Specifically, where First Amendment freedoms are not involved, we consider only whether the statute is constitutional as applied. In re Dependency of C.B., 79 Wn.App. 686, 689, 904 P.2d 1171 (1995), review denied, 128 Wn.2d 1023 (1996). Washington courts have determined that termination proceedings do not involve First Amendment rights.

Washington courts presume statutes are constitutional. In re Dependency of C.B., 79 Wn.App. 686, 689, 904 P.2d 1171 (1995). The party challenging a statute's constitutionality

Washington courts presume statutes are constitutional. In re Dependency of C.B., 79 Wn. App. 686, 689, 904 P.2d 1171 (1995).

In re Dependency of C.B., 79 Wn. App. 686, 689, 904 P.2d 1171 (1995). C.B., 79 Wn. App. at 689.

L.B. argues that termination of her fundamental right to parent was unconstitutional because MP. had achieved permanency through a guardianship, adoption was not foreseeable, and termination was therefore unnecessary to achieve the State's interest under the statutes. In re Dependency of C.B., 79 Wn.App. 686, 689, 904 P.2d 1171 (1995). C.B., 79 Wn.App. at 689.

Sentencing courts can restrict the fundamental right to parent by conditioning a criminal sentence if the condition is reasonably necessary to further the State's compelling interest in preventing harm and protecting children. State v. Berg, 147 Wn. App. 923, 942, 198 P.3d 529 (2008); Ancira, 107 Wn. App. at 654; see State v. Letourneau, 100 Wn. App. 424, 437-42, 997 P.2d 436 (2000); see also In re Dependency of C.B., 79 Wn. App. 686, 690, 904 P.2d 1171 (1995) (stating prevention of harm to children is a compelling State interest), review denied, 128 Wn.2d 1023 (1996). Crime-Related Prohibition

We will not validate any "de facto" termination argument, especially where, as here, the parent had every opportunity to argue about these issues in her dependency hearing and subsequent appeal. The trial court properly considered both the dependency orders and the Oregon orders as simply part of the case posture and, if it found that those orders excused HB's failure to visit, it could have done so. The question on review is limited to whether sufficient evidence supported the termination court's decision. In re the Welfare of Hall, 99 Wn.2d 842, 849, 664 P.2d 1245 (1983); In re the Dependency of C.B., 79 Wn. App. 686, 692, 904 P.2d 1171 (1995). We find that the evidence was sufficient, and we affirm the termination order.

The challenging party has the burden to prove otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Dependency of C.B., 79 Wn. App. 686, 689, 904 P.2d 1171 (1995), review denied, 128 Wn.2d 1023 (1996). Since First Amendment freedoms are not involved, we consider only whether the statute is constitutional as applied.

In considering the constitutional challenges raised by the Defendants, we begin with the presumption that statutes are constitutional. State v. Coria, 120 Wn.2d 156, 163, 839 P.2d 890 (1992); In re C.B., 79 Wn. App. 686, 689, 904 P.2d 1171 (1995). A party challenging the statute has the burden of proving it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.

Additionally, a finding of aggravated circumstances does not compel termination but triggers a more stringent standard of proof to the key determinations made by the court. In re Dependency of C.B., 79 Wash.App. 686, 690, 904 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Wash.Ct.App. 1995). The district court found this reasoning to be persuasive and that the burden of proof for aggravated circumstances in a Child Protective Act proceeding is a preponderance of the evidence