We intend to narrow the gap between concrete implementations of cryptographic protocols and their verified models. We develop and verify a small functional implementation of the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS 1.0). We make use of the same ...

Recent work has established the importance of automatic reverse engineering of protocol or file format specifications. However, the formats reverse engineered by previous tools have missed important information that is critical for security ...

We describe the design and implementation of Privacy Oracle, a system that reports on application leaks of user information via the network traffic that they send. Privacy Oracle treats each application as a black box, without access to either its ...

Proving that particular methods within a code base are functionally pure--deterministic and side-effect free--would aid verification of security properties including function invertibility, reproducibility of computation, and safety of untrusted code ...

In the Horn theory based approach for cryptographic protocol analysis, cryptographic protocols and (Dolev-Yao) intruders are modeled by Horn theories and security analysis boils down to solving the derivation problem for Horn theories. This approach and ...

Many security properties are naturally expressed as indistinguishability between two versions of a protocol. In this paper, we show that computational proofs of indistinguishability can be considerably simplified, for a class of processes that covers ...