri |first3=Santiago |last4=Berman |first4=Paula}}</ref> For example, extending the [[web of trust]] by having a protocol that verifies proof of identities using social interactions would allow a community of users to assign corresponding levels of trusts to different candidates in relation with others. However, this would require a fully decentralized system.<ref name=":6" /> This web-of-trust protocol could even expand to allowing candidates to provide proof of personhood by physical attendance, which could lead to trusted clusters that grow into communities.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Howitt |first=Aleeza |date=2019-03-05 |title=Proposal for a Decentralized Unique Identity Seeding Protocol |url=https://ubiresearch.org/proposal-for-a-decentralized-unique-identity-seeding-protocol |access-date=2020-11-10 |website=UBI Research |language=en-US}}</ref>
===Hybrid systems===
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===Electronic ballots===
Electronic voting systems may use ''electronic ballot'' to store votes in [[computer memory]]. Systems which use them exclusively are called DRE voting systems. When electronic ballots are used there is no risk of exhausting the supply of ballots. Additionally, these electronic ballots remove the need for printing of paper ballots, a significant cost.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://electronicsewa.com/ |title=Home |access-date=2 June 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151120222242/http://electronicsewa.com/ |archive-date=20 November 2015 }}</ref> When administering elections in which ballots are offered in multiple languages (in some areas of the United States, public elections are required by the [[Voting Rights Act|National Voting Rights Act of 1965]]), electronic ballots can be programmed to provide ballots in multiple languages for a single machine. The advantage with respect to ballots in different languages appears to be unique to electronic voting. For example, [[King County, Washington]]'s demographics require them under U.S. federal election law to provide ballot access in
Critics argue{{who|date=July 2016}} the need for extra ballots in any language can be mitigated by providing a process to print ballots at voting locations. They argue further, the cost of software validation, compiler trust validation, installation validation, delivery validation and validation of other steps related to electronic voting is complex and expensive, thus electronic ballots are not guaranteed to be less costly than printed ballots.{{citation needed|date=July 2016}}
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In ''Runoff'', a 2007 novel by [[Mark Coggins]], a surprising showing by the [[Green Party (United States)|Green Party]] candidate in a [[San Francisco Mayor|San Francisco Mayoral election]] forces a [[Two-round system|runoff]] between him and the highly favored establishment candidate—a plot line that closely parallels the actual results of the 2003 election. When the private-eye protagonist of the book investigates at the behest of a powerful Chinatown businesswoman, he determines that the outcome was rigged by someone who defeated the security on the city's newly installed e-voting system.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.januarymagazine.com/crfiction/runoff.html |title=January Magazine, "The Fix Is In" |publisher=Januarymagazine.com |access-date=24 May 2010 |archive-date=29 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201129163222/http://www.januarymagazine.com/crfiction/runoff.html |url-status=live }}</ref>
"[[Hacking Democracy]]" is a 2006
The central conflict in the [[Massively multiplayer online game|MMO]] video game [[Infantry (video game)|Infantry]] resulted from the global institution of [[direct democracy]] through the use of personal voting devices sometime in the 22nd century AD. The practice gave rise to a 'voting class' of citizens composed mostly of homemakers and retirees who tended to be at home all day. Because they had the most free time to participate in voting, their opinions ultimately came to dominate politics.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.freeinfantry.com/history1/infantry/ |title=Infantry Archive, 'The Collective Era' |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no-byline.--> |website=freeinfantry.com |access-date=21 September 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170103154939/http://www.freeinfantry.com/history1/infantry/ |archive-date=3 January 2017 }}</ref>
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* [http://www.aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/e-voting/ E-Voting information] from [http://www.aceproject.org/ ACE Project]
* [http://brainstorms.in/?p=309 How do we vote in India with Electronic Voting machine]
* [https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90727541 NPR] summary of current technology status in the states of the U.S., as of May 2008
* [https://www.valimised.ee/en/internet-voting/internet-voting-estonia Internet Voting in Estonia] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201119035243/https://www.valimised.ee/en/internet-voting/internet-voting-estonia |date=19 November 2020 }}
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