Assortment optimization concerns the problem of selling items with fixed prices to a buyer who will purchase at most one. Typically, retailers select a subset of items, corresponding to an "assortment'' of brands to carry, and make each selected item ...

The Internet-scale peer-to-peer (P2P) systems usually build their success on distributed protocols. For example, the well-known BitTorrent network for resource exchange is based on the proportional response protocol, where each participant exchanges its ...

We study a continuous and infinite time horizon counterpart to the classic prophet inequality, which we term the stationary prophet inequality problem. Here, copies of a good arrive and perish according to Poisson point processes. Buyers arrive ...

We study the limits of an information intermediary in the classical Bayesian auction, where a revenue-maximizing seller sells one item to n buyers with independent private values. In addition, we have an intermediary who knows the buyers' private values,...

The Colonel Blotto game and its variants are a common approach to study competitive allocation of interchangeable resources (e.g., soldiers, money, or votes). We introduce a new variant of Blotto, which we call the Derby game, to study competitive ...

We study the competition complexity of dynamic pricing relative to the optimal auction in the fundamental single-item setting. In prophet inequality terminology, we compare the expected reward Am(F) achievable by the optimal online policy on m i.i.d. ...

Statistical discrimination results when a decision-maker observes an imperfect estimate of the quality of each candidate dependent on which demographic group they belong to [1,8]. Imperfect estimates have been modelled via noise, where the variance ...

In anticipation of a procurement auction, speculators have the incentive to consolidate the market by acquiring items from different sellers. By doing so, speculators gain market power and can reduce competition in the procurement auction. Consequently, ...

We introduce and study a variation of the submodular maximization problem motivated by applications in online retail. A platform displays a list of products to a user in response to a search query. The user inspects the first k items in the list for a k ...

We consider the model of the data broker selling information to a single agent to maximize his revenue. The agent has private valuation for the additional information, and upon receiving the signal from the data broker, the agent can conduct her own ...

We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly asymmetric) means of ...

Machine learning has developed a variety of tools for learning and representing high-dimensional distributions with structure. Recent years have also seen big advances in designing multi-item mechanisms. Akin to overfitting, however, these mechanisms ...

We study the matching of jobs to workers waiting in a queue, for example a ridesharing platform dispatching drivers to pick up riders at an airport. Under FIFO dispatching, the heterogeneity in earnings from different trips incentivizes drivers to ...

I construct a novel random double auction as a robust bilateral trading mechanism for a profit-maximizing intermediary who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. It works as follows. The intermediary publicly commits to charging a fixed ...

Correlated equilibrium is an established solution concept in game theory describing a situation when players condition their strategies on external signals produced by a correlation device. In recent years, the concept has begun gaining traction also in ...

It is a well-known fact that selfish behavior degrades the performance of traffic networks. Various measures have been proposed in the literature as a remedy for the inefficiency of traffic equilibria (such as road tolls or network design techniques). ...

We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with one informed sender and several uninformed receivers. The sender can affect receivers' beliefs via private signals and the sender's objective depends on the combination of induced beliefs.

We reduce the ...

We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents who deviate ...

We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategyproof and individually-...