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State v. Llamas-Villa

67 Wn. App. 448 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
State v. Llamas-Villa

61 Citing cases

  1. State v. Witkowski

    415 P.3d 639 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses

    In another case, Division One of this court did not distinguish between locked and unlocked containers. See State v. Llamas-Villa , 67 Wash. App. 448, 454, 836 P.2d 239 (1992). In Llamas-Villa , officers executing a premises warrant for an apartment entered a storage room outside the apartment, near the front door.

  2. State v. Hearn

    131 Wn. App. 601 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 35 times
    Holding that the mere presence of drugs in a vehicle was insufficient to show that the car was used to store drugs and that the vehicle was not used to store drugs where no fixture of the vehicle itself was used to conceal or hold the contraband

    As an issue of constitutional magnitude, it may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 454-55, 836 P.2d 239 (1992) (citing RAP 2.5(a); State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 757 P.2d 492 (1988)); see also State v. Julian, 102 Wn. App. 296, 304, 9 P.3d 851 (2000) (holding that the right to challenge the conditions of community placement is not waived by the failure to object below). ¶10 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, permits the court to impose crime-related prohibitions as part of a sentence.

  3. State v. Riles

    86 Wn. App. 10 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 21 times
    In Riles, the court upheld a condition stating that the defendant was to avoid and not frequent '"places where minors are known to congregate.'"

    While a person generally must be charged with violating a statute before it can be challenged on vagueness grounds, a potentially vague community placement condition involves different considerations. See State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 455, 836 P.2d 239 (1992). "A criminal defendant's constitutional rights during community placement are subject to the infringements authorized by the [Sentencing Reform Act (SRA)]."

  4. State v. Ross

    129 Wn. 2d 279 (Wash. 1996)   Cited 174 times
    Stating that for a plea to be knowing and voluntary, a criminal defendant must be informed of all direct consequences of his plea

    In effect, community placement imposes significant restrictions on a defendant's constitutional freedoms. In re Caudle, 71 Wn. App. 679, 683, 863 P.2d 570 (1993) (Sweeney, J., concurring); State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 455, 836 P.2d 239 (1992). We echo the assessment by Judge Sweeney of the Court of Appeals:

  5. State v. Gardner

    No. 52646-8-II (Wash. Ct. App. Jun. 9, 2020)

    Id. Vega is supported by State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn.App. 448, 455-56, 836 P.2d 239 (1992), where this court held that the condition that an offender not associate with persons using, possessing, or dealing with controlled substances was not unconstitutionally vague. Llamas-Villa argued that the provision was vague because it did not limit his liability only to situations involving people he knew were engaging in the prohibited activities.

  6. State v. Schuettke

    No. 51803-1-II (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2020)

    "A criminal defendant's constitutional rights during community placement are subject to the infringements authorized by the Sentenc[ing] Reform Act [of 1981] ([ch.] 9.94A [RCW])." State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn.App. 448, 455, 836 P.2d 239 (1992). A court may order an offender to refrain from "contact with the victim of the crime or a specified class of individuals" or from possessing or consuming controlled substances, including alcohol, or to comply with any crime-related prohibitions. RCW 9.94A.703(2)(c), (3)(b).

  7. State v. Knotts

    138 Wn. App. 1018 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)

    But, in general, "[n]o causal link need be established between the imposed condition and the crime committed, so long as the condition relates to the circumstances of the crime." State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 456, 836 P.2d 239 (1992). Moreover, the trial court may impose affirmative conditions only when specifically permitted under a sentencing provision.

  8. State v. Acrey

    135 Wn. App. 938 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 15 times
    In State v. Acrey, 135 Wn. App. 938, 945, 146 P.3d 1215 (2006), a case upholding a felony sentence condition, we held that "[t]he court's jurisdiction to enter and enforce its sentence does not depend upon the authority given the Department of Corrections."

    ¶20 Under RCW 9.94A.030(13), no causal link need be established between the prohibition imposed and the crime committed, so long as the condition relates to the circumstances of the crime. State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 456, 836 P.2d 239 (1992). Sentencing conditions, including crime-related prohibitions, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 36-37.

  9. State v. Boyer

    124 Wn. App. 593 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 10 times
    In State v. Eserjose, officers—acting on a tip that James Eserjose and Joseph Paragone were responsible for a robbery—went to the suspect’s house at 1:30 a.m. without a warrant.

    The question turns, then, on whether the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant. ¶20 Examination of State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 836 P.2d 239 (1992), a Division One case, is instructive. In Llamas-Villa, officers executed a search warrant for apartment 101 at a specified address. After entering and searching apartment 101, an officer exited the apartment and opened a door labeled "storage" located in the common hallway immediately to the right of the apartment door.

  10. State v. Matsunaga

    82 Haw. 162 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 6 times
    Explaining that the Hawai‘i Supreme Court appeared to reject the good faith exception in Lopez, 78 Hawai‘i at 446, 896 P.2d at 902, and that if Hawai‘i did recognize the good-faith exception rule, it would not apply to the facts of the case

    State v. Erickson, 496 N.W.2d 555, 560 (N.D. 1993). See also State v. Devine, 307 Or. 341, 768 P.2d 913, 916 (1989); State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 836 P.2d 239, 241 (1992). A search of a place not described in a search warrant amounts to a warrantless search and is unlawful.