Battle of the Dnieper: Difference between revisions

| date = 26 August 1943 – 23 December 1943<br />({{Age in years, months, weeks and days|month1=08|day1=26|year1=1943|month2=12|day2=23|year2=1943}})<ref>{{cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ed9jDwAAQBAJ&dq=%C2%A0Battle+of+the+Dnieper+december+23&pg=PA41 | title=The Eastern Front: The Germans and Soviets at War in World War II | isbn=978-0-8117-6784-2 | last1=Edwards | first1=Robert | date=15 August 2018 | publisher=Rowman & Littlefield }}</ref>

| combatant2 = {{flagcountry|Nazi Germany}}<br />{{flagcountry|Kingdom of Romania}}<br />{{flagicon|Slovak Republic (1939–1945)|war}} [[Slovak Republic (1939-1945)|Slovakia]]

* [[6th Army (Wehrmacht)|6th Army]]<br/>(until 17 September 1943)

* [[6th Army (Wehrmacht)|6th Army]]<br/> (re-subordinated from 17 September 1943)<ref>Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Eastern Front 1943-1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 356.</ref>

Forczyk:<ref>Forczyk, Robert. The Dnepr 1943: Hitler's Eastern Rampart Crumbles. Osprey Publishing 2016, p. 91.</ref><br/>- 290,000 killed or missing<br/>- 1,000,000+ in total

| casualties2 = {{flagcountryFlagicon|Nazi Germany}} [[Nazi Germany|Germany]]<br> Forczyk:<ref>Forczyk, Robert. The Dnepr 1943: Hitler's Eastern Rampart Crumbles. Osprey Publishing 2016, p. 91.</ref><br>- 102,000 killed or missing<br>- 372,000+ in total<br />{{flagFlagicon|Kingdom of Romania}} [[Kingdom of Romania|Romania]]<br>Unknown

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Faced with such a situation, the Soviet commanders had two options. The first would be to give themselves time to regroup their forces, find a weak point or two to exploit (not necessarily in the lower part of the Dnieper), stage a [[breakthrough (military)|breakthrough]] and encircle the German defenders far in the rear, rendering the defence line unsupplied and next to useless (very much like the German [[Panzer]]s bypassed the [[Maginot line]] in 1940). This option was supported by Marshal [[Georgy Zhukov|Zhukov]] and Deputy Chief of Staff [[Aleksei Antonov]], who considered the substantial losses after the [[Battle of Kursk]]. The second option would be to stage a massive assault without waiting, and force the Dnieper on a broad front. This option left no additional time for the German defenders, but would lead to much larger casualties than would a successful deep operation breakthrough. This second option was backed by Stalin due to the concern that the German "scorched earth" policy might devastate this region if the Red Army did not advance fast enough.

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[[File:CrossingПереправа theдействующих Dnieperчастей Красной Армии через реку Днепр.pngjpg|thumb|[[Soviet Union|Soviet]] soldiers crossing the [[Dnieper River|Dnieper]] on improvised [[raft]]s]]

Stavka detached the [[Central Front (Soviet Union)|Central Front]]'s [[3rd Guards Tank Army (Soviet Union)|3rd Tank Army]] to the [[Voronezh Front]] to race the weakening Germans to the Dnieper, to save the wheat crop from the German scorched earth policy, and to achieve strategic or operational river [[bridgehead]]sbridgeheads before a German defence could stabilize there. The 3rd Tank Army, plunging headlong, reached the river on the night of 21–22 September and, on the 23rd, Soviet infantry forces crossed by swimming and by using makeshift rafts to secure small, fragile bridgeheads, opposed only by 120 German Cherkassy flak academy NCO candidates and the hard-pressed 19th Panzer Division Reconnaissance Battalion. Those forces were the only Germans within 60&nbsp;km of the Dnieper loop. Only a heavy German air attack and a lack of bridging equipment kept Soviet heavy weaponry from crossing and expanding the bridgehead.

The first bridgehead on the Dnieper's western shore was established on 22 September 1943 at the confluence of the Dnieper and [[Pripyat River|Pripyat]] rivers, in the northern part of the front. On 24 September, another bridgehead was created near [[Kamianske|Dniprodzerzhynsk]], another on 25 September near [[Dnipropetrovsk]] and yet another on 28 September near [[Kremenchuk]]. By the end of the month, 23 bridgeheads were created on the western side, some of them 10 kilometers wide and 1–2 kilometres deep.

By mid-October, the forces accumulated on the lower Dnieper bridgeheads were strong enough to stage a first massive attack to definitely secure the river's western shore in the southern part of the front. Therefore, a vigorous attack was staged on the [[Kremenchuk]]-[[Dnipropetrovsk]] line. Simultaneously, a major diversion was conducted in the south to draw German forces away both from the Lower Dnieper and from Kiev.

The Soviet success during this battle created the conditions for the follow-up [[Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive|Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive]] on the [[right-bank Ukraine]], which was launched on 24 December 1943 from a bridgehead west of [[Kiev]] that was secured during this battle.<ref>Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 19.</ref> The offensive brought the Red Army from the [[Dnieper]] all the way to [[Galicia (Eastern Europe)|Galicia]] ([[Poland]]), [[Carpathian Mountains]] and [[Romania]], with [[Army Group South]] being split into two parts- north and south of Carpathians.

:[[Nikopol–Krivoi Rog offensive|Krivoi Rog Offensive]] 14–21 November 1943

:[[Nikopol–Krivoi Rog offensive|Krivoi Rog Offensive]] 10–19 December 1943