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|function = [[ICBM]]
|manufacturer = [[Glenn L. Martin Company|Martin Company]]
|country-origin =
|cpl-year =
|cpl = [[United States dollar|$]]1.5 million
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|stage2fuel =[[RP-1]]/[[LOX]]
}}
The [[Martin Marietta]] '''SM-68A/HGM-25A Titan I''' was the
Originally designed as a backup in case the [[United States Air Force|U.S. Air Force's]] [[SM-65 Atlas]] missile development ran into problems, the Titan was ultimately beaten into service by Atlas. Deployment went ahead anyway to more rapidly increase the number of missiles on alert and because the Titan's [[missile silo]] basing was more survivable than Atlas.
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By January 1955, the size of nuclear weapons had been shrinking dramatically, allowing the possibility of building a bomb that could be carried by a missile of reasonable size. The Titan I program began on the recommendation of the [[Teapot Committee|Scientific Advisory Committee]].<ref>Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. vi.</ref> The committee presented to the [[United States Air Force]] (USAF) their findings of the technical feasibility to develop weapons (bombs) and their delivery systems (intercontinental range ballistic missiles) that were completely invulnerable to "surprise" attack.
The reduction in the mass of nuclear warheads allowed full coverage of the entire Sino-Soviet land mass, and the missile control capabilities were also upgraded. The Titan I would be fully independent in controlled flight from launch to the ballistic release of the warhead, which would descend to its target by the combination of gravity and air resistance alone. In May 1955 the Air Materiel Command invited contractors to submit proposals and bids for the two stage Titan I ICBM, formally beginning the program. In September 1955, [[Glenn L. Martin Company|The Martin Company]] was declared the contractor for the Titan missile. In early October the Air Force's Western Development Division was ordered to start work.<ref>Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. vi.</ref> The Titan was developed in parallel with the [[Atlas (missile)|Atlas]] (SM-65/HGM-16) ICBM, serving as a backup with potentially greater capabilities and an incentive for the Atlas contractor to work harder.<ref>Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 11.</ref> Martin was selected as the contractor due to its proposed organization<ref name="auto9">Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 17.</ref> and method of igniting a liquid fueled engine at high altitude.<ref>Green, Warren E.. The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 17.</ref>
The Titan I was initially designated as a bomber aircraft (B-68),<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.strategic-air-command.com/missiles/Titan/Titan_Missile_Home_Page.htm |title=Titan Missile |publisher=Strategic-Air-Command.com |access-date=2016-02-06}}</ref> but was later designated [[SM-68 Titan]] and finally HGM-25A in 1962.
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===Budgetary problems===
The Titan, proposed as a fallback in case the Atlas failed, was by December 1956 accepted by some as a "principal ingredient of the national ballistic missile force."<ref>Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 36.</ref> At the same time, others pushed for the cancellation of the Titan program almost from the beginning, arguing that it was redundant.<ref name="auto5">Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 37.</ref>
===Flight testing===
The Titan I flight testing consisted of the first stage only Series I, the cancelled Series II, and Series III with the complete missile.<ref name="auto7">Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 91.</ref>
A total of 62 flight test missiles were constructed in various numbers. The first successful launch was on 5 February 1959 with Titan I A3, and the last test flight was on 29 January 1962 with Titan I M7. Of the missiles produced, 49 launched and two exploded: six A-types (four launched), seven B-types (two launched), six C-types (five launched), ten G-types (seven launched), 22 J-types (22 launched), four V-types (four launched), and seven M-types (seven launched). Missiles were tested and launched in [[Florida]] at [[Cape Canaveral Air Force Station]] from Launch Complexes [[LC15]], [[LC16]], [[LC19]], and [[LC20]].<ref>{{cite web | url=http://afspacemuseum.org/displays/TitanI/ | title=Titan I | author=Air Force Space & Missile Museum | access-date=11 November 2019
The four A-type missile launches with dummy second stages all occurred in 1959 and were carried out on 6 February, 25 February, 3 April, and 4 May. The guidance system and stage separation all performed well, and aerodynamic drag was lower than anticipated. Titan I was the first program to have a new missile succeed on the initial attempt, which left launch crews unprepared for the series of failures that followed. Missile B-4 exploded from a LOX pump failure during a static firing at Martin's Denver test stand in May and assorted other mishaps occurred in the following two months.<ref name="auto10">Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 93.</ref>
Missile B-5 was intended to launch from LC-19 as the first flight article Lot B missile, incorporating most Titan I missile systems but with a dummy warhead. A planned launch on July 31 was scrubbed due to fuel system problems. At about noon on August 5, B-5 was launched. The missile rose about ten feet before the engines shut down and it fell back onto LC-19 in a fiery explosion. Postflight investigation found that the hold-down bolts released prematurely, causing B-5 to lift before full thrust rise had been achieved. A still-attached umbilical sent a shutdown command to the engines. LC-19 was badly damaged and would not be used again for six months.<ref name="auto10"/>
Further problems occurred over the next several months. Missiles continued to be damaged through careless personnel mistakes and General [[Osmond Ritland]] sent Martin an angry letter calling their handling of the Titan program "inexcusable." Ritland's disciplinary blast had little effect for the time being. On December 10, the first attempt was made to launch a Lot C missile, which would be a complete Titan I with all systems and a detachable warhead. Missile C-3 was prepared for launch but much like with B-5, a premature shutdown command was sent due to failure of an umbilical to detach, fortunately the missile had not been released from the pad. The umbilical was quickly repaired but any relief at having avoided near-disaster was short-lived.
On 12 December 1959, the second attempt to launch a complete Titan (Missile C-2) took place at LC-16. One pad umbilical failed to detach at ignition, and an automatic shutoff signal terminated thrust before the missile could be released by the launcher mechanism. Ground crews quickly repaired the umbilical, and a second launch attempt was made two days later. However, the Titan exploded almost as soon as it was released by the launcher mechanism. The mishap was quickly traced to the Range Safety destruct charges on the first stage inadvertently going off. Martin technicians had moved the activator relay into a vibration-prone area during repair work on the missile, and testing confirmed that the shock from the pad hold-down bolts firing was enough to set off the relay. Because the RSO charges had spilled out the propellants and minimized mixing of them, the explosion was not as powerful as that of Titan B-5, and so damage to LC-16 was less extensive. The pad was repaired in only two months.<ref>Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 94.</ref>▼
▲
On 2 February 1960, LC-19 returned to action as Missile B-7 marked the first successful flight of a Titan with a live upper stage. On 5 February, LC-16 returned to action by hosting Missile C-4. The second attempt at a Lot C Titan failed at T+52 seconds when the guidance compartment collapsed, causing the RVX-3 reentry vehicle to separate.<ref>Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 94.</ref> The missile pitched down and the first stage LOX tank ruptured from aerodynamic loads, blowing the stage to pieces. After the first stage destroyed itself, the second stage separated and began engine ignition, sensing that normal staging had taken place. With no attitude control, it began tumbling end-over-end and quickly lost thrust. The stage plummeted into the Atlantic Ocean some 30–40 miles downrange. After the successful flight of Missile G-4 on 24 February, Missile C-1's second stage failed to ignite on 8 March due to a stuck valve preventing the gas generator from starting.<ref>Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 95.</ref> On 1 July, the newly opened LC-20 hosted its first launch when Missile J-2, an operational prototype, was flown. Unfortunately, a broken hydraulic line caused the Titan's engines to gimbal hard left almost as soon as the tower was cleared.<ref>Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 96.</ref> The missile pitched over and flew onto a near-horizontal plane when Range Safety sent the destruct command at T+11 seconds. The burning remains of the Titan impacted 300 meters from the pad in an enormous fireball. The piece of plumbing responsible for the missile failure was retrieved—it had popped out of its sleeve resulting in loss of first stage hydraulic pressure. The sleeve was not tight enough to hold the hydraulic line in place, and the pressure being imparted into it at liftoff was enough to pop it loose. Examination of other Titan missiles found more defective hydraulic lines, and the Missile J-2 debacle caused a wholesale review of manufacturing processes and improved parts testing.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://archive.org/stream/NASA_NTRS_Archive_19730015128/NASA_NTRS_Archive_19730015128_djvu.txt | title=NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS) 19730015128: Long life assurance study for manned spacecraft long life hardware. Volume 3: Long life assurance studies of components | author=Martin Marietta Corporation | date=September 1972 | access-date=16 June 2018 }}</ref>▼
▲On 2 February 1960, LC-19 returned to action as Missile B-
The next launch at the end of the month (Missile J-4) suffered premature first stage shutdown and landed far short of its planned impact point. Cause of the failure was a LOX valve closing prematurely, which resulted in the rupture of a propellant duct and thrust termination. Missile J-6 on 24 October set a record by flying 6100 miles. The J series resulted in minor changes to alleviate the second stage shutting down prematurely or failing to ignite.<ref>Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 96.</ref>▼
▲The next launch at the end of the month (Missile J-4) suffered premature first stage shutdown and landed far short of its planned impact point. Cause of the failure was a LOX valve closing prematurely, which resulted in the rupture of a propellant duct and thrust termination. Missile J-6 on 24 October set a record by flying 6100 miles. The J series resulted in minor changes to alleviate the second stage shutting down prematurely or failing to ignite.<ref
The string of failures during 1959–60 led to complaints from the Air Force that Martin–Marietta weren't taking the Titan project seriously (since it was just a backup to the primary Atlas ICBM program) and displayed an indifferent, careless attitude that resulted in easily avoidable failure modes such as Missile C-3's range safety command destruct system relays being placed in a vibration-prone area.<ref>Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 94.</ref><ref>Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 128.</ref>▼
▲The string of failures during 1959–60 led to complaints from the Air Force that Martin–Marietta weren't taking the Titan project seriously (since it was just a backup to the primary Atlas ICBM program) and displayed an indifferent, careless attitude that resulted in easily avoidable failure modes such as Missile C-3's range safety command destruct system relays being placed in a vibration-prone area.<ref
[[File:Titan I missile emerges from its silo at Vandenberg Operational System Test Facility in 1960.jpg|thumb|Titan I missile emerges from its silo at Vandenberg Operational System Test Facility in 1960.]]
In December, Missile V-2 was undergoing a flight readiness test in a silo at [[Vandenberg Space Force Base|Vandenberg Air Force Base]], [[California]]. The plan was to load the missile with propellant, raise it up to firing position, and then lower it back into the silo. Unfortunately, the silo elevator collapsed, causing the Titan to fall back down and explode. The blast was so violent that it ejected a service tower from inside the silo and launched it some distance into the air before coming back down.<ref>Stumpf, David K., Titan II, p 22-26, The University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville, Arkansas, 2000 {{ISBN|1-55728-601-9}}</ref><ref name="See, Earl 2014, p. 118">See, Earl , Titan Missile Memoirs, Huntington Beach, California: American Aviation Historical Society Journal, Summer 2014, p. 118.</ref><ref>Marsh, Lt. Col.Robert E., Launch of The Blue Gander Door, Brekenridge, Colorado: Association of Air Force Missileers, Volume 4, Number 1 1996, p. 8.</ref>
A total of 21 Titan I launches took place during 1961, with five failures. On 20 January 1961, Missile AJ-10 launched from LC-19 at CCAS. The flight ended in failure when an improper disconnect of a pad umbilical caused an electrical short in the second stage. The Titan performed well through the first stage burn, but after second stage separation, the fuel valve to the gas generator failed to open, preventing engine start. Missiles AJ-12 and AJ-15 in March were lost due to turbopump problems. Missile M-1's second stage lost thrust when the hydraulic pump failed. Missile SM-2 experienced early first stage shutdown; although the second stage burn was successful, it had to run to propellant depletion instead of a timed cutoff. The added stress of this operation apparently resulted in a failure of either the gas generator or turbopump, as the vernier solo phase ended prematurely. Missile M-6's second stage failed to start when an electrical relay malfunctioned and reset the ignition timer.<ref
With attention shifting to the Titan II, there were only six Titan I flights during 1962, with one failure, when Missile SM-4 (21 January) experienced an electrical short in the second stage hydraulic actuator, which gimbaled hard left at T+98 seconds. Staging was performed successfully, but the second stage engine failed to start.<ref
Twelve more Titan Is were flown in 1963–65, with the finale being Missile SM-33, flown on 5 March 1965. The only total failure in this last stretch of flights was when Missile V-4 (1 May 1963) suffered a stuck gas generator valve and loss of engine thrust at liftoff. The Titan fell over and exploded on impact with the ground.<ref>{{cite web|title=Titan I Captive and Flight Test Firing History |url=http://www.chromehooves.net/documents/martin/titan_i_firing_history/01_-_titan_i_firing_history_ocr.pdf|date=February
Although most of the Titan I's teething problems were worked out by 1961, the missile was already eclipsed not only by the Atlas, but by its own design successor, the Titan II, a bigger, more powerful ICBM with storable [[hypergolic propellant]]s. The launch pads at Cape Canaveral were quickly converted for the new vehicle. Vandenberg Launch Complex 395 continued to provide for operational test launches. The last Titan I launch was from LC 395A silo A-2 in March 1965.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.afspacemuseum.org/vandenberg/395A/ | title=Complex 395A | author=Air Force Space & Missile Museum | access-date=11 November 2019 | archive-date=12 November 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191112231640/http://www.afspacemuseum.org/vandenberg/395A/ | url-status=dead }}</ref> After a brief period as an operational ICBM, it was retired from service in 1965 when Defense Secretary [[Robert McNamara]] made the decision to phase out all first generation cryogenically
==Characteristics==
Produced by the [[Glenn L. Martin Company]] (which became "The Martin Company" in 1957), Titan I was a two-stage, liquid-fueled [[ballistic missile]] with an effective range of 6,101 nautical miles (11,300 km). The first stage delivered 300,000 pounds (1,330 kN) of thrust, the second stage 80,000 pounds (356 kN). The fact that Titan I, like Atlas, burned Rocket Propellant 1 ([[RP-1]]) and liquid oxygen ([[LOX]]) meant that the [[oxidizer]] had to be loaded onto the missile just before launch from an underground storage tank, and the missile raised above ground on the enormous elevator system, exposing the missile for some time before launch. The complexity of the system combined with its relatively slow reaction time – fifteen minutes to load, followed by the time required to raise and launch the first missile.<ref>United States Air Force, The T.O. 21M-HGM25A-1-1 Technical Manual Operation and Organizational Maintenance HGM-25A Missile Weapon System, United States Air Force, 1964, paragraph 1-159 - 6-1 - 6-4</ref> Following the launch of the first missile the other two could reportedly be fired at {{frac|7|1|2}}-minute intervals.<ref name="auto2">Hoselton, Gary A., Titan I Guidance System, Brekenridge, Colorado: Association of Air Force Missileers, Volume 6, Number 1, March, 1998, p. 4.</ref> Titan I utilized radio-inertial command guidance. The inertial guidance system originally intended for the missile was instead eventually deployed in the Atlas E and F missiles.<ref>Guidance Changes Made on Atlas, Titan, Aviation Week 28 July 1958, page 22</ref> Less than a year later the Air Force considered deploying the Titan I with an all-inertial guidance system but that change never occurred.<ref>Titan Guidance Switch, Aviation Week 6 April 195, page 31</ref> (The Atlas series was intended to be the first generation of American ICBMs and Titan II (as opposed to Titan I) was to be the second generation deployed). The Titan 1 was controlled by an autopilot which was informed of the missile's attitude by a rate gyro assembly consisting of 3 gyroscopes. During the first minute or two of the flight a pitch programmer put the missile on the correct path.<ref
Titan I also was the first true multi-stage (two or more stages) design. The Atlas missile had all three of its main rocket engines ignited at launch (two were jettisoned during flight) due to concerns about igniting rocket engines at high altitude and maintaining combustion stability.<ref>Walker,Chuck, Atlas The Ultimate Weapon, Burlington Canada: Apogee Books, 2005, {{ISBN|0-517-56904-3}}, p. 11</ref> Martin, in part, was selected as the contractor because it had "recognized the 'magnitude of the altitude start problem' for the second stage and had a good suggestion for solving it."<ref
The warhead of the Titan I was an AVCO Mk 4 re-entry vehicle containing a [[W38
===Specifications===
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*Total production missiles built: 163 Titan 1s; 62 R&D Missiles – 49 launched & 101 Strategic Missiles (SMs) – 17 launched.
*Total deployed strategic missiles: 54.
*Titan base cost: $170,000,000 (US$ {{formatnum:{{Inflation|US|0.17|1960|r=2}}}}B in {{CURRENTYEAR}})<ref name="missilebases.com">{{cite web|year = 2011|url = http://www.missilebases.com/history|title = History of Missile Bases|publisher = missilebases.com|access-date = 4 September 2011|last = missilebases.com|url-status = dead|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20090302073728/http://www.missilebases.com/history|archive-date = 2 March 2009|df = dmy-all}}</ref>
'''First Stage:'''
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*Propellants: liquid oxygen (LOX), kerosene
*Number of engines: one [[Aerojet]] [[LR91|LR91-3]]
=== Athena guidance computer ===
The [[UNIVAC]] Athena computer calculated [[Command guidance|ground commands]] to transmit to the Titan missile as part of [[Western Electric|Western Electric's]] missile guidance system. The Athena was the "first transistorized digital computer to be produced in numbers." It consisted of ten cabinets plus console on a 13.5 by 20 foot (4.1 by 6 m) floor plan. It used radar tracking of the missile to compute Titan flight data to the necessary burn-out point to start a [[ballistic trajectory]] toward the target. On-board Titan attitude control rolled the missile to maintain the missile antenna aligned to the ground antenna. Computer commands were transmitted to the missile from a ground transmitter a "quarter mile out" ({{convert|0.25|mi|m|disp=out}}).{{r|Hoselton}} Completed in 1957, the Athena weighed {{convert|21000|lb|ST MT}}.<ref name=SiLogic>{{cite news |date=26 January 2018 |title=Univac Athena Missile Guidance Computer |url=http://www.silogic.com/Athena/Athena.html |work= Mark DiVecchio }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.ed-thelen.org/comp-hist/BRL61-a.html#ATHENA|title=ATHENA|last=Weik|first=Martin H.|date=Mar 1961|website=ed-thelen.org|series=A Third Survey of Domestic Electronic Digital Computing Systems}}</ref>
The Athena computer used a [[Harvard architecture]] design with separate data and instruction memories by [[Seymour Cray]] at [[Sperry Corporation#Sperry Rand|Sperry Rand Corporation]] and cost about $1,800,000.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://vipclubmn.org/CP24bit.html |title=UNIVAC 24-bit computer genealogy }}</ref>
Used with the computer were the:
*AN/GSK-1 Computer Set Console (OA-2654)<ref>{{cite news |date=22 October 1968 |title=Athena Reference guide |url=http://www.silogic.com/Athena/1968%20Athena%20User%27s%20Manual%20%28grayscale%29.pdf |work=Carnegie Institute of Technology Computation Center }}</ref>
*[[Friden, Inc.]] terminal with [[punched tape|paper tape]] equipment{{r|SiLogic}}
*"massive [[motor-generator]] set with 440 volt 3 phase AC input [that] weighed over 2 tons" at remote locations<ref name="United States Air Force 1964, Figure 1-43">United States Air Force The T.O. 21M-HGM25A-1-1 Technical Manual Operation and Organizational Maintenance HGM-25A Missile Weapon System, United States Air Force, 1964, Figure 1-43</ref>
*input from one of two large AN/GRW-5 [[Western Electric]] radars in silos each with "20 foot (6 m) tall antenna" raised prior to launch and locked to the raised Titan's "missileborne antenna".<ref name="United States Air Force 1964, paragraph 1-159">United States Air Force The T.O. 21M-HGM25A-1-1 Technical Manual Operation and Organizational Maintenance HGM-25A Missile Weapon System, United States Air Force, 1964, paragraph 1-159</ref><ref name=Hoselton>{{cite web|url=http://www.afmissileers.org/newsletters/NL1998/Mar98.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=2013-08-22 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120916113437/http://www.afmissileers.org/newsletters/NL1998/Mar98.pdf |archive-date=2012-09-16 }}</ref>
The "[[battleshort]]" mode ("melt-before-fail") prevented [[fail-safe]] circuits such as fuses from deactivating the machine ''e.g.'', during a missile launch.<ref>{{Cite web |last = DiVecchio|first = Mark|title = Univac Athena Missile Guidance Computer|url = http://www.silogic.com/Athena/Athena.html}}</ref> The last Athena-controlled launch was a [[Thor-Agena]] missile launched in 1972 from [[Vandenberg Air Force Base]] in California, the last of over 400 missile flights using the Athena.<ref>{{Cite web |last = Shufelt|first = Wayne|title = Letter Concerning the Last Athena guided Missile Launch|url = http://www.silogic.com/Athena/1972%20Letter%20to%20Dr.%20Uta%20Merzbach%20at%20Smithsonian%20from%20Univac.pdf }}</ref><ref name="VIP Club Information Technology Pioneers">{{cite web |url=http://vipclubmn.org/sysmissles.html | title=Information Technology Pioneers | access-date= 11 February 2016}}</ref>
==Service history==
The production of operational missiles began during the final stages of the flight test program.<ref
Titan was originally planned for a 1 X 10 (one control center with 10 launchers) "soft" site.<ref>Green, Warren E., The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 54.</ref> In mid-1958 it was decided that the American Bosh Arma all-inertial guidance system designed for Titan would, because production was insufficient, be assigned to Atlas and the Titan would switch to radio-inertial guidance.<ref>"Guidance Changes Made on Atlas, Titan", ''[[Aviation Week]]'', 28 July 1958, page 22</ref> The decision was made to deploy Titan squadrons in a "hardened" 3 X 3 (three sites with one control center and three silos each) to reduce the number of guidance systems required. (Radio-inertial guided Atlas D squadrons were similarly sited).<ref>Walker, Chuck Atlas The Ultimate Weapon, Burlington Canada: Apogee Books, 2005, {{ISBN|0-517-56904-3}}, p. 154</ref>
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Weapon System 107A-2 was a weapon system. It encompassed all of the equipment and even the bases for the Titan I strategic missile. The Titan I was first American ICBM designed to be based in underground silos, and it gave USAF managers, contractors and missile crews valuable experience building and working in vast complexes containing everything the missiles and crews needed for operation and survival. The complexes were composed of an entry portal, control center, powerhouse, terminal room, two antenna silos for the [[ATHENA computer|ATHENA]] guidance radar antennas, and three launchers each composed of: three equipment terminals, three propellant terminals, and three missile silos. All connected by an extensive network of tunnels.<ref>United States Air Force, The T.O. 21M-HGM25A-1-1 Technical Manual Operation and Organizational Maintenance HGM-25A Missile Weapon System, United States Air Force, 1964, Pg 1-9</ref> Both antenna terminals and all three launchers were isolated with double door blast locks the doors of which could not be open at the same time. This was to ensure that if there was an explosion in a missile launcher or the site was under attack, only the exposed antenna and/or missile silo would be damaged.<ref>United States Air Force, The T.O. 21M-HGM25A-1-1 Technical Manual Operation and Organizational Maintenance HGM-25A Missile Weapon System, United States Air Force, 1964, Pg 1-52</ref>
The launch crew was composed of a missile combat crew commander, missile launch officer (MLO), guidance electronics officer (GEO), ballistic missile analyst technician (BMAT), and two electrical power production technicians (EPPT).<ref>United States Air Force, The T.O. 21M-HGM25A-1-1 Technical Manual Operation and Organizational Maintenance HGM-25A Missile Weapon System, United States Air Force, 1964, Pg 7-1 - 7-3</ref> There were also a cook and two Air Police.<ref name="auto4">Simpson, Charles G, The Titan I part 2, Breckenridge, Colorado: Association of Air Force Missileers, October 1993, p. 5.</ref> During normal duty hours there was a site commander, site maintenance officer, site chief, job controller/expediter, tool crib operator, power house chief, three pad chiefs, three assistant pad chiefs, another cook and more air police. There could be a number of electricians, plumbers, power production technicians, air conditioning technicians, and other specialist when maintenance was being performed.<ref
These early complexes while safe from a nearby nuclear detonation, however, had certain drawbacks. First, the missiles took about 15 minutes to fuel, and then, one at a time, had to be lifted to the surface on elevators for launching and guidance, which slowed their reaction time. Rapid launching was crucial to avoid possible destruction by incoming missiles. Even though Titan complexes were designed to withstand nearby nuclear blasts antenna and missile extended for launch and guidance were quite susceptible to even a relatively distant miss.<ref>United States Air Force, The T.O. 21M-HGM25A-1-1 Technical Manual Operation and Organizational Maintenance HGM-25A Missile Weapon System, United States Air Force, 1964, page 6-1</ref> The missiles sites of a squadron were placed at least 17 (usually 20 to 30) miles apart so that a single nuclear weapon could not take out two sites.<ref>Green Warren E..1962, The Development of the SM-68 Titan, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Systems Command, 1962, AFSC Historical Publications Series 62-23-1, p. 85.</ref> The sites also had to be close enough that if a site's guidance system failed it could "handover" its missiles to another site of the squadron.<ref>Hoselton, Gary A., Titan I Guidance System, Brekenridge, Colorado: Association of Air Force Missileers, Volume 6, Number 1998, p. 6.</ref><ref>United States Air Force, The T.O. 21M-HGM25A-1-1 Technical Manual Operation and Organizational Maintenance HGM-25A Missile Weapon System, United States Air Force, 1964, page 3-100</ref>
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*one was destroyed in Beale AFB Site 851-C1 silo explosion 24 May 1962
*54 were deployed in silos on 20 January 1965
*29 were in storage at SBAMA<ref name="auto3">{{cite web |url=http://www.militarymuseum.org/MiraLomaQMD.html |title=Mira Loma Quartermaster. Depot (Mira Loma Air Force Station |publisher=California Military Department|access-date=2019-11-11}}</ref>
(three at VAFB, one at each of five bases, one at Lowry, and 20 in storage at SBAMA elsewhere)
The 83 surplus missiles remained in inventory at [[Mira Loma Air Force Station|Mira Loma AFS]]. It did not make economic sense to refurbish them as SM-65 Atlas missiles with similar payload capacities had already been converted to satellite launchers. About 33 were distributed to museums, parks and schools as static displays (see list below). The remaining 50 missiles were scrapped at Mira Loma AFS near San Bernardino, CA; the last was broken up in 1972, in accordance with the SALT-I Treaty of 1 February 1972.<ref
By November 1965 the Air Force Logistics Command had determined that the cost of modifying the widely dispersed sites to support other ballistic missiles was prohibitive, and attempts were made to find new uses.<ref>Clemmer, Wilbur E..1966, Phase-Out of the Atlas E and F and Titan I Weapon Systems, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Historical Research Division Air Force Logistics Command, 1962, p. 28.</ref> By Spring 1966 a number of possible uses and users had been identified. By 6 May 1966 the Air Force wanted to retain 5 Titan sites and the General Services Administration had earmarked 1 for possible use. The USAF removed equipment it had uses for, the rest was offered to other government agencies.<ref>Clemmer, Wilbur E..1966, Phase-Out of the Atlas E and F and Titan I Weapon Systems, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Historical Research Division Air Force Logistics Command, 1962, p. 31.</ref> Eventually no sites were retained and all were salvaged. The chosen method was the Service and Salvage contract, which required the contractor to remove the equipment the government wanted before proceeding with scrapping.<ref>Clemmer, Wilbur E..1966, Phase-Out of the Atlas E and F and Titan I Weapon Systems, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Historical Research Division Air Force Logistics Command, 1962, p. 49.</ref> This accounts for the varied degree of salvage at the sites today. Most are sealed today, with one in Colorado that is easily entered but also very unsafe.<ref>Archived at [https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211211/T76CcAfHQos Ghostarchive]{{cbignore}} and the [https://web.archive.org/web/20181004023449/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T76CcAfHQos Wayback Machine]{{cbignore}}: {{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T76CcAfHQos |title=Abandoned Titan I Missile Base – CO |date=15 October 2014 |publisher=YouTube |access-date=2016-02-14}}{{cbignore}}</ref> One is open for tours.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.themissilebase.com/ |title=The Hotchkiss Titan I ICBM Missile Base |publisher=Bari Hotchkiss |access-date=2016-02-14}}</ref>
On 6 September 1985 [[Strategic Defense Initiative]] (AKA "Star Wars" program), a scrapped Titan I Second Stage was used in a Missile Defense test. The MIRACL Near Infrared Laser, at White Sands Missile Range, NM was fired at a stationary Titan I second stage that was fixed to the ground. The second stage burst and was destroyed by the laser blast. The second stage was pressurized with nitrogen gas to 60-psi and did not contain any fuel or oxidizer. A follow-up test 6 days later was conducted on a scrapped Thor IRBM, its remnants reside at the SLC-10 Museum at Vandenberg AFB.<ref>”Missile Destroyed in First Sdi Test At High-energy Laser Facility”, ''[[Aviation Week]]'', 23 September 1985, page 17</ref>
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==See also==
* [[Titan (rocket family)|Titan rocket family]]
{{Commons|Titan (Rocket)}}▼
* [[List of Titan launches]]
* [[List of military aircraft of the United States]]
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==External links==
▲{{Commons|Titan (Rocket)}}
*[http://aahs-online.org/journals/files/592116.pdf American Aviation Historical Society Journal] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211204013644/https://aahs-online.org/journals/files/592116.pdf |date=4 December 2021 }} by Earl See Titan Missile Memoirs. Summer 2014.
*[https://media.journoportfolio.com/users/66300/uploads/89223f21-d318-4c91-8b8a-e329cefdc02d.pdf Tri-City Herald article] by Kristin Alexander about Titan 1 complexes in Washington State. Published 22 March 1998.
*''Information on "Northern California Triad" of Titan missile bases in [[Lincoln, California]]; [[Chico, California]] and [[Live Oak, Sutter County, California]] ([[Sutter Buttes]])''
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