Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficient (i.e., maximise social utility) and individually rational (i.e., agents ...

We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a model where all other bidders are local and participate in a single auction. ...

This thesis considers engineering both protocols and strategies in multi-agent systems comprised of selfish, rational autonomous agents. Mechanisms dealing with failures as well as aspects of decentralisation are designed and applied to a multi-sensor ...

We define Trusted Kernel-based Coalition Formation as a novel extension to the traditional kernel-based coalition formation process which ensures agents choose the most reliable coalition partners and are guaranteed to obtain the payment they deserve. ...

We define trust-based mechanism design as an augmentation of traditional mechanism design in which agents take into account the degree of trust that they have in their counterparts when determining their allocations. To this end, we develop an efficient,...