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{{short description|Measures to increase the influence of Russian culture and language}}
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{{About||Russification of a computer|Computer Russification|influence of Russian on other languages as a linguistic phenomenon|Russianism}}
{{moreMore citations needed section|date=NovemberAugust 20122024}}
{{Update|date=October 2022|reason=The 2022 invasion of Ukraine and efforts of russification in annexed territories by Russia in Ukraine|part=Modern Russia}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=February 2020}}
[[File:Russification evidence.jpg|thumb|right|250px|[[Minsk]], Belarus, 2011: old street sign in [[Belarusian language|Belarusian]] (right) replaced with new one in [[Russian language|Russian]] (left).]]
'''Russification''' ({{lang-ru|русификация|rusifikatsiya}}), or '''Russianization''', is a form of [[cultural assimilation]] in which non-[[Russians]], whether involuntarily or voluntarily, give up their culture and language in favor of the [[Russian culture]] and the [[Russian language]].
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The major areas of Russification are politics and culture. In politics, an element of Russification is assigning Russian nationals to lead administrative positions in national institutions. In culture, Russification primarily amounts to the domination of the Russian language in official business and the strong influence of the Russian language on national idioms. The shifts in [[demographics]] in favour of the ethnic Russian population are sometimes considered a form of Russification as well.
 
Analytically,Some it is helpful toresearchers distinguish ''Russification'', as a process of changing one's ethnic self-label or identity from a non-Russian [[ethnonym]] to Russian, from ''Russianization'', the spread of the Russian language, culture, and people into non-Russian cultures and regions, distinct also from [[Sovietization]] or the imposition of institutional forms established by the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] throughout the territory ruled by that party.<ref>Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Peoples," in Allen Kassof, Ed., ''Prospects for Soviet Society'' (New York: Praeger, 1968): 143–198. Aspaturian also distinguished both Russianization and Russification from Sovietization, the process of spreading Soviet institutions and the Soviet socialist restructuring of social and economic relations in accordance with the ruling Communist Party's vision. (Aspaturian was a Soviet studies specialist, Evan Pugh Professor Emeritus of political science and former director of the Slavic and Soviet Language and Area Center at [[Pennsylvania State University]].)</ref> In this sense, although Russification is usually [[conflation|conflated]] across Russification, Russianization, and Russian-led Sovietization, each can be considered a distinct process. Russianization and Sovietization, for example, did not automatically lead to Russification – a change in language or self-identity of non-Russian people to being Russian. Thus, despite long exposure to the Russian language and culture, as well as to Sovietization, at the end of the [[Soviet era]], non-Russians were on the verge of becoming a majority of the population in the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver,"Demographic Sources of the Changing Ethnic Composition of the Soviet Union," ''Population and Development Review'' 15, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 609–656.</ref>
 
After the two collapses: of [[Russian Empire]] in 1917 and [[Soviet Union]] in 1992 major processes of [[derussification]] took place.
 
== History ==
The Russification of [[Uralic languages|Uralic-speaking]] people, such as [[Vepsians]], [[Mordvins]], [[Mari people|Maris]], and [[Permians]], indigenous to large parts of western and central Russia had already begun with the original eastward expansion of [[East Slavic peoples|East Slavs]]. Written records of the oldest period are scarce, but [[toponym]]ic evidence indicates<ref>{{cite book|first=Janne|last=Saarikivi|title=Substrata Uralica: Studies on the Finno-Ugrian substrate in Northern Russian dialects|type=PhD thesis|year=2006|isbn=978-9949-11-474-0}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|first=Eugene|last=Helimski|title=The "Northwestern" Group of Finno-Ugric Languages and its Heritage in the Place Names and Substratum Vocabulary of the Russian North|year=2006|journal=Slavica Helsingiensia|volume=27|url=http://www.helsinki.fi/venaja/nwrussia/eng/Conference/pdf/Helimski.pdf|access-date=2014-08-10}}
</ref><ref>{{cite journal|first=Pauli|last=Rahkonen|title=Finno-Ugrian hydronyms of the river Volkhov and Luga catchment areas|year=2011|journal=Suomalais-Ugrilaisen Seuran Aikakauskirja|volume=2011 |issue=93 |doi=10.33340/susa.82436 |s2cid=244880934 |url=http://www.sgr.fi/susa/93/rahkonen.pdf|access-date=2014-08-10}}</ref> that this expansion was accomplished at the expense of various [[Volga Finns|Volga-Finnic peoples]], who were gradually assimilated by Russians; beginning with the [[Merya people|Merya]] and the [[Muromians|Muroma]] early in the 2nd millennium AD.{{cn|date=August 2024}}
 
In the 13th to 14th century, the Russification of the [[Komi people|Komi]] began but it did not penetrate the Komi heartlands until the 18th century. However, by the 19th century, Komi-Russian [[bilingualism]] had become the norm and there was an increasing Russian influence on the [[Komi language]].<ref>{{cite journal|first=Marja|last=Leinonen|title=The Russification of Komi|year=2006|journal=Slavica Helsingiensia|volume=27|url=https://blogs.helsinki.fi/slavica-helsingiensia/files/2019/11/sh27-Leinonen.pdf|access-date=2014-08-10}}</ref>
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==== Korenizatsiya ====
{{Main|Korenizatsiya}}
Stalin's ''[[Marxism and the National Question]]'' (1913) provided the basic framework for nationality policy in the Soviet Union.<ref name = "Rouland 2004 183">{{Harvnb|Rouland|2004|p=183}}.</ref> The early years of said policy, from the early 1920s to the mid-1930s, were guided by the policy of [[korenizatsiya]] ("indigenization"), during which the new Soviet regime sought to reverse the long-term effects of Russification on the non-Russian populations.<ref>For a general timeline of Soviet policy towards the nationalities, see the Russian-language Wikipedia article on "Nationalities policy of Russia" ([[:ru:Национальная политика России]]).</ref> As the regime was trying to establish its power and [[Legitimacy (political)|legitimacy]] throughout the former Russian empire, it went about constructing regional administrative units, recruiting non-Russians into leadership positions, and promoting non-Russian languages in government administration, the courts, the schools, and the mass media. The slogan then established was that local cultures should be "socialist in content but national in form." That is, these cultures should be transformed to conform with the Communist Party's socialist project for the Soviet society as a whole but have active participation and leadership by the indigenous nationalities and operate primarily in the local languages.{{cn|date=August 2024}}
 
Early nationality policies shared with later policy the object of assuring control by the Communist Party over all aspects of Soviet political, economic, and social life. The early Soviet policy of promoting what one scholar has described as "ethnic particularism"<ref>Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, Or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," ''[[Slavic Review]]'' 53, No. 2 (Summer 1994): 414–452.</ref> and another as "institutionalized multinationality",<ref>[[Rogers Brubaker]], "Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account," ''Theory and Society'' 23 (February, 1994): 47–78.</ref> had a double goal. On the one hand, it had been an effort to counter Russian chauvinism by assuring a place for non-Russian languages and cultures in the newly formed Soviet Union. On the other hand, it was a means to prevent the formation of alternative ethnically based [[political movement]]s, including [[pan-Islamism]]<ref>This was not focused simply on religion. In the Revolutionary and immediate post-Revolutionary period, after at first coöpting [[jadid]]ist Tatar [[Mirsäyet Soltanğäliev|Sultan Galiyev]] into a leadership position in the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Soviet regime soon turned to fight against his project and ideas for uniting Muslim peoples in a broader national liberal movement.</ref> and [[pan-Turkism]].<ref>See Slezkine (1994) and Ronald Wixman, ''Language Aspects of Ethnic Patterns and Processes in the North Caucasus,'' University of Chicago Geography Research Series, No. 19 (1980).</ref> One way of accomplishing this was to promote what some regard as artificial distinctions between ethnic groups and languages rather than promoting the amalgamation of these groups and a common set of languages based on Turkish or another regional language.<ref>Wixman (1980). One scholar has pointed out that the basic task of defining "what was a nationality" was assigned to ethnographers immediately after the formation of the USSR in 1924, and that they were asked to work quickly so that a population census could be taken with accounting by nationality. In contrast, the only complete imperial Russian census in 1897 did not use nationality at all as a category but instead used religion and language as ethnic markers. See Francine Hirsch, "The Soviet Union as a Work in Progress: Ethnographers and Category Nationality in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses," ''[[Slavic Review]]'' 56 (Summer 1997): 256–278.</ref>
 
The Soviet nationalities policy from its early years sought to counter these two tendencies by assuring a modicum of cultural autonomy to non-Russian nationalities within a [[federal system]] or structure of government, though maintaining that the ruling Communist Party was monolithic, not federal. A process of [[National delimitation in the Soviet Union|"national-territorial delimitation"]] ([[:ru:национально-территориальное размежевание]]) was undertaken to define the official territories of the non-Russian populations within the Soviet Union. The federal system conferred the highest status to the titular nationalities of union republics, and lower status to the titular nationalities of autonomous republics, autonomous provinces, and autonomous okrugs. In all, some 50 nationalities had a republic, province, or okrug of which they held nominal control in the federal system. Federalism and the provision of native-language education ultimately left as a legacy a large non-Russian public that was educated in the languages of their ethnic groups and that identified a particular homeland on the territory of the Soviet Union.{{cn|date=August 2024}}
 
==== World War II ====
By the late 1930s, policies had shifted. Purges in some of the national regions, such as [[Russification of Ukraine|Ukraine]], had occurred already in the early 1930s. Before the turnabout in Ukraine in 1933, a purge of [[Veli İbraimov]] and his leadership in the [[Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic|Crimean ASSR]] in 1929 for "national deviation" led to the Russianization of government, education, and the media and to the creation of a special alphabet for Crimean Tatar to replace the Latin alphabet.<ref>H. B. Paksoy, "Crimean Tatars," in ''Modern Encyclopedia of Religions in Russia and Soviet Union'' (Academic International Press, 1995), Vol. VI: 135–142.</ref> Of the two dangers that [[Joseph Stalin]] had identified in 1923, now [[bourgeois nationalism]] (local nationalism) was said to be a greater threat than Great Russian chauvinism (great power chauvinism).<ref name="ChulosPiirainen8">Timo Vihavainen: ''Nationalism and Internationalism. How did the Bolsheviks Cope with National Sentiments?'' in [[Korenizatsiia#ChulosPiirainen2000|Chulos & Piirainen 2000]], p. 85.</ref> In 1937, [[Faizullah Khojaev]] and [[Akmal Ikramov]] were removed as leaders of the [[Uzbek SSR]], and in 1938, during the [[Trial of the Twenty One|third great Moscow show trial]], convicted and subsequently put to death for alleged anti-Soviet nationalist activities.{{cn|date=August 2024}}
 
After Stalin, an ethnic Georgian, became the undisputed leader of the Soviet Union, the Russian language gained greater emphasis. In 1938, Russian became a required subject of study in every Soviet school, including those in which a non-Russian language was the principal medium of instruction for other subjects (e.g., mathematics, science, and social studies). In 1939, non-Russian languages that [[Latinisation in the Soviet Union|had been given]] Latin-based scripts in the late 1920s [[Cyrillisation in the Soviet Union|were given new scripts]] based on the [[Cyrillic script]].{{cn|date=August 2024}}
 
Before and during World War II, [[Joseph Stalin]] [[Population transfer in the Soviet Union|deported]] to Central Asia and [[Siberia]] many entire nationalities for their alleged and largely disproven [[Collaborationism|collaboration]] with the German invaders: [[Volga German]]s, [[Crimean Tatars]], [[Chechens]], [[Ingush people|Ingush]], [[Balkars]], [[Kalmyks]], and others. Shortly after the war, he deported many [[Ukrainians]], [[Balts]], and [[Estonians]] to Siberia as well.<ref>Robert Conquest, ''The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities'' (London: MacMillan, 1970) ({{ISBN|0-333-10575-3}}); S. Enders Wimbush and Ronald Wixman, "The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in Central Asia," ''Canadian Slavonic Papers'' 27, Nos. 2 and 3 (Summer and Fall, 1975): 320–340; and [[Alexander Nekrich]], ''The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War'' (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978) ({{ISBN|0-393-00068-0}}).</ref>
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An analysis of textbook publishing found that education was offered for at least one year and it was also offered to children who were in at least the first class (grade) in 67 languages between 1934 and 1980.<ref>On the differential and changing roles of Russian and the non-Russian languages in Soviet education over time see Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Equality, Efficiency, and Politics in Soviet Bilingual Education Policy: 1934–1980," ''American Political Science Review'' 78 (December, 1984): 1019–1039.</ref> Educational reforms were undertaken after [[Nikita Khrushchev]] became First Secretary of the Communist Party in the late 1950s and launched a process of replacing non-Russian schools with Russian ones for the nationalities that had lower status in the federal system, the nationalities whose populations were smaller and the nationalities which were already bilingual on a large scale.<ref>Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Soviet Education Laws of 1958–59 and Soviet Nationality Policy," ''[[Soviet Studies]]'' 14 (Oct. 1962): 138–157.</ref> Nominally, this process was guided by the principle of "voluntary parental choice." But other factors also came into play, including the size and formal political status of the group in the Soviet federal hierarchy and the prevailing level of bilingualism among parents.<ref>Brian D. Silver, "The Status of National Minority Languages in Soviet Education: An Assessment of Recent Changes," ''[[Soviet Studies]]'' 26 (Jan. 1974): 28–40; Isabelle Kreindler,"The Changing Status of Russian in the Soviet Union," ''International Journal of the Sociology of Language'' 33 (1982): 7–39; Anderson and Silver (1984).</ref> By the early 1970s schools in which non-Russian languages served as the principal medium of instruction operated in 45 languages, while seven more indigenous languages were taught as subjects of study for at least one class year. By 1980, instruction was offered in 35 non-Russian languages of the peoples of the USSR, just over half the number in the early 1930s.
 
In most of these languages, schooling was not offered for the complete ten-year curriculum. For example, within the [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Russian SFSR]] in 1958–59, full 10-year schooling in the native language was offered in only three languages: Russian, [[Tatar language|Tatar]], and [[Bashkir language|Bashkir]].<ref name="Silver 1974">Silver (1974).</ref> And some nationalities had minimal or no native-language schooling. By 1962–1963, among non-Russian nationalities that were indigenous to the RSFSR, whereas 27% of children in classes I-IV (primary school) studied in Russian-language schools, 53% of those in classes V-VIII (incomplete secondary school) studied in Russian-language schools, and 66% of those in classes IX-X studied in Russian-language schools. Although many non-Russian languages were still offered as a subject of study at a higher class level (in some cases through complete general secondary school – the 10th class), the pattern of using the Russian language as the main medium of instruction accelerated after Khrushchev's parental choice program got underway.{{cn|date=August 2024}}
 
Pressure to convert the main medium of instruction to Russian was evidently higher in urban areas. For example, in 1961–62, reportedly only 6% of [[Volga Tatars|Tatar]] children living in urban areas attended schools in which [[Tatar language|Tatar]] was the main medium of instruction.<ref name="Silver 1974"/> Similarly in [[Dagestan]] in 1965, schools in which the indigenous language was the medium of instruction existed only in rural areas. The pattern was probably similar, if less extreme, in most of the non-Russian [[Republics of the Soviet Union|union republics]], although in Belarus and Ukraine, schooling in urban areas was highly Russianized.<ref>Bilinsky (1962).</ref>
 
==== Rapprochement ====
{{more citations needed section|date=November 2012}}
The promotion of federalism and of non-Russian languages had always been a strategic decision aimed at expanding and maintaining Communist Party rule. On the theoretical plane, the Communist Party's official doctrine was of eventual national differences and nationalities as such would disappear. In official party doctrine as it was reformulated in the Third Program of the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] introduced by [[Nikita Khrushchev]] at the 22nd [[Congress of the CPSU|Party Congress]] in 1961, although the program stated that ethnic distinctions would eventually disappear and a single common language would be adopted by all nationalities in the Soviet Union, "the obliteration of national distinctions, and especially language distinctions, is a considerably more drawn-out process than the obliteration of class distinctions." At the time, Soviet nations and nationalities were further flowering their cultures and drawing together (сближение – sblizhenie) into a stronger union. In his Report on the Program to the Congress, Khrushchev used even stronger language: that the process of further rapprochement (sblizhenie) and greater unity of nations would eventually lead to a merging or fusion (слияние – sliyanie) of nationalities.<ref>Scholars often misattribute the endorsement of "sliyanie" to the Party Program.{{citation needed|date=November 2012}} This word does not appear in the Party Program but only in Khrushchev's Report on the Program (his second speech at the Congress), though it did appear in officially approved literature about nationalities policy in subsequent years.</ref>
 
Khrushchev's formula of rapprochement-fusing was moderated slightly when [[Leonid Brezhnev]] replaced Khrushchev as General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1964 (a post he held until his death in 1982). Brezhnev asserted that rapprochement would lead ultimately to the complete unity of nationalities. "Unity" is an ambiguous term because it can imply either the maintenance of separate national identities but a higher stage of mutual attraction, similarity between nationalities or total disappearance of ethnic differences. In the political context of the time, rapprochement-unity was regarded as a softening of the pressure toward Russification that Khrushchev had promoted with his endorsement of sliyanie.{{cn|date=August 2024}}
 
The 24th Party Congress in 1971 launched the idea that a new "[[Soviet people]]" was forming on the territory of the USSR, a community for which the common language – the language of the "Soviet people" – was the Russian language, consistent with the role that Russian was playing for the fraternal nations and nationalities in the territory already. This new community was labeled a people (народ – ''narod''), not a nation (нация – ''natsiya''), but in that context the Russian word ''narod'' ("people") implied an [[ethnic group|''ethnic'' community]], not just a civic or political community.{{cn|date=August 2024}}
 
Thus, until the end of the Soviet era, doctrinal rationalization had been provided for some of the practical policy steps that were taken in the areas of education and the media. First of all, the transfer of many "national schools" (schools based on local languages) to Russian as a medium of instruction accelerated under Khrushchev in the late 1950s and continued into the 1980s.<ref>See Anderson and Silver (1984). During this period, in most of the non-Russian official regions, the Ministry of Education distributed three main alternative school curricula, for: (1) Russian schools in which all subjects were taught in Russian, except for foreign (non-Soviet) languages; (2) "national schools" in which the native language was used as the main medium of instruction and Russian was taught as a subject of study (which might be termed the traditional national school); and (3) "national schools" in which Russian was the main medium of instruction and the native language was taught only as a separate subject (a new type of "national school" established after the 1958–59 education reforms). There were also some hybrid versions of the latter two types.</ref>
 
Second, the new doctrine was used to justify the special place of the Russian language as the "language of inter-nationality communication" (язык межнационального общения) in the USSR. Use of the term "inter-nationality" (межнациональное) rather than the more conventional "international" (международное) focused on the special ''internal'' role of Russian language rather than on its role as a language of international discourse. That Russian was the most widely spoken language, and that Russians were the majority of the population of the country, were also cited in justification of the special place of the Russian language in government, education, and the media.{{cn|date=August 2024}}
 
At the 27th CPSU Party Congress in 1986, presided over by [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], the 4th Party Program reiterated the formulas of the previous program:
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Progress in the spread of the Russian language as a second language and the gradual displacement of other languages was monitored in Soviet censuses. The Soviet censuses of 1926, 1937, 1939, and 1959, had included questions on "native language" (родной язык) as well as "nationality." The 1970, 1979, and 1989 censuses added to these questions one on "other language of the peoples of the USSR" that an individual could "use fluently" (свободно владеть). It is speculated that the explicit goal of the new question on the "second language" was to monitor the spread of Russian as the language of internationality communication.<ref>Brian D. Silver, "The Ethnic and Language Dimensions in Russian and Soviet Censuses," in Ralph S. Clem, Ed., ''Research Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses'' (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1986): 70–97.</ref>
 
Each of the official homelands within the Soviet Union was regarded as the only homeland of the titular nationality and its language, while the Russian language was regarded as the language for interethnic communication for the whole Soviet Union. Therefore, for most of the Soviet era, especially after the [[korenizatsiya]] (indigenization) policy ended in the 1930s, schools in which non-Russian Soviet languages would be taught were not generally available outside the respective ethnically based administrative units of these ethnicities. Some exceptions appeared to involve cases of historic rivalries or patterns of assimilation between neighboring non-Russian groups, such as between Tatars and Bashkirs in Russia or among major Central Asian nationalities. For example, even in the 1970s schooling was offered in at least seven languages in [[Uzbekistan]]: Russian, [[Uzbek language|Uzbek]], [[Tajik language|Tajik]], [[Kazakh language|Kazakh]], [[Turkmen language|Turkmen]], [[Kyrgyz language|Kyrgyz]], and [[Karakalpak language|Karakalpak]].{{cn|date=August 2024}}
 
While formally all languages were equal, in almost all Soviet republics the Russian/local [[bilingualism]] was "asymmetric": the [[titular nation]] learned Russian, whereas immigrant Russians generally did not learn the local language.{{cn|date=August 2024}}
 
In addition, many non-Russians who lived outside their respective administrative units tended to become Russified linguistically; that is, they not only learned Russian as a second language but they also adopted it as their home language or mother tongue – although some still retained their sense of ''ethnic'' identity or origins even after shifting their native language to Russian. This includes both the traditional communities (e.g., [[Lithuanians]] in the northwestern [[Belarus]] (''see [[Eastern Vilnius region]]'') or the [[Kaliningrad Oblast]] (''see [[Lithuania Minor]]'')) and the communities that appeared during Soviet times such as [[Ukrainians|Ukrainian]] or [[Belarusians|Belarusian]] workers in [[Kazakhstan]] or [[Latvia]], whose children attended primarily the Russian-language schools and thus the further generations are primarily speaking Russian as their native language; for example, 57% of Estonia's Ukrainians, 70% of Estonia's Belarusians and 37% of Estonia's Latvians claimed Russian as the native language in the last Soviet census of 1989. Russian replaced [[Yiddish]] and other languages as the main language of many Jewish communities inside the Soviet Union as well.{{cn|date=August 2024}}
 
Another consequence of the mixing of nationalities and the spread of [[bilingualism]] and linguistic Russification was the growth of ethnic [[interracial marriage|intermarriage]] and a process of ''ethnic'' Russification—coming to call oneself Russian by nationality or ethnicity, not just speaking Russian as a second language or using it as a primary language. In the last decades of the Soviet Union, ethnic Russification (or [[ethnic assimilation]]) was moving very rapidly for a few nationalities such as the [[Karelians]] and [[Mordvinians]].<ref>Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Some Factors in the Linguistic and Ethnic Russification of Soviet Nationalities: Is Everyone Becoming Russian?" in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, Eds., ''The Nationality Factor in Soviet Politics and Society'' (Boulder: Westview, 1990): 95–130.</ref> Whether children born in mixed families to one Russian parent were likely to be raised as Russians depended on the context. For example, the majority of children in North [[Kazakhstan]] with one of each parent chose Russian as their nationality on their internal passport at age 16. Children of mixed Russian and Estonian parents living in [[Tallinn]] (the capital city of [[Estonia]]), or mixed Russian and Latvian parents living in [[Riga]] (the capital of [[Latvia]]), or mixed Russian and Lithuanian parents living in [[Vilnius]] (the capital of [[Lithuania]]) most often chose as their own nationality that of the titular nationality of their republic – not Russian.<ref>For a summary of ethno-linguistic research conducted by Soviet scholars see [[Rasma Kārkliņa]]. 1986. ''Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Perspective from Below'' (Boston and London: Allen & Unwin).</ref>
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=== Finland ===
[[File:Suomineito (Isto).jpg|thumb|''The Attack'' (''Hyökkäys''), an 1899 [[oil painting]] by [[Edvard Isto]] (1899), symbolically depicting the [[Russification of Finland]] as a [[double-headed eagle#Russia|double-headed eagle]].]]
{{Main|Russification of Finland}}
[[File:Suomineito (Isto).jpg|thumb|''The Attack'' (''Hyökkäys''), an 1899 [[oil painting]] by [[Edvard Isto]], depicting the [[Russification of Finland]] as a [[double-headed eagle#Russia|double-headed eagle]].]]
The Russification of Finland (1899–1905, 1908–1917), ''sortokaudet'' ("times of oppression" in [[Finnish language|Finnish]]) was a governmental policy of the [[Russian Empire]] aimed at the termination of Finland's [[Grand Duchy of Finland|autonomy]]. Finnish opposition to Russification was one of the main factors that ultimately led to [[Finland's declaration of independence]] in 1917.
 
=== GermanyEast Prussia ===
InThe 1945, the [[Red Army]] conquered the northernNorthern part of the German province of [[East Prussia]]. It was annexed by the Soviet Union to [[RSFSR]] after [[World War II]] becoming the [[Kaliningrad Oblast]]. While the non-refugeeformer German population was [[Flight and expulsion of Germans (1944–1950)|expelled]] or forcibly [[Forced labor of Germans in the Soviet Union|deported to the Soviet Union for forced labor until 1949]], a systematic settlement of the [[Kaliningrad Oblast]] with Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians took place. Almost all cultural assets reminiscent of the Germans (e.g., churches, castles, palaces, monuments, library collections, drainage systems, etc.) were demolished or left to decay,. andAll all[[German towns,exonyms bodies(Kaliningrad of water, and forestsOblast)|settlements were given names in the Russian language]], the same for bodies of water, forests and other geographical features. Northern East Prussia was completely russifiedRussified.<ref>About the process of Sovietization/Russification, see Andreas Kossert: 'Ostpreußen: Geschichte und Mythos' (East Prussia: History and Myth). Siedler, Munich 2005, ISBN 3-88680-808-4, pp. 331–348.</ref>
 
=== Latvia ===
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=== Ukraine ===
{{Update|date=OctoberAugust 20222024|reason=The 2022 invasion of Ukraine and efforts of russification in annexed territories by Russia in Ukraine|part=Modern Russia}}
{{main|Russification of Ukraine}}
[[File: Валуєвський циркуляр. Valuev Circular.jpg|thumb|The [[Valuev Circular]] of 1863, was designed to eradicate the usage of the [[Ukrainian language]].]]
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A number of Ukrainian activists died by suicide in protest against Russification, including [[Vasyl Makukh]] in 1968 and [[Oleksa Hirnyk]] in 1978.
 
Following the 2014 [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|Russian annexation of Crimea]] and the emergence of [[2014 Donbas status referendums|unrecognized Russian-backed entities]] in Eastern Ukraine, a subtle{{huh|date=August 2024}} form of Russification was initiated, despite these [[Russian language in Ukraine|areas being predominantly Russian-speaking]].<ref>{{Cite web|date=2019-09-15|title=Rights Group: Ukrainian Language Near Banished In Donbas Schools|url=https://www.rferl.org/a/ukrainian-language-donbas-schools/30165052.html|access-date=2021-12-17|website=RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=2019-09-15|title=Портрет электоратов Ющенко и Януковича|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403101945/http://www.analitik.org.ua/researches/archives/3dee44d0/41ecef0cad01e/|access-date=2023-11-27|website=Web Archive|language=ru}}</ref>
 
== See also ==
* [[Derussianization]]
* [[Russification of Ukraine]]
* [[Russification of Belarus]]
* [[Geographical distribution of Russian speakers]]
* [[History of Russia]]
* [[Military history of Russia]]
* [[Territorial evolution of Russia]]
* [[Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality]]
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* [[Slavophilia]]
* [[Population transfer in the Soviet Union]]
* [[Prometheism]]
* [[Citizenship of Russia]]
* [[Rashism]]
* [[Russophilia]]
* [[Russian diaspora]]
* [[Russian imperialism]]
* [[Russian nationalism]]
* [[Soviet people]]
* [[Soviet nationalism]]
* [[Soviet empire]]
* [[Sovietization]]
* [[Colonialism]]
* [[Ems Ukaz]] – 1876 decree banning use of Ukrainian language in Russian Empire