Russian Armed Forces: Difference between revisions

| minister = [[File:Standart of the Russian Minister of Defence.svg|20px|link=]] [[SergeiAndrey ShoiguBelousov]]

The '''Armed Forces of the Russian Federation''',{{Efn|Russian: Вооружённые Си́лы Росси́йской Федера́ции, Vooruzhyonnyye Sily Rossiyskoy Federatsii}} commonly referred to as the '''Russian Armed Forces''', are the military of [[Russiamilitary]]. In terms of [[Active duty|active-duty personnel]], they are the [[List of countries by number of military and paramilitary personnel|world's fifth-largest military force]], with 1.15 million and at least two million [[Military reserve force|reserve personnel]].<ref>{{cite web |last=Nichol |first=Jim |date=21 December 2022 |title=Russian military announces plan to expand, create new units |url=https://apnews.com/article/putin-finland-sergei-shoigu-ee953abf7f9bf217ccdaa61ec1b35ddd |access-date=21 December 2022 |work=[[The Associated Press]] |publisher= |quote=Russia expands active personnel to 1.5 million from 1.15 forces |archive-date=21 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221221135310/https://apnews.com/article/putin-finland-sergei-shoigu-ee953abf7f9bf217ccdaa61ec1b35ddd |url-status=live }}</ref> According to the United States' [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA), "Russia plans to expand its active personnel force to 1.5 millionIt byis 2026,organized which will make it the third largest in the world, after China and India."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#military-and-security|title=Russia|date=28 February 2023|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency|via=CIA.gov|access-date=20 September 2022|archive-date=9 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210109173026/https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#military-and-security|url-status=live}}</ref> The country hasinto three primary branches of service: thebranches—the [[Russian Ground Forces|Ground Forces]], the [[Russian Navy|Navy]], and the [[Russian Aerospace Forces|Aerospace Forces]],—two asindependent well as two independentcombat arms of service: (the [[Strategic Rocket Forces]] and [[Russian Airborne Forces|Airborne Forces]].),<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#military-and-security|title=Russia|date=28 February 2023|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency|via=CIA.gov|access-date=20 September 2022|archive-date=9 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210109173026/https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#military-and-security|url-status=live}}</ref> In addition,and the [[Special Operations Forces (Russia)|Special Operations Forces Command]] was established in 2013, with an estimated strength in 2022 of 1,000, possibly with additional supporting staff.<ref>IISS, ''The Military Balance 2022,'' 201.</ref>

InThe 2023,Russian RussiaArmed hadForces are the [[List of countries by number of military expendituresand paramilitary personnel|world's third-highestfifth largest military expenditureforce]], allocatingwith a1.15 budgetmillion of[[Active approximatelyduty|active-duty personnel]] and close to two million [[Military reserve force|reservists]].<ref>{{Currencycite web |86.4last=Nichol billion|USDfirst=Jim |passthroughdate=yes21 December 2022 |linkedtitle=no}}Russian military announces plan to theexpand, militarycreate new units |url=https://apnews.<ref>{{citecom/article/putin-finland-sergei-shoigu-ee953abf7f9bf217ccdaa61ec1b35ddd web|url-status=live |archive-url=https://sipriweb.archive.org/sitesweb/default20221221135310/fileshttps:/2021-04/fs_2104_milex_0apnews.pdfcom/article/putin-finland-sergei-shoigu-ee953abf7f9bf217ccdaa61ec1b35ddd |titlearchive-date=Trends21 inDecember World2022 Military|access-date=21 Expenditure,December 20202022 |publisherwork=[[StockholmThe InternationalAssociated Peace Research InstitutePress]] |first1publisher=Nan |last1quote=TianRussia |first2=Audeexpands |last2=Fleurantactive |first3=Alexandrapersonnel |last3=Kuimovato |first4=Pieter1.5 million Dfrom 1.15 |last4=Wezemanforces}}</ref> |first5=SiemonAccording Tto the United States [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA), "Russia plans to expand its active personnel force to 1.5 |last5=Wezemanmillion by 2026, which will make it the third largest in the world, after China and India."<ref>{{Cite web |date=2628 AprilFebruary 20212023 |access-datetitle=24Russia November 2021|url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#military-and-security |archiveurl-datestatus=17 August 2021live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/2021081722481520210109173026/https://sipriwww.orgcia.gov/sitesthe-world-factbook/defaultcountries/filesrussia/2021#military-04/fs_2104_milex_0.pdfand-security |urlarchive-statusdate=live9 January 2021 |access-date=20 September 2022 |publisher=Central Intelligence Agency |via=CIA.gov}}</ref><ref name="SIPRI-2020"/> The Russian Armed Forces maintain the [[Russia and weapons of mass destruction|world's largest stockpile of nuclear weapons]],.<ref>{{cite web |date=August 2020 |title=Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance |url=https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat |access-date=7 June 2021 |work=[[Arms Control Association]] |archive-date=24 January 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180124043430/https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat |url-status=live }}</ref> and possess the world's second-largest fleet of [[ballistic missile submarine]]s;,<ref>{{cite web |url=https://power.lowyinstitute.org/data/military-capability/signature-capabilities/ballistic-missile-submarines/ |work=[[Asia Power Index]] |publisher=[[Lowy Institute]] |date=2021 |title=Ballistic missile submarines data |access-date=25 January 2022 |archive-date=8 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220408173840/https://power.lowyinstitute.org/data/military-capability/signature-capabilities/ballistic-missile-submarines/ |url-status=live }}</ref> theyand are also one of only three national militaries (alongside those of the [[United States Armed Forces|United States]] and [[People's Liberation Army|China]]) that operate [[strategic bomber]]s.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Paul |first1=T. V. |last2=Wirtz |first2=James J. |last3=Fortmann |first3=Michael |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9jy28vBqscQC&pg=PA332 |title=Balance of power: theory and practice in the 21st century |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |date=2004 |pages=332 |isbn=978-0-8047-5017-2 |access-date=5 December 2021 |archive-date=28 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028174352/https://books.google.com/books?id=9jy28vBqscQC&pg=PA332#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref> With certain exceptions, [[Conscription in Russia|Russian law mandates one year of military service for all male citizens aged 18–27]].<ref name="Law53-FZ"/><ref name="cia"/> In 2023, Russia had the [[List of countries by military expenditures|world's third-highest military expenditure]], at approximately {{Currency|86.4 billion|USD|passthrough=yes|linked=no}} to US$109 billion, or close to six percent of GDP.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/fs_2104_milex_0.pdf |title=Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020 |publisher=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |first1=Nan |last1=Tian |first2=Aude |last2=Fleurant |first3=Alexandra |last3=Kuimova |first4=Pieter D. |last4=Wezeman |first5=Siemon T. |last5=Wezeman |date=26 April 2021 |access-date=24 November 2021 |archive-date=17 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210817224815/https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/fs_2104_milex_0.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="SIPRI-2020" />

In spite of Russia's perceived military strength, as recorded in various assessments, deficiencies have been noted in the country's combat performance on both the tactical and operational scales. According to multiple reports, endemic [[Corruption#Military|corruption]] within the Russian Armed Forces has had a major impact on Russia's ability to effectively project [[hard power]].<ref>{{Cite news |title="Вывозили на КАМАЗе". Как российские солдаты и офицеры воровали у армии трусы, берцы и бронежилеты |language=ru |work=BBC News Русская служба |url=https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63177093 |access-date=17 December 2022 |archive-date=20 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221020044846/https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63177093 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Kovalev |first=Alexey |title=As War Hits the Homefront, Russia's Defeat Inches Closer |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/19/russia-ukraine-war-putin-defeat-retreat-mobilization-military-corruption/ |access-date=17 December 2022 |website=Foreign Policy |date=19 October 2022 |language=en-US |archive-date=17 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221217231239/https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/19/russia-ukraine-war-putin-defeat-retreat-mobilization-military-corruption/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=20 October 2022 |title='The army has nothing': new Russian conscripts bemoan lack of supplies |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/20/the-army-has-nothing-new-russian-conscripts-bemoan-lack-of-supplies |access-date=17 December 2022 |website=the Guardian |language=en |archive-date=25 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230225102851/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/20/the-army-has-nothing-new-russian-conscripts-bemoan-lack-of-supplies |url-status=live }}</ref> Amidst the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], severe logistical failures have greatly impacted the operational performance of Russian troops, as different service branches have struggled to coordinate and work together. Continuous shortcomings have led Russia's war effort to suffer extensive setbacks since the initial invasion; the Russian Armed Forces have experienced successive losses of occupied/annexed territory, the large-scale destruction and squandering of their equipment, and a notably high casualty rate.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Sonne |first1=Paul |last2=Lamothe |first2=Dan |last3=Ilyushina |first3=Mary |date=13 September 2022 |title=Rapid loss of territory in Ukraine reveals spent Russian military |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/13/putin-russia-military-spent-ukraine/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220914234329/https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/13/putin-russia-military-spent-ukraine/ |archive-date=14 September 2022 |access-date=10 November 2022 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref><ref name="The Economist">{{Cite news |date=28 February 2022 |title=The woes of the Russian war machine are big and real. Are they also temporary? |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/02/28/the-woes-of-the-russian-war-machine-are-big-and-real-are-they-also-temporary |access-date=13 March 2022 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=13 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220313021041/https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/02/28/the-woes-of-the-russian-war-machine-are-big-and-real-are-they-also-temporary |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="newyorker.com0">{{Cite web |date=11 March 2022 |title=The Russian Military's Debacle in Ukraine |url=https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-russian-militarys-debacle-in-ukraine |access-date=15 March 2022 |magazine=The New Yorker |archive-date=23 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220323052142/https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-russian-militarys-debacle-in-ukraine |url-status=live }}</ref> Researchers from the USU.S.-funded [[RAND Corporation]] have observed that Russia continues to struggle with military professionalization.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russia has a military professionalism problem, and it is costing them in Ukraine |last1=Posard |first1=Marek N. |last2=Holynska |first2=Khrystyna |work=Breaking Defense |date=21 March 2022 |access-date=25 August 2022 |url=https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/russia-has-a-military-professionalism-problem-and-it-is-costing-them-in-ukraine/ |archive-date=5 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220805231345/https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/russia-has-a-military-professionalism-problem-and-it-is-costing-them-in-ukraine/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

to seriously deal with" corruption.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bukkvoll |first=Tor |date=January 2008 |title=Their Hands in the Till: Scale and Causes of Russian Military Corruption |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0095327X06294622 |journal=Armed Forces & Society |language=en |volume=34 |issue=2 |pages=259–275 |doi=10.1177/0095327X06294622 |s2cid=145238073 |issn=0095-327X}}</ref> From 1991- to 2001, Russian authorities uncovered at least 350 billion rubles' (US$11.5 billion USD) worth of corruption in the armed forces (with, for comparison, the total defence budget for 2001 being 214 billion rubles). Areas of particular concern identified by a researcher at the [[Norwegian Defence Research Establishment]] in 2007 included the State Defence Order (perhaps 10-15% realised in 2004); "[[ghost soldiers]]," as "it is generally acknowledged that the number of actually serving personnel differs substantially from the authorized number of personnel," and officers at various levels can pocket excess money for themselves; and "the domestic purchases of goods and services, where corrupt officers overpay civilian providers in return for bribes."

On 24 February 2022, Russian president [[Vladimir Putin]] gave the execute order to for the Armed Forces to begin the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]].<ref>{{cite news |title='Terrible toll': Russia's invasion of Ukraine in numbers |url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/terrible-toll-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-in-numbers/ |work=[[Euractiv]] |date=14 February 2023 |access-date=19 March 2023 |archive-date=12 July 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230712061818/https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/terrible-toll-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-in-numbers/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Hussain |first1=Murtaza |title=The War in Ukraine Is Just Getting Started |url=https://theintercept.com/2023/03/09/ukraine-war-russia-iran-iraq/ |work=The Intercept |date=9 March 2023 |access-date=19 March 2023 |archive-date=18 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230518234805/https://theintercept.com/2023/03/09/ukraine-war-russia-iran-iraq/ |url-status=live }}</ref> On 10 April 2022 General [[Aleksandr Dvornikov]] assumed command of the operation.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Burns |first1=Robert |last2=Yen |first2=Hope |date=10 April 2022 |title=US doubts new Russian war chief can end Moscow's floundering |publisher=AP News |url=https://apnews.com/article/russia-appoints-new-ukraine-war-commander-dvornikov-225f976f9abfb5aff6154ac3b77c21e6 |access-date=3 June 2022 |archive-date=5 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220605060139/https://apnews.com/article/russia-appoints-new-ukraine-war-commander-dvornikov-225f976f9abfb5aff6154ac3b77c21e6?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=AP&utm_campaign=SocialFlow |url-status=live }}</ref> In July 2022, at the same time as the Armed Forces began suffering [[Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War|severe casualties]], the Ground Forces began to site ammunition in or near structures which are frequented by civilians due to the [[human shield]] benefit, ostensibly because Ukrainian [[HIMARS]] had tilted the odds of his strategy of attrition by artillery.<ref name="jpalj">{{cite news |last1=Psaropoulos |first1=John |title=Russia resumes eastern Ukraine offensive and expands war aims |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/21/russia-resumes-hostilities-as-ukraine-targets-ammunition |publisher=Al Jazeera Media Network |date=21 June 2022 |access-date=24 July 2022 |archive-date=25 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220725192317/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/21/russia-resumes-hostilities-as-ukraine-targets-ammunition |url-status=live }}</ref> Within hours after Defence Minister [[Sergei Shoigu]]'s signature on the UN-brokered deal to resume Ukraine's Black Sea grain exports, Russia bombed the [[Port of Odesa]].<ref name="skyyt">{{cite news |title=Ukraine War: Missiles hit Odesa hours after grain agreement |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgVplcsjxRc |agency=YouTube |publisher=Sky News |date=23 July 2022 |access-date=24 July 2022 |archive-date=3 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220803234052/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgVplcsjxRc |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="f24un">{{cite news |title=UN officials announce grain exports deal with Russia, Ukraine and Turkey |url=https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220722-live-ukraine-ports-to-reopen-after-grain-export-deal-with-russia-says-turkey |publisher=FRANCE 24 |date=22 July 2022 |access-date=24 July 2022 |archive-date=24 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220724120705/https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220722-live-ukraine-ports-to-reopen-after-grain-export-deal-with-russia-says-turkey |url-status=live }}</ref>

[[File:Official portrait of Sergey ShoiguBelousov-HR.jpg|thumb|left|[[Minister of Defence (Russia)|Minister of Defence]], [[Army general (Russia)|General of the Army]] [[SergeiAndrey ShoiguBelousov]]|272x272px]]

[[File:Valery Gerasimov official photo version 20172022-0710-1103.jpg|thumb|left|[[Chief of the General Staff (Russia)|Chief of the General Staff]], General of the Army [[Valery Gerasimov]]|272x272px]]

[[File:КомандующийGennady войскамиAnashkin, Южного военного округа Герой РФ Генерал армии Дворников А.В2024.jpg|thumb|right|200px|Army General [[AleksandrGennady DvornikovAnashkin]], commander of the Southern Military District since 2015 SeptemberMay 20162024]]

The plan was put in place on 1 December 2010 and mirrors a proposed reorganisation by former [[Chief of the General Staff (Russia)|Chief of the General Staff]] [[Army General (Russia)|Army General]] [[Yuri Baluyevsky]] for a Regional Command East which was not implemented.<ref>{{cite news|first=Alexsander|last=Golts|url=http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/3-heads-are-worse-than-one/410666.html|title=3 Heads are worse than one|newspaper=[[The Moscow Times]]|date=20 July 2010|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100722071902/http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/3-heads-are-worse-than-one/410666.html|archive-date=22 July 2010}}</ref> The four commands were set up by a decree of President Medvedev on 14 July 2010.{{cncitation needed|date=February 2023}} In July 2011, an Operational-Strategic Command of Missile-Space Defence has also been established on the basis of the former [[Special Purpose Command]] of the [[Russian Air Force]]. A Presidential decree of January 2011 named commanders for several of the new organisational structures.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.kremlin.ru/acts/10032|script-title=ru:Кадровые изменения в Вооружённых Силах|trans-title=Staffing changes in the Armed Forces|language=ru|publisher=[[Presidential Administration of Russia]]|date=9 January 2011|access-date=23 March 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110112174311/http://news.kremlin.ru/acts/10032|archive-date=12 January 2011}}</ref>

This trend [was] "not ..special" but correspond[ed] with the general .. reduction of the Russian armed forces."

The Russian military education system, inherited from the [[Soviet Union]], trains officer-specialists in narrowly-defined military occupational specialties. In this it differs greatly from the [[United States|American]] military education system in which newly- qualified second lieutenants receive particular specialties in the framework of their "career branch" only after graduation from a [[United States service academies|military academy]] or the [[Reserve Officers' Training Corps|ROTC]].<ref>{{cite book|last=Golts|first=Alexander|title=Военная реформа и российский милитаризм|language=ru|trans-title=Military reform and Russian militarism|date=2017|location=Uppsala|publisher=Kph Trycksaksbolaget AB|isbn=978-91-554-9936-5|url=http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1138525/FULLTEXT01.pdf|page=143|access-date=9 March 2022|archive-date=15 March 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220315171313/http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1138525/FULLTEXT01.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> Students of Russian civilian institutions of [[higher education]] wishing to join the [[Reserve Officer Training in Russia|reserve officer training program]] cannot choose a military occupational specialty, because each civilian specialty taught by civilian [[university]] is attached to a particular military occupational specialty taught by the [[Military training centers of civilian universities (Russia)|military training center]] of the same [[university]] by the [[Rector (academia)|rector]]'s order. It also differs from the [[United States|American]] military education system in which students can choose between available types of [[Reserve Officers' Training Corps|ROTC]].

* [[Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia]], which improves skills of officers graduated from military academies to allow them to become highest -ranking military officers (strategic level).

|+ Age limits for admission to military educational institutions<ref name="Law53-FZ"/><ref name="Order185">{{cite act|type=Order|index=185|date=7 April 2015|legislature=[[Minister of Defence (Russia)|Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation]]|title=Об утверждении Порядка и условий приёма в образовательные организации высшего образования, находящиеся в ведении Министерства обороны Российской Федерации|language=ru|url=https://docs.cntd.ru/document/420269638}} {{Cite web |url=https://docs.cntd.ru/document/420269638 |title=ArchivedОб copyутверждении Порядка и условий приема в образовательные организации высшего образования, находящиеся в ведении Министерства обороны Российской Федерации от 07 апреля 2015 - docs.CNTD.ru |access-date=26 April 2024 |archive-date=13 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220313224758/https://docs.cntd.ru/document/420269638 |url-status=bot: unknown }}</ref>

In 2018 the military departments and the military training centers were abolished.<ref>{{cite act|type=Federal Law|index=309-FZ|date=3 August 2018|legislature=[[State Duma]]|title=О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации в части совершенствования военной подготовки студентов федеральных государственных образовательных организаций высшего образования|language=ru|url=http://www.pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000505&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=03.08.2018&a8=309-%D4%C7&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=60&y=17}} {{Cite web |url=http://www.pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000505&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=03.08.2018&a8=309-%D4%C7&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=60&y=17 |title=Archived copy |access-date=26 April 2024 |archive-date=11 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210911130516/http://www.pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000505&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=03.08.2018&a8=309-%D4%C7&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=60&y=17 |url-status=bot: unknown }}</ref> From that moment on, students of civilian institutions of higher education were trained under both officers training programmes (for reserve and for active duty) in the [[Military training centers of civilian universities (Russia)|Military Training Centers]].<ref>{{cite act|type=Decree|index=848|date=3 July 2019|legislature=[[Government of Russia]]|title=Об утверждении Положения о военных учебных центрах при федеральных государственных образовательных организациях высшего образования и о признании утратившими силу некоторых актов Правительства Российской Федерации|language=ru|url=http://www.pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000496&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=102000066&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=03.07.2019&a8=848&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=75&y=12}} {{Cite web |url=http://www.pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000496&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=102000066&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=03.07.2019&a8=848&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=75&y=12 |title=ArchivedЗаконодательство copyРоссии. Поиск: Постановление Правительство Дата принятия 03.07.2019 Номер н |access-date=26 April 2024 |archive-date=11 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210911130520/http://www.pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000496&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=102000066&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=03.07.2019&a8=848&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=75&y=12 |url-status=bot: unknown }}</ref> In 2019, there were training military centers in 93 civilian institutions of higher education.<ref>{{cite act|type=Order|index=427-R|date=13 March 2019|legislature=[[Government of Russia]]|language=ru|url=http://www.pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000499&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=102000066&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=13.03.2019&a8=427-%F0&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=50&y=24}} {{Cite web |url=http://www.pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000499&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=102000066&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=13.03.2019&a8=427-%F0&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=50&y=24 |title=ArchivedЗаконодательство России. Поиск: Распоряжение Правительство Дата принятия 13.03.2019 Номер copyна |access-date=26 April 2024 |archive-date=11 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210911130516/http://www.pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000499&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=102000066&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=13.03.2019&a8=427-%F0&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=50&y=24 |url-status=bot: unknown }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Gavrilov|first=Yuriy|date=15 March 2019|title=Лейтенант из института. Определены вузы для военной подготовки студентов|language=ru|work=[[Rossiyskaya Gazeta]]|url=https://rg.ru/2019/03/15/voennye-uchebnye-centry-sozdadut-v-93-vuzah-strany.html|access-date=11 September 2021|archive-date=11 September 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210911130514/https://rg.ru/2019/03/15/voennye-uchebnye-centry-sozdadut-v-93-vuzah-strany.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

[[2022 Russian mobilization|The first]] [[mobilization]] of citizens being in [[Military reserve force|mobilization human resource]], conducted on a compulsory basis, in the Russian Federation's history was announced by [[President of Russia|Presidential]] Decree of 21 September 2022 №647No.647 during the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine|Russian invasion of Ukraine]].<ref>{{cite news|last1=McCarthy|first1=Simone|last2=Picheta|first2=Rob|date=21 September 2022|title=Russia announces immediate 'partial mobilization' of citizens, escalating its invasion of Ukraine|language=en|magazine=[[CNN]]|url=https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/21/europe/ukraine-russian-referendums-intl-hnk/index.html|access-date=21 September 2022|archive-date=21 September 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220921124520/https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/21/europe/ukraine-russian-referendums-intl-hnk/index.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

However, due to the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]] inon 24 February 2022, the Russian government has dramatically increased military spending to over 85+ billion dollars, returning to third position as the highest military spender in the world. The increase in military spending was needed to recoup losses in the war and reorientate Russia into a [[war economy]].<ref name="SIPRI-2020"/> On 5 October 2023, [[Vladimir Putin]] stated that Russia's spending on defense and security now equals to 6% of its GDP.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2023/1006/095075683/detail.shtml |title=ЦАМТО / / Владимир Путин: расходы на оборону и безопасность возросли вдвое и составляют сейчас около 6% ВВП |access-date=7 October 2023 |archive-date=7 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231007050208/https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2023/1006/095075683/detail.shtml |url-status=live }}</ref>

In early 2023, there were reports that the Russian Defense Ministry purchased more than a thousand tablets with a domestic software for higher -ranking officials and also begun receiving a new line of gliding bombs with a range of tens of kilometers.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://xn--b1aga5aadd.xn--p1ai/2023/%C8%EC%EF%EE%F0%F2%EE%E7%E0%EC%E5%F9%E5%ED%E8%E53/|title=СМИ: военные закупили планшеты с операционкой 'Аврора'|date=2 February 2023|website=Военное.РФ|access-date=25 May 2023|archive-date=29 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230529092504/https://xn--b1aga5aadd.xn--p1ai/2023/%C8%EC%EF%EE%F0%F2%EE%E7%E0%EC%E5%F9%E5%ED%E8%E53/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://xn--b1aga5aadd.xn--p1ai/2023/%C0%E2%E8%E0%F6%E8%FF5/|title=СМИ узнали о разработке линейки новых высокоточных авиабомб для ВКС России|date=14 March 2023|website=Военное.РФ|access-date=25 May 2023|archive-date=28 October 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028174442/https://xn--b1aga5aadd.xn--p1ai/2023/%C0%E2%E8%E0%F6%E8%FF5/|url-status=live}}</ref>

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense,<ref>{{cite web | last=Новости | first=РИА | title=Поставки новой техники в армию в 2023 году составили 98,8 процента от плана | website=РИА Новости | date=2024-01-26 | url=https://ria.ru/20240126/tekhnika-1923645931.html | language=ru | access-date=2024-03-12}}</ref> the Russian Armed Forces received in 2023 several hundreds of thousands of small arms, new and repaired weapon systems, military vehicles and equipment, artillery systems, air defense systems, missiles and bombs, aircraft and helicopters, drones, and also over a million individual armor protection and equipment means.<ref>{{cite web | last=Новости | first=РИА | title=ВМФ в 2023 году получил более 7,7 тысячи единиц средств поражения | website=РИА Новости | date=2024-01-26 | url=https://ria.ru/20240126/vmf-1923654510.html | language=ru | access-date=2024-03-12}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | last=Новости | first=РИА | title=Армия в 2023 году получила 3,5 тысячи отечественных беспилотников | website=РИА Новости | date=2024-01-26 | url=https://ria.ru/20240126/bespilotniki-1923651702.html | language=ru | access-date=2024-03-12}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | last=Новости | first=РИА | title=Российские Сухопутные войска за год получили шесть комплектов систем ПВО | website=РИА Новости | date=2024-01-26 | url=https://ria.ru/20240126/pvo-1923657476.html | language=ru | access-date=2024-03-12}}</ref> [[CNN]] reported on 11 March 2024 that Russia currently produces about 250,000 artillery shells a month or about 3 million a year which is nearly three times the quantity the [[US]] and [[Europe]] produce for [[Ukraine]]. CNN cited Western intelligence officials and also said that Russia imports ammunition from [[Iran]] and [[North Korea]].<ref>{{cite web | lastlast1=Lillis | firstfirst1=Katie Bo | last2=Bertrand | first2=Natasha | last3=Liebermann | first3=Oren | last4=Britzky | first4=Haley | title=CNN Politics | website=CNN | date=2024-03-11 | url=https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/10/politics/russia-artillery-shell-production-us-europe-ukraine/index.html | access-date=2024-03-12}}</ref>

* {{Cite journal |last1=Bowen |first1=Andrew|title=Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian Strategy in Eastern Ukraine|journal=Journal of Strategic Studies|date=2017|volume=42|issue=3–4|pages=312–343|doi=10.1080/01402390.2017.1413550|s2cid=158522112|issn = 0140-2390}}