Munich Agreement: Difference between revisions

The '''Munich Agreement'''{{efn|name="foreign names"}} was an agreement reached in [[Munich]] on 30 September 1938, by [[Nazi Germany]], the [[United Kingdom|Great Britain]], the [[French Third Republic|French Republic]], and [[Fascist Italy]]. The agreement provided for the [[German occupationOccupation of Czechoslovakia (1938–1945)|German annexation]] of part of [[Czechoslovakia]] called the [[Sudetenland]], where more than three million people, mainly [[Sudeten Germans|ethnic Germans]], lived.<ref>see the text at [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/munich1.asp "Munich Pact September 30, 1938"]</ref> The pact is also known in some areas as the '''Munich Betrayal''' ({{lang-cs|Mnichovská zrada}}; {{lang-sk|Mníchovská zrada}}), because of a previous 1924 alliance agreement<ref>Text in ''League of Nations Treaty Series'', 1924 [https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2023/v23.pdf "vol. 23"], pp. 164–169.</ref> and a 1925 military pact between France and the Czechoslovak Republic.

Germany had started a [[Sudetendeutsches Freikorps#Undeclared German–Czechoslovak War|low-intensity undeclared war on Czechoslovakia]] on 17 September 1938. In reaction, Britain and France on 20 September formally requested Czechoslovakia cede the Sudetenland territory to Germany. This was followed by Polish and Hungarian territorial demands brought on 21 and 22 September, respectively. Meanwhile, German forces conquered parts of the [[Cheb District]] and [[Jeseník District]], where local battles included use of German artillery, Czechoslovak tanks, and armored vehicles. Lightly armed German infantry briefly overran other border counties before being repelled. Poland also [[Independent Operational Group Silesia|grouped its army units]] near its common border with Czechoslovakia and conducted an unsuccessful probing offensive on 23 September.<ref name="Goldstein E., Lukes, I." /> Hungary moved its troops towards the border with Czechoslovakia, without attacking. The [[Soviet Union]] announced its willingness to come to Czechoslovakia's assistance, provided that the [[Red Army]] would be able to cross Polish and Romanian territory. Both countries refused to allow the Soviet army to use their territories.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ragsdale |first=Hugh |date=2001 |title=The Butenko Affair: Documents from Soviet-Romanian Relations in the Time of the Purges, Anschluss, and Munich |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4213322 |journal=The Slavonic and East European Review |volume=79 |issue=4 |pages=698–720 |doi=10.1353/see.2001.0004 |jstor=4213322 |issn=0037-6795}}</ref>{{Dubious|Suggested Improvement|date=April 2024|reason=improved sourced implemented. Suggest this tag be removed.}}

In March 1939, the [[First Slovak Republic]], a German [[puppet state]], proclaimed its independence. Shortly afterwards, Hitler reneged on his promises to respect the integrity of Czechoslovakia by invadingoccupying Czechiathe andremainder turningof itthe intocountry and creating the [[Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia]], giving Germany full control of what remained of Czechoslovakia. As a result, Czechoslovakia had disappeared.<ref>{{Cite web |last=office |first=Kafkadesk Prague |date=2021-03-14 |title=On this Day, in 1939: Slovakia declared its independence to side with Nazi Germany – Kafkadesk |url=https://kafkadesk.org/2021/03/14/on-this-day-in-1939-slovakia-declared-its-independence-to-side-with-nazi-germany/ |access-date=2021-10-04 |website=kafkadesk.org |language=en-GB}}</ref> The conquered nation's significant military arsenal played an important role in Germany's invasions of Poland and France in 1939 and 1940.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://joern.de/hoedl.htm#Hitler|title=Hoedl-Memoiren|website=joern.de|access-date=20 July 2019}}</ref>

Much of Europe celebrated the Munich Agreement, as they considered it a way to prevent a major war on the continent.<ref>{{Cite magazine |date=2019-09-24 |title=What the British and the French Actually Thought About the Decision to Appease Hitler at Munich in 1938 |url=https://time.com/5684506/munich-appeasement/ |access-date=2024-04-29 |magazine=TIME |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2013-09-30 |title=What's the context? 30 September 1938: The Munich Agreement – History of government |url=https://history.blog.gov.uk/2013/09/30/whats-the-context-30-september-1938-the-munich-agreement/ |access-date=2024-04-29 |website=history.blog.gov.uk |language=en}}</ref> [[Adolf Hitler]] announced that it was his last territorial claim in Northern Europe. Today, the Munich Agreement is widely regarded as a failed act of [[appeasement]], and the term has become "a byword for the futility of appeasing [[Expansionism|expansionist]] totalitarian states."<ref>[https://www.britannica.com/event/Munich-Agreement "Munich Agreement"], ''Encyclopædia Britannica''. Retrieved 6 August 2018.</ref>

The [[First Czechoslovak Republic]] was created in 1918 after the [[Dissolution of Austria-Hungary|collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire]] at the end of [[World War I]]. The [[Treaty of Saint-Germain]] recognized the independence of Czechoslovakia and the [[Treaty of Trianon]] defined the borders of the new state, which was divided in to the regions of [[Bohemia]] and [[Moravia]] in the west and Slovakia and [[Carpathian Ruthenia#Subcarpathian Rus' (1928–1938)|Subcarpathian Rus']] in the east, including more than three million Germans, 22.95% of the total population of the country. They lived mostly in border regions of the historical [[Czech Lands]] for which they coined the new name [[Sudetenland]], which bordered on [[Weimar Republic|Germany]] and the newly created country of [[First Austrian Republic|Austria]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Glassheim |first=Eagle |url=https://www.worldcat.org/title/951158062 |title=Cleansing the Czechoslovak borderlands: migration, environment, and health in the former Sudetenland |date=2016 |publisher=University of Pittsburgh Press |isbn=978-0-8229-6426-1 |series=Pitt series in Russian and East European studies |location=Pittsburgh, Pa |oclc=951158062}}</ref>

As the previous [[appeasement of Hitler]] had shown, France and Britain were intent on avoiding war. The French government did not wish to face Germany alone and took its lead from [[British Conservative Party|British Conservative]] government of Prime Minister [[Neville Chamberlain]]. He considered the Sudeten German grievances justified and believed Hitler's intentions to be limited. Both Britain and France, therefore, advised Czechoslovakia to accede to Germany's demands. Beneš resisted and, on 19 May, initiated a partial [[mobilization]] in response to a possible German invasion.{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=Vol. 3|p=102}}

On 20 May, Hitler presented his generals with a draft plan of attack on Czechoslovakia that was codenamed [[Fall Grün (Czechoslovakia)|Operation Green]].{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 p. 101}} He insisted that he would not "smash Czechoslovakia" militarily without "provocation", "a particularly favourable opportunity" or "adequate political justification."{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 pp. 1001–1002}} On 28 May, Hitler called a meeting of his service chiefs, ordered an acceleration of [[U-boat]] construction and brought forward the construction of his new battleships, ''[[German battleship Bismarck|Bismarck]]'' and ''[[German battleship Tirpitz|Tirpitz]],'' to spring 1940. He demanded that the increase in the firepower of the battleships ''[[German battleship Scharnhorst|Scharnhorst]]'' and ''[[German battleship Gneisenau|Gneisenau]]'' be accelerated.{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 p. 102}} While recognizing that this would still be insufficient for a full-scale [[Naval warfare|naval war]] with Britain, Hitler hoped it would be a sufficient deterrent.{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 p. 104}} Ten days later, Hitler signed a secret directive for war against Czechoslovakia to begin no later than 1 October.{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 p. 102}}

In the meantime, the British government demanded that Beneš [[Runciman Mission|request a mediator]]. Not wishing to sever his government's ties with [[Western Europe]], Beneš reluctantly accepted. The British appointed [[Walter Runciman, 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford|Lord Runciman]], a former [[Liberal Party (UK)|Liberal]] cabinet minister, who arrived in Prague on 3 August with instructions to persuade Beneš to agree to a plan acceptable to the Sudeten Germans.{{sfn|Bell|1986|p=238}} On 20 July, Bonnet told the Czechoslovak ambassador in Paris that while France would declare its support in public to help the Czechoslovak negotiations, it was not prepared to go to war over Sudetenland.{{sfn|Bell|1986|p=238}} In August, the German press was full of stories alleging Czechoslovak atrocities against Sudeten Germans, with the intention of forcing the West into putting pressure on the Czechoslovaks to make concessions.{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 2 p. 201}} Hitler hoped that the Czechoslovaks would refuse and that the West would then feel morally justified in leaving the Czechoslovaks to their fate.{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 p. 105}} In August, Germany sent 750,000 soldiers along the border of Czechoslovakia, officially as part of army maneuvres.<ref name="Eleanor L. Turk 1999. Pp. 123"/>{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 p. 105}} On 4 or 5 September,{{sfn|Bell|1986|p=238}} Beneš submitted the Fourth Plan, granting nearly all the demands of the agreement. The Sudeten Germans were under instruction from Hitler to avoid a compromise,{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=vol. 3 p. 105}} and the SdP held demonstrations that provoked a police action in [[Ostrava]] on 7 September, in which two of their parliamentary deputies were arrested.{{sfn|Bell|1986|p=238}} The Sudeten Germans used the incident and false allegations of other atrocities as an excuse to break off further negotiations.{{sfn|Bell|1986|p=238}}{{sfn|Noakes|Pridham|2010|loc=Vol. 3|p=105}}

On 12 September, Hitler made a speech at a [[Nuremberg rallies|Nazi Party rally in Nuremberg]] on the Sudeten crisis condemning the actions of the government of Czechoslovakia.<ref name="Eleanor L. Turk 1999. Pp. 123"/> Hitler denounced Czechoslovakia as being a fraudulent state that was in violation of international law's emphasis of national [[self-determination]], claiming it was a Czech hegemony although the [[Germans]], the [[Slovaks]], the [[Hungarians]], the [[Ukrainians]] and the [[Polish people|Poles]] of the country actually wanted to be in a union with the Czechs.<ref name="Adolf Hitler 2007. Pp. 626">Adolf Hitler, [[Max Domarus]]. ''The Essential Hitler: Speeches and Commentary''. Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2007. {{ISBN|9780865166271}}. p. 626.</ref> Hitler accused Beneš of seeking to gradually exterminate the Sudeten Germans and claimed that since Czechoslovakia's creation, over 600,000 Germans had been intentionally forced out of their homes under the threat of starvation if they did not leave.<ref name="Adolf Hitler 2007. Pp. 627">Adolf Hitler, Max Domarus. ''The Essential Hitler: Speeches and Commentary''. Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2007. {{ISBN|9780865166271}}. p. 627.</ref> He alleged that Beneš's government was persecuting Germans along with Hungarians, Poles, and Slovaks and accused Beneš of threatening the nationalities with being branded traitors if they were not loyal to the country.<ref name="Adolf Hitler 2007. Pp. 626" /> He stated that he, as the head of state of Germany, would support the right of the self-determination of fellow Germans in the Sudetenland.<ref name="Adolf Hitler 2007. Pp. 626" /> He condemned Beneš for his government's recent execution of several German protesters.<ref name="Adolf Hitler 2007. Pp. 626" /> He accused Beneš of being belligerent and threatening behaviour towards Germany which, if war broke out, would result in Beneš forcing Sudeten Germans to fight against their will against Germans from Germany.<ref name="Adolf Hitler 2007. Pp. 626" /> Hitler accused the government of Czechoslovakia of being a [[client state|client regime]] of [[France]], claiming that the French Minister of Aviation [[Pierre Cot]] had said, "We need this state as a base from which to drop bombs with greater ease to destroy Germany's economy and its industry."<ref name="Adolf Hitler 2007. Pp. 627" />

On 13 September, after internal violence and disruption in Czechoslovakia ensued, Chamberlain asked Hitler for a personal meeting to find a solution to avert a war.{{sfn|Bell|1986|p=239}} Chamberlain decided to do this after conferring with his advisors [[Edward Wood, 1st Earl of Halifax|Lord Halifax]], [[John Simon, 1st Viscount Simon|Sir John Simon]], and [[Samuel Hoare, 1st Viscount Templewood|Sir Samuel Hoare]]. The meeting was announced at a special press briefing at [[10 Downing Street]], and led to a swell of optimism in British public opinion.<ref name=Reynolds>{{Cite book|last=Reynolds|first=David|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/646810103|title=Summits : six meetings that shaped the twentieth century|date=2009|publisher=Basic Books|isbn=9780786744589|location=New York|oclc=646810103}}</ref> Chamberlain arrived by a chartered [[British Airways]] [[Lockheed Model 10 Electra|Lockheed Electra]] in Germany on 15 September and then arrived at [[Obersalzberg|Hitler's residence]] in [[Berchtesgaden]] for the meeting.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 71">Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. {{ISBN|9781929631421}}. p. 71.</ref> The flight was one of the first times a head of state or diplomatic official flew to a diplomatic meeting in an [[airplane]], as the tense situation left little time to take a [[train]] or [[boat]].<ref name=Reynolds /> Henlein flew to Germany on the same day.{{sfn|Bell|1986|p=239}} That day, Hitler and Chamberlain held discussions in which Hitler insisted that the Sudeten Germans must be allowed to exercise the right of national self-determination and be able to join Sudetenland with Germany. Hitler repeatedly falsely claimed that the Czechoslovak government had killed 300 Sudeten Germans.<ref name=Reynolds /> Hitler also expressed concern to Chamberlain about what he perceived as British "threats."<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 71" /> Chamberlain responded that he had not issued "threats" and in frustration asked Hitler "Why did I come over here to waste my time?"<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 71" /> Hitler responded that if Chamberlain was willing to accept the self-determination of the Sudeten Germans, he would be willing to discuss the matter.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 71" /> Hitler also convinced Chamberlain that he did not truly wish to destroy Czechoslovakia, but that he believed that upon a German annexation of the Sudetenland the country's [[Minority group|minorities]] would each secede and cause the country to collapse.<ref name=Reynolds /> Chamberlain and Hitler held discussions for three hours, and the meeting adjourned. Chamberlain flew back to Britain and met with his cabinet to discuss the issue.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 71" />

On 17 September 1938 Hitler ordered the establishment of ''[[Sudetendeutsches Freikorps]]'', a [[Paramilitary|paramilitary organization]] that took over the structure of Ordnersgruppe, an organization of ethnic [[Germans in Czechoslovakia (1918–1938)|Germans in Czechoslovakia]] that had been dissolved by the Czechoslovak authorities the previous day due to its implication in a large number of [[Terrorism|terrorist]] activities. The organization was sheltered, trained and equipped by German authorities and conducted cross-border terrorist operations into Czechoslovak territory. Relying on the [[War of aggression#The Convention for the Definition of Aggression|Convention for the Definition of Aggression]], Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš<ref>President Beneš' declaration made on 16 December 1941</ref> and the [[Czechoslovak government-in-exile|government-in-exile]]<ref>Note of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile dated 22 February 1944</ref> later regarded 17 September 1938 as the beginning of the undeclared German-Czechoslovak war. This understanding has been assumed also by the contemporary [[Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic|Czech Constitutional court]].<ref name="Con Court ruling">{{Citation

On 20 September, [[German resistance to Nazism|German opponents]] within the military met to discuss the final plans of a plot they had developed to overthrow the Nazi regime. The meeting was led by General [[Hans Oster]], the deputy head of the ''[[Abwehr]]'' (Germany's [[Counterintelligence|counter-espionage]] agency). Other members included Captain {{ill|Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz|de}}, and other military officers leading the planned [[coup d'etat]] met at the meeting.<ref name="Nigel Jones Pp. 73-74">Nigel Jones. ''Countdown to Valkyrie: The July Plot to Assassinate Hitler''. pp. 73–74.</ref> On 22 September, Chamberlain, about to board his plane to go to Germany for further talks at [[Bad Godesberg]], told the press who met him there that "My objective is peace in Europe, I trust this trip is the way to that peace."<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Chamberlain arrived in [[Cologne]], where he received a lavish grand welcome with a German band playing "[[God Save the King]]" and Germans giving Chamberlain flowers and gifts.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Chamberlain had calculated that fully accepting German annexation of all of the Sudetenland with no reductions would force Hitler to accept the agreement.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Upon being told of this, Hitler responded "Does this mean that the Allies have agreed with Prague's approval to the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany?", Chamberlain responded "Precisely", to which Hitler responded by shaking his head, saying that the Allied offer was insufficient. He told Chamberlain that he wanted Czechoslovakia to be completely dissolved and its territories redistributed to Germany, Poland, and Hungary, and told Chamberlain to take it or leave it.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Chamberlain was shaken by this statement.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" /> Hitler went on to tell Chamberlain that since their last meeting on the 15th, Czechoslovakia's actions, which Hitler claimed included killings of Germans, had made the situation unbearable for Germany.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008, pp. 72" />

In the early hours of 24 September, Hitler issued the [[Godesberg Memorandum]], which demanded that Czechoslovakia cede the Sudetenland to Germany no later than 28 September, with plebiscites to be held in unspecified areas under the supervision of German and Czechoslovak forces. The memorandum also stated that if Czechoslovakia did not agree to the German demands by 2&nbsp;pm on 28 September, Germany would take the Sudetenland by force. On the same day, Chamberlain returned to Britain and announced that Hitler demanded the annexation of the Sudetenland without delay.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> The announcement enraged those in Britain and France who wanted to confront Hitler once and for all, even if it meant war, and its supporters gained strength.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> The Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United Kingdom, [[Jan Masaryk]], was elated upon hearing of the support for Czechoslovakia from British and French opponents of Hitler's plans, saying "The nation of [[Saint Wenceslaus I, Duke of Bohemia|Saint Wenceslas]] will never be a nation of slaves."<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/>

On 26 September, Chamberlain sent [[Horace Wilson (civil servant)|Sir Horace Wilson]] to carry a personal letter to Hitler declaring that the Allies wanted a peaceful resolution to the Sudeten crisis.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> Later that evening, Hitler made his response in a speech at the [[Berlin Sportpalast]]; he claimed that the Sudetenland was "the last territorial demand I have to make in Europe"<ref name=sudetenland1>{{cite book|last1=Domarus|first1=Max|last2=Hitler|first2=Adolf|title=Hitler: speeches and proclamations, 1932–1945 : the chronicle of a dictatorship|year=1990|page=1393}}</ref> and gave Czechoslovakia a deadline of 28 September at 2:00&nbsp;pm to cede the Sudetenland to Germany or face war.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> At this point the British government began to make war preparations, and the [[House of Commons of the United Kingdom|House of Commons]] was reconvened from a parliamentary recess.<ref name=Reynolds />

On 28 September at 10:00&nbsp;am, four hours before the deadline and with no agreement to Hitler's demand by Czechoslovakia, the British ambassador to Italy, [[Eric Drummond, 7th Earl of Perth|Lord Perth]], called Italy's Foreign Minister [[Galeazzo Ciano]] to request an urgent meeting.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> Perth informed Ciano that Chamberlain had instructed him to request that Mussolini enter the negotiations and urge Hitler to delay the ultimatum.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 73"/> At 11:00&nbsp;am, Ciano met Mussolini and informed him of Chamberlain's proposition; Mussolini agreed with it and responded by telephoning Italy's ambassador to Germany and told him "Go to the Fuhrer at once, and tell him that whatever happens, I will be at his side, but that I request a twenty-four-hour delay before hostilities begin. In the meantime, I will study what can be done to solve the problem."<ref>Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. {{ISBN|9781929631421}}. pp. 73–74.</ref> Hitler received Mussolini's message while in discussions with the French ambassador. Hitler told the ambassadorresponded "'My good friend, Benito Mussolini, has asked me to delay for twenty-four hours the marching orders of the German army, and I agreed.'" Of course, this was no concession, as the invasion date was set for 1 October 1938."<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 74">Santi Corvaja, Robert L. Miller. ''Hitler & Mussolini: The Secret Meetings''. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. {{ISBN|9781929631421}}. p. 74.</ref> Upon speaking with Chamberlain, Lord Perth gave Chamberlain's thanks to Mussolini as well as Chamberlain's request that Mussolini attend a four-power conference of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Munich on 29 September to settle the Sudeten problem prior to the deadline of 2:00&nbsp;pm. Mussolini agreed.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 74"/> Hitler's only request was to make sure that Mussolini be involved in the negotiations at the conference.<ref name="Santi Corvaja 2008. Pp. 74"/> [[Nevile Henderson]], [[Alexander Cadogan]], and Chamberlain's personal secretary [[Alec Douglas-Home|Lord Dunglass]] passed the news of the conference to Chamberlain while he was addressing Parliament, and Chamberlain suddenly announced the conference and his acceptance to attend at the end of the speech to cheers.<ref name=Reynolds /> When United States President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] learned the conference had been scheduled, he telegraphed Chamberlain, "Good man."<ref name="dallek roosevelt">{{cite book |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=xTKvo-cXv3EC&q=roosevelt+chamberlain+%22good+man%22&pg=PA166 |title=Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945: With a New Afterword |publisher=Oxford University Press |last=Dallek |first=Robert |author-link=Robert Dallek |year=1995 |pages=166 |isbn=9780199826667}}</ref>

5. Germany establishes the [[Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia]] with a [[puppet government]], on 16 March 1939.<br /> 6. On 14 March 1939, a pro-Hitler [[Catholic church|Catholic]]-[[fascist]] government declares the [[Slovak Republic (1939–1945)|Slovak Republic]], as an [[Axis states of World War II|Axis]] [[client state]].]]

Before the Munich Agreement, Hitler's determination to invade Czechoslovakia on 1 October 1938 had provoked a major crisis in the German command structure. The Chief of the General Staff, General Ludwig Beck, protested in a lengthy series of memos that it would start a [[world war]] that Germany would lose, and urged Hitler to put off the projected conflict. Hitler called Beck's arguments against war "''kindische Kräfteberechnungen''" ("childish force calculations"). On 4 August 1938, a secret Army meeting was held. Beck read his lengthy report to the assembled officers. They all agreed something had to be done to prevent certain disaster. Beck hoped they would all resign together but no one resigned except Beck. His replacement, General [[Franz Halder]], sympathized with Beck and they both conspired with several top generals, Admiral [[Wilhelm Canaris]] (Chief of German Intelligence) and [[Wolf-Heinrich Graf von Helldorf|Graf von Helldorf]] (Berlin's Police Chief) to arrest Hitler the moment he gave the invasion order. This plan would only work if Britain issued a strong warning and a letter to the effect that they would fight to preserve Czechoslovakia. This would help to convince the German people that certain defeat awaited Germany. Agents were therefore sent to England to tell Chamberlain that an attack on Czechoslovakia was planned, and of their intention to overthrow Hitler if this occurred. The proposal was rejected by the British Cabinet and no such letter was issued. Accordingly, the proposed removal of Hitler did not go ahead.{{sfn|Parssinen|2004}} On this basis it has been argued that the Munich Agreement kept Hitler in power—Halder remained bitter about Chamberlain's refusal for decades after the war—although whether the attempted removal would have been any more successful than the [[20 July plot|1944 plot]] is doubtful.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Leach |first1=Barry |title=Hitler's Generals |date=1989 |publisher=Quill |page=105}}</ref><ref name="Reynolds" />

Poland was building up a secret Polish organization in the area of [[Trans-Olza]] from 1935.{{sfn|Goldstein|Lukes|1999|p=122}} In summer 1938, Poland tried to organize guerrilla groups in the area.{{sfn|Goldstein|Lukes|1999|p=122}} On 21 September, Poland officially requested a direct transfer of the area to its own control. Polish envoy to Prague [[Kazimierz Papée]] marked that the return of [[Cieszyn Silesia]] will be a sign of a goodwill and the "redress of injustice" of 1920.{{sfn|Jesenský|2014|p=82}} Similar notes were sent to Paris and London with a request that Polish minority in Czechoslovakia should gain the same rights as Sudeten Germans.{{sfn|Rak|2019|p=405}} On the next day Beneš send a letter to Polish president [[Ignacy Mościcki]] with a promise of "border's rectification", but the letter was delivered only on 26 September.{{sfn|Kornat|2012|p=157}} The answer of Mościcki delivered on 27 September was evasive, but it was accompanied with the demand of Polish government to hand over two Trans-Olza counties immediately, as a prelude to ultimate settlement of the border dispute.{{sfn|Majewski|20202019|p=459-460}}{{full citation needed|date=May 2024}} Beneš's answer wasn't conclusive: he agreed to hand over the disputed territory to Poland but argued that it could not be done on the eve of the German invasion, because it would disrupt Czechoslovak preparations for war. Poles recognised the answer as playing for time.{{sfn|Kornat|2012|p=157}}

The Polish ambassador in Germany learned about the results of Munich Conference on 30 September from [[Joachim von Ribbentrop|Ribbentrop]], who assured him that Berlin conditioned the guarantees for the remainder of Czechoslovakia on the fulfilment of Polish and Hungarian territorial demands.{{sfn|Rak|2019|p=409}} Polish foreign minister [[Józef Beck]] was disappointed with such a turn of events. In his own words the conference was "an attempt by the directorate of great powers to impose binding decisions on other states (and Poland cannot agree on that, as it would then be reduced to a political object that others conduct at their will)."{{sfn|Rak|2019|p=410}} As a result, at 11:45&nbsp;p.m. on 30 September, 11 hours after the Czechoslovak government accepted the Munich terms, Poland gave an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak government.{{sfn|Goldstein|Lukes|1999|p=66}} It demanded the immediate evacuation of Czechoslovak troops and police and gave Prague time until noon the following day. At 11:45&nbsp;a.m. on 1 October the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry called the Polish ambassador in Prague and told him that Poland could have what it wanted but then requested a 24 hhour delay. On 2 October, the [[Polish Land Forces|Polish Army]], commanded by General [[Władysław Bortnowski]], annexed an area of 801.5&nbsp;km² with a population of 227,399 people. Administratively the annexed area was divided between [[Frysztat County]] and [[Cieszyn County]].<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Dziennik Ustaw Śląskich, 31.10.1938, [R. 17], nr 18 – Silesian Digital Library|url=https://www.sbc.org.pl/dlibra/show-content/publication/edition/6949?id=6949|access-date=2019-08-29|journal=4258 III| date=14 February 2008 }}</ref>

In 1938, the Soviet Union was allied with France and Czechoslovakia. By September 1939, the Soviets were to all intents and purposes a [[co-belligerence|co-belligerent]] with Nazi Germany, due to Stalin's fears of a second Munich Agreement with the Soviet Union replacing Czechoslovakia. Thus, the agreement indirectly contributed to the outbreak of war in 1939.<ref>{{cite book |last=Sakwa |first=Richard |title=The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union 1917–1991 |publisher=Routledge |date=1999 |isbn=0415122899 |page=225}}</ref>

The American historian [[William L. Shirer]], in his ''[[The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich]]'' (1960), took the view that although Hitler was not bluffing about his intention to invade, Czechoslovakia could have offered significant resistance. Shirer believed that Britain and France had enough [[Anti-aircraft warfare|air defences]] to avoid serious bombing of London and Paris and could have pursued a rapid and successful war against Germany.{{sfn|Shirer|1960|p=520}} He quotes Churchill as saying the agreement meant that "Britain and France were in a much worse position compared to Hitler's Germany."{{sfn|Shirer|1960}} After Hitler personally inspected the Czech fortifications, he privately said to [[Joseph Goebbels]] that "we would have shed a lot of blood" and that it was fortunate that there had been no fighting.<ref>Joseph Goebbels diary, 2 October 1938, p. 2.</ref>

Bohemia, Moravia and [[Czech Silesia|Silesia]] lost about 38% of their combined area to Germany, with some 2.8&nbsp;million German and 513,000 to 750,000<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.bruntal.net/2007072602-k-otazce-vysidleni-obcanu-csr-ze-sudet-tesinska-podkarpatske-rusi-a-slovenske-republiky-v-letech-1938-1939 |title=K otázce vysídlení občanů ČSR ze Sudet, Těšínska, Podkarpatské Rusi a Slovenské republiky v letech 1938/1939 |access-date=2 December 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://archive.today/20141202131759/http://www.bruntal.net/2007072602-k-otazce-vysidleni-obcanu-csr-ze-sudet-tesinska-podkarpatske-rusi-a-slovenske-republiky-v-letech-1938-1939 |archive-date=2 December 2014}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.bohumildolezal.cz/texty/u074-08.htm|title=Fakta o vyhnání Čechů ze Sudet|website=bohumildolezal.cz|access-date=20 July 2019}}</ref> [[Czechs|Czech]] inhabitants. Hungary, in turn, received {{convert|11882|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} in southern Slovakia and southern [[Carpathian Ruthenia]]. According to a 1941 census, about 86.5% of the population in the territory was [[Hungarian people|Hungarian]]. Slovakia lost {{convert|10390|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} and 854,218 inhabitants for Hungary (according to a Czechoslovak 1930 census about 59% were Hungarians and 32% were [[Slovak people|Slovaks]] and Czechs<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.forumhistoriae.sk/documents/10180/70153/hetenyi.pdf|title=Slovak-Hungarian border in the years 1938–1945|first1=Martin|last1=Hetényi|date=2008|access-date=17 July 2021}}</ref>). Poland annexed the town of [[Český Těšín]] with the surrounding area (some {{convert|906|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}}, with 250,000 inhabitants. Poles made up about 36% of the population, down from 69% in 1910<ref>Irena Bogoczová, Jana Raclavska. "Report about the national and language situation in the area around Czeski Cieszyn/Český Těšín in the Czech Republic." ''Czeski Cieszyn/Český Těšín Papers''. Nr 7, ''EUR.AC research''. November 2006. p. 2. (source: Zahradnik. "Struktura narodowościowa Zaolzia na podstawie spisów ludności 1880–1991." Třinec 1991).</ref>){{sfn|Siwek|n.d.}} and two minor border areas in northern Slovakia, more precisely in the regions [[Spiš]] and [[Orava (county)|Orava]]. ({{convert|226|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}}, 4,280 inhabitants, only 0.3% Poles).

In 1937, the ''[[Wehrmacht]]'' had formulated a plan, "Operation Green" (''Fall Grün'') for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was implemented shortly after the proclamation of the [[Slovak Republic (1939-1945)|Slovak State]] on 15 March 1939.{{sfn|Herzstein|1980|p=184}} On 14 March, Slovakia seceded from Czechoslovakia and became a separate Nazi-subordinate state. The following day, [[Carpatho-Ukraine]] proclaimed independence as well, but after three days, it was completely occupied and annexed by Hungary. Czechoslovak President [[Emil Hácha]] traveled to Berlin and was left waiting, and orders to invade had already been given. During the meeting with Hitler, Hácha was threatened with the bombing of Prague if he refused to order the Czech troops to lay down their arms. That news induced a heart attack from which he was revived by an injection from Hitler's doctor. Hácha then agreed to sign the communiqué accepting the [[German occupation of Czechoslovakia|German occupation of the remainder of Bohemia and Moravia]], "which in its unctuous mendacity was remarkable even for the Nazis."<ref>Noakes, J. and Pridham, G. (eds) (2010) [2001] Nazism 1919–1945, Vol 3, Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination, University of Exeter Press, Exeter, p.119</ref> Churchill's prediction was fulfilled, as German armies entered Prague and proceeded to occupy the rest of the country, which was transformed into a protectorate of the Reich. In March 1939, [[Konstantin von Neurath]] was appointed as Reichsprotektor and served as Hitler's personal representative in the protectorate. Immediately after the occupation, a wave of arrests began, mostly of refugees from Germany, Jews and Czech public figures. By November, Jewish children had been expelled from their schools and their parents fired from their jobs. Universities and colleges were closed after demonstrations against the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Over 1200 students were sent to concentration camps, and nine student leaders were executed on 17 November ([[International Students' Day]]).<ref>N.J.W. Goda, ''Tales from Spandau. Nazi Criminals and the Cold War'' (2007). pp. 161–163.</ref>

Chamberlain claimed the Prague annexation was a "completely different category" that moved [[Second Thirty Years War#The move beyond legitimate Versailles grievances, 1938-9|beyond the legitimate Versailles grievances]].<ref>McDonough, 2002, p. 73</ref> Meanwhile, concerns arose in Britain that Poland, which was now encircled by many German possessions, would become the next target of Nazi expansionism. That was made apparent by the dispute over the [[Polish Corridor]] and the [[Free City of Danzig]] and resulted in the signing of an [[Anglo-Polish military alliance]]. That made the Polish government refuse to accept German negotiation proposals over the Polish Corridor and the status of Danzig.<ref>Władysław W. Kulski, "The Anglo-Polish Agreement of August 25, 1939", ''The Polish Review,'' (1976) 21 (1/2): 23–40.</ref> Chamberlain felt betrayed by the Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia, realized that his policy of appeasement towards Hitler had failed and so began to take a much harder line against Germany. He immediately began to mobilize the British armed forces to a war footing, and France did the same. Italy saw itself threatened by the British and French fleets and started its own [[Italian invasion of Albania|invasion of Albania]] in April 1939.<ref>Winston Churchill, ''The Gathering Storm'' (1948) pp 381–401.</ref>

In the United States and the United Kingdom, the words "Munich" and "appeasement" are frequently invoked when demanding forthright, often military, action to resolve an international crisis and characterising a political opponent who condemns negotiation as weakness.<ref>{{cite book|author=Yuen Foong Khong|title=Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0irZ8O6jJt4C|year=1992|publisher=Princeton UP|pages=4–7|isbn=0691025355}}</ref> In 1950, US President [[Harry Truman]] invoked "Munich" to justify his military action in the [[Korean War]]: "The world learned from Munich that security cannot be bought by appeasement."<ref>[http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/The-Munich-Analogy-The-korean-war.html "The Munich Analogy: The Korean War"], ''Encyclopedia of the New American Nation''. Retrieved 11 January 2018.</ref> Many later crises were accompanied by cries of "Munich" from politicians and the media. In 1960, the [[Conservatism in the United States|conservative]] US Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] used "Munich" to describe a domestic political issue by saying that an attempt by the [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican Party]] to appeal to [[Liberalism in the United States|liberals]] was "the Munich of the Republican Party."<ref>{{cite news | title=The Conservative 1960s | date=December 1995 | magazine=The Atlantic | page=6 | first=Matthew | last=Dallek | url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1995/12/the-conservative-1960s/376506/ | access-date=5 September 2020 }}</ref> In 1962, General [[Curtis LeMay]] told US President [[John F. Kennedy]] that his refusal to bomb [[Cuba]] during the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] was "almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich", a pointed barb given that his father [[Joseph P. Kennedy Sr.]] had supported appeasement in general in his capacity as Ambassador to Britain.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Dobbs|first=Michael|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/608213334|title=One minute to midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the brink of nuclear war|date=2008|publisher=Alfred A. Knopf|isbn=9780307269362|edition=1st|location=New York|oclc=608213334}}</ref><ref>Wheatcroft, Geoffrey (3 December 2013), [https://newrepublic.com/article/115803/munich-analogies-are-inaccurate-cliched-and-dangerous "On the Use and Abuse of Munich"]. Retrieved 11 January 2018</ref> In 1965, US President [[Lyndon Johnson]], in justifying increased military action in [[Vietnam War|Vietnam]], stated, "We learned from Hitler and Munich that success only feeds the appetite for aggression."<ref name="auto2">Logevall and Osgood (2010).</ref>

Citing Munich in debates on foreign policy has continued to be common in the 21st century.<ref>Jeffrey Record (2002), ''Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo''</ref> During negotiations for the [[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action|Iran nuclear agreement]] mediated by [[Secretary of State]] [[John Kerry]], Representative [[John Culberson]], a [[Republican Party of Texas|Texas Republican]] Representative, tweeted the message "Worse than Munich." Kerry had himself invoked Munich in a speech in France advocating military action in [[Syria]] by saying, "This is our Munich moment."<ref>{{Cite news|title=Kerry: 'This is our Munich moment'|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-24004687|access-date=2021-10-04}}</ref>

"Munich and appeasement", in the words of scholars [[Fredrik Logevall|Frederik Logevall]] and Kenneth Osgood, "have become among the dirtiest words in [[Politics of the United States|American politics]], synonymous with naivete and weakness, and signifying a craven willingness to barter away the nation's vital interests for empty promises." They claimed that the success of [[Foreign policy of the United States|US foreign policy]] often depends upon a president withstanding "the inevitable charges of appeasement that accompany any decision to negotiate with hostile powers." The presidents who challenged the "tyranny of Munich" have often achieved policy breakthroughs and those who had cited Munich as a principle of US foreign policy had often led the nation into its "most enduring tragedies."<ref>Logevall and Osgood (2010).<name="auto2"/ref>

The [[West Germany|West German]] policy of staying neutral in the [[Arab–Israeli conflict]] after the [[Munich massacre]] and the following hijack of the [[Lufthansa Flight 615]] in 1972, rather than taking a pro-[[Israel]] position, led to Israeli comparisons with the Munich Agreement of appeasement.<ref name=sp_article>{{cite news|title=Deutsche Feigheit|url=http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/image/show.html?did=42765038&aref=image035/0542/PPM-SP197204601200122.pdf&thumb=false|access-date=16 July 2013|newspaper=[[Der Spiegel]]|date=11 November 1972|language=de|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131019124318/http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/image/show.html?did=42765038&aref=image035%2F0542%2FPPM-SP197204601200122.pdf&thumb=false|archive-date=19 October 2013}}</ref>

* Smetana, Vít. "Ten propositions about Munich 1938. On the fateful event of Czech and European history{{snd}}without legends and national stereotypes." ''Czech Journal of Contemporary History'' 7.7 (2019): 5–14. [http://sd.usd.cas.cz/pdfs/sod/2019/11/01.pdf online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220319141012/http://sd.usd.cas.cz/pdfs/sod/2019/11/01.pdf |date=19 March 2022 }}

* [http://www.otr.com/munich.shtml The Munich Agreement in contemporary radio news broadcasts] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110524211711/http://www.otr.com/munich.shtml |date=24 May 2011 }} – Actual radio news broadcasts documenting evolution of the crisis

* [http://www.otr.com/peace.html Peace: And the Crisis Begins] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110715020727/http://www.otr.com/peace.html |date=15 July 2011 }} from a broadcast by Dorothy Thompson, 1 October 1938