Great Firewall: Difference between revisions

The '''Great Firewall''' (''GFW''; {{zh|s=防火长城|t=防火長城|p=Fánghuǒ Chángchéng}}) is the combination of legislative actions and technologies enforced by the [[China|People's Republic of China]] to regulate the [[Internet]] domestically.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Clayton |first1=Richard |last2=Murdoch |first2=Steven J. |last3=Watson |first3=Robert N. M. |title=Ignoring the great firewall of china |journal=International Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies}}</ref> Its role in [[internet censorship in China]] is to block access to selected foreign websites and to slow down cross-border internet traffic.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Mozur|first1=Paul|title=Baidu and CloudFlare Boost Users Over China's Great Firewall|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/14/business/partnership-boosts-users-over-chinas-great-firewall.html|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=13 September 2015|language=en|access-date=16 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190124123846/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/14/business/partnership-boosts-users-over-chinas-great-firewall.html|archive-date=24 January 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> The Great Firewall operates by checking [[transmission control protocol]] (TCP) packets for keywords or sensitive words. If the keywords or sensitive words appear in the TCP packets, access will be closed. If one link is closed, more links from the same machine will be blocked by the Great Firewall.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Clayton |first1=Richard |last2=Murdoch |first2=Steven J. |last3=Watson |first3=Robert N. M. |date=2006 |editor-last=Danezis |editor-first=George |editor2-last=Golle |editor2-first=Philippe |chapter=Ignoring the Great Firewall of China |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11957454_2 |title=Privacy Enhancing Technologies |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |volume=4258 |language=en |location=Berlin, Heidelberg |publisher=Springer |pages=20–35 |doi=10.1007/11957454_2 |isbn=978-3-540-68793-1|hdl=1811/72793 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> The effect includes: limiting access to foreign information sources, blocking foreign internet tools (e.g. [[Google Search]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://en.greatfire.org/google.com|title=google.com is blocked in China {{!}} GreatFire Analyzer|website=en.greatfire.org|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140805232352/https://en.greatfire.org/google.com|archive-date=2014-08-05|access-date=2020-01-18}}</ref> [[Facebook]],<ref>{{cite web |title=How China's social media users created a new language to beat censorship on COVID-19 |url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/03/china-social-media-language-government-censorship-covid/ |website=[[Amnesty International]] |access-date=3 April 2020 |language=en |date=6 March 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200403023740/https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/03/china-social-media-language-government-censorship-covid/ |archive-date=3 April 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Twitter]],<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/07/AR2009070701162.html|title=China Blocks Access To Twitter, Facebook After Riots|newspaper=Washington Post|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100919204716/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/07/AR2009070701162.html|archive-date=19 September 2010|access-date=18 January 2020}}</ref> [[Wikipedia]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theverge.com/2015/9/4/9260981/jimmy-wales-wikipedia-china|title=Wikipedia founder defends decision to encrypt the site in China|date=4 September 2015|publisher=[[The Verge]]|access-date=17 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612141751/https://www.theverge.com/2015/9/4/9260981/jimmy-wales-wikipedia-china|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/chinas-government-has-blocked-wikipedia-its-entirety-again-1532138|title=China's government has blocked Wikipedia in its entirety again|last=Skipper|first=Ben|date=7 December 2015|work=[[International Business Times]] UK|access-date=2 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180503111142/https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/chinas-government-has-blocked-wikipedia-its-entirety-again-1532138|archive-date=3 May 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> and others) and mobile apps, and requiring foreign companies to adapt to domestic regulations.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Mozur|first1=Paul|last2=Goel|first2=Vindu|title=To Reach China, LinkedIn Plays by Local Rules|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/technology/to-reach-china-linkedin-plays-by-local-rules.html?mcubz=0|work=The New York Times|date=5 October 2014|access-date=4 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180613111912/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/technology/to-reach-china-linkedin-plays-by-local-rules.html?mcubz=0|archive-date=13 June 2018|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Branigan|first1=Tania|title=New York Times launches website in Chinese language|url=https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jun/28/new-york-times-launches-chinese-website|work=[[The Guardian]]|date=28 June 2012|access-date=4 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170904154029/https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jun/28/new-york-times-launches-chinese-website|archive-date=4 September 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>

The Great Firewall was formerly operated by the [[State Internet Information Office|SIIO]], as part of the [[Golden Shield Project]]. Since 2013, the firewall is technically operated by the [[Cyberspace Administration of China]] (CAC), which is the entity in charge of translating the [[Chinese Communist Party]]'s doctrine[[Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party|ideology]] and policy into technical specifications.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/china_internet-11242008134108.html|title=How China's Internet Police Control Speech on the Internet|website=[[Radio Free Asia]]|language=en|access-date=15 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140620175605/http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/china_internet-11242008134108.html|archive-date=20 June 2014|url-status=live}}</ref>

As mentioned in the "[[one country, two systems]]" principle, China's [[Special administrative regions of China|special administrative regions]] (SARs) such as [[Hong Kong]] and [[Macau]] are not affected by the firewall, as SARs have their own governmental and legal systems and therefore enjoy a higher degree of autonomy. Nevertheless, the [[U.S. State Department]] has reported that the central government authorities have closely monitored Internet use in these regions,<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/eap/187483.htm|title=China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) - Hong Kong|work=[[U.S. Department of State]]|access-date=29 July 2018|language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190701191914/https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/eap/187483.htm|archive-date=1 July 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> and Hong Kong's [[2020 Hong Kong national security law|National Security Law]] has been used to block websites documenting [[List of protests in Hong Kong|anti-government protests]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Hong Kong police use national security law for first time to block access to website recording anti-government protests, officers' details |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3117072/hong-kong-police-use-national-security-law-block |website=South China Morning Post |date=9 January 2021 |access-date=13 January 2021 |archive-date=28 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210428165219/https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3117072/hong-kong-police-use-national-security-law-block |url-status=live }}</ref>

A favorite saying of [[Deng Xiaoping]]'s in the early 1980s, "If you open the window, both fresh air and flies will be blown in", is considered to be the political and ideological basis of the GFW Project.<ref group=nb>{{zh|c=打开窗户，新鲜空气和苍蝇就会一起进来。|p= Dǎkāi chuānghù, xīnxiān kōngqì hé cāngying jiù huì yìqǐ jìnlái|scase=yes}}.<br />There are several variants of this saying in Chinese, including "如果你打开窗户换新鲜空气，就得想到苍蝇也会飞进来。" and "打开窗户，新鲜空气进来了，苍蝇也飞进来了。". Their meanings are the same.</ref> The saying is related to a period of the economic reform of China that became known as the "[[socialist market economy]]". Superseding the political ideologies of the [[Cultural Revolution]], the reform led China towards a [[market economy]] and opened up the market for foreign investors. Nonetheless, despite the economic freedom, values and political ideas of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have had to be protected by "swatting flies" of other unwanted ideologies.<ref>R. MacKinnon "Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship and civic discourse in China" ''[[Public Choice (journal)|Public Choice]]'' (2008) 134: p. 31–46, Springer</ref>

In 1998, the Chinese Communist Party feared that the [[China Democracy Party]] (CDP) would breed a powerful new network that the partyCCP elites might not be able to control.<ref>Goldman, Merle Goldman. Gu, Edward X. [2004] (2004). Chinese Intellectuals between State and Market. [[Routledge]]. {{ISBN|0415325978}}</ref> The CDP was immediately banned, followed by arrests and imprisonment.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Goldsmith |first1=Jack L. |author-link1=Jack Goldsmith |last2=Wu |first2=Tim |author-link2=Tim Wu |title=Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2006 |location=New York |isbn=0-19-515266-2 |page=[https://archive.org/details/whocontrolsinter00gold/page/91 91] |title-link=Who Controls the Internet? }}</ref> That same year, the GFW project was started. The first part of the project lasted eight years and was completed in 2006. The second part began in 2006 and ended in 2008.

While the United States and several other western countries passed laws creating computer crimes beginning in the 1970s, China had no such legislation until 1997. That year, China's sole legislative body – the [[National People's Congress]] (NPC) – passed CL97, a law that deals with cyber crimes, which it divided into two broad categories: crimes that target computer networks, and crimes carried out over computer networks. Behavior illegal under the latter category includes, among many things, the dissemination of [[pornographic]] material, and the usurping of "[[classified information|state secrets]]."<ref>{{Cite web |title=Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (1997) |url=http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm |access-date=2024-01-03 |website=www.npc.gov.cn |archive-date=6 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240106073907/http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>

|The Chinese firewall is made of [[Transparent proxy|transparent proxies]] filtering web traffic. These proxies scan the requested [[Uniform Resource Identifier|URI]], the "Host" Header and the content of the web page (for HTTP requests) or the [[Server Name Indication]] (for HTTPS requests) for target keywords.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://blog.xeovo.com/what-is-the-great-firewall-of-china-and-why-you-should-care/ |title=What is the Great Firewall of China and why you should care |date=30 December 2021 |publisher=xeovo.com |access-date=2 January 2024 |archive-date=8 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240808050047/https://blog.xeovo.com/what-is-the-great-firewall-of-china-and-why-you-should-care/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

Like for DNS filtering, this method is keyword-based. Encrypting the Server Name Indication (Encrypted Client Hello or ECH) can be used to bypass this method of filtering. It is currently in development by the [[Internet Engineering Task Force|IETF]],<ref>{{cite news|url=https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-esni/|title=draft-ietf-tls-esni-03 - Encrypted Server Name Indication for TLS 1.3|newspaper=Ietf Datatracker|access-date=13 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190606041824/https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-esni/|archive-date=6 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> and is enabled by default for supported websites in [[Firefox]] and [[Chromium (web browser)|Chromium]] ([[Google Chrome]], [[Microsoft Edge]], [[Samsung Internet]], and [[Opera (web browser)|Opera]]).<ref>{{cite web|url=https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2018/10/18/encrypted-sni-comes-to-firefox-nightly/|title=Encrypted SNI Comes to Firefox Nightly|website=Mozilla Security Blog|date=18 October 2018 |access-date=2020-02-11|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200324233735/https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2018/10/18/encrypted-sni-comes-to-firefox-nightly/|archive-date=2020-03-24|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypt-that-sni-firefox-edition/|title=Encrypt that SNI: Firefox edition|date=October 18, 2018|website=The Cloudflare Blog|access-date=February 11, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200214223249/https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypt-that-sni-firefox-edition/|archive-date=February 14, 2020|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://chasersystems.com/blog/disabling-encrypted-clienthello-in-google-chrome-and-why/ |title=How to disable TLS Encrypted ClientHello in Google Chrome using PowerShell |author=<!--Not stated--> |date=9 October 2023 |website= |publisher=Chaser Systems Ltd |access-date= |quote= |archive-date=21 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240221182758/https://chasersystems.com/blog/disabling-encrypted-clienthello-in-google-chrome-and-why/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://chromestatus.com/feature/6196703843581952 |title=Feature: TLS Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) |author=<!--Not stated--> |date=12 December 2023 |website=Chrome Platform Status |publisher=[[Google]] |access-date=21 February 2024 |quote= |archive-date=22 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240122130352/https://chromestatus.com/feature/6196703843581952 |url-status=live }}</ref>

|The [http://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/2017_PRC_NationalIntelligenceLaw.pdf Chinese [National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China]] theoretically allows the Chinese government to request and use the root certificate from any Chinese certificate authority,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.dezshira.com/library/legal/cyber-security-law-china-8013.html|title=Cyber-security Law of the People's Republic of China|website=www.dezshira.com|date=11 January 2018 |language=en|access-date=1 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190601010621/https://www.dezshira.com/library/legal/cyber-security-law-china-8013.html|archive-date=1 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> such as [[CNNIC]], to make MITM attacks with valid certificates.

The Great Firewall scrapes the IPs of Tor and VPN servers from the official distribution channels, and enumerates them.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DX46Qv_b7F4&t=831 |title=28c3: How governments have tried to block Tor |publisher=YouTube |date=2011-12-28 |access-date=2020-02-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200329110424/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DX46Qv_b7F4&t=831 |archive-date=2020-03-29 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZB8ODpw_om8&t=743 |title=Roger Dingledine - The Tor Censorship Arms Race The Next Chapter - DEF CON 27 Conference |publisher=YouTube |date=2019-11-15 |access-date=2020-02-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200329111727/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZB8ODpw_om8&t=743 |archive-date=2020-03-29 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32117|title=#32117 (Understand and document BridgeDB bot scraping attempts) – Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki|website=trac.torproject.org|date=16 October 2019 |access-date=2020-01-21|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200327035436/https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32117|archive-date=2020-03-27|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wxpl8naHQCs |title=Jinyang Li - Censorship Circumvention via Kaleidoscope |date=31 March 2010 |publisher=YouTube |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200523012421/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wxpl8naHQCs |archive-date=2020-05-23 |url-status=live }}</ref> The strategy to resist this attack is to limit the quantity of proxy IPs revealed to each user and making it very difficult for users to create more than one identity.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://people.cs.umass.edu/~amir/papers/TorGame.pdf |title=Tor Games |publisher=people.cs.umass.edu |access-date=2020-02-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200217222223/https://people.cs.umass.edu/~amir/papers/TorGame.pdf |archive-date=2020-02-17 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/rbridge_ndss13.pdf |title=Data |publisher=www-users.cs.umn.edu |access-date=2020-02-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190612072343/https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/rbridge_ndss13.pdf |archive-date=2019-06-12 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://censorbib.nymity.ch/pdf/Sovran2008a.pdf |title=Info |publisher=censorbib.nymity.ch |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160317075430/https://censorbib.nymity.ch/pdf/Sovran2008a.pdf |archive-date=2016-03-17 |url-status=live }}</ref> Academics have proposed solutions such as Salmon, a volunteer-based proxy network designed to combat censorship.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://censorbib.nymity.ch/pdf/Douglas2016a.pdf |title=Info |publisher=censorbib.nymity.ch |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-date=8 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240808050043/https://censorbib.nymity.ch/pdf/Douglas2016a.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RO3wXRn8BfY |title=Frederick Douglas - Salmon: Robust Proxy Distribution for Censorship Circumvention |publisher=YouTube |date=2016-10-10 |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190204190605/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RO3wXRn8BfY |archive-date=2019-02-04 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://community.torproject.org/gsoc/salmon-bridge-distribution/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200626231844/https://community.torproject.org/gsoc/salmon-bridge-distribution/ |archive-date=2020-06-26 |title=Tor Project {{!}} Implementing Salmon as a bridge distribution mechanism}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url = https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/33|title = Salmon: Robust Proxy Distribution for Censorship Circumvention (PETS 2016) · Issue #33 · net4people/BBS|website = [[GitHub]]|access-date = 24 June 2020|archive-date = 30 November 2020|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20201130083139/https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/33|url-status = live}}</ref> Dynamic IPs are quite effective to flush out from blacklists.

# Containing any other content prohibited by law or administrative rules<ref>{{Cite web|date=September 25, 2000|title=Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services|url=https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/measures-for-the-administration-of-internet-information-services-cecc|access-date=April 21, 2021|website=Congressional-Executive Commission on China|archive-date=8 August 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240808050045/https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/measures-for-the-administration-of-internet-information-services-cecc|url-status=live}}</ref>

To filter this content, the Chinese government not only uses its own blocking methods, but also heavily relies on internet companies, such as ISPs, social media operators such as Weibo,<ref>{{Cite news|last=Griffiths|first=James|date=March 20, 2019|title=Weibo's Free-Speech Failure|work=The Atlantic|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/what-went-wrong-chinas-weibo-social-network/584728/|access-date=April 21, 2021|archive-date=1 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201001213308/https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/what-went-wrong-chinas-weibo-social-network/584728/|url-status=live}}</ref> and others to actively censor their users.<ref>“[https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PEN-America_Forbidden-Feeds-report-6.6.18.pdf FORBIDDEN FEEDS: Government Controls on Social Media in China] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211118234716/https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PEN-America_Forbidden-Feeds-report-6.6.18.pdf |date=18 November 2021 }}," ''PEN America''. (March 13, 2018) p. 33.</ref> This results in private companies censoring their own platform for filtered content, forcing Chinese internet users to use websites not hosted in China to access this information. Much of this information is related to sensitive topics.<ref name=":02">“[https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PEN-America_Forbidden-Feeds-report-6.6.18.pdf FORBIDDEN FEEDS: Government Controls on Social Media in China] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211118234716/https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PEN-America_Forbidden-Feeds-report-6.6.18.pdf |date=18 November 2021 }}," ''PEN America''. (March 13, 2018) p. 24.</ref> The Great Firewall's goal is perceived by the Chinese Communist Party as helping to protect the Chinese population by preventing users from accessing these foreign websites which, in their opinion, host content which would be 'spiritual pollution', as well as information about these sensitive topics.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Abbott|first=Jason|date=April 30, 2019|title=Of Grass Mud Horses and Rice Bunnies: Chinese Internet Users Challenge Beijing's Censorship and Internet Controls|url=https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12442|journal=Asian Politics & Policy|volume=11|pages=162–168|doi=10.1111/aspp.12442|s2cid=159308868|access-date=21 April 2021|archive-date=8 August 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240808050052/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.12442|url-status=live}}</ref> These topics include:

* Names of government[[paramount leadersleader]]s, such as [[Xi Jinping]] and [[Deng Xiaoping]]

* Discussions of [[Tibetan independence movement|Tibetan Independence]]<ref>{{Cite news|last=Xiao|first=Qiang|date=April 30, 2009|title=Baidu's internal monitoring and censorship document leaked|work=China Digital Times|url=https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/baidus-internal-monitoring-and-censorship-document-leaked/|access-date=April 20, 2021|archive-date=19 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210419185003/https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/baidus-internal-monitoring-and-censorship-document-leaked/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Shu|first=Catherine|date=June 3, 2019|title=A Look at the many ways China suppresses online discourse about the Tiananmen Square protests|work=Tech Crunch|url=https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/03/a-look-at-the-many-ways-china-suppresses-online-discourse-about-the-tiananmen-square-protests/|access-date=April 20, 2021|archive-date=21 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210421202820/https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/03/a-look-at-the-many-ways-china-suppresses-online-discourse-about-the-tiananmen-square-protests/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>“[https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PEN-America_Forbidden-Feeds-report-6.6.18.pdf FORBIDDEN FEEDS: Government Controls on Social Media in China] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211118234716/https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PEN-America_Forbidden-Feeds-report-6.6.18.pdf |date=18 November 2021 }}," PEN America. (March 13, 2018) p. 41-42.</ref>

A 2020 study found that the Great Firewall blocks approximately 311,000 domains.<ref name=":Zhang">{{Cite book |last=Zhang |first=Angela Huyue |title=High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9780197682258 |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197682258.001.0001}}</ref>{{Rp|page<ref name=90}}":3" />

The [[Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China|Cybersecurity Law]] behind the firewall is targeted at helping increase internet user privacy, increase protections on personal data, and making companies more responsible for monitoring bad actors, in hopes to make the Internet a safer place for Chinese citizens.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Wang|first=Hairong|date=January 17, 2013|title="Legal Firewall" Beijing Review|work=Beijing Review|url=http://www.bjreview.com/print/txt/2013-01/14/content_512143.htm|access-date=April 21, 2021|archive-date=21 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210421202821/http://www.bjreview.com/print/txt/2013-01/14/content_512143.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> Despite this, there have been growing criticisms that the actions of the Chinese government have only hurt Chinese free speech, due to increased censorship, and lack of non-sanctioned sources of information, such as Wikipedia and many English news sources.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last1=Pan|first1=Jennifer|last2=Roberts|first2=Margaret|date=January 2020|title=Censorship's Effect on Incidental Exposure to Information: Evidence from Wikipedia|journal=SAGE Open|volume=10|doi=10.1177/2158244019894068|doi-access=free}}</ref> This has resulted in reports of some cases of legal persecution of those charged with spreading this information.<ref name=":1" />

Censorship of sensitive topics in China has also been easier for the government because of the firewall and its filtering. Because the monitoring of social media and chat apps in China presents a possibility of punishment for a user, the discussion of these topics is now limited to the correct thought of the Chinese Communist Party, or one's home and private spaces, reducing the chance for information about these topics to spread, reducing any threat of protest against the Communist PartyCCP.<ref name=":2">{{Cite news|last=Wang|first=Yaqiu|date=September 1, 2020|title=In China, the 'Great Firewall' is Changing a Generation|work=Politico|url=https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/01/china-great-firewall-generation-405385|access-date=April 20, 2021|archive-date=21 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210421202819/https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/01/china-great-firewall-generation-405385|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Freedom of Expression in China: A Privilege, Not a Right|url=https://www.cecc.gov/freedom-of-expression-in-china-a-privilege-not-a-right|access-date=April 20, 2021|website=Congressional-Executive Commission on China|archive-date=19 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210419120225/https://www.cecc.gov/freedom-of-expression-in-china-a-privilege-not-a-right|url-status=live}}</ref> According to [[Yaqiu Wang]], a prominent human rights researcher, there was a time in China where the internet provided a method for Chinese citizens to learn about the sensitive topics the government had censored in the news, through access to international news reports and media coverage. She claims that, in the past 10 years, it has been increasingly difficult to access second opinions on events, meaning that students rarely have the opportunity to learn diverging viewpoints — only the "correct" thought of the Communist PartyCCP.<ref name=":2" />

The Great Firewall has also allowed China to develop its own major internet services, such as [[Tencent]], [[Alibaba Group|Alibaba]], [[Baidu]],<ref name="washingtonpost.com2">{{cite news|last1=Denyer|first1=Simon|date=23 May 2016|title=China's scary lesson to the world: Censoring the Internet works|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-scary-lesson-to-the-world-censoring-the-internet-works/2016/05/23/413afe78-fff3-11e5-8bb1-f124a43f84dc_story.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181206113628/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-scary-lesson-to-the-world-censoring-the-internet-works/2016/05/23/413afe78-fff3-11e5-8bb1-f124a43f84dc_story.html|archive-date=6 December 2018|access-date=5 September 2017|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref><ref name="WSJ20152">{{cite news|last1=Chen|first1=Te-Ping|date=28 January 2015|title=China Owns 'Great Firewall,' Credits Censorship With Tech Success|work=WSJ|url=https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/01/28/china-owns-great-firewall-credits-censorship-with-tech-success/|url-status=live|access-date=2 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171121094528/https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/01/28/china-owns-great-firewall-credits-censorship-with-tech-success/|archive-date=21 November 2017}}</ref> [[Renren]], [[Youku]], and [[Weibo]].<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Shi |first=Song |title=China and the Internet: Using New Media for Development and Social Change |date=2023 |publisher=[[Rutgers University Press]] |isbn=9781978834736 |location=New Brunswick, NJ}}</ref>{{Rp|page=8}} China has its own version of many foreign web properties, for example: [[Bilibili]] and [[Tencent Video]] (YouTube), [[Weibo]] (Twitter), [[Moments (social networking)|Moments]]<ref>{{cite web |last1=Hoskins |first1=Peter |author2=Fan Wang |title=WeChat: Why does Elon Musk want X to emulate China's everything-app? |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-66333633 |website=BBC News |accessdate=2023-07-30 |date=2023-07-29 |archive-date=12 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231112081132/https://www.bbc.com/news/business-66333633 |url-status=live }}</ref> and [[Qzone]] (Facebook), [[WeChat]] (WhatsApp), [[Ctrip]] (Orbitz and others), and [[Zhihu]]<ref>{{cite news|last1=Millward|first1=Steven|date=12 January 2017|title=China's answer to Quora now worth a billion bucks|work=Tech in Asia|url=https://www.techinasia.com/zhihu-quora-of-china-funding|url-status=live|access-date=4 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170904154318/https://www.techinasia.com/zhihu-quora-of-china-funding|archive-date=4 September 2017}}</ref> ([[Quora]]). With nearly one quarter of the global internet population (700 million users), the internet behind the GFW can be considered a "parallel universe" to the Internet that exists outside.<ref name="WaPo2017"/>

While the Great Firewall has had an impact on Chinese citizens' ability to use the internet to find information about sensitive topics about the Chinese Communist Party, it has not completely stopped them from doing so. The firewall itself has caused much frustration amongst both individuals and internationally operating companies in China, many of whom have turned to VPNs, speaking in codes,<ref>Lyden, Jacki; Xiao, Qiang (September 7, 2013). [https://www.npr.org/transcripts/220106496 “In China, Avoiding The ‘Great Firewall’ Internet Censors”] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230407050205/https://www.npr.org/transcripts/220106496 |date=7 April 2023 }} NPR Podcasts Transcripts. Retrieved April 20, 2021.</ref> and other methods to retain their access to the international internet.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Li|first=Yan|date=April 6, 2016|title=Chinese Voice Frustration Over 'Great Firewall'; Many Internet users criticize intensified blocking of foreign websites|work=The Wall Street Journal Online|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-voice-frustration-over-great-firewall-1459973164|access-date=April 20, 2021|archive-date=20 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210420110757/https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-voice-frustration-over-great-firewall-1459973164|url-status=live}}</ref>

* [[Tor (anonymity network)|Tor]] partially can be used in China.<ref name="Anderson2013" /><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/8cjezx/does_tor_still_work_in_china/|title=r/TOR - Does Tor still work in China?|website=reddit|date=16 April 2018|language=en-US|access-date=2019-11-11|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190904021327/https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/8cjezx/does_tor_still_work_in_china/|archive-date=2019-09-04|url-status=live}}</ref> Since 2010, almost all bridges at TorProject.org are blocked through [[#Proxy distribution|proxy distribution]]. Tor still functions in China using Snowflake,<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YlZZQYLIXe8&t=1400s | title=DEF CON 30 - Roger Dingledine - How Russia is trying to block Tor | website=[[YouTube]] | date=20 October 2022 | access-date=7 April 2023 | archive-date=26 October 2022 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221026203753/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YlZZQYLIXe8&t=1400s | url-status=live }}</ref> independently published Obfs4 bridges and meek.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/foci18/foci18-paper-dunna.pdf |title=Conference paper |publisher=www.usenix.org |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191028052521/https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/foci18/foci18-paper-dunna.pdf |archive-date=2019-10-28 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DX46Qv_b7F4&t=949 |title=28c3: How governments have tried to block Tor |publisher=YouTube |date=2011-12-28 |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200523011126/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DX46Qv_b7F4&t=949 |archive-date=2020-05-23 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29279|title = Test obfs4 reachability (#29279) · Issues · Legacy / Trac| date=February 2019|access-date=22 July 2020|archive-date=29 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201029124816/https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29279|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g6xEfNHkFKY|title=Circumventing Internet Censorship with Tor|date=30 June 2020 |accessdate=Dec 3, 2022|via=www.youtube.com|archive-date=3 December 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221203172133/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g6xEfNHkFKY|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2017, the Chinese government declared unauthorized VPN services illegal, requiring VPN providers to obtain state approval.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Ye |first=Josh |date=January 2017 |title=China tightens Great Firewall by declaring unauthorized VPN services illegal |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2064587/chinas-move-clean-vpns-and-strengthen-great-firewall |access-date=April 21, 2021 |archive-date=24 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210424082112/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2064587/chinas-move-clean-vpns-and-strengthen-great-firewall |url-status=live }}</ref> Although China restricts VPNs, they remain widely used by private individuals.<ref name=":9222">{{Cite book |last=Šebok |first=Filip |title=Contemporary China: a New Superpower? |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2023 |isbn=978-1-03-239508-1 |editor-last=Kironska |editor-first=Kristina |chapter=Social Control and Propaganda |editor-last2=Turscanyi |editor-first2=Richard Q.}}</ref>{{Rp|page=109}} [[State-owned enterprises of China|State-owned enterprises]] or state institutions also use VPNs for official work.<ref name=":9222" />{{Rp|page=109}} The Chinese government has authorized several official VPN providers.<ref name=":9222" />{{Rp|page=109}} Those who develop or sell their own VPNs potentially face years in prison.<ref name=":9222" />{{Rp|page=109}}

* [[Transport Layer Security|TLS]], the Great Firewall can identify the difference between HTTPS TLS and other implementations by inspecting the handshake parameters.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3z56andRyCY |title=Defcon 21 - Defeating Internet Censorship with Dust, the Polymorphic Protocol Engine |publisher=YouTube |date=2013-11-16 |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160707183101/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3z56andRyCY |archive-date=2016-07-07 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBp6opkcxoc&feature=youtu.be&t=361 |title=32C3 - How the Great Firewall discovers hidden circumvention servers |publisher=YouTube |date=2016-04-24 |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-date=21 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220321051525/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBp6opkcxoc&feature=youtu.be&t=361 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://tlsfingerprint.io/static/frolov2019.pdf |title=Data |publisher=tlsfingerprint.io |date=2019 |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190227201210/https://tlsfingerprint.io/static/frolov2019.pdf |archive-date=2019-02-27 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=35l56KjTCb8&feature=youtu.be&t=5315 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211222/35l56KjTCb8 |archive-date=2021-12-22 |url-status=live|title=Anti-Censorship & Transparency - Roger Dingledine |date=26 October 2010 |publisher=YouTube |access-date=2020-05-24}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

In 2010, a [[root name server]] run by [[Netnod]] in China started returning poisoned DNS results to global users, preventing users in [[Chile]] and the U.S. from accessing sites such as Facebook. The server was shut down to stop the poisoning.<ref>{{cite web |last1=McMillan |first1=Robert |title=After DNS problem, Chinese root server is shut down |url=https://www.computerworld.com/article/2755924/after-dns-problem--chinese-root-server-is-shut-down.html |website=Computerworld |language=en |date=26 March 2010 |access-date=28 January 2023 |archive-date=9 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230409102959/https://www.computerworld.com/article/2755924/after-dns-problem--chinese-root-server-is-shut-down.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 2014, two-thirds of China's DNS infrastructure began resolving unrelated domains to 65.49.2.178, an address owned by the US-based [[Freegate|Dynamic Internet Technology, Inc.]], [[Internet anomalies in mainland China in 2014|resulting in widespread internet outage in China]]. No damage to DIT services were reported despite what amounts to an accidental [[DDoS]]. While some sources attribute this incident to GFW's DNS poisoning,<ref>{{cite web |last1=Leyden |first1=John |title=DNS poisoning slams web traffic from millions in China into the wrong hole |url=https://www.theregister.com/2014/01/21/china_dns_poisoning_attack/ |website=www.theregister.com |language=en |access-date=28 January 2023 |archive-date=29 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230129112348/https://www.theregister.com/2014/01/21/china_dns_poisoning_attack/ |url-status=live }}</ref> others (mostly quoting Chinese sources) speculate this incident was somehow caused by DIT themselves.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web|last=Carsten|first=Paul|title="Massive Internet mishap sparks Great Firewall scrutiny in China"|url=http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-internet-idUKBREA0K04T20140122|access-date=22 Jan 2014|website=Reuters|archive-date=8 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160308013801/http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-internet-idUKBREA0K04T20140122|url-status=live}}</ref>

[[Reporters Without Borders]] suspects that countries such as [[Censorship in Cuba|Cuba]], [[Censorship in Iran|Iran]],<ref>{{Cite web|title=Iran To Work With China To Create National Internet System|url=https://www.rferl.org/amp/iran-china-national-internet-system-censorship/30820857.html|access-date=2020-09-30|website=www.rferl.org|archive-date=30 September 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200930031242/https://www.rferl.org/amp/iran-china-national-internet-system-censorship/30820857.html|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Censorship in Vietnam|Vietnam]], [[Censorship in Zimbabwe|Zimbabwe]], and [[Censorship in Belarus|Belarus]] have obtained surveillance technology from China, although the censorship in these countries is less stringent than in China.<ref name="cubaonline">{{cite web|year=2006|title=Going online in Cuba: Internet under surveillance|url=http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_gb_md_1.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090303221407/http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_gb_md_1.pdf|archive-date=3 March 2009|publisher=Reporters Without Borders|df=dmy}}</ref>

Since at least 2015, the Russian [[Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media|Roskomnadzor]] agency collaborates with Chinese Great Firewall security officials in implementing its data retention and filtering infrastructure.<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Soldatov|first1=Andrei|last2=Borogan|first2=Irina|date=2016-11-29|title=Putin brings China's Great Firewall to Russia in cybersecurity pact|language=en-GB|work=The Guardian|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/29/putin-china-internet-great-firewall-russia-cybersecurity-pact|access-date=2017-07-04|issn=0261-3077|archive-date=6 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210706183836/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/29/putin-china-internet-great-firewall-russia-cybersecurity-pact|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="eurozine">{{cite news|date=2017-02-21|title=China: The architect of Putin's firewall|publisher=[[Eurozine]]|url=https://www.eurozine.com/china-the-architect-of-putins-firewall/|access-date=2019-12-10|archive-date=3 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210503194417/https://www.eurozine.com/china-the-architect-of-putins-firewall/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|date=2016-04-29|title=Russia's chief internet censor enlists China's know-how|publisher=[[Financial Times]]|url=https://www.ft.com/content/08564d74-0bbf-11e6-9456-444ab5211a2f |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211/https://www.ft.com/content/08564d74-0bbf-11e6-9456-444ab5211a2f |archive-date=2022-12-11 |url-access=subscription|access-date=2019-12-10}}</ref> During his visit to Beijing in June 2016, Vladimir Putin signed a joint communiqué with [[Xi Jinping]] on information space, followed by Russia’sRussia's National Forum for Information Security in October hosted by [[Fang Binxing]], the architect of the Chinese Great Firewall.<ref name="eurozine"/>

Especially since the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], in order to enforce the [[Russian 2022 war censorship laws|war censorship law]], Russian authorities were making an internet surveillance system akin to Chinese Great Firewall.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://apnews.com/article/russia-internet-censorship-efforts-reveal-shortcomings-c2156ead73e1c33cb9357fb954f958f8|title=War censorship exposes Putin's leaky internet controls|website=[[Associated Press]] |date=March 14, 2022|access-date=18 December 2022|archive-date=21 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230521183313/https://apnews.com/article/russia-internet-censorship-efforts-reveal-shortcomings-c2156ead73e1c33cb9357fb954f958f8|url-status=live}}</ref>

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