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The '''Munich Agreement'''{{efn|name="foreign names"}} was an agreement reached in [[Munich]] on 30 September 1938, by [[Nazi Germany]], the [[United Kingdom
Germany had started a [[Sudetendeutsches Freikorps#Undeclared German–Czechoslovak War|low-intensity undeclared war on Czechoslovakia]] on 17 September 1938. In reaction, Britain and France on 20 September formally requested Czechoslovakia cede the Sudetenland territory to Germany. This was followed by Polish and Hungarian territorial demands brought on 21 and 22 September, respectively. Meanwhile, German forces conquered parts of the [[Cheb District]] and [[Jeseník District]], where local battles included use of German artillery, Czechoslovak tanks, and armored vehicles. Lightly armed German infantry briefly overran other border counties before being repelled. Poland also [[Independent Operational Group Silesia|grouped its army units]] near its common border with Czechoslovakia and conducted an unsuccessful probing offensive on 23 September.<ref name="Goldstein E., Lukes, I." /> Hungary moved its troops towards the border with Czechoslovakia, without attacking. The [[Soviet Union]] announced its willingness to come to Czechoslovakia's assistance, provided that the [[Red Army]] would be able to cross Polish and Romanian territory. Both countries refused to allow the Soviet army to use their territories.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ragsdale |first=Hugh |date=2001 |title=The Butenko Affair: Documents from Soviet-Romanian Relations in the Time of the Purges, Anschluss, and Munich |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4213322 |journal=The Slavonic and East European Review |volume=79 |issue=4 |pages=698–720 |doi=10.1353/see.2001.0004 |jstor=4213322 |issn=0037-6795}}</ref>
An emergency meeting of the main European powers–not including Czechoslovakia, although their representatives were present in the town, or the [[Soviet Union]], an ally to both France and Czechoslovakia–took place in Munich, Germany, on 29–30 September 1938. An agreement was quickly reached on Hitler's terms, and signed by the leaders of Germany, France, Britain, and Italy. The Czechoslovak mountainous borderland marked a natural border between the [[History of the Czech lands|Czech state]] and the Germanic states since the early Middle Ages; it also presented a major natural obstacle to a possible German attack. Strengthened by [[Czechoslovak border fortifications|significant border fortifications]], the Sudetenland was of absolute strategic importance to Czechoslovakia.
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The Munich Agreement was soon followed by the [[First Vienna Award]] on 2 November 1938, separating largely Hungarian inhabited territories in southern Slovakia and southern [[Carpathian Ruthenia|Subcarpathian Rus']] from Czechoslovakia. On 30 November 1938, Czechoslovakia ceded to Poland small patches of land in the [[Spiš]] and [[Orava (region)|Orava]] regions.{{sfn|Jesenský|2014|pp=88–89}}
In March 1939, the [[First Slovak Republic]], a German [[puppet state]], proclaimed its independence. Shortly afterwards, Hitler reneged on his promises to respect the integrity of Czechoslovakia by
Much of Europe celebrated the Munich Agreement, as they considered it a way to prevent a major war on the continent.<ref>{{Cite magazine |date=2019-09-24 |title=What the British and the French Actually Thought About the Decision to Appease Hitler at Munich in 1938 |url=https://time.com/5684506/munich-appeasement/ |access-date=2024-04-29 |magazine=TIME |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2013-09-30 |title=What's the context? 30 September 1938: The Munich Agreement – History of government |url=https://history.blog.gov.uk/2013/09/30/whats-the-context-30-september-1938-the-munich-agreement/ |access-date=2024-04-29 |website=history.blog.gov.uk |language=en}}</ref> [[Adolf Hitler]] announced that it was his last territorial claim in Northern Europe. Today, the Munich Agreement is widely regarded as a failed act of [[appeasement]], and the term has become "a byword for the futility of appeasing [[
==History==
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[[File:Edvard Beneš.jpg|left|thumb|upright|[[Edvard Beneš]], [[president of Czechoslovakia]] and leader of the [[Czechoslovak government-in-exile]]]]
The [[First Czechoslovak Republic]] was created in 1918 after the [[Dissolution of Austria-Hungary|collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire]] at the end of [[World War I]]. The [[Treaty of Saint-Germain]] recognized the independence of Czechoslovakia and the [[Treaty of Trianon]] defined the borders of the new state, which was divided in to the regions of [[Bohemia]] and [[Moravia]] in the west and Slovakia and [[
The Sudeten Germans were not consulted on whether they wished to be citizens of Czechoslovakia. Although the constitution guaranteed equality for all citizens, there was a tendency among political leaders to transform the country "into an instrument of [[Czech nationalism|Czech]] and [[Slovak nationalism]]."<ref>Douglas, R. M. (2012), ''Orderly and Humane'', New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 9</ref> Some progress was made to integrate the Germans and other minorities, but they continued to be underrepresented in the government and the army. Moreover, the Great Depression beginning in 1929 impacted the highly industrialized and export-oriented Sudeten Germans more than it did the Czech and Slovak populations. By 1936, 60 percent of the unemployed people in Czechoslovakia were Germans.<ref>Douglas, pp. 7–12</ref>
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====Sudeten crisis====
{{further|Sudetendeutsches Freikorps}}
As the previous [[appeasement of Hitler]] had shown, France and Britain were intent on avoiding war. The French government did not wish to face Germany alone and took its lead from [[
On 20 May, Hitler presented his generals with a draft plan of attack on Czechoslovakia that was codenamed [[Fall Grün (Czechoslovakia)|Operation Green]].{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 p. 101}} He insisted that he would not "smash Czechoslovakia" militarily without "provocation", "a particularly favourable opportunity" or "adequate political justification."{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 pp. 1001–1002}} On 28 May, Hitler called a meeting of his service chiefs, ordered an acceleration of [[U-boat]] construction and brought forward the construction of his new battleships, ''[[German battleship Bismarck|Bismarck]]'' and ''[[German battleship Tirpitz|Tirpitz]],'' to spring 1940. He demanded that the increase in the firepower of the battleships ''[[German battleship Scharnhorst|Scharnhorst]]'' and ''[[German battleship Gneisenau|Gneisenau]]'' be accelerated.{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 p. 102}} While recognizing that this would still be insufficient for a full-scale [[
On 22 May, [[Juliusz Łukasiewicz]], the Polish ambassador to France, told French Foreign Minister [[Georges Bonnet]] that if France moved against Germany to defend Czechoslovakia, "We shall not move." Łukasiewicz also told Bonnet that Poland would oppose any attempt by Soviet forces to defend Czechoslovakia from Germany. [[Édouard Daladier]] told {{ill|Jakob Surits|ru|Суриц, Яков Захарович|de|Jakow Sacharowitsch Suriz}}, the Soviet ambassador to France, "Not only can we not count on Polish support but we have no faith that Poland will not strike us in the back."<ref name="Paul N. Hehn 2005 89">{{cite book|first=Paul N |last=Hehn| title=A Low, Dishonest Decade: The Great Powers, Eastern Europe and the Economic Origins of World War II, 1930–1941|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=nOALhEZkYDkC&q=%22we+shall+not+move%22 |year=2005|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic|page=89|isbn=9780826417619}}</ref> However, the Polish government indicated multiple times (in March 1936 and May, June and August 1938) that it was prepared to fight Germany if the French decided to help Czechoslovakia: "Beck's proposal to Bonnet, his statements to Ambassador Drexel Biddle, and the statement noted by Vansittart, show that the Polish foreign minister was, indeed, prepared to carry out a radical change of policy if the Western powers decided on war with Germany. However, these proposals and statements did not elicit any reaction from British and French governments that were bent on averting war by appeasing Germany."<ref name="Goldstein E., Lukes, I.">{{Citation
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Hitler's adjutant, [[Fritz Wiedemann]], recalled after the war that he was "very shocked" by Hitler's new plans to attack Britain and France three to four years after "deal[ing] with the situation" in Czechoslovakia.{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 pp. 102–103}} General [[Ludwig Beck]], chief of the [[German general staff]], noted that Hitler's change of heart in favour of quick action was because Czechoslovak defences were still being improvised, which would no longer be the case two to three years later, and [[British rearmament]] would not come into effect until 1941 or 1942.{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 p. 104}} General [[Alfred Jodl]] noted in his diary that the partial Czechoslovak mobilization of 21 May had led Hitler to issue a new order for Operation Green on 30 May and that it was accompanied by a covering letter from [[Wilhelm Keitel]] that stated that the plan must be implemented by 1 October at the very latest.{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 p. 104}}
In the meantime, the British government demanded that Beneš [[Runciman Mission|request a mediator]]. Not wishing to sever his government's ties with [[Western Europe]], Beneš reluctantly accepted. The British appointed [[
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H12478, Obersalzberg, Münchener Abkommen, Vorbereitung.jpg|thumb|upright=1|Hitler greeting Chamberlain on the steps of the Berghof, 15 September 1938]]
On 12 September, Hitler made a speech at a [[Nuremberg rallies|Nazi Party rally in Nuremberg]] on the Sudeten crisis condemning the actions of the government of Czechoslovakia.<ref name="Eleanor L. Turk 1999. Pp. 123"/> Hitler denounced Czechoslovakia as being a fraudulent state that was in violation of international law's emphasis of national [[self-determination]], claiming it was a Czech hegemony although the [[Germans]], the [[Slovaks]], the [[Hungarians]], the [[Ukrainians]] and the [[Polish people|Poles]] of the country actually wanted to be in a union with the Czechs.<ref name="Adolf Hitler 2007. Pp. 626">Adolf Hitler, [[Max Domarus]]. ''The Essential Hitler: Speeches and Commentary''. Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2007. {{ISBN|9780865166271}}. p. 626.</ref> Hitler accused Beneš of seeking to gradually exterminate the Sudeten Germans and claimed that since Czechoslovakia's creation, over 600,000 Germans had been intentionally forced out of their homes under the threat of starvation if they did not leave.<ref name="Adolf Hitler 2007. Pp. 627">Adolf Hitler, Max Domarus. ''The Essential Hitler: Speeches and Commentary''. Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2007. {{ISBN|9780865166271}}. p. 627.</ref> He alleged that Beneš's government was persecuting Germans along with Hungarians, Poles, and Slovaks and accused Beneš of threatening the nationalities with being branded traitors if they were not loyal to the country.<ref name="Adolf Hitler 2007. Pp. 626" /> He stated that he, as the head of state of Germany, would support the right of the self-determination of fellow Germans in the Sudetenland.<ref name="Adolf Hitler 2007. Pp. 626" /> He condemned Beneš for his government's recent execution of several German protesters.<ref name="Adolf Hitler 2007. Pp. 626" /> He accused Beneš of being belligerent and threatening behaviour towards Germany which, if war broke out, would result in Beneš forcing Sudeten Germans to fight against their will against Germans from Germany.<ref name="Adolf Hitler 2007. Pp. 626" /> Hitler accused the government of Czechoslovakia of being a [[
===Berchtesgaden meeting===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1976-063-32, Bad Godesberg, Münchener Abkommen, Vorbereitung.jpg|left|thumb|Chamberlain greeted by Hitler at the beginning of the Bad Godesberg meeting on 24 September 1938]]
On 13 September, after internal violence and disruption in Czechoslovakia ensued, Chamberlain asked Hitler for a personal meeting to find a solution to avert a war.{{sfn|Bell|1986|p=239}} Chamberlain decided to do this after conferring with his advisors [[
After the meeting, Daladier flew to London on 16 September to meet with British officials to discuss a course of action.<ref>Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. {{ISBN|9781929631421}}. pp. 71–72.</ref> The situation in Czechoslovakia became tenser that day, with the Czechoslovak government issuing an arrest warrant for Henlein, who had arrived in Germany a day earlier to take part in the negotiations.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72">Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. {{ISBN|9781929631421}}. p. 72.</ref> The French proposals ranged from waging war against Germany to supporting the Sudetenland being ceded to Germany.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> The discussions ended with a firm British-French plan in place.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Britain and France demanded that Czechoslovakia cede to Germany all territories in which the German population represented over 50% of the Sudetenland's total population.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> In exchange for that concession, Britain and France would guarantee the independence of Czechoslovakia.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Czechoslovakia rejected the proposed solution.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" />
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[[File:Čs. vojáci v Krásné Lípě.gif|thumb|Czechoslovak Army soldiers on patrol in the Sudetenland in September 1938]]
On 17 September 1938 Hitler ordered the establishment of ''[[Sudetendeutsches Freikorps]]'', a [[
| last = Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic
| year = 1997
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On 18 September, Italy's ''[[Duce]]'' [[Benito Mussolini]] made a speech in [[Trieste]], Italy, where he declared "If there are two camps, for and against Prague, let it be known that Italy has chosen its side", with the clear implication being that Mussolini supported Germany in the crisis.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 71" />
On 20 September, [[German resistance to Nazism|German opponents]] within the military met to discuss the final plans of a plot they had developed to overthrow the Nazi regime. The meeting was led by General [[Hans Oster]], the deputy head of the ''[[Abwehr]]'' (Germany's [[
Later in the meeting, a deception was undertaken to influence and put pressure on Chamberlain: one of Hitler's aides entered the room to inform Hitler of more Germans being killed in Czechoslovakia, to which Hitler screamed in response "I will avenge every one of them. The Czechs must be destroyed."<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> The meeting ended with Hitler refusing to make any concessions to the Allies' demands.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Later that evening, Hitler grew worried that he had gone too far in pressuring Chamberlain, and telephoned Chamberlain's hotel suite, saying that he would accept annexing only the Sudetenland, with no designs on other territories, provided that Czechoslovakia begin the evacuation of ethnic Czechs from the German majority territories by 26 September at 8:00am. After being pressed by Chamberlain, Hitler agreed to have the ultimatum set for 1 October (the same date that Operation Green was set to begin).<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73">Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. {{ISBN|9781929631421}}. p. 73.</ref> Hitler then said to Chamberlain that this was one concession that he was willing to make to the Prime Minister as a "gift" out of respect for the fact that Chamberlain had been willing to back down somewhat on his earlier position.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> Hitler went on to say that upon annexing the Sudetenland, Germany would hold no further territorial claims upon Czechoslovakia and would enter into a collective agreement to guarantee the borders of Germany and Czechoslovakia.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/>
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A new Czechoslovak cabinet, under General [[Jan Syrový]], was installed and on 23 September a decree of general mobilization was issued which was accepted by the public with a strong enthusiasm – within 24 hours, one million men joined the army to defend the country. The [[Czechoslovak Army]], modern, experienced and possessing an excellent [[Czechoslovak border fortifications|system of frontier fortifications]], was prepared to fight. The [[Soviet Union]] announced its willingness to come to Czechoslovakia's assistance, provided that the [[Red Army]] would be able to cross Polish and Romanian territory. Both countries refused to allow the Soviet army to use their territories.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930–33. The Impact of the Depression|last=Haslam|first=Jonathan|publisher=St. Martin's Press|year=1983|location=New York}}</ref>
In the early hours of 24 September, Hitler issued the [[Godesberg Memorandum]], which demanded that Czechoslovakia cede the Sudetenland to Germany no later than 28 September, with plebiscites to be held in unspecified areas under the supervision of German and Czechoslovak forces. The memorandum also stated that if Czechoslovakia did not agree to the German demands by 2 pm on 28 September, Germany would take the Sudetenland by force. On the same day, Chamberlain returned to Britain and announced that Hitler demanded the annexation of the Sudetenland without delay.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> The announcement enraged those in Britain and France who wanted to confront Hitler once and for all, even if it meant war, and its supporters gained strength.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> The Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United Kingdom, [[Jan Masaryk]], was elated upon hearing of the support for Czechoslovakia from British and French opponents of Hitler's plans, saying "The nation of [[
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R99301, Münchener Abkommen, Chamberlain, Mussolini, Ciano.jpg|left|thumb|Chamberlain with Benito Mussolini, September 1938]]
On 25 September, Czechoslovakia agreed to the conditions previously agreed upon by Britain, France, and Germany. The next day, however, Hitler added new demands, insisting that the claims of ethnic [[Germans in Poland]] and [[Germans in Hungary|Hungary]] also be satisfied.
On 26 September, Chamberlain sent [[
On 27 September 1938, when negotiations between Hitler and Chamberlain were strained, Chamberlain addressed the British people, saying, in particular: "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing."<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.historyguide.org/europe/munich.html|title=Neville Chamberlin on "Appeasement" (1939)|website=www.historyguide.org}}</ref>
On 28 September at 10:00 am, four hours before the deadline and with no agreement to Hitler's demand by Czechoslovakia, the British ambassador to Italy, [[Eric Drummond, 7th Earl of Perth|Lord Perth]], called Italy's Foreign Minister [[Galeazzo Ciano]] to request an urgent meeting.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> Perth informed Ciano that Chamberlain had instructed him to request that Mussolini enter the negotiations and urge Hitler to delay the ultimatum.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> At 11:00 am, Ciano met Mussolini and informed him of Chamberlain's proposition; Mussolini agreed with it and responded by telephoning Italy's ambassador to Germany and told him "Go to the Fuhrer at once, and tell him that whatever happens, I will be at his side, but that I request a twenty-four-hour delay before hostilities begin. In the meantime, I will study what can be done to solve the problem."<ref>Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. {{ISBN|9781929631421}}. pp. 73–74.</ref> Hitler received Mussolini's message while in discussions with the French ambassador. Hitler
===Resolution===
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3. Border areas (southern third of Slovakia and southern [[Carpathian Ruthenia]]) with Hungarian minorities became part of Hungary in accordance with the [[First Vienna Award]] (November 1938).<br />
4. On 15 March 1939, during the German invasion of the remaining Czech territories, Hungary annexes the remainder of [[Carpathian Ruthenia]] (which had been autonomous since October 1938).<br />
5. Germany establishes the [[Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia]] with a [[puppet government]], on 16 March 1939.<br /> 6. On 14 March 1939, a pro-Hitler [[
[[File:MunichAgreement.jpg|left|thumb|British Prime Minister [[Neville Chamberlain]] after landing at [[Heston Aerodrome]] following his meeting with [[Adolf Hitler]]]]
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Hitler felt cheated of the limited war against the Czechs which he had been aiming for all summer.<ref>Ian Kershaw, ''Hitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis'' (London: Penguin, 2001), pp. 122–123.</ref> In early October, Chamberlain's press secretary asked for a public declaration of German friendship with Britain to strengthen Chamberlain's domestic position; Hitler instead delivered speeches denouncing Chamberlain's "governessy interference."<ref>Robert Self, ''Neville Chamberlain'' (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 344.</ref> In August 1939, shortly before the invasion of Poland, Hitler told his generals: "Our enemies are men below average, not men of action, not masters. They are little worms. I saw them at Munich."<ref>John W. Wheeler-Bennett, ''The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918–1945'' (London: Macmillan, 1964), p. 447.</ref>
Before the Munich Agreement, Hitler's determination to invade Czechoslovakia on 1 October 1938 had provoked a major crisis in the German command structure. The Chief of the General Staff, General Ludwig Beck, protested in a lengthy series of memos that it would start a [[world war]] that Germany would lose, and urged Hitler to put off the projected conflict. Hitler called Beck's arguments against war "''kindische Kräfteberechnungen''" ("childish force calculations"). On 4 August 1938, a secret Army meeting was held. Beck read his lengthy report to the assembled officers. They all agreed something had to be done to prevent certain disaster. Beck hoped they would all resign together but no one resigned except Beck. His replacement, General [[Franz Halder]], sympathized with Beck and they both conspired with several top generals, Admiral [[Wilhelm Canaris]] (Chief of German Intelligence) and [[
===== Britain and France =====
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=====Poland=====
[[File:Polish Army capturing Zaolzie in 1938.PNG|left|thumb|The Polish Army entering Trans-Olza in 1938]]
Poland was building up a secret Polish organization in the area of [[Trans-Olza]] from 1935.{{sfn|Goldstein|Lukes|1999|p=122}} In summer 1938, Poland tried to organize guerrilla groups in the area.{{sfn|Goldstein|Lukes|1999|p=122}} On 21 September, Poland officially requested a direct transfer of the area to its own control. Polish envoy to Prague [[Kazimierz Papée]] marked that the return of [[Cieszyn Silesia]] will be a sign of a goodwill and the "redress of injustice" of 1920.{{sfn|Jesenský|2014|p=82}} Similar notes were sent to Paris and London with a request that Polish minority in Czechoslovakia should gain the same rights as Sudeten Germans.{{sfn|Rak|2019|p=405}} On the next day Beneš send a letter to Polish president [[Ignacy Mościcki]] with a promise of "border's rectification", but the letter was delivered only on 26 September.{{sfn|Kornat|2012|p=157}} The answer of Mościcki delivered on 27 September was evasive, but it was accompanied with the demand of Polish government to hand over two Trans-Olza counties immediately, as a prelude to ultimate settlement of the border dispute.{{sfn|Majewski|
Polish diplomatic actions were accompanied by placing army along the Czechoslovak border on 23–24 September and by giving an order to the so-called "battle units" of Trans-Olza Poles and the "Trans-Olza Legion", a paramilitary organisation that was made up of volunteers from all over Poland, to cross the border to Czechoslovakia and attack Czechoslovak units.{{sfn|Goldstein|Lukes|1999|p=122}} The few who crossed, however, were repulsed by Czechoslovak forces and retreated to Poland.{{sfn|Goldstein|Lukes|1999|p=122}}
The Polish ambassador in Germany learned about the results of Munich Conference on 30 September from [[
The historian [[Dariusz Baliszewski]] wrote that during the annexation there was no co-operation between Polish and German troops, but there were cases of co-operation between Polish and Czech troops defending territory against Germans, for example in [[Bohumín]].<ref name="Baliszewski">{{Cite web|last=Baliszewski|first=Mariusz|title=Prawda o Zaolziu – Uważam Rze Historia|url=https://historia.uwazamrze.pl/artykul/1149147/prawda-o-zaolziu|access-date=2019-10-12|website=historia.uwazamrze.pl|language=pl}}</ref>
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[[Joseph Stalin]] was upset by the results of the Munich conference. On 2 May 1935, France and the Soviet Union signed the [[Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance]] with the aim of containing Nazi Germany's aggression.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Jabara Carley |first1=Michael |title=Who Betrayed Whom? Franco-Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1932–1939 |url=https://www.webdepot.umontreal.ca/Usagers/carleym/MonDepotPublic/Carley%27s%20Web%20site/Carley_Berlin_2014.pdf |publisher=Université de Montréal}}</ref> The Soviets, who had a mutual military assistance treaty with Czechoslovakia, felt betrayed by France, which also had a [[Little Entente|mutual military assistance treaty with Czechoslovakia]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Franco-Czech Treaty |url=http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,717350,00.html |magazine=Time |date=7 January 1924}}</ref> The British and French mostly used the Soviets as a threat to dangle over the Germans. Stalin concluded that the West had colluded with Hitler to hand over a country in [[Central Europe]] to the Germans, causing concern that they might do the same to the Soviet Union in the future to allow its partition between the western nations. This belief led the Soviet Union to reorient its foreign policy towards a [[rapprochement]] with Germany, which eventually led to the signing of the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact]] in 1939.{{sfn|Hildebrand|1991}}
In 1938, the Soviet Union was allied with France and Czechoslovakia. By September 1939, the Soviets were to all intents and purposes a [[
===== Elsewhere =====
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In his [[The Second World War (book series)|postwar memoirs]], Churchill, an opponent of appeasement, lumped Poland and Hungary, both of which subsequently annexed parts of Czechoslovakia containing Poles and Hungarians, with Germany as "vultures upon the carcass of Czechoslovakia."<ref name="Winston S. Churchill 2002 290">{{cite book |first=Winston S |last=Churchill |title=The Second World War |volume=1: The Gathering Storm |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Daxn4IOTqC4C&pg=PA290 |year=2002|publisher=RosettaBooks LLC |pages=289–290 |isbn=9780795308321}}</ref>
The American historian [[William L. Shirer]], in his ''[[The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich]]'' (1960), took the view that although Hitler was not bluffing about his intention to invade, Czechoslovakia could have offered significant resistance. Shirer believed that Britain and France had enough [[
===Consequences===
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In early November 1938, under the First Vienna Award, after the failed negotiations between Czechoslovakia and [[Kingdom of Hungary (1920–1946)|Hungary]], as a recommendation to settle the territorial disputes by the appendix of the Munich Agreement, the German-Italian arbitration required Czechoslovakia to cede southern Slovakia to Hungary, and Poland independently gained small territorial cessions shortly afterward (Trans-Olza).<ref>Anthony Komjathy, "The First Vienna Award (November 2, 1938)." ''Austrian History Yearbook'' 15 (1979): 130–156.</ref>
Bohemia, Moravia and [[Czech Silesia|Silesia]] lost about 38% of their combined area to Germany, with some 2.8 million German and 513,000 to 750,000<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.bruntal.net/2007072602-k-otazce-vysidleni-obcanu-csr-ze-sudet-tesinska-podkarpatske-rusi-a-slovenske-republiky-v-letech-1938-1939 |title=K otázce vysídlení občanů ČSR ze Sudet, Těšínska, Podkarpatské Rusi a Slovenské republiky v letech 1938/1939 |access-date=2 December 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://archive.today/20141202131759/http://www.bruntal.net/2007072602-k-otazce-vysidleni-obcanu-csr-ze-sudet-tesinska-podkarpatske-rusi-a-slovenske-republiky-v-letech-1938-1939 |archive-date=2 December 2014}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.bohumildolezal.cz/texty/u074-08.htm|title=Fakta o vyhnání Čechů ze Sudet|website=bohumildolezal.cz|access-date=20 July 2019}}</ref> [[Czechs|Czech]] inhabitants. Hungary, in turn, received {{convert|11882|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} in southern Slovakia and southern [[Carpathian Ruthenia]]. According to a 1941 census, about 86.5% of the population in the territory was [[Hungarian people|Hungarian]]. Slovakia lost {{convert|10390|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} and 854,218 inhabitants for Hungary (according to a Czechoslovak 1930 census about 59% were Hungarians and 32% were [[
Soon after Munich, 115,000 Czechs and 30,000 Germans fled to the [[Rump state|rump]] of Czechoslovakia. According to the Institute for Refugee Assistance, the actual count of refugees on 1 March 1939 stood at almost 150,000.<ref>[http://www.radio.cz/en/article/46238 Forced displacement of Czech population under Nazis in 1938 and 1943], [[Radio Prague]]</ref>
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{{main|German occupation of Czechoslovakia}}
In 1937, the ''[[Wehrmacht]]'' had formulated a plan, "Operation Green" (''Fall Grün'') for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was implemented shortly after the proclamation of the [[
By seizing Bohemia and Moravia, Nazi Germany gained all of the skilled labour force and heavy industry located there as well as all the weapons of the Czechoslovak Army. During the 1940 [[Battle of France]], roughly 25% of all German weapons came from the protectorate. Nazi Germany also gained all of the Czechoslovakia's gold treasure, including gold stored in the [[Bank of England]]. Of a total 227 tons of gold found after the war in salt mines, only 18.4 tons were returned to Czechoslovakia in 1982, but most of it came from Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was also forced to "sell" war material to the ''Wehrmacht'' for 648 million of prewar [[Czechoslovak koruna]], a debt that was never repaid.<ref>David Blaazer, "Finance and the end of appeasement: the Bank of England, the National Government and the Czech gold." ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 40.1 (2005): 25–39.</ref>
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-2004-1202-505, Prag, Burg, Besuch Adolf Hitler.jpg|left|thumb|Adolf Hitler on his visit to [[Prague Castle]] after the establishment of a German [[Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia|protectorate]], 15 March 1939]]
Chamberlain claimed the Prague annexation was a "completely different category" that moved [[Second Thirty Years War#The move beyond legitimate Versailles grievances, 1938-9|beyond the legitimate Versailles grievances]].<ref>McDonough, 2002, p. 73</ref> Meanwhile, concerns arose in Britain that Poland, which was now encircled by many German possessions, would become the next target of Nazi expansionism. That was made apparent by the dispute over the [[Polish Corridor]] and the [[Free City of Danzig]] and resulted in the signing of an [[Anglo-Polish military alliance]]. That made the Polish government refuse to accept German negotiation proposals over the Polish Corridor and the status of Danzig.<ref>Władysław W. Kulski, "The Anglo-Polish Agreement of August 25, 1939", ''The Polish Review,'' (1976) 21 (1/2): 23–40.</ref> Chamberlain felt betrayed by the Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia, realized that his policy of appeasement towards Hitler had failed and so began to take a much harder line against Germany. He immediately began to mobilize the British armed forces to a war footing, and France did the same. Italy saw itself threatened by the British and French fleets and started its own [[
==== Strengthening of Wehrmacht armaments ====
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=="Ghost of Munich"==
In the United States and the United Kingdom, the words "Munich" and "appeasement" are frequently invoked when demanding forthright, often military, action to resolve an international crisis and characterising a political opponent who condemns negotiation as weakness.<ref>{{cite book|author=Yuen Foong Khong|title=Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0irZ8O6jJt4C|year=1992|publisher=Princeton UP|pages=4–7|isbn=0691025355}}</ref> In 1950, US President [[Harry Truman]] invoked "Munich" to justify his military action in the [[Korean War]]: "The world learned from Munich that security cannot be bought by appeasement."<ref>[http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/The-Munich-Analogy-The-korean-war.html "The Munich Analogy: The Korean War"], ''Encyclopedia of the New American Nation''. Retrieved 11 January 2018.</ref> Many later crises were accompanied by cries of "Munich" from politicians and the media. In 1960, the [[Conservatism in the United States|conservative]] US Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] used "Munich" to describe a domestic political issue by saying that an attempt by the [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican Party]] to appeal to [[Liberalism in the United States|liberals]] was "the Munich of the Republican Party."<ref>{{cite news | title=The Conservative 1960s | date=December 1995 | magazine=The Atlantic | page=6 | first=Matthew | last=Dallek | url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1995/12/the-conservative-1960s/376506/ | access-date=5 September 2020 }}</ref> In 1962, General [[Curtis LeMay]] told US President [[John F. Kennedy]] that his refusal to bomb [[Cuba]] during the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] was "almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich", a pointed barb given that his father [[Joseph P. Kennedy Sr.]] had supported appeasement in general in his capacity as Ambassador to Britain.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Dobbs|first=Michael|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/608213334|title=One minute to midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the brink of nuclear war|date=2008|publisher=Alfred A. Knopf|isbn=9780307269362|edition=1st|location=New York|oclc=608213334}}</ref><ref>Wheatcroft, Geoffrey (3 December 2013), [https://newrepublic.com/article/115803/munich-analogies-are-inaccurate-cliched-and-dangerous "On the Use and Abuse of Munich"]. Retrieved 11 January 2018</ref> In 1965, US President [[Lyndon Johnson]], in justifying increased military action in [[Vietnam War|Vietnam]], stated, "We learned from Hitler and Munich that success only feeds the appetite for aggression."<ref name="auto2">Logevall and Osgood (2010).</ref>
Citing Munich in debates on foreign policy has continued to be common in the 21st century.<ref>Jeffrey Record (2002), ''Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo''</ref> During negotiations for the [[
"Munich and appeasement", in the words of scholars [[Fredrik
The [[
==See also==
* [[Causes of World War II]]
* [[Lesson of Munich]]
* [[European foreign policy of the Chamberlain ministry]]
* [[Treaty of Prague (1973)]]
* [[Expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia]]
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* {{Cite book |last=Majewski |first=Piotr M. |title=Kiedy wybuchnie wojna? 1938. Studium kryzysu |date=2019 |publisher=[[Krytyka Polityczna]] |isbn=9788366232419 |location=Warsaw |language=pl |trans-title=When will the war break out? 1938: A study of the crisis}}
* {{cite book
|last=Maugham
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* Riggs, Bruce Timothy. [https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc278388/m2/1/high_res_d/1002720956-riggs.pdf "Geoffrey Dawson, editor of "The Times" (London), and his contribution to the appeasement movement" (PhD dissertation, U of North Texas, 1993 online)], bibliography pp 229–233.
* Ripsman, Norrin M. and Jack S. Levy. 2008. "[https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.148 Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s]." ''International Security'' 33(2): 148–181.
* Smetana, Vít. "Ten propositions about Munich 1938. On the fateful event of Czech and European history{{snd}}without legends and national stereotypes." ''Czech Journal of Contemporary History'' 7.7 (2019): 5–14. [http://sd.usd.cas.cz/pdfs/sod/2019/11/01.pdf online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220319141012/http://sd.usd.cas.cz/pdfs/sod/2019/11/01.pdf |date=19 March 2022 }}
* Thomas, Martin. "France and the Czechoslovak crisis." ''Diplomacy and Statecraft'' 10.23 (1999): 122–159.
* Watt, Donald Cameron. ''How war came: the immediate origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939'' (1989) [[iarchive:howwarcameimmedi00dona|online free to borrow]]
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{{commons|Munich Agreement}}
* [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/munich1.asp The Munich Agreement] – Text of the Munich Agreement on-line
* [http://www.otr.com/munich.shtml The Munich Agreement in contemporary radio news broadcasts] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110524211711/http://www.otr.com/munich.shtml |date=24 May 2011 }} – Actual radio news broadcasts documenting evolution of the crisis
* [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/system/topicRoot/The_Munich_Agreement_/ The Munich Agreement] Original reports from The Times
* [http://www.britishpathe.com/record.php?id=49806 British Pathe newsreel (includes Chamberlain's speech at Heston aerodrome)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110708095933/http://www.britishpathe.com/record.php?id=49806 |date=8 July 2011 }} ([[Adobe Flash]])
* [http://www.otr.com/peace.html Peace: And the Crisis Begins] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110715020727/http://www.otr.com/peace.html |date=15 July 2011 }} from a broadcast by Dorothy Thompson, 1 October 1938
* [http://airminded.org/archives/sudeten-crisis/ Post-blogging the Sudeten Crisis] – A day by day summary of the crisis
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20120928233832/http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/treaties/TS1/1942/3 Text of the 1942 exchange of notes nullifying the Munich agreement]
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