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The Future
of Political
Science

Published simultaneously in Great Britain
by Prentice-Hall International, London

The Future
of Political
Science

Harold D.
Lasswell

Atherton Press, A Division of Prentice-Hall, Inc.
70 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, New York 1963

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Harold D. Lasswell

Published simultaneously in Great Britain by

Prentice-Hall International, Inc.

28 Welbeck Street, London W.l, England

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be
reproduced in any form, except for brief quotation
in a review, without written permission from the
publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to

Atherton Press, A Division of Prentice-Hall, Inc.
70 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, New York

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 63-16401
Printed in the United States of America 34586

The American Political Science Association Series

Nation-Building

KARL W. DEUTSCH AND
WILLIAM FOLTZ, EDITORS

Party and Representation:
Legislative Politics in Pennsylvania

FRANK J. SORAUF

The Future of Political Science

HAROLD D. LAS SWELL

Preface

The present discussion of the future of political science has grown out
of the phenomenally rapid expansion of the study of government in the
United States and elsewhere. Leading figures in the American Political
Science Association backed the initiative taken by Charles S. Hyneman
during his presidency to encourage exhaustive consideration of the
policy problems now facing the association, university and college de-
partments of political science, and individual scholars and students
presently or prospectively connected with the discipline. The idea was
to encourage active members of the association to publish sustained re-
flections on the issues at stake. It was assumed that each contributor
would emphasize the conceptions of political science with which he had
the deepest experience, but that he would relate what he said to a com-

viii PREFACE

prehensive set of questions concerning the study of government.

Political scientists have not been studied with the care that has
gradually built up a body of knowledge about physicians, lawyers, and,
to an increasing extent, physical scientists and engineers. For the data
that appear in the first two chapters, I am chiefly indebted to Evron
M. Kirkpatrick and his staff at the national office of the American
Political Science Association, particularly to Miss Cora Prifold. I have
also had the benefit of comment by several members of the Yale De-
partment of Political Science and by colleagues and students in many
official and unofficial agencies with which I have been connected.

The book deals mainly with the American scene, since this country
has encouraged the relatively unfettered study of government on an
unprecedented scale. In some bodies politic, the formidable potenti-
alities of freedom to research, teach, and publish are so well un-
derstood by the political elite that every effort has been made to
commandeer political science as a tool of the Establishment. In coun-
tries where the dominant aims of the community are industrialization
and modernization, the lack of a competent political science profession
has contributed to the turmoil of transition. As it happens, our pro-
grams of what was styled economic growth suffered in the early stages
from one-sided guidance by specialists unaccustomed to thinking com-
prehensively about the value goals and institutions affected by interven-
tion in the lives of others.

For opportunities to explore many problems in political science
at home and abroad, I thank several sources of support, without in-
criminating them in the positions taken in this volume. I have es-
pecially in mind the Ford Foundation and Yale University. Within
Yale, I am under lasting obligation to the Law School, which manages
to keep alive over the years the creative intellectual tension that be-
came endemic in the deanships of Mr. Hutchins and Judge Clark and
continued to flourish under Deans Gulliver, Sturges, and, presently,
Eugene V. Rostow.

I especially desire to acknowledge the importance of my closest
collaborators at Yale, among whom Myres S. McDougal plays the most
redoubtable part. On technical matters, M. R. Campbell, of Wash-
ington, D.C., is as skilled and judicious as ever. In New Haven, Miss
Theresa V. Brennan met every challenge with characteristic distinction.

I trust that Charles S. Hyneman will not feel too acutely discom-
fited by this partial result of his high-minded initiative.

Harold D. Lasswell
June 1963

Contents

Preface vii

1 Political Science Today 1

2 Growth and Ambiguity 30

3 The Basic Data Survey (I) : Intelligence, Promoting,

Prescribing 43

4 The Basic Data Survey (II) : Invoking, Applying,

Appraising, Terminating 69

Appendix to Chapter 4 89

X CONTENTS

5 Experimentation, Prototyping, Intervention 95

6 Micromodeling 123

7 Cultivation of Creativity ( I ) 147

8 Cultivation of Creativity (II) 167

9 Collaboration with Allied Professions 189

10 Centers for Advanced Political Science 208

1 1 Conclusion 239
Index 243

The Future
of Political
Science

Political
Science
Today

The present period of world transformation could with equal justice
be called the age of science or that of astropolitics. No one imagines
that political science alone among the arts and sciences will remain
unaffected by the changes through which the world is moving. The
distinctive concern of political science is with the political process
itself, and it is impossible to believe that government and law will lie
outside the accelerating tempo of history. In this inquiry, directed
mainly to those who are seriously concerned with the study of govern- j
ment, we shall consider the future of political science from the view- i
points of scope, method, and impact.

Any problem-solving approach to human affairs poses five in-
tellectual tasks, which we designate by five terms familiar to political

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

scientists — goal, trend, condition, projection, and alternative. The first
question, relating to goal, raises the traditional problem of clarifying
the legitimate aims of a body politic. After goals are provisionally
clarified, the historical question arises. In the broadest context, the
principal issue is whether the trend of events in America or through-
out the world community has been toward or away from the real-
ization of preferred events. The next question goes beyond simple
inventories of change and asks which factors condition one another
and determine history. When trend and factor knowledge is at hand,
it is possible to project the course of future developments on the pre-
liminary assumption that we do not ourselves influence the future.
Finally, what policy alternatives promise to bring all preferred goals
to optimal fulfillment?

PAST CONTRIBUTIONS

The problem-solving frame of reference is no novelty to political
scientists. It is and has been, for example, common for members of
the profession to concentrate on one or another of the intellectual
tasks involved. A few reminders will establish the point.

Among the enduring contributions to the study of politics we
number treatises that have undertaken to clarify the goals appropriate
to political activity. The principal writing of this kind falls roughly
into two categories, the first directed toward the specification of goal,
the second toward justification.

The most successful method of specifying a positive vision is an
imaginative essay in the manner of Plato's Republic or More's Utopia.
There are also the counterutopias, full of hell-fire and damnation, to
which Orwell's 1984 belongs.

The treatises that seek to justify more than to specify desirable
goals rely on many modes of argument. Perhaps the principal tool is
rhetoric properly keyed to the receptivities of a waiting audience. This
was true of Rousseau's Social Contract. It is also possible for a writer
to dispense with eloquence almost entirely and to depend on the
cumulative impact of evidence and analysis. Such was the method of
Marx in Capital, which sets forth a theory of power in the language
and framework of economic history. Many famous works of justifica-
tion dispense with rhetoric, empirical detail, or historical analysis and
trust the razor of logic and the weight of authoritative citation. This
mode of expression is particularly congenial to theologians and jurists.

The great bulk of writing on politics is more devoted to history
than to any other dimension of the subject. It would, however, be a

Political Science Today

mistake to assume that history is written for its own sake. Even the
most dreary account of changes in the structure of government is
typically inspired by the hope of making available a body of data that
will eventually help discharge the obligation shared by all political
scientists to explain the rise and fall of political institutions. The im-
mediate technique, however, is historical, bound to the collection and
criticism of sources and to the establishing of sequences of events in
time and place.

In the United States, political scientists have been captivated by
the task of tracing the roots of goverrmient, law, and politics in this
country to the soil of England or elsewhere and distinguishing be-
tween the original design and subsequent adaptations to American
experience, Woodrow Wilson's treatise on Congressional Government
is a classic work of the kind.

Systematizers deal directly with the problem of explanation by
putting forward propositions that are confirmed, or open to con-
firmation, by empirical data. One irony of history is that writers have
sometimes been identified with a single factor, a set of factors, or a
single generalization that does scant justice to the scope and subtlety
of their approach. Michels, for example, is known almost exclusively
for his formulation of the oligarchical tendencies of mass political
parties. Even Aristotle is more commonly referred to in connection
with the role of the middle classes in politics than for his discussion of
other subjects.

It is not inappropriate that Hobbes is immortalized as the ex-
ponent of psychological motives for political action or even that the
fecund Bentham is identified with a calculus of felicity. But it does
little justice to Montesquieu to narrow his originality to comments on
climate, geography, and politics or to condense Spencer to axioms on
centralization and external threat.

Grand theories of the probable course of future development only
occasionally rise to enduring influence. In this select company, Marx
and Engels take the prime position. On a far more modest scale, po-
litical scientists are continually engaged in estimating the probable
strength of trends in the immediate and remote future. For example,
students of American government have been substantially of one voice
in predicting such developments as the further centralization of the
federal system, the rise of metropolitan regions and the decline of
states, the concentration of executive power, the liquidation of ethnic
discrimination, the continuation of the two-party system, the increase
of litigation over civil and political rights, the continuation of con-

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

troversy over civil-military relations, and the extension of social in-
surance coverage.

Contributions of this kind are often made jointly with proposals
in the realm of public policy. No historian of the American Constitu-
tion is unaware of the attention paid by the most active drafters and
defenders of the document to classical and contemporary treatises on
government and law. Several of the founding fathers attained a com-
mand of the theory of government that is impressive to this day. It
is necessary to go no further than to name James Madison, Thomas
Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton. Among political scientists of the
present century, we think of the role of Woodrow Wilson, A. Lawrence
Lowell, and others in founding or promoting the League of Nations.
Whatever the problem, political scientists frequently appear as in-
novators or critics of policy. This is in fact the intellectual task that
many professional students of government find most congenial.

FUTURE PROBLEMS

Political scientists, we have said, possess a tradition of distin-
guished achievement in many areas of problem-solving importance.
As we face the future, it is safe to say that the challenges are of far-
reaching and unprecedented variety and importance. It is perhaps
useful to glance here, however briefly, at the scope of these develop-
ments.

Will questions of value goal, of overriding objective, become more
or less acute as science and technology continue their explosive
course? In all probability, these issues will not recede from sight. On
the contrary, the chances are that the immediate future contains a
unique challenge to man's conception of himself and to the values to
which he is presently committed.

I do not intend to emphasize the potentialities of modern knowl-
edge for the destruction of man and his works, formidable as these
implications are; I refer to another dimension of the problem. Among
all faiths, "man" is traditionally assumed to be an identifiable and
usually a cherished form of "life." In Europe-centered civilizations—
and America unquestionably belongs in this company — prevailing
images of man were shaped by classical philosophy and the Judaeo-
Christian religion. Asia-centered civilizations have a more varied re-
ligious inheritance, mainly Buddhist, Taoist, Hindu, and Muslim. In
whatever doctrinal terms the affirmation is grounded, the articulate
leaders of the world community presently employ the language of
deference to human dignity. Although many differences of specifica-

Political Science Today

tion exist, it is generally understood that human dignity implies an
opportunity for mobility on the basis of merit; human indignity, on
the contrary, assumes the blind immobility of caste.

The most obvious forms of "man" and "life" are easy to locate
on the cosmic map of science. There are also marginal forms, and
sooner or later the question of identity will be posed by these marginal
phenomena. Computing machines perform many intellectual tasks
more quickly than men do. Even today it is no longer out of the
question to design machines that repair themselves or reproduce their
kind. More to the point, machines can be made with built-in criteria
of "enjoyment" and with the capability of learning through experi-
ence. The original criteria, if not specified in fine detail, permit novel
responses.

As it becomes more widely recognized that the differences be-
tween man or life and machines have reached a vanishing point, the
question becomes: Shall we treat machines with the same deference
that we give ourselves as advanced forms of life ?

The same question will be posed somewhat less starkly in con-
nection with products from laboratories of experimental embryology
and related sciences. It is not easy to overcome the original image of
"thingness" where a machine is involved. Induced mutants have at
least the advantage of belonging to the traditional realm of "life." We
must be prepared, of course, to meet living systems whose central in-
tegrative plan is organized quite differently from the brain and nerv-
ous system of man.

The central issue will hinge on how the overriding goal of human
dignity is to be interpreted. Shall the idea of "human" be redefined
to bring within its field of reference many phenomena that we now
tend to exclude ? Shall we retain the current identification of the "hu-
man" with the biological envelope called Homo sapiens and merge
the "higher" characteristics of man with a larger category — "ad-
vanced forms of life" — in which the human species may some day
play a subordinate role? More specifically: When shall we extend the
protection of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to machines
and mutants?^

In whatever terms we eventually define the commonwealth of
life or delimit the forms to be called advanced, it is plausible to be-
lieve that we will feel some residual loyalty to the symbols of what we
today identify as human. Looking back from a future vantage point,
the story of man will continue to seem, in some intimate sense, "our"
history.

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

When we consider the trends that have carried the species to-
ward or away from a conception of human dignity^ it is apparent that
the decisive steps toward a positive self-image were taken during the
tens of thousands of years that elapsed before written records were
invented. Living in migratory and occasionally settled bands, early
man was in contact with protohuman forms, forms that were not
always easy to distinguish from Homo sapiens. As protohuman types
dropped out, the biological environment grew more stable. As "re-
ality" was more sharply defined, man was able to achieve a clear,
affirmative self-image.

The conception of the dignity of man includes an ordering prin-
ciple among men as well as between men and other forms of life. It
is not farfetched to conjecture that, in early generations, human sur-
vival depended on the cultivation of discipline within bands. Entirely
egocentric conduct could bring disaster to everyone. When we take
into account the propensity of individual members of the species to
act egocentrically, it is possible to perceive the evolutionary signifi-
cance of what may be called the syndrome of parochialism. Included
in the syndrome are demands by the self on the ego (and on all
group members) to sacrifice for the power of common defense and
for other shareable outcomes. Among the added outcomes were physi-
cal safety, comfort, convenience; those related to intimacy and re-
spect; and those of cultivation or transmission of know-how and of
physical facilities. There are indications of the presence of common
themes of fantasy and ritual and of common conceptions of cosmic
order. We can summarize by saying that it was the experience of
interdependency that enabled man to survive and to develop his pe-
culiar cultures.

All this lies in the shadow before records were written. The ap-
pearance of written records is a manifestation of the greatest inven-
tion of man — urban civilization. Cities are the launching pads of
mankind's meteoric rise. Urban civilization dates from about 3000 B.C.,
when the first cities emerged in the valleys of the Nile, the Tigris-
Euphrates, and the Indus.^

During the preceding tens of thousands of years, man had been
divided into small, independent folk societies, bound by ties of family
identification, mutual sacrifice, and self-preoccupation. It was in ur-
ban communities that traditional bonds of kinship were attenuated
for the benefit of territorial units; hence, the simultaneous rise of law,
legislation, and the techniques of impersonal administration. Cities

Political Science Today

brought literacy, and with literacy came records and the expansion
of knowledge in all departments. The accelerated productivity result-
ing from the new division of labor encouraged capital formation and
the building of fortifications, monuments, temples, palaces, and whole
cities. The new skills of production were also turned to destructive
use, and empires spread from an urban hub. In the new cities and
states, the social gap between ruler and ruled was not always filled
by middle-class formations. Hence, revolutions as well as wars were
fought on an unprecedented scale.

It was in city-centered civilizations that the conception of human
dignity became articulate.^ Generalizing beyond the obvious differ-
ences that divide mankind — of physiognomy and ways of life — an oc-
casional thinker, poet, or religious innovator envisioned a single family
of man and an inclusive commonwealth where everyone obtained a
basic minimum of consideration, supplemented by value indulgences
according to need and to the meritorious exercise of capability. Any
dream of a common humanity unified in a commonweal of merit chal-
lenged the ideological residues of a thousand wars and indicted every
vestige of caste.

The record shows how ideologies of human dignity rise and fall,
spread and retract, in the ebb and flow of world affairs. On the
whole, however, the conception has been moving toward universality,
and today the dominant elites of the globe give at least lip service to
human rights.

It is directly within the scope of political science to identify the
factors that impede the realization of policy goals and to assess their
relative significance. Even a cursory examination fixes attention on
the discrepancy between our articulate deference to life and the con-
tinued practice of death. How can we account for the continuing
facts of war and preparation for war? We shall briefly consider some
of the factors involved as a means of underlining this component of
the total problem-solving approach.

The perennial tragedy of the uncounted millions who despise
violence is that, in concrete circumstances, they feel constrained to
engage in organized killing as an alternative to something worse. They
are victims of a factor that is often overlooked or taken for granted
and hence underemphasized. I refer to the expectation of violence,
the expectation that, despite many formal renunciations of war, it is
probable that collective violence will continue to be used in general
and limited war.*

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

It would carry us too far into the study of a single problem to
analyze in detail the disastrous role that continues to be played by
expected violence. Perhaps it is enough to think of the position of the
effective head of a modern state. He may cherish the dream of leading
his people, and ultimately all mankind, from the shadow of annihila-
tion. He is, nevertheless, aware of many factors that hold him in
check. For instance, he cannot order serious reductions in armed
force without spreading consternation among trusted colleagues and
strengthening the hand of opposing leaders and factions within his
party. His opposite numbers abroad are simultaneously trapped in the
same bog. Given the prevailing fact of a divided and militant world,
there are plausible grounds for perpetuating the structure of precau-
tion that we call national security. The situation is further compli-
cated by the growth of vested and sentimental interests in continuing
the situation indefinitely. The threat to the general peace that results
from a divided world fluctuates through time as a function of a com-
bination of factors whose net impact determines the level of crisis.
Among major factors is the demand for intensity — of subjective life,
of communicative expression, and of overt action. The demand for
intensity is variously distributed among the cultures of the globe.
American civilization, for example, is organized to encourage a stren-
uous life of vigorous self-assertion. Intensity also varies from one social
class to another and among interest groups. And we know enough
about the structure of personality to see that intensity is a significant
personality variable.

Intensities are particularly dangerous when they are joined with
severity, the factor that is present in a "pure-power" approach to
human relations. Latent severity demands may at any time spring to
life and add to the destructive potential of diplomacy and of other
modes of international intercourse. The central feature of severity is
the obtaining of deep gratification in the act of imposing significant
value deprivations on others. (It should be expressly noted that de-
mands can be intense without exhibiting this admixture of sadism.)

It is not within the scope of the immediate task to go further with
this analysis of some of the critical factors that condition the future
of destructiveness and the attainment of a world in closer harmony
with the ideal of human dignity.^

We turn for an equally brief discussion to the fourth dimension
of our political task and project the course of certain developments
that bear on the realization of preferred events. Undoubtedly, the at-
tainment of human dignity will be intimately bound up with the future

Political Science Today

of science and technology, which have already brought us to the
threshold of an age in which man's habitat is changing.

It is worth underlining the point that, despite their spectacular
successes, science and technology have been singularly without effect
on the fundamental structure of world politics. When we look closely
at technological innovation, we are not surprised to see that improve-
ments begin at highly localized centers. During recent decades, innova-
tions diffused from originating centers that were almost exclusively in
Western Europe and North America. New instruments of production
cut the cost of production when the scale of output was sufficiently
enlarged. Hence, the manufacturing interests of a locality sought to
obtain translocal markets.

At some stage in the spread of these economic activities, power
institutions entered the picture. Seeing the local market diminish, local
producers turned to politics in order to exclude foreign competitors
and to protect their local position, or strong competing manufacturers,
equally interested in translocal trade and raw materials, turned to
politics in the hope of obtaining exclusive markets.

The piecemeal introduction of science and technology led to the
subordination of the productive and destructive potentialities of the
new pattern of civilization to the basic structure of the world political
arena. Scientists and engineers have not abolished politics; they have
not liquidated the division of the world arena; they have not changed
the domination of public affairs by rival syndromes of parochialism.
Hence, prime loyalties are less than universal; values are sacrificed for
goals less inclusive than the commonwealth of man; the expectation
of violence continues to sustain the institutions of militant division.

Is it likely that a turning point in the relation of science to power
has finally come? The question is whether the joint exploitation of the
potentialities of man's newly accessible astral environment will provide
a set of goals for the whole of mankind and for all advanced forms of
life that will appear to be of such overwhelming importance that
traditional differences will rapidly become obsolete.®

Political scientists are increasingly aware of the task of projecting
to the age of space. They are also aware that their participation in
problem-solving does not stop with the passive projection of future
development. The "creative flash" of policy innovation is no monopoly
of the man of action; it may, in fact, elude a mind dusty with every-
day affairs. Of course, it is not necessary for political inventors to
assume that their proposals will change the course of history. One
may, for instance, hold grave reservations about the probability that

10 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

the age of space will be a new era of science, order, and freedom. At
the same time, no wise man is dogmatic about present visions of fu-
ture reality, including forecasts of what cannot be done.

PROFESSIONAL ROLES

The attention that we gave above to eminent names and treatises
has drawn a somewhat unbalanced picture of the profession as a
whole. It is no use pretending that every professional student of gov-
ernment is primarily engaged in the writing of masterpieces. It is not
to be assumed that he writes at all. Many advanced students become
civil servants. A considerable fraction stays out of the civil service,
writes little, and instructs much. The active teachers shape the cur-
riculum and control the organized aspects of the profession in coun-
tries where it is possible for relatively free professions to exist. It is
also true that teachers are heavily involved in advisory activities of a
part-time character.

The sustained study of government, politics, and law was un-
doubtedly a feature of the first urban civilizations that arose in the
Nile, Tigris-Euphrates, and Indus valleys. Some of the early legal
codes suggest the presence of thoughtful minds interested in the theory
of what they were doing. Nevertheless, voluminous treatises of a
theoretical character did not appear until about twenty-five hundred
years ago. This is true whether we look to China and Confucius, India
and Kautilya, or Greece and Plato and Aristotle.^

The principal difficulty in the way of identifying members of the
political science profession in many civilizations is uncertainty about
the theoretical context of the training received by public officials. The
transmission of know-how is not enough to constitute a profession. The
scholar class in traditional China was unquestionably a profession,
since scholars were supposed to entertain comprehensive conceptions
of the place of politics in society and nature. Specific skills were ac-
quired "on the job" or in clerkships occupied to obtain the funds
needed to continue studying for examinations.*

Careers develop by playing several roles at the same time or in
sequence. For convenience, we speak of the following professional
roles that may be taken by persons who have received advanced train-
ing: teaching; research and equivalent activities; advice (participation
in public affairs short of leadership or administration) ; management
(civil service, staff of unofficial organizations) ; and leadership (com-
munity commitment on controversial issues). Many of those who re-
ceive advanced training migrate into other activities.

Political Science Today 11

Teaching about government is formally organized and carried on
at many levels. The United States Office of Education reports that
there are over two thousand universities and colleges in the United
States (2,040 in 1961). About one-third of these establishments offer
sufficiently sustained instruction in the field to award a degree (B.A.,
M.A., Ph.D.) in political science or international relations. Approxi-
mately 700 schools offer courses in political science.

At the precollege level, the study of government is frequently
merged with history and the social studies generally. No dependable
information is at hand to estimate the number of qualified professors
and teachers who are engaged in offering instruction about govern-
ment. Ambiguity rises in part from the fact that no separate depart-
ment of political science is organized even at some universities and
colleges, where it may be joined with history, economics, or another
related discipline. An unknown percentage of the courses in govern-
ment are taught by persons whose primary training is not in political
science and whose exposure to the subject is slight.^

In recent years, the demand to upgrade instruction throughout
the American educational system has favored the engagement of
qualified personnel. In this connection, the staffing policies of junior
colleges are indicative. The National Education Association has re-
ported on the new full-time teachers in 343 public and 187 nonpublic
junior colleges. The figures show that over 55 per cent of the new
teachers of political science had completed the M.A. and at least
one additional year of study or the Ph.D. No other group had a
higher record of academic qualification.

It is clear that about two-thirds of recently graduating doctors
of philosophy enter college and university teaching.

Although teaching is the principal responsibility of advanced stu-
dents of government, the obligation to contribute to the advancement
of knowledge is taken seriously. Higher degrees are awarded to candi-
dates who demonstrate, among other capabilities, their competence to
complete an acceptable piece of research. In the case of doctoral dis-
sertations, it is usual to require publication or evidence of suitability
for publication.

The number of doctoral dissertations in political science fluctu-
ates rather sharply from year to year. The Office of Education records
191 Ph.D.'s in 1959 and twenty in 1960 (plus twenty-seven Ph.D.'s in
international relations). The responding universities and colleges re-
ported 649 and 722 M.A. degrees during these years.^"

It is common knowledge that the doctoral dissertation is the only

12 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

substantial piece of research or writing that many political scientists
complete during their entire career, and this is not unusual. The term
"research" is often stretched to include the preparation of textbooks
whose novelty is mainly typographic. There are, it is reassuring to
add, textbooks that are more suitably described as treatises, since they
introduce intellectual order where little could be discerned before.
Without a separate research project, it is impossible to say what per-
centage of postdoctoral publications can be regarded as new knowl-
edge or as critical interpretations of the field deserving of equal
recognition.^^

A quick way to obtain some estimate of the body of "live writing"
in scholarly political science is to find how many titles have been put
out as paperbacks during the current revolution in publishing. The
1962 figure is 900, which covers 691 authors and ninety-nine publish-
ing houses.^^

The scholarly journals publish research and critical writing in
political science and adjacent fields. The American Political Science
Review has for many years reflected the varied intellectual interests
of the profession. The Review has, of course, been unable to provide
a channel for the many specialties within the study of government.
New — now old — journals have come into existence in public adminis-
tration, public opinion, international relations, social and political
philosophy, public law, and jurisprudence; and new periodicals are in
prospect.

The special issue of established journals and the yearbook or
symposium volume are devices that have provided an immediately
eff"ective and stimulating outlet for systematic, critical, or empirical
expression.

It has been implied, and correctly, that the most significant re-
search has been done by political scientists who retain their connec-
tions with colleges and universities. There are, nonetheless, important
reservations to this statement. The scientific and technological innova-
tions of recent days have coincided with and exacerbated a continuing
crisis in world affairs. Political scientists who are associated for long
or short periods with new and largely government-financed agencies
of research and policy critique have played an increasing part in the
recent development of political science. The practice of subcontracting
Defense Department and other official projects to universities has
done much to break down the personal and intellectual isolation that
formerly prevailed.^^

I have briefly characterized the teaching and research roles of

Political Science Today 13

political scientists. It is also important to describe the advisory func-
tion. In the present context, the advisory role is understood to be a
part-time activity carried on by political scientists who are otherwise
absorbed in research and teaching. It is widely assumed by his fellow-
citizens that a professor is, or purports to be, an authority on current
events; that he is willing and able to make public statements and to
lecture on practically everything from the assassination of X to the
politics of Zanzibar; or that he is on tap as a consultant on charter
reform, the reorganization of state government, or the politics of
foreign aid.

A rough indication of the advisory activity of political scientists
can be gleaned by examining how many are engaged as official con-
sultants at the international, national, state, or local levels of govern-
ment and how many spend some time writing for private media of
communication or working with unofficial organizations concerned
with public questions. At present, no exhaustive inventory of these
diverse connections exists. I have, however, examined the Who's Who
entries of professors of government in a few institutions with which I
am acquainted. There are, perhaps, political scientists whose advisory
roles are negligible, but they would be as rare as unicorns.

Despite the high proportion of advanced students of government
who make their careers in teaching, research, and consultation, it is
not to be supposed that career alternatives end there. A sizable frac-
tion steers toward government and enters the federal civil service;
the armed forces; the diplomatic corps; or state or local levels of
employment. I use the term "management" to cover the holding of an
official or party job and regular responsible participation in the de-
cisions of an organization that tries to influence public affairs.

The gradation between advice and management is not distinct,
since advisors sometimes become so deeply involved in a particular
activity that it absorbs their available time over many years. But it is
not difficult to identify the tenure of a definite, full-time job.

For present purposes, I distinguish advice and management from
each other, and I give separate consideration to the role of leadership.
This term is intended to designate the public leader, the one who
plays an influential, conspicuous part in public affairs. Leadership
goes beyond advice to commitment; it goes beyond management to
goal-setting and high-level integration. The full-time public figure or
active politician comes in this category.

Many young people have studied government in the hope of
pursuing active political careers, and they have done so. Given the

14 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

variety of ladders by which an ambitious young man or woman may
become a political leader, it is common for students of political science
to approach the goal somewhat indirectly. They may, for example,
begin by teaching and move into active participation in civic and
party affairs. An increasing number find that the most direct route is
to serve an apprenticeship with an active leader, starting as a research
or administrative assistant and moving up. Some young people have
organized, or taken an active part in, civic or issue organizations. For
others, the media of mass communication are the obvious choice, since
journalists or commentators have high public visibility. By tradition,
many students of government have added legal training to their
equipment and obtained a foothold by practicing law and partici-
pating vigorously in public affairs.^*

The five roles described above refer to the major specializations
in the official and informal government of our society. As indicated
above, many students of government move away from careers of this
kind, often going into business and dealing with public affairs in the
intermittent fashion that characterizes most citizens. It is not to be
assumed that the study of government is lost on the hundreds of
thousands of students who receive some exposure to the study of
politics at the collegiate, secondary, or presecondary level. On the
contrary, there is little doubt that some permanent impressions are
left. We are at present in no position to assert that these effects im-
portantly determine conduct or to establish whether — to face unwel-
come contingencies with candor — the exposure to political science, as
usually taught, leaves negative conceptions of the field and, indeed,
of the aims and potentialities of citizenship.

POLITICAL SCIENTISTS IN THE DECISION PROCESS

We have cursorily inspected the role of political scientists as seen
by themselves. Our inquiry goes deeper, however; the most pressing
question about the study of government relates to the adequacy of
political science when assessed in the wider context of past and pro-
spective community decisions. Hence we shift the standpoint of ob-
servation and sketch the relationship between political scientists and
the decision process in each functional phase.

At this stage we shall not insist on precise definitions of these
phases. It is important, nevertheless, to call attention to two sets of
meanings. We distinguish between functional definitions which are set
up to serve the analytic needs of political science and the conventional
usages current in a given community. In conventional usage, the of-

Political Science Today 15

ficial decision process of the United States is carried on by various
authorized participants, among which we mention the electorate;
Congress (state and local legislatures) ; the presidency (governorship
and local chief executives); the federal departments, agencies, and
authorities (and any corresponding structures at state and local
levels); and the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary (state and
local judiciaries). In conventional terms, the world decision process
is said to be carried on multilaterally among authorized representa-
tives of state authority or in intergovernmental agencies set up for the
purpose (United Nations and other transnational structures).

No agency is authorized to tell the scholarly community what
terms must be used or how they must be defined and applied. This is
left to the judgment of each scholar, who is free to accept or reject
the terms proposed by other scholars on the basis of criteria that seem
good to him. His chief professional responsibility in the interest of
clear communication is to be explicit about the "referent" of his labels.
The rapid growth of political research in our day has brought with
it an accelerated tempo of experimentation with new concepts and
terms. Conventional usages are data of reference for functional cate-
gories. One result of terminological change is the discovery of con-
cealed or tacit meanings in the conventional language of the United
States or, indeed, of any body politic that receives close study.

As analyzed here, the decision process includes both formal au-
thority and eflfective control.^^ Thus, "lawful" power is authoritative
and controlling; "naked power" is controlling and not authoritative;
"pretended power" is not controlling. When the decision process of
any body politic is described, it is necessary to examine the pattern
of perspectives that constitute recognitions of authority and the pat-
terns that exemplify effective control.

Think of any act of decision. We conceive it as beginning in an
influx of information from sources at the focus of attention of partici-
pants in the decision process, some of whom perceive that their goal
values have been or may be affected in ways that can be influenced
by community decision. We refer to this as the intelligence phase.

The next phase is recommending, or promoting, which refers to
activities designed to influence the outcome. The prescribing phase is
the articulation of norms; it includes, for instance, the enacting of en-
forceable statutes. The invoking phase occurs when a prescription is
provisionally used to characterize a set of concrete circumstances.
When a prescription is employed with finality, we speak of application.
The appraisal phase characterizes the relationship between policy goals

16 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

and the strategies and results obtained. The terminating phase involves
the handling of expectations ("rights") established when a prescrip-
tion was in force.

Every interaction in the political process at a transnational, na-
tional, or subnational level can be examined with all seven phases of
the decision process in view. Consider, for paradigm purposes, the pub-
lication of a volume such as Charles A. Beard's Economic Interpreta-
tion of the Constitution. This was, of course, a private venture by the
author and publisher of the book. It therefore belongs to the unofficial
stream of activity. In terms of phase analysis, it obviously belongs to
the general stream of intelligence relating to the history of a major
institution of American government. Given the constellation of factors
in the political process of the time (1913), the book was immediately
interpreted as offering or implying an appraisal of the Constitution
as part of a conspiracy of various economic interest groups to use
political power through a new institution of government to their own
advantage. It is true that a literal reading of Beard's book does not
lend support to the conspiracy theory, since no evidence is presented
of a secret strategy among the principal groups named as beneficiaries
of the new form of government. For that matter, the assertion is not
flatly made that all who stood to benefit in the enumerated ways were
aware in advance of ratification of their advantageous position and
exerted themselves for adoption. There are no actual estimates of
the alleged impact of the calculation of economic advantage on the
behavior of the persons most actively engaged in promoting the Con-
stitution. Nevertheless, many phrases in the book are sufficiently am-
biguous to lend themselves to the "liberal" view prevalent in many
American circles at the time that both the Constitution and the Court
originated as part of an antidemocratic movement.^®

Small wonder, then, that Beard's book was turned to active prop-
aganda use by crusaders who claimed to be completing the democratic
revolution in America. Monopoly finance and industry were the prin-
cipal enemies, and Beard's volume was said to confirm the allegation
that financial influences had been active and successful from the be-
ginning of the constitutional system.

It can also be suggested that the prescribing and applying phases
of decision were aff"ected by Beard's contribution, since it fostered a
"sociological" and "realistic" approach to the work of the courts.
American sociological and realistic schools of jurisprudence were ac-
tively forming at the time. They emphasized the importance of think-
ing about the social consequences of decision and especially of giving

Political Science Today 17

weight to economic repercussions, rather than remaining at a formalis-
tic level of doctrinal analysis. In effect, Beard had written a brief on
behalf of a problem-solving method that emphasized the importance
of bringing economic causes and consequences to the focus of judges'
attention. And judges — as is today widely understood — make law
whenever they affirm or deny the relevance of a prescription to a con-
troversy. When the intellectual method of judges is modified, the reper-
cussions go far, since the bar now advises clients to adopt a new
approach to the judiciary. It is conceivable, though difficult to demon-
strate conclusively, that the economic interpretation influenced the
readiness of community decision-makers to deal generously with private
claims for compensation. If past privileges came into existence as a re-
sult of the undue influence of monopoly interests, why deal gently with
them in controversies growing out of the exercise of eminent domain
or franchise termination?

That Beard's publication interacted with every phase of the de-
cision process is not, in principle, an exception. It is true that few
recent books have had such an immediate succes de scandale or a
more solid impact on the tools of thought. When a new trend of
thought begins, many publications are necessary to build the pre-
dispositions required to accept a "famous" culminating volume. Sub-
sequent contributions, though individually minor, largely confirm the
trend.

The interplay between political science and the total process of
decision goes far beyond the eff"ects obtained from book publication.
This will be more evident as we give separate, though necessarily
brief, consideration to each of the seven decision phases that we have
identified.

The Intelligence Phase

Every government develops a network of structures specialized in
obtaining information about the intentions and capabilities of actual
and potential allies and opponents in the world arena and detecting
subversive tendencies at home. Relatively covert channels of informa-
tion are supplemented by overt data-gathering operations conducted
by census agencies and by diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural
attaches abroad. The information is organized in terms of trend,
analyzed as to cause, projected into the future, and related to clarified
goals and to potential alternatives of policy.

Political scientists are among the specialists who are heavily re-
lied upon to supply personnel for information and planning agencies

18 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

of government at all levels. The literature of political science has a
long tradition of concern with the strategy and tactics of intelligence.
In ancient monarchies and tyrannies, the theorists of government were
well aware of the difficulties of obtaining reliable information. Thus we
find in Kautilya's Arthasastra explicit consideration given the choice
of agents for covert operations; guidance is also provided for open in-
telligence.^^

In open societies, the channels operated by government are sup-
plemented, and often eclipsed, by the flow of information provided
by the press and by other private agencies. We observe in connection
with the press that, as it seeks to achieve professional status, its rela-
tionship with political science grows closer. In the United States, this
is indicated by the role that has been played by individuals who com-
bine journalism with political science in changing the curriculum of
schools of journalism.

To the intelligence agencies of any body politic must be added
the universities and private organizations of research and planning.
In many countries, the rise of centers of advanced instruction has been
furthered by political objectives; and these objectives have included
obtaining a large supply of knowledgeable specialists in public law,
international politics, government, and administration. That knowl-
edge is perceived as a base of power is emphasized in the history of
institutions of higher learning. The German university system took
shape in the shadow of Napoleon, and L'ficole Libre des Sciences
Politiques was born after the humiliation of 1870. More recently, the
institutions of higher learning among the defeated powers underwent
varying degrees of reconstruction, especially in political studies. Mod-
ernizing and industrializing countries are everywhere alert to the fact
that the complex fabric of world society cannot be grasped unless an
adequate supply of trained specialists are produced at home as well
as abroad. In such programs, the study of political science occupies a
place, occasionally of great emphasis.

American universities have been welcomed abroad by many re-
viving civilizations or modernizing societies, and political scientists have
been actively involved in the development of programs designed to
increase the supply of competent administrators of the public services
and to widen the vision and the skills at the disposal of the rising
generation of American students. In 1957-1958, there were 382 ex-
change programs at 184 American universities, covering a vast range
of subjects. In 1960-1961, 53,107 foreign students from 143 countries
and political areas were enrolled at 1,666 institutions of higher learn-

Political Science Today 19

ing in this country. More than 15,300 American students were at-
tending foreign universities. More than 3,600 members of foreign
faculties were affiliated with 304 American colleges and universities,
and more than 2,200 members of American faculties were teaching
abroad. Edward W. Weidner calls attention to the fact that the Center
for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and the Michigan-Okayama project in area studies are among the
programs that have been effectively used for research as well as other
purposes.^^

The Promoting Phase

Where popular government exists, the official agencies of per-
suasion are often less potent than political parties, pressure groups,
and other private associations. Nevertheless, as "big government"
grows, the line between purveying intelligence and promoting policy is
dimmed. In closed systems, no pretense is made that a proper function
of government is the providing of pure information. In the arena of
foreign politics, it is everywhere taken for granted that news and com-
ment are slanted in order to influence policy commitments.

In the United States, modern information and propaganda serv-
ices began by relying on newspaper reporters and editors, since it was
obvious that a large part of the job was to win the confidence of other
media men. In many cases, however, there were advantages in reach-
ing government officials at the national or subnational level, and ex-
pert knowledge became an asset. Hence, political scientists were often
involved. Since promotional activity to some extent entails negotiation
between government officials and party leaders or other group leaders,
lawyers are often chosen to do the job. This is partly because many
party leaders have legal training and because many managers of pri-
vate associations are lawyers or ex-lawyers. Political scientists, especially
those with training and experience in international relations, have an
advantage in various transnational operations.^^

The study of government often leads to the invention of proposed
lines of policy innovation. Political scientists typically feel under an
obligation to provide civic leadership where leaders are few or weak.
Hence it is possible to call attention to many policy innovations at the
national, transnational, or subnational level that owe a great deal to
the promotional zeal of individual political scientists. I shall undertake
no definitive summary of these activities, although it may be service-
able to cite a few cases. In world affairs, the United Nations, the
movement toward international arbitration and adjudication, and the

20 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

pursuit of collective security were causes with which prominent po-
litical scientists actively identified themselves. Perhaps the names of
J. W. Garner and of Quincy Wright, the dean of academic students
of international politics, are sufficient reminders of the scholars in-
volved.

The reform movements that aimed at improving the mechanisms
of government in the United States included many campaigns with
which students of government became prominently identified. Think
only of the council-manager movement or the demands for women's
suflFrage; for the direct election of senators; for primary elections; for
a simplified ballot; for the initiative, referendum, and recall; for per-
manent registration and voting machines; for separation of national
and local elections; for redistricting (antigerrymandering) ; for poll
watchers and safeguards to ensure honest tabulation of ballots; for
organized civil service; for administrative consolidation (county and
local) ; for independent, dominant-purpose "authorities" — and I have
barely made an inroad on the list.

The Prescribing Phase

A legislature is the most distinctive official structure specialized in
the prescribing function. It is common knowledge that legal training
is a major asset in running for elective office, and no one is surprised
to learn that research confirms the established image. However, there
are indications that, as professions become differentiated, the domi-
nance of the lawyer is somewhat weakened. Leaving aside the fact that
legal training is often preceded or combined with advanced training
in political science, we note that full-fledged members of the political
science profession sometimes appear in Washington in the Senate or
the House.2°

Political scientists have been active in varying degrees in state
legislatures and in the municipal councils of many communities, large
and small. In some countries, legislators are heavily recruited from
the civil service and hence have received advanced education in gov-
ernment.^^

In the last few decades, the legislatures have become increasingly
aware of the magnitude of the responsibilities that they bear in
complex modern societies. The chief executive has the advantage of
drawing on the entire administrative establishment for intelligence and
recommendations. Legislatures, on the contrary, are handicapped by
lack of control over sources on which they can rely. As a result, new
agencies have been brought into being, or greatly expanded, in the

Political Science Today 21

hope of overcoming current limitations. The Library of Congress, for
example, has steadily extended its Legislative Reference Service. Fur-
thermore, the committees of Congress have augmented their staffs with
professionally qualified personnel. The committee investigation device
has been given a new lease on life in recent years as a means of coping
with the almost overwhelming burden on Congress. Political scientists
have played an active role in strengthening the intelligence agencies
specializing in the immediate requirements of legislatures at every
level.22

A comprehensive functional analysis of the prescribing phase of
decision in the United States must await research bringing the prin-
cipal private organizations into the picture with government. A pre-
scription is not identical to the words of a statute, although the statute
is of importance in stabilizing the perspectives that constitute a pre-
scription. The text of a statute can be used to make a tentative in-
ference regarding the labor-management code, for example. However,
the inference must be verified by ascertaining whether the alleged
prescription is in fact applied to most of the situations to which it is
presumably applicable. By examining concrete circumstances and by
discovering the views of "insiders," it may be possible to confirm the
original hypothesis regarding the content of a prescription. On the
other hand, the pattern may be so confused that no prescription can
be said to exist.

The relative independence of law from the phraseology of con-
stitutional charters or legislative statutes is well brought out in the
case of customary regulation of a market.-^ It often happens that the
statutes-at-large lack definite statements about fair-trade practice. Yet,
if one interviews representative traders, it will be apparent that prac-
tically everyone expects participants in market transactions to live up
to rather clear norms. A consensus also exists about the sanctions that
will undoubtedly be used against an occasional offender. In the con-
text of the market, or even of the body politic as a whole, some of
these unofficial sanctions are classifiable as severe, rather than mild
(for example, exclusion from all markets) . If our functional definition
employs the term "law" to refer to norms enforceable by means of
severe sanctions, we classify community-tolerated severe unofficial
practices as law. Conversely, we do not accept the face of the statutory
text as establishing the existence of a law. In fact, research may show
that nobody expects a given statutory norm to be enforced and as-
sumes that whatever sanctions are applied will be mild, not severe.

It is appropriate to refer to the wider context of community life

22 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

because it calls attention to the fact that effective legislation is in
course of enactment in interactions that take place outside legislatures.
We speak of the "minds and hearts of men," or, less rhetorically, the
prescribing phase of the decision process is carried out as expectations
change or remain the same.

One implication of this is that political scientists affect the pre-
scriptive code of a body politic by engaging in the scholarly act of re-
affirming or altering research conclusions about severely sanctioned
norms. These affirmations influence the assumptions of public officials,
party and pressure group members, and effective figures in other pri-
vate associations.

Community expectations are also modified in the classroom or
the tutorial session. The instruction of future decision-makers is a
matter of consequence in any body politic. We are aware of acute
sensitivity in all matters that affect the rearing of the heir apparent
of the monarch, the heirs apparent of an oligarchy, or the leaders of
a popular government. The deference accorded by the emperor of
China to his tutor — the tutor was exempted from the usual forms of
etiquette — is well known. In the Indian classics, the rearing of the
princes especially emphasizes the role of companions. The preoccupa-
tion of classical Greece with the political socialization of the entire
citizenship is justifiably celebrated. In the vast democracies of con-
temporary times, the educational task is channeled through huge in-
stallations in which professional students of government play a
prominent part in crystallizing basic expectations— or in failing to do
so.

The teachers and researchers, then, perform a legislative, a pre-
scriptive, function which is insufficiently recognized in many formal
treatises on government. Unless they transmit fundamental expecta-
tions regarding the allocation and the objects of power, they fail to
transmit the constitutional framework of the body politic. In this way,
they perpetuate or amend the constitution.

The Invoking Phase

It is comparatively easy to identify the official organs of govern-
ment whose responsibilities are highly specialized in the invoking phase
of the decision process. The policeman who makes an arrest alleges
that a specific act violates prescription; so, too, do the prosecuting at-
torney who seeks an indictment and the grand jviry which indicts.
The health inspector who tickets a violation or the building inspector
who finds a deviation from the building code is confronting a concrete

Political Sciejice Today 23

case with a provisional application of what purports to be authoritative
community prescription.

In our society, the bulk of the invoking function occurs unoffi-
cially. Think of all the controversies among private individuals and
groups in which the argument is about the "law" and an alleged
violation. If legal counsel is brought in, negotiations may continue un-
til a settlement is reached without introducing into the controversy
the official decision-makers of the whole community.

Although the role of the lawyer in acts of invocation is prominent,
the trained political scientist is actually involved at many points. Po-
litical scientists are often engaged in administrative activities where
questions of conformity to regulation are conspicuous. Indeed, the en-
tire stream of administrative action is supposed to stay within the
channels laid down by the basic prescriptive code, and the legality of
alternative courses of action may be impugned at any moment. A large
part of the routine task of administration is to act directly on private
individuals and organizations which are required to show that they
have lived up to officially prescribed standards. In this connection, we
think of the regulatory agencies concerned with commerce, finance,
industrial and agricultural production, relations of employer and em-
ployee, transportation and communication, resource conservation, and
private education.

To an increasing extent, regulatory agencies draw their com-
missioners and staff from among political scientists. The literature in-
cludes many attempts to arrive at working principles of administrative
regulation. When are objectives best served by formal invocation?
When is it enough to refrain from initiative?^*

The Application Phase

When an administrative tribunal or court has the last word in a
dispute or an executive decides to proceed with a project, a "final"
commitment is made in the decision process. Most of the personnel
engaged in public administration are presumably absorbed in activities
of this kind.

The continuing operations of government — ^which we call enter-
prisory activities — make use of most of the facilities available to public
authorities. Although we are in no position to give precise estimates
of the number of political scientists who are engaged in the application
phase of government, there are grounds for saying that perhaps a
third of all who do advanced work find their way into government
service rather than into private research or teaching.

24 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The literature of political science reflects the breadth of pro-
fessional interest in the widely ramified tasks of application. Practically
every field of administrative specialization has been enriched by this
literature. Recall the treatises that focus directly on problems of or-
ganization, personnel selection, management, and fiscal administration.
Every value-institution process that is touched by government has
generated an inter-disciplinary collection of books and journals. This
is abundantly true of education, public health, and welfare administra-
tion. The last-named tends to fan out to include all government con-
tact with the family. In recent times, American political scientists have
concentrated on the use of the established instruments of national
policy for the achievement of the overriding goals of the system of
public order. The quality and quantity of contributions to the strategy
and tactics of military, diplomatic, and communications policy have
risen sharply.

The Appraisal Phase

Official agencies set up specialized structures to report on the
degree to which objectives have been fulfilled, to account for perform-
ance or nonperformance, and especially to assess the impact on the
result. In many cases, reports from operating branches are reviewed
to discover degrees of fulfillment or nonfulfillment of task. Auditing,
inspecting, and censoring units participate in the appraisal function.
In large modern governments, it is not unusual for management, often
supplemented by outside consulting services, to study the efficiency
with which operations are carried on and to weigh the effect of "the
organization chart" on results.

Legislative bodies spend a large part of their time employing the
mechanisms of committee inquiry in attempts to perform the appraisal
task. The "watchdog" role is congenial to many legislators and legis-
lative assistants. In many instances, we cannot discover without new
investigation precisely "who does what" in connection with appraisal.
It is, nevertheless, clear that political scientists often gravitate toward
this phase of the governmental process.

It is obvious that many individuals and agencies whose main job
is appraisal perform other distinguishable functions. Inspectors may go
beyond factual reporting and performance analysis to recommend
changes of personnel, of operating policy, or of organizational struc-
ture. Censors may be authorized to suspend or to indict (invoking or
applying functions) . Control commissions may proceed to reorganize

Political Science Today 25

units of government — unmistakably an applying or even a prescribing
activity. ^^

When we turn from official to unofficial appraisal, the part that
political scientists play looms in the foreground. A significant propor-
tion of all political science publications has to do with the assessment
of policy or of specific factors that influence the outcome of official
acts. Given the ideological structure of the United States, it is pre-
dictable that systematic students of government will contribute to the
appraisal of such external policy commitments as participation in
(rather than isolation from) international organizations and programs
of military, economic, diplomatic, and cultural aid (or refusal of aid) .
On questions of internal policy, an audience is always ready to give
attention to studies showing that an expanded federal government
program has positive (or negative) effects on individual freedom,
pluralistic enterprise, or state and local government. Our ideological
heritage prepares us to listen to appraisals of the balance between
civilian and military elements in the body politic or to evaluations of
more (or fewer) limitations on freedom to speak, listen, or investigate.
The American ideological system provides an explicit or implied
agenda for the perpetual review of the place of government in society,
with particular concern for individual development.^®

The Terminating Phase

When public policy changes in ways that disturb established ex-
pectations, the community often seeks to ease the difficulties of termi-
nation and establishes agencies to settle the claims put forward. If
land is expropriated for public purposes, "just compensation" clauses
provide norms of adjustment. In public emergencies, various groups
may suffer disproportionately, and, at the termination of the prescrip-
tions authorized during the crisis, private groups may be given restitu-
tion or compensation. When private relations are ended — as in divorce,
bankruptcy, or dissolution of a college — the community intervenes to
safeguard public order.

Matters connected with severance of personnel and payment of
pension benefits, as well as with the administration of sanction law,
enter the terminating phase of public action. The authority to parole
or pardon is included here. Political scientists figure in many special-
ized organs connected with the terminating function and are assisting
in the evolution of a body of literature that undertakes to clarify this
often-neglected dimension of community action. For many years, most

26 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

of the questions at issue were left to the attorneys, on the tacit as-
sumption that the aggregate impact of poHcy change was not worth
looking into or that it could not be tackled with any prospect of suc-
cess.

To summarize, political scientists are actively involved at every
phase of the decision process of the commonwealth at all levels —
national, international, and subnational. Although every phase of de-
cision is directly or indirectly affected by what they say or do, the chief
professional role of students of government is most immediately linked
with the functions of intelligence and appraisal. As teachers and re-
search workers, political scientists are responsible for presenting an in-
clusive, reality-tested image of the changing role of government in the
social process of every community. Their responsibility includes the
linking of descriptive and explanatory knowledge and estimates of
the future with clarified interpretations of community goals and evalu-
ations of major policy alternatives.

Although leadership is not the primary function of political scien-
tists, many students of government possess the additional qualities that
make for active and conspicuous influence. The framers of the Amer-
ican constitutional system were often learned men who, if they did not
devote themselves to the full-time study or practice of government,
nevertheless sought enlightenment from every promising source, an-
cient or contemporary, on the pressing questions of public policy with
which they were confronted. For a few outstanding Americans, notably
Woodrow Wilson, professional inquiry into government provided a
career that culminated in high office and a source of guidance that led
to a complex achievement of dazzling success and crushing defeat.

NOTES

^ I have referred to such problems in my presidential address to the Amer-
ican Political Science Association, "Political Science of Science: An
Inquiry into the Possible Reconciliation of Mastery and Freedom,"
American Political Science Review, 50 (1956), 961-979.

^V. Gordon Childe, What Happened in History (Baltimore: Pelican Books,
1954).

3 J. A. Wilson, The Culture of Ancient Egypt (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1951), particularly Chap. 5; but see S. N. Kramer,
From the Tablets of Sumer (Indian Hills, Colo.: Falcon's Wing
Press, 1956), Chap. 13. Further sidelights in H. and H. A. Frank-
fort, J. A. Wilson, and T. Jacobsen, Before Philosophy, "The In-

Political Science Today 27

tellectual Adventure of Ancient Man" (Baltimore: Penguin Books,
1949).

* Some current models of world politics are M. Kaplan, System and Process
in International Relations (New York: Wiley, 1957); G. Liska,
International Equilibrium (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1957); T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960); A. Rappoport, Fights, Games, and
Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960); K.
Boulding, Defense and Conflict, "A General Theory" (New York:
Harper and Row, 1962); W. H. Riker, The Theory of Political
Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

5Cf. M. S. McDougal et al., Studies in World Public Order (1960); M. S.
McDougal and F. P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum Public Order
(1961); M. S. McDougal and W. T. Burke, The Public Order of
Oceans (1962) — all New Haven: Yale University Press — and M.
Kaplan and N. de B. Katzenbach, The Political Foundations of In-
ternational Law (New York: Wiley, 1961).

^ Concerning the use of past-future constructs as a component of problem-
solving method, see H. Eulau, "H. D. Lasswell's Developmental
Analysis," Western Political Quarterly, 11 (1958), 229-242.

^ See D. S. Nivison and A. F. Wright, eds., Confucianism in Action (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1959); E. Barker, Greek Political
Theory, "Plato and his Predecessors" (4th ed.; London: Methuen,
1951); Kautilya, Arthasastra, trans. R. Shamasastry with introduc-
tory note by J. F. Fleet (4th ed.; Mysore: Sri Raghuveer Printing
Press, 1951).

^ Cf , T. S. Ch'ii, Local Government in China under the Ch'ing (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1962).

^ The figures concerning the United States come from National Education
Association, Teacher Supply and Demand in Universities, Colleges,
and Junior Colleges (Washington, D.C.: National Education As-
sociation, 1962), and the national office of the American Political
Science Association, Washington, D.C. John D. Millett's Committee
on Standards of Instruction (American Political Science Associ-
ation) found that 786 colleges and universities offer political science
courses. Of these, 466 have separately organized departments. In
162 instances, political science is joined with history; in 129 cases,
political science is part of a department of social studies. Cf. Amer-
ican Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 417-421.

^° Some information about political science outside the United States is
available through the International Political Science Association
and UNESCO. Cf., e.g., "Teaching of the Social Sciences in the
U.S.S.R.," International Social Science Journal, 11 (1959), No.

28 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

2; J. Barents, Political Science in Western Europe, "A Trend Re-
port" (London: Stevens and Sons, 1961).

^^ The International Social Science Journal publishes current news and re-
search in the United States and other countries. Representative
numbers: "The Study and Practice of Planning," 11 (1959), No.
3; "Citizen Participation in Political Life," 12 (1960), No. 1;
"Technical Change and Political Decision," 12 (1960), No. 3; and
"The Parliamentary Profession," 13 (1961), No. 4.

^- H. Holland, Paper Backs and Reprints in Political Science (Washington,
D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1962).

13 New types of institutions or modifications of established institutions are
the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., and the Operations
Research Office, Johns Hopkins University.

I'* Cf. R. E. Lane, Political Life, "How People Get Involved in Politics"
(Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1959), and the literature of elite
analysis.

1^ I adhere to the usages in H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and So-
ciety, "A Framework of Political Inquiry" (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1950), and H. D. Lasswell, The Decision Process,
"Seven Categories of Functional Analysis" (College Park, Md. :
University of Maryland Press, 1956). Among the analyses of de-
cision, attention should be given to the suggestions of R. A. Dahl,
C. E. Lindblom, R. C. Snyder and associates, H. A. Simon, and
G. A. Almond — among others.

1*^ For example, the concluding sentence of the book says that the Constitu-
tion "was the work of a consolidated group whose interests knew
no state boundaries and were truly national in scope." Cf. the sharp
critique of Beard on factual ground in R. E. Brown, Charles Beard
and the Constitution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956);
also, B. C. Borning, The Political and Social Thought of Charles
A. Beard (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962).

1^ On intelligence problems, especially in reference to questions of external
policy, R. Hilsman's work is especially useful: Strategic Intelligence
and National Decisions (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1956). The
older literature on public opinion — by Walter Lippmann and John
Dewey, for example — is concerned with what the intelligently par-
ticipating citizen needs to know and what stands in his way. We
can expect more empirical studies oriented to gauging the effect on
aggregate decisions of various total patterns of statement available
to decision-makers.

18 Among political scientists who have joined with others, particularly edu-
cators, to guide or evaluate programs may be mentioned E. W.
Weidner — whose The World Role of Universities (New York: Mc-

Political Science Today 29

Graw-Hill, 1962), is the standard summary — R. N. Adams, B. L.
Smith, F. A. Pinner, H. F. Cleveland, W. H. C. Laves, C. D. Fuller,
J. Gauge, G. A. Mangone, C. H. Wells, W. Y. Elliott, and many
others.

^^ Political scientists have been especially active in increasing the level of
awareness that modern politics is, at least, highly manipulative. I
refer to the stream of publications on the promotional activities of
governments, political parties, pressure groups, other private associ-
ations, and individuals.

^'^At the moment. Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D., Minn.) is the most con-
spicuous example.

21 Scattered data are in the Hoover Institute Studies on Comparative Elites
(D. Lerner, I. Pool, R. North et al. (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1952 — ); D. Marvick, Political Decision-Makers (New York:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); R. D. Matthews, The Social
Background of Political Decision-Makers (Garden City, N.Y. :
Doubleday, 1954); S. M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960).

2^ A key figure in the growth of the reference services is E. S. Griffith. G.
Galloway is the outstanding analyst of Congressional mechanisms.
Cf. K. Hofmehl, Professional Staffs of Congress (Lafayette, Ind.:
Purdue University Press, 1962).

-^ Many of the issues involved are examined in M. S. Massel, Competition
and Monopoly, "Legal and Economic Issues" (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1962).

"* Information on regulatory bodies is to be found in the work of E. P. Her-
ring, M. E. Dimock, E. Latham, M. Bernstein, M. Grodzins, and
others.

23 Suggestions are to be found in the writings of E. L. Redford and other
specialists on administrative strategy.

26 On civil-military relations, for example, see, among others : W. T. R. Fox,
S. P. Huntington, L. I. Radway, J. Masland, A. Vagts, W. R.
Schilling, P. Y. Hammond, K. N. Waltz, S. Melman, M. J. Jano-
witz, D. C. Rapoport, B. M. Sapir, and R. C. Snyder.

Growth
and
Ambiguity

The present inquiry into the future of political science is an outgrowth
of factors more specific than those described in the preceding chapter.
As we shall presently demonstrate, the profession has been rapidly
expanding in numbers and diversity of activity; and the result has
been considerable ambiguity in the conception of the roles proper to
political scientists.

EXPANSION

A convenient point of departure is the formation of the American
Political Science Association in 1903, an organizational step that had
been taken by the economists in 1885 and the historians in 1884. The

Growth and Ambiguity 31

initiative for a distinct organization is to be seen as a manifestation of
the process whereby the mother discipHne of philosophy was losing
intellectual and organizational control of the study of social and po-
litical life. As the nineteenth century wore on, the reorganization of
higher learning and research had accelerated.^

In the United States, the formation of centers for advanced study
and research proceeded with some rapidity after Reconstruction. The
Johns Hopkins University came into existence at one stroke in 1876,
and both The University of Chicago and Stanford were launched in
the 1890's. The older institutions were responding to the same ex-
pansionist forces. (The Ph.D., for instance, was inaugurated at Yale
in 1861.) Of particular importance for political science was the Fac-
ulty of Political Science that was approved at Columbia University in
1880.

The rise of political science benefited from the superimposition
of features borrowed from the German university system on those of
the English college. The study of government and other social sciences
as independent professional disciplines was inadvertently furthered by
the disappearance of the European-style faculty of law in the migra-
tion of university traditions to America. The tradition that training
for the bar is strictly technical was established early in this country.
The basic task was conceived as preparing students to pass state ex-
aminations for admission to the practice of law. With this back-
ground, the law schools attached to American universities did not
become faculties of law in the European sense after the university
movement reached America in the 1870's. In the universities of Berlin
or Paris, for example, the faculty of law was part of the faculty of
philosophy and included lectures on subjects that we classify as po-
litical science, economics, or some other social science. In the United
States, it was definitely established that the dominant law-school
figures had no interest in European-style faculties of law. At Colum-
bia University, for example, Prof. John W. Burgess undertook to
broaden the scope of the Law School by lecturing on comparative
constitutional law in the manner with which he had become ac-
quainted as a graduate student in Germany. His lectures, which began
in 1876, were not popular and were presently discontinued.

The resistance of American law schools to becoming faculties of
law proved a blessing in disguise to the social sciences. In the Euro-
pean faculty of law, specialists other than lawyers were privately or
openly regarded as second-class citizens who had little claim on uni-

32 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

versity resources to develop new directions of inquiry. At Columbia's
Faculty of Political Science and Public Law, the social sciences were
no longer subject to the faculties of philosophy or of law. A distinct
Faculty of Science was responsible for "natural philosophy." It was
administratively unwieldy and intellectually incongenial to group all
the social sciences with philosophy or with arts and letters. The result
was a tripartite university structure in which the natural and bio-
logical sciences, the social sciences, and what were presently called the
humanities occupied separate administrative realms. The tripartite
system was varied at different places — by the separation of physical
and biological sciences, for instance, or by an outer breastwork of
such professional schools as law, medicine, and engineering. But the
American plan was trinitarian, a tripartite separation of responsibility
in place of the unitary conception of philosophy as pure, and the
professions as applied, knowledge.

Concomitant with the rise of the social sciences within the uni-
versity was another organizational development that reflected and
further crystallized the intellectual currents of the time. I refer to the
growth of organized departments for the administration of advanced
instruction and the cultivation of research. As the departments began
to compete for graduate students, they became more aware of the
market. As the demand for graduate schools and departments spread
throughout the country, the new schools and departments constituted
their own best market and fostered the intellectual consolidation of
each field of specialization. When departments were completed at the
main universities, new outlets were found at lower echelons of the
educational system itself. Hence, departmental plans of organization
were extended or confirmed at college and secondary levels. At the
same time, new career opportunities were sought or opened spon-
taneously outside the educational network. For departments of po-
litical science, this meant chiefly the civil service at all levels of
government.

The expansion of the American Political Science Association de-
pended on the emergence at several universities of strong faculties for
teaching and research. The association began with 214 members and
by 1960 had grown to 9,000 (including institutions). These figures
convey an accurate picture of the expansion. The impression is con-
firmed when we glance at other associations In which political scien-
tists predominate or take an active part (in public administration,
international law, law teachers). Further, we take note of regional
organizations that cover the country.^

Growth and Ambiguity 33

DIVERSIFICATION

More significant than the simple fact of expansion is the growth
of diversified activity. A recent indication is the establishment of na-
tional headquarters for the A.P.S.A. in Washington, D.C., and the
launching of programs of service to the profession and to the local,
national, and international community. The congressional internship
program is an excellent example of a service to the profession and to
the body politic as a whole. The program brings academically trained
students and instructors into intimate contact with one another and
also with the organs, procedures, and personnel of statecraft. The
headquarters staflf coordinates preparation for periodic conventions
and looks after publication, placement, and consultative activities.

In the educational system of the nation, the growth of political
science instruction and research has been rapid. When the A.P.S.A.
was founded in 1903, there were 977 colleges and universities in the
United States. Not many departments of political science were in
existence either separately or jointly with history or some other dis-
cipline. Present figures do not reflect the relatively modest numbers
of graduate programs that were then available or the number of ad-
vanced degrees awarded at the turn of the century.

The diversification of political science is reflected in many ways.
Long before the twentieth century, instruction in political philosophy,
law, and government policy was included in the curriculum of colleges
of liberal arts. At some of the better-known colleges, it was the custom
for the president to participate directly in the induction of the senior
class into these mysteries.

In contemporary decades, the field has been prodigiously sub-
divided and extended. The history of political philosophy has con-
tinued to emphasize Greek and Roman thought. It has, however, been
modified in many ways. More attention has been given to the political
inheritance of non-European civilizations, notably Chinese, Japanese,
and Indian. The accumulating weight of precedent in the American
legal system has had a parochializing effect on instruction and in-
vestigation in the study of constitutional, municipal, and administra-
tive law, an eflfect only partly compensated by the attention given to
international law and occasionally to jurisprudence.

The most massive change has been in what is often called de-
scriptive political science. Even the most cursory review of curricular
oflFerings in representative departments confirms the fact of course
expansion in the study of political parties; pressure (or interest)
groups and leadership; public opinion; public administration, with

34 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

emphasis on organization, personnel, and finance; and with state,
metropolitan, and local government. Descriptive courses have gone
well beyond the traditional account of the British parliamentary sys-
tem, the governments of Western Europe, or even the totalitarian or
near-totalitarian leviathans of recent times. Under the impact of
America's expanding role in the arena of world politics, instruction
is offered in international organization and in the regional problems
of the Americas; Africa; and the Near, Middle, and Far East.

THE PUBLIC IMAGE

That the relationship between political scientists and the en-
vironment has been changing need occasion no surprise. The trans-
formation indicated in the preceding paragraphs could not have
occurred without community support.

A link between the professional study of government and public
affairs is occasionally brought to general notice when an academic
specialist plays a prominent part in national politics. Woodrow Wilson
is the only president of the United States who spent the early years
of his adult career as a professor of government. There are, however,
senators, representatives, governors, mayors, and political bosses who
have received degrees in political science or taught the subject. The
mention of Woodrow Wilson may bring to many minds the image of
a public figure whose effectiveness was flawed by an aloof and self-
righteous personal style of the kind that is often supposed to betray
the academic man. A tendency to overgeneralize in this direction may
be partially corrected by recalling the late Bois Penrose, of Pennsyl-
vania, who was taken by many of his contemporaries as a symbol of
unscrupulous practicality. Penrose appeared in print in the publica-
tions of the graduate school at Johns Hopkins University.^

A significant trend is discernible in the public image of political
science and political scientists. It is not too much to say that, until
recent years, there was no such image in general circulation. A po-
litical scientist was not appreciably different from any other academic
"long hair" (or "crew cut"). One searches the Congressional Record
in vain for other than an occasional matter-of-fact or derisive refer-
ence to the political scientist. The Congressional Record now contains
many appreciative references to the work of the American Political
Science Association. Dozens of congressmen have come in touch with
capable and earnest young political scientists through the internship
program. Many public officials, committees, and agencies have learned
to recognize a special field of competence, thanks to their experience

Growth and Ambiguity 35

with staff members of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library
of Congress. The headquarters of the association have become a clear-
inghouse for routing requests for information to qualified persons.
Daily contact is creating an image of political science as a contributor
to the intricate tasks of official and unofficial participation in public
affairs.

The image, it must be repeated, is recent and dim and contains
both ambiguity and contradiction. And this public image is not un-
related to the corresponding self-conception of many, if not most,
members of the profession. Ambiguity and confusion betray the inner
tensions that have accompanied the rapid development of the field.

Ambiguities in the Self-image

The clearest evidence of inner stress is the unsettled character
of advanced training, especially at the graduate level, particularly in
the first year and in the basic survey of the field. Traditionally, the
fundamental course was "political theory"; in practice this was a
chronological review of political philosophy in classical and post-
classical Europe. In recent years, however, the expansion of descrip-
tive political science has led to dissatisfaction with the traditional
course as an introduction to the field. The trend has been toward
surveying the "scope and method" of political science. The survey is'
expected to provide a systematic view of the field and some training in
the chief data-gathering and processing procedures available. Diffi-
culties arise from the fact that members of the political science de-
partment who have specialized in the history of political thought are
not always acquainted with the methods of research into the con-
temporary political process. Nor are they necessarily adept at sys-
tematic presentations that take into account the findings and
potentialities of contemporary research. In many cases, they are in-
tellectually alienated from the "new" political science and are un-
willing to undergo the discipline required to achieve more than lay
acquaintance with the appropriate methods.

Lack of agreement about the goals and procedures of political
science is reflected in the range of solutions, often temporary, that
have appeared in various places. Some graduate schools are unable to
agree on a "scope-and-method" course and provide no unified picture
of the past, present, and prospective future of political science. In a
fragmented department of this kind, the power process is more likely
to be practiced than investigated. In such an academic arena, feudal
fortresses are built to defend various provinces called "political the-

36 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ory," "political parties," "comparative government," "public law,"
"international relations," and the like. Treaties and agreements es-
tablish courses of instruction (major and minor fields) which permit
theses to be accepted and degrees to be granted without mutual dead-
lock. Every prospective appointment to the faculty is weighed in terms
of its probable impact on the balance of power and hence on the
appropriations available for salaries, research assistants, physical fa-
cilities, and fellowships. Loving and not-so-loving colleagues lie in
wait for opportunities to put one another in the wrong or to damage
self-respect. Students learn that the choice of courses and topics of
investigation are acts of allegiance or of treason and that the con-
sequences may be felt for years in letters of recommendation (or lack
of them) when occasions arise for faculty appointment, for research
and fellowship grants, or for government appointment.

Faculty participants in the power struggle within the "Hobbes-
ian" department characteristically seek to defend and improve their
positions by contracting foreign alliances, especially with govern-
ment agencies willing to subcontract research and with private foun-
dations and individuals able to make research funds available. With
these assets at their disposal, department support can be obtained by
a research consortium that absorbs graduate students from enough
"fields" to command bloc support. If the departmental arena is un-
propitious, arrangements can be made for the autonomy of a "com-
mittee," "project," or "institute" or even to secede and form a school
or department of international relations, of communication, of admin-
istration, or of thought. The arrangements call for the support of key
deans, the president or the board of trustees, and of leading donors or
alumni.

In this bellicose setting, intellectual differences of scope and
method are transmuted into fighting ideologies and slogans. In this
way "philosophy," "morality," and "religion" manage to oppose "sci-
ence," "pseudo-science," and "administrative triviality"; in reply, the
"pursuit of verifiable truth" stands over against the "arrogance" of
purported "truth by definition" and "private revelation." Even "math-
ematics" and "statistics" are fighting words, and "behavioral," "meta-
physical," and "legalistic" are expressions of opprobrium or encomium.

It has been fortunate for political science that some departments
where intellectual differences are most pronounced have been led by
men of integrity and sophistication who have been able to disagree
without rancor and to avoid the "Hobbesian" trap. Under such con-
ditions, a working agreement that accepts the fact of diversity has

Growth and Ambiguity 37

come into being and uses the collective power of the department to
preserve a situation in which students are expected to have the "right
of exposure" to able representatives of the leading currents of tra-
ditional and contemporary thought. The department achieves an
order in which the pursuit of enlightened skill is a dominating con-
cern. "Minority protection" is a majority policy.

It is evident that the inner tensions of the recent decades of ac-
celerated growth are to be explained in part by the tradition that
political science is a microcosm of the macrocosm of law, the humani-
ties, and the social and psychological sciences. Small wonder that
scholars of diverse traditions have found it difficult to live with one
another. If we examine the history of older departments of political
science, we find that the original inhabitants usually migrated from
elsewhere in the academic universe, often from history, philosophy, or
law. Modern developments have broadened the intellectual ante-
cedents or brought closer contact with sociology, psychiatry, psy-
chology, social anthropology, and related disciplines.

THE BEHAVIORAL UPSWING

It is possible to locate without difficulty the principal place and
time in American political science at which the "newer aspects" of
the subject gained momentum. The creative center was The Uni-
versity of Chicago, and the time was the 1920's and early 1930's. The
leading figure was Charles E. Merriam, who encouraged the new
emphasis at the university and through the American Political Science
Association. He also took the lead in initiating the Social Science Re-
search Council. Funds were made available for the most part through
private foundations, especially Rockefeller and Carnegie. Merriam
believed — and he was by no means alone — that political science was
too much dominated by the "library research" tradition of historians,
including historians of political theory. He sought to establish a better
balance by making it feasible for students of politics to use specialized
methods to describe political events that they observed directly. The
transition from "library research" to the conduct of field work in sur-
viving primitive societies had already transformed social anthropology.
The "participant-observer" had become acutely conscious of the im-
portance of systematic notes and of cultivating and disclosing his re-
lationship to informants. Psychiatrists were accustomed to summarizing
interview protocols and observations and to supplementing routine
medical tests with psychological instruments of measurement. Soci-
ologists and human geographers were interviewing in various com-

38 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

munities and mapping in systematic fashion the distribution of
physical habitats, artifacts, and usages. Psychologists and social psy-
chologists were experimenting with instruments designed to test in-
formation, to discover evaluative judgments, or to measure the
personality as a system.

The initiative taken by Merriam was to supplement, not sup-
plant, lethargy of the chair by the activism of field and laboratory.
However, he did desire to enrich the traditional methods of describing
past political events. Merriam was impressed by the steady advance
of economics after the advent of time-series techniques for the study of
business fluctuations. It seemed probable that statistical procedures
could be devised to describe the fluctuating political process with
equal success, whether the phenomena in question were wars; popu-
lar votes; or votes by legislatures, commissions, chief executives, or
judges.

Advanced students found their way from Chicago to many facul-
ties of political science and were often given facilities to develop
teaching and research and to work with colleagues who, though hav-
ing no direct experience of Chicago, were interested in research on
pressure groups and political parties, public opinion, leadership, and
related dimensions of the political process, particularly in its inter-
national aspect.

The difficulties that accompanied the redirection of political sci-
ence were met in many ways, some of which I shall consider at length
elsewhere in this book. It is sufficient here to observe that theoretical-
descriptive political science received meager and grudging admission
to some faculties. The shoe was occasionally on the other foot, and
traditional scholarship in the history of political theory suffered from
deprivations of every kind; so, too, did teaching and inquiry in public
law. Given the mixed provenance of political scientists, it was pos-
sible, in a fit of xenophobia, to tell the "philosophers": "If you are
any good, you ought to be good enough to get an appointment in a
regular department of philosophy." Similarly with the "public law-
yers"; let them go jump in the law school.

A UNIFYING SELF-CONCEPTION

It seems to me that, as political science faces the future, it is in
a remarkable position to take an important initiative in the creative
integration of thought and organization at the higher as well as the
lower levels of knowledge and policy. The prospect of realizing a
working harmony among diverse approaches has provided political

Growth and Ambiguity 39

scientists with an opportunity, which they have only partially utilized,
to achieve a coherent conception of a problem-solving discipline ori
ented to the larger issues of the life of man in society.

Political scientists with a theoretical-empirical bent have often
looked enviously at departments of economics, where legalistic and
evaluative issues seem never to interfere with the smooth course of
theory-building and investigation. They have, however, overlooked the
fact that these issues were not resolved, but provisionally delegated.
The delegation was to schools of business, which were frankly oriented
toward the policy problems faced by responsible managers of the in-
stitutions conventionally specialized in the shaping and sharing of
wealth. Schools of business could not, however, maintain a university
status without gradually coming to concern themselves with the social
consequences of business systems. In short, professors of business be-
came professional men and not shop assistants. They concerned them-
selves with the aggregate impact of economic institutions and enlarged
the contexts of the business curriculum to include explicit awareness
of the total interaction between business and community.

A closely connected change was willingness to recognize a re-
sponsibility for training managers other than specialists working for
the profits of the stockholders. Trade-union managers have an im-
portant organized constituency in the economic process, and a com-
prehensive professional school can find a place for those whose role is
to define the interests of the workers in the relevant context.

This gradually brings other participants into the picture, among
them managers of such institutions as consumers' cooperatives. And
there are government managers whose main role is the administration
of enterprises, many of which are organized on private-profit or the
consumer-profit plans.

Schools of business have become places where every type of spe-
cialist in personality and culture can involve himself in the study of
the shaping and sharing of wealth by all institutional practices. Mean-
while, academic departments of economics are experiencing new
strains as theoretical problems concerning wealth seem most inter-
esting and rewarding when institutional diversity is put into the
foreground, as it is for policy problems of industrialization and mod-
ernization. Voices are raised to demand a multivalued, multi-institu-
tional approach to economic theory. Hence, academic and business
school economists are becoming problem-oriented in the sense of in-
creasing concern with the clarification of goal and questions of trend,
condition, projection, and alternative.

40 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Law schools, too, seemed enviable to members of political science
departments perpetually confronted with "marginal" issues. But mod-
ern American law schools are also losing their innocence. Only a few
years ago, the famous casebooks compiled to further the needs of the
case method of instruction were remarkably homogeneous. They were
composed for the most part of snippets of the appellate court opinions
of American and English courts. Today, by contrast, a casebook is a
fearfully and wonderfully heterogeneous object containing, besides
appellate court opinions, material from many sources, and especially
from the psychological and social sciences. The books that deal with
family, criminal, labor, corporation, administrative, or constitutional
law — or, in fact, with any branch of the subject whatsoever — bring
the language of legal technicality into the context of social inter-
action.* It is more obvious than ever that jurisprudence is a problem-
solving discipline whose task is to aid the scholar and the active
participant alike to perform all five intellectual tasks related to goal,
trend, condition, projection, and alternative.^

Quite recently, departments of sociology have also become ca-
pable of arousing envious glances from modern-minded political scien-
tists who find themselves struggling against collegial resistance to
obtain the facilities or the permission to enable a student of political
science to augment his professional equipment by courses in mathe-
matics, statistics, psychological testing, and related specialties. Al-
though political scientists were among the first to foster the
contemporary efflorescence of research in communication and had
long been especially concerned with the study of public opinion, they
were losing out in many research competitions to social psychologists
and sociologists who had spent the time necessary to obtain technical
training in the procedures essential to refined research. In another
important problem — the investigation of elites — political scientists
were sometimes at a disadvantage in relation to sociologists, who had
more acquaintance with field work or methods of processing data.

Sociologists, however, do not escape the impact of contextually
oriented problems, despite the delegation of various matters to schools
of social work or to programs in industrial sociology, medical soci-
ology, vocational and educational guidance, and the like. If an "ap-
plied" school begins with pedestrian intellectual standards and
modestly tries to provide candidates for the payrolls of departments
of social welfare or of private welfare agencies, the situation refuses
to stay static. Able and ambitious minds insist on examining their
part of the social process in the light of available knowledge of the

Growth and Ambiguity 41

whole and in the face of challenges to improve social institutions.

The story is the same wherever we look at graduate and pro-
fessional training and research. Schools of medicine and public health,
agriculture, education, religion, departments of anthropology and so-
cial geography — everywhere the unit sooner or later searches to com-
prehend its role by discovering a map of the whole.^

In political science itself, the problem has been made more acute
by the intellectual insurgency of organizations that were once supposed
to content themselves with a modest patrimony of intellectual equip-
ment. Today, schools, departments, or programs in public administra-
tion are frequently the germinating beds of vigorous programs of
research in which the tools of operations research are familiar aids.

The long history of secession from "philosophy" is to be under-
stood in part as a consequence of the rigidity of the professors who
were traditionally expected to provide an inclusive map for the guid-
ance of every participant in the vast field of intellectual labor. As
modern society expanded in numbers and variety of institutions,
philosophers were often put in the position of repeating the traditional
wisdom in abstract formulas that lacked specification to the newly
disclosed configurations of nature or society. Although the "eternal"
questions were always present, creative contributions depended on
building a bridge between the prescriptive language of the past and
the unfolding present. Since many philosophers were unwilling to j
undergo the discipline needed to acquaint themselves with the new I
knowledge of nature or the novel practices of society, they were un-
able to think creatively. At the same time, they were impatient with
"fact-oriented" specialists and helped to establish an atmosphere of
contempt for the discoverers of empirical truth.

As we look to the future, it seems unnecessary to make the er-
ror of mistaking a part of the intellectual problem of politics for the
whole. The challenge is to find ways of focusing man's search for the
clarification of his goals and for policies giving optimal expression to
these objectives. Both intellectual tasks, when rationally and realisti-
cally conducted, must proceed within a framework of knowledge of
past trends and conditioning factors and of contingencies of future
development.

In succeeding chapters, we direct attention to various dimensions
of the contextual task of political science. First, we outline the re-
quirements of a continuing survey of world political phenomena ade-
quate to the problem-solving needs of political science. Second,
attention is directed to methods by which intellectual bridges can be

42 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

laid between knowledge of trends and highly specialized laboratory
knowledge, on the one hand, and the information required to guide
large-scale policy intervention, on the other. Third, we consider
procedures by the use of which the vast Niagara of pertinent informa-
tion can be kept manageable. Finally comes the question of creativity
at every level of participation.

NOTES

1 On the long European background, cf. Frederick M. Powicke and A. B.

Emden, eds., The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages by the
Late Hastings Rashdall (3 vols.; Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1936); Vol. 3 deals with English universities; S. d'Irsay, Histoire des
universites frangaises et etrangeres des origines a nos jours (2 vols.;
Paris: A. Picard, 1933-1935). The American Social Science As-
sociation was organized in the United States in 1865. It was chiefly
concerned with humanitarian reform. The Archaeological Institute
of America was founded in 1879, the American Anthropological As-
sociation in 1902, and the American Sociological Society in 1905.

2 They include Southern, Oklahoma, Southern California, Western, Pacific

Northwest, Northern California, Mid-Western, Southwestern, Iowa,
New England, Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania.

2 B. Penrose and E. P. AUinson, "The City Government of Philadelphia,"
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Sci-
ence, 5th Ser., 1-2 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1887).

* Among contemporary casebooks, cf., e.g., the pioneer volumes on the social
control of business by W. O. Douglas; by W. A. Sturges on arbitra-
tion; by M. S. McDougal on property; by F. Harper and F. James
on tort; and the most recent type, exemplified by R. C. Donnelly,
J. Goldstein, and R. D. Schwartz, Criminal Law, "Problems for
Decision in the Promulgation, Invocation, and Administration of a
Law of Crimes" (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962),
and A. Westin, The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case (New
York: Macmillan, 1958).

s My colleague M. S. McDougal and I have been outlining and testing such
a jurisprudential conception for several years.

6 Cf. B. Blanchard, C. J. Ducasse, C. W. Hendel, A. E. Murphy, and M. C.
Otto, Philosophy in American Education (New York: Harpers,
1945).

The Basic
Data

^*-^-*-*^^y 1/ Promoting, Prescribing

We now consider how the political science profession can organize
its own intelligence function (which it willingly shares with others) in
ways that enable the political scientist to be knowledgeable about the
nature and extent of political events. It is far beyond the competence
of any single investigator to make more than a small contribution to the
vast body of data required to describe the changes in the distribution
of power and in the structure and function of political institutions
throughout the arena of world politics. However, this is the task for
which political scientists have professional competence and respon-
sibility, though it is shared with other specialists — among whom are
journalists and undercover agents — -who may or may not have po-
litical science training and identity.

44 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

As matters stand, political scientists have only partially met the
challenge of applying their tools of description and analysis to the flow
and spread of events in the political process. I shall therefore outline
a possible line of development in which the American Political Science
Association and other professional organizations in the United States
and elsewhere can play a major role.

Professional organizations are strategically located to encourage
and in part to administer comprehensive surveys of world political
change. We have in mind associations of scholars, including scholars
in socialist and Communist countries to the extent that their scientific
independence is in fact accepted and enforced. In a divided world,
there will always be limitations on publishing the results of research
into government. Under totalitarian powers, which subordinate en-
lightenment to power, any publication will be censored to fit the cur-
rent interpretation of the power interest of the elite. In the United
States and in many other bodies politic, power is subordinated to a
more inclusive set of values. Policies of "free press" and "free speech"
imply "academic freedom," since the academic task can be performed
in a free society only when research can be conducted on almost any
topic and the results made known in the interests of general enlighten-
ment.^

A private professional organization such as the American Political
Science Association already provides a well-established mechanism for
intelligence. Annual conventions, conferences, and committee meetings
provide forums for the review of problems, methods, and findings.

The A.P.S.A. is a mechanism through which basic data surveys
might be fostered and coordinated. We note in this connection that
the association could be used for survey activities calling on all the re-
sources of political science as a teaching profession. This has never
been done, and the resulting loss of opportunity has weakened every
function of the profession.

Thousands of college students are exposed to courses in political
science. It is commonly said by experienced teachers that the level of
the advanced undergraduate is higher than that of beginning graduate
students; and there is much justification for this view when we recall
that undergraduates constitute a pool of talent that is later channeled
through all the professions."

In any case it is well within the scope of an undergraduate, when
competently supervised, to gather research data having obvious im-
portance for the describing of trend and the discovery of conditioning
factors.^ We propose that the mechanism of the professional associ-

The Basic Data Survey (I) 45

ation be fully employed for the purpose of correlating our peda-
gogical, research, and consultative objectives by bringing students at
every practicable level into a comprehensive program.

One objective of a basic data survey would be to strengthen the
teaching efTectiveness of political science, particularly at the college
level. In this connection, however, it is not necessary to think ex-
clusively of college students. Many secondary school students are
capable of excellent research when properly motivated, equipped, and
directed.

At every level, teaching involves problems of motivation. A key
to intense interest in political science, as in any subject, is the sense
that one is participating in an enterprise of genuine importance. Many
routine exercises required in the usual course of instruction are peda-
gogically inefTective because they fail to communicate the importance
of doing them well.

It is not difficult to show that participation in a basic data survey
would be worthwhile. Such a survey is part of the adult world of
public responsibility. The information obtained enters immediately
into the public intelligence on which judgment depends at all levels
of government. Wherever the survey was competently introduced and
conducted, it would be possible for students to see that they are en-
gaging in a serious enterprise.

In recent years, many new procedures for research on man and
society have been invented.* Some of these methods were introduced
and developed by political scientists, although many originated with
psychologists and other social scientists. We think immediately of tests
of aptitude, motivation, and performance. Modern research on com-
munication has led to the invention of techniques of content analysis
to describe the messages found in various channels and techniques of
both brief and prolonged interviewing intended mainly to describe
audience response. The study of electoral and administrative statistics
is well established. The investigation of war and other forms of con-
flict has also produced specialized techniques. Devices have been
worked out for the analysis of political elites and for comparative
analysis of statutes and judicial opinions. It is beyond reasonable
doubt that in future years new instruments will be invented or re-
modeled to serve the manifold needs of political research. Methods
will continue to vary in intensiveness, that is, in length of contact with
the object of inquiry, in complexity of the data obtained, and in
length of training required. But the basic aim is the same — to bring
to the attention of a scientific observer the events to be described, to

46 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

provide a faithful record of what is observed (employing indexes suit-
able to the purpose), and to process data in ways that link them to
analytic concepts and hypotheses designed to explain the phenomena
in question.

Partly because political science has expanded rapidly in recent
years, a gap exists between research practice and teaching. Many new
manuals are needed to make clear to students (and to teachers not
primarily specialized in the use of a given set of procedures) how to
apply the methods at hand. Once the flow of manuals has filled the
present gap, it will be possible to keep them up to date.^

In proposing a basic data survey, we are not oblivious to the
favorable effects that participation in the survey could have on mem-
bers of the teaching profession itself. Activities relating to the survey
would provide concrete evidence of the distinctive task of political
science and aid in crystallizing conceptions of the political scientist's
role. The manuals show the range of special procedures the competent
application of which provides dependable answers to pertinent ques-
tions.

In the process, the questions themselves would gain specification.
For example: How do the changes occurring among officeholders in
this community compare to the changes in neighboring or distant
communities? How do the sources of political intelligence differ here
and in other communities? What are the characteristic contrasts in
political participation as exhibited in party and pressure group pro-
motional activity and voting? What are the significant contrasts in
the course of prescription (legislation) here and elsewhere? What
legislative prescriptions are invoked or allowed to lapse in practice?
How do performance levels vary here and elsewhere in various ad-
ministrative applications? Are there significant likenesses and differ-
ences in the self-appraisal activities here and elsewhere? What has
happened in connection with the termination of existing patterns of
interests, as in the exercise of eminent domain in redevelopment?

Once under way, the continuously reported survey would provide
even the most isolated political scientist with a comprehensive and
selective image of the principal political changes in the locality, prov-
ince, nation, region, and world. It would no longer be possible for him
to reflect morosely on the fact that he is little better prepared than
any other member of the mass audience to illuminate events. The data
would lend themselves to visual presentation in the form of maps,
charts, and models that would help to show the contexts of specific
incidents. It would become obvious that the political scientist does, in

The Basic Data Survey (I) 47

fact, differ from the layman in the discipline to which his words are
subjected. It would be perfectly obvious that, when a scholar makes
a descriptive assertion about the direction and intensity of political
change, he speaks as an expert. This does not, of course, imply that a
political analyst is or would be beyond challenge by other experts or
by laymen. His role in a free society is to enter the political process
with particular responsibilities of intelligence and appraisal.

The data provided by the survey would enable one to achieve a
clearer image of himself in the historical process of the current epoch.
The survey would produce a map whose successive editions would
show the changing patterns of world politics. Hence, one would have
at his disposal a means of clarifying his political goals and strategies.

In reference to the map as a whole, these recurring questions
would be basic: What new political patterns have appeared? Where?
Where have patterns spread or been restricted (even to the vanishing
point) ? These inquiries refer to patterns of every kind, whether petty
and local or cases of emergence of world revolution.®

The scope of the proposed basic data survey can be suggested by
directing attention first to the study of local units. We deal with these
units first partly because the coverage of representative cases is a
matter of great importance for the entire conception of an inclusive
survey and partly because student aid is likely to be most readily
available to describe local events. We would not, however, confine the
survey to data that can be obtained only with the assistance of stu-
dents. Many of the facts required call for the competence of the
specialist. We shall not call attention to this distinction in all cases,
since it will be obvious. The basic data survey includes projects of
every degree of methodological complexity, and the use of students is
one among many elements in the total undertaking.

In Chapter 1, we described participation by political scientists in
the political process at any community level (international or local)
in terms of seven phases. We follow the same outline here, thinking of
each phase in the flow of decision as "outcome" events occurring
within the decision process as a whole. At each phase, we subdivide
the data in order to provide answers to the following questions: Who
are the significant participants (official or unofficial) ? What are the
participants' perspectives of the outcome (values) they seek, their
prospects of success, and the groups with whose fate they identify
themselves? What arenas are specialized in the task? What assets
{base values) are at the disposal of participants seeking to influence
results? What strategies do they employ in managing base values to

48 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

affect outcomes? With what immediate and long-run results {outcomes
and effects) ?

INTELLIGENCE PHASE
Participants

All individuals who affect the flow of intelligence are participants
in the process. It is, however, economical of research time to concen-
trate on persons and organs who specialize in gathering or disseminat-
ing information and to inventory their audiences. Among offlcials,
this points immediately to agencies of reporting and planning. From
time to time, local officials leave the area to obtain information about
events elsewhere. A check will also show the extent to which local
officials depend on sources outside the locality for news of relevance
to local decisions. Organizations of mayors and of other officeholding
groups publish bulletins and reports of municipal activities and also
state, national, and international news of possible interest to local
decision-makers.

Unofficial local sources of politically significant intelligence in
the United States include the mass media, which often maintain cor-
respondents at the state or national capital, and the reports of party,
civic, or other private associations. In turn, these channels rely in
varying degree on outside press, party, civic, and other sources.

It is possible — assuming diligence and competence — to inventory
the principal sources of current information on which participants rely
for intelligence that affects local decisions. There are the questions of
(1) amount of exposure to the source and (2) evaluation of the
source. It is useful to focus on the specialists who are most easily
identified (planning agencies, broadcasters, and the like) and to ex-
amine the network of personal contacts on which they rely for rumors
of current happenings that bear on local decisions. There is likely
to be a high degree of interchange among these specialists; each in
turn may rely on an identifiable circle at clubs, homes, offices, street
corners, and other gathering places. The sources of information can
be mapped according to the structure of politics and of the com-
munity as a whole. The result will show, for example, the extent to
which any specialist has familiar access to upper, middle, or lower
strata of government, party wealth, enlightenment, well-being, skill,
respect ("social class"), affection (popularity), and rectitude.

The point of these distinctions and the need for relevant data
are obvious on reflection. Common sense and research agree on the
selective effect of position in the social context on sources of informa-

The Basic Data Survey (I) 49

tion. A rich businessman (a member of the upper wealth class, in our
terms) who talks mainly to other rich businessmen can be expected
to have a version of news differing from that of a rich man who main-
tains contact with middle-income or poor people. Similarly, the editor
who mixes only with persons having equally exhaustive "top-level"
knowledge of public affairs is likely to get out of touch with the cur-
rent scene as viewed by reporters who circulate among humbler
people. If one moves only among healthy people, he is likely to over-
look the world as seen by the ill. Similarly, in regard to any occupa-
tion or profession where skill is important, the current interpretations
of events diverge to some extent according to the level of excellence.
That social class is a selective factor in rumor and gossip has been
heavily emphasized in contemporary social science. In addition, there
are persons of exceptional popularity and unpopularity in any com-
munity, and this affects versions of events. Similarly, persons and
organizations who are regarded as custodians of religion and morality
are likely to report current affairs in distinctive terms.

We have been itemizing the broad value-institution categories
that are worth applying in any examination of participants in the
gathering, dissemination, and interpretation of intelligence. Further,
in many communities major differences in ways of life show the im-
pact of contrasting cultures rather than class distinctions within a
culture. In the United States, the distinctions between white and
Negro castes survive in many localities; the organization of intelli-
gence sources is deeply affected by this alignment.

Political scientists are accustomed to searching for smaller group-
ings whose effect on the flow of intelligence is often decisive. It is a
question of interest groups; by definition, these may include fewer
than all members of a culture or class or cut across such lines. Much
of the time spent on the job by political reporters is devoted to at-
tempts to uncover interest alignments that may affect their sources
of information and therefore influence the intelligence made available
to others. Every sophisticated person concerned with municipal poli-
tics is aware of an enormous number of interests, such as particular
offices, departments, or commissions; political leaders and factions;
specific publishers, editors, commentators, or reporters; public-utility,
banking, real-estate, department-store, supermarket, hotel, theater,
sporting, gambling, prostitution, drug, employer, trade-union, or other
economic interests; associations concerned with accident prevention
and hospital care; interests relating to administration of tests or
awarding of recognition for excellence; "society"; concern with per-

50 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

sonal popularity; and religious or denominational interest. Obviously,
the list could be extended indefinitely. The research task is to see the
political process as a whole and to concentrate on combinations of in-
terests that seem most likely to affect intelligence content on signifi-
cant matters.

Instruments for personality testing open a new field for the in-
tensive study of those who participate in the flow of information.
Preliminary research points strongly to the role of various personality
types in distorting the flow of intelligence. One thinks of the standard
image of gossipy and malicious old maids, of disgruntled characters
sliding down the ladder of social respect, of "litigious paranoids" and
"persecutory agitators." As crisis levels fluctuate in local communities,
the role played by such personalities in private rumor and public
print fluctuates accordingly. On-the-spot surveys are needed to en-
rich our scanty understanding of the importance of these relationships.

If the knowledge pertinent to participation in the intelligence
process seems to become unmanageably complex under modern con-
ditions, it is worth recalling that it is not necessary to do everything
at once. Approximations can be made, and the whole enterprise be-
comes cumulatively more important as successive generations of stu-
dents and others add to the data.

In addition to planning and news, all research activities, includ-
ing political science research, whether official or unofficial, come
within the intelligence category and are eligible for inclusion as ob-
jects of survey.

Perspectives

The participants in intelligence activities approach their tasks
with difTering values, expectations, and identifications. Students of
government will presumably concern themselves mainly with dis-
covering the truth about local politics and relating information about
local aflfairs to a comprehensive view of the political process. The
dominant value of such a person is enlightenment or skill in research.
In contrast, many individuals look on their intelligence tasks as "just
a job," a means of making a living. On the other hand, the appeal
may be the respect potentials of the task, as with some by-line re-
porters and commentators. For some persons, camaraderie is the main
job aim and satisfaction. Others are oriented toward power, their
own or that of the political party with which they are identified. It
may be that the intelligence worker is more involved in advancing
the cause of his religion or in reforming society than in any other part

The Basic Data Survey (I) 51

of his task. There are also cases in which the job has a specific, deep
appeal that can be understood only when we see it as a means of
preserving precarious mental health. "Inside dopesters" occasionally
come in this group.

Whatever the individual case may show, a main object of the
survey would be a picture of the aggregate situation at a cross-section
in time usable as a bench mark for future changes. It is conceivable
that, in the future, fundamental shifts in the relationship among
power and other values will be detected earlier in local situations than
in larger aggregates. The intelligence flow in the United States has
been colored at the local level by the influence of groups actively
seeking many values. Will future tendencies give prominence to power,
and especially to the power of parties and pressure coalitions seeking
to move the people toward militant nationalism? Will this bring with
it relative decline in the influence of wealth as traditionally exercised
through advertising and social pressure? Or will the leisure and edu-
cation fostered by an opulent economy bring greater intellectual curi-
osity and sophistication, with a resulting domination of the flow of
local intelligence by journalists, commentators, officials, and research
workers who take a political scientist's view of the task?

In surveying the perspectives of intelligence participants, we are
cognizant of the strategic role that they play in advancing or limiting
competing ideological systems. The relative strength of competing
systems can be assessed at the grass roots by a survey of local units.
There must, however, be preliminary studies of materials that reflect
the most comprehensive and systematic structures of ideology. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, is a com-
pendium of official interpretations of the dignity of man. The partic-
ular problem of the survey when conducted at the local level would
be to discover to what extent members of the community are com-
mitted to these objectives in the immediate process of decision.

Many methods are already at hand for gathering the data re-
quired for a successful survey. Municipal charters and ordinances can
be analyzed to find harmonies or discrepancies with the Universal
Declaration and other pertinent ideological statements. It is reason-
able to assume — subject to more intensive study — that members of
the elite are giving utterance to accepted views when they make un-
contradicted declarations in public. Content analyses may therefore
be made of uncontradicted assertions found in speeches or other
public expressions by leading planners, media controllers, and re-
search workers during selected periods. When contrasted with similar

52 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

declarations by top governmental and party leaders and by other elite
spokesmen, the results would show what is stressed or left unstressed
by the different groups.

Relatively brief private interviews or tests may be conducted in
order to discover the goal commitments of the interviewee and his
perception of the goals of other members of the body politic. Depth
interviewing can be employed to give a clearer picture of the intensity
with which the various views are held.

Alongside the data that have to do with doctrinal declarations
of goal, two other types of information bear on fundamental per-
spectives. The first relates to the structure of the self; the second to
political lore, or "miranda."^ The pertinent question about the self
considers the boundaries of the system. How identified am / with
family, party, religious, and other groups? What images do / entertain
of the self and of others?

We have called attention above to the challenge in future years
to the continued exclusion of advanced forms of life and machines
from the category "man." In the immediate future, however, we are
more concerned with trends of reference to "race," since world po-
litical alignments may conceivably crystallize along racist lines. If we
go back to the epoch of the Declaration of Independence in the
United States and of the Declaration of the Rights of Man in France,
it is evident that the symbols of identity which received emphasis were
universalistic, legal, and moral. It was an epoch whose leaders sought
to realize the "rights of man," without derogatory distinctions based
on criteria other than merit and common humanity. However, the
next great world-revolutionary wave spoke the language of "eco-
nomic" or "material" relations and exalted one economic "class" over
another in the hypothetical transition to classlessness.

Beginning with Nazi racialism, world prominence has been given
to biological or pseudobiological distinctions. Ex-colonial peoples are
usually nonwhite, whence an obvious temptation to propagate racism.
In this context, an inhibiting factor of enormous weight is the Com-
munist movement which has identified many ex-colonial peoples with
Eastern Europe and played down the racial cleavages. The Com-
munist area may split; if so, the Sino-Russian tension suggests that the
reorientation may be along "racist" lines.

We do not ignore the possibility that, as the boundary between
living forms grows dim, exclusionist ideologies with new lines of de-
marcation may appear. Superior forms of life — superior, that is, tech-
nologically and in capability — may be discovered as man probes outer

The Basic Data Survey (I) 53

space or mutants or machines emerge who possess sensational capa-
bilities and who see no reason to take the claims of man seriously.

Surveys at the local level are especially well adapted to ascertain
the facts of caste and class. It is in the sphere of family and friendship
that caste distinctions retain most vitality. At the same time, this is
the area of human association in which specific attachments exert
their greatest effect on established strategies. The changing balance
resulting from ambivalence can be described in detail in local units
with particular regard to the whole decision process.

In the study of perspectives, we do not depend exclusively on
what people say, especially in estimating degrees of intensity. Many
of the data called for elsewhere in this prospectus would provide be-
havioral indications that would deepen our understanding of the per-
spectives that prevail among intelligence personnel and in the general
community.^

Arena

The various participants in the intelligence function interact to
form an aggregate; the aggregate constitutes an "arena," a situation
relatively specialized in the power process. The fact of entering into
or leaving off interaction is the important point in describing the ex-
pansion or contraction of intelligence operations during a given pe-
riod. The official agencies are not necessarily identical with the
effective arena of information-gathering and -dissemination or -with-
holding. On the contrary, the principal decisions affecting intelligence
may be made by political party leaders or by the staffs of pressure
organizations.

Political science is concerned with the original constitution of
an arena and with subsequent admissions, exclusions, consolidations,
and separations. The total context can be described according to the
number and relative strength of participants as multipolar, pluripolar,
bi-, tri-, or unipolar. In totalitarian societies, the formal monolithic
structure seeks to receive infomiation of local affairs without pro-
viding any counterflow of uncensored information or any compre-
hensive public image of the local situation. This unipolar pattern is
never entirely successful, however, since rumor and informal routes
of contact supplement the formal channels.

Base Values

As far as official agencies of intelligence are concerned, the for-
mal language of constitution, statute, or ordinance provides authority

54 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

for a voice in community decision and clears the way to obtaining
those assets in addition to power which are required for effective
operation. Surveys of base values can conveniently begin with an
analysis of the assets and liabilities provided in the authoritative
language.

It may be prescribed, for example, that all agencies of local gov-
ernment make information available to the intelligence or planning
center. The intelligence organs themselves may be barred from giving
information to anyone except the head of the government (the mayor
or the council). The services may obtain funds by appropriation or
borrowing, and they may be granted access to facilities and to per-
sonnel whose qualifications they may prescribe. These may affect the
human resources, skill, loyalty, respect, and moral standing of the
intelligence operation.

In addition to formal authority, an organ of intelligence can ob-
tain base values of every kind informally for use in gathering informa-
tion. Personal friendship with key politicians can augment the effective
power at its disposal. The economic assets of the individuals connected
with intelligence, their social standing, knowledge, dexterity, intelli-
gence, and uprightness all count heavily.

Private operations in the field of intelligence may receive no more
protection from the public order than is customary for voluntary
organizations generally. But they may have important connections
with politics and every other value-institution process in the locality
and outside it.

Recall that the survey of "participants" would classify them ac-
cording to class position in order to describe the sources open to them
in the community.^ In the present context, the values available or
potentially available at any cross-section in time are evaluated as
contributions to the total influence of the individuals and organizations
involved.

Strategies

When we refer to the strategies of a participant in intelligence
we have in mind the ways by which base values are utilized to effect
the outcomes sought.

Two subobjectives of strategy — assembling and processing — are
always present. Base values are not always in a form operationally
adapted to the task at hand. Personnel may be available on assign-
ment from other agencies, but training programs may be needed to
equip the staff to gather or disseminate information. Similarly, broad-

The Basic Data Survey (I) 55

casting facilities must be built before the active processing of intelli-
gence can begin. Surveys can show, for example, the man-hours of
time devoted to assembling the units required for planning, news, or
research and the man-hours given over to processing. Breakdowns of
both sets of strategic activities can be made in minute detail as hy-
potheses are formulated to guide investigation.

An important question in reference to strategy is whether co-
ercive instruments are used to obtain or block the dissemination of in-
telligence or to alter the prevailing structure of participation in
intelligence. Many dramatic examples of the use of coercion to inter-
fere with news reporting are known, notably in connection with gangs
connected with illicit activities. More subtle are the interferences that
come from economic pressure (for example, threats of foreclosure or
boycott).

Agencies often employ the intelligence at their disposal as a
means of augmenting their control of intelligence. For example, dur-
ing periods of acute crisis in foreign affairs, local groups of retired
intelligence officers may circulate "loyalty" information to discredit
the leaders of intelligence groups active in civic affairs or in the gov-
ernment. The result may be an effective monopoly of many types
of intelligence for the group. The association in question may be
dominated by a single decisive figure who concentrates control in his
own autocratic hands.

Outcome

An intelligence outcome is the culminating moment in the dis-
closure or nondisclosure of information. Thus, an official agency may
decide to release or to withhold copies of a completed city plan, or a
civic association may decide to suppress or to circulate a report on
the gangster connections of a candidate. A publisher may defer or ex-
pedite the appearance of a book analyzing city government and poli-
tics.

Whatever the content of communication media at the outcome
phase, it is always pertinent to political science to estimate the degree
of influence exerted by whom on the product. This can be done for a
given period by examining the source of proposed or of vetoed mes-
sages. Such an analysis reveals the coalition alignments for and against
various alternatives and isolates the pivotal participants in determin-
ing the result.

For purposes of comparison, we emphasize the importance of
classifying content according to the five intellectual tasks — goal, trend.

56 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

condition, projection, and alternative. How comprehensive are com-
munity goals in reference to each sphere of value and institution?
What parts of the whole process are ignored or given prominence?
What is the relative prominence given to trend, condition, and pro-
jection, to various alternatives of policy?

At the outcome phase, it is possible to detect the appearance of
new ideological patterns and to take note of the diffusion or restrict-
tion of the old. When we look at the grand scope of religious or po-
litical myths at the extreme of their historical spread, it is easy to
lose sight of circumscribed beginnings. One purpose of surveying po-
litical change is to learn of new initiatives before they spread gen-
erally and to improve methods of evaluating their potential domain.
As we describe the current scene, will we be alert enough to detect
the incipient stages of a T'ai P'ing Rebellion or a Bolshevik Revolu-
tion?

Innovations which themselves have little future may be impor-
tant indicators of a maelstrom of symbolic activity gradually veering
toward new directions of belief, faith, and loyalty. In this connection,
"nonpolitical" as well as "political" symbols must be kept in view.
Symbolic structures whose manifest content is religious sometimes per-
form a cathartic function that drains off the pool of motivation open
to political programs. Immediately after Japan's defeat in World War
II, no fewer than two thousand new religious sects took shape in
various parts of the country.^" It seems clear in the light of subsequent
knowledge that the immediate role of these sectarian movements was
to provide small pluralistic groups with affection, respect, and en-
lightenment and thereby to forestall programs of political action.
Among sharecroppers and isolated hill folk in the United States, re-
ligious revivalism appears to have a similar role of catharsis.

When we referred to outcome events in the intelligence flow, the
reference was to such culminating occurrences as the dissemination
or withholding of information and exposure to or isolation from in-
formation. Subsequent events are assignable to the category of effects.
We are asking for data about the total impact of information to which
various participant audiences are exposed in a given slice of time. Are
their goals for the local commonwealth clarified? If so, in what direc-
tion? Are their images of trend, condition, and projection influenced
in any way? Is their perceived range of policy alternatives modified?

We referred above to the need for outcome data in terms of new
or old ideological systems. The question at this point is how to obtain
evidence of results of exposure to communication channels.

The Basic Data Survey (I) bl

Already there are apprehensions at combining signs with chem-
ical factors in the transmission of intelligence, thereby fixing audience
response more permanently than by means of signs alone. These
methods would presumably be part of the educational channels dedi-
cated to the transmission of established ideology and operational tech-
nique.^^

PROMOTING
Participants

We now consider the requirements of a survey of activities of
promotion at the local level. In some communities, the initiative for
new policy lies with associations whose staffs are expected to go be-
yond the intelligence function to advocacy. This is often the case with
crime commissions, tax reform associations, property improvement
leagues, and the like. Promotional activities are included in various
degree in the work of elected officials, party machines, and the press.
One task of the survey would be to locate the full-time and part-time
performers of the function and to place them in the contexts of cul-
ture, class, interest, and personality.^^

Perspectives

What value effects are sought by those who engage in promo-
tional activities? If we assume that the future holds greater freedom
from work, is it reasonable to expect that human activities will be-
come enormously more diversified than they are at present and that
many new policies will be pressed on the community? Will one conse-
quence be that professional promoters gradually disappear as citizens
engage in voluntary civic efforts ?

A related question is whether economic interests will become
more or less important sources of pressure for change in countries
where private enterprise continues. We are aware of the role that has
been played in the United States by equipment manufacturers in im-
proving municipal technology, whether we speak of water works,
streets, lights, fire-fighting, police equipment, textbooks, teaching aids,
school buildings, or parks and recreational equipment. As science and
technology expand and obsolescence is cultivated by industrial lab-
oratories, new materials and designs will abound. If we pursue this
line of thought, it seems probable that business promoters will, in fact,
multiply in a mixed economy.

What significance do these considerations have for corruption?
Will participants in promotion become more grasping, ruthless, and

58 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

subtle in the pursuit of advantage? It is sometimes predicted that an
opulent society will be a virtuous one, since the desperation of poverty
■will be gone. On the other hand, it is notorious that, in an economy
of graduated incomes, economic scope is ofTered for people to become
greatly concerned with small absolute diflferences ("keeping up with
the Joneses"). Since traditional morality has been closely bound up
with the ethical imperative to work, an economy that dilutes this im-
perative is presumably open to moral confusion during transitional
stages. ^^

As a means of classifying the demands put forward at the pro-
motional phase of decision, I propose the following broad adaptation
of value-institution analysis. Which demands relate to:

(1) The structure of decision at each phase (intelligence, recom-
mending, prescribing, invoking, applying, appraising, terminating)
and to participants, perspectives, base values, strategies, outcomes, or
effects?

(2) The functioning of the structure of power in the pursuit or
defense of predominantly power objectives in the external arena? In
the internal arena?

(3) The functioning of power in primary reference to wealth and
to institutions relatively specialized in the shaping and sharing of
wealth?

(4) The functioning of power in primary reference to respect
and to institutions chiefly specialized in the shaping and sharing of
respect?

(5) The functioning of power in primary reference to well-being
and to institutions which further it?

(6) Functioning in primary reference to rectitude and to insti-
tutions which further it?

(7) Functioning in primary reference to affection and to insti-
tutions which further it (family, etc.) ?

(8) Functioning in primary reference to skill and enlightenment
values and institutions?

Arena

The traditional biparty system in this country does not apply to
many local arenas, where a unipolar pattern predominates. Pressure
organizations are usually numerous, although in many local circum-
stances a single association or very small number is characteristic.
The rise and fall of new parties and pressure associations would be

The Basic Data Survey (I) 59

one of the phenomena to be described by the basic data survey in any
period.

Base Values

On the basis of survey data, it should be possible to follow trends
in the dedication of value assets to promotional work. Lurking in the
background of any study of promotion is the hypothesis that, if the
commitment of resources reaches great magnitudes, the probability is
increased that promotional activities may themselves be prohibited as
a consequence of revolutionary change. The analysis runs in these
terms: If conflicting policies are vigorously supported against one an-
other, the level of frustration, uncertainty, and anxiety will rise, cul-
minating in a social movement to restore order.

Another hypothesis connects a possible transition from peaceful
persuasion to coercion with the magnitude of base values at the dis-
posal of opposing promoters. If money and other assets are unsuccess-
fully expended on persuasion, the temptation to coerce is increased in
the hope of obtaining a surprise advantage.

Surveys of base values need to measure values in various con-
texts, especially in terms of the perspective of each participant or
total asset involvement, political advantage, and probability of net ad-
vantage. We are aware of the desperation with which rear-guard
actions can be waged by cultural minorities who recognize that, owing
to the exhaustion of resources at their disposal, they are near the end
of their privileged position.

Strategies

The temptation to cut promotional costs and uncertainties by
entering into monopolistic agreements with competitors or by drives
to abolish competition are as common in politics as in other situations.
Surveys of party strategy are often able to demonstrate collusion be-
tween a perpetual majority and minority party.^* Why go to the
bother of a vigorous electoral campaign if the minority can be "bought
ofT" in advance with a guaranteed place? Or why should parties
identified with the established order allow themselves to be harassed
by a vocal minority? Majority parties often connive to erect insur-
mountable obstacles to organizing a new party and obtaining a place
on the ballot.

When party or pressure campaigns expect to win through the
support of an uncommitted and pivotal body of individuals or organ-

60 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

izations, the strategy is to emphasize demands acceptable to the pivotal
elements. This tends to universalize "issue" demands and to transfer
tactical emphasis to "personalities." The appearance of issue una-
nimity may create an exaggerated picture of ideological unity; that is,
the strength of the dissatisfied extremes may be understated. Hence
one task of the survey would be to devise methods of describing cam-
paigns which distinguish genuine "issue unity" from more doubtful
cases.

The survey would follow the justifications employed by the ad-
vocates of the various demands during the preoutcome phase. A
particular demand in regard to power, for instance, may be justified
in terms of power, in the language either of legality or of expediency.
The same demand may be promoted in the language of ethics or re-
ligion (rectitude) or as a boon to safety (well-being), family solidarity
(aflfection), science and education (enlightenment and skill), eco-
nomic growth (wealth), or prestige (respect).

Outcomes

Promotional activities culminate in alignments that win, lose,
or draw — whether the situation is that of a candidate or an issue elec-
tion. Who took the initiative to promote a given demand or to block
a demand? Whose support was pivotal in the formation of a success-
ful coalition in obtaining or blocking a result ?^^

Effects

In providing data for the assessment of efTects, a major question
is whether promotional activities as a whole strengthen or weaken an
established ideology for the benefit of rival ideologies. Ideologies be-
come phraseology when the key terms, though given great promi-
nence, lose intensity of commitment among their adherents. The best
evidence of intensity changes comes from depth interviewing. Impor-
tant assumptions emerge, however, if discrepancies between the pat-
tern of justification employed in elite-to-elite and in elite-to-mass
promotions multiply.^*^ One index of a secularizing policy, for instance,
is the omission of religious justifications where elites are addressing
one another and when they are attempting to influence a mass au-
dience.

Thus, the comparative reporting of justifications would furnish
the observer with grounds for affirming the rise or fall of various
values as goals of community action. Economic considerations have
had a noteworthy impact on the language of advocacy. In the United

The Basic Data Survey (I) 61

States, for example, business decisions are supposed to be made for
the benefit of the shareholders; hence, policies whose support is non-
economic (such as rectitude, power, or respect) are phrased in mon-
etary terms. In local affairs, economic policies have often been
championed in the vernacular of "business efficiency." More recently,
the threat of war has led to the use in municipal matters of "national
security" (power) as a justification for programs.

PRESCRIBING

Participants

Formal participants in local units include legislators and chief
executives; where the initiative and referendum are authorized, the
electorate also participates directly. Local community studies presently
provide scattered data about the relationship between prescribers and
the social context. One of the most obvious tasks of the basic data
survey would be to enlarge the coverage by region throughout the
nation.

In coming years, a topic of particular interest in this connection
will be the degree to which the rising elite of scientists and engineers
enters the local picture. In the past, some localities have become
strongholds of archaic social forms. Because local leaders engage in
full-time political activity, these districts exerted an influence out of
proportion to their numbers. ^^

Perspectives

Every specialized arena tends to establish norms that restrain
the pursuit of power. Among legislators, in particular, procedural ar-
rangements lend themselves to the cultivation of particular skills that
may take priority over the individual's pursuit of power. Respect often
goes to an adroit parliamentarian or debater or to the negotiator of
coalition agreements. The rewards of "the game" can become so ab-
sorbing that the participant fails to adopt a realistic power strategy
and neglects to look beyond the confines of the committee room or the
chamber. He may lose contact with constituents, and the process
may go so far that the entire structure of government loses support
throughout the body politic.^^ This narrowing of the focus of at-
tention to immediate opportunities for gain or loss carries with it some
systematic distortion of reality. Participants who are spatially remote
tend to drop out of sight, and developments at the periphery are
greeted with surprise or shock.

By examining the focus of attention of the legislators at the local

62 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

level, we may discover trends toward greater parochialism even within
the local community, such as the neglect of neighborhoods or cultural
minorities.

But data on "the game of politics" afford many clues to the value
perspectives and ideological involvements of prescribers. Additional
clues are obtainable from some of the data called for in connection
with intelligence and promotion. Here the information is brought to-
gether for the whole community in order to disclose the commitments
of the specialists in prescription.

Arenas

The aggregate of formal arenas at the level of federal govern-
ment is tripolar. At the local level, the judiciary tends to drop out of
sight, and sometimes the mayor; but the electorate may take a more
prominent part. In many communities, the prescribing function is
highly dispersed to include the board of education, board of public
health, a number of other boards, commissions, and relatively inde-
pendent commissioners.

As usual in the investigation of effective as against formal in-
stitutions, it would not be possible for the survey to present a valid
picture of the function of any part until the entire context had been
described. Meanwhile, of course, particular indexes would be gathered
because they are of obvious pertinence, even though they cannot be
definitive.^^

Base Values

Local units of government in the United States are usually re-
garded as creatures of state or even of federal government, not of the
narrower community. In practice, of course, the situation may be
markedly different, since the economic and other bases of power of
some metropolitan areas may transform the state unit into a sub-
sidiary structure.

In the local decision process, the consideration of base values can
be focused on the authority of the legislative body in relation to other
organs of government that enter actively into community affairs. This
brings into the picture a number of agencies (state, federal, or inter-
national) that may be engaged in local programs. Some of the suburbs
of New York, for example, include citizens whose connections ramify
to Washington, Albany, or Hartford, with potentialities that can
modify the values at the disposal of local authorities. Pending data

The Basic Data Survey (I) 63

obtained by the direct study of outcome situations, the basic data
survey might use panels of "insiders" selected from among knowledge-
able politicians to estimate the influence potential of a given unit. The
questions would deal with possible conflicts between local authorities
and other units of government. -°

Strategy

The distinctive tool at the disposal of a prescribing authority is
language; hence, drafting tactics are especially relevant to the strategy
of prescribers. Modern systems of logic lend themselves to the study
of statutes and ordinances, and it may be that more attention to the
content of municipal regulations would influence the future phras-
ing of such enactments. Carelessness often leads to ambiguities that
affect the discretion of officials charged with administrative respon-
sibility, and it is often alleged that unnecessary damage is thus done.
In any case, the survey could report on the clarity with which pre-
scriptions are formulated, perhaps noting the diff"erence between
original proposals and final statements. ^^

In the interest of putting citizens on notice of their obligations, it
is often urged that laws ought to be simple and clear. Several criteria
have been suggested for classifying the relative simplicity and clarity
of prose, and sample studies can be made by students of municipal
ordinances.

A further point made in the cause of simple clarity is that "con-
stitutional" provisions should be separated from "statutory" matter.
In the local context, this would mean that charter provisions or funda-
mental ordinances ought to be kept free of cluttering detail.

Outcome

The survey would regularly record the sheer volume of words
put out by authoritative agencies of prescription and classify accord-
ing to the aspect of the social process to which they refer. Ordinances
dealing with participation in the decision process obviously relate to
power. Some are focused primarily on the economic process (for ex-
ample, taxation and commerce). Local legislation is normally con-
cerned with education, health, information, and morals. Matters of
respect and affection play a pervasive but typically unformulated role.

For comparative purposes, the flow of authoritative prescription
can usually be classified according to several codes designed to em-
phasize the role of government itself.^- The "constitutive" code is

64 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

identical to the power category mentioned above; it includes the
language that specifies "who, with what qualifications, selected how,
and with what objectives and base values may decide what, under
what circumstances, and by what procedure."

The "enterprisory" code includes all prescriptions about activities
for which the government has continuing administrative responsibility,
for example, public utility services. The "regulative" code deals with
the norms according to which private activities are to be carried out.
The "supervisory" code concerns matters that are voluntarily referred
to the community for settlement, which include most of the civil con-
troversies sufficiently petty to get into municipal rather than state
courts. The "corrective" code covers the measures that may be used
by the community to cope with non-responsible offenders. The other
"sanctions" are considered parts of the appropriate code whose norms
are to be maintained.

In this context, we should note that a complete prescription in-
cludes three sets of statements: (1) the norm to be lived up to; (2)
the factual circumstances to which the norm refers; (3) the sanction
to be employed in case of breach or conformity. It is relevant to em-
phasize the point regarding conformity because sanctions are positive
as well as negative: they may involve citations, honors, tax exemptions,
and the like.

The basic data survey could throw light on the trend to rely
on coercion or persuasion by reporting the changing balance of pre-
scriptions of positive and negative sanction and the values involved.
These categories are especially relevant to state and other inclusive
units of government which are commonly authorized to monopolize
the most severe sanctions. But there are grounds for asserting that
variations in local practice are especially sensitive indicators of the
significant tendencies in any period.

If the scientific approach to human affairs becomes more per-
vasive, sanctions will not be applied against non-responsible deviants;
further, sanctions will be subject to continuing adjustment according
to the results obtained from past applications. Survey data on the
total sanctioning process are of great importance to political science
and public policy. ^^

Effects

We have already mentioned a major effect that may follow pre-
scription. Most of the data on effects will appear as we move through
the remaining parts of the outline.

The Basic Data Survey (I) 65

NOTES

1 R. Hofstader and W. P. Metzger, The Development of Academic Freedom

in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955),
show the slow growth of the doctrine and operation of freedom of
teaching, inquiring, publishing, and of civic participation. Also, J. E.
Kirkpatrick, Academic Organization and Control (Yellow Springs,
Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1931).

2 Information about the pool of talent is to be found in D. C. McClelland

et al., Talent and Society, "New Perspectives in the Identification
of Talent" (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1958).

^ Research by undergraduates is often acknowledged by professors in prefaces
and footnotes. It is common knowledge that senior theses often
reach the level of masters' theses in quality.

* Cf. G. Lindzey, ed.. Handbook of Social Psychology (2 vols.; Cambridge:
Addison-Wesley, 1954); S. Arieti, ed., American Handbook of Psy-
chiatry (New York: Basic Books, 1959); P. F. Lazarsfeld and M.
Rosenberg, eds., The Language of Social Research (Glencoe, 111.:
The Free Press, 1955); A. Ranney, ed., Essays on the Behavioral
Study of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962); V.
Van Dyke, Political Science, "A Philosophical Analysis" (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1960); C. Hyneman, The Study of Poli-
tics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959); R. Young, ed..
Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern
University Press, 1958).

^ Active efforts are being made to overcome the "method gap." The urgency
of providing suitable manuals has been repeatedly stressed in the
regional seminars conducted under the auspices of the A.P.S.A. in
recent years.

^ On the rise, diffusion, and restriction of political patterns, cf. H. D. Lass-
well and D. Blumenstock, World Revolutionary Propaganda, "A
Chicago Study" (New York: Knopf, 1939). The framework was
originally outlined in the senior author's World Politics and Personal
Insecurity (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935).

"^ I follow in this book the terminology utilized in H. D. Lasswell and A.
Kaplan, Power and Society, "A Framework for Political Inquiry"
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). Political myth is di-
vided into three categories — doctrine, formula, and miranda, which
are approximately equivalent to philosophy, law, and folklore. The
term "formula" comes from G. Mosca, and "miranda" from C. E.
Merriam. "Self" is defined to include identifications (or identities),
expectations, and demands.

^ "Perspectives" are defined as subjective events which can be described

66 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

according to symbols of reference and intensity or degree of
stress toward completion of an act. Nonsubjective events which are,
in addition to subjective events, parts of an act, are defined as
operations. A relatively stable pattern of operations and perspectives
is a "practice." Institutions are classified according to the value
(preferred events) in the shaping and sharing of which they are
relatively specialized. Perspectives can be inferred from self-ob-
servation and by observing the operations of others relatively spe-
cialized in communication or collaboration in the social process of
interaction.

^ On the composition, recruitment, and role of intelligence personnel, cf.
R. E. Carter, Jr., "Newspaper 'Gatekeepers' and the Sources of
News," Public Opinion Quarterly, 22 (1958), 133-144; R. L. Jones
and G. E. Swanson, "Small-City Daily Newspapermen: Their Abili-
ties and Interests," Journalism Quarterly, 31 (1954), 38-55.

1° Prof. H. Kishamoto of the University of Tokyo has studied religious ac-
tivities in Japan in detail. For background, cf. his Japanese Religion
in the Meiji Era (Tokyo: Obunsha, 1956).

^1 Cf. R. J. Lifton, Thought Rejorm and the Psychology of Totalism (New
York: Norton, 1961); A. D. Biderman and H. Zimmer, eds.. The
Manipulation of Human Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1961); and
the work of E. H. Schein, J. A. M. Meerloo, and others.

12 Cf. the early contributions of B. L. Smith and L. C. Rosten, especially

Rosten, The Washington Correspondents (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1937). Further, L. Lowenthal and N. Guterman, Prophets
of Deceit (New York: Harpers, 1949); G. E. Swanson, "Agitation
through the Press: A Study of the Personalities of Publicists," Pub-
lic Opinion Quarterly, 20 (1956), 441-456. See the hints in S.
Kelley, Jr., Professional Public Relations and Political Power
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956).

13 A. Rogow and H. D. Lasswell, Power, Corruption and Rectitude (Engle-

wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963). On socialization and norms,
see D. Easton and R. D. Hess, "Youth and the Political System,"
in S. M. Lipset and L. Lowenthal, eds., Culture and Social Char-
acter, "The Work of David Riesman Reviewed" (New York: The
Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 226-251; A. J. Brodbeck, "Values
in The Lonely Crowd: Ascent or Descent of Man?" ibid., pp. 42-71;
S. de Grazia, The Political Community (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1948); H. H. Hyman, Political Socialization (New
York: Columbia University, Bureau of Applied Social Research,
1957).

"V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics (New York: Knopf, 1956); J. H.
Fenton, Politics in the Border States (New Orleans: The Hauser
Press, 1957); A. Leiserson, Parties and Politics, "An Institutional
and Behavioral Approach" (New York: Knopf, 1958).

The Basic Data Survey (I) 67

1^ The analysis of electoral behavior is the principal source of estimates of
impact on outcomes. See the standard works of H. F. Gosnell, A. N.
Holcombe, V. O. Key, P. F. Lazarsfeld, A. Campbell, W. E. Miller,
S. J. Eldersfeld, S. Lubell, D. E. Stokes, P. T. David, among many
others.

^^ The technique of such comparison is exemplified by G. A. Almond, The
Appeals of Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1954).

1" Cf. A. J. Vidich and J. Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1958); M. Janowitz, ed.. Community
Power Systems (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961); R.
C. Wood, Suburbia, "Its People and Their Politics" (Boston:
Houghton, Mifflin, 1959). In preindustrial cultures, the impact of
the old, though great, is not always against change, even at the vil-
lage level. Cf. G. M. Carter and W. O. Brown, eds.. Transition in
Africa, "Studies in Political Adaptation" (Boston: Boston University
Press, 1958); R. L. Park and I. Tinker, eds.. Leadership and Po-
litical Institutions in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1959).

i^The technique of such analysis is exemplified by N. Leites, On the Game
of Politics in France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).

^^ Studies of local government are beginning again. Cf. R. A. Dahl, Who
Governs? "Democracy and Power in an American City" (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). A comprehensive survey is
S. Humes and E. M. Martin, The Structure of Local Government
throughout the World (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1961).

20 The connections of metropolitan to larger areas are indicated throughout

W. Sayre and H. Kaufman, Governing New York City, "Politics in
the Metropolis" (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960).

21 On technique, cf. L. E. Allen, "Symbolic Logic: A Razor-Edged Tool

for Drafting and Interpreting Legal Documents," Yale Law Journal,
56 (1957), 833-879.

22 G. H. Dession and H. D. Lasswell, "Public Order Under Law: The Role

of the Advisor-Draftsman in the Formation of Code or Constitu-
tion," Yale Law Journal, 65 (1955), 175-184. The five categories
for the comparative study of systems are constitutive, regulatory,
enterprisory, supervisory, and corrective; they are systematically
applied by M. S. McDougal and associates to the law of nations in
the Yale Law School series in course of publication by the Yale
University Press.

23 Cf. the technical devices used to assess legislative outcomes according to

final or early alignment, pivotal position, or initiative: J. C. Wahlke,
H. Eulau, W. Buchanan, and L. C. Ferguson, The Legislative Sys-

68 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

tem, "Explorations in Legislative Behavior" (New York: Wiley,
1962); D. B. Truman, The Congressional Party, "A Case Study"
(New York: Wiley, 1959); D. McRae, Jr., The Dimensions of Con-
gressional Voting (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1958); J. Turner, Party and Constituency, "Pressures
on Congress" (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955).

The Basic
Data
Survey (II)

Invoking, Applying,
Appraising, Terminating

INVOCATION
Participants

Those who officially participate in invoking activities are promi-
nent at the local level. Besides policemen and magistrates, however,
we must not lose sight of the large number of private citizens who
frequently initiate complaints of "criminal" breach or become in-
volved in private controversies that are presented or referred to the
courts.^ The basic data survey would enable us for the first time to
follow in detail the factors that affect the changing level of invocation.

Perspectives

In the lower levels of society, it would presumably be an indica-

70 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

tion of increasing self-confidence if more complaints were lodged
against upper-class organizations and individuals who were formerly
feared. Not all rate increases are likely to have this significance,
however. They may reflect an "overproduction" of lawyers and a re-
sulting multiplication of disputes.

Research at the local level for the survey could provide informa-
tion needed to distinguish between the articulated and ostensible
grounds of an invocation and the value goals actually pursued. Con-
sider the enforcement policies of local officials. Why do they suddenly
act against long-standing abuses? Why do they adopt more permis-
sive policies toward gambling and other illicit activities? Why do
trends toward vigilant or lax law enforcement continue for several
years or change abruptly? A notorious feature of many law enforce-
ment drives is the desire to raise money for party purposes or even
as private graft.

Since many of the calculations that affect policies of invocation
are private, it may be necessary to approximate the facts by relying
first on panels of insiders, whose views would be reported anony-
mously.

A neglected area of research is the matching of cases of invo-
cation with cases that seem quite similar yet led to no appeal to offi-
cial tribunals. Investigation may show that various commercial or-
ganizations or religious and ethnic groups have worked out their own
arbitration arrangements. One problem for the basic data survey
would be to report the flow of informal invocation and to direct at-
tention to situations in which acts of invocation are missing (despite
evidence, for instance, of traffic "violations" or of considerable vio-
lence in husband-wife, parent-child, or neighbor-neighbor relation-
ships) .

Arenas

In any given period, the aggregate composition of the arenas
specialized in invocation will emerge if the survey gives attention to
the initiators and targets of action in the framework of prescription.
It is especially relevant to watch for new groups and organizations
seeking to stimulate the exercise of formal authority by public agencies
in every field. Similarly, it is relevant to note the dissolution, ab-
sorption, or inactivity of previously active associations. Emergency
committees to press officials to clean up unsanitary conditions or to
remove traffic hazards are typical examples.

The Basic Data Survey (II) 71

Base Values

The usual analysis of formal authority and of formally authorized
access to values is relevant here. In the future, however, the survey
would be justified in paying particular attention to "respect values."
There are also many indications that a new field of professional spe-
cialization is emerging which has particular significance for the in-
voking function. I refer to "sanction law," or the study of the entire
subprocess of sanctioning within the decision process as a whole.-
Many adjoining or partial specialties are involved, including political
science, especially police administration and criminal law and crimi-
nology. To the extent that war is superseded by police action, the
army, navy, and air and space forces will fuse with the sanctioning
process. My forecast is that, as sanction law improves in scientific
strength and professional recognition, the status of local sanctioners
will rise.

Strategy

We referred to the timing of law enforcement activities in dis-
cussing perspectives. In the present context, the survey would sum-
marize, among other data, the justifications invoked on behalf of a
particular policy demand. It is not a question here of demands to
prescribe, but of claims in concrete circumstances to obtain a result
allegedly authorized by prescription or to block a result alleged to be
contrary to a prescription.

The survey would need to summarize according to the five codes
mentioned above (constitutive, regulatory, enterprisory, supervisory,
corrective) and according to the value norm invoked. For instance,
a demand to remove X from office for alleged breach of discipline
might be elaborated by asserting that other formal prescriptions have
been violated or that informal prescriptions have been broken.

Outcome

The survey would report as outcomes such culminating acts as
formal complaints or the filing of a controversial claim. Preoutcome
activities include the formation of coalitions for or against action. In
this connection, we may note that some invocations are entirely in-
dividual acts; others involve collective behavior.^

Effects

The most significant efTect is application or nonapplication, as
will be outlined in the next section.

72 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

APPLICATION
Participants

The survey would identify as participants all who are so identi-
fied by fellow members of the application process and groups which,
though not explicitly recognized in a given context, are nevertheless
visible to the scientific observer with comparable experience. Subject
to certain exceptions mentioned elsewhere in this outline, all who are
charged with the execution of the authorized prescriptions relating
to a local community belong to the application phase of the decision
process.

In general, then, official participants include all administrative
personnel. They would be further divided according to rank or grade
into upper, middle, and lower echelons; further subdivided by serv-
ice (public works and so on) ; and further into central and field compo-
nents.* In the most general sense, "centralization" refers to the
inclusiveness of a pattern. Thus, authority may be centralized for a
given service — as for the settlement of a given category of disputes —
at one level and in one office. Or a service, like sanitation, may have
a headquarters and several field stations. The scope of authority of
the headquarters includes all the field stations. However, there may be
only two echelons at the headquarters which outrank the man in
charge of a field station, and formal authority over many outcomes
is delegated to the station.

At any given echelon, we speak of the degree to which authority
is "concentrated" in one office and official or the extent to which it
is dispersed among several coordinate agencies or persons. Instead
of one judicial officer, there may be several independent courts, some
of which have more than one judge.

The survey would reveal basic trends in the structure of govern-
ment by reporting the ratio of officials to population for various serv-
ices and the ratio between headquarters and field staffs. Comparisons
of field districts would be facilitated if ratios were related to popula-
tion densities, since some parts of the local community may be sparsely
populated. Reporting by rank and grade would bring into the open
tendencies to inflate the upper levels, or the reverse. With the intro-
duction of automated procedures, it is likely that the future balance
of administrative organizations will be appreciably modified by re-
ducing "clerical" personnel.

It would be useful to bring into the survey information about the
State, federal, or international units within which the locality is in-

The Basic Data Survey (II) 73

eluded, since these have immediate efTects in the local decision process,
especially at the application phase. The report should summarize
the ratio of the local population to the population of each district
and the place of the district office in the structure of which it is a
part. These figures would indicate something of the ease of access to
the centers of policy for the entire area.

The survey would supplement the formal image by adding for
each participant a list of the significant organizations and unorganized
groups which exercise a relatively strong influence over what it does.
Most of this information can be revealed only by intensive and time-
consuming case studies. However, a valuable preliminary result can
be obtained by interviewing panels of "insiders" and recording their
estimates. The top health authority, for example, is continually sub-
ject to initiatives that originate with "client" groups which expect to
be affected by what the authority does. Hospitals, physicians, drug-
stores, food processors and purveyors, manufacturers who use poi-
sonous or noxious materials or processes — these constitute a brief
reminder. In seeking to obtain appropriations and facilities, the health
authority is able to enlist the support of some of these client interests.
Support or pressure is not limited to the locality, since state and even
larger official and unofficial groupings are potentially implicated in
local health affairs.^

As usual, the survey would report the results of elite analysis
of official and other groups.

Perspectives

A key question in connection with administrative activity is
whether the responsible officials are determined to serve the common
interest as that interest is currently interpreted by the leaders of
thought in the profession concerned. The question is not whether the
contemporary views entertained by public health authorities or traffic
specialists are correct, but whether the officials of a given locality are
attempting to give their community the benefit of the best available
judgment, recognizing the restrictions within which they must operate.
The surveyors would need to be kept abreast of contemporary per-
spectives in each field, a formidable task which should be performed
for the local people by colleagues elsewhere. Panels could be set up,
if necessary, to provide estimates of the perspectives that in fact
prevail at top, middle, and low levels.

Such an inquiry would simultaneously weigh the importance of

74 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Other factors. For example, there may be agreement that special
economic, ecclesiastical, or other interests affect the outlook of officials
on discernible points.^

Arenas

As usual in portraying the arena as a whole, it would be easy
for survey purposes to take note of all the official agencies which say
a final word in concrete circumstances on the meaning of authorized
public policies. The difficult questions relate to organizations that en-
force conformity on themselves or others or, on the contrary, persist
in failing to apply the manifest norms laid down in formal documents.

The conformity-enforcing organizations may apply a regulation
directly that all business houses in a given area close by 7:00 p.m.
Perhaps such a standard is not found in the book of ordinances; in-
quiry may reveal that the merchants of the locality agreed on this
rule and to punish any nonconformist by refusing the use of delivery
trucks, by exclusion from the merchants' association, or perhaps by
harassment of customers and clerks. Effectively applied prescriptions
are sometimes enacted by other than the government as convention-
ally identified. In fact, there may be no formal enactment of any kind;
an alert surveyor will discover that something new has come into
existence "by custom" and that deviations have serious consequences
for the offender.'^

Base Values

Here is the most convenient place for survey planners to consider
the economic and other assets available to various participants. To
some extent, this is a simple matter of reporting the per-capita
equipment and current income accounts (including all forms of extra-
local aid) of each activity (school system, urban redevelopment, and
so on). Interviewing can disclose the positive assets or liabilities of
public officials in terms of community respect and reputation for in-
tegrity. The principal asset of an organization for many purposes is
the legislative enactment that confers jurisdiction on it and provides
an authoritative claim on other organizations and individuals for eco-
nomic and other bases of power.

Strategy

In the discussion of invocation, we emphasized the relation be-
tween concrete social situations and the uses of complaint and claim.

The Basic Data Survey (II) 75

Although the examples were largely from the field of police adminis-
tration, comparable phases are involved in every public service. As-
sume, for instance, that a public works administrator is authorized
by community prescription to proceed with site clearance and prepara-
tion, and the construction of recreational centers. Despite informal
suggestions that he begin, the official may decide not to invoke his
authority until other projects are completed. A survey of authorized
activities (permissive or mandatory) not begun by a given time would
provide pertinent information. Activities begun (with or without
completion) would belong to the survey's inventory of the application
function.

In addition to the strategy of timing, it would be convenient to
explore the instruments on which each participant depends in manag-
ing his external relations. Each value base could be considered in de-
tail. It is, however, illuminating for purposes of comparison to think
of strategies as employing diplomacy, mass communications, wealth,
or weapons. Each unit of officialdom operates in an arena in which
superordinate, coordinate, and subordinate units are involved; ex-
ternal relations can be understood as relating to superordinate and
coordinate units as well as to any other identifiable entity in the
official or unofficial environment with which coalitions may be made
or against which coalitions can be formed. Diplomacy is elite-to-elite
contact and is designed to make or break working agreements. (Thus,
in cooperation with finance officers, it may be possible to deny funds
to Y and free more assets for X.) Communication is elite- to-mass
contact and includes word-of-mouth and other types of publicity in-
tended to advance the aims of the unit under study. Economic assets
can be used to induce or intimidate action, and in some cases actual
weapons are available even at the local level. It would presumably
be easiest for the survey to obtain information about the man-hours
(or dollars) devoted to propaganda than to other instruments.

In the context of the community decision process, each decision
sequence internal to a participant can be viewed as part of the
strategy whereby the organization in question seeks to make itself ef-
fective. The internal arena can be examined in detail through the
categories used in reference to the community as a whole (partici-
pants, perspectives, base values, strategies, outcomes, and effects). In
this way, the finer structure of government is brought into view and
the assumptions reflected in the opinions of the "insiders" can be
subjected to independent check. Although most of the information

76 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

called for in this connection would require case investigations, it
would be possible in some instances to obtain usable results with little
outlay of time and facilities.

For some agencies, it would be possible to summarize the man-
hours per capita spent in patterns of various kinds — receiving or
giving information, advocating or listening to advocacy, putting regu-
lations into final form, invoking or listening to the invoking of pre-
scriptions, applying prescriptions in concrete cases or being an object
of such application, appraising success or failure, terminating pre-
scriptions, and disposing of resulting claims.

Outcomes

The final application of the authority of an official to concrete
cases is an outcome. A decision by a revenue agency may be appealed
to the courts. In the context of the agency, it is, however, final.
Similarly, the contractual agreements of an administrative unit, the
grants of license or relief, or acceptances of gifts are final outcomes.

The survey would tabulate decisions made by agencies of ap-
plication and provide some indication of the magnitude of the values
at stake (for example, dollars of contracts, capital investment in
licensed enterprises, persons given varying amounts of aid, or capital
evaluation of the land and facilities received by gift for recreational
or other purposes).

Many decisions are made with little effort to provide a formal
opinion justifying the outcome. This is also true in low-level courts.
But the lives of millions of people are affected by the functioning of
courts that deal with minor offenses and quarrels, and the survey
would perform a unique service if it provided a more inclusive and
accurate view than we have today of how the tribunals that are most
directly in contact with the population function.

Surveys can usefully compare the successes of the same partici-
pant in several arenas. Thus, a minority group may fare badly in
influencing legislative votes, even though it usually wins court cases
involving its members. The report may be refined to bring out the
originating or pivotal role in the eventual solution.®

Effects

Many postoutcome events can be attributed without much doubt
to the combination of factors that are crystallized in an outcome, and
the survey would be on the lookout for instances of this kind. For
example, some public health results can be imputed to the decision

The Basic Data Survey (II) 77

to vaccinate or immunize school children. Public enlightenment may
be aflFected by a program that exchanges students with a foreign
country. Employment figures rise after new industries are brought
in by advertising, land development, and tax exemption. Divorce may
decline after the inauguration of matrimonial clinics connected with
courts. Levels of skills may rise sharply after the completion of tech-
nical schools. Discriminatory practices in many community institutions
may be abolished after a decision to discover and eliminate differential
treatment of minorities in access to civil service positions, hospitals,
and the like. The political impact of the community in the state legis-
lature may be increased if a lobbyist is appointed to push measures
affecting the area. The juvenile delinquency rate may fall after the
introduction of club programs in depressed areas.

APPRAISAL
Participants

Official appraisers include financial officers responsible for giv-
ing an over-all account of the success of fiscal operations when as-
sessed in terms of solvency and liquidity. Departments often have
specialists in the preparation of reports, including the statistics sup-
posedly depicting the successes and failures of programs. In future
years, the skills at the disposal of such personnel will presumably in-
clude the various versions of operations research, the employment of
which would be tabulated by the survey.

Perspectives

Will the demand for competent and impartial appraisal continue
to grow ? Most pertinent to the assessment of this demand is the prac-
tice of consulting experts on any aspect of local government which
comes into controversy. Many appraisal activities have been organized
in modern society to provide data for private and public commitment.
We are accustomed to quantifying the performance of many munici-
pal services and to comparing results through time and among com-
munities. This is true, for instance, of fire, police, traffic, schools,
health, sanitation, and finance. And it is relevant for a survey to dis-
cover the degree to which current reports of this kind reach insurance
agents, physicians, school board members, and other appropriate
local audiences.

Arenas

Since appraisal units are less clearly identified in contemporary

78 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Structures of government than some other functional units, it would
often be necessary for survey purposes to encourage detailed inquiries
into the actual operation of local systems. In this way, an aggregate
picture could be drawn and the rise and fall of organized activities
could be followed through time. Specialized private associations would,
of course, be included.

Base Values

In view of the mechanization of reporting routines in modern
administration, it is probable that large capital expenditures would
be necessary for adequate appraisal.

Strategies

The acceptance of the idea of competent and impartial ap-
praisal is often accomplished in different ways. The most persuasive
argument is economic: what is the taxpayer getting for his dollar?
But appraisal operations are often the children of scandal, being
introduced in the wake of public consternation about bad policing,
poor schools, or graft. Quiet research can gather the facts which the
community is willing to consider when in the grip of alarm and
revulsion. The survey would occasionally examine the activities of ap-
praisal services in bringing their findings to the attention of commu-
nity groups and of the public at large.

It is notorious that no single index is ever satisfactory to every-
one as a summary of the effectiveness of a program. This comes in
part from the spontaneous defensiveness of one who fears that his
position is imperiled. In fact, however, reluctance to agree on a single
master index rests on more solid ground. The values of a free society
are plural, and the emphasis on them varies among members of the
community. Furthermore, specific operational indexes differ and give
rise to diverse judgments. Officials charged with appraisal tasks there-
fore resort to "defense by technicalization" in the sense that they
typically refrain from flat, over-all assessments and confine themselves
to comparisons between "partial indexes of performance" and "partial
indexes of goal." Furthermore, they adhere as closely as possible to
a plausible interpretation of authoritative prescriptions.

Unofficial agencies and individuals are freer to put forward defi-
nitions of community goals which may or may not coincide with the
prescriptions currently in force. Part of the contribution that unoffi-
cial groups can make is to call attention to more exacting specifica-

The Basic Data Survey (II) 79

tions of objective than have been fully accepted in legislation. In
this they are invoking the political myth to appraise the political
formula.

Basic surveys would perform a clarifying function if they called
attention to agreements and differences that arise in interpreting ob-
jectives or in discussing the index used to define goals. In the past, for
example, varying methods of estimating the net worth of public
utilities have led to great differences in published figures. Contrasting
methods of measuring unemployment lead to important divergencies,
especially in reference to the partially employed (or people with two
jobs). Expert opinion is not unified on the best way to describe how
public services affect the standard of living — a point of no small
significance in comparing socialist and mixed economies.

Outcome

The grand objective of scientifically minded appraisers is a com-
prehensive view of the community that can be relied on to show the
degree to which policy objectives are realized. At a more sophisticated
level, appraisers add a further complication — to what extent are
governmental activities instrumental in producing the results de-
scribed? Sometimes the answer to this question is obvious: the new
hospital was struck by lightning, hence the government cannot be
regarded as a factor in the failure to hit the target of improved hos-
pitalization by building new facilities.

There may be evidence that appraisers have been sharply divided
about what they should report. It may, indeed, be spread over the
face of reports signed by majority and minority members. But the
split may be disguised. It may be possible to describe preoutcome
maneuvers in terms that show which contending coalition supported
or opposed the appraisals finally published. The issue may be pri-
marily technical and may serve mainly to show that trained econo-
mists differ from trained lawyers or political scientists.

Effects

Perhaps the most far-reaching effect of the basic data survey
would be in the appraisal phase of the decision process. It would
focus on goals and performances of the body politic and, by bringing
fundamental questions recurrently to general attention, affect the
frame of mind in which problems of government are considered.

As a convenient check list for thinking about the total context,

80 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

I use the value-institution categories employed in this book. Those
responsible for the survey would need to keep this or an equivalent
set of categories at the focus of their attention in order to achieve
systematic coverage. To some extent, efTect data are currently avail-
able regarding each local community (as remarked above in the dis-
cussion of strategy). But it will be obvious to political scientists that
there are many important gaps limiting any appraisal operation.
Many of these gaps will challenge the profession to improve its re-
search programs and to stimulate other disciplines to participate.^

TERMINATION
Participants

If concern for human dignity and for the dignity of all advanced
forms of life increases in coming years, it is probable that more at-
tention will be given to obviating adverse effects of policy change.
More government officials will be involved in listening to complaints
and seeking to make adjustments in ways compatible with funda-
mental policy. Such a criterion implies sensitive consideration for
human rights and freedoms. Termination problems are familiar; for
example, they involve adjustments intended to reduce particularly
burdensome eflfects when a community shifts from rent control to a
free market or back again or when a city terminates the policy of
unrestricted land use and substitutes urban redevelopment. In the
past, these adjustments have often been "highly political"; one topic
of the survey would be the composition of boards or groups of referees.

Perspectives

More direct evidence of the frame of mind in which termination
officials approach their tasks could be obtained by an "insiders' panel."
It is likely that officials charged with such responsibilities would de-
velop a professional specialty in clarifying the appropriate criteria.
Inquiry would show whether the local boards are cognizant of these
activities and whether they participate in professional meetings and
related affairs.

Arenas

Since termination is a category that is not used in the conven-
tional classification of government operations in the United States,
the survey would usually need to interview "insiders" in order to
draw a preliminary picture of all units engaged in this function and
to describe the appearance and disappearance of units.

The Basic Data Survey (II) 81

Base Values

Perhaps the most interesting survey problem in this connection
would be to follow fluctuations in the deference assets of terminators
(respect, rectitude, and so forth).

Strategy

Estimates of damage to a value position depend in part on es-
tablishing expectations of their future value position that claimants
could have rationally entertained prior to termination. Hence, it is
necessary to consider evidence of past trend and projection; if this
is to carry conviction, the sources used must be among the best avail-
able. The survey would report on the quality of information brought
into the determination of claims (by expertness of source and the
like).

Outcomes; Effects

The results would be examined as usual to bring out their sig-
nificance for fortifying the established ideological system, undermining
adherence to it, and for aflfecting the practices prevailing in the com-
munity. Do terminations provoke resentment in identifiable groups?
Is one effect to cut down local financing of civic enterprises ?^°

ORGANIZATION OF THE SURVEY

The A.P.S.A. need not assume responsibility for the entire stream
of data required to present a comprehensive and current map of
political change. However, the association would be well-advised to
initiate the entire enterprise and to keep an appraising eye on future
attempts in this direction. Fortunately, a few data centers are in
existence and would welcome a mechanism limiting their responsibility
by facilitating a voluntary division of labor that might well be worked
out by a committee of the association and revised as circumstances
suggest.^^

Although the specific examples given in this chapter refer with
few exceptions to the level of local government in the United States,
I want to repeat the caveat given at the start that this limitation was
adopted only in the hope of providing a concrete sketch of the whole
idea. The scope of the proposed basic data survey is restricted neither
to local affairs nor to the United States. The framework outlined
above is applicable with appropriate modifications to provincial, na-
tional, and international arenas. ^^

How should tasks be allocated among cooperating organizations

82 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

and scholars? As usual in matters touching on politics, two principles
must be combined if the results are to be workable. Some research
and training programs are pitched at the international level and
focus on transgovernmental, transparty, or transpressure activities.
Others focus on selected areas of the globe and consider the decision
process of each power within the region, its relation to other powers
in the area, and the interplay between the region and the surrounding
world community. Many institutions devote themselves to the affairs
of their own nations or specialize in a provincial, state, or local area.

The topical principle cuts across all territorial processes and sub-
ordinates them to categories that stem from, or imply, an analytic
model of the political process within the social process as a whole.
The legal field — the realm of authoritative prescription — is a con-
spicuous instance. When philosophical concern is joined with the
empirical study of philosophies in action, the principal interest is in
ideology. The structures of government are so diverse and numerous
that a broad distinction is made between studies of top policy and
those of the administrative completion of policies. As a means of
showing the connection between myth and organizational structure,
some programs concentrate on unofficial groups or groups that,
though official, are distinguishable from what is usually regarded as
the government (political parties or pressure organizations).^^

A recent tendency is to emphasize strictly political analysis and
hence to operate with an analytic model of the decision process.^* This
will prepare the soil for research programs whose scope is narrowed
to such selected features of decision as intelligence, promotion, pre-
scription, invocation, application, appraisal, and termination or to
the affiliations and perspectives of participants, arenas, base values,
strategies, outcomes, and effects.

Although no important conditioning factor can be ignored in
systematic political science, the emphasis can vary widely in terms of
interaction patterns within the social process and between the social
process, on the one hand, and the basic predispositions of man at
birth and the resource environment, on the other. The interaction
patterns within the social process are divisible by culture, class, in-
terest, personality, and level of crisis. The study of crisis levels
concentrates on such exceptional states as war, revolution, class re-
organization, reinterpretation of interest, and personality conflict.

In sheer numbers, however, research projects are usually related
to particular policy problems known by such currently popular sym-
bols as "modernization" or "urban redevelopment" and "metropolitan

The Basic Data Survey (II)

planning." These inquiries can be classified according to each value-
institution category.

The table summarizes the scope of research institutes and proj-
ects according to the primary emphasis of the topics studied.

Territorial

Local

Provincial

National

Regional

North Atlantic
Inner Eurasia
South Asia
North Pacific
Mediterranean
South Atlantic
South Pacific

World

Analytic

Legal systems
(formula)

Ideologies

(doctrine, lore)

Decision process

Intelligence

Promotion

Prescription

Invocation

Application

Appraisal

Termination

Participants

Perspectives

Arenas

Base Values

Strategies

Outcomes

Effects

Conditioning Factors

Social Process

culture, class, in-
terest, personality,
crisis level

Human and envi-
ronmental resources

Policy

(According to
value institution)

Power

Enlightenment

Wealth

Well-being

Skill

Affection

Respect

Rectitude

In order to make full use of the training and research commit-
ment of undergraduate students there would be advantages to pro-
viding special services through the American Political Science
Association. Some steps have already been taken to foster the prepa-

84 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ration of research manuals. Arrangements could be made to file
duplicates of local-data cards at a national repository established by
the association at Washington or at designated subcenters. From time
to time, basic data sheets (maps or graphs) setting local findings in
relation to one another could be issued. These could be released to
the press and other interested parties.

Voting studies have recently been encouraged on a large scale.
However, they suffer from the absence of such local data as the
proposed survey could supply. National and regional polls of opinion
have become established institutions; they, too, suffer from lack of
local studies and from insufficient attention to the long-run needs of
political analysis. The polling agencies have been slow to select re-
curring topics for periodic re-examination.

As political scientists became more concerned with the basic
data survey, the effects on historical scholarship would be many and
deep. Some of these would reveal themselves in the collection of
fundamental documents.^^

Needless to demonstrate in detail, concern with the extension of
trend lines backward in time would lead to more systematic ex-
ploitation of past serials. It is only recently that equipment has been
developed to a point that promises to make the content analysis of
past records automatic. Machines will scan, code, and excerpt samples
of newspapers, pamphlets, proceedings (for example, of conventions,
legislative sessions, and administrative and court sessions), books, stat-
utes, administrative regulations, records (for example, tax assessments
and receipts, licenses, assistance, gifts, calendars of appointments,
registers of correspondence and phone calls, registers of the flow of
official documents within and among organizations, property titles
and transfers, and court and administrative orders) .^^

The preceding outline of the decision process can be used to
describe that of any community whatever, whether a participant in
modern industrial civilization or a remote folk society. It is clear that,
the greater the cultural contrast, the more the functional categories
must be adapted by complex intermediate procedures to the realities
of the local situation. In this connection, I shall make no concrete
references here to my experiences in research on preindustrial societies,
since a detailed report will presently be available. However, it may
be helpful to give some clues to the procedures involved in compara-
tive investigation.

It is essential once more to underline the distinction, fundamental
to political science, between the functional categories for which the

The Basic Data Survey (II) 85

scientist takes full responsibility and the conventional usages embodied
in any society. How does the scientific observer relate his functional
terms to concrete occurrences ?

The fundamental strategy for research is the use of successive
approximations, which, for purposes of rapid exposition, I shall con-
dense into a few steps. Step One is to collect and provisionally classify
available information about the object of study. At this point in the
development of travel and of anthropology it is rare to find any tribe
or neighborhood wholly ignored in the literature. True, in extreme
cases, one is limited to a traveler's tale or to allusions in missionaries'
reports. It is usually possible to obtain enough information to assign
a given "fact" to one of the eight value-institution categories for the
comprehensive description of a social process. A report says that there
is a "chief"; this is provisionally treated as among the "power — insti-
tutions of government." Or a report speaks of "silent trading"; this
goes to the file on "wealthy — economic institutions." The reference
may be to "bilateral kinship"; this goes to "affection — family and
institutions of intimacy." And so on.

Sometimes Step Two can be taken early in the preparation for
work in the field. If accumulated knowledge is fairly rich, each value-
institution category can be provisionally subdivided into outcome,
preoutcome, and postoutcome phases and each subsituation can be
characterized according to the terms employed in this book — partici-
pants, perspectives, arenas (subarenas: organized, unorganized), base
values, strategies, outcomes (specific; aggregated in time), and effects
(specific, aggregate). It may aid in the conduct of research to isolate
the power (decision) situations according to the sevenfold classifica-
tion of outcomes used above: intelligence, promoting, prescribing, in-
voking, applying, appraising, and terminating and, further, to draw
preliminary distinctions in degree of authority and control.

Perhaps enough data are at hand to make a provisional analysis
of each situation according to the interactions involved. Who indulges
or deprives whom (self, other) in terms of which value (power,
wealth, respect, and so on) ? The scientific observer may adopt more
than one standpoint for the study of value changes by participants in
any situation. He may, for instance, describe interactions from the
perspective of each participant, or he may use third-party viewpoints.

When field work begins (or, in historical research, when standard
authorities are abandoned for primary sources), Step Three can be
taken. It is usually possible to focus successively on various kinds of
situations chosen according to dominant value. For example, the ob-

86 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

server may witness an assembly of all village males in a council
meeting or sit with an elder who is listening to a complaint that X
has taken his field and has no right to it. In field work, however,
the sequence from situations largely specialized in one value to situ-
ations specialized in another can be followed only approximately, since
an informant may introduce testimony about altogether different cir-
cumstances, and it then becomes wise to pursue the new topic further.

As data multiply, the reclassification of original data becomes a
regular procedure (Step Four). The operation can be kept adminis-
tratively practicable by reclassifying only when substantial increments
of data have accumulated. It may begin to appear quite early that
the original image of the decision process was badly out of harmony
with the facts. The "governor" put forward by a village to meet
strangers may turn out to be an insignificant participant in the in-
ternal process by which community decisions are made. Only at a
late stage of investigation may it become apparent, for instance, that
the key participants are the heads of the principal ceremonial associ-
ations into which all inale members of the community are initiated
at puberty.

The procedure of successive approximation allows the final pic-
ture to emerge — final, that is, from the investigator's perspective. At
this stage, the conventional usages of the community have been com-
prehensively reanalyzed according to the functional categories of the
scientific observer. Hence, the data are ready for inclusion in com-
parative political science, where they can be analyzed for the light
they throw on alternative models of the political process.

I have indicated before that surveys have relevance to theoretical
systems for the study of political dynamics. It would carry us too far
from the necessarily limited scope of the present discussion to present
a critique of existing models. However, I do give some attention to
the problem in the Appendix.

NOTES

1 Cf., e.g., R. B. Hunting and G. S. Neuwirth, Who Sues in New York City?

"A Study of Automobile Accident Claims" (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1962); J. Goldstein, "Police Discretion Not to
Invoke the Criminal Law: Low- Visibility Decisions in the Ad-
ministration of Justice," Yale Law Journal, 69 (1960), 543-594.

2 Cf. R. A. Arens and H. D. Lasswell, In Defense of Public Order, "The

Emerging Field of Sanction Law" (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1961).

The Basic Data Survey (II) 87

3 Cf., e.g., C. Vose, Caucasians Only, "The Supreme Court, the NAACP,
and the Restrictive Covenants Cases" (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1959).

* Cf. W. N. Kinnard, Jr., Appointed by the Mayor (University, Ala.: Uni-
versity of Alabama Press, Inter-University Case Book Program, No.
36, 1956). For a system of distinctions, cf. P. M. Blau and R. W.
Scott, Formal Organization, "A Comparative Approach" (San
Francisco: Chandler, 1962). Note D. Marvick, Career Perspectives
in a Bureaucratic Setting (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1954). Also, the important trend studies of the prestige (re-
spect position) of civil servants initiated by L. D. White and con-
tinued by M. Janowitz and others.

^ Cf. R. C. Martin et al., Decisions in Syracuse (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana
University Press, 1961).

^ The emphasis on interest groups in politics fosters the study of official
as well as unofficial versions of advantage. Cf. D. B. Truman's in-
fluential study. The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf,
1951).

^ The role of informal decision-making — which includes prescribing — is
among the phases of the process described in R. Agger, D. Goldrick,
and B. Swanson in their study of four communities in two regions
(forthcoming).

^ Cf. the techniques used in G. A. Schubert, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial
Behavior (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1959); C. H. Pritchett,
The Roosevelt Court, "A Study in Judicial Politics and Values,
1937-1947" (New York: Macmillan, 1948).

^ Strictly speaking, planning operations are classified in the present context
as part of the intelligence function (when the activity does not
proceed to the promotion, prescription, or other phases of the total
decision process). When policy has already been formulated and
put into effect, the problem of assessing results and analyzing the
effects of various factors on results enters the picture. Hence, plan-
ning includes use of the findings produced by appraisals, which may
or may not be carried out by the same structures. The International
Institute of Administrative Sciences has had many sessions on the
problems of intelligence and appraisal. An example of scholarly ap-
praisal is C. Tunnard and B. Pushkarev, Man-Made America: Chaos
or Control? "An Inquiry into Selected Problems of Design in the
Urbanized Landscape" (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

^° Cf. P. H. Rossi and R. A. Dentler, The Politics of Urban Renewal, "The
Chicago Findings" (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

^^ A Political Data Center was organized at Yale in 1962 and plans to work
out cooperative arrangements. The Roper Center at Williams Col-

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

lege is an important repository of polling information. A newly
organized "Inter-University Consortium" unites, in the first year,
the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan with
more than twenty institutions of higher learning in the United
States.

12 The university at Oslo, Norway, has been among the most dynamic centers
of modern social and political science and takes important ini-
tiatives in the direction of international research. Cf. S. Rokkan,
ed., "Citizen Participation in Political Life," International Social
Science Journal, 12 (1960). Also, G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman,
eds., The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1960); and J. A. Robinson's continuing study of Con-
gress, Congress and Foreign Policy-Making, "A Study in Legislative
Influence and Initiative" (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1962).

1^ R. S. Lane has reconsidered the present and prospective state of knowl-
edge of Political Ideology, "Why the American Common Man Be-
lieves as He Does" (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

1* E.g., R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs, and R. L. Davis, eds.. Decision Proc-
esses (New York: Wiley, 1960); R. L. Chapman, "Data for Test-
ing a Model of Organizational Behavior" (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND Corporation, 1960; M. Haire, ed.. Modern Organizational
Theory (New York: Wiley, 1959); J. G. March and H. A. Simon,
Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958); A. Downs, An Economic
Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957); G. L. S.
Shackle, Decision, Order, and Time in Human Affairs (Cambridge:
University Press, 1961).

1^ How fruitful such a task can be is convincingly demonstrated by W.
Jenkins at the University of North Carolina center of documenta-
tion.

1*^ Cf. W. N. Locke and A. D. Booth, eds.. Machine Translation of Lan-
guages (New York: Wiley, 1953) ; J. W. Perry and A. Kent, Tools for
Machine Literature Searching (New York: Interscience Publications,
1958); B. Mittman and A. Ungar, eds.. Computer Applications —
1960 (New York: Macmillan, 1960); R. E. Machol and P. Gray,
eds., Recent Developments in Information and Decision Processes
(New York: Macmillan, 1962). Cf. especially Norbert Wiener's re-
maiks. Current developments can be followed in M.U.L.L., "Mod-
ern Uses of Logic in Law," quarterly newsletter of the American
Bar Association Special Committee on Electronic Data Retrieval in
collaboration with the Yale Law School, edited by L. E. Allen
and M. E. Caldwell.

Appendix
to
Chapter 4

DISCIPLINE BY THEORETICAL MODELS

Fortunately, political science is rich in theoretical propositions capable of
guiding the choice of survey data. Hypotheses are also being welded into
hypothetical models of how decision processes work, and the terms employed
are intended to lend themselves to the choice of operational indexes. It is,
of course, elementary that investigators must keep in mind the most com-
prehensive theoretical requirements of their discipline, especially at the mo-
ment when they make heroic simplifications as part of a program of research.
If, as political scientists, we were omniscient, we would have at our
disposal descriptive and analytic tools enabling us to do the following: make
a rapid survey of the predispositions found everywhere in the world; "pre-
dict" (retrospectively) the conditioning factors accounting for the direction
and intensity of these predispositions; predict the way in which these pre-
dispositions would express themselves under the impact of any conceivable
constellation of future conditioning factors; predict the probable occurrence
of future constellations; outline the strategies by which the probability of

90 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

future factor constellations can be modified (at stated cost in terms of all
values); and connect past and prospective sequences of events with speci-
fications of goal (in our case, the goal of realizing the dignity of man — and
of other advanced forms of life — on the widest possible scale).

Any operation of this kind presupposes that we can describe the per-
spectives and capabilities (base values) of each participant. If we know the
value preferences (demands) and the expectations of feasible strategies and
outcomes, it is possible to predict the response, since behavior of advanced
living forms is postulated as a function of expected net value advantage
among perceived alternatives.

This point calls attention to the importance of devising procedures of
value and expectation analysis (and also of identification, since identifications
interact with all other perspectives). Moreover, each interaction requires that
appropriate procedures be used to describe the effect of the environment on
the focus of attention and on immediate perceptions. As implied above, ex-
pectations may be realistic or in error both in regard to outcome events and
to capabilities. Presumably, the realism or unrealism of such perspectives
depends in part on environmental impacts on the focus of attention and the
immediate perceptions of the individual or the group. In principle, it must
be within the competence of political scientists to describe every interaction
according to its significance in the decision process of the social context un-
der study.

The challenge is to invent or adapt instruments whereby we can describe
any political interaction of value indulgence or deprivation as a function of
expected net advantage and of actual capability in any arena.

Concurrently with value analysis, we are concerned with institutional
analysis. The value categories, it will be recalled, are a comprehensive list
of terms employed to describe any social process, particularly all culminating
events (elections, loans, marriages, and so on). Having provisionally located
such events, we describe the patterns relatively specialized in each, recog-
nizing that all values are to some degree involved in every interaction. Var-
ious practices (perspectives and operations) comprise an institution, which
can be described in terms of myth and technique — myth being patterns of
perspective, technique being patterns of operation.

For many purposes, it is convenient to intensify the description of value
or institutional events by treating them as patterns of mechanism, that is,
as analyzable into fundamental common elements. The most useful categories
of mechanism distinguish an act (or "interact") as a sequence in which
actors affect the outcome. Further, an act is "externalized" or "internalized"
according to the degree to which all actors are involved as the sequence runs
to completion.

In terms of fundamental mechanism, we also characterize the degree to
which symbolic or nonsymbolic events are implicated in the act sequence.
Symbolic events are subjective; other events are not. The nonsymbolic events
are signs or nonsigns. A sign is specialized in mediating among symbol events;

Appendix to Chapter 4 91

hence, it includes gestures and languages. A somatic event is a physical move-
ment or structure of the body. Environing resources are physical events, and
they are open to modification by actors to create culture materials.

Mechanism distinctions are valuable in the comparison of political and
social styles, since they enable externalized or internalized patterns to be
readily designated and provide ways of describing symbolic and nonsymbolic
characteristics. For instance, symbols and signs may be greatly elaborated in
some bodies politic where oratory and poetry are in flower, and images
varying through time provide clues to the potential action, or tension, level.

As for the pursuit of power, the general hypothesis is that power is em-
phasized as an outcome when it is expected to yield greater net advantages
than the pursuit of other values. In regard to strategies that rely on power
or instruments of power, the general hypothesis is that they are expected to
yield comparative net advantages.

Appropriately rephrased, the same formulation is applicable to the rise
and fall of ideologies and technical operation and to the appearance of any
pattern in competition with any alternative.

The data obtained by basic data surveys would be affected by develop-
mental constructs of the future, since these constructs provide a sense of
priority. In the preceding pages, we have mentioned the desirability of fol-
lowing certain events because our developmental constructs suggest their im-
portance.

Contemplated strategies of future action also raise questions about past
and current events that would influence the survey. However, the consider-
ation of strategies almost invariably discloses the existence of not inconsider-
able gaps between what we know and what we would like to know for the
guidance of policy. Can we use methods that narrow this discrepancy and
provide solid bases of inference for decision? In Chapter 5, we put forward
suggestions in answer to this challenging question.

The basic data survey sketched in the preceding pages can be sum-
marized in the form of a generalized outline appropriate to the study of the
decision process in any social context or subcontext. The operational indexes
appropriate to each category or subcategory depend on the intensiveness of
the observational standpoint taken by the scientific obsei'ver and the discern-
ible features of the field of events observed.

DECISION PROCESS
Prearena events — >- arena events — >- postarena events

Prearena Events

Includes all interactions that precede the involvement of authoritative
or controlling decision-makers in the context. We may distinguish between
precipitating events and parallel events, the former being interactions that
lead up to entry into an arena; the latter, despite their resemblance to pre-
cipitating events, do not.

92 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Arena Events

Includes all interactions in which decision-makers are involved. We
distinguish preoutcome and outcome events, the latter being the events re-
garded as the culminating interactions in the sequence, since they are per-
ceived as especially important for the value position of those involved.

Postarena Events

Includes all interactions that are influenced by the outcome.

The decision process occurs in the context of a larger social process
which can also be characterized in preoutcome, outcome, and postoutcome
terms. The political scientist must discriminate in the social process the
frame of reference of special interest to him. This can be accomplished if
the context is characterized by a list of terms that is kept fixed for potential
use in designating any social context whatsoever. In this way, the observer
uses the same "lenses" for locating comparable features of each situation
that he approaches for comparative purposes. He is able to assign operational
indexes to the terms in the fixed list. If other observers disagree with his
assignments, the difference may be resolved by discussion, or equivalency of
result may be guaranteed by discovering the magnitude of the difference in
findings to be attributed to the index. One investigator may think that one
or more terms in the fixed list (as generally defined) are not appropriately
employed; another investigator, however, may use the whole list. This diver-
gence, too, if not eliminated by discussion, can be dealt with by discovering
the constants permitting intertranslatability.

The functional definition of "power" that I recommend designates in-
teraction patterns in which the expectation prevails that severe sanctions are
involved, either by immediate action, as in fighting, or potentially. Opera-
ational indexes must ultimately be chosen to designate "expectations," "se-
vere" (rather than "mild") sanctions, and "prevailing" patterns.

At every phase of the decision process, the same components of the
situation are open to study.

Participants

Conventional usage identifies many participants. Scientific observers
may also note the existence of aggregates for which no symbol is found. (The
general categories are culture, class, interest, and personality at various levels
of crisis.)

Perspectives

Every value-institution process has a special myth. In specific situations,
however, one myth (conventionally described) may blanket all others, making
it necessary to investigate particular situations in detail if differentiations are
to be found. Religious ideologies, for example, may include gods of health,
good crops, victorious war, knowledge, expertness, love, honor, and salvation.

Appendix to Chapter 4 93

In the ideology of power, prescriptions may refer to each phase of decision,
though inquiry may show that the nominal rule is not adhered to in actual
circumstances. (Within each myth, we have further distinguished formula,
doctrine, and lore.)

Arena

The observer must select some minimum frequency of conjunction of
events to justify his identification of an arena. In world politics, for instance,
an isolated and remote country may maintain such a low frequency of inter-
action that it is not a "participant" (foreign relations, such as they are, may
be administered by a foreign power; trade is negligible; news exchanges are
inconsequential). Once an arena is established, the pattern of polarity can
be described.

Base Values

The principal categories here are by value, actual and potential, under
stipulated contingencies. Since the contingencies are as a rule incompletely
considered, there is usually incipient ambiguity in the description of base
values.

Strategies

The distinction in strategic objectives according to assembling and
processing has been referred to before, likewise that in terms of persuasion
and coercion and combinations of indulgence and deprivation. Differences by
style {mechanism) are also appropriate, for instance in degree of symbol-
sign-and-resource pattern. Communication and diplomacy depend on the
former (symbol-sign pattern), military and economic strategies, on the latter.
Strategies of isolation or combination depend especially on the polar structure
of arenas.

Outcomes

The culminating events that affect value position are describable ac-
cording to final alignment and weight, as indicated by initiative and by
pivotal position in the preoutcome management of coalitions.

Effects

Particular effects can be followed for active participants in an arena,
notably the subsequent fate of winners and losers as affected by this result.
Aggregate effects are ultimately to be summed up in terms of value shaping
and sharing and institutional stability or change.

It is possible to describe the whole decision process in terms of value
indulgence and deprivation and of institutional stability or change. The basic
data survey could supply indispensable information of trend toward or away
from the goal of broad, rather than narrow, participation in value shaping

94 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

and sharing. By correlational procedures, it would also provide some indica-
tion of the eflect of various combinations of conditioning factors on trend
variation and lay a foundation for inferences regarding desirable clarifications
of goal and future projections and policy alternatives. However, the survey
would have limitations requiring other methods to overcome.

Experimentation,
Prototyping,
Intervention

Trend data are in many ways insufficient to meet the criteria of
science and policy. In the study of conditioning, the ideal is to for-
mulate propositions that correctly state the relations among the
factors involved. It is true that time series can be correlated with one
another to verify explanatory hypotheses. However, a more satis-
factory design would seem to be an experimental program conducted
under circumstances that provide the widest variety of opportunities
for the controlled investigation of factor combinations.

EXPERIMENTATION AND INTERVENTION

Contemporary social psychologists have made laboratory experi-
ments providing valuable hypotheses for the analysis of politics. When,

96 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

for example, a small experimental group agrees to try to make a de-
cision within the constraints imposed on a flow of communicationj re-
sults are aflfected by the pattern of flow. If each message must be
routed through one member, rather than being sent directly between
any pair, frustrations accumulate that are likely to take the inter-
mediary link as the target of discharge. The outcome may be periodic
disruptions of group work.^

It is tempting to extend the findings of such an experiment di-
rectly to field situations and to hypothesize that official prescriptions
will produce frustration if they require that each message be centrally
cleared. On reflection, however, the political scientist sees no grounds
for assuming that this applies to all arenas. In actual situations, offi-
cial regulations are circumvented in many ways. If obstacles arise to
communication between A and G, A and G are likely in practice to es-
tablish informal channels. The hypothesis, however, is serviceable in
directing attention to the importance of studying the actual flow of
both authoritative and effective communication among officials. But
this is no new idea, nor does the experiment provide a measuring de-
vice transferable to field situations. The data called for must, as usual,
be obtained by the well-known methods of interview or participant
observation.

Another laboratory experiment explores the effect of overloading
a communication net. Let M be messages fed to an operator for trans-
lation from Gode One (words) into Gode Two (telegraphic code).
Research may show that operators of equal skill (measured by test)
will begin to increase their errors at a given level of M and that at
some level of input the whole process breaks down. This is a sugges-
tive finding for politics, since it calls attention to the fact that all
communication systems can be overloaded and that overloadings at
key subcenters can work havoc.

Moreover, the findings are immediately transferable to those
parts of the decision process that employ word-to-telegraphic-code
operations — transferable, that is, in the sense of providing hypotheses
for the quantitative description of performance. When the input-out-
put records of a group of (tested) operators in fire, police, military,
or other services are analyzed, it may turn out that they make more
errors under less pressure of input than were made by an experimental
group. Further, the breaking point may diff"er, as shown by a few
emergency situations of which there are records.

What variables account for the diff"erences? Interviews may re-
veal that operators in field situations are not much interested in the

Experimentation, Prototyping, Intervention 97

job and make few conscious demands on themselves or colleagues to
work hard. They make more errors; and, as pressure increases, they
speed up very little, postponing personal breakdowns indefinitely, even
though unsent messages accumulate. The operation is overloaded,
but the human components do not "knock themselves out." Restudy
of the laboratory group may show, by contrast, that the subjects who
took part in the experiment were highly motivated to do well, since
they wanted to win the respect of the scientists in charge, and they
also felt competitive with one another.

In this case, the laboratory contributed more than calling atten-
tion to an interesting aspect of politics. Tests of performance could
be transferred to the field — that is, to administrative situations — and
the quantification of both laboratory and field results made it feasible
to appraise government operators provisionally. A constellation of fac-
tors that condition administrative services was identified; their im-
pact was precisely expressed.

Consider yet another variation in the relationship between labo-
ratory and field. When experimental groups are given increasingly
exacting tasks, behavior changes can be recorded by observers (who
sit unobtrusively in the laboratory or look through one-way glass) or
by instruments (for example, that trace the movements of chair springs
or respiratory rhythms). Such random movements as directly observ-
able frequencies of head or arm and instrumentally recorded respir-
atory frequencies or irregularities increase. These changes may be
correlated with time (late versus early morning, early versus late
afternoon). 2

The results are pertinent to political science in several ways.
Some procedures of data-gathering, especially the visual recording of
random movements, can be directly transferred. These procedures can
be adapted to studies of tension — a field that will probably attract
much research effort in the future.^

Many laboratory procedures can be applied immediately to trans-
national and other group comparisons. For instance, important clues
to the direction and intensity of world perspectives have been obtained
from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT).* There are grounds
for predicting that tests of perceived body image (of the self and of
others) will generate information about fundamental changes of po-
litical perspective. Preliminary results, with primitive methods, indi-
cate that authoritative individuals are perceived as taller and heavier
than one's self.^ If this proves to be true of lower castes and classes,
trends at all class levels can be disclosed by a program of periodic

98 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

retesting. Democratization or the reverse is subtly registered by the
phenomena of attention and perception.

Changes in communication style provide clues to trends that are
not fully conscious. The demand to impose the self on others is likely
to be revealed in gesture, intonation, and choice and arrangement of
words. When commands are uttered, for instance, the sign compo-
nents of the communication show "response-contrasting" in that they
have a pattern which the audience is not expected to repeat. But in
more equalitarian situations the style shows "response-modeling" (the
hand outstretched in greeting is expected to be reciprocated).®

The foregoing discussion is intended to suggest both the advan-
tages and limitations of laboratory experiments as tools of political
science. From the point of view of basic data surveying, laboratories
are now the chief innovators of data-gathering procedures and instru-
ments. In the future, measuring instruments developed in the labora-
tory can be deployed in a comprehensive and perpetual survey of
political "weather" (the direction and intensity of key predispositions).

It is rarely practicable or desirable to leap directly from the lab-
oratory to legislative or regulatory innovations. It is not often prac-
ticable since the laboratory exercise may strike too many legislators,
administrators, and publicists as "artificial," that is, as inappropriate
to the values and institutional practices of the community affected by
the proposed change. Furthermore, it is not desirable from the scien-
tific point of view to extrapolate from the simplified and highly con-
trolled conditions of the laboratory, since variables present in the
field may modify or even reverse the results of the experiment. Typi-
cally, responsible politicians and administrators are concerned with
value outcomes and effects in which the scientists' pursuit of enlight-
enment has a relatively low priority. If innovations are introduced by
statute or after they have been incorporated into the platform of a
political party, they have been justified on allegedly scientific grounds.
But the scientists create a false sense of the scope of their knowledge
if they claim to know all the significant factors of the institutional
setting. Before political scientists can speak with scientific justification
about an innovation in institutional practice, they need to know what
they are talking about, namely, the pattern or variables whose inter-
actions constitute the relevant political institution.

Several strategies are used to overcome the gap between labo-
ratory experiments and full-scale innovation. The most important is
the "pilot study," in which an official innovation is introduced in part
of a jurisdiction with the expectation that, if results are satisfactory,

Experimentation, Prototyping, Intervention 99

the innovation will be extended throughout the nation or the region
involved.

Pilot studies differ greatly from one another. At one extreme,
they are conducted in the glare of publicity and controversy. The in-
novation may be under the direction of politicians who are determined
to discredit the project or to score a seeming success at any price. At
the other end of the scale, pilot studies may attract little immediate
attention from the political parties, pressure associations, legislators,
or administrators in the larger political arena in which it is conducted.
Further, the direction of the study may be in the hands of scientists
— including political scientists — who are deeply concerned with con-
tributing to knowledge and professional skill.

Let us distinguish, as usual, between conventional and functional
definitions. In the conventional sense, all official innovations, whether
pilot studies or not, come into the same broad category of official
prescriptions. It will be useful to isolate a functional category accord-
ing to the importance of the effective pursuit of enlightenment. Proto-
typing is such a category, and I shall undertake a provisional
formulation of the strategy of prototyping. My expectation is that
prototyping will play an increasingly important part in the future of
political science as a scientific and policy-oriented discipline.

As we shall see, prototypes are not necessarily official, since many
institutional practices may be inaugurated for purposes of scientific
research outside formal government. I think of prototyping as an in-
novation, typically small-scale, made in political practice primarily
for scientific purposes. The institutional practice involved can be
copied; hence, the practice may be incorporated into the institutional
patterns of a body politic. An unofficial prototype may stimulate an
official pilot project or an innovation that is authoritatively extended
throughout a national or regional jurisdiction.

PROTOTYPING

We are principally concerned here with improving the scientific
capability and achievements of political science. As the level of po-
litical science rises, so, too, will its significance for public policy. It is
worth emphasizing the possibility of linking experimentation, proto-
typing, and intervention as a comprehensive strategy of policy in-
novation. At the same time, the sequence has great relevance to the
strategy of knowledge.'^ In general, the scientist loses control over the
relevant variables at successive stages. Clearly, his control is greatest
in laboratory experiments and diminishes in a prototype situation. It

100 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

is typically least in official intervention. In that case, the applicable
methods of analysis are largely correlational. Prototyping is partly
experimental and partly dependent on correlation.

A laboratory experiment is the procedure presumably least likely
to be interfered with for partisan purposes. (However, the distinction
is not likely to hold in totalitarian states or, for that matter, in rela-
tively open societies if experiments conflict with genuinely efTective
norms of official and private life.) When a prototype is in process of
formation, dangers from partisan interferences are usually greater
than in the laboratory, since prototypes are likely to be identified by
interests who seek to control results for their special benefit. However,
the vulnerability to interference is greater still in the case of official
innovations.

In some circumstances, the demand for knowledge outweighs all
other considerations, even when officially prescribed patterns are under
appraisal. For instance, leaders and led may be genuinely puzzled by
failures of administrative efficiency; hence, political scientists are al-
lowed a free hand to investigate and report. The typical advantage
of prototypes is that they may be kept sufficiently small scale to stay
out of sight until results have been rather fully studied. In this, they
differ from a pilot project, although in the marginal case differences
disappear.

In the present embryonic stage of political research, it is impos-
sible to outline a body of verified principles of strategy for the con-
struction of prototypes. Enough experience is at hand, however, to
provide at least a degree of guidance. In the discussion of prototyping
to follow, I make frequent reference to two projects, one at Vicos,
Peru,^ the other at the Yale Psychiatric Institute.^ By agreement with
the Peruvian government, the Vicos project was conducted under the
auspices of Cornell University. The aim of the project was to prepare
the Indians of Vicos for a decision-making process that would share
the power in the village while making realistic demands and adopting
realistic strategies for coping with the larger environment in which it
was located (locally, nationally, internationally). The hope was to
achieve a level of functioning that would encourage the government
and other authorities concerned with the development of folk or
peasant culture to repeat the prototype in pilot projects and even-
tually on an extensive scale, by intervention, throughout Peru.

The Yale project was also a prototype undertaking. The innova-
tors sought to reach a level of operation that would present a new
model of hospital practice and, if successful, encourage other psychi-

Experimentation, Prototyping, Intervention 101

atric establishments to adopt its fundamental features. The aim was
to enlarge participation in decision-making by patients on the hypoth-
esis that this would have favorable therapeutic consequences.

One of the first problems in prototyping is when to regard an
innovation as past the "preparatory" phase and effectively "intro-
duced." After the introduction is made, the "results" of the innovation
can be observed. Before valid comparisons can be drawn between the
results of innovation X and established pattern Y, it is obvious that
sufficient incorporation of X must take place to justify the assertion
that the innovation has, in fact, been studied.

The principal question that arises in drawing the line between
"pre-" and "post-" introduction is that human loyalties, beliefs, and
faiths are involved. Unless a high degree of agreement has been reached,
it can not be claimed that pattern X has been tried, since a precon-
dition of institutional life is effective commitment to the operations
concerned. From a scientific point of view, the task is to assess the
consequences of pattern X after a specified degree of acceptance has
occurred. From a policy point of view, the questions about pattern
X are these: In view of the consequences of X in a situation in which
it had a certain degree of support, should I support X in situations
where it is not yet accepted, but where I can influence support?

It would make no sense to insist that every participant in a given
prototype situation believe in the innovation before we regard the
pattern as "introduced," since we live in a world where degrees of
conscious and unconscious opposition are commonly present. Let us
adopt as a working strategy, therefore, the requirement that a proto-
type is "introduced" when an effective rtiajority of the leadership is
committed to try out the innovation and agrees that important results
may reasonably be expected to follow from it. At the Yale Psychiatric
Institute, medical opinion was initially divided over the merits of the
project, although the undertaking was an outgrowth of earlier work
at the institute.

The anthropologist in charge at Vicos had formal authority to
run the hacienda, and he determined to use it to bring into being a
decision process that would continue after his withdrawal. The Vicos
elders did not know what to make of the situation at first; but, by
the end of a few months, they had got the idea that they did have
a genuine voice in policy. At that point, we could say that the project
was fully under way and that the prototype began to take shape.

When effective innovating support has been achieved, prototype
managers should make it easy for the ideologically alienated and the

102 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

characterologically incapable among responsible leaders to withdraw.
We have said that, if the long-range implications of an innovation are
to be demonstrated, it is important that acceptance reach at least a
stated minimum. Otherwise, failure can be explained with the alibi
that the proposed policy "has never been tried," meaning that sincere
attempts were not made to discover the true potential of the idea. Of
course, the preparatory phase itself is of no little scientific interest,
since we need to improve strategies of obtaining acceptance of policies
under various original patterns of predisposition. But the fact that a
prototype must sufficiently overcome initial obstacles to achieve a
minimum level of support is not the distinctive problem or contribu-
tion of prototyping.

Once initial working acceptance is won, it is desirable to discover
the potential of the prototype by encouraging dissidents in the leader-
ship to withdraw. A distinction was drawn above between "ideological
alienation" and "characterological incapability." Ideological alienation
is not difficult to detect if the situation encourages openness. It is a
question of leaders who are unwilling to agree that the project is
worthwhile or that it has a reasonable chance of success. In the Psy-
chiatric Institute case, there were physicians who found the whole
approach distasteful, since it contradicted their conception of the
physician's role in the treatment of patients. For them, the proper task
of a psychiatrist is to work individually with patients and to authori-
tatively decide what changes should be made in the patient's hospital
environment. The prospect of being criticized in public by patients
and of becoming objects of public criticism by professional colleagues
was intolerable to them. In the Vicos project, it was important that
all outside innovators and the dominant element among the elders
adopt a positive approach. The innovators could enlist the cooperation
of others only if they indicated that they thought the project worth
trying. The approach recommended here is not blind faith that the
prototype will succeed; rather, the appropriate perspective is candid
willingness to give it the benefit of the doubt and to proceed with
determination.

The characterological point is more subtle. Many scientists are
unable to play the role that they consciously agree to play. Among
the psychiatrists, for example, were physicians who were consciously
in favor of patient-staff conferences and of a power-sharing approach
generally. But in the judgment of their colleagues they were unable
to live up to the requirements of a cooperative way of life. For ex-
ample, one leading staff member seemed to sulk when adverse com-

Experimentation, Prototyping, Intervention 103

merits on a hospital rule were made by a patient or when patients
spoke on such particular issues as whether a patient was showing
enough improvement to warrant a visit home. Similarly, an outside
scientist who was active at Vicos for a time showed impatience with
criticism and set a bad example for the members of the council.

A further principle of prototyping is that clarifications of goal
should be encouraged to continue intermittently even after minimum
consensus has been achieved. Not many creative projects begin with
agreement in detail on the objectives to be sought or on the criteria
appropriate to appraisal. Even when current perspectives are highly
favorable and the point of "introduction" has been passed, explicit
agreement on objectives may be inconclusive. In fact, a merit of
prototyping is that it permits objectives to gain clarity through ex-
perience, enriching in this way the considerations to be taken into
account in redesigning the basic proposal for later tests or for official
intervention.

The idea of trying out patient-staff conferences was well received
as a step in the direction of patient responsibility, although it delib-
erately stopped short of reinstalling the full responsibilities of ordinary
life. It soon became clear that the medical personnel did not intend to
give up their veto power over suggestions offered by patients. But it
was equally apparent that conferences must go beyond "mere talk"
and culminate in at least some outcomes that patients could attribute
to their own initiative. Without attempting an exhaustive enumer-
ation, it is possible to name several specific objectives that came to be
regarded by the staff as among the legitimate goals: in general, to
increase the therapeutic effectiveness of the institute; to discourage
withdrawal by patients from active responsibility to larger social
groups; to encourage a flow of information about hospital conditions
that would assist in making better decisions; to encourage initiative
on the part of patients (and all component elements of the institute)
in proposing and advocating particular policy acts; to reduce the
patients' sense of isolation from people by providing more knowledge
of others; to stimulate realistic social judgment by supplying expe-
rience in evaluating the factual and preferential statements of staff
and patients; to clarify the therapeutic goal of individuals and the
institute by participating in attempts to evaluate situations and pro-
posals; and to clarify the ideology of a social order of human dignity
by giving concrete attention to the principles of democratic problem-
solving.

Not many of these concrete objectives were in the mind of any

104 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

one person at the beginning. Initial perspectives were decidedly fuzzy;
but clarified objectives emerged once the staff -patient procedure was
under way. We must bear in mind that the criteria applied by one
scientist in assessing a prototype are not necessarily identical to those
of another scientist or to all who participate in a given innovation.
Even after the degree of unity that justifies one in saying that a proto-
type is launched has been achieved, important differences will prob-
ably occur within the framework of consent.

In the Vicos situation, for example, it is possible to isolate a few
of the initial criteria that the originating anthropologist used in gaug-
ing the short-run effectiveness of the project. Would council members
increase the frequency and extent of their participation in council
meetings? It was also important to see from the attendance record
and verbal statements whether the leaders thought things were going
well in the council's deliberations. Other questions were whether more
members of the community acquired the practice of listening to dis-
cussions and began to take a more positive part in talking about policy
and in trying to affect the outcome of council deliberations. Another
indication of effectiveness was the concern of council members for
obtaining expert advice about the technical aspects of any problem
that came before them.

The criteria of success or failure favored by the originators of
the Vicos innovation went much further. However, many of these
could not be tested before several years had passed and the Vicos
community had taken the critical step of buying hacienda land and
bringing local government entirely into its own hands. Would the
community be able to act together without breaking up into struggling
factions that might even come to blows? Could the community learn
to obtain and identify expert advice given on behalf of common, rather
than special, interests? That is, could council members distinguish a
special pleader from a source both competent and disinterested?

As it turned out, the Vicos community did in fact operate with
democracy and realism when the transition to self-government was
made. Hence, the prototype model was regarded as successful by all
who were willing to adopt these criteria. Judgment about long-range
performance had to be reserved.

The Yale institute faced comparable problems of assessment. Be-
fore many months, the immediate participants agreed that the in-
novation was justifiable and even important. Key questions were: Did
the recovery rate or rate of improvement change in either direction
9,fter the prototype was launched? Did rates for discernible categories

Experimentation, Prototyping, Intervention 105

of patients (for example, young schizophrenics, older schizophrenics)
change ? Did regressive behavior improve ? Did physicians and patients
come to agree more closely? Did patients try to pressure the staff into
acting against the staff's judgment? Did physicians and patients carry
more democratic perspectives and operational skills into other situ-
ations ?

The preceding discussion distinguishes ( 1 ) the goal of an innova-
tion, (2) the essential pattern of the new practice, and (3) the specific
consequences in terms of which the degree of achievement can be
described. Since all social values are to some extent affected, the goal
( 1 ) can be given a wide meaning, such as the sharing of all values in
the social context. It is also useful to construe goals more narrowly,
as at Vicos and the institute, where the chief goals were, respectively,
realism and democracy in decision-making and improved therapy. If
a political scientist had conceived the latter project, he might have
formulated it as a means of exploring the degree to which power-
sharing can be achieved in a therapeutic community without much
or any sacrifice of well-being — -the dominant value outcome sought in
such a community.

The chief specific practice innovated at the institute was the
patient-staff conference; at Vicos, the principal feature was the devo-
lution of power to council and people. We have emphasized the point
that a prototype is in being when an effective majority accepts the
project as reasonable. This requirement implies agreement on (1)
and (2), above. It is not enough to endorse a general value goal: a
degree of precision concerning the specific practice to be launched
and investigated is also required.

A significant distinction can be made between the early phases of
the Vicos and the institute prototypes. The initiator at Vicos was
clear about the broad objectives he sought in the project. By contrast,
it is not easy to demonstrate the time at which the institute program
became clarified as an identifiable project in the minds of the re-
sponsible members of the medical staff. The fact seems to be that the
situation was moving toward greater deference to the patients, even
though specific patterns of participation were not thought out in ad-
vance or assigned dates in a calendar of innovation. The patient-staff
conference was a practice that grew out of the dynamic interplay of
the variables of the situation. We can say that the prototype leaders,
when they became fully aware of the situation, simply took advantage
of tendencies already present. The strategy of prototyping is especially
well adapted to the discovery and further development of newly

106 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

emerging patterns of institutional life. Hence, it is appropriate to
speak of "organic," or "structural," changes in the social process and
to emphasize the opportunity that political scientists enjoy when they
are sufficiently in step with change to use the technique of prototyping
to expedite potential evolution. The method can also be employed to
strengthen the forces working against the emergence of various pat-
terns, such as ruthlessness in the pursuit of political objectives.

The preceding allusions to Vicos and the institute have called
attention to problems that must be met in inaugurating any prototype.
There are, in addition, conditions that may invalidate the prototypi-
calness of a given attempt. Exceptional circumstances may put far
too many obstacles in the path of the project (or, less often, foster
the project). The former conditions occur, for example, if war, flood,
or similar disasters interrupt the test. The latter conditions might
occur if the project suddenly becomes a focus of general policy interest
and support, so that many remarkable inducements are added to those
ordinarily available for inaugurating change. Money and talent may
"bribe" the test community into becoming a "model." This fate almost
befell Vicos because many public figures in Peru recognized the ur-
gency of "doing something about the Indians" and thought that they
could exploit Vicos in a big way. Fortunately, the barrage was avoided
until after the actual transfer of power.

A prototype, then, cannot be "completed" unless the factors that
condition its operation are representative of other than extreme cir-
cumstances. Views can differ on the question of representativeness.
If there is difficulty in preparing a context suitable to a prototype,
great faith is needed to continue the attempt. We know that some
influential prototypical situations have eventually been completed
because of the tenacity of a man of vision who foresaw the possibilities.
In this connection, we note that modern research has been greatly in-
fluenced by Elton Mayo's innovations in industrial sociology. Although
usually referred to as "experiments," they come more nearly into the
category of prototypes, since the practices could be incorporated into
modern industry. A "test room" was set apart so that output of the
prototypical group could be easily measured. The nurse who kept
physical measurements was also on hand to record and discuss per-
sonal problems. (The practice of holding management seminars on
cases of labor-management difficulty could also be copied.)

We may find it profitable to review in more detail some factors
that have conditioned the success or failure of prototypical innova-
tions. An interesting point is the role of "faith" and "rational infer-

Experimentation, Prototypiiig, Intervention 107

ence" in launching and carrying through such projects. When we hear
people extol "the faith that moves mountains" (for example, the cele-
brated case in which a devoted teacher succeeded with Helen Keller,
a severely handicapped child), they usually overlook attempts that
were frustrated largely because of failure to identify and control fac-
tors that seem obvious on rational reflection. We have already paid
some deference to these matters by referring to characterological limi-
tations. Frequently, personality limitations are conspicuous among the
agitators who originate or promote novel ideas. One combination is
particularly noteworthy — the fanatic who is partly sound on scientific
grounds and wildly unscientific in other respects. Schliemann is a
typical case in the recovery of man's classical past and especially in
the vogue of archaeology. (Cases might be chosen from reform in the
treatment of children, mentally ill, women, castes, criminals, soldiers,
and so on.)

The Vicos case draws attention to several factors that condition
prototyping attempts. Devolution was undertaken in a community
that had learned to regard any top man at the hacienda with grave
suspicion. At least four hundred years of bitter experience had cured
the Indians of whatever romanticism they may once have had about
the good intentions of an outside boss. Hence, mere verbal assurances
could not be expected to carry conviction. The project director be-
gan with a dramatic and tangible step. He announced that the crops
from the boss's land would be turned over to the community. The im-
pression was favorable but cautious, since the Indians wondered if
this were part of a subtle plot to damage them in some way they did
not yet grasp. Eventually they accepted the good faith of the project
director, as shown by many expressions of respect and affection that
went far beyond the demands of simple expediency.

The Vicos example is in harmony with the guiding principle for
affecting conduct by persuasion — lead people to expect to be better
off by acting in accord with a program rather than deviating from
it.

In many cases, the assets available to a leader may be unrepro-
ducible until he has had time to mold a new generation which some-
what conforms to his image. If the leader is cut down early, his
promising initiatives may collapse. The main Vicos figure approached
everyone with a friendly style that offered human warmth and fellow-
ship until an individual demonstrated himself to be undeserving.
Furthermore, the leader was tireless in respecting the personal identity
and opinions of the Indians and of all with whom he worked. He

108 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

adopted a simple style of greeting and showed that the obsequious
etiquette used to address bosses in the past was neither expected nor
desired. He discovered the intimate worries of people and did what
he could to be helpful; and he took in return nothing that could be
regarded as a bribe or special favor. Here, too, he set up a new model
for the community to follow, and it demonstrably spread to the re-
lations between fathers and sons, elders and neighbors, and so on. We
note also that he was no plaster saint; he did not fail to drink and
be a good fellow, and at times he got obviously angry. He showed
human weaknesses and admitted them; and, if he overstepped, he did
what was necessary to put things right.

(Some of these descriptions rest on satisfactory data, such as field
notes, that describe through time the dropping of old forms of pros-
tration and the use of the handshake or salute. Other statements are
less well grounded.)

If the members of a group become inspired with the significance
of what they are doing, they create a mutually indulgent environ-
ment of congratulation for being in the project at all. A perpetual
stream of reassuring remarks about the enterprise and hearty approval
for cooperative conduct occur spontaneously.

At the same time, the invocation of these standards can be car-
ried to censorious extremes, as when phlegmatic or explicitly unco-
operative persons are made butts of indignation, boycott, or even
violence. Since the Vicos and institute projects alike were oriented to
persuasive action, the leaders set a model of patience with errors of
ignorance or with persisting patterns that could not be expected to
disappear in a day.

The prototypes were by no means developed in obscurity, though
they were screened from general publicity until well along. Quite early
in the project, the institute innovation aroused the enthusiasm of
some patients who established contact with patient groups in other
hospitals, suggesting that everyone seek to have a voice in policy.
Administrators and staff members attached to other hospitals dis-
cussed the innovation and listened to brief reports of theory and
progress at meetings and in less formal conversations. Vicos, of course,
was always on the edge of potential eruption if anything happened
to make a political football of the enterprise.

Obviously, the strategy of prototyping must aim at confidence
without generating sanguine expectations that end in disillusionment
or permitting the pessimism that invites paralysis. We referred above
to the special environment of mutual support that "true believers"

Experimentation, Prototyping, Intervention 109

create among themselves. Since more than words and gestures (for
example, afTection, respect, and rectitude) are needed, it is always
relevant to ask: What else do the participants get out of it? Whose
value demands are indulged? Deprived?

Clearly, the demand of individuals for arbitrary power is exposed
to value deprivation by any innovation of the type we are discussing.
At the same time, individual demands for a share in common de-
cisions are indulged. Some physicians did not go along with the idea
of patient-staff conferences; and many staff members and patients at
first resented the attention and time that the meetings took. There
were patients who were accustomed to getting their own way by tan-
trum behavior or by using family wealth and respect to overcome
difficulties; they felt endangered by the new power structure. An-
other element in the patient population consists of highly withdrawn
and very timid people. They were passive resisters and practitioners
of indirection, especially in making themselves a burden on others.

In Vicos it was tempting to project directors to build a vested in-
terest in transition and to postpone relinquishing control to the In-
dians. There always seemed to be plausible grounds for waiting a
little longer in the name of more education. The temptation, however,
was successfully resisted.

It must not be supposed that economic values were of no con-
sequence in these (or in any) prototype situations. One of the first
programs that the Vicos council endorsed was a potato-growing ex-
periment that during the first season actually did pay off handsomely
to those who cooperated. The whole Vicos project depended on the
willingness of private and governmental sources to make money and
facilities available for staff and improvements. In common with many
prototype situations, the investment in Vicos was not trivial, especially
in relation to the amount of outside investment available to other
villages in the Andes. This created a strong incentive to "make good"
and to justify the money, no doubt partly in the hope of getting grant
renewals to carry the program further. The Yale institute did not
depend on a specific grant; nevertheless, economic considerations were
not insignificant. If the innovation had initiated a wave of suicides
or assaults, for example, the financial position of the institute would
have been threatened, since the wealthy clientele on which it drew
extensively might have withdrawn.

We mentioned respect as a factor; it is worth stressing the role
that this played among the scientific leaders of both projects. The
professional people concerned were connected with top-flight univer-

110 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

sities, and they were ambitious, not only to advance human enHghten-
ment and skill, but to obtain a respected place among their colleagues
in the wider community.

Moral factors were involved throughout. Many American psy-
chiatrists have been sensitive to the anomaly of exercising great power
over the lives of others in a society whose proclaimed goals are human
dignity and many of whose actual practices allow for considerable
power-sharing. However, the moral considerations were not all favor-
able to the project. Some physicians were shocked when traditional
conceptions of privacy were abandoned at the patient-staff meetings.
And the Vicos project invariably raised questions in the minds of some
participants and observers about the legitimacy of the degree of con-
trol exercised in shaping the future of Vicos. At least, the directors
would say in reply, the aims are frankly stated.

But is this strictly true? Did the project leaders go out of their
way to make clear to interested groups how their interests might be
affected? In the environment of Vicos — nearby and elsewhere in
Peru — there were groups which would have risen against the under-
taking if they had been fully alerted to the threat that it implied to
their vested interests. It can be said frankly that the project director
did not go out of his way to stir up sleeping dogs. His self-justification
was clear: If this project succeeds it will supply actual knowledge
rather than mere polemic regarding the capacity of Indian commu-
nities in Peru for self-government.

The patient-staff conference, too, was begun without an effort
being made to spell out in detail the impact that it might have on the
component groups of the hospital community. Some physicians saw
that their type of therapy would be undermined; but it was impossible
to argue, in a scientific environment, that test projects should not be
undertaken. Perhaps the nurses were least prepared for what the fu-
ture might bring, which was nothing less than posing a grave ques-
tion of the usefulness of the profession as traditionally practiced.

The problem of balancing, or integrating, rectitude and disclosure
is one of the most delicate in the past and future of the sciences, and
especially of political science. New knowledge is likely to redefine the
value position of many members of the body politic. If the "sleeping
dogs" are alerted before knowledge is acquired, the resulting political
controversy proceeds with less pertinent knowledge for the guidance
of community decision than would be the case if the prototype had
not been established. Both the Vicos and the Yale innovations were
profoundly revolutionary in their potential findings, and they pro-

Experimentatio7i, Prototyping, Intervention 111

ceeded on the assumption that some sacrifice of disclosure in advance
was a justifiable cost of the total enterprise.

The members of the Vicos community were soon aware of the
fact that the project improved their health. This was not so obvious,
however, to patients in the institute; it was also less certain from the
physicians' standpoint. We note in this connection that discrepancies
of interpretation are particularly likely to occur when ego-norms are
in process of reconstruction. Psychiatrists are accustomed to welcom-
ing as evidences of improvement acts that may be resented in more
conventional circles. We know that, when patients have been ex-
ceedingly withdrawn personalities, others are accustomed to exploiting
their timidity and dependence. As the patients improve and begin to
externalize their attention over a wider range of objects in the en-
vironment and to assert themselves more often, conflicts usually de-
velop with the former exploiter — the husband, wife, brother, sister,
or friend. These people often think that the patient is getting worse,
since he is becoming "unmanageable." However, this is not necessarily
the psychiatrist's interpretation.

When ego-norms of inequality are called in question, the result-
ing tension and conflict are, in principle, signs of growth. As Vicosinos
became more confident of their judgment in relation to the sur-
rounding world, they were bound to seem less agreeable people to
anyone who had previously thought of them as passively obedient
toilers or maids of all work. The mixed, or "Spanish," population
would certainly resent their new demands for political, economic, and
respect values.

In the cases mentioned here, the prototype-builders were aware
of these contingencies and sought by appropriate strategies to keep
the tensions and conflicts of growth within limits (especially limits
this side of violence). As a means of improving the strategy of proto-
typing, it is essential to view comprehensively the sequence of value
deprivations and indulgences among all participants in any project
and particularly to assess the role of the scientists as part of the in-
dulging or depriving environment. From the perspective of each par-
ticipant, the following questions need to be asked and answered: What
indulgences or deprivations does the participant attribute to the in-
novation? In terms of what values? From the point of view of the
scientific observers (who are active participants), what value changes
are being experienced by each participant? In terms of what value?
How are these questions to be answered from the point of view of
scientific observers, nonparticipants in the prototype situation?

112 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The experience of prototype-building usually includes partial
failures that call attention to better strategic possibilities. As we have
suggested, one justification for a prototype is that it stimulates the
discovery of an improved program and lays the foundation for orderly
replication of the revised prototype model. Timing, for example, can
as a rule be greatly improved by experience. Possible modifications are
suggested by these questions: Would a larger or smaller group learn
more quickly? Should preliminary discussions of the project be long
or short? Should the discussion style vary (for example, more or less
hortatory) ?

Which possible participants are likely to be favorably disposed
toward the project? How can their predispositions be most efficiently
dealt with without disturbing the basic structure of the innovation?
What composition of project groups is likely to overcome adverse
predispositions most economically (in teniis of man-hours of talent) ?

Questions of this kind emphasize the feedback relationship be-
tween prototype and experiment. As a prototype is built, ideas multi-
ply for experiments that systematically modify various features of
each prototypical situation. Ideas are also generated that can be
meaningfully employed in laboratory experiments having little con-
nection to the prototype itself. For example, every significant proto-
type situation to date has been handicapped by lack of efficient
measuring instruments. How can simple procedures or tests be devised
that will show how much incapacity an individual is likely to show
in making his behavior conform to his proclaimed ideal? How can
these tests be adapted to persons of diverse culture, class, interest, and
personality exposure and predisposition? What simple tests will show
how rapidly people of specified past exposure can learn to conform
under conditions of mixed indulgence and deprivation (by value cate-
gory) ?

The prototype experience is not only a means of improving in-
stitutional practice and scientific knowledge in general; it creates a
new body of assets and liabilities that can be utilized to spread or
block the specific innovation. Successful prototype situations tend to
create an elite of knowledgeable and skilled individuals who can gain
further advantages by continuing their activity on behalf of the goal
(the "cause"). Vicos prepared a few such people; so did the institute.

At the same time, a prototype often generates negative assets, or
liabilities, perhaps because of clumsy technique in the early stages and
because some opposition to the aims and methods of the project is
crystallized by early exposure. Such professional jealousies as resent-

Experimentation, Prototyping, Intervention 113

ment at receiving insufficient acknowledgment or annoyance at the pub-
licity received by a rival figure may be involved. Besides these ego-
centric motivations, there may be divergencies of outlook on plausible
scientific grounds or from fear of eventual damage to political, ec-
clesiastical, or philosophic affiliations.

We have said that the prototype procedure adds to knowledge
and that future political scientists will rely on it to bridge the gap
between survey and experimentation, on the one hand, and official
intervention, on the other. To phrase this more precisely: A prototype
enables the observer to report that, when a given innovation was in-
troduced by participants who were largely in favor of the attempt, the
innovative practice was or was not stabilized in a given situation by
the use of a reported strategy during a given period with reported
results. The previous discussion provides an indication of what is in-
volved in specifying each of the key phrases above — the characteristics
of the innovation, of the innovators, and of other participants; the
strategy; and the results.

Prototyping as a Strategy of Self-Observation

Prototyping can be effectively used as a contextual procedure
that seeks to clarify to all who participate in a situation their role as
interacting factors. The depth of self-observation varies greatly from
one prototype to another. The environment of the Yale institute was
full of ego-assessment, since the hospital attached therapeutic im-
portance to understanding others and obtaining insight into the self.
The Vicos project brought many insights to its directors. They learned
to assess themselves continually as efficient or inefficient instrumentali-
ties of the over-all objective. The elders of Vicos went along with this
process to some extent, since they were obtaining tools of thought
and talk with which to designate the decision process in which they
were engaged and to refer to the cultural differences between Indian
and non-Indian communities. They were set a model of candid ac-
ceptance of at least partial responsibility for the failures as well as
the successes of the enterprise.

The political science of the future, especially in relatively free
societies, will no doubt rely extensively on prototypical methods in
order to influence the political process by means of the variables of
insight and understanding. Our previous discussion has indicated the
important role of subjective events and especially of expectations in
the manifold of events. The role of the observer, with his total sub-
jectivity, has been emphasized in connection with the fundamental

114 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

operations of the physical sciences. Earlier versions of scientific method
often presented it as a device for ignoring subjectivity, rather than
for exposing subjective events to proper discipline. In the light of
what has been said, it is clear that the older view was a misconcep-
tion."

However, the disposition to exempt the "I-me" from candid de-
scription and evaluation is strong; it is a subjective pattern of no in-
considerable importance in limiting the application of the scientific
perspective to political events. But the culture of science in the mod-
ern world is gradually closing in and melting the ice floe on which the
touchy ego has taken refuge. The total situation has been drastically
redefined. The distraught ego is not faced with the humiliating al-
ternatives of annihilation or admission that he is part of the ice; on
the contrary, he is invited by the pursuing ego to join the common
self of the age of science.

Political scientists have always been close enough to the perspec-
tives of active politicians to appreciate the importance of the personal
factor in politics. They have, however, joined with the adroit political
leader in screening themselves from candid observation, using the
screen to impose the prestige of "distance" on others. The scholar has
fallen into this frame of mind willingly enough, since he often has
much to conceal — such as why he shrinks from active political par-
ticipation. He is not deliberately conspirative in obtaining deference
and other values from the community, but distracting the focus of
attention from incongenial features of the self is one of the automatic
defense mechanisms of the ego. Neither the political scientist nor the
practicing politician has to learn self-deception; rather, he has to un-
learn it.

In the future it will become less easy for political scientists or
politicians to escape from self-observation, chiefly because the ob-
servational imperative of science grants no more than temporary ex-
emption from its searching eye. Prototyping is itself a cultural device
of enonnous potential for the reconstruction of politics, as of all of
civilization, by providing a fundamental strategy for examining all
the egos involved — including the initiating scientists'.

Prototyping provides an easy transition in many circumstances
from an initial point of innovation to the eventual adoption of an
institutional pattern by the official prescribing authorities of a body
politic. In the past, many new ideas have been inaugurated under lay
or scientific or combined auspices and have spread widely through
the civic order, culminating as part of the public order.^^ In some

Experimentation, Prototyping, Intervention 115

of these cases, attention has been given to recording data that are
useful in evaluating the consequences of the new practice. More often,
scientific values have played a very subordinate role, and the full
potentialities of prototyping have not been realized.

Where opportunities exist for prototypical situations to be multi-
plied at private initiative and guided by scientific considerations, it is
possible to approximate a truly experimental approach. Theoretically,
for example, the Vicos pattern could be deliberately extended to haci-
endas matched according to size of population, equality of land dis-
tribution among families or castes, levels of education, exposure to the
outside culture, and similar variables. The program itself could be
varied by emphasizing cottage industry rather than agriculture or
by introducing a manufacturing plant (at first under outside manage-
ment) able to absorb much of the local manpower. The program
could be varied by enlarging the role of collectively managed re-
sources.

On the other hand, the original project could be replicated in
major outline, and the research directed to the study of factors af-
fecting diffusion of the program. The aim would be to improve the
strategy of encouraging community demand to obtain assistance in
inaugurating such projects. For example, visits could be arranged to
bring Vicos elders to new haciendas, where their testimony could be
added to the presentation of the idea by the scientists.

Civic initiative, especially when strengthened by research evalu-
ation, provides experience enabling the whole body politic to proceed
with no little rationality to decide whether to extend a program. In
popular government, this includes the possibility that a majority vote
may be obtained in the face of substantial minority opposition; and
it brings a new but familiar factor into the localities where the innova-
tion enters actively into the balance of political power. A successful
prototype is able to stay at the margin of the political arena and to
avoid controversy among parties and pressure organizations.

When objectives and techniques are relatively noncontroversial,
prototyping can be carried on within the framework of governmental
authority. Political scientists are asked or permitted to initiate and
control such projects, with heavy emphasis on obtaining data of scien-
tific worth.

Prototyping and the Deeper Dynamics of Politics

Undoubtedly, the future use of prototyping in conjunction with
other methods will greatly improve our knowledge of intensity factors

116 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

in the political process and of the changing environmental and pre-
dispositional elements that condition intensity. In turn, the strategy
of clarification and consent will become more refined.

From one point of view, prototyping is a means of uncovering the
predispositions of the political process at any particular time and
place. It adds depth to the knowledge obtained by surveys able to
describe one or only a few variables at a time.

Consider in this connection some of the findings at Vicos and
at the institute. When contact was first established with Vicos, the
pattern of excessive alcoholism was well established. It was usual for
people to drink themselves insensible during fiestas or over the week
end. Furthermore, the pattern was strengthened by the success of the
potato-growing program, since ready cash was brought into the com-
munity. This cash was spent on fiestas to obtain respect by lavish
hospitality.

We interpret the drinking as part of a boredom syndrome, not
only at Vicos but perhaps in all folk societies at a stage of easy and
partial accommodation to civilization. To the casual eye, the members
of a folk society may not seem to suffer from devaluation of self.
Nevertheless, many lines of inquiry often point in this direction. Evi-
dently, the Vicosinos had gradually come to see themselves as cutting
a somewhat ridiculous figure in their traditional costumes, since many
villagers were discarding parts or all of the ancient garb and donning
the clothes of "civilization." Furthermore, the respect given, grudg-
ingly or not, to anyone who obtained a new gadget — a clasp knife, a
wrist watch — was significant. This behavior was supported in intimate
talk during which it became apparent that some parents were secretly
determined that their children should have a better life and a chance
to obtain some education and skills appropriate to the modern world,
even if it meant spending time away from home.

Looking into the historical records kept by Spanish administra-
tors and priests and assessing individual stories of the past, it was
necessary to conclude that alchoholism had grown as Vicos culture
was impoverished by the dropping of old rituals and the attenuation
of the traditional ideology.

We predicted that alcoholism would diminish as life in Vicos got
more interesting with the introduction of education and the multipli-
cation of community activities. (This was, in fact, the case.)

Data from other folk cultures in many parts of the world tend
to confirm that drugs may be used to excess as a self-damaging re-
sponse to self-contempt and impotence in a changing world. The

Experimentation, Prototypiiig, Intervention 117

Borneo head-hunters, for example, were restricted by outside author-
ity from head-hunting, and the frustrations experienced by young men
were intense. They no longer had an approved method for demon-
strating their masculine status and obtaining respect, power, and other
values. A substitute activity became the collective and excessive use
of alcoholism; the drinking parties in the long house often went on
for days.^^

The boredom hypothesis goes much deeper than the assertion
that, in transitional stages of exposure to modern civilization, the
members of folk societies entertain self-contempt and internalize their
aggressive impulses — which do not find gratifying expression against
the external world — against themselves. They are internalized, for
example, against their bodies and in the forms of factionalism, bitter
gossip, ridicule, ambivalent overassertion, rejection of traditional pat-
terns of culture, and boredom or distaste with the insipidity of life.
Is it probable that boredom is a latent mood in all isolated small so-
cieties and that the temptations and limitations of contact with a
universalizing civilization simply bring the boredom near to aware-
ness? Boredom is itself a defense of the ego against such alternatives
as explosive rage (running amuck, for instance). Alcoholism is a
simple use of drugs to abolish the dullness and meaninglessness of life.
It is characteristic of small communities to continually invade individ-
ual egos and to subordinate their latent demands to the parochially
tolerated outlets of the culture. The perpetual interaction of the small
community is a vigilant mutual censorship that smothers individuality.

That the human ego is endowed with a large repertory of strate-
gies with which to protect itself from the steam roller of other people
is becoming clearer to us in the perspective of modern findings on
many topics. Not long ago, a team of psychiatrists at Yale tried
hypnosis as a research method in studying a group of severely ill pa-
tients. They often seemed to be getting full cooperation. Eventually,
however, the subjects would cast aside the fagade of acquiescence and
resume their original states, including the symptoms. In one sense,
the experiment was negative, but it strongly confirmed the depth and
subtlety of the protective devices at the disposal of the ego.^^

The emergence of the modern urban metropolitan aggregate has
brought the question of ego alienation into the foreground. Durkheim
proposed the concept of anomie to describe the failure of the ego to
achieve an identification with society. We analyze this as failure to
achieve a self-system providing a satisfactory entity in terms of which
value demands can be shaped and shared.^* Marx's image of the

118 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

alienated proletarian was in the same vein. The proletarian was pre-
sented as a man rejected by the culture of capitalism, since, deprived
of ownership, he lacked security in any human relationship.

Recent research on metropolitan areas casts a great deal of doubt
on the idea that human beings are in fact cut ofT from human asso-
ciation. Studies of Los Angeles and Detroit, for example, show that
high percentages of the population are in weekly or even more fre-
quent contact with relatives. Nearly everyone is in several networks
of human association.^^

Though accepting these results, we must emphasize that they do
not destroy the point that crises of ego identity do in fact occur in
civilized society and that many of the labile and even explosive char-
acteristics of urban crowds are to be attributed to the inner tensions
generated by exposure to such an environment. It is impossible to
survey the figures for suicide, murder, rape, or major crimes against
property and the indexes of petty quarrels and altercations without
a renewed sense of the relevance of these factors. The picture is even
more impressive if we add the incidence of psychosomatic disease and
mental disorder.

When we reflect on the boredom of primitive man and the in-
securities of civilized man, a major point emerges. The culture forms
hitherto devised by Homo sapiens are in some profound sense mal-
adapted to his needs. This is the large kernel of truth in the picture
of "man versus society." It is, however, man (modified by early ex-
perience of other men) against man (similarly modified) in the sense
that the forms of culture thus far invented both perpetuate and gen-
erate conflict.

Perhaps the most interesting hypothesis for future exploration
is that the cultural forms thus far developed do not use or challenge
man's fundamental capacities for creative expression. Man suffers
from unused capability; his recurrent crisis is generated by excess
capacity for value formation.^^

It is at first glance paradoxical that man is only beginning to
discover himself at the moment when he appears on the verge of
bringing superior successors into existence or of annihilating himself
altogether. Nevertheless, the pioneering achievements of science and
technology contain the seeds of man's fulfillment, since the methods
of science are able to disclose the capabilities of the human brain and
to make a continuing appraisal of the cultural practices by which the
potential can become actual.

Unused capability, therefore, may prove to be the key to the

Experimentation, Prototyping, Intervention 119

symptomatic generation of boredom and kindred forms of withdrawal
and of intermittent explosions of rage and destructiveness. The rela-
tively isolated items serialized in the basic data survey would gain
depth, direction, and coherence when supplemented by the results ob-
tained by strategically placed prototypes presenting the whole dy-
namic balance of local forces.

That prototyping provides a means of clarifying and dissemina-
ting the social practices of human dignity and of revealing the latent
capability of man is evident. In particular, prototyping lends itself to
discovering the limits of power sharing in various circumstances. The
Yale institute research was undertaken on an island of autocracy in
a prevailingly democratic order; it threw light on the strategy by
which power might be fully shared without heavy adverse costs. Our
society has many islands of limited participation in decision, of which
the most obvious are perhaps schools, prisons, and units of such large,
organized structures as the army and civil service.

The Vicos project was also a deliberate devolution of power, in
this case by the boss of the hacienda and the government. In view
of the structure of Peruvian politics and society, Vicos could hardly
be called an island of autocracy. More accurately, it became, for the
time being at least, an island of democracy on an archipelago of con-
trasting structures.

The prototypes discussed thus far have been limited to small
community or small group units. However, prototypical units can be
developed from top to bottom or from bottom to top of every existing
hierarchical structure. All kinds of combinations are conceivable: the
chief of a unit of a large organization plus deputies, assistants, and
departmentalized subordinates; the members of a board plus major
figures in the subordinate stafT; coordinate chiefs of units plus deputies,
assistants, and departmentalized subordinates; each of the above plus
significant participants from outside the official line of authority (trade
union officials, client agencies, supply agencies, and the like).

The future will probably see more attention given to the inter-
mediate echelons of large-scale organizations and to other interme-
diate units. We have moderately satisfactory information at hand
about the national cabinet and the smallest units of national govern-
ment. But the intermediate level has been grossly understudied from
the point of view of carrying the practice of shared participation as
far as is compatible with other objectives.

Prototypes are nearly experiments when they can be replicated
under appropriate conditions; they are also "case studies" in the

120 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

sense that they take note of many variables which are not controlled.
The conspicuous virtue of a case study — whether the observational
field is a community, a small group, a personality, or some other sub-
ject— is that it familiarizes the scientist with what to expect in such
circumstances. In this way, he is able to estimate the hypotheses that
can be profitably tested in the context and what methods are best
adapted to the task. However, only a handful of case studies oriented
to a common objective seem rewarding.^^ As quickly as possible, cor-
relational or experimental research should be designed, or cases can
be put fully into the context of a prototype.

A problem that is certain to arise in prototyping is how to be
as precise as possible in providing data on the basis of which pertinent
appraisals can be made. An essential consideration is that data-
gathering not be allowed to interfere with, in particular, the pre-
paratory phase of the project since the precondition of having
anything worth appraising is at least a minimum degree of harmony in
the perspectives of the responsible group. After the initial stage, it is
still important to limit data-gathering whenever it promises to become
a disrupting factor.

Ideally, the political scientists who inaugurate a prototype proj-
ect should have it so well planned that bench-mark data can be ob-
tained all along the way (preprototype, preparatory phase, full phase,
and subsequent phase). However, we know enough of the facts of
inquiry to expect new implications of a study to dawn on the in-
novators throughout the course of the experience and in retrospective
appraisal.

NOTES

^ The experimental design is generalized from A. Bavelas, "Communication
Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups," in D. Lerner and H. D. Lass-
well, eds., The Policy Sciences (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1951). The experiments referred to in the following paragraphs are
greatly simplified in order to emphasize the points pertinent to the
present discussion. The potential significance of communication
theory for political science is outlined in K. Deutsch, Nationalism
and Social Communication (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1953).
On communication in small groups in general, cf. A. P. Hare, E. F.
Borgatta, and R. F. Bates, eds., Small Groups (2nd ed.; New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1955); D. Cartwright and A. Zander, eds.. Group
Dynamics (2nd ed.; Evanston: Row, Peterson and Co., 1959);
J. W. Thibaut and H. H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959); R. T. Golombiewski, The

Experirtientation, Prototyping, Intervention 121

Small Group, "An Analysis of Research Concepts and Operations"
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); S. Verba, Small
Groups and Political Behavior, "A Study in Leadership" (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1961). On the assimilation of
experimental studies to organization theory, cf. especially the con-
tributions of H. A. Simon, J. G. Marsh, and H. Guetzkow.

2 On body movement and gesture, cf. L. C. Kolb, "Disturbances of the Body-

Image," in S. Arieti, ed.. Handbook of American Psychiatry (New
York: Basic Books, 1959), 749-769.

3 Preliminary tension studies have been initiated on a large scale by O. Kline-

berg, H. Cantril, and other psychologists, sociologists, psychiatrists,
and anthropologists with strong political interests. UNESCO has
often provided official sponsorship.

* On TAT and other tests, cf. G. G. Stern, M. I. Stein, and B. S. Bloom,

Methods in Personality Assessment (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press,
1956), and subsequent articles. Cf. further, M. K. Opler, ed., Cul-
ture and Mental Health (New York: Macmillan, 1959); F. L. K.
Hsu, ed.. Psychological Anthropology (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey
Press, 1961).

^ Psychoanalytic psychiatry gave enormous impetus to body-image research.
J. Bruner's research on perception is stimulating in this field. Cf.
J. Kennedy and H. D. Lasswell, "A Cross-Cultural Test of Self-
Image," Human Organization, 17 (1958), 41-43.

^ These distinctions were drawn in H. D. Lasswell, N. Leites et al., Language
of Politics, "An Introduction to Quantitative Semantics" (New
York: G. W. Stewart, 1949).

^ A proposal to treat political science and legislation as sciences to the ex-
tent that pilot "experiments" are taken seriously is made by L.
Donnat, La politique experimentale (2 vols.; Paris: C. Reinwald,
1885-1891).

* Alan Holmberg is the innovating figure at Vicos. For a provisional account,

cf. A. R. Holmberg, H. F. Dobyns et al., "Community and Regional
Development: The Cornell-Peru Experiment," Human Organiza-
tion, 21 (1962), 108-124. I have participated in the Vicos project
and benefited from discussions of method with Holmberg and
others.

^ Robert Rubenstein and I will publish an analysis of Y.P.I, experience. I
am especially indebted to Dr. Rubenstein for suggestions about
prototyping.

^° Cf. M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958).

^^ The civic order of a community includes the patterns of value distribution

122 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

and basic institutions which receive the protection of relatively
mild sanctions. The public order has severe sanctions at its dis-
posal. Cf. my discussion in C. J. Friedrich, ed., The Public In-
terest, "Nomos V" (New York: Atherton Press, 1962), especially
pp. 66-67.

^- Concerning Borneo, I am indebted to Tom Harrisson, curator and govern-
ment ethnologist, Sarawak Museum, Kuching, without binding him
to the formulations here.

^^ Cf. inter alia R. Newman, J. Katz, and R. Rubenstein, "The Experimental
Situation as a Determinant of Hypnotic Dreams: A Contribution to
the Experimental Use of Hypnosis," Psychiatry, 23 (1960), 63-73.

^^ E. Durkheim, Suicide, "A Study in Sociology," trans. J. A. Spaulding and
G. Simpson (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1951).

1^ For interpretation of recent research, cf. S. Greer, Governing the Metrop-
olis (New York: Wiley, 1962); W. Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass
Society (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959).

1^ For a fuller treatment, cf. my paper "Communication and the Mind," in
S. M. Farber and R. H. L. Wilson, eds., Control of the Mind (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

1^ Extended evaluations of the case study are to be found in E. A. Bock, ed..
Essays on the Case Method (New York: Inter-University Case Pro-
gram, 1962). Contributions by H. Stein, D. Waldo, J. W. Fesler,
and the editor.

Micromodeling

The volume of data relevant to the depiction of the world arena or of
any component community is enormous. How can we prevent over-
loading the political scientist who tries to use the intelligence services,
especially the surveys and analyses made available by colleagues?
Selective presentation is the answer and the problem. Detailed in-
formation must be at hand when required, properly located in an
image of the whole in which the configuration of past, present, and
future events is related to clarified value goals.

It has long been obvious that the verbal presentation of data
and interpretations is in some respects unsatisfactory. Listeners vary
in speed of comprehension, whether the medium is oral or printed.
They differ in recall of pertinent information and in ability to discern
the patterns relevant to the problem. Although it is impracticable to
bring everyone to the same level of excellence in such matters, many
limitations can be overcome with suitable methods.

A fundamental principle is to supplement one mode of com-

124 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

munication by others. Television is an impressive example of how
words, printed messages, diagrams, maps, and dramatizations can be
synthesized into an experience surpassing the impact of media that
rely solely on one sensory mechanism.

The simple fact of exposure to data and interpretation does not
as a rule produce an optimum effort at problem-solving by members
of an audience. The situation must be organized in ways that elicit
audience participation. For example, breaks in the presentation could
be arranged, and everyone encouraged to discuss or meditate on what
he has seen and heard.

Several devices are available to mitigate individual differences in
recall. A group could meet in the same place, and surroundings could
be modified to provide memory cues in aid of recall. Such are the
roles of graphs, tables, maps, pictures, and models.

The elements of a problem-solving situation — multichannel ex-
posure, participation, memory aids — are found in many places and
can be effectively molded for the use of political scientists. (For the
time being, we take predispositional factors for granted, assuming
that competent and motivated persons would be selected or self-
selected to participate.)

To go no further into history than to the Prussian general staff,
we have a striking case of ingenuity in the selection of procedures for
training and planning.^ The staff invented the war game, which
brought definiteness into planning, since it became possible to simulate
battle conditions and allow initial dispositions to be studied and
strategies to be played through to the end. The same technique has
recently been transplanted into the realm of diplomacy and business. -

In educational circles, the simulation of adult reality is well
rooted in practice. Debating, for example, has been conducted ac-
cording to several plans, usually adapted from models of Congres-
sional or legal procedure. The moot court is an auxiliary of legal
education in which actual judges are often introduced to informally
guide the argument and give decisions. Political science classes are
occasionally resolved into sessions of the United Nations Security
Council or municipal councils. Teams of students play roles assigned
by country or group or according to affirmative or negative positions
in a controversy.

These exercises vary in the degree to which they are conducted
as inquiries or as competitions in advocacy. The moot court or the
traditional academic debate is a frankly competitive exhibition of skill
and is judged accordingly. Many conferences or seminars, by contrast,

Micromodeling 125

are intended to follow an impartial, exploratory approach in which
each participant keeps an open mind until his attention has been di-
rected to the putative facts and to alternative interpretations of them.
The war game or the diplomatic game keeps rivalry in the foreground,
since the policy moves by each side are judged as successful or not by
umpires who are instructed to play the role of "nature" and to decide
impartially among contenders. Umpires cannot in fact speak for the
future; hence, their assumptions can gradually become sufficiently
apparent to tempt the participants to play the umpire rather than
to act on the basis of candid estimates of how future events are likely
to turn out.

DECISION SEMINARS

We can give concreteness to the idea of a problem-solving semi-
nar ("decision seminar") by considering the case of political scientists
specialized in a given region.^ Parallel considerations apply if the
domain is enlarged to the globe or the astropolitical arena or nar-
rowed to a particular country, section, or locality. Specialists focus on
particular problems in a context during a given period; such concen-
tration is, in fact, indispensable to the cultivation of knowledge. It is
notorious, however, that the woods can vanish as the trees become
conspicuous. If the observer is to remain in intellectual command of
a reasonably realistic and comprehensive image of the whole, he must
participate in a situation that brings the general map to his attention
and explicit consideration. Problem-solving calls for a procedure that
pursues the configurative aim by guiding the focus of attention back
and forth between part and whole.

A procedure appropriate to this end is an agenda of periodic
meetings among the territorial experts whom we are presently con-
sidering. A periodic meeting would provide an occasion for freshening
the paint on the neglected part of the intellectual house, for repairs
or extension, or even, on presumably rare occasions, for a revolution-
ary reconstruction.

The Setting

Such a convocation could most fruitfully take place in a familiar
setting in which the key subject is visually represented. A permanent
seminar room would best serve the purpose. The charts, maps, and
other materials could be displayed on the four walls (even the ceiling)
to refer to past and future events. One might, for example, adopt the
convention of an eye-level line around the room as representing a

126 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

recent year and imagine that time proceeds upward. All that had
reference to past trend or conditioning factors would thus be kept
below the line; projections, goal constructs, and policy alternatives
would be placed above the line.

As the members of the group work together, the room would
gain the significance of a comprehensive though microscale image of
the reality with which they were concerned. Each item would be
separately introduced and discussed; hence, every permanent item
would call up the original discussion, including any reservations about
the method used or the reliability of the information on which the
chart or table was based. Perhaps a trend chart indicates that the
percentage of the electorate in a given country which voted in na-
tional elections has risen over the past twenty years. The initial dis-
cussion might throw considerable doubt on the figures for the first
few years or suggest that, since the size of the electorate was diminish-
ing as legal restrictions were multiplied, the chart be augmented by a
line relating eligibility to total adult population. (The line has possibly
since been added. )

Undoubtedly any projection would bring similarly critical con-
siderations to mind. Perhaps a chart shows that acts of rebellion in Y
are likely to diminish sharply in the next few years. However, dis-
cussions may have revealed that emigres are not likely to accommodate
themselves to the new state of affairs; hence, in case of tension between
country X and Y, they would massively infiltrate the boundary zones
of Y. (Cross references to charts projecting the alignments of X and
Y are possible.)

Projections are sometimes useful when they take the form of
simple extrapolations of recent trends, since extrapolations often point
to the timing or location of incipient conflicts. But projections are
also made on bases of inference more complex than simple extrapola-
tion; they add, for example, assumptions about the factors aflfecting
migration into a given boundary zone. If industrial development is
shown to move away from a boundary zone and jobs become available
elsewhere, internal movements of population may be expected to
change. Past correlations between industrial growth and population
movement can be used to modify simple extrapolations of population
shift.

Provisional specifications of goal would undoubtedly occasion
many exchanges among seminar participants. What, in addition to
voting in elections, are the most suitable indexes of shared power?
One participant proposes that we specify only statutes passed by a .

Micromodeling 127

legislature (not decreed by the executive) after more than pro forma
debate. In the latter case, it is suggested that both pro- and anti-
ruling-party elements shall have taken part in debating proposed
legislation. (Debate participation can be measured by percentage of
debate time occupied by all parties, for example.) Or a provisional
specification might be the absence of intimidation, measured, perhaps,
by direct testimony taken in sample interviews.

The range of policy alternatives coming before a decision seminar
might be wide, and new charts would undoubtedly call up many
comments about future contingencies. Each step in a possible policy
sequence would be open to evaluation. Assume that we begin to
formulate a strategy of economic aid in these terms: a sum of dollars
is available for use in country X; the dollars are transformed into
local units of buying power and used to obtain L units of labor (or
L^ units of man hours), M units of raw materials, and F units of
machinery and related manufacturing facilities within a year.

Such a characterization of a policy would be sufficient for some
purposes. But it would have to be greatly elaborated before the polit-
ical consequences can be competently assessed. Many further acts
could properly be regarded as part of the policy and therefore must
be added. Let us imagine that news of the program arouses cries of
imperialism, colonialism, and warmongering in the press and private
channels of political parties opposed to the government in office. What
assumptions are to be made about the next moves by our officials?
Will our men on the spot have prepared the way for the program by
encouraging popular demands for assistance so that wind is rather
successfully prevented from getting into the sails of the opposition?

Or, passing beyond the immediate "crisis of acceptance" — Will
new factories prove vulnerable to opposition attack on the grounds
that they actually discriminate against the North or South or against
the tribes, religions, peasants, landlords, or parties of these sections?
Will the attack lead to the withdrawal into opposition of factions in
the government legislative coalition and put the cabinet in a minority ?
Will the ruler and his aides be provoked to liquidate parliament en-
tirely and rule by decree and police suppression of dissident elements?

In assessing the significance of any chart, map, or other material,
the fact that the discussion occurs in the context of a permanent
seminar can be used to raise in systematic fashion questions that might
in other circumstances be overlooked. For example, a trend chart
depicting the rapid expansion of the armed forces and their share of
government expenditures needs to be kept in perspective by directing

128 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

attention to trends elsewhere in the society. Have the numbers gain-
fully employed in agriculture or commerce been affected? Do educa-
tion, health, information, and religious activities grow at the same
rate as the armed forces? Are marriage rates affected? Do recruits
come only from the lowest castes and classes, or are they spread pro-
portionately throughout the social structure? Such questions are
brought to mind by passing one's eye around the chart room and
thinking in turn of possible impacts on all other values and selected
institutional practices.

If the impact of a conditioning factor in the past, such as the
influence of increased purchasing units (a wealth factor), is under con-
sideration, the various value-institution panels in the seminar room will
suggest problems. In terms of well-being, for instance, a question
would be whether the units of purchasing power were spent in ways
that made the diet more or less healthful. In reference to family and
intimate relations, did higher money income lead to the taking of
more concubines or mistresses? In terms of enlightenment, has the
money been spent on visits to new parts of the country? Has the
money influenced skill, for example, by increasing effective demand
for music lessons? Are the depressed classes the recipients of the new
income, and do they get new respect from other classes for their
"modern" clothes? Do the priests succeed in directing the new funds
into more ceremonies, memorials, and shrine repairs? Taking each
of these and other suggested effects into account, what power results
can be imputed to the income change; for instance, did the groups
that benefited directly shift to support the government or did they
stay with opposition parties that bragged of a supposed success and
demanded more?

When a specific projection is being considered, the analytic con-
text provided by the seminar room can give guidance to critical dis-
cussion. Projections of the ecology of population give rise to such
questions as these: Will the health facilities of the newly occupied
areas be overstrained? With what results? What of the school facili-
ties? Of family housing and stability of units? Of accommodations
for worship? Of access to radio and newspapers? Of employment?
Will new population mixtures result in reducing class and caste dis-
criminations or exacerbating them? Will the political weight of pro-
or anti-government groups be strengthened ?

Every policy alternative can properly initiate a similar contextual
examination. Will news of the true source of the aid that permitted
new plants to be built be widely disseminated, or will it be kept secret

Micromodeling 129

by the local government? Will artisans in certain lines find themselves
faced by competition and immediately contribute to cutthroat com-
petition? Will new manufacturing plants raise health hazards by at-
tracting workers who billet themselves in unsanitary shacks and
alleyways? Will artisans find some of their skills useless and turn to
industrial tasks? Will families be separated as husbands migrate to
the sites of jobs ? Will the practice of employing people by merit help
to reduce social discrimination without precipitating violence? Will
the removal of people from family temples and churches expose them
to the propaganda of new sects and increase the membership of these
organizations ? Summarizing eflfects in political terms, will they enable
mass revolutionary movements from outside to reach a large number
of potential members rapidly and successfully ?

From time to time it would be useful to respecify goals, often
by translation into immediate, mid-range, and long-range objectives.
All the experience acquired by a problem-solving group since the last
discussion could be mobilized, since it has become part of the pre-
dispositions of the participants. In the decision context, various as-
sumptions could be made about the objectives at various times in
each value-institutional category. The problem would be to clarify
the political goals that expedite optimal movement toward a shared,
realistic decision process.

The most provocative issues in this context relate to the timing
of goals that move in zig-zag, rather than in nominally straight, lines
toward a free commonwealth. Such questions rise in acute form when
a traditional society tries to introduce the institutions of congressional
or parliamentary government as practiced in English-speaking and
Western European countries. Instead of strong and unified leadership,
the immediate result may be weak, unstable, and confused national
direction. Analysis may show that the "political parties" are largely
unknown to the villagers of the country and whirl suspended in a
foggy, windy atmosphere of intrigue in the national capital.

It is therefore appropriate for political scientists to consider the
possibility of devising programs of progress toward effective power-
sharing which draw on the predispositions present in a situation and
mobilize them in a sequence of interaction eventuating in the desired
result. In various countries, some significant elements are capable of
operating creatively from the national center, and potential or actual
village systems exhibit a sizable measure of power-sharing and realism
on local matters. At the national center, the monarchy and entourage
may include individuals exposed to some modern education. At the

130 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

national center may also be found military or police officers with
foreign training who have access through the defense and internal
security services to district personnel. In some cases, the administrative
services are almost wholly destitute of officials with a modern orienta-
tion, and the occasional scholar, physician, or engineer who also con-
cerns himself with politics has a small and highly personal following.

Is it not sensible, then, for policy-makers to distinguish clearly
in their own minds between the long-range value objectives — shared
power, for instance — and the particular pattern of institutions most
effective in concrete cases in moving the community through transi-
tional phases, even though the institutions may diverge in many
ways from the arrangements current in Anglo-Western European
bodies politic?

Political scientists see that a village program may conceivably
be carried through by strong central leadership that encourages the
election of local councils without intimidation and also constructs
consultation machinery at the regional and national levels by indirect
election. Pluralistic elements in the society may also be associated with
the consultative process at all levels.

In weighing such possibilities, a group must consider the chances
that the central leadership will be strong enough to execute the sweep-
ing social reconstruction that is likely to be required in a society tra-
ditionally run by a landholding nobility. If the nobility is unwilling
to permit land reform, for instance, the society may remain vulner-
able to the well-tried tactics of "revolution from below," the leader-
ship, inspiration, and initial wherewithal of which come from
experienced outside centers. Landholders may, however, be divided
against themselves, with "middle holders" eager to improve income
with new crops and methods and by investing in local industries to
meet local needs.

The foregoing comments are designed as reminders of the goal-
clarifying and policy-setting task as it frequently confronts political
scientists and decision-makers in the non-Communist world. It is im-
plied that informed, intermittent concern with a comprehensive policy
orientation may lead to the uncovering of new tactical and institu-
tional patterns that move the situation ahead.* The function of the
decision-seminar technique of micromodeling the total context is to
foster the creative consideration of such problems.

The Agenda

The principal tasks of problem-solving suggest the broad outlines

Micromodcling 1 3 1

of an agenda for regular meetings of a decision seminar. Territorial
experts could obtain optimal advantages from mutual association if
they prepared replies to a common interrogatory privately and in ad-
vance. Results would be likely to be best when the questions required
definite answers, explicit estimates of the probable course of develop-
ment in periods of varying duration (immediate, mid-range, or long-
range).

It would not be essential to the self-educating effect of the ex-
perience to give publicity to the replies. Instead, answers could be
deposited with a trusted secretary who compiles and reports the ag-
gregate results to the group for discussion. If anyone wished to vol-
untarily avow his position he might, of course, do so; but, if the
anonymity rule were to be taken seriously, there would have to be no
moral compulsion.

The first joint discussion, then, might evaluate projections pro-
posed anonymously by the participants. The members might also agree
to make private reassessments of the future which, at the end of the
seminar session, would be deposited with the secretary and added to
the private archives. (It might be agreed to follow the pattern estab-
lished by a group of Wall Street economists who are permitted to
direct the secretary to disclose their forecasting records to prospective
clients or employers.)

The next item on the agenda might be a research report on a
trend or set of conditioning factors. To ensure that particular value-
institution areas are not overlooked or grossly de-emphasized, a semi-
nar should proceed on a basically cyclical agenda in which the main
trends and conditioning factors in every category are recurrently
considered. In this way, the central body of charts and maps would
be kept approximately current, without imposing on the group the
immediate urgencies that confront a busy decision-maker in govern-
ment. Reports oriented to the future would, of course, deal with par-
ticular projections and policy proposals. From time to time, the
agenda would need to focus on the respecification or the grounding
of goal values in order to distinguish among immediate, mid-range,
and long-range objectives.

Occasionally, too, it would be useful for a decision seminar to
engage in self-appraisal, subjecting the seminar itself to review. The
most significant part of this operation in the long run could be the
analysis of the roles played by individual participants. Permission
might be given to the secretary to study the pre- and postmeeting
shifts of the participants. Is the shift toward agreement, or are dis-

132 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

agreements becoming more extreme? Can the aggregate response be
explained by the role in the discussion of one or a few individuals?
Is the shift in regard to matters about which the participants are least
expert?

What of the relation between aggregate forecasts and the reality
as disclosed by subsequent events ? In this context, an intriguing point
is whether the net result of group discussion is to reduce realism by
inducing conformity. Is the trend of the group toward greater or less
realism ?

What of the trend displayed by each individual? Analysis may
show that individuals become more or less conformist to the aggregate
— that is, to the positions taken most frequently. They may also be-
come more or less accurate in anticipating events.

The group would presumably ask to have aggregate results
brought to its notice and authorize individuals to obtain their records
privately. In this way, insight could be deepened in two connected
though not identical dimensions.

There could be a further aid to insight and understanding on
the agenda. Individuals might be encouraged to explain why they
made accurate or inaccurate forecasts. The relevant part of the
agenda could be divided into two sections, the first concerned with
comment on developments since the last meeting and the second with
estimates of the future. During the first section, the participants would
seek to account for being "right" as well as "wrong," recognizing that,
in a complex universe, the former is no less puzzling than the latter.

Self-analysis can lead individuals to guard against proclivities to
be overimpressed by or to react against particular sources, such as the
military. One might also find that he is chronically sanguine or pessi-
mistic about the success of forces that he hopes will succeed.

It is no secret that human beings at large and prestigious persons
in particular are prone to strategies of at least partial deception of the
people around them and often of themselves. The causes of this pro-
pensity are not mysterious. Utter candor about one's estimates of the
future, for example, may lead to value deprivation; a degree of evasive
ambiguity can protect the ego from loss of respect or even loss of in-
come and power. It is impossible within the limits of the present
discussion to examine this tactic of protective ambiguity in detail. We
note, however, at one level the use of such preliminary ploys as: "Of
course, I'm neither a prophet nor the son of a prophet" or "No one
can prophesy with certainty" — and then comes a prediction. A fre-
quent gimmick is a sentence of normative ambiguity, an assertion that

Micromodeling 133

can be treated as an expression of hope if things turn out badly and
as a designative statement if it hits the bull's-eye. For instance, "The
forces of law and order are rallying in X."

The scientific outlook itself provides excellent ego protection,
since science can be interpreted as justifying only conditional as-
sertions about future events. (If p, then the probability of q is so and
so.) Since the probability of knowing all future factors that may af-
fect events is low and the likelihood of having knowledge from the
past of the degree of interdependency of all factors is not great, the
ego can feel secure from inner or outer contempt if its statements are
"kept within strictly scientific limits." Even equations for predicting
remote contingencies refer to a configuration of factors that is in-
accessible to knowledge at the moment of commitment to the future.

The scientific challenge to the ego is highly exacting in another
perspective. It requires that all conceivably relevant factors be
sought with perseverence and remorseless self-appraisal. From this
standpoint, most of the statements uttered by all of us are extremely
casual.

Within the fivefold analysis of each problem-solving strategy, in-
finite variations can be introduced in order to fit particular circum-
stances. Provision could be made for visiting expert witnesses who
report their own goal clarifications and whatever results they think
relevant to trend, factor, projection, and alternative. Collaborators
might be brought in for periods of associate membership in the same
way that a university adds temporary members to the permanent
faculty.

Variations in seminar composition should be introduced and
analyzed. Many designs are conceivable — all senior colleagues, one
senior and the rest juniors, two seniors and the rest juniors, and so on.
Scholars of diverse cultural, class, interest, and personality character-
istics could be combined in various ways.

Correlation with Machine Technique

Up to this point, the assumption has been that the seminar would
rely largely on verbal discussion of charted and mapped material.
We must give explicit attention to the possibility of operating with
the aid of machine researches reporting the results of comprehensive
simulations of the past and future. In principle, it is possible to treat
political events as an interdependent stream through time in which
the equations written into the program specify the routines of de-
pendency. Simulations of this kind are already in process of develop-

134 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ment, and it is evident that such methods will soon become major
tools of all the social sciences.^

The applicability of micromodels depends on valid data properly
stored and mobilized. The storage and retrieval parts of the problem
are well advanced toward solution. The phenomenal advances in the
design and manufacture of computing machines and in instruments
for the scanning, coding, translating, and projection of the contents
of documents have for the first time put within the grasp of political
scientists the possibility of mastering the hitherto overwhelming mass
of available desired data.

We are at the beginning of a revolutionary reconstruction of
collective memory and recall. We have hitherto depended on libraries
to serve as repositories of manuscripts and books and, in conjunction
with museums, to house the fruits of past observation and collection.
Catalogues provided indispensable though meager guides to the data
pertinent to any research question. The limitations of the catalogue
(whether in book or card form) were partially ofTset by the assiduous
labor of the bibliographer, who provided detailed topical breakdowns
of the titles of books, pamphlets, periodicals, manuscripts, and col-
lections. The bibliographer was supplemented by the abstractor, who
summarized the method and findings of research reports. Because of
the professional demand for such services, the most exhaustive publi-
cations in the abstracts field have dealt with court and administrative
decisions and opinions. (Strictly speaking, these did not summarize
research, but source material.) As the division of intellectual labor
has grown, "critical reviews" of the state of investigation of particular
problems have come to play an important part in assessing current
assets. Handbooks, compendiums, encyclopaedias, textbooks, and syn-
optic treatises perform some of the operations required to keep knowl-
edge accessible.

Until the machine age supplied the brain with computing sup-
plements, political scientists were engaged in a losing cause. Our
theoretical equipment enabled us to ask many of the right questions
about politics; and ingenuity fathered the invention of many data-
gathering, data-processing, and model-fitting devices. But the cascade
of history was too swift and voluminous; observers were too few and
too inadequately equipped; facilities were rudimentary and poorly
distributed.

It is evident that a vast new network of communication to serve
the needs of research will presently be in operation. Research pub-
lications concentrated at designated points in the system will be

Micromodclins, 135

scanned and described automatically in all the guidance cards or card
equivalents throughout the network. Data will be automatically ab-
stracted and deposited in the appropriate storage slots at centers for
various subjects. The publications themselves will be kept available
for recheckj and the entire publication (the original or copies) will be
available for screening at any center. Unpublished research data will,
in principle, be treated the same way.

A scholar who desires the publications, abstracts, or data on any
subject can "press a button" and, presto, all the centers provide lists
to be photographed.

Storage and retrieval operations are practicable on such a scale
because of the progress of microtechnology. Thousands of words can
be stored on a square-inch tape and made available for reproduction
when desired.®

We are close to the day of microcomputers small enough to be
portable and hence capable of accompanying a research worker to
the field where the relationships of new data can be explored without
delay.

The incorporation of storage, retrieval, and simulation methods
into problem-solving does not do away with the need of permanent
seminars to give critical consideration to the emerging configuration
of world affairs. On the contrary, the pace of problem-solving will
be vastly accelerated by the new instruments. The demands for miss-
ing data and for equations that economize the data required to pro-
gram realistic simulations of past and future will intensify.

The Problem of Index Instability

It will be more obvious than ever that index instability is a key
characteristic of the political and social process and that expert at-
tention must be continually given to the satisfactoriness of proposed
indexes. Index instability is characteristic of all allegedly conceptual-
empirical relationships. There is no advantage in attempting to evade
the problem by defining a concept as identical to an empirical index.
The term "vote" can be usefully defined in political science as a com-
mitment in a decision process. For purposes of a specific research,
the operational index of "vote" may be restricted to "marked ballots."
In other researches, the index may be vocal "ayes" and "nays" as
officially recorded, unofficial statements obtained in a poll of opinion,
or absence of hesitation in picking up arms to storm a building ("be-
havioral consensus in an undercover unit"). In much historical re-
search, the indexes gf votes (as at a secret convention) may be

136 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Statements found in correspondence, unpublished notes, reports by
police and espionage agents, and the like. A wide range of discretion
must be left the data-gatherer in selecting the possible indexes and in
estimating their weight as evidence. If the concept "vote" were abol-
ished from the terminology of political science and each empirical
index made identical to an independent use of the term, the result
would be unnecessary obscurity, since a category equivalent to the
original concept of "vote" would be required to guide the matching
of likenesses and the noting of differences.

It is not a waste of time to give multiple index readings to a
highly abstract conceptual model. It is only a waste of time to forget
the formal equivalency of these readings. If the equivalency assump-
tion is forgotten, the intellectual processes required to "improve"
equivalency are likely to be neglected or poorly performed. Thus, the
definition of "commitment in a decision process" may include the
requirement of near absence of intimidation and direct coercion. If
the definition is overlooked, the research worker may neglect to make
a critical evaluation of the index that seems convenient in a concrete
case. (On proper investigation of a particular political context, he
may learn that a fifth of the participants could not be properly
designated voters because they were in a state of intimidation.)

Problem-solving projects, including decision seminars, would do
well to give full attention to the fit between conceptual models and
index-fitted versions. Attention should be directed to the discovery of
"constants" that render it practicable to translate one index into an-
other, that is, establish valid equivalents in the empirical world.

In this connection, a rewarding question concerns the relation-
ship among observational standpoints of varying degrees of intensity.
The same "concepts" at the same cross-section in time apply at each
standpoint, but the "indexes" used at each observational position are
not the same. For example, we may use the concept "internalization-
externalization" to characterize acts of communication to be obseived
at standpoints of varying intensity (depth). However, the indexes at
Standpoint A (relying on news accounts) may record how many
people were said to have voted or abstained. Standpoint B (relying
on verbatim records of the proceedings) may note how many who
abstained also made public statements. This index (making of state-
ments plus abstaining) obviously cuts down the percentage of "in-
ternalization." Standpoint C might add to the verbatim record notes
taken by gallery observers of the number of abstainers who shouted

Micromo deling 137

angrily, stamped their feet, shook their fists, or engaged in other such
behavior. In this perspective, perhaps only a few acts of communica-
tion would be recorded as "internalized."

Theoretically, all differences among observer-scientists over in-
dexes can be settled by candid analysis of the constants of difference
among them. Thus if we think of A, B, and G, above, as three scien-
tists observing the "same" observational field, the differences among
them in choice of index need give rise to no problem of intertrans-
latability if the necessary constants are ascertained and reported.
When procedures are well established, recognized constants can be
used, subject to occasional check.

The problem of index instability through time is more important
for ordinary research in the political and social sciences than in the
physical disciplines, where indexes can be accepted as stable through
time unless the situations referred to are exceedingly small or exceed-
ingly large (involving, for example, subatomic or galactic units). Since
the significance of a detail is a function of its context and symbol
contexts change through time (often during short intervals), the ap-

l O" 3

propriateness of particular indexes of political phenomena is always
open to review.

One method of equating indexes through time is to use panels
of historians. Historians are exposed to residues of the whole con-
figuration of life during a given period; hence, their estimates of the
meaning of details in the period is the best obtainable at a given pres-
ent moment. A technique of overlapping observation can be employed
to discover the constants that must be introduced to adjust one set of
indexes to another. The diagram shows what is meant. Historian O^
specializes in a period that overlaps the special periods of O^ and O^.
The judgments of O^ (based on his whole period) can be corrected
for the period of overlap with O^ by applying O-'s judgments to the
period of overlap. The judgments of O^ can be corrected for the in-
terval of overlap with O^ by applying the judgments of O^ based on
his entire period.

138

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Use of Alternative Models

In decision seminars, it is frequently illuminating to make use of
contrasting approaches to the consideration of the same events.
Strictly speaking, it is possible to think of all change as a sequence of
interdetermining variables. It is also possible to focus on categories of
change of particular interest to an observer and to think of them as
responses to the impact of environmental on predispositional factors.
Although these are equivalent ways of referring to a political process,
one may liberate the mind of an observer more effectively than the
other.

Applying these points to the analysis of the historic flow of events,
we may proceed as suggested in the diagram.

■4 c

-♦ b

-♦ a

Lines a, h, and c indicate the direction of time. At the cross-
section labeled "1," the R stands for the events that are to be explained
(such as externalized acts of violence). E stands for the events in the
environment that are treated as explanatory factors for the emergence
of R (such as externalized acts of violence directed against the self
by power in the arena) . P in the cross-section labeled "2" designates
the factors that predispose the power under study to respond as he
does (for example, recall of past successes in bringing about a stoppage
and the withdrawal by the other power and the perception of the self
as having the present capability to do so) .

The R in cross-section 1 could be further subdivided into sections.
R^ might indicate the focusing of attention on E; R^, the sequence of
violent rejoinders; R^, the estimation of the self as better or worse off
in net value position as a result of the policy.

Similarly, the £ in 1 could be subdivided. E^ might be the events
that precipitate R^; E^ could refer to the operations concurrent with
R^. Many other slices could be made, but these distinctions are suffi-
cient for the moment.

We may note that P in 2, which we have called predispositional
for i? in 1, becomes an R when the problem is broadened to explain

Microviodclins.

139

its occurrence. Similarly, /2 in 1 becomes P for the explanation of sub-
sequent events.

At any cross-section in time, the political analyst challenges him-
self to explain R and to characterize i? as a P for contingent impacts
of E. Since any completed historical sequence has, in effect, opted for
a specific set of factor combinations, the data available at any cross-
section do not provide an exhaustive presentation of all potential com-
binations.

However, there are methods that to some extent overcome these
limitations. Suppose that the violent acts of power X are mild when
compared to the possible range of acts. Nonetheless, if the appropriate
subsituations are explored, it will be found that some persons (in-
habitants of bordering countries, for instance) have been confronted
by what were for them huge doses of violence. By focusing on these
contexts, we may be able to obtain more intensive knowledge of how
power Y is disposed to respond to severely deprivational changes in
its environment. It may turn out, for instance, that the lower-class
components of the body politic were not willing to fight.

If we begin with long slices through time, some intriguing re-
lationships may be brought into view. In the diagram, A'' stands for
the nuclear center of a world revolutionary emergence (Moscow, 1917;
Paris, approximately 1789). D means diffusion, either total diffusion
from a body politic centered on the nucleus or substantial diffusion of
traits from the nuclear pattern. R means restriction, perhaps by the

1 ^

partial incorporation of certain traits but emphatically accompanied
by rejection of the nucleus and of the revolution. The communities
that fall into the two categories are recorded at time slices 1 to 5. Ar-
ranged in this way, major determining factor clusters stand out. The
diffusion from the nucleus of the 1917 revolution during the first forty
years was largely in contiguous zones east and south through thinly
industrialized and often colonially subject peoples.

Hypotheses can be refined by multiplying the cross-sections stud-

140 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ied in a given period (microslicing). This not only makes it possible
to explain the historical sequence more completely, but it discloses
cross-sections that lend themselves to analysis because of either like-
ness or diflference. All cross-sections that show no significant change
could be matched against those that do, or changes in a new direction
could be set against revivals of older patterns. At some point in the
course of research, the microslicing technique blends with models of
continuous interdetermination.^

SOCIAL PLANETARIUM

Many of the orientative advantages of permanent decision semi-
nars could be shared with the community by constructing appropriate
settings. In order to emphasize some fundamental features of the idea,
I have sometimes referred to a "social planetarium."* The name has
pertinent connotations borrowed from the planetaria designed to pop-
ularize astronomy. The latter are intended to give the spectator a spe-
cific idea of celestial phenomena seen from various observational
standpoints. The audience member sits comfortably while his space
ship takes off for the moon or a planet, or he stays on the moon while
the dome of the hall shows what he would see from that point. The
planetarium enables him to envisage the future or to rehearse the past
and to become familiar with the phenomena that confirm or contra-
dict a theoretical model of an expanding universe. In principle, the
consequences of alternative policies in astropolitics can be made vivid
in this way.

The advantages of universality, selectivity, and vividness are ob-
tainable in reference to the flow of history into the future. Vividness
is an important requirement, since, as we said above, many people are
unable to obtain rich imagery from reading or listening to words.

The practice of surrounding individuals with reminders of the
past, present, and future is very old. When we encounter folk societies,
we are immediately impressed by the fact that the whole panoply of
nature is impregnated with meaning by the tribal myth. Every river,
plain, hill, rock, or tree has a role in the unending drama of the col-
lective self. When a civilization cuts the tie with nature by heaping
people together in urban agglomerations, they provide substitutes for
the supporting world of nature by monumental edifices — palaces,
temples, memorial columns. And every great religion seized on the
need for concreteness by remolding nature, as in the Ajanta caves in
India, and by depicting the past and future of man and the gods in
the universe. At a highly sophisticated level, the whole story may be

Micromodeling 141

told in a single room, possibly in a single giant fresco or wall painting,
as in the Sistine Chapel of the Vatican.

In a more secular context, the museum is adapted to the double
task of providing a repository of original specimens and of laying out
for the visitor a sequence of development. One thinks of the vast
riches of the Louvre, the British Museum, the Metropolitan, or the
American Museum of Natural History. From time to time, these in-
stallations are supplemented by fairs and special exhibitions whose
keynote in recent decades has often been the challenge of tomorrow.

In spite of the richness of these precedents, it remains true that
the potential effects of the relatively permanent exhibition are poorly
adapted to provide man with a critically accepted image of the past
and future. Hence, the proposal to develop the possibilities of the so-
cial planetarium.

Imagine one of the many forms that such an exhibition might
take. Suppose that several buildings were available as part of the Na-
tional Museum establishment in Washington, D.G. The visitor might
begin with presentations designed to portray the distribution and cul-
ture of early man and show the lines of significant innovation until
the emergence of cities in the fifth millennium. The sequence
would be planned to teach awareness of the distinction between folk
society and civilization and to emphasize the variety of cultural forms.
Prominence would be given to the relatively temporary empires cre-
ated by able leaders of tribal federations and to the more durable
structures held together by bureaucratic elites. The city state, devoted
to commerce and manufacturing, would be in the picture, as would
the feudal and small-state systems created in the aftermath of im-
perial disintegration. More recently, the consolidation of large na-
tional units and empires would dominate the scene. At various
cross-sections and in chosen regions, international "orders" ("parties")
have arisen, though no one of them has achieved a central monopoly
of coercive violence on behalf of inclusive policy. The types of trans-
national arenas (multipolar, pluripolar, bipolar, tripolar) would be
presented, and the actual limitations on the self-described "universal
states" set forth.

Exhibits would emphasize the infrastructure of community life
and show the degree of value participation and the distinctive prac-
tices of various institutions. In the presentation of "power," for ex-
ample, the emphasis would be on typical patterns of dominance by the
few or the many. The major institutional forms of power would in-
clude the principal patterns of democratic and nondemocratic govern-

142 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

merit. It will not be necessary at this point to comment on the other
value-institution categories except to say that the aim in presenting
them would be parallel; that is, they would be shown as fostering
wide or narrow value participations and as exhibiting almost infinite
variations in institutional practice.

The future would be projected in a version that included contact
with the planets and the creation of satellites. At least two major
constructs would be outlined, so that a spectator might proceed from
today through future A by one route and through future B by an-
other. In the same way, the past could be shown in version A and
version B at various cross-sections. Hence, a more dynamic relation-
ship among individuals, groups, and history could be cultivated. Con-
veniently spaced along the main line of march would be side halls
giving more elaborate and systematic exposition to the events of a
period and indicating ever-wider ranges of possibility.

Every community could maintain a social planetarium of its own
in which the past, present, and future of the area could be put in
larger frames of reference. At every international and national capital,
long-range presentations could be supplemented by relatively intensive
outlines of immediate policy alternatives.

The permanent features of a social planetarium would be ca-
pable of providing a unified frame of experience for old and young.
From the problem-solving point of view, it is obvious that short-term
policy questions always require treatment in a comprehensive frame-
work accessible to all.

PRELEGISLATURES

It is important to focus on relatively immediate, as well as long-
term, issues of public policy. That political science associations can
take new initiatives along these lines is evident on reflection. One pos-
sible format has been christened the "Pre-Congress," and an outline
of the proposal may be suggestive. The idea is that some seasons of
the year seem to be preliminary to great waves of decision-making
activity in the body politic. By tradition, the New Year is such a mo-
ment, and many operations are in fact terminated at the end of an
old calendar year. Moreover, the New Year in the United States now
harmonizes closely with the assumption of authority by a new ad-
ministration and with the initiation or resumption of work by Con-
gress. It fits the dominant frame of reference to give contextual
consideration to goals and strategies at such a time. This is an aus-

Micromodeling 143

picious time to reach the leaders of opinion and all active citizens
with comprehensive presentations of national policy.

A Pre-Congress, then, is an occasion on which, under the aus-
pices of the American Political Science Association, for instance, pend-
ing policy issues could be clarified. The purpose is not to arrange for
advocates of outstanding proposals to "fight it out," but rather to
encourage inquiring minds to search for comprehensive national in-
terests. There are grounds for asserting that Americans are substan-
tially united on many goals. Differences often depend on conflicting
estimates of consequences, including costs, of policy action; discussion
can help identify the occurrences to be assessed. Discussions are most
illuminating when they begin with inclusive and concise presentations
of policy alternatives. Such formulations are largely questions of re-
search and analysis. Since they cannot be definitive, they set the stage
for further discussion.

Some of the questions on the agenda of a Pre-Congress might
lie beyond the field of current public notice. Reports on the machinery
of government, for example, though of enormous importance, are
rarely able to arouse the public. If emphasized at the Pre-Congress,
proposals relating to the machinery of government might mobilize
more members of the national community to grasp the significance of
such matters.

If the Pre-Congress demonstrated the competence and imparti-
ality of the program planners, it would probably win general con-
fidence. Much depends on the auspices. Fortunately, the American
Political Science Association is experienced in providing services tran-
scending partisan interests. This has been recognized in connection
with the Congressional Service Awards, for instance, which are given
to members of both political parties who have served the national
interest in their legislative duties.

In principle the Pre-Congress, as a prelegislature, could be
adapted to the needs of the states; rechristened a precouncil, it might
perform an orienting function for cities and towns. At the other
extreme, the conception could be adapted to international organiza-
tions. All the resources of presentation technique could be employed
in prelegislatures to aid understanding.

CONTEXTUAL BROADCASTING

Prelegislatures could be meaningfully supplemented throughout
the year by the public information programs of the mass media. Po-

144 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

litical scientists can usefully expand the roles they have begun to play
in television and radio broadcasting. Associations, schools, or individ-
uals might take responsibility for preparing and presenting a con-
textual treatment of current affairs. As public information programs
built up backlogs of suitable film, it would be possible to put the
latest news headline into perspective and to make evident its potenti-
ality for the values and institutions of the world community and its
components.

Suppose, for example, that a rebellion is reported in a new
African state. At once the visual resources of an adequate television
library provides local and historical footage that furnishes trend and
explanatory information. If the rebellion is similar to other rebellions
(and on analysis this is bound to be true), alert programming will
provide information about comparable cases. The presentation may
go further and project, clarify, and evaluate policy alternatives.

It is in connection with programs in election years that profes-
sional competence and impartiality meet the most severe test. Political
scientists are citizens fully qualified to vote and to support contro-
versial persons and issues; more than that, it is generally expected
and often demanded that, as particularly knowledgeable citizens they
do so. How are such requirements to be reconciled with professional
concern for impartiality and competence?

Let us begin by assuming competence on the part of a political
scientist. Is he obligated to refrain from expressing preferences or
even from engaging in active party work ? Definitely not. But all rele-
vant norms are to be kept in mind. One major norm is candid disclosure
of pertinent — that is to say, possibly distorting — interests. If the po-
litical scientist is affiliated with a political party or subjectively com-
mitted to a controversial position, his obligation is not to quit the
party or to abstain from opinions but to disclose these facts to any
audience whose reliance on his statements may be influenced by this
knowledge. Furthermore, he has an inner obligation to be candid
with himself in seeking to keep his statements of a factual character
free from distortion.

In connection with elections, it is important to play down the
stress on short-range forecasting that has plagued the specialists on
polling. The question whether A or B is likely to win is of no impor-
tance whatsoever to the national sifting of issues or the assessing of
candidates' capabilities. However, forecasts are of great importance to
campaigners, since selective audience analysis can show where interest
is lagging or sentiment is changing. There is no practicable way to

Micromodeling 145

limit forecasting to the private intelligence services of campaigners
or even to exclude predictions from general dissemination.

It is possible, however, for political scientists, acting in their
professional and civic capacities, to take measures to moderate the
negative impact. Pre-election analyses can focus on the significance of
voting studies for the attainment of self-knowledge by audience mem-
bers. Research may show, for example, that candidate X appeals to
white, middle-aged, suburban, Protestant housewives who are usually
uninterested in and uninformed about politics. An important program
objective is to heighten the self-critique of people who fall into such
a slot. Or candidate Y appeals to retired businessmen in the upper-
income brackets who regard themselves as devout and are suspicious
of intellectuals. The great contribution of scientific knowledge to the
political process is less in predicting the future than in deepening in-
sight into the self as the self prepares to take further steps into the
future.

NOTES

1 On war exercises (the use of men and weapons in the field) and war

games, cf. W. Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff, 1657-
1945 (New York: Praeger, 1956), which describes the growth of
staff techniques.

2 The RAND Corporation has played an important part in these innovations.

Cf. J. Goldsen, "The Political Exercise: An Assessment of the
Fourth Round" (Mimeographed; Washington, D.C.: The RAND
Corporation, 1956); H. Goldhamer and H. Speier, "Some Obser-
vations on Political Gaming," World Politics, 12 (1959), 71-83;
and burgeoning literature by L. Bloomfield, C. McClelland, H.
Guetzkow, and others.

^ Cf. H. D. Lasswell, "The Technique of Decision Seminars," Midwest
Journal of Political Science, 4 (1960), 213-236.

■* The gradual disenchantment of scientists and policy-makers with traditional
economic or sentimental "plowshare" approaches to the problems
of industrialization and modernization are copiously documented.
For a positive position, cf. H. Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of
Foreign Aid," American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 301-
309. Cf. also J. D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New
York: Praeger, 1962); J. H. Kautsky, ed.. Political Change in Un-
derdeveloped Countries (New York: Wiley, 1962); R. N. Adams
et al.. Social Change in Latin America Today (New York: Harper,
1960); M. F. Millikan and D. L. M. Blackmer, eds.. The Emerging
Nations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960); H. Cleveland, G. J. Man-

146 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

gone, and J. C. Adams, The Overseas Americans (New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill, 1960).

^ On simulation, cf. I. Pool and R. Abelson, "The Simulmantics Project,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (1961), 167-183; W. McPhee, "Note
on a Campaign Simulator," Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (1961),
182-193; O. Benson, "Simulation of International Relations and
Diplomacy," in H. Borke, ed., Computer Applications in the Be-
havioral Sciences (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961);
and especially H. Guetzkow, ed., Simulation in Social Science
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963). Further, J. Neu-
mann, The Computer and the Brain (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1962).

^ Current developments can be followed in M.U.L.L., "Modern Uses of Logic
in Law," quarterly newsletter of the American Bar Association
Special Committee on Electronic Retrieval in collaboration with
Yale Law School, edited at Yale by L. E. Allen and M. E. Cald-
well.

^ On the unfinished task of linking the various standpoints and procedures
now at hand — case, correlational, and experimental techniques;
laboratory, field, and historical methods; systematic models ex-
pressed in prose and mathematical or graphical notation — cf. es-
pecially the penetrating publications by D. Easton, H. Eulau, and
R. C. Snyder. Easton and Snyder made important theoretical and
critical contributions in the period immediately following World
War n. Cf. especially D. Easton, The Political System (New York:
Knopf, 1953).

^ Cf. "Strategies of Inquiry: The Rational Use of Observation," in D. Lerner,
ed.. The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences (New York:
Meridian Books, 1959).

Cultivation
of
Creativity (I)

No static certainty is to be found in politics or political science, hence
the importance of cultivating an afhrmative, inventive, flexible mind.
The present chapter treats the cultivation of creativity, since it is
concerned with professional training.

In recent decades, the social and behavioral sciences have been
able to add precision to the idea of creativity and to identify some
of the factors conditioning its incidence.^ The idea is not a simple
one, and many popular connotations are irrelevant. We must, for ex-
ample, disregard the assumption that whatever is new is creative. Un-
doubtedly, a novel element is always present. Yet a creative act is not
fantastic; it must be able to pass reality tests.

Another erroneous connotation is that creativity is a flash in utter

148 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

darkness. It is entirely fitting to celebrate the achievements of individ-
uals who give birth to important ideas; it is nonetheless a gross distor-
tion of the creative process to confound it with an individual or with
a single moment. The process is social and interactive and, properly
understood^ reaches forward and backward from the culminating mo-
ment. Not every thinker, of course, is able to locate a dramatic instant
as Descartes was able to do and to say that his whole theory de-
pended on an "emotional intuition" that struck him on a specific date.
Descartes saw his comprehensive vision on the night of November
10, 1619. However, the idea of a rational universe arose and won
subsequent ratification in the course of a creative process of great
scope and complexity. It is possible for historians of philosophy to
identify many influences that played on Descartes and contributed to
that heaping up of preconditions to be discovered in all human con-
duct when closely scrutinized. This is the phenomenon to which Freud
referred with the odd but expressive term of "overdetermination."
The creative pattern was not complete when Descartes experienced
his vision nor even when he committed it to print. Until ratified by
others, creativity remains potential; it is not yet actual. The lag may
be very long, although in Descartes' case he carried conviction to
enough contemporaries to justify his classification as a creative
thinker.

Today we are accustomed to taking the collective character of
creativity for granted. We plan inventions. So it was with the atomic
bomb; so it is every day in industrial laboratories. When wealth and
respect are put at the disposal of persons of recognized skill, they are
usually able to gather competent colleagues.

It is, perhaps, pertinent in view of the planned parenthood of
ideas in modern society to warn against underestimating the finer
structure of creativity. The target is rarely hit by a perfectly straight
course. A target can best be described as a working image of a des-
tination which can be reached only by many zig-zags or even returns
to the starting point. It is not to be wondered at that the most bril-
liant results are often, if not, indeed, typically, achieved as side effects
rather than as stations along a well-mapped route. In a given re-
search project, the ostensible target may or may not be reached
promptly or with much originality; yet society's capital of knowledge
continues to grow.

In the physical and biological sciences, the peculiar character of
creativity has long been understood. Able research men have learned
to proceed in a way that laymen sometimes regard as fraudulent.

Cultivation of Creativity (I) 149

Capable research workers do not like to tie themselves closely to a
single target or to a predescribed method. They want elbow room to
explore promising side lanes and to devise new procedures or even to
pursue basic scientific ideas a certain distance. They are concerned
that science itself grows only in this fashion; hence they are not true
scientists if they bind themselves in advance to a map too precisely
drawn. In the budgeting of research, it is therefore taken for granted
that the allotment includes a margin of support for general explora-
tion. Since the repertory of modern science is enormous, many re-
search implications invariably appear once capable investigators get
to work on any concrete task.

Given these facts, it seems defensible to obtain research funds
in the name of popular problems, while keeping free of any inner
commitment or public pledge to solve the problem at once. Consider
the notorious case of cancer. As of this moment, the millions of dollars
and man hours of talent that have gone into cancer research have
fallen short of the goal. Research in the name of cancer is nearly as
permissive as the pursuit of truth itself. Yet the whole episode is not
to be dismissed as a plot by research administrators engaged in build-
ing rival empires at the expense of a credulous public. The by-
products of research launched in the name of cancer are of undoubted
importance in many fields. Of this, both research administrators and
the beneficiary scientists have been morally certain all the time. And
many laymen who join in money-raising share the viewpoint of the
scientists, since they know enough science themselves or have had
enough experience with good scientists to recognize the policies that
are most likely to keep them productive.

The contrast with the typical research situation of political and
social scientists is evident. Even rather capable political scientists have
rarely had enough self-confidence to adopt the approach that is usual
for colleagues in the physical and biological sciences. Hence, their re-
search projects tend to be cut and dried, with deadlines, contents, and
procedures rather clearly specified in advance. They typically provide
little leeway for the pursuit of promising theoretical leads or for the
invention of novel methods.

What can be said when we sum up the fundamental criteria of
creativity? An important clue has come from the psychologists of
perception. We are not far wrong in condensing the fundamental
point into the phrase "context completion." To a degree, context
completion is inseparable from any living organism, since life per-
petually seeks solutions to the problems of the new environment.

150 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

There are vast differences between mild exercises of ingenuity
and the masterpieces that are commonly viewed as turning points in
the history of thought. What are the distinguishing marks of a con-
tribution, such as those of Planck or Einstein, that receives universal
acclaim from knowledgeable scientists? These celebrated instances of
intellectual achievement introduced a coherent picture where the
conventional map was full of contradiction, confusion, and ambiguity.
New ways of looking at the world disclosed a comprehensible pattern
in which ancient incompatibilities were redefined and disappeared.

I comment briefly in this connection on the work of a distin-
guished physician who has influenced political science and many other
fields of thought. Sigmund Freud was trained in neurology and cog-
nate disciplines.^ He was, in fact, reared in one of the most orthodox
temples of the "scientism" of the day. All brain functions were to be
reduced to objective events. Any mention of subjectivity was seen as
a regrettable concession to the undeveloped state of the science.

In his training, Freud was also exposed to contradictory images
of reality. For instance, he visited a clinic where the therapeutic
efficacy of hypnotism was being demonstrated. Hypnotism obviously
relies on communication in a social context to affect inner life and
outer conduct. Neither neurons nor chemicals enter visibly into the
chain of events that initiates response.

It was not possible for Freud to eliminate the mind-body prob-
lem. He nonetheless provided a map in which many hitherto-dis-
jointed observations became intelligible. Without constructing "neural
myths" to add to "myths of subjectivity," Freud suggested how hu-
man organisms can influence one another. He appeared to treat "in-
stincts" as part of the "body." However, the "soma" was shown to be
affected by nonphysical events — in a word, by signs and symbols. The
"unconscious" became a patterned repository of primitive instincts as
modified by interactions in the social process.

When we examine creativity directly in political science it is
soon apparent that context completion is a serviceable guide. The
images entertained by those who participate in a political process are
conventionally a blend of prescriptions and observed "facts of life."
Almost every serious, competent study in political science redefines a
conventional image and refocuses the connection between "preferred
norms" and "factual norms."

We have referred to Beard's analysis of economic factors in the
forming and ratification of the United States Constitution ; it is unques-
tionably a case in point. A monument of the same kind is Michels' study

Cultivation of Creativity (I) 151

of social-democratic parties in Europe. The social-democratic elites were
accustomed to speaking in the name of democracy. Michels drew at-
tention to the facts that the leaders tended to stay in office for many
years and that in many cases their children succeeded them in office.
He summed up the data by generalizing about the "oligarchical tend-
encies" of mass political parties. In the long run, it may be that the
criteria of oligarchy applied by Michels are too loose to satisfy pro-
fessional opinion and that he was vague about factors that might re-
verse a trend toward narrowly held power. ^ Nevertheless, the study
was sufficiently compelling to induce great defensiveness and some
insight in European socialists of the time.

Few scholars would deny that Marx and Engels were the most
original and also most successful political and social theorists of recent
generations. If the criteria were changed by de-emphasizing success,
a strong case could be made for the opinion that some French thinkers
— Saint-Simon, for example — were more inventive or that Bentham
is ultimately to be regarded as more creative. For present purposes, it
is enough to say that Marx provided the most comprehensive and up-
setting confrontation of conventional imagery on record. He provided
rebellion with the favorite intellectual tool of the status quo, namely,
history. Rebellion was no longer perceived as personal caprice, dis-
order, or heroism, but as a transpersonal natural law of society that
could be grasped by an instructed mind trained in the necessary
method of thought. Hence, the triumph of realistic thinking was not
to "make" history but to harmonize with reality; rebellion became
the ultimate conformity.

The capture of the appeal to history is correctly interpreted as
an impressive burst of creativity; it is of particular interest because it
exemplifies "rejection by partial incorporation" of an "enemy" ide-
ology and also provides a case of differentiation by an appeal to
method.

The first point — the use of partial incorporation — means that a
mode of justification, the appeal to history, was taken over by Marx
and Engels, although most of the doctrines asserted in the ideology of
the social order that "history" originally justified were in fact rejected.
Socialism in turn often became the target of a comparable strategy,
notably when Hitler opposed "international" socialism in the name of
"nation" and "race."

The second point — differentiation by an appeal to method — re-
ceived tremendous emphasis in the Marx-Engels contribution as a
means of borrowing the prestige of the physical sciences and trans-

152 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ferring it to a counterideological system. "Historical materialism" was
put forward as a procedure by which the attention of an individual
could focus on data revealing the dynamic and implacable sequence
of history from feudalism through capitalism to the classless society.
When French revolutionary thinkers assailed feudalism, they also ap-
pealed to method, namely, the test of "reason." But the connotations
of the term were capricious. My reason may lead to affirmations
which your reason is unwilling to accept. By the time Marx and
Engels wrote, a more disciplined idea of method had become recog-
nized. The conception of universal law validated by empirical ob-
servation seemed to provide a tool for controlling the ebullience of
individual subjectivity. "Historical materialism" revived the notion of
inescapable truth ascertainable by proper method.

These examples of creativity enable us to pose our present prob-
lem in fundamental terms. How can we strengthen the probability
that future questions will be approached with the balance between
innovation and realism that characterizes high-level creativity?

THE GRADUATE DEPARTMENT

For years to come, the principal responsibility for professional
preparation and hence for the cultivation of creativity will presumably
lie with graduate departments of universities. It will continue to be
the task of such academic structures to offer the basic introduction to
scope and methods and to arrange the environment of graduate stu-
dents in harmony with the requirements of professional objectives. It
is, after all, the graduate department that consolidates rival con-
ceptions of the profession into working unity.

How does a graduate department sustain the creativity of pro-
fessors and students? Experience shows how rarely any department
succeeds in maintaining its position as a well-balanced representative
of the past and as a pioneer.

Part of the difficulty comes from the fact that, in an epoch of
accelerating change, the training that fits men for today may unfit
them for tomorrow. At any given time, the leading figures are some-
what obsolete. At best, they provide partial models for the problem-
solvers who will be best adapted to the tasks of the next thirty or
forty years. We must suggest, I think, that a factor in support of a
creative department is an acute sense of partial obsolescence.

The versatility and competence with which political scientists
cope with the future depend in no small degree on professional prep-
aration. From the beginning of their specialized studies the larger

Cultivation of Creativity (I) 153

context must be kept in sight if the perspectives conducive to crea-
tivity are to be nourished and applied. Hence, the basic orientation
to the scope and methods of political science is of strategic impor-
tance. Properly conceived, introductory exercises in "Scope and
Method" are returned to throughout the years of professional prep-
aration and continue to challenge, guide, and inspire the political
scientist at every subsequent phase of his career.

In the following pages, I present a synopsis of suggestions for
the presentation of political science to advanced students at the
threshold of professional training. Our previous discussion has drawn
attention to the five intellectual tasks of a problem-oriented approach
to political science. I refer briefly to these tasks in providing some
concrete indication of what is implied for "scope and method." Be-
cause of the close tie between the clarification of goals and the tradi-
tional study of political doctrines, I shall deal at some length with the
task of clarifying goals and more cursorily with trend, condition,
projection, and alternative.

When we speak of the value goals of political science, the refer-
ence is to empirical events in the social process. It is at once necessary
to draw a distinction between statements of goal referring explicitly to
the social process and statements whose reference is to a wider con-
text than the sociopolitical process. When I read a declaration on
behalf of "democracy" — in the sense of shared power — it is unmistak-
able that the declaration belongs to the first category; the statement
manifestly refers to the political process. If, however, I read that the
proper end of man is to glorify God, there is some doubt about the
intended meaning of the words. Does it refer to glorification in a
heavenly choir after death? If so, this is outside the social process and
is not classifiable as a social value. On the other hand, the writer may
say that in politics this implies the practice of democracy, and this
claim is, by the definition given above, part of the political process.

It lies beyond the present discussion to enumerate the many pro-
posals that have been made in regard to the scope values of political
science. In passing, however, we may draw attention to a common
misunderstanding of objectives that are sometimes called "value-
neutral." In the present frame of reference, this is always an inap-
propriate term. If the assertion is made, for example, that political
scientists should pursue scientific ends, the suggestion means that the
enlightenment value should be emphasized.

Another point is possibly important enough to put explicitly.
Goals are sometimes formulated in terms of rank-order, sometimes as

154 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

preferred patterns of value distribution. In the former case, power
may be put above or below wealth, respect, rectitude, and other social
outcomes. In the latter, a commitment may be made to the wide
sharing of power (democracy) or to a system of narrow sharing (non-
democracy).

In whatever words the following distinctions are made, they refer
to categories that are serviceable in classifying statements of goal:

Justification of goal

Transempirical derivation

Theology, metaphysics
Empirical grounding

Logic, personal responsibility
Specification of goal

Statements that purport to clarify goals move in two directions —
toward specification and toward justification. The first operation
makes the terms of reference to the goal more explicit, that is, more
operational. If the goal is "power-sharing," it is necessary to make
more specific what we intend to designate in concrete circumstances
as "power" or "sharing."

Justifications, we have said, are of two kinds — by transempirical
derivation and by empirical grounding. The first purports to derive
values from statements whose ultimate validity is beyond empirical
confirmation. If theological formulations are used, the typical se-
quence is: first, an assertion that divine will is so and so; second, a
declaration that divine will ought to be followed in the choice of
values; third, an affirmation that the recommended values are in har-
mony with divine will. If metaphysical formulations are relied on, a
secular rather than a sacred terminology is employed, and the same
sequence is followed. The initial proposition may be, for example:
"The universe is a struggle between the forces of light and the forces
of darkness." The next assertion, then, is that we ought to conform
to the "is-ness" of the universe (light or darkness) and, finally, that
the goal affirmed is in harmony with the universe.

To ground a goal value empirically is to assert that various em-
pirical events justify the choice.* The events may be a direct affirma-
tion of ego responsibility. The speaker may simply assert a subjective
preference: "I believe in democracy (oligarchy, etc.)." As a rule,
however, individuals attempt to elaborate their preferences and voli-
tions by showing that legitimizing experiences can be shared by others.
The most common justifications of this type are in terms of "logic."

Cultivation of Creativity (I) 155

The distinction (between part and whole, for instance) that is called
"logical" is an empirical event; that is, the subjective stream includes
the experience of the distinction. (The distinction may be further at-
tributed to such metaphysical entities as "reason," but this elaboration
is not always made.) The justification may proceed as follows: "I
perceive a distinction between part and whole; since the whole is
greater than the part, I should subordinate my preferences and voli-
tions to the whole; hence I should accept the primacy of the whole
social process when that process gives equal consideration to all its
parts."

The clarifications that we have referred to are examples of one
of two modes of clarifying values — by content and by procedure.^

All the examples cited belong to the category of content. They
put forward statements purporting to guide the individual in his quest
for what he "ought" to do or what he "should" value. This is in
harmony with a tradition that has long dominated the civilization of
Western Europe, where the attempt has been to achieve and fix
"truth by definition."

Some of the oldest and most widely distributed traditions ap-
proach the problems of values and valuation differently. The Zen
branch of Buddhist mysticism is a case in point. The Zen monk does
not try to define the ultimate truth or to articulate general norms for
the guidance of practical judgment. On the contrary, he treats the
search for "truth by dialectic" with indifference or contempt. In its
place is put the cultivation of the propensities of the self to become a
site where illumination can occur. After years of spiritual exercise a
monk may achieve his aim and at that point choose whether to
proceed forthwith to Nirvana or to return for the purpose of helping
others to discover the true path.

I have suggested elsewhere that a remarkable equivalency is to
be found between Asian mysticism and American pragmatism. Prag-
matists assert that the quest for truth is a "logic of inquiry." It is,
therefore, an experience in self-discipline in the course of which the
knowledge and perhaps the order of preference of the inquirer is open
to change. Mystics and pragmatists are alike in seeking to de-empha-
size the role of general statements about final truth by putting the
stress on the inquiry or the quest as a lifetime process. Whether mys-
tic or pragmatist, the individual adopts a procedure that includes
suspended commitment to other than the procedure itself. The sub-
jective content at the beginning is expected to be modified in the
course of time by the procedures induced in individuals. The mystic's

156 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

typical approach is to dismiss his initial formulation of value goal as
part of the world of illusion and to engage in the discipline of exer-
cises which are expected to prepare him to pierce the veil of illusion
with increasing success.

The pragmatic method differs greatly in specific detail from the
path traversed by mystics. A pragmatic inquirer follows a problem-
solving agenda in achieving self-change. We have often identified five
intellectual tasks performed in problem-solving. A pragmatic pro-
cedure uses each intellectual tool as an instrument with which to ex-
plore the context of events — past, present, prospective — in which any
working formulation of value goal is located and with which it inter-
acts. Among other content, the inquirer attends to symbols of refer-
ence to the variables of culture, class, interest, and personality that
have acted on his career to date. He is open to any technique of study
that offers promise of assistance, such as the investigation of the un-
conscious dimensions of his personality by prolonged free association
or specialized tests. Any discovery of hitherto unrecognized factors
that have conditioned value demands is a liberating event in the proc-
ess of inquiry, since it increases freedom of choice of future value
demands. Part of the problem-solving quest is to estimate the conse-
quences of alternative value outcomes.

At any given moment in the exercise of pragmatic or mystical
procedures, an individual is prepared to commit himself tentatively to
statements of value goal, justification, and specification. As the self
is further modified by appropriate discipline, tentative commitments
presumably change, less in the terms used to state overriding goals
than in interpretations of goal in concrete contingencies and in ca-
pability to conform to these interpretations.*^

It is appropriate for political scientists to adopt the view that
their part in the division of labor among intellectuals is to concentrate
on the pursuit of enlightenment in the sense of seeking historical,
scientific, and projective knowledge or bases of inference. Political
scientists may refrain from constructing philosophies to defend either
value rankings or patterns of value distribution. Instead, they may
adopt goals as working postulates and develop the implications for
political analysis and strategy. If working goals are adopted, democ-
racy and nondemocracy are regarded as postulates to which the in-
dividual may or may not add a declaration of personal preference.

I have much sympathy with this approach, and I recommend
that it be made explicit to students. However, it is not the role of a
basic course in scope and method to load the dice in favor of this

Cultivation of Creativity (I) 157

or any solution. It is a responsibility that each student must shoulder
for himself and reconsider at successive stages of his career.'^

In addition to presenting versions of the goals of political science,
the fundamental course is well conceived when it outlines the history
of systematic reflection on the subject. This presentation, when ade-
quately conceived, goes beyond the conventional "history of political
theory" to give a sketch of the profession in past and present civiliza-
tions. In this way, a sense of continuity between past and present
becomes part of one's image of his role.^

Measured in terms of man hours, the principal task of "scope
and method" is to introduce the scientific approach to the study of
politics. This is a matter of presenting the various methods available
when the introduction is given for the formulation of theoretical
models to guide inquiry and also of reviewing the procedures for
gathering and processing data. Presumably, these points can be most
firmly grasped if students have an opportunity to study research re-
ports and descriptions of method and to obtain some acquaintance
with recent developments. The perspective in which these matters are
seen can be greatly enriched by examining the anticipatory proposi-
tions and factor identifications found in the traditional literature.

It is also within the province of the introduction to bring de-
velopmental constructs into view, partly for the sake of exhibiting
methods of thought and partly in order to provide a means of re-
orientation, especially in the undermining of established rigidities of
expectation.

Finally, in this enumeration of scope, is the presentation of the
policy challenge. Assuming that postulated goals are to be maximized,
how is this to be done? At this stage, the main task is to make explicit
by theory and case the process by which policy alternatives are in-
vented and evaluated.

I do not intend to evaluate the many devices presently available
to the teacher of "Scope and Method." In fact it is not essential that
there be a "course" in the usual sense of the word. A syllabus could
be followed on the basis of supervised individual study rather than by
group discussion. There are, however, advantages to seminars, espe-
cially when the decision-seminar technique outlined in the preceding
chapter is fully adapted to the task at hand. This stimulates the
search for relevance in the years ahead.

When we examine the spread of political science in America,
the forward-looking character of the most creative institutions is
clearly corroborated. I think it is generally understood that three

158 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

major centers fostered the importation of political science from Eu-
rope and reoriented the discipline to the distinctive challenges of the
American environment. (I shall not refer here to the current picture.)

We have had occasion to refer to The Johns Hopkins University
and to the stress that was laid on the history of American political
institutions in the context of the English experience from which they
came. This phase was essential to the discovery of an American self
in clarifying the new identity that had come during the first century
of political independence from Europe. Most of us are acquainted
with some of the mechanisms that come into play when a family
member achieves personal maturity. There is continual focusing of
attention on present identity and the identity of origin. In the course
of this "to-and-fro," the image of the self takes shape. It discovers
likeness and difference and orders these details in a working concep-
tion of "who I am" and "who you are (or were)." Parallel mech-
anisms operate when a new cultural entity emerges by seceding from
a more inclusive whole. There is much back-and-forth at the focus
of attention — back from the self of today to the self (and other) of
origin and separation. The image of present identity is formed as
likenesses and diflferences are observed, and past and present events
are unified as part of an intelligible history.

The preoccuption with English history was too narrow to procure
for American scholars all the tools of European political scientists for
the study of government, politics, and law. During the later years
of the nineteenth century, the great centers of theory were on the
Continent, especially in Germany. Ambitious American graduate stu-
dents went to Berlin, Heidelberg, and other distinguished universities.
John W. Burgess was given special facilities to examine the situation
on the Continent, particularly in Germany, as a preliminary to launch-
ing the Faculty of Political Science at Columbia. It was at Columbia
that Continental political theory, jurisprudence, and comparative gov-
ernment found their chief port of entry to America.^

The third creative center in the United States was The Univer-
sity of Chicago in the 1920's and 1930's, as developed at the initiative
and under the direction of Charles E. Merriam. It was here that
latent tendencies in the American scene came to their most dis-
tinctive expression. I refer, of course, to the p's and q's — the emphases
on psychology and quantity. The individualism of the European tra-
dition has been accentuated in the United States, where the great
natural resources provided a relatively uncluttered field for individual
and small-group achievement. The quantitative accent was an im-

Cultivation of Creativity (I) 159

mediate expression of the prestige of the methods of the physical
sciences, economics, and psychology.

It is instructive to examine the Chicago case in more detail. In
no way did Merriam harbor an illusion that political scientists must
be made over in his own image. He was, after all, a comparatively
modest and realistic man, indeed — as Harold Ickes sums him up — a
"timid" man. Merriam was dissatisfied with his own training and re-
gretted his lack of command of many skills and areas of knowledge
whose implications for political science were clear to him. He knew,
too, that there were no colleagues who exemplified many of the prom-
ising new approaches any better than he did. However, his problem
as a department head with vision was to put together the best possible
team he could find from colleagues who at least shared his goal and
were willing to cooperate in creating a permissive environment where
a new generation could come into being.

Then began the long wait — though a busy and in many ways an
exciting wait — for students to grow up. In any truly creative setting,
this is a frustrating business, since the first crop of students is likely to
include quite imperfect models of what is sought. They are somewhat
alienated from tradition and often lack motivation to demonstrate
high competence within it. At the same time, they are neophytes,
often having mediocre mastery of the tools they are attempting to
redesign and apply. They lack self-confidence, though some may com-
pensate for inner turmoil by an arrogant style. To compound these
complications, many of the students who are most attracted by nov-
elty are in a phase of personal rebellion against traditional authority;
some are highly neurotic or even marginally psychotic. If this adds
to the color of the graduate community, it also adds to the distempers
of the conservative generation when it meets flaming youth.

As a historian of political doctrine and an experienced man of
affairs, Merriam was acutely aware of the magnitude of the task of
bringing about a deep and abiding transformation of the profession.
He knew that it would take twenty or thirty years for the most suc-
cessful survivors of the new environment to achieve the academic
prominence necessary to consolidate the situation. By then several
former graduate students would be senior professors, department
heads, and deans, matching the corpulence of affluent middle age
with weighty academic posts.

But Merriam knew that the new ideas would not automatically
spread as the first generation rose in rank. Some ex-students would
undergo true changes of intellectual outlook and reject much or all

160 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

of the new approach. In other cases, a turn toward tradition would
result from academic expediency. A more subtle threat would come
from individuals who continued to speak in the name of the new
combination of theory and empirical research, but who were unwilling
to support programs enabling graduate students to obtain better train-
ing than they themselves received. If they had acquired elementary
statistics, they would think that this was all anybody needed. Why
invest time in the mathematical foundations of statistical logic? Or
why study symbolic logic or machine programming? Weren't the
"fundamentals" good enough?

Perhaps I should interpose a categorically personal opinion at
this point. Because of my involvement with new approaches to the
study of politics, I am often asked whether it is of any general im-
portance to intellectual life or public policy that departments of po-
litical science redefine the scope and method of the field in ways
that harmonize with Merriam's fundamental vision.

In reply, I concede that all the approaches in which I am in-
terested could be carried out in neighboring academic departments
and schools. "Political sociology," for instance, already has at least
one outstanding department in the United States. Some of the most
promising work in the study of systems of organization is done at
schools of business and of engineering. Many sophisticated studies of
the role of prescription in the decision process are made in schools of
law. Several of the most illuminating research reports on public opin-
ion are planned and executed in schools of journalism or, more gen-
erally, of communication. Excellent monographs on the curriculums
and methods of civic training are written in schools of education. And
these examples can be supplemented from other departments and
schools.

The issue, then, is not whether political science is to continue.
The question is much simpler — shall departments carry the label, and
shall a profession that carries the name continue? The function can
be and will be carried on regardless of the conventional symbols with
which the function is linked.

Neither the political process nor political science can be abolished.
I am sure that most members of the profession agree with Merriam's
central thesis in Political Power:

Whether in the study of personalities, of associations, of social
forms and institutions, of competing ideologies and interests, the
significance of the central integrating power becomes more appar-

CuUivation uf Creativity (!) 161

ent, and the possibilities of the regulator for good or evil take on a
deeper meaning (p. 10).

We can predict with confidence that, if the institution of study
itself continues, it will be applied to power and government. The scien-
tific approach to any phase of the natural or social order is so deeply
embedded in our civilization that, if one group of scholars fails to
apply it to a field for which they are presumably responsible, the field
will be taken away from them and cultivated by more strongly mo-
tivated and capable colleagues under other labels.

Is there any justification in terms of general rather than of par-
ticular interests for proposing that departments of "political science"
be continued and that a profession called "political science" be per-
petuated ?

My reply is affirmative. There are advantages in charging a spe-
cialized intellectual group with responsibility for examining the social
process in a fundamental frame of reference. A group of the kind
performs an important critical function since it knows enough history
to help distinguish purported novelty from actual innovation and
hence to aid in identifying creativity when it occurs. Creativity is
fostered by concern with the relationship between the part and the
whole. Contradictions, gaps, and ambiguities in the field are recurring
challenges to insightful completion.

As a case exemplifying this, I cite the history of modern research
on communication. It is generally recognized that the scientific study
of communication has made giant strides in recent decades. An im-
portant date in the growth of the field was the early 1930's, when
the Humanities Division of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Social
Science Research Council interested themselves in the state of knowl-
edge regarding propaganda and communication.

An observer of the academic world of the time might have taken
it for granted that the initiative for accelerated research would origi-
nate with specialists in linguistics. After all, students of language were
primarily responsible for investigating the most distinctive social pat-
terns devised by man in aid of mutual comprehension. But the ob-
server would have been mistaken. The most successful step was taken
by political scientists. They provided a unified map of the field that
brought specialists of many kinds to sudden awareness of a common
frame of reference. The step was taken because political scientists
were Increasingly aware of the strategic significance for arenas of
power of the control of communication. Looking at the many prac-

162 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

titioners and technicians of the arts of communication at local, na-
tional, and international levels, political scientists were startled by the
lack of communication among them.

The committee appointed by the Social Science Research Council
to report on the situation was composed, for the most part, of political
scientists who had previously concerned themselves with the use of
guided communication by political parties, pressure groups, or by of-
ficial agencies in war or peace.^° The integrative, community-wide
perspective of political scientists had already begun to make an im-
pression on schools of journalism by seeking to transform the curricu-
lum from overabsorption in ephemeral technicalities. The conferences
and bibliographic aids prepared by the council's committee were help-
ful in bringing together the fragments of knowledge and the diversities
of technique among political scientists, historians, journalists, adver-
tising men, public-relations experts, social psychologists, sociologists,
and many other specialists.^^

Acting as team members or as independent research workers, po-
litical scientists conducted descriptive or analytic studies and devised
or adapted many data-gathering and data-processing procedures.
Among technical innovations can be mentioned various modes of ana-
lyzing content and of interviewing message-senders and -receivers.

At no time was there any question that political scientists were
attempting to monopolize research on communication. It is character-
istic of the community-wide, decision-oriented perspective of political
science as a professional field that, when an important area of study
was seen to be neglected, students of politics called attention to the
neglect and themselves engaged in pioneering research. As other sci-
entists busied themselves with inventing, developing, and applying
methods of increasing technicality, the contributions of political scien-
tists became relatively less important. In the main, political scientists
are users of the results from communications research rather than
originators of new techniques. Some individuals continue to work in-
tensively with full-time specialists on problems of joint concern and
to mediate between colleagues in political science and specialists in
mass or private communications. In the future, such relationships will
undoubtedly continue to be mutually advantageous. But the innova-
tive role of political scientists may never reach the importance in this
sector of human affairs that it achieved in the past few decades. ^^

In any case, we can anticipate innovations in other fields that
come to the attention of political scientists as they pursue all factors
that seem to exert a significant influence on the ever-changing context

Cultivation of Creativity (I) 163

of decision. The distinctive frame of reference of the profession will
continue to indicate its fruitfulness for science as well as policy. A
precondition is solution of problems relating to professional prepa-
ration in ways that foster comprehensive vision and bold ingenuity.

The responsibility of those in charge of graduate work is to provide
an experience that justifies the admission of a qualified student to full
professional standing. Traditionally, this responsibility has been met
by requiring ( 1 ) a demonstration of knowledge of the field as a whole
and (2) a contribution to knowledge.

Professional preparation is something more than demonstrated
facility in passing examinations or writing a publishable book. Po-
litical scientists attempt a distinctive role in society. Role performance
is a complex enterprise which depends in part on common perspec-
tives that grow in personal association. A professional group is always
somewhat vulnerable to attack, and there are persuasive grounds for
asserting that a preparatory experience of intensive exposure to older
colleagues and to contemporaries is a valuable means of inducing in-
tegrity and solidarity. This is a justification for "residence" require-
ments and for facilities that smooth the way to intellectual and social
intercourse. At the same time, there are advantages in forestalling
tendencies toward parochialism by providing means of contact among
graduate schools and for conducting off-campus research.

Before coming to rest in support of any more definite plan of
graduate study, we have the usual problem of evaluating proposals in
seeming conflict with one another. We must, for example, look into
a policy to recommend on the highly controversial issue of training
teachers and research scholars.

NOTES

^ Cf. H. H. Anderson, ed., Creativity and Its Cultivation (New York: Harper
& Bros., 1959); H. G. Barnett, Innovation, "The Basis of Cultural
Change" (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953); E. Kris, Psychoanalytic
Explorations in Art (New York: International Universities Press,
1952); M. Wertheimer, Productive Thinking (New York: Harper
& Bros., 1945); G. Humphrey, Thinking, "An Introduction to Its
Experimental Psychology" (London: Methuen, 1951); J. Bruner
et al., A Study of Thinking (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1956); F.
Bartlett, Thinking, "An Experimental and Social Study" (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1958); and especially H. Gruber et al., Con-
temporary Approaches to Creative Thinking (New York: Atherton
Press, 1962).

164 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

2 E. Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud (3 vols.; New York: Basic

Books, 1953-1957). The centennial of Freud's birth produced many
remarkable interpretations of his life work, e.g., E. Erikson, "The
First Psychoanalyst," Yale Review, 1956. Cf. the forthcoming study
by R. R. Holt, "Two Influences on Freud's Scientific Thought: A
Fragment of Intellectual Biography," in R. W. White, ed., The
Study of Lives, "Essays on Personality in Honor of Henry A. Mur-
ray" (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), Chap. 16.

3 For pertinent comment on Michels, cf. S. M. Lipset, Union Democracy

(Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1956).

* The most systematic approach to the clarification of goals, including an
attempt to ground value commitments empirically, is A. Brecht,
Political Theory, "The Foundations of Twentieth Century Political
Thought" (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). Of con-
temporary theologians and philosophers concerned with political
doctrine, the following are among the most active: R. Niebuhr, J.
Hollowell, L. Straus, and E. Voegelin. Among scientists, A. Rappa-
port and C. H. Waddington have tried to formulate a scientific
basis for evaluative commitments. Cf. further E. Cassirer, Deter-
minism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics and Systematic
Studies of the Problem of Causality (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1956); The Logic of the Humanities, trans. C. S. Howe (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); and The Problem of Knowl-
edge, "Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel," trans. W. H.
Woglom and C. H. Hendel (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1950).

5 Cf. my "Clarifying Value Judgments: Principles of Content and Procedure,"
Inquiry [Oslo], 1 (1958), 87-98. On many pertinent matters, cf.
Nomos, the volumes published by Atherton Press for the American
Society of Political and Legal Philosophy, edited by C. J. Friedrich
since 1958. Also, the two volumes edited by H. D. Lasswell and H.
Cleveland for the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion
in Their Relation to Democratic Life, entitled The Ethic of Power
and Ethics and Bigness (New York: Harper & Bros., 1962). The
proposal to regard a problem as "solved" when details have been
disciplined by reference to context is implied by many approaches.

^ Of the many descriptions of Buddhism and especially of the stricter sects,
the unassuming essay by E. Herrigel, in Zen in the Art of Archery
(New York: Pantheon, 1953), often communicates successfully with
Americans. The volumes by D. T. Suzuki and A. Watts are widely
read. An exhaustive critique of what can be accomplished by ex-
plicit generalization is A. Naess, Interpretation and Preciseness
(Oslo: I. Kommisjon Hos Jacob Dybwad, 1953).

'' The literature often called "antibehavioral" or "antiscientific" contains
many warnings to young and old and deserves attention at an early
stage of the career. Cf., e.g., E. Voegelin, The New Science of Pali-

Cultivation of Creativity (I) 165

tics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); B. Crick, The
American Science of Politics, "Its Origins and Conditions" (Berke-
ley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959); D. E.
Butler, The Study of Political Behaviour (London: Hutchinson,
1958); H. J. Storing, ed.. Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962). The last two are
especially well informed.

s Key questions concerning the recruitment, training, and professional role
of political scientists are becoming more sharply defined as the
general sociology and psychology of knowledge takes shape. Cf.
especially B. Barber and W. Hirsch, eds.. The Sociology of Science
(New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962). See also the syn-
thesis by S. F. Mason, A History of the Sciences (Rev. ed.; New
York: Collier Books, 1962); and T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

° A near-contemporary account of the evolution at Columbia University is
given by M. Smith, A History of Columbia University, 1754-1904
(New York: Macmillan, 1904), pp. 199-305. My presentation some-
what underemphasizes the roles of Cornell University and the uni-
versities of Wisconsin and Michigan. For the general picture,
including Johns Hopkins, cf. the admirable treatment by F. Ru-
dolph, The American College and University, "A History" (New
York: Knopf, 1962). Also, A. Nevins, The State Universities and
Democracy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962). Else-
where: W. H. G. Armytage, Civic Universities (London: E. Benn,
1955); E. Ashby, Technology and the Academies (London: Mac-
millan, 1958); M. H. Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge in Transition
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959).

1° Political scientists on the S.S.R.C. committee were H. F. Gosnell, E. P.
Herring, H. T). Lasswell, P. H. Odegard, and S. Wallace. The Pub-
lic Opinion Quarterly was established and guided for many years
by H. F. Childs.

^^ Cf. H. D. Lasswell, R. D. Casey, and B. L. Smith, Pressure Groups and
Propaganda, "An Annotated Bibliography" (Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 1935).

1- On communications research in general, cf. B. Berelson, "The Study of
Public Opinion," in L. D. White, ed.. The State of the Social Sci-
ences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). Since World
War II, the most important impetus has come from the mathema-
ticians and engineers. Cf. H. D. Lasswell, "Communication as an
Emerging Discipline," Audio-Visual Communication Review, 6
(1958), 245-254. "Information theory" as originally devised does
not refer to "messages" ("ments"), but rather to the physical pat-
tern employed in transmission ("bits"). Symbol references and signs
have yet to be fully integrated with each other. Concerning my own
work in this area, R. Horwitz has made a conscientious, competent,

166 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

and often valuable statement in Chap. 4 of H. J. Storing, ed., Es-
says on the Scientific Study of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1962). Cf. also P. Henle, ed.. Language, Thought, and
Culture (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958); L.
Lowenthal, Literature, Popular Culture, and Society (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961); C. Cherry, On Human Com-
munication (Cambridge-New York: Technology Press of M.I.T.-
Wiley, 1957); and the notable studies of L. Festinger, M. Rokeach,
and J. Bruner.

Cultivation
of
Creativity (II)

SEPARATE BUT EQUAL TRAINING FOR TEACHING
AND RESEARCH?

In the preceding chapters, we have laid the accent on improving the
substantive content of political science. The stress has hence been on
research. However, no academic member of the profession can avoid
coming to terms with teaching responsibilities at university and col-
lege levels.

What is a good teacher? Properly condensed, the amount of
rhetoric that this seemingly simple question has produced could power
a flight to Mars. Alumni contribute to the flow; they are given to in-
termittent seizures of nostalgia for the lost heroes of youth, especially
if they have been financially successful and absent from the campus

168 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

for a while. Teachers themselves, for reasons not altogether myste-
rious, can deliver moving panegyrics to or about other classroom giants.
There are always deans and presidents to join the chorus, especially
if they feel guilty for giving status and money to other administrators
or to scholars rich in publications, rather than to deserving peda-
gogues.

The good-teacher theme has several standard modes of ornamen-
tation. There is "me and Mark and the log," a trialogue in which
neither the log nor Mark Hopkins is present to speak for himself.
There is the Socratic theme, in which a homely, aloof fagade houses
a lightning brain, a rapier wit, and a loving heart. There is the ogre
image, the image of the sophomore Demosthenes, and many others.

Most of us would concede that different classroom styles appeal
to different students and that part of the problem of a teaching pro-
gram in political science is to create an environment of strong and
diverse personalities who share a common intellectual commitment to
the subject and give young people an opportunity to understand the
intellectual and personal challenge of the field. This is not to deni-
grate other disciplines. On the contrary, in the modern age there is
something obsolete, even neurotic, about attempts at ego-inflation by
undermining other skills.

That members of the political science profession have often been
great teachers is a statement that cannot be successfully challenged.
I shall cite one example, that of an Englishman whose impact on this
side of the Atlantic was almost, if not quite, as immediate and deep
as his effect on India and many Asian and African nations. I refer to
Harold J. Laski, the articulate and devoted teacher of several gen-
erations of students at the London School of Economics and Political
Science. Laski spent time with students from all parts of the world.
He inspired many gifted young Americans to overcome the traditional
prejudice against an active career in politics. He sought to prepare
the rising generation to come to terms with socialism and anticolonial-
ism. There was no doubt in Laski's mind that, unless an intellectual
bridge was built between the dogmatisms of conservative capitalism
and the collectivizing trends of the age, there would be a catastrophic
age of terror and revolutionary violence. Laski enthusiastically iden-
tified himself with the cause of independence for awakening colonial
peoples and convinced hundreds if not thousands of students from
colonial countries that they could realistically expect an understand-
ing policy in London. For a vast congregation of former students,
Laski personified an informed intelligence and a sympathetic person-

Cultivation of Creativity (II) 169

ality attuned to the major issues of his day and concerned with clari-
fying and affecting history by reaching the minds and consciences of
everyone within the sound of his persuasive voice or able to read his
unceasing flow of books, articles, and declarations. He brought to the
forum of learned debate the policy issues of the moment. For him,
they were framed in the great tradition of the perpetually oscillating
balance between the claims of order and liberty. Tireless teacher,
publicist, scholar, and advisor, Laski was a model for one of the most
attractive and rewarding roles open to professional students of poli-
tics, law, and government.^

The question before us is whether the requirements of graduate
departments should be changed in order to establish two equally
prestigious paths to a professional degree. One suggestion is that a
"teaching degree" be introduced alongside the "research degree."

There are, however, several factors militating against this idea.
There is an established disposition in the academic world to think of
other than research degrees as "cheap degrees" and to devalue their
holders accordingly. It has been proposed to "debase the Ph.D." by
agreement among the leading universities. This could be done by mak-
ing clear that the dissertation is to be an article, not a book, and that
the degree can be obtained in two rather than three years. The
change is advocated on the grounds that the aim of a dissertation is
to demonstrate that the candidate is capable of making a publishable
contribution to knowledge and that this demonstration does not re-
quire a book-length example. A book is an example of "overkill" in
the weapons of academic life.

In weighing this proposal, it is rational to ask why the Ph.D. has
come to play a role of such importance. Universities and colleges in
the United States have had to fight against a supposedly "democratic"
demand to keep standards low enough to "give everybody a chance."
Partisan and personal pressures are not trivial in connection with
many professorial and junior faculty appointments. Hence, scholars
and administrators recognize the importance of having a relatively
obvious test of merit to use in sifting candidates and defending their
judgment when questioned by boards of trustees, influential alumni,
and important family dynasts. It must be conceded that the compe-
tence of a writer can be better judged from a book than an article,
especially since an article is likely to be more derivative of the senior
professor than is a book. Hence, the doctoral dissertation has de-
veloped in the United States into a rough equivalent of the Hahilita-
tionsschrijt, the postdoctoral volume used in German universities to

170 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

determine whether a scholar is ready for a university appointment.^

The proposal to create separate teaching and research degrees or
to dilute the Ph.D. is a losing cause, and it will become increasingly
obvious that the cause deserves to lose. The decisive factor will be the
accelerated pace of learning in American education. As mathematical,
logical, and scientific skills become commonplace in early years of
school (and preschool) and genuine intellectual motivations are at last
tapped on a large scale, the problem of political science teachers will
be to make the subject intellectually challenging and hence competi-
tive for able students. The instructor will need to have the intellectual
mastery of his craft that is signalized by a research degree.

The chances are that teaching and research will merge at a much
earlier stage in the academic process than heretofore and that po-
litical science teaching will require much more exacting research than
in the past.

I do not think that it is a secret among experienced members of
the academic community that departments of political science often
fail to appeal to students of first-rate intellectual capability. By this
is meant, of course, the students who excel in handling the abstrac-
tions that comprise the distinctive instruments of science and scholar-
ship (symbolized, for instance, by excellence in mathematics, logic, or
theoretical physics). Political science departments have often "lost"
these students to departments of economics because economists seem
to be in demand and because the intellectual content and apparatus
of economics is relatively more impressive. In many institutions, the
department of political science seems highly pedestrian when evalu-
ated in intellectual terms. It is populated by professors who enjoy
courses full of descriptive detail, semirigorous legalisms, and semi-
defined affirmations of preference on questions of public policy. Such
a department is scarcely competitive in the search for talent with the
law school, for example, which cannot fail to appeal to brilliant dia-
lecticians and activists who respond to the double challenge of in-
tellectual technique and the possibility of an influential career.

I believe that political science needs to attract a larger rather
than a smaller share of able minds and that this will require graduate
schools able to provide more students than ever with better tools than
ever for the advancement of knowledge. There need be no distinction
between "teaching" and "research" degrees.

There is, however, a further relevant point. What of the chal-
lenge to participate actively in public life? Surely political science
courses at the undergraduate level are not aimed exclusively at stu-

CultivaLwn of Creativity (II) 171

dents bound for professional schools. Is it not within the province of
political science teachers to do their best to reach everyone with a
clear and vivid presentation of the opportunities and obligations of
citizenship? Does this not suggest that research is an inappropriate
training for professors who would inspire active participation?

Civic training is, indeed, our province; there is no argument
about that. The question is about the competence to be acquired by
those who engage in instruction at various levels. If anything is clear
in this controversial area, it is that practical political experience by
itself is not dependable as a qualification for teachers of government.
Call the roll of any state legislature or of Congress. Among those who
stand out as possibilities are men who are so absorbed in the urgencies
of daily politics that they have no time for other jobs. If it is a ques-
tion of lame ducks, the lameness that got them out of office is often
excellent justification for keeping them off a faculty.

I am not saying, of course, that students should be insulated from
association with practicing politicians during student years. On the
contrary, in every dynamic center of political studies there is an un-
ending procession of politicians, legislators, executives, administrators,
judges, military officers, diplomats, and political commentators. Small
group discussions, individual conferences, classroom lectures, and pub-
lic debates provide varied occasions for more than perfunctory asso-
ciation between visitor and student. It is standard practice in many
colleges for classes to visit the principal organs of government acces-
sible in the locality and to encourage ofF-campus vacation trips and
projects. It has been customary for years to supplement the regular
teaching staff by part-time persons, many of them actively or recently
engaged in public aflFairs.

There is, however, a fundamental problem: a practicing politician
is not necessarily a competent political scientist, and a competent po-
litical scientist is not necessarily a practicing politician. The distinc-
tion lies in goal value; the competent political scientist is mainly
responsible for enlightenment, for the advancement of knowledge. His
role in the decision process is not restricted to the topical urgencies of
the moment. Part of his responsibility, in fact, is to keep the urgencies
of the day in the broader context of knowledge and understanding.
Whatever else they may do, political scientists are under a primary
obligation to contribute to the intelligence and appraisal phases of
community decision.

In teaching, the task is to share this larger map with students,
adapting the presentation to the reservoir of motivation and com-

172 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

petence. As educational levels rise, communications can be more di-
rect and technical, and students can participate at earlier stages in
the intelligence and appraisal which are the distinctive tasks of po-
litical science. They can be encouraged to step into active politics by
the many routes of contact and mobility known to the faculties of all
institutions.

FREEDOM, DIVERSITY, AND DEPTH

What further proposals hold promise for the preparation of po-
litical scientists? A principal one concerns freedom. Graduate students
need to exercise wide freedom of choice in arranging their programs of
study and research. The communications revolution has made possible
a film library containing the main body of political science knowledge.
We have been slow to grasp audiovisual tools and to make of them
basic instruments of research and advanced instruction. Educational
films for precollege students have gradually moved into the gap, with
modest success. However, it remains true that political scientists gen-
erally have taken little responsibility for the full utilization of film and
television. One major possibility is that lectures could be made avail-
able for recombination in whatever patterns seem best adapted to local
requirements. (Political science associations and educational institu-
tions could cooperate with educational television in preparing a great
library of appropriate material.)

Some successful films give prominence to a lecturer who handles
a topic with conspicuous mastery even though the lecturer is not him-
self a research contributor to the topic at hand. Film and television
also afford opportunities to bring audiences into direct contact with
distinguished political scientists whose research or analysis is generally
regarded as significant. The lecture itself may be less suitable for class-
room or adult education audiences than a presentation by an ac-
complished classroom master. However, the opportunity to form a
first-hand impression of the mind and personality of the lecturer often
compensates for the difference. Fortunately, too, the research man
and the able lecturer are often identical.

Films are most useful when they employ visual images to do well
what words do badly. Under the auspices of the basic data program,
comprehensive arrangements could be made for the production and
selection of visual records of contemporary world trends and also for
means of putting such material in context.

It might eventually be practicable for the American Political Sci-
ience Association, in cooperation with other scholarly bodies, to take

Cultivation of Creativity (II) 173

responsibility for a contemporary political history program designed to
supplement the "spot shots" taken for news purposes. As part of po-
litical science instruction, photo-documentation teams could be organ-
ized locally to augment collections of nonvisual data. With the
cooperation of governmental, press, and other organizations, the re-
sources of the newsreel companies and press libraries, for example,
could be drawn on to exhibit the trends during the years since photog-
raphy began.

If vast libraries of original data and interpretation were avail-
able to each student in a private studio, his freedom would be enor-
mously enhanced. Film and television can make instruction in specific
skills available to each student whenever he feels motivated to acquire
them. This applies to mathematical statistics, machine programming,
symbolic logic, planning and processing of questionnaires, and the
like.

The student can also have means at his disposal of examining
himself as a series of events among events and of comprehending the
impact that he makes on others. Everyone who hears himself "played
back" on tape is initially astonished by the sound of his voice. Each
student needs to see himself filmed under various circumstances, since
posture, gesture, and dress are to some extent under his control.

There are limits to unsupervised learning, however; hence, de-
partments responsible for advanced study would be well advised to
put specialists at the disposal of students. New medical and psycho-
logical tests are in continual process of revision, and individuals can
benefit directly by knowing what there is to know about themselves.
In some cases, this should lead to therapy to remedy organic or func-
tional handicaps.

As much attention needs to be given the cultivation of the "whole
man" among political scientists as is provided in many military and
business programs for the education of young officers and executives.

Although it is possible to obtain a great deal of understanding of
alien cultures and of novel situations in one's own society through film
and television, there is ultimately no substitute for first-hand exposure.
The advanced student must be financially enabled to travel and to
conduct study projects away from the home campus.

Financial independence is important in order to reduce the temp-
tation of the student to compromise his integrity. It is not too much
to say that many graduate schools train their students from start to
finish to sacrifice intellectual integrity. Professors may have funds at
their disposal to buy cheap labor and hence to offer impecunious stu-

174 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

dents a part-time job that helps to cover living expenses. Further, in
order to help in cutting down the number of years often spent in
graduate work, many well-meaning professors indicate that a dis-
sertation can be obtained in connection with a research project by
doing a little extra work and grinding out a passable dissertation.
The student who needs money — and this is the typical case — finds
the possibility most enticing even though he possesses little intellectual
commitment to the research or even to the subfield within which it
lies.

Mitigating factors are, of course, often present. If the research
project is in a field that is just opening up, the student is able to ob-
tain a higher level of skill than is usual even if he does not write a
dissertation. If the investigation brings a graduate student into con-
tact with an able professor who has attracted an alert and highly
motivated corps of assistants, it is fortunate for all concerned. The
student is able to make an insider's appraisal of his own suitability
to a new approach.

It may be argued that, if a scholar is relatively indifferent to
subject matter, he might as well take whatever opportunity comes
his way. It is not being perfectionistic to say that students who are
indifferent to subject matter have no business in the field. I strongly
suspect that political science has been damaged as a profession by the
number of students of ordinary ability who have gone into it for the
sake of an easy and relatively genteel livelihood. Many of the huge
departments at colleges and universities have grown by accretion to
meet the heavy teaching obligations that devolve on them. The ex-
pansion of enrollment creates a demand for student assistants to mark
papers and perform similar chores, and the assistants become instruc-
tors when they show reasonable competence and stay out of jail.
Meanwhile, a dissertation is written or accumulated — often in the
same department — and supporting interests are established in obtain-
ing the promotion of the instructor-Ph.D.

If I am correct in predicting that intellectual standards will rise
in coming years, I think it reasonable to propose that we make every
effort to attract into the study and practice of political science young
men and women of outstanding competence and integrity. And this
means money — money to provide students with the freedom of choice
too often denied them in the past.

The desirable scope of freedom includes access to whatever com-
binations of courses or course equivalents are offered at universities.
The department of political science can make available to Ph.D. can-

Cultivation of Creativity (II) 175

didates a syllabus covering the general field of political science and
the fields of concentration recognized for individual candidates. Be-
fore obtaining the degree, the student is usually required to (1) pass
a written examination on both fields and (2) present an acceptable
dissertation.

The syllabus suitable for (1) is approximately the same as the
introduction to the scope and method of political science mentioned
earlier. The requirements for (2) are complex, since they must often
be worked out with the help of a committee some of whose members
are outside the political science department. Each graduate student
deserves to have the attention of a committee chosen to guide his
specialized studies and test his progress. Often, though not invariably,
this committee can also act as a dissertation committee.

At the end of the Ph.D. period, advanced students who desire it
should have fellowships for a five-year period of research and study.
During the Ph.D. phase of growth, the student is almost certain to
rely heavily on the advice of the local department. When the Ph.D. is
passed, it is possible to gain the independence of judgment required
to settle on a line of inquiry that may deviate from local tradition.
If the topic and method come within the tradition, the chances are
that the new judgment will be better based than it can be in pre-
doctoral days.

Not all students want to proceed directly to research. They may,
for example, welcome "internship" programs that bring them into
close and responsible association with active political figures at the
international, national, or local level. In many cases, too, the student
finds himself attracted by teaching and desires to spend two or three
years in active classroom work. This is also important in clarifying the
career goals and strategies appropriate to him. Graduates often pro-
ceed directly to official responsibilities or attach themselves to private
organizations. They may or may not have research or teaching in
view.

SOCIALIZATION

In all that touches on intellectual accomplishment, political sci-
ence will share the benefits expected to follow the revolution in edu-
cation now under way. Undoubtedly, there are optimum years for
introducing children and young people to various skills; in all prob-
ability, these optimum periods are much earlier than is generally ad-
mitted. It is already clear that language skills can be systematically
taught at an early age (the third and fourth years of life, for ex-

176 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ample). Evidence is accumulating that higher mathematics, symbolic
logic, and in general skills that do not depend on empirical observa-
tion are rapidly acquired at this stage (the fourth or fifth year). At
this phase, the child appears to excel in the manipulation of syntactic
terms. ^

We cannot disregard various questions about personality growth
and maturity when we contemplate the rapid progress that is possible
in such skills as logic, mathematics, language, music, sculpture, the
graphic arts, and body management (dancing, swimming, and the
like). Lurking in the mind of every responsible educator or parent
are the images of the misshapen prodigies occasionally met. Over-
impressed by the symbol-managing dimensions of society, they have
developed into social cripples unable to empathize or to achieve af-
fectional relationships uncontaminated by rudimentary destructive-
ness, reactive arrogance, hidden dependence, and anxiety.

The maturative problems of a gifted child will be greatly eased
when gifted children exist in abundance. As the excess capacities of
the human brain are at last unlocked, the norms of civilized society
will undergo drastic change. It is not simply a matter of speeding the
acquisition of abstract skills. The probing of man's potential will un-
cover capabilities for creative expression in every medium that have
hitherto lain largely dormant.*

Among the stereotyped images that will go by the board is the
dichotomy between "intellectual" and "emotional" components of
mind. All ideas are rooted in fundamental mood-flows which sustain
the elaboration of images (ideas) until they achieve ultimate form
and expression. Rather, we conventionally credit composers of music
and of some other forms of communication with deep feeling and
emotion. Phrases of this kind are less often used to describe scientists
and mathematicians who are, in fact, often depicted as aloof and
absorbed in the frigid air of thought.

The truth about scientists is quite otherwise and undermines the
antinomy that has been erected between the arts and sciences. All
symbolic creativity has much in common, especially the interplay of
mood and image. Skilled performers of any operation are well ac-
quainted with the exhilarating sense of achievement that accompanies
a complex pattern of symbol, sign, and movement as it unfolds. By
contrast, the dominant tone of an exercise in enlightenment is one of
incipient illumination of the face of nature and society. In healthy
bodily expression — whether stylized or not — there is the vitality of
well-being. The nuances of love, honor, and responsibility are rec-

Cultivation of Creativity (II) 177

ognizable in the dimension of mood, as are the peculiar urge and joy
of acquisition and processing; and the propensity to dominate others.

If the ancient barriers between "abstract" and "aesthetic" ex-
pression are lowered, young people can be provided with environ-
ments that increase the mood experiences open to them which they
can subsequently blend with any dominant problem activity.

Assume that we are concerned in the long run with eliminating
the use of coercive instruments of policy. The aim is to rely on per-
suasion, especially on the sharing of enlightenment. If each generation
is to be prepared for participation in persuasive activities, its members
must have ample opportunity to engage in the process successfully,
hence learning to rely on persuasion even under circumstances which
at first seem unsuited to persuasive activity.

For instance, it is frustrating for competent scientists to be con-
fronted by ignorant attacks on science, and many scientists find it in-
tolerable to defend science to fools. The latent sympathy of many
engineers and scientists with despotism comes from the hope that the
"fools" can be handled by despots who keep the scientists from being
bothered. This is a danger to democratic systems of public order; the
process of civic training should enable skilled individuals to feel at
home in occasional contact with "fools." This is not a simple matter
of "toleration" but of enlightenment concerning the role of persuasive
communication in society. If the socialization process is to be success-
ful, persuasion must be connected with indulgent rather than dep-
rivational experiences in the home, school, and general community.

It is tempting to rely on the mechanism of conditioning, strin-
gently applied from early years of life, to reduce coercion in human
affairs. Should we aim at conditioning all children to nonviolent
modes of dealing with other people?^ If such a mechanism of non-
violence were specific enough to use for indoctrination purposes, it
would have to impose an inhibition against performing any act that
damaged other people physically. No explosive could be detonated; no
blade could be used to cut or gouge; no blow could be delivered; no
push entailing the likelihood of damage to the person could be given;
and no button or intermediary of any kind could be employed to start
any sequence likely to end in any physical deprivation of a human
target. The sanction could be built in by conditioning exercises under
circumstances that increase its automatic, unconscious compulsiveness.
Presumably the conditioning would begin at a very early age and
would be aided by hypnotic or chemical means. Perhaps the individ-
ual who is tempted, even unconsciously, to complete a prohibited act

178 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

could be trained to turn impulses of this kind into destructive acts
against the self, rather than against an external target. The subject
might be conditioned to experience a splitting headache, to faint, to
undergo paralysis of the motor apparatus, or to suffer heart attacks
— even fatal ones.

A problem that confronts such a conditioning program is that
many of the specific acts mentioned may also occur in socially de-
sirable forms. This is true of surgical interventions that require cut-
ting and of police acts to restrain the individual whose conditioning
fails or who has been deliberately reconditioned in secret conclaves
of dissenters who conspire to restore man's freedom or who plan a
ruthless elite corps equipped to take over a society whose members
are conditioned against offering resistance. If the community comes
into contact with inimical forces in the astropolitical arena, a suc-
cessful program of conditioning might have provided an unconscious
preparation for servitude to the new order.

If it is decided to meet these problems by arranging an "exemp-
tion cue" that would "inhibit the inhibition," the political question
becomes: Who is to be empowered under what circumstances to ad-
minister the cue? We are back to the familiar probability in political
calculations — administrators may not be perfect. Hence, they may use
their control of cues as a base of power, perhaps striving to liberate
a gang intent on seizing power.

Some of these difficulties might be faced by devising a new
strategy of conditioning. One technique would be to influence an act
of thought at the phase of intention, rather than to work for automatic
inhibition of a specific list of act completions. Such training might
proceed by drilling the individual to acknowledge the presence of
destructive subjectivity whenever it appeared. The conditioning would
be explicitly tied to destructive intention. Hence any subjective event
— even at the threshold of awareness — would precipitate the inhibiting
mechanisms mentioned above. The hope would be that each individ-
ual could act as his own "exemption manager," since a benevolent
intention would enable activities to be modulated as seemed best (in-
cluding the completion of acts of cutting or killing) .

This program gives rise to fascinating technical problems. Having
in mind the subtlety of man's mechanisms of adjustment and es-
pecially the notorious deceptiveness of unconscious motivation, one
wonders whether it is possible to prevent unacknowledged impulses
toward hostility from appearing at the conscious phase in the guise
of benevolence. Would conditioning be necessary during states com-

Cultivation of Creativity (II) 179

parable to pscychoanalytic hours in which the individual is capable of
permitting basic initial impulses to expose themselves instantly in
gesture or vocalization ?

Techniques will presumably improve steadily in this as in every
field of research. In the astropolitical age, the enormous number of
natural and fabricated locations for habitation may be turned into
communities where contrasting methods of conditioning are utilized
and the results compared.

CODES OF CONDUCT

It is a fact of more than casual interest that political scientists
possess no written code of professional conduct for the guidance of
students or others and no formal machinery for disciplining anyone
for malpractice. The legal profession, by contrast, is well armored
with prescriptive language on the subject, and the grievance com-
mittees of bar associations are by no means inactive. Physicians, of
course, have codes, and one of the most conspicuous trends in modern
professionalization has been for new associations to draft bodies of
rules and aspirations. Several factors no doubt help to explain why
political scientists are codeless. Whatever investigation of this point
may eventually reveal, it is safe to say that one contributing factor
has been the ambiguity of the image of the political scientist and the
looseness with which many individuals have been identified with its
development.

Whether political scientists agree on an official code of practice
or not, I am confident that the growth of a professional identity will
carry with it greater clarity of expectation about the conduct ap-
propriate to a political scientist as researcher, teacher, advisor, and
practitioner of politics. A casebook of problems that have actually
arisen could usefully be published. I think, too, that young people
would welcome a book of observations on the subject by several ex-
perienced seniors.

A code of professional conduct would presumably deal with ques-
tions of confidentiality, candor, and consideration. In his role of re-
searcher, teacher, advisor, or active practitioner, a political scientist
faces many problems related to communications obtained in confi-
dence. Under what circumstances, if any, is a political scientist justi-
fied in violating the confidences of others? There are also problems of
self-disclosure. When is there an obligation to report candidly to a
group or to put an individual on notice of facts that may influence
judgment by the group or individual of what is declared or proposed?

180 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Should some lines of research be avoided because they do violence to
individual or group conceptions of rectitude? In our society, such
considerations relate to acts that are regarded as invasions of privacy
or that call for activities shocking the sensibilities of the persons in-
volved (as in some potential experiments).

Clearly, political scientists often find it necessary to sacrifice one
valued outcome for another. The role of professional codes of conduct
is to clarify the questions arising in complex circumstances. The prime
value of research workers is enlightenment, or the improvement of skill.
As we have suggested, however, these values may be compromised
in varying degree for some participants in research. If we accept the
overriding conception of human dignity and think that responsible
conduct is the deliberate evaluation of conduct in the context of goal,
a code of professional conduct is an obvious means of bringing po-
litical scientists into harmony with the fundamental aim.

I shall summarize a few cases in which political scientists were
aware of conflicting values. They may be taken as points of departure
for the casebooks and codes to which I have referred.

Many years ago, a social scientist who studied organized crime
and politics in an American city got in touch with criminal gangs and
eventually established himself so successfully that he was tipped off
in advance of robberies and even of gang skirmishes. He met the
problem by giving the police no information, arguing that his re-
lations to the world of organized crime were unique and would pro-
duce knowledge of much more lasting importance to public order
than could possibly result from a few tips.

A political scientist who was engaged in area research abroad
during the rise of the German National Socialists won the confidence
of local Nazis to a degree that enabled him to learn the strength, and
even to identify secret leaders, of the Nazis in several foreign coun-
tries. He was personally anti-Nazi, but as a political analyst he was
concerned with discovering the group sources of their strength and
the nature and effectiveness of their strategy. To become a polit-
ical police agent, as he would in effect be if he gave his information
to the authorities, would bring his investigation to a stop before he
could conclude the general picture that he felt competent to draw if
he continued to keep Nazi confidences. He had explained to the Nazis
that he was not in sympathy with their ideas but that he w-as not
going to break faith with them; they had come to believe in his word.

Another political scientist faced a problem of a somewhat dif-
ferent kind. For years he had been among the small number of schol-

Cultivation of Creativity (II) 181

ars qualifying as genuine experts on the Soviet Union. Since he made
repeated trips to Russia and had known it before the revolution, he
had contact with individuals and circles in bitter opposition to Bol-
shevik dictatorship. On each return to the United States, he was
sought by Washington officials who welcomed his candid appraisal
of developments since the previous visit. One year in particular, there
were rumors that the regime was in grave peril as a result of its fail-
ures in agriculture — evidently a chronic condition — and of faction-
alism in the party. Outside forces, eager to embarrass and upset the
Bolsheviks, were redoubling their propaganda and sabotage measures
against them. It was at this time especially that strong urgings were
made to provide official sources with the names of individuals and
groups who were disaffected and who might therefore become part of
an antirevolutionary campaign based in Western Europe. The scholar
in question was entirely willing to testify as an expert, giving his
judgment of the principal trends of recent years. But he was adamant
about providing the "police and military" information asked for. He
believed that it would be ruinous to his hard- won reputation as "an
honest bourgeois scholar" to become involved in subversion against
the Reds. He was undoubtedly influenced by other considerations as
well. He believed that the Bolsheviks were in power for keeps and
that it was fantastic to expect to overturn them by attempting to set
even the Trotskyists against the Stalin machine.

A more urgent problem arose in another case. A political scien-
tist who did not regard himself as an area specialist on Western Eu-
rope or on any Western European country learned of a political
conspiracy engineered by Communists to overthrow the government
of a small, friendly country. The disclosure had come only acciden-
tally in the course of a research trip that had nothing directly to do
with Communism. He felt entirely free to make his unexpectedly de-
tailed foreknowledge available to the responsible authorities.

Another political scientist was approached by the intelligence
services with the proposal that he become an agent and a specialist on
a country speaking a language unknown to many Americans. The
offer was to finance him for several years of study by providing (un-
acknowledged) funds to be administered through his university. Not
the least tempting feature of the offer was the appeal that it made
to his national loyalty and to his anti-Communist beliefs. He felt cer-
tain that no Soviet citizen would turn down such an offer if made by
Communist intelligence services, and he also suspected that Americans
were probably too full of "liberal inhibitions" to fight the Com-

182 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

munists effectively. Despite all this, the invitation was eventually
turned down. He believed it contrary to his obligation as a scholar
and an American to "prostitute" universities into cover agencies for
intelligence services.

Of a more commonplace character is the problem that faced a
former colleague who relied on interview methods of obtaining in-
formation about local politics. He became acquainted with the scan-
dalous personal life of a candidate for high public office on a reform
ticket. It seemed obvious that the man was — I quote — a "hypocrite, a
sadist, a pervert, and a crook." He had illicit connections with gam-
blers and addicts, and it became increasingly clear that the man was
a "psychopathic character," with everything implied by the techni-
cal use of the term. My colleague asked whether he did not owe it
to the public to make the facts available. The question was how it
could be done without violating legitimate trust or exposing inform-
ants to retaliation. To denounce the fellow in general terms without
specific names, dates, and places would get nowhere, since the ordi-
nary language of vituperation in American politics covered most of
the points. In addition, publicity would endanger the completion of the
research on which he was at work and compromise the future of what
he believed would be an important contribution to knowledge of the
American political system. So, aside from endorsing a proposal to re-
quire all candidates to take a psychiatric examination, he did nothing.

Political scientists have not in the past engaged in the kinds of
experiment that raise such questions as the individual's "right" to en-
danger his life. If we consider the significance of the claim to "waive"
one's interest in safety in the perspective of a commitment to human
dignity, there is not much doubt about the result. The body politic
cannot permit suicide; it cannot, that is, admit that the decision to
end one's life is for an individual to make by himself. Too many col-
lective values are at stake. Not only does the person represent an enor-
mous social investment, but he is a potential asset. The decision to
take "my" life is also a decision regarding "our" life together, and it
is not in harmony with the goal of sharing that I should play the
autocrat in the matter.

An important though subsidiary' aspect of the question of public
policy on suicide is that, when many attempts at self-destruction are
made, the individual is in a disturbed frame of mind and therefore
handicapped in coping with his problems realistically.

The questions that arise in the physical and biological sciences are

Cultivation of Creativity (II) 183

not typically of this kind. Rather, they invove full or at least candid
disclosure of danger and the ofTering of inducements to run the risks
involved. In connection with radioactivity, many physicists and phy-
sicians have mutilated their bodies and eventually lost their lives in the
conduct of experiments. It is no novelty in the investigation of patho-
genic organisms for bacteriologists to put themselves in the experi-
mental group. We know that people of all ages have consented to be
guinea pigs in perilous experiments, a practice that seems to have
tacit public consent provided that the subjects have been given a com-
plete briefing on the dangers involved. We are accustomed to not in-
terfering with people who engage in hazardous sports if other persons
are not immediately endangered by what they do.

It is not entirely true that political scientists are always engaged
in a nonhazardous occupation. I know of students of politics who have
suddenly discovered that political gangs and bosses did not look on
their snooping with a friendly eye, and studies of hot spots in labor-
management controversies and in "race relations" are not always wel-
come. Totalitarian countries are, of course, uniformly suspicious of re-
search of any kind, which is immediately assumed to be espionage.

The martyrs in political science are as few as in the neighboring
social and behavioral disciplines. There are not, at least as yet, enough
martyred political scientists, economists, sociologists, and psychologists
to justify a memorial wall, much less a hall. The exception appears to
be in anthropology, and it is perhaps a comment on the perspectives
current among professionals that the rare student who has lost his or
her life on a field trip "had it coming" because of some flagrant dis-
regard for local culture.

There has been no dearth of people with political training who
have been killed or maimed for their ideological position and for tak-
ing an active part in public afTairs. However, the significant figures
among political philosophers seem more cautious than physically cou-
rageous. The stereotype case remains that of Hobbes, the scholar of
fire-eating imagination who was "the first of those who fled." In re-
gard to jockeys or picadores of the great Leviathan, Hobbes, too,
would rather see than be one.

EVALUATING FACTORS THAT INHIBIT INQUIRY

The liberation of creativity calls for full candor in perceiving —
and some courage in overcoming — the influence of all factors, formal
and informal, that inhibit active and potentially important inquiry.

184 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Some important informal restraints are connected with the perspec-
tives of tight, homogeneous eHtes that perpetuate the traditions of pre-
democratic systems.

An illuminating case in point is the history of psychological studies
of political elites. The rise of political and social psychology has been
intimately tied to democratic individualism, especially in America.
These disciplines and modes of approach are so closely linked with de-
mocracy chiefly because of the defensiveness of power figures. Political
psychologists want access to their subjects now. They want data that,
if unpublished for a time, are at least open to summary by the omis-
sion of names and by the publication of anonymous group or personal
profiles.

If anyone hesitates to accept the fact that large, homogeneous
elites do in fact inhibit empirical inquiry of a social-psychological or
psychiatric character, let him consider the reluctance of English uni-
versities to encourage this approach. Traditional barriers are at present
dissolving owing to the belated rise of new universities as social change
accelerates.^

Political and social scientists do not distribute their attention
evenly to the upper, middle, and lower strata of society, even in bodies
politic whose ideology is democratic. It is often remarked that political
and social scientists find it easier to write about the middle and lower
classes than to deal with elites of power, wealth, or other values.^
Social scientists have evidently felt less anxiety when they study in-
dividuals of lower social position. We note, too, that many students
of society have been drawn into research when their rebelliousness
against the established order could find no political outlet. They were
initially drawn to studies of the rank and file by revolutionary roman-
ticism and by the impulse to discredit the powers that be.

Political scientists have, as a rule, been too prudent or timid to
become involved in research that would arouse the ire of churchmen
or professional moralists. They have produced little research on
church-state relationships despite the obviously growing importance of
the policy questions. It is true that political scientists have been willing
to study electoral data to bring out Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish
patterns of behavior at the polls. They have, however, been little con-
cerned with case studies of how ecclesiastical elites have relied on
coercive or persuasive strategies to influence formal or informal leaders.

We observe, also, that sex is a touchy topic for political scientists,
if one is to judge by the paucity of research on the interplay of sex
and politics. Prostitution is dealt with as a source of "corruption," but

Cultivation of Creativity (II) 185

the role of sexual development in attitudes toward authority is rarely
dealt with. Despite the traditional and scientifically validated role that
is assigned to the family in imprinting various sexual and political per-
spectives, there is almost no team research bringing political scientists
into close working collaboration with child psychologists, physicians,
and nurses.^

It is not necessary that an exercise in creative thinking deal with
a "delicate" topic. It is, however, a threat to enlightenment if creativity
is herded into conventional and into no other channels. Freedom of
inquiry demands a franchise to study every value-institution process
for the sake of public enlightenment.

A striking example of neglected research possibilities that must
be explained on other than cautionary grounds is the interplay of art
and politics. True, the frontier tradition is supposed to have been es-
tablished by men who were so doubtful that their masculinity had
survived the trip West that they were afraid of the "efTeminizing" ef-
fects of the arts. But this point of view has long evaporated in sophis-
ticated centers. Among political scientists, there has evidently been a
process of negative selection of students committed to the arts.

My prediction on this matter is unequivocal. If the world holds
together, political scientists will concern themselves with doing what
they can to illuminate the impact of the arts on politics and of politics
on architecture, literature, music, graphics, plastics, and the dance.^
More than this — the aesthetic interest will find creative expression in
the criticism of power, rectitude, and in fact of all values.

The initiative has already been taken in this direction. Among
Americans, the philosopher-politician T. V. Smith is the principal
figure. Following in the tradition of Santayana, Smith speaks with
charm and wit on behalf of the enjoyment of the imperatives of con-
science, for example, and speaks of himself as one who celebrates the
democratic ideal.^° In common with all values, the cultivation of an
aesthetic perspective has two phases — shaping and sharing. The former
phase is exhibited in the skills of the craftsman, the latter, in the con-
templative skill of the connoisseur. In the relatively pure case, art is
not art unless it is "art for art's sake," that is, unless the value de-
mands of the craftsman or the connoisseur are for the realization of
gratifying patterns among the elements of a culminating outcome. The
criteria of gratification, when made explicit in communication, are
statements of the preferred norm of the communicator in pattern ar-
rangement. Without accepting the connotations of traditional meta-
physics, we can use the term "intrinsic" to designate this criterion for

186 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

the evaluations of outcome events as art. If we evaluated sculpture
or music as instruments of power, wealth, or other values, the evalu-
ation would be, not in terms of art, but of other events.

In this developmental construct of politics and the arts, we must
eventually consider many other historical and analytic factors. One of
them is the demand to devalue power, especially in historical epochs
in which the imperatives of power are pressing heavily on the lives of
men. There are many ways of seeking to turn away from, or to reduce
as far as possible, one's active commitment to power. Among these al-
ternatives, one of the most successful contenders in the lives of many
people is, and has long been, the aesthetic quest.

In coming years, the rising level of education will prepare gen-
erations of advanced students to work effectively in cross-disciplinary
fields, humanistic or scientific, that lie outside the specialized frame of
political reference. It is probable that, as the division of intellectual
labor opens and occupies interstitial and intersecting zones, the number
of scholars who acquire "double competence" will increase. The
permissive program of graduate training envisaged in the present
discussion would cultivate both depth and diversity as means of
professional development toward high levels of continuing creative
achievement. It would become increasingly common for multidisci-
plinary collaboration to occur at successive stages of the professional
career. In the following chapter, we deal explicitly with the prospects
of collaborative activity in fields that are by tradition closely connected
to the description, analysis, and management of politics. ^^

NOTES

1 Something of the flavor of Laski's personality shines through in the pub-

lished correspondence with public figures, especially with Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes. Cf. Holme s-Laski Letters, "The Correspondence of
Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski, 1916-1935," Mark De-
Wolfe Howe, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).

2 Basic historical information is in M. J. L. O'Connor, Origins of Academic

Economics in the United States (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1944); A. Haddow, Political Science in American Colleges
and Universities, "1636-1900" (New York: Appleton-Century,
1939).

^ On this speed-up, it is possible to follow developments in The American
Behavioral Scientist edited by A. deOrazia at Princeton. Cf. the
special issue on "The New Educational Technology," 6 (November
1962), No. 3. Among political scientists, Herbert Simon has been

Cultivation of Creativity (II) 187

the most influential figure. His command of mathematics and lively
experimental imagination have set a new model of professional prac-
tice. On "Statistical and Quantitative Methodology," cf. J. W.
Tukey, in D. P. Ray, ed.. Trends in Social Science (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1961), pp. 84-136. He speaks of the standard
research cycle as conjecture-design-experiment-analysis and suggests
that the cycle be adapted to the distinctive needs of research candi-
dates in various fields. In political science, where research means
making or taking new data, he advocates a "phase of careful analy-
sis of someone else's data over a long time" (p. 124). Cf. P. F.
Lazarsfeld, "Evidence and Inference in Social Research," in D.
Lerner, ed.. Evidence and Inference (New York: The Free Press
of Glencoe, 1958), pp. 107-138. On certain questions of logical
statement, cf. F. Oppenheim, Dimensions of Freedom, "An Anal-
ysis" (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961).

* The problems of a prodigy in his generation are told from the inside by
Norbert Wiener, Ex-Prodigy, "My Childhood and Youth" (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1953); also his / Am a Mathematician,
"The Later Life of a Prodigy" (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1956).

^ On the technique of conditioning, cf. B. F. Skinner, Science and Human
Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

^ Recent original contributions to political science in Great Britain — not
necessarily by members of the academic profession — include those
of J. Eysenck, R. S. Milne, D. E. Butler, W. Pickles, J. Plamenatz,
D. W. Brogan, H. C. MacKenzie, J. F. S. Ross, and J. A. Thomas.
G. E. G. Catlin has for many years been the outstanding exponent
of the scientific development of political science in Great Britain.
His principal academic appointments have been in the United
States and the Commonwealth. Cf. his recent Systematic Politics,
"Elementa Politica et Sociologica" (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1962).

^ Most recently by D. Riesman, Individualism Reconsidered (Glencoe, 111.:
The Free Press, 1954), pp. 467-483.

^ An exception is Arnold Rogow and his collaborators. It is obvious that the
study of political socialization, at least, will find it difficult to avoid
the subject. In political biography, the contextual approach — in-
cluding the psychoanalytic or psychosomatic dimensions — -is more
frequent. For example, A. and J. George, Woodrow Wilson "A
Personality Study" (Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson, 1956); and A.
Gottfried, Boss Cermak of Chicago, "A Study of Political Leader-
ship" (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962); G. M. Gil-
bert, The Psychology of Dictatorship (New York: Ronald, 1950).

^ It is not to be ignored that many political scientists have received pro-
fessional training in one or more of the arts, play a role on boards

188 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

of art institutes, or build significant private collections. These "hid-
den assets" will eventually be mobilized for serious inquiry.

10 T. V. Smith, Beyond Conscience (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935).

11 It will be evident that, in the present book, I am chiefly concerned with

putting our own house in order. I hope that this will strengthen the
eventual impact of the challenging criticism of education in neigh-
boring fields by my colleague R. E. Lane in The Liberties of Wit,
"Humanism, Criticism, and the Civic Mind" (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1961).

Collaboration
with
Allied Professions

Many aims of political science can be most effectively achieved if col-
laboration between political scientists and individuals of closely allied
skills is successfully maintained. I single out for specific mention two
of the professions with whose members we have had close connections
and with whom it is highly desirable to have continuing ties in coming
years.

JOURNALISM

Although graduate school dissertations must be the work of indi-
vidual candidates, there is no sound reason why dissertations should
not be part of joint undertakings in which journalists are involved and
which provide material for independent publication by all concerned.

190 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Once the dissertation hurdle is passed, joint projects would often be
most successful when they lead to publications in which political scien-
tists and journalists have fully fused their contributions.

Although closely connected, particularly when journalists special-
ize in political reporting and commentary, journalism and political
science are not identical. A journalist is the chief reliance of the read-
ing, listening, and viewing public for immediate political intelligence.
A journalist is at his best when he correctly anticipates tomorrow's
coup and stations himself where he can provide a first-hand account.
Since his report must be nearly instantaneous, he must be precisely in-
formed of communication facilities and arrange alternative channels
if established routes are blocked by sabotage, censorship, or technical
breakdown.

A political scientist does not as a rule need to keep contact with
a network of informants, official or unofficial, highly placed or humbly
stationed, to provide tips on impending developments. It is rarely
necessary for a working scholar to sacrifice orderly living and to make
himself available at any hour of day or night to observe the birth of a
new elite or to record the demise of an old regime. For him there is
little physical discomfort, body peril, or crushing fatigue. He is some-
what protected from appearing as a gullible fool, since he is not driven
by deadlines. It is unlikely that he will be scooped by rivals or duped
by unscrupulous informants.

We may sum up the life of an active political journalist by saying
that it is relatively insecure and risky. Reference has been made to
hazards to life and reputation; it is appropriate to add moral risk. A
journalist is likely to find it necessary on occasion to overcome scruples
against betraying the confidence of others. More subtle than bribery —
although bribery is not out of the question — is the temptation to take
it easy by relying on official handouts. And it is tempting to abandon
the role of spectator-reporter to play an active political part by sup-
pressing or distorting information.

This statement suggests why the working journalist is likely to be
a valuable collaborator. Attuned to the immediate, he is impatient of
delay. Accustomed to coping with tacticians of deceit, he is a so-
phisticated assessor of false witness. A journalist is also aware of "who
knows what," since his dramatizing imagination often perceives the re-
lationship of every participant to the central action, recognizing po-
tential informants who would otherwise be overlooked. Journalists
belong to a world-wide freemasonry of a profession that is still required
in many parts of the world to brace itself against the low esteem in

Collaboration with Allied Professions 191

which it is held. It is true that, as with all men, political differences
build walls between journalists. Yet, if anyone anywhere is willing to
sacrifice in behalf of enlightenment, he is likely to be among profes-
sional reporters.

I have referred to social status. Not long ago a newspaperman was
somewhat contemptuously dismissed as a careerless man who had taken
a hack job in desperation. It is not difficult to identify well-known
figures who have contributed to this image. They were rebels against
family discipline, and rebellion took the form of unwillingness to finish
the academic preparation required for law, medicine, university teach-
ing, or civil service. They were too impecunious or too concerned with
public affairs to find satisfaction in ordinary business.

In those days, journalists were "misfits," and anyone pictured by
his contemporaries as a misfit is likely to use one of two well-known
mechanisms for the aid and succor of a suffering ego. He tries to divert
his attention from the private humiliation of admitted failure by sub-
stituting the image of a brash and adventurous hero. To the extent
that he is overwhelmed by self-contempt, he grows personally disorgan-
ized and may conform to the stereotype of an amiable, even pitiable,
sot.

We have not yet touched on the skill that is usually given first place
in listing the assets of a journalist. He can write. Unless he can find
words that carry the message to a large audience, he is miscast.

After this evaluation of what the journalist is equipped to offer,
the question may be what the political scientist can contribute to a
collaborative undertaking. He is concerned with system and with time
perspective. Good journalists may be, and typically are, aware of the
advantage of looking at the present in a larger frame of reference, but
they are driven by the detail of the here and now. Unless they keep
moist in the spray of current events, their judgment withers. Sources
dry up from lack of reciprocity. As scholars, political scientists are less
bound to headlines, since their aim is to write something outliving the
excitement of the moment. Perhaps his entire professional output,
highly prized by other scholars though it may be, never makes the
headlines. Or he waits years to publish a book that took years to pre-
pare.

If he is conscientious in the best tradition, the scholar hates to
say what other people have said without express acknowledgment. By
contrast, it is not required that a reporter lay bare his every source
or acknowledge that a sentence echoes the conclusions of a research
worker who toiled long years to establish a single point. Scholars sense

192 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

the ruthlessness of kleptomania in the journalist-borrower, who in turn
thinks the typical scholar is suffering from excessive doubt and scruples
— a Hamlet of the footnote. The scholar is forever disclosing the pa-
ternity of his brainchildren; the journalist is accustomed to bastards.

Collaboration is possible between bearers of diverse though com-
plementary skills because personalities are larger than skills. It is in
general true that our occupational stereotypes are too thin to cor-
respond to the diverse patterns of life. For instance, scholars may de-
cide to meet rather exigent deadlines, and scholars may possess
rhetorical brilliance in speech or prose. Journalists may seek escape
from the clatter of the newsroom into history and analysis, as did
Henry Jones Ford when he wrote the Rise and Growth of American
Politics during active newspaper days. And today's story may be il-
luminated with knowledge of a whole complex of conditioning ele-
ments and become a classic, even as Lincoln Steffens' The Shame of
the Cities.

In the contemporary world, the educational and cultural back-
grounds of journalists and political scientists are approaching each
another. '^ Hence it is not venturesome to forecast that joint projects
will become more frequent. I suspect that collaboration will be es-
pecially beneficial in the gray zone separating readily available sources
of information from public or private secrets. I predict that a rela-
tively new mode of communication will emerge to fill the gap between
a sensational expose and historical or analytic studies.- A topic in
point is "political corruption." I do not minimize the contribution to
public intelligence and appraisal that is made by courageous reporters
who tear the mask off graft and chicanery and shout to everybody to
look and shudder. Nor, on the other hand, do I regard the historian's
monographic treatment of yesterday's scandal as useless because no-
body can be prosecuted in court. The point, rather, is that public
understanding of corruption needs a frame of reference disciplined by
comparative studies. Clearly, some "corrupt" acts, viewed in the per-
spective of one culture, are more like a traditional tip, or service
charge, than a perversion of public responsibility for private gain.
Moreover, when corruption goes beyond traditional limits, great dif-
ferences in function exist. In some traditional states (for example,
Turkey, when the sultan symbolized the sick man of Europe), mon-
archs and bureaucrats extorted so much for consumption purposes
that corruption interfered with modernization and progress. In other
societies, the progressive elements, determined to enjoy the benefits of
modernization, cannot be stopped. Corruption may be used to buy off

Collaboration with Allied Professions 193

the left-overs of an ancient social system and eventually to give them
a more legitimate place in the new order.

The implication is not that "whatever is, must be," rather that,
by adequate understanding of a "must," it may be possible to change
an "is" with greater speed. The exploratory competence of the expert
journalist, joined to competent comparative analysis, can modify the
map of policy aim and method.

THE LAW

The connection of political scientists to legal scholars has a long
history. In the European faculty of law, professors of government are
responsible for describing the structure of the principal nation-states
of current interest. Constitutional, municipal, and international law
are often cultivated by professors of law and government. To go no
further back than John W. Burgess, in the United States, Political
Science and Constitutional Law fell squarely within the tradition that
joined the theory of the state with public law. Eminent figures in po-
litical science have taught law in schools of law or they have won
recognition among legal scholars despite their exclusive association
with departments of political science or the absence of a law degree. I
shall make no attempt at an exhaustive roster. It is, however, impos-
sible to overlook in recent decades Edward S. Corwin, Thomas Reed
Powell, Charles Grover Haines, and W. W. Willoughby in constitu-
tional law; Frank W. Goodnow and Ernst Freund in the introduction
of administrative law into the United States; or James W. Garner,
Charles G. Fenwick, and Philip Marshall Brown as scholars of inter-
national law.

It is, however, significant that, despite the relative freedom from
the rigid professionalism of the conventional law school enjoyed by
these scholars, their names do not figure among the molders of Amer-
ica's most distinctive school of jurisprudence. I refer to American
realism, with its emphasis, presumably congenial to political scientists,
on the proposition that, since judges are people, they are to be under-
stood by studying the impact on their decisions of factors that are
known to affect human conduct. A judicial response, in this perspec-
tive, is not exempt from the conditioning of the judge to the culture
in which he is reared or to the social class or interest groups with
which he is or was affiliated; nor is he exempt from the conflicting
equilibrium of his personality system.

The American realists, it appears, owe more to Walter Wheeler
Cook than to anyone else,^ Cook spent a year in Germany in the study

194 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

of physics before turning to law. He continued to be vexed by the
flagrant discrepancy between the methods of physics and those of the
teachers and practitioners of law. In this he was responding to a
challenge built into our civilization and of urgency growing since the
sixteenth century, when mathematics and experimental physics began
to gain momentum. Why should physicists be able to participate in an
enterprise whose results become more general and dependable as the
years go by, while jurisprudence remains much as it has always been,
a battleground of controversy over traditional issues? Cook answered
that legal studies were in a prescientific stage and that legal studies
would gain precision and acceptance if the methods of science were
properly applied to establishing the balance between theoretical mod-
els and empirical data.

These reflections led Cook to take the lead in a devastating at-
tack on the prevailing method of the law, namely, legal logic. His
position was that the method cannot possibly do more than demon-
strate that opposing conclusions can be supported with equal facility
by the same set of doctrines. Hence, the whole approach is radically
unsound. In article after article, Cook expounded his point by apply-
ing the lawyer's preferred tool, namely, the logical analysis of defini-
tions and of chains of argument in concrete legal controversies. Every
article was intended as a blow at the ancient giant of the "logical
infallibility" of law. Cook insisted that by its nature logic could be
nothing other than fallible. At best, belief in infallibility is a dogma
of innocence; at worst, a hoax.

Cook's competence as a legal craftsman and his painstaking work
in the classroom and in the law journals carried conviction to the
bright young men who formed the vanguard of the realistic approach.
His impact at Johns Hopkins and Columbia University was decisive,
since he trained a corps of colleagues, some of whom later migrated —
for administrative reasons — to Yale, which became the home of "the
Yale approach."

At first glance, it may seem surprising that the lead in establish-
ing the realist school was not taken by a political scientist rather than
by such a highly specialized legal scholar as Cook. It is presumably
well known to every student of political doctrine that general theories
have received, and are likely to continue to receive, plausible and even
convincing interpretations that contradict one another. He sees that
the trick is sometimes turned by redefining key terms, as when "hu-
man equality" is alleged to condone the enslavement of a particular
ethnic group ("they are not fully human"). Or the device is to intro-

Collaboration with Allied Professions 195

duce a modifying doctrine that is presumably implicit in the context,
such as an alleged doctrine of "necessity" justifying the suspension of
democracy during "crises" (though the "crisis" may continue for gen-
erations). Whatever technique is employed, the terms of the doctrine
assumed to be authoritative can be plausibly manipulated without
doing violence to logical relationships (such as the requirement that
affirmations within a system of propositions shall not contradict one
another). However, logical systems, though internally harmonious,
can be flatly at odds with one another. There is no escape, since the
next move is to propose a distinction that, if equally acceptable, re-
mains equally unconvincing.

I suggest that political scientists did not make the crucial break-
through in jurisprudence because they were so deeply absorbed with
the discovery of "interests," economic or otherwise, in the exploitation
of ambiguity. Hence, they did not demonstrate at great length and in
technical detail that legal method was a source of confusion and con-
tradiction whenever it was assumed to apply in concrete circumstances.
A distinction must be kept in mind between the internal relationships
of a family of statements (which can be established "by definition")
and the external "referents" of a statement (which must be demon-
strated "by observation"). Walter Wheeler Cook stamped this funda-
mental point, the difference between what can be called "syntactics"
and "semantics," into American legal literature.

At once a sense of great liberation gave enormous zest to the
young men who followed in the wake of Cook. They gleefully dem-
onstrated in every controversy in every field that definitions or argu-
ments were equally plausible on both sides; hence, to repeat the
allusion that was so often used to caricature the realistic movement,
the judge's decision depended less on logic than on "what he had for
dinner."

Political scientists who work with legal scholars will discover that
the realistic point of view is by no means universal and that many
lawyers who profess to go along with it are not willing to apply the
realistic approach with vigor and constancy to every problem. More-
over, it cannot be taken for granted that the distinction between syn-
tactics (logic) and semantics is generally understood.

Furthermore — and this is of the greatest relevance — many realists
have become conscious of the fact that something is missing from the
approach of traditional realism. Having demonstrated that legal logic
provides no satisfactory guide to the solution of judicial problems,
American legal realists have usually found that they are stuck in a

196 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

negative, agnostic position. Granted that logic is devoid of necessary
empirical references, so what ? Are all doctrinal interpretations equally
acceptable to the work of lawyers, judges, and scholars?

The answer is definitely in the negative. Political scientists, work-
ing in conjunction with realistically inclined lawyers, can contribute
to the emerging jurisprudence of our day because their results help to
supplement the limitations of logic as a problem-solving tool.

First of all, it is apparent that American legal realism focused
on only two of the five intellectual tasks to which we have referred in
our analysis of problem-solving in general. The two tasks are trend
and conditioning analysis — What decisions have been made? What
factors have influenced them? Three tasks are left untouched or re-
ceive incidental treatment — What are the postulated goals of the legal
system? What are the projections of probable future events? What
major alternatives of policy will maximize value goals?

By working in close association with students of legal processes,
political scientists can assist in clarifying the scope and method of
jurisprudence. In the most inclusive sense, jurisprudence is itself a
component of political science. Jurisprudence is particularly concerned
with authoritative patterns of decision. Obviously, decisions may be
both authoritative and controlling; specialists in neither jurisprudence
nor political science are exclusively concerned with one or the other.
However, a division of emphasis — hence a division of labor — does in
fact exist. Specialists in jurisprudence provide problem-solving guid-
ance for professional lawyers, judges, and legal scholars; specialists in
political science aim at a somewhat different public. To some extent,
however, the audiences overlap, especially in public law (international,
constitutional, and municipal). A continuous gradation of specialties
covers the total field of political science and jurisprudence. The dif-
ference lies in the detail with which attention is focused on the spe-
cialized, conventional language of "the law." Where does this appear?

Most prominently, of course, legal language is used by courts,
especially by tribunals that write "opinions" in addition to giving "de-
cisions." It is taken for granted that the opinions justify the decisions
in the name of the legal formula. It is unthinkable that any agency
purporting to be a "court" would declare itself uninterested in legal
doctrine or precedent. Such a disclaimer is not thinkable because the
overwhelming expectation of the body politic is that the decisions are
made to conform to the prescriptions of the system of legal authority
(constitutions, statutes, treatises, ordinances, regulations, "customs,"
and the like).

Collaboration with Allied Professions 197

The legal realists were often correct in saying that decision-
makers "made up their minds" how to decide a controversy and
"wrote opinions to fit" the decision. But this formulation is exceed-
ingly ambiguous. Does it mean that decision-makers disregard all the
prescriptions of the legal system? Inquiry suggests that the answer is
usually, if not always, "no." The careful selection of justifying opin-
ions can result from the desire to win general approval for a result
that is arrived at on somewhat unconventional, though "legal,"
grounds. The manipulative character of the opinion is not necessarily
intended to justify "lawlessness" in the exercise of judgment, but
rather to divert attention from the "legalistic" elements of the specific
decision. The court might think that candid disclosure of "genuine
interpretations" would prove unnecessarily disturbing to bar and
bench.

We must also underline the fact that research on judges confirms
the view that many, if not most, are largely conventional in outlook.
They use the intellectual tools acquired in law school, perfected in
practice, and brought with them to the bench. It would be a mistake
to imagine that they are intellectually sophisticated enough to under-
stand their own intellectual processes. On the contrary it is likely that
they are trapped by the current expectations regarding legal syntax.
Analysis indicates that, as a group, judges are not competent intel-
lectuals in the degree of awareness with which they evaluate the cate-
gories and procedures of the legal system, the conventional application
of which they may, however, manage expertly.

It is a caricature of the judicial process to affirm that judges are
wholly arbitrary in interpreting current legal doctrine. In any given
period, many expectations about the prescriptions of a legal order
are relatively explicit. True, there may be zones of conflict and am-
biguity, but there are also zones of assent and explicitness.

A major problem of continuing research is keeping abreast of
changing expectations and forecasting responses, with or without ma-
nipulative intervention. It is the role of the lawyer to intervene in the
future and to try to influence the response of courts or other decision-
making tribunals authorized to apply prescriptions. It is the role of
the judge to step into the future and to make up his mind about the
interpretation of available doctrines. The scholar moves into the fu-
ture, seeking to clarify the objectives of the legal system in reference
to the circumstances affected by controversy.

Political scientists enlarge these perspectives in several directions.
As scholars, they are, for instance, relatively free to devote themselves

198 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

to the Study of factors that conditioned past decisions. This comes
partly from the fact that, if the political scientist is not a practicing
lawyer, he has relative freedom from incessant pressure to argue cases.
Hence, he can let the flow of current case reports go by for a few
months or years while he concentrates on another set of questions,
notably historical trends and conditioning factors. Legal scholars, too,
may take time out from the immediate pressure of case reports. In
our society, however, it is more common for legal scholars to keep
prepared for current questions.

An examination of research will show that some of the most dar-
ing, long-range studies of legal process have been undertaken by po-
litical scientists.* Political scientists are more likely to gather "factual"
data about the total process of decision than legal scholars, since
lawyers are more typically rewarded for "argument" than for "factual
summaries" or "scientific generalizations" in regard to facts.

Differences of expected reward (indulgence) are matters of major
importance in collaborative projects between legal scholars and po-
litical scientists. It is within the accepted routine of lawyers to sum-
marize the briefs submitted to legislative committees, administrative
commissions, courts, or related agencies. It is well within the routine
of political scientists to discover the pressure groups that tried to in-
fluence legislation and administrative or judicial decision. The two
strands of research directly supplement each another.

There are, nonetheless, far-reaching differences in the approaches
to research characteristic of legal scholars and of political scientists.
As a rule, legal scholars are interested in trend research, argumenta-
tion, and data summaries (for evidential purposes). Trend research
is often necessary to disclose the changes in the interpretation of legal
doctrines. Argumentation is, of course, an inescapable feature of every
controversy. Data summaries deal with factual materials intended to
strengthen an argument. If it is alleged, for example, that unfair trade
practices have become more frequent, experts may be consulted to
testify to the trend or to call attention to information that corrobo-
rates the point.

Political scientists, as social scientists, are orientated to problems
that fail to interest many lawyers. They are concerned with general
theories of the political process. Hence, they work with theoretical
models that, when confirmed by data of observation, explain political
events. Thus, political scientists study revolution and counterrevolu-
tion, reform and counterreform, rise and spread (or restriction) of
political ideology, centralization and decentralization, democratization

Collaboration with Allied Professions 199

and antidemocracy, and the like. Lawyers, on the other hand, usually
look on these problems as "vague," "ambiguous," and hence of mar-
ginal relevance to jurisprudence. Legal training prepares students to
feel intellectually ill at ease unless they have rather persuasive argu-
ments at their disposal — that is, a persuasive interpretation of how a
given prescription applies to concrete circumstances. Generalizations
only partially supported by data "will not stand up in court"; hence,
lawyers often assume that they are useless "theories." Such, at least,
is the conventional bias.

To some extent, the perspective of lawyers and legal scholars is
changing. In many problem areas, for instance, it is of obvious im-
portance to analyze causal factors. This is true of legal administration
itself. It is clearly pertinent to consider under what circumstances
courts meet heavy case loads and achieve a reasonable level of justice.
What methods of selection and training and what ladders of profes-
sional advancement contribute to a competent judiciary? What sanc-
tioning methods yield what results ?

If political scientists and lawyers are to improve their effective
working relations in future years, it will be helpful if they possess a
common map of the decision-making and executing processes and of
the features in regard to which they have greatest competence and
concern.^ We have previously outlined the seven phases into which it
is often convenient to classify the characteristic outcomes exhibited
by the decision process of a body politic — intelligence, recommending
(promoting), prescribing, invoking, applying, appraising, and ter-
minating.

We have heavily underscored the distinction between conven-
tional and functional uses of terms. Speaking in the conventional lan-
guage of a body politic, the officials authorized to act in the name of
the whole are easily distinguishable. Legal scholars and practitioners
are distinctively engaged in describing and manipulating the formula,
the official prescriptions assumed to constitute the legal system. Al-
though the legislative organs of government are traditionally charged
with responsibility for formulating authoritative prescriptions, closer
examination shows that legislatures do not monopolize the function.
Since prescriptions are patterns of expectations in reference to au-
thority, whatever changes these expectations changes "the law." It is
commonplace to recognize — as we have had occasion to repeat — that
courts have a hand in making as well as in applying authoritative
legal doctrine. To some extent the same point is applicable to every
official agency. Going beyond organs of government, "law" is made

200 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAT. SCIENCE

informally in the shifting expectations current in the market place,
the daily routines of family life, and in every institutional activity
within the social process. It is, in fact, impossible for any participant
in society to resign from the law-making process without departing
this life. While there is breath, there is legislation, since expectations
regarding authority cannot be escaped.

Phrasing the characteristics of a legal prescription more techni-
cally, we repeat that every prescription contains three principal ele-
ments— (1) the primary norms, such as standards of "fair practice";
(2) the contingency norms, which state the factual circumstances un-
der which the primary norms apply; and (3) the secondary, or sanc-
tioning, norms that include the negative or affirmative measures
available when a primary norm is breached or conformed to.

Because of the prominence of the courts in the decision process in
which lawyers play a prominent part, it is convenient to give special
consideration to the roles of lawyers and political scientists in the
court's work. In the total context of community decision, a judicial
organ, we have said, is part of the "application" phase. We refer to
the interactions between parties and decision-makers as the judicial
"arena" and further distinguish the decisions made by judge or jury
as "outcomes" in the flow of relevant events. Preoutcome events fall
in two broad categories, namely, events in the arena prior to decision
and the prearena occurrences that led to the involvement of the court.
Postoutcomes refer to future occurrences affected by the decision,
that is, after the immediate impact of the decision on the parties.

A chronological commentary on the controversies that reach the
courts during a given period can bring out the interplay between law-
yers and political scientists. Lawyers are usually turned to by partici-
pants within the social process who assert that they have been
value-deprived in some way that contravenes public order; hence,
professional assistance is required. However, many potential cases are
not prepared for presentation to the authorized decision-makers of the
community. They may be settled by negotiation among counsel of the
parties, or the client may be convinced that there is no reasonable
prospect that the case, if litigated, can be won. We enlarge the scope
of preoutcome events to include grievances that are not carried to
court and those not brought to the attention of a lawyer, perhaps be-
cause the parties are able to settle without assistance. At the other ex-
treme, the aggrieved parties are too ignorant or too weak to engage
counsel. In summary:

CoUaburaiion with Allied Frofcssioiis 2U1

Prearena (preoutcome) events

Precipitating events

Participants in the social process allegedly experience value
deprivations that are claimed to contravene the authoritative
prescriptions comprising the public order.

Preparatory events

Participants engage counsel who bring claims to the atten-
tion of community decision-makers (the court).

Parallel events

Participants experience alleged value deprivations that from
the point of view of the scientific observer are practically
identical to precipitating events, but settlements are obtained
by direct negotiation among the parties, or preparatory ac-
tivities are not engaged in, and official arenas are not in-
volved.

The direct concern of legal scholars is clear: they examine the
cases brought to the attention of counsel and assess the skill with
which counsel managed the prearena steps of direct negotiation, in-
formal arbitration, or refusal to proceed. Political scientists are quali-
fied as interviewers to obtain information that puts the activity of
counsel and of the legal process itself in context. Among significant
questions are these: To what exent is it true that, at a given time,
various participants in the social process fail to resort to courts be-
cause they suspect the impartiality of the judges or are unable to bear
the cost of litigation ? Are those who hold these expectations the mem-
bers of cultural minorities, of low status groups, of particular interest
groups, or of discernible personality types? Legal scholars share an
active concern with such matters. Until recently, however, they have
done little research to bring out the aggregate picture of denial of
justice, and it is to be anticipated that political scientists will be
among the social scientists with whom they will most actively col-
laborate.

When we examine the arena, the first step is as usual to discover
the participants. Lawyers automatically classify many of the relevant
participants according to the conventional technicalities of litigation.
There are parties who are plaintiffs or defendants, and they are rep-
resented by counsel who summon witnesses. There are judges, jurors,
and court attendants. Although lawyers are fully aware of other par-
ticipants, they do not regularly investigate their roles. Political sci-

202 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

entists are predisposed to go beyond the judge to examine the
composition of the audience in the courtroom and to study the larger
audience reached by mass media reporting and comment or whose
members are actively engaged in collecting money or striving in other
ways to influence the result. Political scientists also focus on the im-
mediate environment that affects the final decision, such as the stream
of casual comment by family and friends.

Legal scholars concentrate on the technical claims put forward
by counsel on behalf of the parties and the justifications — legal argu-
ment, proof — advanced in support of the claims. Political scientists
are more disposed by training and professional interest to put these
formalities in the context of genuine perspectives and value assets or
liabilities of the participants. Not that counselors are oblivious to these
matters; on the contrary, they are so aware of them that in many
cases they try to keep such factors off the record. As social scientists,
political scientists know that it is impossible to arrive at genuine ap-
praisals of the legal process until these elements are competently de-
scribed in representative instances. Hence, it is necessary that the
language of legal technicality be translated into terms that designate
value-indulgence or -deprivation. The claim to be a legatee in a given
controversy may, when translated, mean that the party is asking the
court to increase his wealth by directing that one million dollars from
an estate be turned over to him. The principal value at stake in a case
may be power, respect, or any of the value categories which can be
used to describe the factual context.

When legal claims are put forward, counsel use conventional
terms of legal technicality to identify the claimant or the counter-
claimant. These symbols of identity — the terms "legatee" or "bene-
ficiary," for instance — do not tell us much about the position of the
claimant in the social process. Hence, in order to compare cases, po-
litical and social scientists find it necessary to describe the claimants
and other participants according to such categories as culture, class,
interest, and personality.

The justifications include arguments, that is, assertions that the
claim is more in harmony with community prescription than are al-
ternative claims. In summarizing cases, legal scholars tend to restrict
the reporting of justifications to the legal terminology. Political sci-
entists, on the other hand, are interested in amplifying the report to
reveal the degree to which the language of the legal formula is ac-
companied by such other symbol patterns of the social myth as re-

Collaboration with Allied Professions 203

ligious, ethical, or political doctrines and by "miranda" (folk items)
in popular versions of history and prophecy. They are interested, also,
in ascertaining such elements that affect credibility of testimony as
the class accent of witnesses and a host of pertinent culture, class,
interest, and personality factors. Although these matters are of obvious
importance to counsel, the tradition has been to treat them in the
spirit of the amateur, rather than to welcome systematic observation
and analysis.

Most generally defined, the sequence of activities engaged in by
counsel constitute the strategy of litigation. It includes the choice of
arena, the phrasing of the claims and justifications, and all moves
made on reaching the attention of decision-makers. The strategy of
litigation depends in large part on the base values at the disposal of
the counsel, and this depends mainly on the assets or liabilities, in
terms of money and of all other social values, at the disposal of clients.
Political scientists are more concerned than lawyers with obtaining an
explicit record of such factors.

Judges and jurors approach a given case with predispositions
molded by their previous exposure to culture, class, interest, and per-
sonality environments. Lawyers pay immediate heed to the previous
commitments of judges, seeking to assess predispositions by noting past
decisions and opinions. However, until the recent rise of political and
social-scientific activity, they had done little to advance the systematic
analysis of such factors.

The presiding judge, in particular, begins to respond in a re-
corded and responsible way from the beginning of a proceeding. His
most important base value in the courtroom is the prescription or
body of prescriptions that authorize jurisdiction; for example, the
strategy of dealing with the motions made by counsel is aflfected by
the prescriptions that relate to admissibility of evidence. Political sci-
entists are interested in the use made by justices of such other value
assets as the ethical norms of the community.

Arena preoutcome events
Participants

Immediate: claimants, counselors, witnesses, court, jury,

court attendants, courtroom audiences, etc.
Other: individuals and groups who hear about a controversy
or seek to influence the outcome by raising funds,
agitating, etc.

204 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Statements — claims

Identifications : formally identified plaintiffs, defendants, etc.
Demands: formally asking decision-maker to value-indulge
or -deprive self or others, to take appropriate par-
ticular measures.
Expectations: fact-form assertions about precipitating
events or the future.
Statements — justifications
Arguments in support of claims.
Proof in support of claims.
Base values and strategies

Of all participants — assets during controversy.
Persuasion, coercion.

The final responses of a community decision-maker may be in
terms of any value (for example, power — disqualification from or
qualification for office; enlightenment — denial of information or ac-
cess; wealth — loss or gain of property; well-being — hard labor or re-
lease; skill — recognition or denial of performance record; affection
— loss or recovery of custody of child; respect — discrimination abol-
ished or tolerated; or rectitude — conduct hailed as moral or immoral).

The responses go far beyond the value outcomes sought by the
immediate parties to the controversy. There are positive or negative
references to the justifications, as well as the claims, advanced to de-
fend or attack the value demands put before the court. Also, the
statements made by witnesses are accepted or rejected as part of the
support for, or rebuttal of, claims. All who are in any degree identified
with the statements endorsed or rejected by judge or jury are value-
affected. Counsel for the parties, for example, rise in prestige and
eventually perhaps in income and power if they win. Lower court
judges are not oblivious to the impact on their reputation of the re-
sponse of appellate tribunals; in fact, the entire court structure, or
even the bar, of a locality may be downgraded if it fails to be sus-
tained on a series of controversial questions.

Political scientists are especially equipped to bring into view the
whole context of effects of a given decision or an aggregate of de-
cisions. Legal scholars pay strict attention to the acceptance of a result
as a "leading case" that is frequently cited by subsequent judges and
hence figures in the calculations of counsel when they advise clients
or choose specific claims and justifications in later litigation. But legal
scholars are rather less motivated than political scientists to join with

Collaboration with Allied Professions 205

other social scientists in examining the continuing effects of the sanc-
tioning measures employed on behalf of public order.

Decision outcome and efTect (postoutcome)

Value-indulgence or -depriva- Participants
tion Immediate

Other
Statements ( those identified
with:)
Claims
Justifications
Base values and strategies

Fortunately, the trend of professional interest among legal schol-
ars and practitioners is toward providing information that contributes
to the possibility of appraising the judicial institutions of the com-
munity. As data become more comprehensive, it becomes increasingly
feasible to confront the conventional "legal process" with a function-
ally disciplined image of the facts of life to date and the outlook for
the future. Hence, we can reclassify "officials" according to the func-
tional definition of law as authoritative and controlling. If officials do
not in fact exercise, or are not expected to exercise, severe sanctions
on behalf of public order, they may nonetheless employ mild sanctions.
In the latter contingency, they are appropriately seen as part of the
civic order of the body politic, not of the public order.

We are somewhat sanguine that political scientists and jurists will
be able to work together in future years in view of the fact that strat-
egies of counsel are often based on considerations of the kind that we
have said are among the principal factors to which political scientists
attach great weight. The choice of court — to take a recurring matter
— often depends on intelligence data about the predispositions of the
court; this calls for estimates of the political ambitions of the judges
and of the expectations that ambitious judges are likely to entertain
about the effects for their elevation to a higher court of the alterna-
tives open to them in the present controversy. The political scientist
adds motive and technique to the lawyer's special skill with authorita-
tive language and to the lawyer's sophistication and opportunities for
inside observation.^

The candor and competence required to put the courts into func-
tional perspective are no less indispensable to the adequate appraisal

206 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

of all institutions of community decision. Ultimately, lawyers and po-
litical scientists will effectively contribute to the evaluation of all
phases of the process of decision at every level, whether transnational,
national, or subnational.

We could multiply the skill groups with which the political scien-
tists of tomorrow will be intimately associated, both at the level of
advanced training and professional performance. Before concluding
the analysis, we propose to open the questions relating to the institu-
tions best adapted to the mature intellectual tasks of political scien-
tists.

NOTES

^ Political scientists played an important part in modernizing the education
of journalists — to cite a single instance, Ralph D. Casey, now emer-
itus, at the University of Minnesota.

2 I do not necessarily have in mind the brilliant polemics of political scien-

tist Eugene Burdick and his journalist colleagues. In passing, it
should be acknowledged that some political scientists are also writers
or publicists of professional distinction, among whom may be men-
tioned Walter Lippmann, Max Lerner, Leo Rosten, Saul Padover,
and Hannah Arendt.

3 The more technical the field, the more representative of Cook. Cf. W. W.

Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1942).

■* Political scientists now actively engaged in extending quantitative tech-
niques to the study of legal process include H. Pritchett and G. A.
Schubert. The prevailing view of the judiciary is exemplified in J.
Peltason, Federal Courts in the Political Process (New York:
Doubleday, 1955). Cf. V. G. Rosenblum, Law as a Political In-
strument (New York: Doubleday, 1955). For a normative, critical
approach, cf. W. Berns, Freedom, Virtue, and the First Amendment
(Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1957).

^ My perspectives on legal process have been seasoned by association with
colleagues at Yale, in both the Law School and the Graduate
School. Myres S. McDougal and the late George Dession have been
especially close collaborators. A recent guide to the general field is
E. Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence, "The Philosophy and Method of
Law" (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962). Also, J. Hall,
Studies in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory (New York: Oceana
Publications, 1958); C. J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in His-
torical Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958);
W. Friedmann, Legal Theory (4th ed.; Toronto: University of To-
ronto Press, 1960). Cf. also, among current contributors, H. A. L.

Collaboration with Allied Professions 207

Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); A.
Ross, On Law and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1959); F. S. C. Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical
Experience (Boston: Little, Brown, 1959).

Among many recent collaborations, cf. B. Manning and M. H. Bernstein,
the directors of the study by the Special Committee on the Federal
Conflict of Interest Laws of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Conflict of Interest and Federal Service (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960).

Centers
for Advanced
Political Science

Which organizational forms are best adapted to the future task of
political science ? Organizations are relevant in two ways — by affecting
content of what is considered and by afTecting the procedure of con-
sideration. The content pertinent to the integrative solution of prob-
lems of public policy falls into the categories of goal, trend, condition,
projection, and alternative. The relevant procedures influence re-
cruitment and the agenda of the problem-solving process.

LIMITATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY

There are many grounds for rejecting the contemporary univer-
sity as a satisfactory model for the forms of organization best adapted
to the integrative consideration of fundamental matters of public af-

Centers jot Advanced Political Science 209

fairs. For one thing, the number of people involved diminishes the
chances that attention will be focused on a common map of past,
present, and future events. Leaving aside the students and counting
as faculty only those who have achieved the status of instructor or
above, it is not unusual to find that nominal colleagues at a university
number in the thousands. We often hear of the tens of thousands of
students who congregated at various university centers in late medi-
eval times. The central faculty, on the other hand, was often small
enough to permit a high degree of mutual awareness and direct inter-
course. The contemporary institution of higher learning, though keep-
ing a student body of thousands, has multiplied the faculty until there
is little life in common.^

To the diluting effect of number, the fact of physical dispersion
must be added. The same university frequently operates on several
campuses widely separated in space. From the hub of the main, or of
each subsidiary, campus, faculties distribute themselves in every di-
rection. Dwellings may be twenty, fifty, or even several hundred miles
apart. Travel time may reach four, six, or even more hours.

More drastic than the size and dispersion of university faculties
is the fractionalizing effect of modern specialization. For years it has
been a theme of lamentation that the unified perspective that allegedly
characterized Europe in the Middle Ages no longer exists. The usual
account says that once every literate person shared a high degree of
intellectual culture. He knew the Judaeo-Christian scriptures and
many of the writings of the church fathers and, after the revival of
Greek and Roman learning, became acquainted with Aristotle and
Plato and with classical poets, dramatists, and historians.

In ancient civilizations, the highest intellectual class was generally
saturated with a common image of man and nature. This was evi-
dently true of Chinese and East Indian civilizations, for example.^

With the breakup of the world view of earlier times, the intel-
lectual initiative gradually and then rapidly passed to the sciences.
Scientists are typically impatient with the history of their subject,
since it consists mainly of primitive first approximations and rudimen-
tary instrumentation. Further, they assume that there is little to respect
in the pasts of other disciplines, which at best show a few gleam-
ing needles in a haystack of folklore. The advanced training of a
physical scientist tends to focus on theoretical models, exploratory
designs, and instrumentation.^

Academic philosophers, historians, and scholars of the arts have
chosen a somewhat different though related path of retreat from the

210 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

challenge of a comprehensive view. This withdrawal occurs as re-
search competition grows more intense and as graduate schools mul-
tiply. Respect and advancement come to depend on publication, and
especially on a fomi of publication that matches the data-rich papers
of empirical scientists with citation-rich accumulations. In this evi-
dence-conscious age, one may continue to "appreciate" Dante or
Shakespeare. But the proliferation of appreciative remarks presently
begins to sound verbose, pretentious, and in fact ridiculous. If the
lecturer on the arts has lost his franchise to celebrate the beauty of
the beautiful, a similar fate has befallen the instructor in ethics, since
there is limited tolerance for his confirmation of the good. Theo-
logians, too, are barely tolerated if they bear witness to their faith
and fail to get on with the "solid" task of connecting doctrine with
history or morals.

We have had occasion earlier to comment on the empirical, evi-
dence-oriented emphasis of political scientists and of colleagues in
psychology, economics, and allied fields of social science; they, too, are
affected by the specialized life of graduate schools.

Given the strength of the many tendencies to narrow the focus
of attention, it is not difficult to see why universities have lost co-
herence and faculties have ceased to feel responsible for a currently
intelligible and inclusive map of man and nature. Universities have,
however, kept the label while abandoning the function of a univer-
sitas. They have increasingly become post office addresses and holding
companies for congeries of particular operations showing no clear
sense of common responsibility.

It is, of course, impossible for all members of the intellectual
community to give up the struggle for enlightenment and to fail to
insist that particular operations, no matter how skillfully executed or
how immediately successful, be expressly related to a comprehensive
image of man and nature. A memory of vanished unity lingers on.
Individual theologians often possess an enormous sense of responsi-
bility for recapturing the ground that their predecessors lost to one
another. And there are always speculative minds whose familiar ori-
entation is contextual and who perceive what they do in a broad
frame of reference.

Political scientists are predisposed by the traditions of the field to
produce at least a few minds in every generation who think contextu-
ally and who in contemporary times are alienated by the fragmentation
of universities. We have also suggested that the problem-solving ex-

Ceiitcn fur Advanced Puiitital Science 211

perience of political scientists contains a valuable clue to an approach
capable of moving in the direction of efTective integration. Policy
awareness means awareness of the future, and this implies sense of
direction, or goal, as one steps out of the past and present. Policy
awareness implies the mobilization of all knowledge, whether of trend
or condition, that illuminates the shape of things to come or stimulates
the invention or evaluation of policy alternatives. The traditional con-
cern of political science with the whole body politic also means that it
is relatively easy to focus on the world context.

It is this inclusive problem-solving orientation that enables po-
litical science to aid in recovering the idea of a university. Political
science does not sufTer from the degree of under- or overemphasis on
one of the problem-solving tasks that limits the effectiveness of certain
other disciplines which might otherwise perform a reintegrative role.
For example, political scientists are more concerned with finite time
than are theologians and metaphysicians. Political scientists are more
explicitly conscious of the world as a whole, and especially of the fac-
tors that limit cooperation, than economic theorists have been. They
are more accustomed to considering the issues that arise in the clari-
fying of goal or the invention of policy than are, for example, so-
ciologists or psychologists.

THE EMERGING STRUCTURE

There are grounds for asserting that, in recent times, a new or-
ganizational form has begun to emerge that facilitates focusing at-
tention and talent on the problem context of mankind. I refer to
centers of study, research, and consultation.

What are the salient features of such a center? One characteristic
is size. It must be small enough to foster direct interaction. Another
is proximity. The members need to be sufficiently contiguous to do
many things in common. A third feature is concern for intellectual
integration.

An early deliberate innovation was the Institute for Advanced
Study at Princeton, which grew out of Abraham Flexner's unflinching
criticism of the hodgepodge of operations carried on by institutions
bearing a university label.* The essential vision was that of a small,
eminent body of scholars who would work independently or jointly as
they chose on problems considered strategic for the advancement of
knowledge. The senior scholars are also free to cooperate with a lim-
ited number of juniors. The most impressive achievements have been

212 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

in mathematics and mathematical physics, thanks in part to the over-
whelming concentration of talent in the persons of Einstein, Weyl, and
others.

Another innovation — and one directly related to the subject mat-
ter that concerns us — is the Center for Advanced Study in the Be-
havioral Sciences at Stanford. As originally conceived, the center
provided facilities for a group of established scholars and a more nu-
merous group of younger men (about fifty at a time).^ The chief
intellectual stress was methodological and — in the terms of our prob-
lem-solving analysis — mainly on conditioning factors. The methodo-
logical concern was threefold — (1) to encourage mathematical think-
ing or comparably strict methods; (2) to stimulate thinking about
social processes in human society by giving consideration to general
biological theory; (3) to provide a setting appropriate to the planning
of research on problems of importance that are neglected or pursued
by inferior methods unless recognized and undertaken by interdisci-
plinary teams.

For several reasons, the center did not appoint a permanent nu-
cleus after the manner of the Princeton institute. It was generally
agreed that the supply of outstanding talent in several fields was short
and that the universities would not welcome the permanent removal
of outstanding figures. Moreover, the total impact of the leading pro-
fessors on the next generation would probably be greater if they con-
tinued to function at the universities. A further point was lack of
consensus about the truly contributory figures in the behavioral sci-
ences or the direction of future growth. In the circumstances, it ap-
peared wise to refrain from providing a few senior persons with
exceptional influence.

The idea of a center has been adapted to special situations in
ways that vindicate the flexibility of the basic plan. Why not employ
the center mechanism to further the tempo of integration of university
life? This thought has crossed the mind of more than one administra-
tor and scholar and has led to the proposal to assign members of a
university faculty to temporary, or even permanent, duty at a center
operated within the framework of the university. There are obvious
difficulties connected with this arrangement, since the members of an
existing staff are disposed to think that they themselves are eligible
simply because they do competent research.

A center of political science is more suitable than an all-encom-
passing "university within a university" to an established institution.
The scope of a political science center would be somewhat restricted,

Centers for Advanced Political Science 213

since it puts the accent on the policy goals of man or the future of a
large community context. Centers of political science could be formed
within universities or established as independent entities.

CLARIFIERS OF GOAL

Within any center, it would be important to provide for the par-
ticipation of individuals whose chief interest and competence was in the
clarification of goals. Because of the role played by the concept of
responsibility in public policy, this topic is among the most eligible
themes for continuing examination. The concept of human dignity,
when defined as an overriding goal, includes the ideal of a common-
wealth in which all participants act responsibly.

It will be necessary to clarify the levels of educability and edu-
cation appropriate to various contingencies. For example, what degree
of modifiability by experience is necessary to justify inclusion among
advanced forms of life? In regard to all candidates (human or not),
what levels of educability and education should be required for ad-
mission to political arenas in the role of intelligence source, advocate,
legislator, peace officer, general administrator, censor, or referee in
termination proceedings? What standards are appropriate to the
management of sanctions ?

The idea of responsibility will no doubt continue to arouse de-
bate over the concept of causal determination.^ Since the notion of
causality gained weight from the achievements of science, it would
be helpful to have philosophers of science who are grounded in science
among the personnel of a center. The type of question that arises in
this connection is such as this: If a subjective event, such as an inner
declaration of intent to promote peace, can be explained, does the
intention to promote peace cease to be "responsible" ? Empirical stud-
ies may show, for example, that almost all who have been reared in
Quaker families and schooled in Quaker institutions assert that they
favor peace. Is a Quaker to be regarded as nonresponsible or ir-
responsible when he takes this position?

From the point of view of public policy, the answer is in the
affirmative if we take the position that a minority culture is strong
enough to override the socializing process of the majority. Only those
who have been exposed to standard conditioning by the majority cul-
ture are, on this definition, to be held responsible by decision-makers
who exercise community authority.

However, does not the fact that subjective perspectives and be-
havioral operations can be conditioned by exposure to the majority

214 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

pattern signify that everyone is irresponsible or nonresponsible to the
extent that the probability of his response can be predicted according
to group frequencies? Is an individual acting responsibly only when
he violates standard expectations for persons of comparable ante-
cedents?

One interpretation of responsibility approaches the problem by
including among the long-range goals of the community the require-
ment that the authoritative prescriptions of the body politic be en-
acted and revised by a process in which most of the body politic is
eligible to participate and is encouraged to do so. This is part of the
usual specification of popular government. The suggestion is that
everyone shall be held responsible for conforming to a prescribed norm
if the following conditions hold: (1) he has had the opportunity
standard to the community to be informed of the norm; (2) he has
been exposed to standard levels of conformity to the norm; (3) he
has been exposed to the standard opportunity to acquire the knowl-
edge and skill needed to understand what he sees and hears; (4) he
has the psychosomatic aptitudes capable of taking advantage of op-
portunities to acquire cultural patterns; (5) he is in immediate situ-
ations where incentives to override the norms are not excessive when
appraised according to standard situations of the community.

Consider the case of a self-declared conscientious objector in a
democratic body politic. Should such claimants be regarded as non-
responsible for conforming to the norm of military service? If the
claimants have been reared in a minority community, it can be said
that they have been underexposed to the standard levels of expression
favorable to conformity and that they have been exposed to excep-
tional indoctrination against the norm.

Or consider a band of assassins from a foreign country who at-
tempt to liquidate the president in order to rivet the attention of the
world on the sad plight of their country. We may regard an assassin
as nonresponsible if we discover that he is suffering from a serious
psychotic disorder that disposes him to attack alleged persecutors. We
may also suggest that he be considered nonresponsible if we learn that
the assassin has been in an exceptionally provocative situation (as in
melodrama — his mother was raped and enslaved by an American
plantation manager; he was beaten and taunted by his neighbors and
playmates as a foreign bastard; he was befriended by an anarchist
printer and provided with funds and guns by a secret cell of super-
patriots).

Questions of policy regarding responsibility are always with us,

Centers for Advanced Political Science 215

regardless of the novelty of the situation in which the body politic
finds itself. In the space age, we shall face rather novel problems. For
instance, if our astronauts establish contact with a superior civilization
— superior in intellectual capability and scientific achievement — shall
we claim exemption from full responsibility in the astropolitical com-
munity? Shall we analogize ourselves to an isolated primitive society
suflFering from absence of opportunity or to the gibbons, gorillas, and
dolphins whose protocultures reflect organic constraint?^

FORECASTERS

In addition to the clarification of goals, centers of political science
would encourage sustained attempts to anticipate contingencies.
Given the dynamic impact of science and technology, it is obvious that
the flow of communication between scientists and the center would
be of high priority. It would also be essential to develop a corps of
political scientists at home with science by virtue of double training.

Double competence, by the way, is no novelty in the history of
political science. Cooper, for example, was a professor of both chemis-
try and political economy who lectured in political science, a combina-
tion that is not yet found, I think, at so advanced an institution as
M.I.T.^ It is part of the traditional lore of textbooks on political
theory that John Locke studied medicine; and there is always the
commanding image of Aristotle, who is only intelligible today as, say,
the editor-in-chief of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences — and
other encyclopedias — of his day.

It would be fortunate for a center of political science that physi-
cal and biological scientists have a great tradition of trying to com-
municate with the lay public. In England, the tradition goes even
further back than the Darwinian controversy, which brought the tire-
less, eloquent, and cogent T. H. Huxley to the fore as a popularizer of
evolution. In our day, we have had the advantage of a contemporary
Huxley in the exposition of biology and an entire galaxy of top-flight
astronomers, among whom it is almost invidious to choose even a
figure of such distinction and dedication as Harlow Shapley.^

Part of the tradition of communicating with a wider audience has
helped to motivate and legitimize the science fiction of our day. Many
outstanding figures in the scientific community contribute to the ef-
florescence of this type of literature. They have done it in a playful
spirit, but many of them have approached the task with an underly-
ing serious purpose. It is only too obvious that mankind is drastically
unprepared to cope with the grave new world into which we are being

216 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

catapulted by science and technolog)^ Furthermore, the education of
the poets and novelists of our time has left almost all of them un-
equipped to feel at home in man's new habitat or in company with
hitherto-undreamed-of forms of life.^° Aldous Huxley's Brave New
World is an epochal exception; so, too, are the remarkable contribu-
tions to science fiction of G. Day Lewis, the English poet; Karel
Capek, the whimsical Czech; and the prophetic H. G. Wells.

Among working scientists, one thinks at once of Fred Hoyle, of
Oxford and Gornell, whose Black Cloud is an exercise in defining the
conception of life. In the story, astronomers detect the approach of a
cloud formation from outer space that blocks out the sun and subjects
the earth to cold that destroys hundreds of millions of people. But the
truly remarkable characteristic of the cloud is only gradually per-
ceived by watching scientists. It follows a course that can only be ex-
plained by assuming that it is alive, that is, that it responds to complex
inner patterns of its own instead of reacting in simple fashion to the
immediate environment.

Isaac Asimov poses questions of the same kind, though perhaps
more immediate. He imagines a future civilization on earth that relies
on intricate servomechanisms to perform its tedious, laborious, danger-
ous, and superspecialized intellectual tasks. In order to forestall the
overthrow of man's dominance, all robots (the book is /, Robot) are
constructed on such a plan that the following code is built into each
individual: "A robot may not injure a human being, or, through in-
action, allow a human being to come to harm. A robot must obey the
orders given it by human beings except where such orders would con-
flict with the First Law. A robot must protect its own existence as
long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second
Law."^^ Given the complex, even refined, discriminations of which the
"machine" is capable, what justification is there for permanent, built-
in servitude?

In many ways, the book that succeeds above all others in convey-
ing the majesty of the universe and the inexhaustible abundance and
activity of life and nature is the product of a professional philosopher
whose soaring imagination was kept under exemplary discipline
throughout. I refer to Olaf Stapledon.^-

The contemplation of the future appropriate to centers of po-
litical science is no undisciplined fantasy. It requires a continuing in-
ventory of the trend of scientific knowledge in every field and a
regular sampling of each area for recent findings, methods, and specu-
lations. The world of pure mathematics and logic is not excluded; on

Centers for Advanced Political Science 217

the contrary, mathematical literacy among political scientists is al-
ready rising. The postulational pattern of thinking pioneered by math-
ematicians and logicians has permeated the intellectual culture of our
time, with implications for political science that have been imperfectly
articulated.

Interplay between Forecast and Goal

It is to be expected that the life of a major center would greatly
accelerate the drawing of these implications. For example, is an ele-
ment of arbitrariness, even capriciousness, inescapable with a postu-
lated, a stipulated, mode of thought? Is all thought postulational, the
difference being that some procedures are self-aware and systematic
whereas others remain subliminal and chaotic? How are we to inte-
grate the element of arbitrariness with the demand for a firm ground
from which to derive value assertions ?

In such a context, it is pertinent to consider the wisdom of de-
fining "arbitrariness" in words that authorize it to be used to refer to
all subjective commitments. Suppose we agree that subjective events
are in a time sequence measured in microseconds. Let us designate a
subjective event at a given time as "postulating human dignity (or
indignity)" or "God's will" as the events to be sought in the future.
Shall we say that such a postulate is "arbitrary" ?

My proposed reply is, "not necessarily." A distinction can be
drawn between postulations that follow the consideration of a prob-
lem— such as the appropriate goals of man — and postulates having no
such antecedent. The latter give cursory attention to the context. I
propose the label "arbitrary" for patterns at the lower end of the
continuum and suggest calling the patterns at the upper end "ra-
tional." I further stipulate that the thinker shall meet at least the
minimum criteria of responsibility in terms of culture and personality
referred to above.

INTERPLAY WITH THE SCIENCES: ASTRONOMY

Unlike mathematics and logic, many sciences are both analytic
and descriptive. Among the latter, the political science center would
keep in close communication with astronomy for reasons that have
been sufficiently indicated. Astronomy has entered a phase in which
its practitioners will have more in common with political scientists
than they have had for many generations. Ever since astronomers
shook themselves loose from astrology, they have appeared to them-
selves and others to be cultivating a mission that is purely scientific.

218 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

uncontaminated by temptations to intervene in and control cosmic
phenomena.^^ Today astronomers are busily collaborating in "astro-
meddling" on a huge though primitive scale. Their knowledge is ex-
ploited to launch artificial satellites and to release missiles and energies
that may damage astral bodies or upset the balance of electromagnetic
phenomena.

It is reasonable to predict that sooner or later astronomers will
begin to think systematically about their potential role as redesigners
of the universe. At first their eflfect on the face of the heavens may
be much less than the effect on the water of a boat designed by an
engineer. But engineering has now come to a point where it remakes
rivers. Can we calculate the optimum orbits of the sun and other stars
that could serve the needs of life? Will it be possible to locate zones
of tension where forces are easily balanced and hence vulnerable to
the planned use of comparatively small amounts of energy? Can cal-
culated programs of conservation modify the climate and surface con-
ditions that prevail on the natural satellites of the stars and thereby
obtain millions of habitats for man and other advanced forms of life?

Physics and Chemistry

When physicists and chemists became detached from alchemy,^*
they repressed tendencies to think of speculative models that would
imply a cosmic plan or a randomly structured sequence in the or-
ganization of matter and energy. When synthetic chemistry developed
and molecular combinations previously unknown in nature were
created in profusion, it became permissible to assume a more positive
orientation to chemical evolution. Chemical forms were now perceived
as phased phenomena; photosynthesis, for example, seemed to occupy
a strategic position as a precondition of life, which in turn precon-
ditioned the emergence of synthetic forms in nature. As research pro-
gressed, many dividing lines that were supposed to separate organic
and inorganic realms grew dim and vanished. Wendell Stanley made
the point with telling impact by showing the ambiguous, interchange-
able, or marginal character of the tobacco mold.^^ Physics was mean-
while undergoing sensational reconstruction. The interconvertibility
of matter and energy, when recognized, did away with an intellectual
chasm,^" and some observations suggested that even the deployment of
small particle-energy units was not independent of orbit "rightness"
and "leftness" In direction of motion. Can something be made of the
evolutionary sequence among the various "units" of physical nature?

Centers for Advanced Political Science 219

If we are in the midst of known evolutionary sequences — astral,
atomic, molecular— is it not plausible that evolution continues ? More-
over, if the circuitry of events by way of the human brain or of cor-
responding central processes of integration in living forms is part of
the total process, is it not reasonable to infer that the events we call
"subjective" are not only expressive of "evolution" to date but also
serve as links giving shape to the future? In a word, are not the clari-
fication of goals and the inventing and evaluation of alternatives in
the context of trend, condition, and projection interdependent com-
ponents of the universal manifold of events ?

Cosmic Evolution

Since there are grounds for affirming that human goals are part
of, and interact with, other events comprising the cosmic manifold,
the fusion of interest between political scientists, on the one hand,
and physicists and chemists, on the other, becomes as significant for
cosmic evolution as the consortium referred to above between political
scientists and astronomers. Hence, the wisdom of providing such
mechanisms as centers for occasions of confrontation and cooperation
among qualified, articulate, and motivated persons.

This point remains valid if we accept the view that random in-
teractions among events can lead to the patterning of phenomena in
ways that seem to imply deliberate plan, though no such plan can be
shown to exist. Place living cells of a small organism under heat bom-
bardment. It can b(3 shown that the predispositions of the organism
are so organized that an ascertainable range of behavioral adjust-
ments to the environment can be made, in addition to internal ad-
justments. Let us imagine further that the organism displays these
responses at random. Suppose that it can be shown that the organism
will die if heat bombardment reaches certain cell nuclei at a given
intensity (in short, a range of lethal responses is known). Perhaps
random movements by an aggregate of cells under bombardment pro-
duce a narrowing of the cell surfaces exposed to the most intense
heat and thereby preclude a lethal response. Imagine now that sur-
viving organisms reproduce their kind by means of molecular messages
to the next generation that contain keys to the building of new or-
ganisms. These "information packets" are also subject to change when
exposed to various environments, and they change within a potential
range of readjustment. A hypothesis of randomization is that a
"thinned surface determinant" is among the possible readjustments

220 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

and that, if results are nonlethal, the new pattern can become geneti-
cally stable. To the lay observer, it would seem that the organism has
deliberately planned to protect itself against deadly heat exposure.

The same mode of random analysis applies to brain behavior.
Physicists and chemists are attempting to discover the potential range
of response at any location in the brain when synchronized with any
other site. Light has recently been thrown on a mechanism that sta-
bilizes response under stated conditions.^^

I have commented on these points because political scientists have
not as a rule been aware of the context in which problems of conscious
choice are currently seen in the community of science. There is no
denying that subjective events occur; after all, no scientist pretends to
be wholly unconscious. The brain chemist's task is to describe with
greater preciseness the "nonsubjective" precipitants, concomitants, and
consequences of subjective events. As matters now stand, "gaps" are
narrowing in "time-space," but they are far from abolished in "figure"
(experienced content).

An appropriate continuing task for political scientists and phys-
ical scientists at a center would be to keep up with the operational
indexes employed by "self" and "other" observers in designating sub-
jective and nonsubjective events.

We have said that the testimony of physical and biological sci-
entists would be essential to the center if we were to anticipate the
shape of things to come and hence to give policy consideration to
contingencies before they have restricted our range of choice. A center
would undoubtedly draw on an unending succession of scientists and
engineers for brief reports such as do not necessitate resident member-
ship.

But the principal goal to be served by the inclusion of scientists
in the work of the center is more fundamental to the growth of
knowledge than the anticipation of contingencies. We have directed
attention to the remarkable fact that a turning point has been reached
in the work of every scientific discipline. Even astronomy — and pos-
sibly nuclear physics — has come to involve the observer as part of the
phenomena. This involvement goes beyond the familiar point that the
observer, by affecting the immediate field of observation, influences
the records obtained by his instruments. The novelty in the case of
astronomy, for instance, is that human subjectivity is beginning to en-
ter the data of astronomy, most obviously in the creation of "arti-
ficial" satellites.

If we postulate a universe of events, there can be no such phe-

Centers for Advanced Political Science 221

nomenon as an "artificial" event. Subjective events of goal formulation
are in the universal manifold as surely as is the realized satellite.

The crucial point is that man is taking all evolution into his hands
whether his evolution as a species, the planned introduction of novel
forms of life, or the evolutionary future of the cosmos. The circuiting
of events through the internal processes of man and other higher
forms of life is the policy-making process through which evolution can
be affected.

Given a potentiality of this kind, political science comes to play
a crucial role in the clarification of goals and strategies within the
decision process, not only for man, not only for such advanced forms
of life as are created or discovered, but for the universe as a whole.

A Sample Theory:

The Cosmic Role of Decision

How shall we conceive of subjective events in the universal mani-
fold? Undoubtedly, this question will continue to occupy a central
position in the problems of man and his future. At present, the com-
plex tasks that we recognize as rational problem-solving occur in
organisms possessing a brain, namely, a central organ that appears to
be the site of information input, initiation, and execution.

It cannot be said, however, that the presence of an intricate set
of circuits is a sufficient explanation of the occurrence of complex
subjectivity. An alternative hypothesis, for example, is that subjec-
tivity is a specific energy localized only when certain catalytic pre-
conditions occur, for example, when the concentration of circuits and
of electrochemical energies reaches a necessary level.

A distinguishing mark of subjective events (in addition to
"awareness") is referentiality, that is, referring in the present to
events that may be at a distance in time-space and which may never
have been brought to the focus of attention (of or by the referring
ego) in previous sequences of subjective events. Subjective events of
problem-solving clarify future operations and hence guide the proc-
esses of nature to the purposes conceived by one part of nature,
namely, the part that achieves a focal center of circuiting. In prin-
ciple, a continually redirected flow of events can be progressively
subordinated to the goals conceived in central decision structures. De-
cision structures in which man participates may become exceedingly
intricate, especially if forms of higher life are discovered or brought
into existence.

In the light of these reflections on subjectivity, it seems that the

222 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

principal role of subjective events is to redesign the future patterns
of physicochemical energies and masses. Tampering with the future,
then, is the distinguishing point or, to put it another way, tampering
with time.

Imagine that the universe of events is an expression of one funda-
mental energy which we shall designate "duration," an operation that
leaves the term "time" free to perform its everyday task of designating
perceived sequences. Imagine, further, that the energy of duration is
finite; that is, no matter how gigantic in terms of ordinary human
experience the magnitudes involved, the universe will eventually be-
come void.

The next step in the speculative construct is to allow for the
possibility that the flow of duration toward voidness can be interfered
with. Since all energy is postulated as duration, this requires us to
imagine that duration becomes divided against itself and in so doing
postpones the approach of voidness. Timing is paralyzed, as it were,
into patterns that preclude the release of energy in the fundamental
form of duration.

Hence we conceive of mechanical, chemical, electrical, in fact, all
derived forms, of energy as patterns of captured and at least tem-
porarily imprisoned duration. In accordance with the equivalence of
mass and energy, the patterns of mass can be explained under various
conditions that permit us to locate particles or waves in configurations
of micro- or macromagnitude.

Although the evolution of the stars appears in universal perspec-
tive to be a grandiose means of organizing and retaining the energy
of duration, nevertheless present knowledge suggests that astral bodies
contain the seeds of their destruction and eventually fail to maintain
themselves. ^^

The evolution of life seems to offer another strategy by which
the approach to voidness can be deferred. Living forms are formi-
dable fixers and users of energy. This has led to the description of life
as an "open system," in contrast to the "closed systems" of physics
and chemistry.^'' The open system is a site for the generation of energy
on a huge scale; hence, we conceive of life as a highly successful
means whereby the energy of duration is caught and held.

These considerations point to the distinctive role of higher forms
of life in the universal manifold of events. The setting of goals and
the adoption of strategies can defer the dissipation of the energy of
duration into voidness. This may be accomplished by tapping the
Niagara of duration energy to provide energy of subjectivity and to

Centers for Advanced Political Science 223

guide the future flow of other energies into patterns whose perpetu-
ation forestalls dissipation into voidness.

A critical feature of the present speculative model is the genera-
tion of conflict in the stream of duration. What is the simplest postu-
late that would allow such contradictions to occur? We can generalize
the image introduced by Planck, since jumps from various points in a
random pattern of direction, length, and figure would contain con-
flicting possibilities.'"

A Check-List of Value Projections

Among the immediate preoccupations at a center would be the
task of estimating the impact of science and technology on fighting
potential and hence on the balancing of power. I am among those
who have long advocated spending billions to develop a less destruc-
tive system of weapons than we have traditionally employed in in-
ternational politics and in police work. The "paralysis bomb" is
presumably coming closer as our command of brain chemistry im-
proves. The objective is to incapacitate the target temporarily and to
permit him to revive with no organic damage from the experience.

As a denial device, the effect of the paralysis weapon resembles
that of censorship on the mind. There are also in prospect chemical
instruments whose role is more positive, hence akin to propaganda or
indoctrination. It is generally agreed by qualified specialists at present
that chemicals (drugs) do not enhance the capability of an individual,
but that they may be of enormous importance in enabling a human
being to live up to his highest potential.'^

This modest proposition greatly understates the significance of
the drugs now known or in prospect. Even a partial inventory calls
attention to the alleviation of pain, the temporary or enduring cure
of psychic and somatic ailments, the fostering of equable moods suit-
able to congenial human relations, the suspension of fatigue in periods
of emergency, the encouragement of exhilarated moods of relaxed en-
joyment, the stimulation of fantasy for purposes of creative thinking,
the suspension or control of procreation, and the stimulation or con-
trol of sexual and other bodily appetites.

The use of combined chemical, communicative, and small-group
controls for political purposes is a subject that has received a blaze
of public attention in recent years, and properly so, since in the past
the pertinent questions of public policy have been dealt with feebly
or sporadically. It would be one of the main challenges of a multi-
disciplinary political science center to explore standards of authorita-

224 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

tive prescription designed to safeguard at least a minimum sphere of
responsibility. Which zones of privacy are to be protected against in-
trusion by official or unofficial persons ?

A continuing preoccupation of political science centers would be
to anticipate the significance of science and technology for production.
In this context, a leading question is: How superfluous will most hu-
man beings become for other than a consumer's role? It is probable
that technological innovations will provide in abundance the mole-
cules required for human sustenance. Similarly, there are grounds for
predicting that buildings and other structural forms can be put to-
gether, moved, or demolished with much the same nonchalance that
some Pacific islanders show in manipulating a palm leaf.^^

Political thinkers have traditionally approached the prospect of
universal affluence with misgivings. In the United States, it is facile
to suggest that the categorical imperative to work and save was in-
tensified by the ideological and operational patterns of New England
Puritans and that these social formations brought to the New World
an outlook that was a peculiarly pure example of the capitalistic warp
of Protestantism.^^ However this may be, a long-term cyclical move-
ment in human culture may be upon us, and the elimination of work
may be imminent. If we welcome the emancipation of man from work
— in the sense of occupations imposed as a condition of livelihood —
ingenuity will be required, since the transition to self-direction can
precipitate the anxieties and uncertainties of which Erich Fromm
memorably wrote. The task is a strategy of escape to freedom by over-
coming the residues of past socialization.^*

Archaeology, History, and Anthropology

That a political science center would draw on colleagues in his-
tory, archaeology, and the adjacent social sciences is to be taken for
granted. The links between students of folk society — the distinctive
subject matter of social anthropology — and political science have been
closer in recent years as whirlwind modernization added to the tur-
bulence of politics in Asia, Africa, South America, and many hereto-
fore-isolated island communities.^^ In future years, the data of
anthropology will be highly pertinent to the consideration of various
problems that are likely to grow into large dimensions. We have al-
ready referred to the obsolescence of work. Some folk societies have
long been accustomed to relative exemption from work. Is it true that
they have devoted themselves assiduously to the cultivation of con-
genial human relationships and therefore achieved a sociable, aflfec-

Centers for Advanced Political Science 225

tionate, and lively style of life? Or, on the other hand, has exemption
from serious responsibility favored the rise of sensual and tyrannical
personalities who rule by intimidation? Perhaps we shall find that the
dominance attained by the domineering element in society depends
on the possibility of exploiting the fears that are kept alive by such
occasional disasters as pestilence, flood, and earthquake. This source
of tyranny will presumably recede as the scientific image of the world
moves toward universality.

Anthropology, archaeology, and history are inexhaustible sources
of data on every phase of man and culture, and political science will
draw on various parts of this repository as problems gain in urgency.
It is also true that the scientific advantage will not always be on one
side. In the past, the questions raised by students of government and
law have often provided a sense of priority for scholars who work in
archaeology, history, and anthropology. Sometimes, it is true, political
science has been slow to assimilate the answers given to its questions.
This is partly because recent Western political theory has been caught
between two dogmatic images of primitive man — the pastoral fantasy
of Rousseau and the bellicose nightmare of Hobbes. As anthropologi-
cal and archaeological data accumulate, the idea of a social contract
seems inappropriate to preliterate people. It also seems to exaggerate
the role of climactic events and of rational agreement in place of the
incremental growth of culture.

It is possible to affirm today the the outline of a working syn-
thesis between political science conceptions and the data of archae-
ology, history, and anthropology is in sight. Centers of political science
would expedite the synthesis and draw further implications for policy
and science.

Ideas that were dimly perceived or figuratively expressed in
Western European theory have been greatly clarified by new kno^vl-
edge. The bucolic image of primitive man does in fact approximate
the style of life achieved by many folk societies. Listen to the late
Robert Redfield's characterization of the folk community as a moral
entity:

The primitive and precivilized communities are held together
essentially by common understandings as to the ultimate nature and
purpose of life. . . . Humanity attained its characteristic, long-
enduring nature as a multitude of difTerent but equivalent systems
of relationships and institutions each expressive of a view of the
good. Each precivilized society was held together by largely un-
declared but continually realized ethical conceptions.-*'

226 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

But this is not the whole story of early man. When we complete
Redfield's picture, we find that the external arena in which folk so-
cieties interacted with one another resembles nothing so closely as
Hobbes's image, if we edit it to show that it was the hand of the
group that was raised against the foreign group, rather than the hand
of each individual against every other. The syndrome of parochialism
was precipitated by, and in turn consolidated in, the arena where the
expectation of violence prevailed.

The conception of social contract becomes meaningful if we
redefine it to refer, not to the beginning of orderly group life, but to
the origin of urban culture or civilization, which carried with it
literacy, legal codes, bureaucracy, taxation, and the concomitant
weakening of kinship identifications. We have evidence that however
drawn-out the preurban life of man, civilizations took shape with as-
tonishing speed. The creativity of man flowered exuberantly in the
opportunities that urban specialization could afford. The ideas of sud-
den development and of the important role played in urban life by
rational methods of articulating and solving problems do not exag-
gerate the situation.

In company with many if not most Western thinkers, Rousseau
and Hobbes were acutely conscious of their individuality and of their
alienation from many of the traditional institutions of the society in
which they lived. Under the stress of ego sensitivity, they gave cur-
rency to a dichotomy that readily lends itself to misinterpretation.
They opposed an entity called the "individual" to an entity called
"society," and they imagined that the origin of society was the mys-
tery to be explained. It was this imagined need of explaining why
gamboling lambs or bloodthirsty lions quit gamboling or pouncing
that led to the conception of a social contract and varied its provisions
accordingly.

Psychology

If archaeology, history, and anthropology have provided a cor-
rected map of the past of organized politics, we must credit social
psychology with helping to explain the mechanisms whereby inter-
acting individuals achieve both culture and individuality. It is un-
thinkable that any center of political science would cut itself off from
these disciplines.

The theoretical model that commends itself today recognizes that
a social process of any kind, whether involving human actors or not,
is a distinctive configuration within the universal manifold of events.

Centers for Advanced Political Science 227

The distinctiveness of a social process resides in the traits of the actors
and the traits of interaction. The participants are alive; we have al-
ready said that living systems are more than objects passively affected
by their surroundings. On the contrary, they behave, and this means
that they modify what they do by passing potential act-completions
through an inner circuit. While passing through an inner circuit, the
various influences originating in the environment are also integrated,
as are all the predisposing features of the organism. The predisposi-
tions— such as demand for food — are residues of past interactions with
the environment plus current demands arising in the system.

The social process of organisms of any kind is never adequately
described as "individuals versus the whole." If the whole of any so-
ciety is divided into two hostile parts, the situation is most clearly
described as one group of "individuals" modified by collective factors
versus another group of "individuals" modified by collective factors.
If one biological organism seems to oppose all the others, the same
point applies; it is an "individual" modified by collective factors who
is opposing all other "individuals" modified by collective factors.

If we phrase the problem as "the individual versus society," we
confuse by implying that society is not composed of individuals or that
the individual is not shaped by interacting with others who compose
society.

The traditional mode of opposing the individual to society is
sometimes thought of as an opposition between "human nature" and
"society," or "culture." The connotation is usually that the genetic
constitution endows the individual with needs and capabilities that
cannot be sufficiently gratified in social life. Hence, man is invariably
at war with his own creation.

This theoretical model may serve to describe history without fore-
closing the possibility that future cultures or genetic structures can be
more smoothly adjusted to one another. Even in regard to the past,
it is possible to call attention to many human beings living at many
times and places who have given no indication of being dissatisfied
with their societies. But it is also possible to call attention to millions
of men and women who have given drastic evidence of dissatisfaction
in the forms of rebellion, murder, or suicide. It is to be observed that
much recorded dissatisfaction is not aimed at society, but at nature,
for nature is often niggardly of fertile soil and propitious climate and
is given to earthquake, flood, storm, poisonous plants and snakes, and
to other dangerous animals and murderous micro-organisms.

As matters stand today, it is "original nature plus some patterns

228 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

of culture plus some features of nature" that may culminate either in
gratification or lack of it. Experimental psychology provides us with
a picture of man's predispositions that confirms two points of rele-
vance here — natural impulses at given stages of life may conflict, and
mechanisms of conflict adjustment are themselves part of original na-
ture.

One of the most dramatic confrontations of "man" and "society"
in recent times was made by Freud when he portrayed the uncon-
scious dimensions of man's original nature as constituted in such a
way that it is almost unthinkable to imagine that man can ever
achieve high levels of enduring gratification. It must be pointed out,
however, that Freud's methods of research and therapy brought to
light evidence of a difTerent kind. His data were never demonstrably
about original predispositions; they always referred to predispositions
as modified by exposure to particular civilizations, classes, interests,
and to systematic adjustment of personality. The data of psychoanal-
ysis are "man plus particular patterns of culture plus particular ex-
posures to nature." Any hypotheses about inborn predisposition,
whether in reference to direction or to strength, are open to further
investigation.^''

A continuing question for any future center of political science
is whether, as interdisciplinary data accumulate, the present balance
of emphasis on "original nature" versus that on "culture" must be
changed, especially in reference to such profoundly important and
damaging institutions as the divided world arena. At present, the
evidence weighs heavily on the side of cultural patterning. The pres-
ent world arena appears to express the self-perpetuating strength of
conflicting cultural syndromes of parochialism as they modify human
beings. ^^ The solution appears to lie in the rise of a civilization of
universal identities, value demands, and pacific expectations.

At the same time, the microscopes of psychoanalysis and of other
specialized forms of inquiry have traced in detail the destructive con-
sequences of many social practices and institutions now prevailing on
the globe. The implication is that changing constellations of destruc-
tive factors veto the tendencies working in favor of peaceful unifica-
tion of world public order.

If a center of political science is to keep an informed eye on
the changing map of institutional and cultural knowledge, it would
be necessary to arrange for intermittent exposure to representative
specialists in the various social institutions and regions of the world
community.

Centers for Advanced Political Science 229

Political scientists must themselves carry the primary burden of
describing and explaining the flow of political institutions throughout
the globe. This task is of such fundamental importance to the pro-
fession that we have given rather extended consideration in preced-
ing chapters to the problems involved.

THE ROTATIONAL CYCLE

For the moment, it will suffice to call attention to major insti-
tutional specialties that must find a place in the rotational cycle of
any such center. First, we mention specialists in the numbers and the
physical and mental states of man and of any organisms in which man
comes to have particular interest.

In the years immediately ahead, the significance of the popula-
tion explosion and the feasibility of various policies in regard to it will
continue to occupy the minds of people at any center. At the moment,
chemical means and surgical devices for limiting conception are
known. In estimating the wisdom of alternative programs, we must
not lose sight of the fact, hinted in passing above, that progress in
astronavigation and settlement may be used to alleviate the pressure
of numbers on living standards.

Perhaps the most tantalizing long-run question for a center to
think about is how to use scientific knowledge to design or redesign
advanced forms of life. For instance, it has long been a favorite pro-
posal of some that man's famous destructive potential should be
tamed by genetic means. It is not out of the question to think of
modifying the genetic message that is part of every germ cell in such
a way that whole generations will be altered and tamed. Actually, the
precise nature of the proposed modification is ambiguous. Further-
more, it is important to give weight to the point that, if a strain of
men is bred which is inhibited from anger, rage, or strong self-as-
sertion, though capable of love and gentleness, the result may be a
flood of victims for unreconstructed members of the species and of
other advanced forms of life.

Among the specialists at the center would be students of com-
munication ranging from linguists to engineers. One long-range prob-
lem in this field relates to the design of life and society. Why not aim
at forms of life able to exchange messages directly from brain to
brain, dispensing with the clumsy installations now required to con-
duct mass and person-to-person communication? What consequences
are likelv to follow the acquisition of interbrain communicative capa-
bility? One immediate demand would presumably be to perfect the

230 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

means of screening unwelcome messages. If "mind reading" goes along
with the new technology, the demand for privacy will also become acute.

In this connection, the ability of individuals to achieve empathic
relations with others would be of great importance for human under-
standing and solidarity. It is recognized by artists that empathy is not
invariably associated with sympathy, since the divining of the inner
experience of others is not always connected with willingness to enter
into the moods and images of another person.^'' Brain-to-brain com-
munication would probably identify those human beings who are lim-
ited in sympathy as well as in empathy, and this might result in a
more refined process of social selection in which genuinely benevolent
characters have an advantage.

A more immediate potentiality in the field of communication is
the emancipation of the individual audience member from his present
dependence on program directors. The ideal equipment for this pur-
pose would enable each of us to send his "pick-up" equipment any-
where at any time. If one is not in the frame of mind to watch the
debate on the floor, one may beam on the court or on the work of a
commission.

Specialists in education would be of great importance at the cen-
ter, since every important innovation in adult culture carries implica-
tions for the socializing practices of schools, families, neighborhoods,
and in fact everyone who affects the preadult. Much time would be
given to working out the most effective ways to employ "teaching
machines" in society. What are the proper limits of "conditioning"?
Questions similar to the problems of chemical or genetic taming of
man and advanced forms of life occur here.

Political scientists have a tradition of great sensitivity to policies
affecting love and sexuality, partly because factors of this kind have
been notoriously difficult to subordinate to comprehensive visions of
collective achievement. The loyalties generated in the small family and
extended kin group are frequently in opposition to the state, which
traditionally disrupts the private lives of men and women in the name
of war, preparation for war, or devotion to projects that eliminate
family life. Tension has been everlasting between large, community-
wide organizations (church, army, civil service) and families or in-
termediate associations.

There is a possibility of emancipating sexuality from procreation
and thereby eliminating some of the considerations traditionally in-
voked to justify the limitation of sexual interstimulation to married
partners and to oppose relations among unmarried partners of the

Centers for Advanced Political Science 231

same or the opposite sex. Aside from measures designed to prevent
violent quarrels, what can be said in terms of deference to man's
freedom of choice about the norms appropriate to the emerging
world ?

REPRESENTATION ACCORDING TO INTELLECTUAL TASK

We may summarize the composition of centers of political science
by calling attention to the variety of emphases that must obtain if
all five intellectual tasks are to be performed with distinction. A ro-
tating arrangement would presumably be necessary to achieve a sam-
ple of the intellectual division of labor and of the contemporary map
of knowledge. If a nucleus of permanent members existed, the chief
aim would be to supplement their approaches. In any case, the choice
of personnel would be by much more exacting criteria than simply by
subject matter. Intellectual alertness and scope are indispensable to
the successful working of a collegial venture like the center. When
these qualities are present, they hold in check the "occupational para-
noia" not infrequently endemic among able scholars. After all, exag-
gerated estimates of the contributions of the self are only tenable
when the mind is dull or the scope of a discipline is minuscule.

For the intellectual task of clarifying the goals of the center, we
have indicated above that specialists in the grounding as well as in the
specification of preferred outcomes would be consulted. In our society,
we think at once of professional theologians, metaphysicians, ethical
theorists, and mathematicians.

In connection with the examination of trend, condition, and pro-
jection every analytic-empirical specialty contains potential candi-
dates. Some candidates would contribute mainly to problems of method
that crop up in the task of forming theoretical models to guide re-
search or in the gathering and processing of data at various ob-
servational standpoints in the manifold of events. In this context, we
have in mind mathematicians, logicians, and statisticians, especially
those accustomed to dealing with biological and social processes.

We would give prominence to the physical sciences at centers of
political science largely because expert testimony by specialists in these
various fields is indispensable to the projecting of contingencies. Some
scientists deal with complex structures in the natural order. We have
astronomers, and especially cosmologists, in mind. The earth sciences
also come into this category, since geology, physiography, and meteor-
ology deal with configurations of matter and energy in time. Strictly
speaking an "earth science" is needed for every star, planet, and sat-

232 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ellite, since each astral structure is a large, patterned sequence re-
quiring individual study. The "life sciences" also belong among the
larger configurations and cross-refer to astronomy and paleontology
in connection with problems of evolution.

Physics and chemistry deal with the microstructures and func-
tions of the processes of nature — molecules and atoms, mass and en-
ergy. Once an entity has been identified, the search begins to describe
its distribution throughout the cosmos, the earth, and all living forms.
Hence, our map of the universe is continually refined as more subtle
entities are identified and their configurations delineated.

Besides the members drawn from the physical and biological sci-
ences, a vigorous center of political science would systematically in-
clude specialists in history, prehistory, and the other social sciences.

Psychology would require rotations within the field in order to
keep in touch with the changing views of the basic potentialities of
original nature and the distribution of predispositions among individ-
ual members of the species. Comparative psychology, physiology, neu-
rology, and brain chemistry are among the disciplines that intersect
in the study of fundamental structures and functions.^"

Prehistory, history, and social anthropology must be relied upon
to provide a map of the succession of human cultures.

Economic values and institutions are illuminated by all the social
sciences. However, it would be important to bring actively into a
center academic and business economists and economists with experi-
ence in stimulating economic growth in both socialist and capitalist
economies.

The study of communication today includes specialists in linguis-
tics and on the engineering of communication networks specialized in
mass and particular media. Since the distinctive value outcome af-
fected by communication is enlightenment, the study of current in-
formation grades over to organizations and persons who engage in
research.

Obviously, a center would draw continually on specialists in com-
munication. It would also be important to associate with a center
population analysts and public health and social medicine specialists.
Social biology is an area necessitating close ties with biological sci-
ences generally.

The study of occupational, professional, and artistic skill groups
is the province of sociologists, economists, political scientists, and par-
ticularly of educators. A center must include within its agenda spe-
cialists in all phases of socialization and professionalization.

Centers for Advanced Political Science 233

The family and other institutions of intimacy seem likely to un-
dergo profound changes. Hence, the center would draw on all who
study these relationships.

That the respect structure of society should move toward mo-
bility and the recognition of merit are axioms of all who accept hu-
man dignity as an overriding objective of policy. But caste forms are
deeply entrenched, and the center would need to be in contact with
scholars in touch with the social class systems of the world com-
munity.

The center would also draw on scholars who specialize in the
history of religion and morality.

Political scientists would be recruited from the several fields within
the profession, such as the history of doctrine; jurisprudence; law;
and the structure of government, politics, and administration at in-
ternational, national, provincial, and local levels.

THOUGHT AND ACTION

Although we have emphasized the place of political science in
the intellectual community, it is not our intention to suggest that cen-
ters of political science restrict their membership to full-time scholars
and scientists. On the contrary, we are favorably impressed by the
mutual enrichment that follows when men of action and scholars are
brought together in circumstances favorable to serious exchange of
experiences and of views. In this interchange, it is not to be assumed
that the division of labor between the men of action who report ex-
perience and the scholars who analyze and interpret will be clear-cut.
Reflective and creative minds are not limited to full-time teachers,
researchers, and advisors. Nor are significant experiences of active af-
fairs a monopoly of the professional politician, businessman, and ad-
ministrator. Personalities are too varied in motivation, skill, and
exposure to life for the traditional images to apply. The modern in-
tellectual is more likely to live at a communication center than in the
isolation of a tower, whether ivory or glass, and the modern decision-
maker usually has considerable professional background and remains
in contact with specialists of many kinds. In future years, we expect
the level of intellectual culture to continue to rise and at the same
time to become more selective in arranging common maps of knowl-
edge to be shared throughout life, irrespective of specialization.

At the principal centers of civilization, once-celebrated difficulties
of communication are largely obsolete. At thousands of board and
committee meetings and consultations, the technique of communica-

234 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

tion has been mastered on all sides, so that lawyers, engineers,
scientists, investors, and managers get on with the problem at hand
with little skill-consciousness or misinterpretation. It is true that, as
one moves away from the top levels of New York, Washington, and
Cambridge, for example, the traditional stumbling blocks appear, and
this is as true of the lower echelons in the East as anywhere else. In
coming years, however, fuller advantage should be taken of improved
means of sharing experience.

The idea of centers of political science is to consolidate and im-
prove the advances that have been made in integrating frames of
reference among scholars and scientists and between them and the
responsible decision-makers of government and other social institu-
tions.

NOTES

1 The literature of controversy over the role of universities in America in-

cludes, e.g., R. M. Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936); and H. D. Gideonse,
The Higher Learning in a Democracy, "A Reply to President
Hutchins' Critique of the American University" (New York: Far-
rar and Rinehart, 1937). An important interpretation of Education
in the Forming of American Society is by B. Bailyn (New York:
Vintage Books, 1960). Approaches attempting to portray the edu-
cational system "as it is" include T. Caplow and P. J. McGee, The
Academic Marketplace (New York: Basic Books, 1958); and L.
Wilson, The Academic Man (New York: Oxford University Press,
1942). Cf. also R. Thomas, The Search for a Common Learning,
"General Education, 1800-1960" (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962).

2 For insight into the traditional outlook of various civilizations, cf. D. S.

Nivison and A. F. Wright, eds., Confucianism in Action (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1959); F. Rosenthal, trans., Ibn Khaldun,
The Muquaddiinah, "An Introduction to History" (London: Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1958); W. Barclay, Educational Ideals in
the Ancient World (London: Collins, 1959); W. Jaeger, Paideia,
"The Ideals of Greek Culture," trans. G. Highet (2nd ed.; 3 vols.;
New York: Oxford University Press, 1943); S. Radakrishnan and
C. Moore, eds., A Source Book in Indian Philosophy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957).

3 A study of books and articles cited in advanced biological research showed

that 50 per cent went no further back than five years; fewer than
10 per cent went back twenty years or more. Cf. P. Weiss, "Knowl-
edge: A Growth Process," Science, 131 (1960), 171&-1719,

Centers for Advanced Political Science 235

* A. Flexner, Universities, American, English, German (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1930).

^ Ralph Tyler has directed the center from the first. The driving initiative
was taken by B. B. Berelson, then of the Ford Foundation. The
spread of the term "behavioral sciences" owes much to the choice
of label for the center. Many potential labels were rejected, partly
because they had acquired unfortunate connotations in influential
quarters, partly because they were identified with an existing — and
somewhat circumscribed — set of organizations. Among the rejected
expressions were "human relations" and "social sciences." In po-
litical science, the expression "behavioral" is sometimes facetiously,
perhaps enviously, used to refer to the work of anyone who has a
grant from Ford. More solemnly, the term is taken to refer to a
strong emphasis on joining systematic theory with disciplined ob-
servation. Systematic theory does not ultimately close its eyes to
historical data, nor are disciplined observational procedures re-
stricted to field or laboratory studies of contemporary events.

^ At first, scientists of the modern era found it necessary to phrase what they
did in terms of the Aristotelian categories as interpreted by con-
temporary theologians. Scientists thus concentrated on material,
formal, and efficient causes and found increasing difficulty with
"final causes." Final causes in Aristotelian usage were the purposes
for which objects were designed. The designs, patterns, or forms —
the formal causes — were regarded as open to direct observation.
Final causes, however, could only be inferred from a comprehensive
vision of the whole field of potential study. The construct of an
ultimate designer and creator of materials, designs, and mechanisms
— if treated as a hypothesis, not as an article of faith — is compatible
with scientific inquiry. Traditionally, most theologians and ecclesias-
tical authorities have insisted on faith, not hypothesis, although they
have often argued that the plausibility of various hypotheses — par-
tially established empirically — justifies the leap to belief.

^ Cf. the discussion of possible contact with advanced forms of life in M. S.
McDougal, H. D. Lasswell, and I. Vlasic, The Public Order of
Outer Space (New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming).

^Thomas Cooper (1759-1839) came to the United States from England with
Joseph Priestley in 1794. His connection with South CaroHna be-
gan in 1820.

^ Harlow Shapley, long director of the Harvard Observatory, actively pro-
motes science clubs at the preparatory level and lectures untiringly
on astronomy to audiences of every level of sophistication. For the
general reader who would like direct access to an intelligible col-
lection of historic landmarks, cf. Shapley, ed.. Source Book in As-
tronomy, 1900-1950 (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1960).

236 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

10 C. P. Snow is an eminent exception. Cf. the controversy precipitated by
The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge: Uni-
versity Press, 1959).

" New York: A Signet Book, 1956, p. 6.

12 Author of The Star Maker and several other works.

12 The early connections between the study of the heavens and the activities
of the political elite were close. The standard histories of science
— by G. Sarton, L. Thorndike, O. Neugebauer, and N. J. T. M.
Needham, for instance — are informative on these connections. The
timing of acts of state was deeply influenced by the testimony of
experts on the heavens. Cf. D. J. de SoUa Price, Science since Baby-
lon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

1* The connection between politics and alchemy was close in many civiliza-
tions. Sometimes the accent was on discovering means to immor-
tality, sometimes on the making of metal — of interest to the treasury
and the military.

15 Stanley's contribution is put into context by I. Asimov, The Intelligent
Man's Guide to Science (New York: Basic Books, 1960), Vol. II,
Chap. 13.

1^ Cf. A. Einstein and L. Infeld, The Evolution of Physics (Cambridge: Uni-
versity Press, 1938).

1^ Cf. H. Hyden, "Biochemical Aspects of Brain Activity," in S. M. Farber
and R. H. L. Wilson, eds., Control of the Mind (New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill, 1961).

1^ A concise review of current hypotheses can be found in J. Singh, Great
Ideas and Theories of Modern Cosmology (New York: Dover Pub-
lications, 1961), describing the views of Schmidt, Hoyle, Weizsacker,
Kuiper, Alfen, Whipple, Urey, and many others. Also cf. M. K.
Munitz, ed.. Theories of the Universe from Babylonian Myth to
Modern Science (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press-Falcon's Wing Press,
1957).

19 Cf., e.g., L. Bertalanff'y, Modern Theories of Development, "An Introduc-

tion to Theoretical Biology" (New York: Oxford University Press,
1933). Bertalanffy's general systems approach has influenced some
biologists and social scientists.

20 Cf. F. A. Lindemann, The Physical Significance of The Quantum Theory

(Oxford: University Press, 1932). The map I have outlined sug-
gests that the subjective event of reference, by bringing models of
the past and future into the present, enlarges the context in regard
to which behavior — hence social interaction — occurs. This carries
with it the potentiality of orderly arrangement of subsequent con-
texts. The m»^ss-energy preconditions of a specific set of subjective

Centers for Advanced Political Science 237

events are trivial; however, the "trapping" of duration energies is
accomplished by selective intervention in the unfolding future. Con-
flicting policy programs among living systems may nullify the po-
tential for order by blocking integration within the inclusive context
of interaction. Mass-energy units can be arranged in a hierarchy of
magnitudes; subjective references can be described according to the
time-space context alluded to and the complexity and integration of
the arrangements referred to in the context; interaction sequences
can be described according to the actualization of arrangements in
context. Many currents in contemporary thought harmonize in vary-
ing degree with this speculative model; cf., e.g., Teilhard de Char-
din, The Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harpers, 1959). Cf.
also some trends that appear in philosophies of history. A con-
venient compendium is H. MeyerhofT, ed.. The Philosophy of History
in Our Time, "An Anthology" (New York: Harpers, 1959), with
selections from Dilthey, Croce, CoUingwood, Pirenne, Toynbee,
Becker, Beard, Aron, Dewey, Lovejoy, White, Butterfield, Berlin,
Popper, Jaspers, and others. The study of decision, as I conceive
it, increases the probability of actualizing inclusive goals in the cos-
mic process, even if inclusive goals have not been achieved before.

21 Cf. the section on "The Influence of Drugs on the Individual," especially

the papers by S. S. Kety, J. G. Miller, and J. O. Cole, in S. M.
Farber and R. H. L. Wilson, eds., Control of the Mind (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1961).

22 Cf . the rather cautious essays authorized by Soviet scientists in M. Vas-

siliev and S. Gouschev, eds.. Life in the Twenty-First Century
(Baltimore: Penguin, 1961).

23 Cf. P. Miller, The New England Mind from Colony to Province (Cam-

bridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).

24 An imaginative and informed reassessment is S. de Grazia, Of Time, Work,

and Leisure (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962).

25 Cf. D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, 111.: The

Free Press, 1958).

2^ R. Redfield, The Primitive World and Its Transformation (Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press, 1953), pp. 12, 15.

2^ I note in passing that psychoanalytic formulations are being stated in ways
that admit of more concentrated research. E.g., K. M. Colby,
Energy and Structure in Psychoanalysis (New York: Ronald, 1955);
D. Rapaport, "The Conceptual Model of Psychoanalysis," in Theo-
retical Models and Personality Theory (Durham, N.C.: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 1952). Applications of dynamic psychiatry and
psychology to the study of politics are gradually gaining in volume
and quality. Recent examples are L. Pye, Politics, Personality, and
Nation Building, "Burma's Search for Identity" (New Haven: Yale

238 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

University Press, 1962), and, above all, the works of N. Leites,
H. V. Dicks, and E. Erikson. Cf. L. W. Milbrath and W. W. Klein,
"Personality Correlates of Politics," Acta Sociologica, 6 (1962), 53-
66; L. W. Milbrath, "Predispositions toward Political Contention,"
Western Political Quarterly, 13 (1960), 5-18.

2® But see the new genetic knowledge tersely summarized in C. H. Wadding-
ton, The Nature of Life (New York: Atheneum, 1962).

23 The most refined examination of the relevant subjectivities is M. Scheler,
Zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der SympathiegefUhl und von
Liebe und Hass ("On the Phenomenology and Theory of Sympathy
and of Love and Hatred"), with an Appendix on the reason for as-
suming the existence of other selves, Gesammelte Schriften (Berne:
Franke, 1954), I.

^° For new models of the brain, cf. G. S. Blum, A Model of the Mind, Ex-
plored by Hypnotically Controlled Experiments and Examined for
Its Psychodynamic Implications (New York: Wiley, 1961); D. O.
Hebb, Organization of Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1949); W. R.
Ashby, Design for a Brain (New York: Wiley, 1952); and G. A.
Miller, E. Galanter, and K. Pribram, Plans and the Structure of
Behavior (New York: Holt, 1960).

Conclusion

The present inquiry comes at a time when great and accelerating
changes multiply the problems that press on individuals and groups
at every stage of national, international, and subnational life. There is
obvious, pressing demand for the services of every person or pro-
fession believed competent to contribute to the solution of the vexing
questions of public policy.

This discussion is addressed to all who concur in the fundamental
importance of harmonizing our institutions with the requirements of
human dignity and who recognize that the task calls for higher levels
of performance by public and private agencies dealing with political
intelligence and appraisal.

Explicitly, I am concerned with increasing the weight of factors
that favor responsible freedom by giving more emphasis to the study
of government. If the study of government is to make the impact of
which it is capable, no government, no political party, and no private
association can be allowed a monopoly on research, teaching, or con-

240 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

sultation. In the huge urban civilizations of our day, an indispensable
safeguard of freedom is enlightenment regarding the past and prospec-
tive role of government in the social process as a whole.

The prospects of democratic and responsible government are en-
hanced when the doings of governments and of every other influen-
tial participant in the political process are open to mutual inspection
and appraisal. Inspection gains depth when immediate happenings
are seen in the broader context of space and time. It is the distinctive
task of professional students of government to supplement the news
and views of the day in any locality by providing comprehensive and
reliable maps of the larger currents of politics.

I have put the accent on the consideration of policies available
to political scientists for improving the bases on which their inferences
rest. Recognition has therefore been given to the perfecting of com-
prehensive, selective, and reliable surveys of contemporary and his-
torical events and of supplementing surveys by strategies that exploit
the potential returns from experimentation, prototyping, and interven-
tion.

Acutely sensible to the sheer magnitude of pertinent detail, I
have put forward a number of procedures intended to bring to the
attention of any scholar, citizen, or official an intelligible image of the
configuration of past, present, and future events in which he is en-
meshed and with which he interacts. The decision seminar, the social
planetarium, and related devices are tentative solutions to problems
of preventing an overload on the network of political communication.

In anticipation of the persisting challenge to creativity that the
future will undoubtedly contain, my discussion of professional train-
ing has centered on the cultivation of creativity. The relevant exercises
of political imagination presuppose intimate familiarity with the most
distinctive features of the era, and this points unmistakably to the
roles of science and technology.

After the stage of induction into the professional study of gov-
ernment come the problems connected with careers devoted to re-
search, teaching, consultation, administration, or public leadership.
Since this book is directed mainly to questions posed by the rising
level of intellectual excellence in our society, I have given extended
treatment to the building of environments in which political science
can be cultivated under optimal conditions. The idea of centers of
political science is a specific example of an institutional means of ad-
justing our perspectives and operations to our emerging needs.

Many matters of no inconsiderable importance have been given

Concludun 241

scant attention or left to one side. This has sometimes been done in
the hope of giving more extended consideration to the topic elsewhere.
Such topics are strategies of general civic training, of collaboration in
research and policy teams, and of giving and obtaining advice. Other
topics could be usefully discussed in a factual setting that lies beyond
the limits of the present sketch. I have in mind, for instance, the
strategy of introducing the study of government to peoples of reviving
ancient civilization whose traditional forms of political life are non-
democratic, save possibly at the lowest levels, or the strategy of in-
troducing political science to industrializing peoples whose cultural
traditions are characteristic of folk societies. Another topic worthy of
extended factual analysis and policy recommendation is the financing
of political science and civic education at all age levels. What are the
appropriate criteria for the allocation of manpower and facilities to
research, training, consultation, and dissemination? This question, in
particular, deserves exploratory study by a committee of the American
Political Science Association.

I have, I trust, made it plain that the fundamental fact of politics
is inextricable from human society, if by politics we mean the largest
arena of interaction in which goals are clarified, degrees of achieve-
ment are described, conditioning factors are analyzed, future develop-
ments are projected, and policy alternatives are invented and
evaluated.

In a specialized civilization, the case for the continuing study of
government by an organized profession of scholars is persuasive. I
am, however, among those who recognize that, under various cir-
cumstances, political scientists may make fewer significant contribu-
tions to the subject than other scientists or writers. This is the
competitive thrust of life, and it is eminently reasonable that con-
temporary and future members of an identifiable profession measure
up to competitive conditions. I have outlined some policies open to
the profession, as presently constituted, that promise to contribute
to the success of political science in years to come.

Whether a conventionally named body of scholars called "po-
litical scientists" will continue to play a prominent part in the study
and appraisal of politics depends chiefly on its vigor and imagination.
Can we improve the intelligence flow on which the profession must
depend for the opportune performance of the teaching, consultative,
research, and other tasks for which they are responsible? Can we
achieve levels of personal competence that measure up to the formi-
dable t^sks of the twin ages of science and astropolitics ?

242 THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The future in this, as in other dimensions, is partly open to direc-
tion through keener insight into the goals, assets, and liabilities of the
self. The present inquiry is a phase of this continual self-appraisal. It
is impossible to contemplate the present status of man without per-
ceiving the cosmic roles that he and other advanced forms of life may
eventually play. We are, perhaps, introducing self-awareness into cos-
mic process. With awareness of self come deliberate formation and
pursuit of value goals. For tens of thousands of years, man was ac-
customed to living in relatively local environments and to cooperating
on a parochial scale. Today we are on the verge of exploring a habitat
far less circumscribed than earth. The need for a world-wide system
of public order — a comprehensive plan of cooperation — is fearfully
urgent. From the interplay of the study and practice of cooperation
we may eventually move more wisely, if not more rapidly, toward
fulfilling the as-yet-mysterious potentialities of the cosmic process.

INDEX

Abelson, R., 146, n. 5

Action, and thought, 233

Adams, J. C, 146, n. 4

Adams, R. N., 29, n. 18; 154, n. 4

Advice, 10, 13

Affection, values and institutions,

science of, 233
Agger, R., 87, n. 7
Alchemy, 236, n. 14
Allen, L. E., 67, n. 21; 88, n.

16; 146, n. 6
Allinson, E. p., 42, n. 3
Almond, G. A., 28, n. 15; 67, n.

Alternative thinking, 2, 126, 157

American Bar Association, 88, n.
16; 146, n. 6

American Behavioral Scientist,
The, 186, n. 3

American Political Science Asso-
ciation, 27, n. 9; 30; 32-34;
44; 65, n. 5; 81; 88, n. 12;
172; 241

American Political Science Re-
view, 12

Anderson, H. H., 163, n. 1

Anomie^ 117

246

INDEX

Anthropology, and political sci-
ence, 224 f.
Application, phase of, 15, 23 f.,

72 f., 200
Appraisal, phase of, 15, 24 f., 77 f.
Archaeology, and political science,

224 f.
Arenas, 47, 53, 58, 62, 70, 74, 77,

80, 91-93, 200, 203 f.
Arendt, H., 206, n. 2
Arens, R., 86, n. 2
Arieti, S., 65, n. 4; 121, n. 2
Aristotle, 3, 10, 215
Armitage, W. H. G., 165, n. 9
Arthasastra, 18
Arts and sciences, 176; research

upon, 185 f.; 187, n. 9
AsHBY, E., 165, n. 9; 238, n. 30
AsHBY, W. R., 238, n. 30
AsiMOv, I., 216; 236, n. 15
Association of the Bar of the City

of New York, 207, n. 6
Astrology, 236, n. 13
Astronomy, and political science,

217 f., 231
Astropolitics, age of, 1, 241
Attention, focus of, 184
Audiovisual aids, 172-173
Authority, and control, 196

Bailyn, B., 234, n. 1
Barber, B., 165, n. 8
Barclay, W., 234, n. 2
Barents, J., 28, n. 10
Barker, E., 27, n. 7
Barnett, H. G., 163, n. 1
Bartlett, F., 163, n. 1
Base values, 47, 53, 59, 62, 71, 74,

78, 81, 93, 204-205
Basic data survey, 43 f .
Bates, R. P., 120, n. 1
Bavelas, a., 120, n. 1

Beard, C. A., 16, 150
Behavioral emphasis, 37 f.
Behavioral sciences, 235, n. 5
Bensman, J., 67, n. 17
Benson, O., 146, n. 5
Bentham, J., 3, 151
Berelson, B., 165, n. 12; 235, n. 5
Berlin, University of, 158
Berns, W., 206, n. 4
Bernstein, M., 29, n. 24; 207, n.

6
Bertalanffy, L., 236, n. 19
BiDERMAN, A. D., 66, n. 11
Biology; see Systems
Black Cloud, 216
Blackmer, D. L. M., 145, n. 4
Blanchard, B., 42, n. 6
Blau, p. M., 87, n. 4
Bloom, B. S., 121, n. 4
Bloom FIELD, L., 145, n. 2
Blum, G. S., 238, n. 30
Bock, E. A., 122, n. 17
Bodenheimer, E., 206, n. 5
Books, 12

Booth, A. D., 88, n. 16
Boredom, hypothesis of, 117
Borgatta, E. F., 120, n. 1
BoRKE, H., 146, n. 5
Borneo, 117

BoRNiNG, B. C., 28, n. 16
BouLDiNG, K., 27, n. 4
Brain - to - brain, communication,

230, 239
Brave New World, 216
Brecht, a., 164, n. 4
Broadcasting, 143 f.
Brodbeck, a. J., 66, n. 13
Brogan, D. W., 187, n. 6
Brown, P. M., 193
Brown, R. E., 28, n. 16
Brown, W. O., 67, n. 17
Bruner, J., 121, n. 5; 163, n. 1;

166, n. 12
Buchanan, W., 67, n. 23

INDEX

247

BuRDicK, E., 206, n. 2
Burgess, J. W., 31, 158, 193
Burke, W. T., 7, n. 4
Butler, D. E., 165, n. 7; 187, n. 6

Caldwell, M. E., 88, n. 16; 146,

n. 6
Campbell, A., 67, n. 15
Cantril, H., 121, n. 3
Capek, Karel, 216
Capital, 2

Caplow, T., 234, n. 1
Carnegie Foundation, 37
Carter, G. M., 67, n. 17
Carter, R. E., Jr., 66, n. 9
Casey, R. D., 165, n. 11; 206
Cassirer, E., 164, n. 4
Catlin, G. E. C, 187, n. 6
Center for Advanced Study in the

Behavioral Sciences, 212
Centers for advanced study, 208 f.
Characterological incapacity, 102
Chardin, Teilhard de, 237, n. 20
Chemistry, and conditioning, 177;

and political science, 217 f.,

223 f., 232
Cherry, C, 166, n. 12
Chicago, University of, 31, 37,

158 f.
Childe, V. C, 26, n. 2
Childs, H. L., 165, n. 10
Ch'u, T. S., 27, n. 8
Church-state research, 184
Cities, 6

Civic order, 121, n. 11; 205
Civic training, 169-170
Civilization, 6

Clarification, 103, 155, 213 f., 231
Cleveland, H. P., 29, n. 18; 145,

n. 4; 165, n. 5
Code of professional conduct, 179

Coercion, and conditioning, 177 f.

Colby, K. M., 237

Cole, J. O., 237, n. 21

Coleman, J. S., 88, n. 12

Collaboration with allied disci-
plines, 189 f.

Columbia University, 31-32, 158,
194

Communication, and political sci-
ence, 162 f., 232

Competence, double, 186

Conditioning, and coercion, 177 f.

Configurative; see Problem-solving

Confucius, 10

Congressional Government) 3

Content, principles of, 155, 208

Contextual; see Problem-solving

Contextual broadcasting, 143 f.

Contingency norms, in prescrip-
tion, 200; 206, n. 4

Control, and authority, 196

Conventional definitions, 184

Cook, W. W., 193 f.

Coombs, C. H., 88, n. 14

Cooper, T., 215; 235, n. 8

Cornell University, 100; 165, n. 9

Corwin, E. S., 193

Cosmic evolution, and political
science, 219 f.; role of deci-
sion in, 221 f.

Creativity, 147 f.

Crick, B., 165, n. 7

Cross-disciplinary research, 186,
189 f.

Curtis, W. H., 165, n. 9

Dahl, R. a., 28, n. 15; 67, n. 19
David, P. T., 67, n. 15
Davis, R. L., 88, n. 14
Decision process; cosmic role of,

221 f.; and political scientists,

14 f.; theory, 91 f.

248

INDEX

Decision seminars, 125 f.

Demand; for intensity, 8; for se-
verity, 8

Dentler, R. a., 87, n. 10

Descartes, R., 148

Dession, G. H., 67, n. 22; 206, n.
5

Detroit, studies in, 118

Deutsch, K., 120

Developmental constructs, 27, n.
6; 157

Devolution, 119

Dicks, H. V., 238, n. 27

Dignity, human, 7; see also Hu-
man, dignity

DiMOCK, M. E., 29, n. 24

Diversification, 33

DoBYNs, H. F., 121, n. 8

Doctoral dissertations, 11

Doctrine, political, 65, n. 7

Documentation, 84, 134, 173

DoNNAT, L., 121, n. 7

Donnelly, R. C, 42, n. 4

Double competence, 186

Douglas, W. O., 42, n. 4

Downs, A., 88, n. 14

Drugs, and politics, 177; 223 f.;
237, n. 21

DucAssE, C. J., 42, n. 6

Duration and voidness, 212 f.; 237,
n. 20

DuRKHEiM, E., 122, n. 14

Dynamics, deeper, 115f.

Earth sciences, 231

Easton, E., 66, n. 13; 146, n. 7

Economic Interpretation of the

Constitution, 16
Economics, 232
Economic values and institutions,

39
Education, revolution in, 175 f.

Effects of decision, 47, 60, 64, 71,

76, 79, 81, 93
Ego mechanisms, 117
Einstein, A., 236, n. 16
Eldersfeld, S. J., 67, n. 15
Electronic data retrieval, 88, n.

16; 146, n. 6
Elites, studies of, 184
Emden, A. B., 42, n. 1
Empirical grounding of goals, 154
Energy in evolution, 222; 236, n.

20
Engels, F., 3, 151-152
Enlightenment, values and institu-
tions; see Communication
Erikson, E., 164, n. 2; 238, n. 27
EuLAu, H., 27, n. 6; 67, n. 23;

146, n. 7
Evolution; see Cosmic evolution
Expansion of political science, 30

f.
Expectation; and syntax, 197; of

violence, 7

Factor thinking, 2, 126, 157, 217
f.

Faith, and hypothesis, 235, n. 6

Family institutions, science of, 233

Farber, S. M., 122, n. 16; 236,
n. 17; 237, n. 21

Feliciano, F. p., 27, n. 5

Fenwick, C. G., 193

Ferguson, L. C, 67, n. 23

Fesler, J. W., 122, n. 17

Festinger, L., 166, n. 12

Film in teaching, 172-173

Final causes, 235, n. 6

Financial independence of stu-
dents, 173-174

Fleet, J. F., 27, n. 7

Flexner, a., 235, n. 4

Folk societies, 6; boredom in, 117

INDEX

249

Ford, H. J., 192

Ford Foundation, 235, n. 5

Forecast and goal, 217

Forecasters; see Projective think-
ing

Foreign student exchange, 18

Formula, political, 65, n. 7; 196;
199

Fox, W. T. R., 29, n. 26

Frankfort, H., 26, n. 3

Frankfort, H. A., 26, n. 3

Freedom and creative thinking,
172 f., 184 f.

Freud, S., 150, 228

Freund, E., 193

Friedmann, W., 206, n. 5

Friedrich, C. J., 122, n. 11; 164,
n. 5; 206, n. 5

Fromm, E., 224

Fuller, C. D., 29, n. 18

Functional definitions, 14

Future problems, 4 f.

Galanter, E., 238, n. 30

Galloway, G., 29, n. 22

Games, 124

Gange, J., 29, n. 18

Garner, J. W., 20, 193

George, A., 187, n. 8

George, J., 187, n. 8

Gideonse, H. D., 234, n. 1

Gilbert, G. M., 187, n. 8

Goal thinking, 2, 4, 103, 126, 153
f., 213 f., 231; and projective
thinking, 217; and scientific
thinking, 217 f.
Goerlitz, W., 145, n. 1
Goldhamer, H., 145, n. 2
Goldrick, D., 87, n. 7
Goldsen, J. M., 145, n. 2
Goldstein, J., 42, n. 4; 86, n. 1
Golembiewski, R. T., 120, n. 1

Goodnow, F. W., 193

Gosnell, H. F., 67, n. 15; 165, n,

10
Gottfried, A., 187, n. 8
GouscHEV, S., 237, n. 22
Graduate department, 152 f.
Gray, P., 88, n. 16
Grazia, a. de, 186, n. 3
Grazia, S. de, 66, n. 13; 237, n. 24
Greer, S., 121, n. 15
Griffith, E. S., 29, n. 22
Grodzins, M., 29, n. 24
Gruber, H., 163, n. 1
Guetzkow, H., 121, n. 1; 145, n.

2; 146, n. 5
Guterman, N., 66, n. 12

Haddow, a., 186, n. 2
Haines, C. G., 193
Haire, M., 88, n. 14
Hall, J., 206, n. 5
Hallowell, J., 164, n. 4
Hamilton, A., 4
Hammond, P. Y., 29, n. 26
Hare, A. P., 120, n. 1
Harper, F., 42, n. 4
Harrisson, T., 121, n. 12
Hart, H. A. L., 207
Hebb, D. O., 238, n. 30
Heidelberg, University of, 158
Hendel, C. W., 42, n. 6
Henle, p., 166, n. 12
Herrigel, E., 164, n. 6
Herring, E. P., 29, n. 24; 165, n.

10
Hess, R. D., 66, n. 13
Higher forms of life, 222
Highet, G., 234, n. 2
HiLSMAN, R., 28, n. 17
HiRSCH, W., 165, n. 8
Historical materialism, 152
History, and political science, 138,

224 f., 232

250

INDEX

HoBBES, T., 3, 183; modified, 226
HoFMEHL, K., 29, n. 22
HOFSTADER, R., 65, n. 1
HoLcoMBE, A. N., 67, n. 15
Holland, H., 28, n. 12
HOLMBERG, A., 121, n. 8
HoRWiTz, R., 165, n. 12
Howe, C. S., 164, n. 4
HoYLE, F., 216
Hsu, F. L. K., 121, n. 4
Human; dignity, 5, 7, 222 f.; rela-
tions, 235, n. 5
Humes, S., 67, n. 19
Humphrey, G., 163, n. 1
Humphrey, H., 29, n. 20
Hunting, R. B., 86, n. 1
Huntington, S. P., 29, n. 26
HuTCHiNS, R. M., 234, n. 1
Huxley, A., 215-216
Huxley, T. H., 215
Hyden, H., 236, n. 17
Hyman, H. H., 66, n. 13
Hyneman, C, 65, n. 4
Hypnosis, 117, 177
Hypothesis, and faith, 235, n. 6

Identification, 65, n. 7
Identities, 65, n. 7
Ideological alienation, 102
Images, and moods, 176
Index instability, 135 f.
"Individual" versus "society,"

formulation criticized, 227 f.
Infeld, L., 236, n. 16
Inquiry, inhibition of, 183 f.
Institute for Advanced Study, 212
Institutions, 66, n. 8; analysis, 90
Intellectual tasks, five, 1-2, 133,

196, 231 f.
Intelligence, phase of decision, 15;

17 f.; 43; 48 f.; 87, n. 9

Intensity; demand for, 8; factors,
115

Internalization, mechanism of, 90

International Institute of Admin-
istrative Sciences, 87, n. 9

Internship program, 33, 175

Intervention, and experimentation,
95 f.

Introductory phase, of prototyp-
ing, 101

Invoking, phase of decision, 15,
22 f., 69 f.

I, Robot, 2\6

d'Irsay, S., 42, n. 1

Jacobsen, T., 26, n. 3

Jaeger, W., 234, n. 2

James, F., 42, n. 4

Janowitz, M. J., 29, n. 26; 67, n.
17; 87, n. 4

Jefferson, T., 4

Jenkins, W., 88, n. 15

Johns Hopkins University, 31;
158; 165, n. 9; 194

Jones, E., 164, n. 2

Jones, R. L., 66, n. 9

Journalism, and political science,
189 f.

Journals, 12

Jurisprudence, 16, 193 f.

Justification; of claim, 204; of de-
cision, 196; of goal, 154

Kaplan, A., 28, n. 15
Kaplan, M., 27, n. 4; 27, n. 5
Katz, J., 121, n. 13
Katzenbach, N. de B., 27, n. 5
Kaufman, H., 67, n. 20
Kautilya, 10; 27, n. 7
Kautsky, J. H., 145, n. 4

INDEX

251

Kelley, H. H., 120, n. 1
Kelley, S., 66, n. 10
Kennedy, J., 121, n. 5
Kent, A., 88, n. 16
Kety, S. S., 237, n. 21
Key, V. O., 66, n. 14; 67, n. 15
Kinnard, W. N., 87, n. 4
KiRKPATRICK, J. E., 65, n. 1
KisHAMOTo, H., 66, n. 10
Klineberg, O., 121, n. 3
KoLB, L. C, 121, n. 2
Kornhauser, W., 121, n. 15
Kramer, S. N., 26, n. 3
Kris, E., 163, n. 1
Kuhn, T. S., 165, n. 8

Lane, R. E., 28, n. 14; 88, n. 13;

188, n. 11
Laski, H. J., 168-169; 186, n. 1
Lasswell, H. D., 26, n. 1; 27, n.

15; 65, n. 7; 66, n. 13; 67, n.

72; 86, n. 2; 120, n. 1; 121,

n. 5; 121, n. 6; 145, n. 3; 146,

n. 8; 164, n. 5; 165, n. 10-12;

235, n. 7
Latham, E., 29, n. 24
Laves, W. H. C, 29, n. 18
Law, and political science, 21, 40,

193 f.
Lazarsfeld, p. p., 65, n. 4; 67,

n. 15; 187, n. 3
Leadership role, 10, 13-14
L'ficole Libre des Sciences Poli-

tiques, 18
Leiserson, a., 66, n. 14
Leites, N., 67, n. 18; 121, n. 6;

238, n. 27
Lerner, D., 29, n. 21; 120, n. 1;

146, n. 8; 187, n. 3; 237, n.

25
Lerner, M., 206, n. 2
Lewis, C. D., 216

Library of Congress, 21, 35
Life, traits of, 5, 218, 222, 232
LiFTON, R. J., 66, n. 1 1
Lindblom, C. E., 28, n. 15
LiNDEMANN, F. A., 236, n. 20
LiNDZEY, G., 65, n. 4
LipPMANN, W., 206, n. 2
LiPSET, S. M., 29, n. 21; 66, n. 13;

164, n. 3
LisKA, G., 27, n. 4
Locke, J., 215

Logic, fallibility criticized, 194
Los Angeles, studies in, 118
Lowell, A. L., 4
LowENTHAL, L., 66, n. 12-13;

166, n. 12
LuBELL, S., 67, n. 15

M
McClelland, C, 145, n. 2
McClelland, D. C, 65, n. 2
McDougal, M. S., 27, n. 5; 42,

n. 4-5; 67, n. 22; 206, n. 5;

235, n. 7
McGee, p. J., 234, n. 1
Machines, in research, 84, 133
Machol, R. E., 88, n. 16
Mackenzie, H. C, 187, n. 6
McPhee, W., 146, n. 5
McRae, D., 68, n. 23
Madison, J., 4
Man, traits of, 5
Management role, 10, 13
Mangone, G. J., 145, n. 4
Manning, B., 207, n. 6
March, J. G., 88, n. 14; 121, n. 1
Martin, E. M., 67, n. 19
Martin, R. C, 87, n. 5
Martyrs, lack of, 183
Marvick, D., 29, n. 21; 87, n. 4
Marx, K., 2-3, 151-152
Masland, J., 29, n. 26
Mason, S. F., 165, n. 8

252

INDEX

Massel, M. S., 29, n. 23

Mathematics, and political sci-
ence, 231

Matthews, R. D., 29, n. 21

Maturation, 176

Mayo, E., 106

Meerloo, J. A. M., 66, n. 11

Melman, S., 29, n. 26

Merriam, C. E., 37-38; 65, n. 7;
158 f.; quot. 160-161

Method, legal, 195 f.

Metzger, W. p., 65, n. 1

Meyerhoff, H., 236, n. 20

Michigan, University of, 88, n. 1 1 ;
165, n. 9

Michigan-Okayama study, 19

MicHELs, R., 3, 150-151

Micromodeling, 124

Miller, G. A., 238, n. 30

Miller, J. G., 237, n. 21

Miller, P., 237, n. 23

Miller, W. E., 67, n. 15

MiLLETT, J. D., 27, n. 9

Millikan, M. F., 145, n. 4

Milne, R. S., 187, n. 6

Miranda, political, 65, n. 7

Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, 19, 215

MiTTMAN, B., 88, n. 16

Models, political, 89 f., 138 f.

Montesquieu, Baron de, 3

Montgomery, J. D., 145, n. 4

Mood, and images, 176

Moore, C., 234, n. 2

More, Sir T., 2

MORGENTHAU, H., 145, n. 4

Mosca, G., 65, n, 7

M.U.L.L., 88, n. 16; 146, n. 6

MuNTz, M. K., 236, n. 18

Murphy, A. E., 42, n. 6

Murray, H. A., 164, n. 2

Mysticism, 155

Myth, political, 65, n. 7

N
Naess, a., 164, n. 6
National Education Association,

27, n. 9
Needham, N. J. T. M., 236, n. 13
Neugebauer, O., 236, n. 13
Neumann, J., 146, n. 5
Neuwirth, G. S., 86., n. 1
Nevins, a., 165, n. 9
Newman, R., 122, n. 13
1984, 2

Nivison, D. S., 27, n. 7; 234, n. 2
Norms; see Prescribing phase
North, R., 29, n. 21
North Carolina, University of, 88,

n. 15
Northrop, F. S. C., 207, n. 5

O'Connor, M. J. L., 186, n. 2
Odegard, p. H., 165, n. 10
Operations, 66, n. 8
Operations Research Office, 28, n.

13
Opler, M. K., 121, n. 4
Oppenheim, F., 187, n. 3
Optimum years, for learning, 175

f.
Orwell, G., 2

Oslo, University of, 88, n. 11
Otto, M. C, 42, n. 6
Outcomes, of decisions, 47, 55, 60,

63, 71, 76, 79, 93, 200, 205,

231

Padover, S. K., 206, n. 2
Parallel events, in politics, 91, 201
Park, R. L., 67, n. 17

INDEX

253

Parochialism, syndrome of, 6

Partial incorporation, 151

Participants, in politics, 47-48, 57,
61, 69, 77, 80, 92, 203, 205

Peltason, J., 206, n. 4

Penrose, B., 34; 42, n. 3

Perry, J. W., 88, n. 16

Personality growth, and education,
176f.

Perspectives, in politics, 47; 50;
57; 61; 65, n. 8; 69; 73; 80;
92

Ph.D., 169 f.

Philosophy, and political science,
41; see also Goal thinking

Photodocumentation, 173

Physics, and political science, 218
f., 232

Pickles, W., 187, n. 6

Pilot study, 98

Pinner, F. A., 29, n. 18

Plamenatz, J., 187, n. 6

Planck, M., 223

Planetarium, social, 140 f.

Planning, 87, n. 9

Plato, 2, 10, 21, 215

PoLANYi, M., 121, n. 10

Policy sciences; see Problem-solv-
ing

Policy thinking, 2, 126, 157, 233 f.

Political Power, 160

Political Science and Constitu-
tional Law, 193

Political science profession,
needed? 38 f., 161 f., 242

Pool, I. de Sola, 29, n. 21; 146,

n. 5
Postarena events, in decision, 91-

92
Powell, T, R., 193
Power; science and technology, 9;
theory, 91

PowicKE, F. M., 42, n. 1
Practice, social, 66, n. 8
Pragmatism, 155
Prearena events, in decision, 91,

201
Precipitating events, in decision,

91, 201
Pre-Congress, proposed, 142-143
Prehistory; see Archaeology
Prelegislatures, proposed, 142 f.
Preoutcomes, in decision, 200-201
Preparatory phase, in decision,

101, 201
Prescribing phase, in decision, 15,

20 f., 61 f.
Pribram, K., 238, n. 30
Price, D. J. de Solla, 236, n. 13
Primary norms, in prescription,

200
Princeton Institute for Advanced

Study, 212
Pritchett, H. C, 87, n. 8; 206,

n. 4
Problem - solving, approach, 1-2,

133, 196, 211, 221, 231 f.
Procedure, principles of, 155, 208
Professional conduct; code of, 179

f.; in public debate, 144
Professional roles, 10
Projective thinking, 2, 126, 157,

215 f.; value projections, 223

f.
Promoting phase, of decision, 15,

19f., 57f.
Prototyping; and experiment, 112

f.; and self-observation, 113 f.;

method of, 99 f.
Psychology, and political science,

226 f.
Public image, 34
Public order, 121, n. 11; 205
PusHKAREV, B., 87, n. 9
Pye, L., 237, n. 27

254

INDEX

Radakrishnan, S., 234, n. 2

Radway, L. I., 29, n. 26

RAND Corporation, 28, n. 13j

145, n. 2
Ranney, a., 65, n. 4
Rapaport, D., 237, n. 27
Rapoport, D. C, 29, n. 26
Rappoport, a., 27, n. 4; 164, n. 4
Ray, D. p., 187, n. 3
Realistic jurisprudence, 16, 143 f.
Reason, 152
Recommending, phase of decision,

15
Rectitude; science of, 233; values

and institutions, 233
Redfield, R., quot. 225; 226; 237,

n. 26
Redford, E. L., 29, n. 25
Referentiality, 221
Rejection, by partial incorpora-
tion, 151
Religion, and research, 184
Republic, 2
Research; inhibition of, 183 f.;

role, 10-12; strategy, 85;

training, 165 f.
Respect; science of, 233; values

and institutions, 233
Responsibility, clarification of, 213

f.
Retrieval; data, 88, n. 16; 146, n.

6; and storage, 135
Revolution, in education, 1 75 f .
RiESMAN, D., 187, n. 7
RiKER, W. H., 27, n. 4
Rise and Growth of American

Politics, 190
Robinson, J. A., 88, n. 12
Rockefeller Foundation, 37, 161
RoGow, A., 66, n. 13; 187, n. 8
RoKEACH, M., 166, n. 12
RoKKAN, S., 88, n. 12

Roper Center, Williams College,

87, n. 11
Rosenberg, M., 65, n. 4
RosENBLUM, V. C, 206, n. 4
Rosenthal, F., 234, n. 2
Ross, A., 207, n. 5
Ross, J. F. S., 187, n. 6
Rossi, P. H., 87, n. 10
RosTEN, L. C, 66, n. 12; 206, n. 2
Rotational cycle, at center, 229 f.
Rousseau, J. J., 2; modified, 226
RuBENSTEiN, R., 121, n. 9; 121,

n. 13
Rudolph, F., 165, n. 9

Saint-Simon, Comte de, 151

Sanctioning norms, and prescrip-
tion, 200

Sanctions; and conditioning, 25,
177 f.; severe and mild, 205

Sapir, B. M., 29, n. 26

Sarton, G., 236, n. 13

Sayre, W., 67, n. 20

ScHEiN, E. H., 66, n. 11

Scheler, M., 238, n. 29

ScHELLiNG, T. C, 27, n. 4

Schilling, W. R., 29, n. 26

Schubert, G. A., 87, n. 8; 206,
n. 4

Schwartz, R. D., 42, n. 4

Science, and politics, 9, 157, 217 f.

Sciences; see Arts and sciences

"Scope and method," course in,
153

Scott, R. W., 87, n. 4

Self, 65, n. 7

Self-image, 35 f., 38 f.

Self-observation; and analysis, 132;
and prototyping, 113

Semantics, and syntactics, 195

Severity, demand for, 8

Sex, research on, 184-185

INDEX

255

Shackle, G. L. S., 88, n. 14
Shamasastry, R., 27, n. 7
Shame of the Cities, The, 192
Shapley, H., 215; 235, n. 9
Sign mechanisms, 90
Simon, H. A., 28, n. 15; 88, n. 14;

186, n. 3; 121, n. 1
Simulation, 88, n. 16; 135
Singh, J., 236, n. 18
Skill, and education, 176 f., 232
Skinner, B. F., 187, n. 5
Smith, B. L., 29, n. 18; 66, n. 12;

165, n. 11
Smith, M., 165, n. 9
Smith, T. V., 185; 188, n. 10
Snow, C. P., 236, n. 10
Snyder, R. C, 28, n. 15; 29, n.

26; 146, n. 7
Social Contract, 2
Social planetarium, proposed, 140

f.
Social Science Research Council,

37, 151-162
Social sciences, 232; 235, n. 5
Socialization, 175 f.
"Society" versus "individual," for-
mulation criticized, 227 f.
Sociological jurisprudence, 16
Sociology, and political science,

40 f.
Specification, of goal, 154
Speier, H., 145, n. 2
Stanford University, 31
Stanley, W., 218
Stapledon, O., 216
Steffens, L., 192
Stein, H., 122, n. 17
Stein, M. I., 121, n. 4
Stokes, D. E., 67, n. 15
Storage, and retrieval, 135
Storing, H. J., 164, n. 7; 166, n.

12
Strategies, political, 47, 54, 59, 63,

71, 74, 78, 81, 93, 204-205
Straus, L., 164, n. 4

Students, in political science, 18
Sturges, W. a., 42, n. 4
Subjective events, and nonsubjec-

tive events, 220 f.
Survey, organization of, 81 f.
Survey Research Center, 88, n. 1 1
Suzuki, D. I., 164, n. 6
SwANsoN, B., 87, n. 7
Sw^anson, G. E., 66, n. 9; 66, n.

12
Symbol mechanisms, 90
Syndrome, of parochialism, 6, 227
Syntactics, and semantics, 195
Systems, open and closed, 222

TAT, 97; 121, n. 4

Teaching; role of, 10-11; training

for, 167 f.
Technology, and politics, 9
Terminating, phase of decision,

16, 25 f., 80 f.
Theoretical models, 89 f.
Thibault, J. W., 120, n. 1
Thomas, J. A., 187, n. 6
Thomas, R., 234, n. 1
Thorndike, L., 236, n. 13
Thought, and action, 233 f.
Thrall, R. M., 88, n. 14
Timidity, and research, 184
Tinker, I., 67, n. 17
Training; for research 167 f.; for

teachers, 167 f.
Transempirical derivation, of goal,

154
Trend thinking, 2, 126, 157
Truman, D. B., 67, n. 23; 87, n.

6
Tukey, J. W., 187, n. 3
TuNNARD, C, 87, n. 9
Turner, J., 68, n. 23
Tyler, R., 235, n. 5

256

INDEX

UNESCO, 27, n. 10; 121, n. 3

Ungar, a., 88, n. 16

Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, 5
Universalism, versus parochialism,

227
University, limitations of a, 208 f.
Urban, 6
Utopia, 2

Vagts, a., 29, n. 26

Value, 66, n. 8; analysis of, 4, 90,
153 f., 204, 231; indulgence,
deprivation, 205; projections,
223 f.; see also Goal thinking

Van Dyke, V., 65, n. 4

Vassiliev, M., 237, n. 22

Verba, S., 121, n. 1

Vices, 100 f.

ViDicH, J., 67, n. 16

Violence, expectation of, 7-8

Vlassic, I., 235, n. 7

Voegelin, E., 164, n. 4; 164, n. 7

Voidness, and duration, 212 f.

VosE, C, 87, n. 3

Waddington, C. H., 164, n. 4;

238, n. 28
Wahlke, J. C, 67, n. 23
Waldo, D., 122, n. 17
Wallace, S., 165, n. 10
Waltz, K. N., 29, n. 26
Watts, A., 164, n. 6
Wealth, values and institutions,

232

Weidner, E. W., 19; 28, n. 18

Weiss, P., 234, n. 3

Wells, H. G., 216

Wertheimer, M., 163, n. 1

Westin, a., 42, n. 4

White, L. D., 87, n. 4; 165, n. 12

White, R. W., 164, n. 2

Williams College, 87, n. 1 1

Wilson, J. A., 26, n. 3

Wilson, L., 234, n. 1

Wilson, R. H. L., 122, n. 16; 236,
n. 17; 237, n. 21

Wilson, W., 3-4, 26, 34

Wisconsin, University of, 165, n. 9

Woglom, W. H., 164, n. 6

Wood, R. C, 67, n. 17

World revolution; nuclear center,
139; total and partial dif-
fusion, 139; total and partial
restriction, 139

Wright, A. P., 27, n. 7; 234, n. 2

Wright, Q., 20

Yale Law School, 88, n. 16; 146,

n. 6; 194
Yale Political Data Center, 87, n.

11
Yale Psychiatric Institute, 1 00 f .
Yale University, 31; 206, n. 5
Young, R., 65, n. 4

Zander, A., 120, n. 1
Zen Buddhism, 155
ZiMMER, H., 66, n. 11

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