

**HEADLINE
SERIES**



**FOREIGN POLICY
ASSOCIATION**

UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

JA
37
.H43
no. 107


SEP 26 1954

PERIODICAL
READING ROOM

**The U.S.
and the UN**

**Benjamin H. Brown
and Joseph E. Johnson**

THIRTY-FIVE CENTS



HEADLINE SERIES

The *U.S.* and the *UN*

*by Benjamin H. Brown
and Joseph E. Johnson*

Page 3

Talking It Over

Page 56

NUMBER 107

SEPTEMBER - OCTOBER 1954

JA
37
H 43
No. 107

The Authors

DR. JOSEPH E. JOHNSON, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace since 1950, was formerly Deputy United States Representative in the Interim Committee of the United Nations General Assembly; member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; and adviser and expert at the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences.

DR. BENJAMIN H. BROWN is a consultant, speaker and writer on international affairs. Former Deputy Secretary General of the United States Mission to the United Nations, he served as Technical Director of the American Assembly meetings on UN Charter Review in the summer of 1954. Before World War II he taught at Columbia University. Following wartime naval service, he was with United States Military Government in Germany.

HEADLINE SERIES, No. 107, September 20, 1954, published bimonthly by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 E. 46th St., New York 17, N. Y. JOHN W. NASON, President; VERA MICHELES DEAN, HEADLINE SERIES Editor; FELICE NOVICH, Assistant Editor. Subscription rates \$2.00 for 6 issues. Single copies, 35¢. ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER AUGUST 19, 1943, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879. Copyright, 1954 by FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC. Produced under union conditions and composed, printed and bound by union labor. Manufactured in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 54-12088

The U.S. and the UN

*by Benjamin H. Brown
and Joseph E. Johnson*


IN COMING MONTHS MUCH WILL BE HEARD OF the United Nations, pro and con.

One reason for this is that next year, when the UN will celebrate its tenth birthday, there will be a kind of stock-taking. The people who wrote the Charter provided in Article 109 that if no conference to review the Charter had been held before 1955, the General Assembly must in that year consider calling such a conference.

Another reason for increased discussion of the UN in this country is that some Americans are beginning to doubt the utility of the world organization. A few feel it is too powerful and threatens our independence. They say: "Let's get America out of the UN and the UN out of America."

Another group feels it is not strong enough. Some of these argue that we need world government. Some say: "Russian abuse of the veto has paralyzed the UN. Let's kick the Russians out and get down to business."


Between these extremes is a large group, probably a majority, who generally support the UN. But some are not entirely clear



Some think UN is too powerful

about what it is they are supporting. And others attach rigid conditions, saying that if we are outvoted and cannot have our own way on this or that issue, then we ought to withdraw.

This reappraisal comes at a time of great peril. Communism is making great gains in Southeast Asia. The Western alliance



Some think UN is too weak

is dangerously divided. Over every man's horizon towers the gigantic mushroom cloud of the new hydrogen age.

It is more important than ever that Americans get their facts straight about the UN and America's interest in it. For if we decide wrongly about its future, we may be in for a very bad time indeed.

Why the U.S. Joined the UN

IN 1945 THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES approved the United Nations Charter by the overwhelming majority of 89 to 2.

The vote surprised no one at the time. It seemed indeed as inevitable as the sunrise. At the end of the greatest war in history the voice of America was firm and decisive: Wartime cooperation with the Allies was to be followed by a cooperative effort to win a lasting peace.

Official planning for a postwar international organization had started early in the war. The planning was bipartisan, and both the executive and legislative branches of government were deeply involved. There was a conscious effort on all sides to apply the lessons of World War I, when President Wilson's "vest-pocket planning" was rewarded by the defeat of his League of Nations proposals in the Senate. In 1945 the effort culminated in the sending of a strong, bipartisan American delegation to the San Francisco Conference.

Private groups also carried out intensive preparations. One such group was the Commission to Study the Organization of the

Peace, under the leadership of Professor James T. Shotwell of the Carnegie Endowment. Another was the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, established by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America and headed by John Foster Dulles, who also served on the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference. Mr. Dulles has written that on this subject there was close cooperation among Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish groups.

Everyone who had his eyes open in 1945 knew that America was involved in the world—for keeps. American fighting troops were in Europe, Africa, Asia and on remote Pacific islands. Young airmen who departed from Midwestern farms were likely to send letters to their families a few days later from the other side of the world.

Transoceanic flights, which when the war began were still somewhat of a novelty, were by now a daily routine occurrence. The showering of London with pilotless V-1 and V-2 weapons in the last year of the war left little doubt that American cities could be targets in the next war.

Self-interest, therefore, was a basic element in America's decision to join the new world organization. The issue seemed to be survival itself. But survival of what? Not mere physical survival, for that usually can be purchased—by surrender.

No, survival to Americans meant then, as it means now, survival of American values, of liberty under law, of freedom of worship and of the mind, and of equal opportunity for all. So when we speak of "self-interest" in American foreign policy, we speak of interest closely allied with principle.

In America the eternal argument between "idealists" and "practical men" usually is a stale semantic exercise. It often ends with the mutual discovery that "enlightened self-interest" and "practical idealism" add up to the same thing.

In 1945 "idealists" and "practical men" worked together to ensure solid American backing for the UN.

Was the UN 'Oversold'?

It often is said that the UN in 1945 was "oversold" to the American people. This assertion contains an element of truth, but it would be more accurate to say that Americans oversold themselves.

In 1945 moral revulsion against the horror of war made the thought of another almost intolerable. Wishful thinking led to oversimplification. Many felt that the League of Nations had failed mainly because the United States had not joined it. They were tempted to think—and did—that with the United States a leading member, the new world organization was bound to succeed. This view has not been proved wrong, but the over-optimism to which it led received a rude shock when the hard realities of the postwar world began to be understood.

It also was tempting to believe that Russia really wanted collective security and that the wartime unity of Russia and the West would remain unshaken in the postwar world. This bit of wishful thinking, in which both officials and ordinary citizens indulged, probably generated more false hopes than any other.

The disappointment of such hopes has produced a sharp reaction against the UN in some quarters. Yet the troubled state of the world in 1954 makes the need for the organization greater, not less. It is more, and not less, important that Americans try to understand its strengths and weaknesses.

The UN has some notable achievements to its credit. In meeting unforeseen challenges of the postwar era it has shown an unexpected capacity for growth and adaptation. Had the pitfalls and perils of the postwar period been foreseen in 1945, only an incurable optimist would have predicted that the UN could survive at all.

But it has survived, and in nine years much has been learned of what it can and cannot do. The problem of the years to come is to put this hard-won knowledge to practical use.

What Is the UN?

THE UN HAS BEEN CALLED A LOT OF NAMES, good and bad. It has been called a "parliament of man," a community of nations, an organization of sovereign states, the "town meeting of the world," a "glass house" and a number of other things which it happens, in fact, to be. It also has been called many things which it is not: a world government, creeping socialism, a mere debating society and a few other things which had better be left unmentioned.

A Human Institution

The long and short of the matter is that the UN is a human institution, and like most human institutions—the family, for example—it assumes different aspects to different observers. As the sociologist, clergyman and economist—not to speak of father, mother and children—are likely to differ in their views of the family, so every observer is apt to have his own image of the UN.

On the charts the UN appears as a galaxy of commissions and committees grouped loosely around several "major organs." Most charts leave little doubt that the General Assembly is the most important organ of the UN. It certainly is. The Security Council

has an honored place in the charts but in practice is losing most of its importance. In actuality it is perhaps less important now than the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council, which are under the authority of the General Assembly and seldom take final action on important matters.

Most of the lesser stars of the UN constellation revolve around the Economic and Social Council, known for short as ECOSOC. The commissions under ECOSOC reveal the tremendous variety of UN concerns, ranging from the status of women to the control of narcotic drugs.

In the "outer heavens" of the charts are those giant and distant stars, the specialized agencies. Each of these has its own charter or constitution and its own membership, overlapping that of the UN and usually including certain states that are not UN members. The specialized agencies enjoy a high degree of independence but are related to the UN by special agreements and are in some respects subject to UN coordination.

Not a World Government

Watching the General Assembly in action, one grasps the reality of the fact that the UN is not a world government. The 600 representatives and alternate representatives of the 60 member states are in every sense *national* delegations. They consult their governments for instructions in all important issues. Occasionally, when time is short, they do this by telephone from the Delegates' Lounge. The UN switchboard handles calls to and from all parts of the world.

The General Assembly cannot take decisions which are binding on member governments. It can only recommend. The sole "decision-making body" in the UN is the Security Council, and there the great powers, including the United States, are protected by a veto.

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals of 1944 specified that the organization which was to become the United Nations should be

based "on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states." The substance of this language is retained in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter. The same article states that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Some members have used this language to justify their protest against any attempt by the UN even to discuss matters which they feel are in their domestic jurisdiction. Although a member cannot prevent *discussion* of a matter against the wishes of the majority, it can without doubt deny effect to a UN resolution within its borders. The Union of South Africa, for example, has blocked every effort to bring South-West Africa, a mandate of the old League of Nations, into the jurisdiction of the UN. Likewise, the Soviet members have refused to allow the UN to investigate conditions in forced-labor camps in their territory.

If the UN is not a world government, neither can it be described as a "club of like-minded members." There are some who would like to make it so and to use it as a club in another sense to accomplish this or that special purpose. They can scarcely succeed as long as the UN mirrors the real variety in the world around it. The fact that important resolutions require a two-thirds majority for passage in the General Assembly virtually insures that the interest of most major blocs and regions will be taken into account in any resolution which is adopted.

A Diplomatic Glass House

The late Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican of Michigan, called the Assembly the "town meeting of the world." Much of what delegates say in the Assembly is said for "home consumption." Much of it is directed primarily at "public opinion abroad." Seldom do delegates talk to each other in public debate. More often than not they are talking to the press gallery and to the radio and television outlets.

The UN practice of "open diplomacy" makes this inevitable. The UN is a "glass house" figuratively as well as literally. The proceedings are recorded, reported, photographed and commented upon on a vast scale. Delegates sometimes wonder whether they are not more in the business of public relations than diplomacy.

There are some who feel that this is not the best way to get the business of diplomacy done. But the decision went against them when it was decided that meetings generally should be public and that most of them would be held in the city of New York—possibly the world's greatest center for "pressure groups" and the mass information media.

Audience Talks Back

The audience at the town meeting of the world talks back vigorously to the people on the stage. In the United States and in many other member countries any citizen can write to his UN delegate—and sometimes when the mailbags are bulging, it seems as if most of them were availing themselves of the privilege. The mail is carefully read, and answered if humanly possible. The present American ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., like his predecessor, Ambassador Warren R. Austin, is frequently in the office nights and week ends taking care of his mail.

At press conferences, too, delegates are made aware of what the "town hall" audience is thinking. Reporters attending UN press conferences send their stories or beam their broadcasts to the 48 states and to some 70 or 80 countries. Their editors and program managers keep them informed of what the "people at home" are thinking. The questions asked at press conferences reflect these trends of opinion and tip delegates off when their policies are not receiving public support. The delegates seldom have the power to change policy themselves; but many of them are high in the councils of their governments and can exercise a vital influence on the shaping of policy. The American representative is appointed by the President of the United States. He

can and does "carry a decision to the President" whenever he feels it is important enough to do so.

Many great nongovernmental organizations, both national and international, have permanent observers stationed at the UN. These observers keep their members informed of what is going on in the UN and keep UN delegates informed of what their members are thinking. Some—those of the International Chamber of Commerce and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, for example—may participate without vote in meetings of the Economic and Social Council and its commissions.

A Continuing Conference

The UN has been called a "continuing international conference." This indeed is one of its most significant aspects. The delegates of the 60 member states and the "observers" of many nonmember states are in constant contact with each other.

They are engaged in what the professionals have come to call "multilateral diplomacy" in contradistinction to traditional "bilateral diplomacy." The immediate object, as in a national legislature, is to build up a satisfactory majority. The great powers of course wield the major influence, but they cannot always have their own way. Ethiopia's vote is as important as that of Britain, and there are more small powers than large.

The new multilateral diplomacy goes on almost around the clock. On an average busy day during a General Assembly it carries a UN delegate through his morning delegation meeting, private consultations, a public morning meeting at UN headquarters, an official luncheon, more private consultation before an afternoon public meeting, a regional caucus, a formal reception, an official dinner, and frequently a late evening caucus in a Manhattan delegation office.

These are not occasions of relaxed social intercourse. They are all part of the day's work. The discussion of policy, strategy and tactics goes on with few interruptions.

What is unique about this "continuing international conference" is its scope. The agenda of the major UN organs, taken together, constitute a check-list of most of the world's major problems. The list has included Germany, Korea, disarmament, human rights, the economic development of underdeveloped areas and some of the explosive "colonial issues" such as Tunisia and Morocco. Matters not on the formal agenda also are frequently discussed, for the UN headquarters is a good place for officials to float trial balloons and try out their views on others.

Sometimes a question which cannot be settled in public debate is successfully handled in private. The Russian blockade of Berlin, which was countered by the dramatic Allied airlift, was brought to an end following informal meetings between Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, representing the United States, and Jacob Malik, representing the Soviet Union.

Role of Secretariat

Apart from the meetings and conferences and apart from the individual and collective acts of member states, the UN has a separate and somewhat independent existence in the person of the Secretary-General (now Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden, who in 1953 succeeded Trygve Lie of Norway) and in the international staff, known as the Secretariat, which serves under him. The Charter lists the Secretariat as one of the "principal organs" of the UN. The Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer; he makes an annual report to the General Assembly; and he may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which he feels endangers international peace and security.

In helping to "implement" resolutions of UN organs, the Secretariat acts as the servant of the members, but it assumes the character of a "corporate entity," separate and to some extent independent of the members and acting on its own within limits set by resolutions. The heads of the UN Relief Agencies in Palestine and Korea and the chief of the Truce Supervision

Organization in Palestine, for example, are UN officers. They do not act as citizens of national states, but as international civil servants.

The Secretary-General and members of the Secretariat sometimes play important roles in behind-the-scenes negotiations among delegations. As experienced diplomats, they can help overcome disagreements and smooth the way for the decisions which are taken in public meetings.

Regional Arrangements Within UN

It should not be supposed that the United Nations is—or ever was supposed to be—a complete substitute for bilateral and regional diplomacy. It is generally recognized that countless matters are better dealt with through these older traditional forms. Article 52, paragraph 2, of the Charter, for example, states that UN members “shall make every effort” to settle local disputes through their regional agencies before appealing to the Security Council.

On the basis of this provision the United States, Brazil and Colombia argued in the summer of 1954 in the Security Council that the UN should not consider the Guatamalan case until the Organization of American States had had a try at settling it. Certainly, no one will argue that the UN ought to try to do everything, but the debate as to where the line should be drawn raises constitutional questions of some importance.

The UN may be thought of as a world organization where problems of world-wide concern are dealt with by the representatives of the peoples of the world in the light of the Charter principles which their governments are pledged to uphold. They do not uphold these principles at all times. Some seem to reject them completely; and most are not above cutting the corners sharply when self-interest dictates. But the pledges are nevertheless a real force. Any government which tries to forget its pledge will doubtless be reminded of it and will have to try to

justify its conduct in the light of its promises. Even totalitarian governments have shown time and again that they respect world opinion and are worried when opinion is aroused against them.

The UN is a living institution. It is growing and changing all the time in response to new challenges and new needs. As long as it continues to grow and develop, it will be a subject of controversy and it probably also will be a real force working for peace.

Above all, for Americans, the UN is a place where American representatives have worked and can continue to work to protect America's interests and advance America's purposes in the world. It has been said that the preamble and statement of principles of the Charter reflect the loftiest aspirations of the American people and offer a convenient statement of basic American foreign policy. This is a fact of no small importance. It is no doubt true, as Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., United States representative to the UN has said, that if we did not have this organization, we should have to try to create it without delay.

The UN in a Changing World

THE NINE YEARS SINCE THE SAN FRANCISCO Conference have been years of revolutionary change.

These years saw the birth of the Atomic Age; and then, almost before the world knew what had struck it, the Hydrogen Age was born.

The wartime alliance between the West and the Soviet Union broke down. The cold war, each side armed with the new "absolute weapons," became an everyday fact of life.

Nationalist revolutions shook the established colonial order in Asia and Africa. International communism schemed to use the new nationalism to turn the world balance against the Western democracies.

As if these difficulties were not enough, the world had to continue to grapple with major problems produced by the Second World War. In 1954 armies still were quartered in former enemy territory, and Germany, Austria and Korea remained divided.

It is not surprising that these stresses and strains have been felt in the UN. The surprising thing, perhaps, is that the UN has survived. It has not been able to control the new forces; but neither have they succeeded in destroying the UN.

The UN has proved to be resilient and tough; it has staying power. One reason for this is to be found in the nature of the Charter itself.

The Living Charter

The UN Charter is not a precise legal document. As the product of the rough give-and-take of a series of political conferences, it contains many compromises, ambiguities and apparent contradictions. Here are a few examples:

(1) The "founding fathers" bowed to what appeared in 1945 to be the "realities of power" by giving the five big countries—the United States, the U.S.S.R., Britain, China and France—special rights and responsibilities in the Security Council. The desire of small powers for an equal voice and vote was met by placing all members on an equal footing in the General Assembly.

(2) The Charter gives the Security Council "primary responsibility" for keeping the peace. But it gives the General Assembly wide powers of discussion and recommendation in this and other fields.

(3) The Assembly's power of discussion and recommendation is limited by Article 2, paragraph 7, which provides, as we have seen, that the UN shall not intervene in matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." But "essentially" was not defined in the Charter.

(4) Article 52 provides, as we have seen, that members belonging to regional agencies shall try to settle local disputes through these agencies "before referring them to the Security Council." Under Article 35, on the other hand, any member "may bring any dispute . . . to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly."

On the whole these and other such ambiguities have been a source of strength, not weakness. Like the American Constitution, the UN Charter has grown by construction and interpretation. Amid the growing body of precedents and experience can be discerned what scholars call "the living Charter." It is comparable to the "living Constitution." In many ways it is more important than the written Charter adopted at San Francisco.

The divided world, signalized in the UN by the Soviet vetoes,

has been the chief barrier to the functioning of the written Charter along intended lines. The "living Charter" is largely the record of the search of other members for a free passage around this barrier.

Armed Forces and Disarmament

One of the highways of cooperation envisaged at San Francisco was to stem from Article 43, which contemplated the creation of an international military force under the Security Council to keep the peace. The force was to be organized and directed by a Military Staff Committee of top military men from the Big Five countries. Construction of this highway was blocked early by Soviet opposition. After 1948 the project was all but abandoned.

Failure to create an international force made it almost inevitable that negotiations for the regulation of national armaments would fail too. The authors of the Charter assumed that peace must be backed by force, and that, therefore, an effective system of collective security would have to be built before the nations would seriously consider disarming. Events have not proved them wrong.

When it became clear that these highways toward peace and security were blocked, the search for detours began in earnest.

Article 51 Pacts

One route led through Article 51, which affirms that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." This path had been charted by the American states, which agreed in the Rio Pact of 1947 that an armed attack on one "shall be considered as an attack against all."

When the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia alerted Western Europe to the growing Soviet menace, Britain,

France and the Benelux powers pledged in the 1948 Brussels treaty that if one should be attacked in Europe, the others would rally round with "all military and other aid . . . in their power." In the following year the North Atlantic Treaty powers agreed that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."

These pacts, like the Rio treaty, made specific reference to Article 51 and affirmed the determination of the signatories to uphold the principles of the Charter. They admittedly were substitutes for a system of universal collective security. They were, however, a realistic response to the disagreeable but undeniable fact of Soviet hostility. They signified the willingness of the Western powers to back the words of the Charter with deeds.

Collective Action in Korea

Another road toward collective security was hastily mapped out and constructed in 1950 when the Communists launched their attack across the 38th Parallel in Korea. As we shall see in the next chapter, the Republic of Korea was in a very real sense "the child of the UN." Yet the UN had no troops at its disposal to protect its offspring; and none of the pacts referred to above could be used in the Far East. In the emergency the United States took the lead, which was subsequently confirmed by the Security Council. The Council then requested the United States to establish a "unified command," to which member states were asked to contribute troops. The "unified command" was to serve as an executive military authority on behalf of the UN. It was an improvised substitute for the system envisioned in Article 43.

The improvised structure did not produce perfect results, but it enabled the UN to act—and the action was by no means a failure.

Next to the South Koreans themselves, the United States bore the brunt of the fighting against the Communists. The United

States Department of Defense estimated that of every 100 men in combat with the enemy at any given moment, 52 were Koreans, 38 were Americans and 10 were other UN troops. These "other UN troops" were supplied by 15 member states. They included Australians, Belgians, Britishers, Canadians, Colombians, Dutch, Ethiopians, Filipinos, Frenchmen, Greeks, Luxembourgers, New Zealanders, South Africans, Thais and Turks—about 36,000 men in all, or two divisions of infantry plus a fighter squadron.

It has been estimated by Ambassador Lodge that at least three additional divisions might have been forthcoming from other countries had United States military authorities not refused offers of troops because of anticipated supply and organizational difficulties.

Many believe that the United States would have had to go to the aid of the South Koreans alone if necessary, in order to deny the Communists a jumping-off place against Japan. On this assumption, Ambassador Lodge has estimated that the two divisions of troops supplied by other UN countries saved the American taxpayer at least \$600 million a year.

Great quantities of nonmilitary assistance also were furnished, including much-needed medical supplies, soap, rubber, wheat, clothing and blankets.

This was not collective action according to the letter of the Charter. But it was a truly international operation which went far toward giving effect to the spirit of the Charter.

Asian countries made a notable contribution. The Philippines and Thailand sent troops. Burma, Cambodia and Pakistan sent great quantities of foodstuffs. India, a leader of the so-called neutralist powers, sent a field ambulance unit, medical supplies and a giant shipment of jute bags estimated to be worth more than \$165,000. At the end of the fighting the Indian general, K. S. Thimayya, with a fine body of troops under his command, played a significant part in helping to carry out the difficult

armistice provisions relating to the disposition of prisoners of war.

Above all, this first international police action in history was successful. The aggression was repelled. The Communist armies were driven back across the 38th Parallel.

Development of General Assembly

Another road toward collective security under the Charter lay in the development of the power of the General Assembly to act when the Security Council was tied up by a Soviet veto. The Western powers began cutting a trail toward the General Assembly in the UN's early years. The trail was widened and paved when the Assembly adopted the "Uniting for Peace" resolution by an overwhelming majority in the fall of 1950.


The Acheson Plan, which was incorporated in this resolution, represented an effort to make practical use of some of the lessons learned from the Korean war. Here are the lessons and the means adopted to put them to use:

(1) As will be seen in the next chapter, a UN commission was luckily on the spot in June 1950 and was able to send the secretary-general an immediate first-hand report of the aggression. The plan established a Peace Observation Committee to be available to go to troubled areas to perform this vital function in the future.

(2) In June 1950 the Security Council was able to act because of a temporary Soviet boycott in protest against the Council's refusal to seat a Chinese Communist delegate. The plan provided for a special session of the General Assembly on 24-hour notice in case a veto blocked Council action against any future aggression. The Assembly resolved that in such event it would "consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations . . . for collective measures."

(3) The UN could hardly afford to rely again on its ability to improvise a field army in an emergency. It therefore asked members to maintain military forces "so trained, organized and

Some of General Assembly Jobs



equipped” that they could promptly serve as UN units. It also established a Collective Measures Committee to follow through on the troop problem, taking account of the Article 51 defense pacts referred to earlier in this chapter. The 1951 report of the Collective Measures Committee contains, ready for use, an elaborate blueprint for economic, political and military sanctions in future UN action against aggression.

In particular, the committee recommended the use of an “executive military authority” to meet future cases of aggression.

The device has not been used again—but the General Assembly could at any time in case of need ask one or more members to set up such an authority.

In the hypothetical case described in the next chapter it is indicated how the device might be used in *anticipation of an aggression* or in a case where the issues are not at first clearly enough defined to justify UN military intervention.

Indochina was apparently such a case—but it was not brought to the UN, and therefore the question of appointing an executive military authority did not arise. While making no attempt to judge the matter, it is interesting to speculate whether the position of the Western powers in Indochina would not have been materially strengthened if the matter had been brought to the UN.

It is clear that only by use of an executive military authority can the UN work directly to repel an aggression as it did in Korea.


The concept of an executive military authority is a working tool. It is ready at hand in the toolbox. Perhaps it should not be allowed to rust if Communist expansion continues to threaten.

Economic and Social Cooperation

Those who established the UN knew that peace could not be maintained if the UN played only a policeman's role. The Charter therefore proclaims that "conditions of stability and well-being are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations." International economic and social cooperation designed to develop such conditions is mapped out in two chapters of the Charter, both beyond the reach of a big-power veto. In this sphere the UN has a chance to travel the main highways. It is not moving as fast as some would like, but at least it does not have to detour on bumpy secondary roads.

The work of the UN in the economic and social sphere is of no small importance to Americans. It may have a decisive effect in determining whether underprivileged peoples in Asia, Africa—and possibly even of Latin America—will fall for Communist propaganda or stand foursquare with the free world.

Contributions to Technical Assistance Program



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953

The UN technical assistance program offers an example of the constructive things that can be accomplished. Technical assistance experts have produced spectacular results in helping people help themselves to a better and more abundant life in key strategic areas all over the world. Roads have been built, crop-yields doubled or tripled, debilitating diseases eradicated, life expectancies increased, new industries introduced.

The United States normally has paid about 60 percent of the \$20 million to \$25 million available annually for the UN technical assistance program. However, the program is truly international in character. In 1953 recipient countries contributed nearly \$40 million in local currencies to defray local costs of projects. And underdeveloped countries themselves have furnished hundreds of experts for work in other underdeveloped countries.

Limited resources have kept the UN technical assistance program small in comparison to the bilateral United States programs. But there are many signs that underdeveloped countries, particularly those in Asia, are less willing to accept United States "charity" (with some strings usually attached) than to participate on a more equal footing in an international program under UN auspices.

If Americans really want to build up strong centers of resistance to Communist penetration, the expansion of the UN technical assistance program offers interesting possibilities.

Administration of Dependent Areas

Three chapters of the Charter lay the basis for the UN's work relating to the problems of dependent territories. Here, also, members have a chance to travel the broad highway mapped out at San Francisco, free of hampering Soviet vetoes. Here, too, the record of performance may vitally affect the future political alignment of underdeveloped countries in the East-West conflict.

UN members responsible for the administration of dependent

territories have accepted as a "sacred trust" the obligation of promoting the well-being of inhabitants of these territories. The Charter rather guardedly specifies that this includes the development of self-government as well as economic, social and educational advancement.

The high stakes of politics and strategy can be suggested by a partial listing of the territories in question. Morocco, Tunisia, Indonesia, Indochina, British Guiana, the Belgian Congo, Kenya, Malaya and Puerto Rico are, or until recently were, classified as nonself-governing territories within the meaning of the Charter.

India and other Asian and Arab members, usually supported by many Latin American states, and by the Russians for their own reasons, have made use of the broad language of the Charter to champion speedy independence of overseas territories of the so-called colonial powers. The latter generally feel that the tendency of the UN to give form and emphasis to these explosive forces is dangerous and should be curbed. Others argue that the UN is shaping safe channels of peaceful change through which the convulsive nationalist thrust of 20th-century Asia and Africa can work itself out.

The cleavage between "administering" and "nonadministering" powers in the colonial field is closely related to the split between "haves" and "have nots" in the economic and social field. It threatens the unity of the free world and gives the Soviet Union a chance to bid high in spectacular worthless promises for the sympathy and support of underprivileged peoples.

Whether the present processes of the UN tend to widen or narrow the split is a debatable question. Whatever the answer, the Western powers face an opportunity and a challenge to give effect in a progressive and orderly manner to the Charter pledge of advancement of dependent areas toward self-government.

Their success in doing this and in persuading the world of their good intentions may have an important bearing on the shape of things to come.

How the UN Works

A GOOD WORK OF DRAMATIC ART USUALLY FALLS into three clearly defined parts: a beginning, a middle and an end.

The same often is true of the handling of problems in the United Nations.

Act I takes place before a problem gets to the UN. It consists of what the professional foreign-service officer calls "governmental and diplomatic preparation." It usually unfolds in secret, although the curtain may from time to time be lifted by an enterprising correspondent or by a deliberate "diplomatic leak."

Act II is what the visitor to the UN headquarters sees—in part. It consists of public debate and continuing off-stage diplomatic activity at or near the UN headquarters. It usually is concluded by the adoption or rejection of one or more resolutions.

Act III is the stage of carrying decisions into effect. The nature of this stage varies from case to case. Much of it takes place far from UN headquarters and rarely is mentioned in the newspapers.

Let us construct a hypothetical "UN drama" as viewed by Americans and see how this can work out in practice. We have selected a "political" case; except for the urgency involved, its

main features might be found in the handling of problems in the economic, social or dependent area fields.

Act I: The Crisis Starts

PLACE: *Washington and London.* TIME: *The present.*

Top State Department officials in Washington arriving at their desks in the morning, find disturbing news in the overnight telegrams. The foreign minister of Country X summoned the American ambassador last evening and showed him reports of troop movements across the frontier in Country Y. There is evidence that Country Y is about to break off negotiations on disputed water rights which have long been a source of antagonism between the two countries. The foreign minister fears Country Y is preparing to launch a military attack to enforce its claims. He is considering an appeal to the UN. He hopes the United States will sponsor the case in the Security Council, of which his country is not a member.

American officials have long recognized that the X-Y area is of considerable strategic importance. The Soviet Union might take advantage of any disorder to intervene. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council have already decided that extension of Soviet influence in this direction would raise "grave questions affecting the security of the United States" and must be vigorously opposed.

Pooling of Information

At a meeting in the office of the Secretary of State the first order of business is a rapid pooling of information. Foreign ambassadors already have been in touch with the assistant secretaries, who report their conversations; cables from all over the world bring news of reactions in other countries. New messages from Country X indicate the situation is growing worse. There are unconfirmed reports of shooting at the frontier.

At length, the Secretary approves a tentative plan of action. Then he joins the Secretary of Defense and other Department

heads at a conference at the White House, where congressional leaders also are present. The problem is examined in all its ramifications. Ideas are tentatively advanced, criticized, discarded, accepted, pooled with other ideas. After several hours the meeting produces a plan which is unanimously recommended to the President. It involves various diplomatic, economic and military steps, including an appeal to the UN—first to the Security Council, then to the General Assembly if, as expected, the Soviet Union vetoes a Council resolution.

In the late afternoon, as newspapers hit the streets with stories of violence at the X-Y frontier, the President approves the plan.

In the State Department's communication room, NIACT (night action) cables start going out to American embassies all over the world, detailing the plan and asking them to seek the support of the "governments to which they are accredited." The diplomatic preparation is about to begin.


The scene shifts to London—it might shift to Paris or any one of a number of capitals where American diplomats are cancelling dinner engagements and preparing for a hard night's work.

Exchange of Ideas


It is evening in London—one of those evenings when correspondents note that the lights are burning later than usual in government offices in Whitehall. The American ambassador is calling on the foreign secretary in Downing Street across from No. 10. The foreign secretary has just emerged from a meeting with Commonwealth representatives. They think the American draft resolution may be a trifle strong. According to Commonwealth intelligence, Country Y may be willing to back down. A strong resolution, yes, but one that will offer a "carrot as well as a stick"—this, briefly, is the British and Commonwealth view.

The American ambassador resists amendments which he feels may "water down" the resolution. He notes that the Security Council is being asked to meet tomorrow morning. Time, therefore, is of the essence. But he will cable the "carrot idea" to

FAR-FLUNG ACTIVITIES



ACTIVITIES OF UN



Washington. He suggests that American and British UN representatives be asked to settle the final details before the Security Council meeting in the morning.

Act II: Search for Agreement

PLACE: New York. TIME: Several days later.

Things have been moving swiftly. As expected, the Anglo-American draft resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Security Council. Now the General Assembly is meeting in special session. There are indications that Country Y already may be coming to the conclusion that it has bitten off more than it can chew.

Intense diplomatic activity has taken place among the various blocs: Latin American, Commonwealth, NATO, and Arab-Asian. A much-revised draft resolution now commands wide support. The necessary two-thirds vote seems probable but not certain.

Let us pause a moment to glance at the draft resolution.

At the heart of it lies the idea of sending a seven-nation commission to the X-Y area for "conciliation and observation." Rather more emphasis is given to conciliation than was the case in the original American draft. After some "politicking" the proposed commission has what the diplomats call "good geographical balance"—that is, Latin America, Europe, Asia and the Middle East will have approximately equal representation.

'Carrot and Stick'

The resolution also would request the United States, Britain and a certain neutral state of the X-Y area to explore the possibility of establishing an "executive military authority" under which the UN could, if necessary, launch "united military action" to restore peace and security in the area. The Assembly would ask the executive military authority to swing into action if the commission reported that its conciliation efforts had failed and an aggression had occurred. This is a modified version of the "big stick" originally urged by the United States.

The "carrot idea," modified by the Asian-Arab group, has led

to the insertion of a paragraph under which a technical-assistance team would go to the disputed area and map out a plan for economic development with benefits for X and Y alike.

A controversial feature of the draft resolution is a paragraph condemning the Soviet Union for using its veto in the Security Council. Some delegates argue that this is an "unnecessary slap in the face," that it will increase tension instead of reducing it. India has introduced an amendment to delete the paragraph. It is understood that unless the amendment is adopted, India will not accept the "military authority" idea.

Much depends on the willingness of the United States to agree to the Indian amendment. At the last minute the American delegation still awaits instructions from Washington.

A "standing room only" crowd has gathered in the meeting room of the General Assembly's Political Committee. The room buzzes with excitement. The last speaker has been heard, and the committee stands in brief recess for private consultations before the vote is taken. It is rumored that the American representative is talking to the Secretary of State on the telephone. Here and there a flash bulb explodes: the photographers, as usual, are busy.

The chairman bangs his gavel. In their glass-enclosed booths the "simultaneous interpreters" hunch over their microphones.

The American representative asks for the floor. He announces on behalf of the sponsoring powers that they are happy to accept the "statesmanlike amendment offered by the government of India."

The role call begins. The affirmative votes mount. After a moment for tallying the votes, the chairman announces the adoption of the resolution by 52 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.

Act III: Peaceful Ending

PLACE: *A plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly.*

TIME: *Indefinite.*

It is difficult to say at what precise point in time this concluding scene should take place—probably several years later. But if every-

thing turns out as it can and should (and occasionally does), the play will have a happy ending.

Let us indulge our fancy and assume that such is the case.

The foreign minister of Country X is addressing the General Assembly. He recalls that the UN commission came to his country and set up a "border watch" of military observers. The commission's offer of good offices in the X-Y dispute was turned down by Country Y. Nevertheless, Y's threatening military activity gradually ceased, as Assembly delegates know from reading the commission's reports. For a year now the border has been quiet.

Country X sees no reason to ask the commission to remain longer. Its work is done. The foreign minister feels that if the Assembly will keep the X-Y case on its agenda for occasional review, this should be sufficient warning to Country Y not to repeat its mistake.

Country X deeply appreciates the promptness and vigor with which the United States, Britain and the neighboring neutral country put themselves in readiness to form a UN "executive military authority" in case of need. The generous offers of other member states to contribute troops and supplies have been a source of great satisfaction to the people of X. Fortunately, the need for "united military action" did not arise.

Meanwhile, the foreign minister continues, the UN technical-assistance team has mapped out a plan for the development of the area surrounding the disputed river. The project calls for the cooperation of both countries and the mutual sharing of the benefits. The government of X is prepared to begin now. The government of Y so far has refused. The offer still stands. Country X hopes the day will come when the valley will bloom and there no longer will be any reason to quarrel over it.

The foreign minister sits down amid prolonged applause.

Curtain.

The case of Country X versus Country Y is purely imaginary, but it combines a number of features which are familiar to veteran UN delegates.

The diplomatic preparation which precedes and frequently continues during the public debate is thoroughly characteristic. "UN business" is carried on not only at UN headquarters but in almost all the world's capitals. A delegation which is on its toes and is kept properly informed by cables from its foreign office has up-to-the-minute news on all these far-away developments.

Mediation and Fact-Finding

Another characteristic feature of the X-Y case is the use of a commission for observation and mediation, assisted by military observers. Similar commissions have done effective work in Indonesia, Kashmir, Greece and Korea.

In the first-named case the UN commission helped bring about a cease-fire agreement which finally ended a bloody colonial war between the Indonesians and the Dutch. It then helped the two parties to come to a fairly complete settlement of their differences. In an unusually happy ending the newly formed Republic of Indonesia was admitted as the 60th member of the UN.

In the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir the efforts of the UN commission were rewarded by a cease-fire agreement to which the two contending parties both adhered; but a final settlement is not yet in sight. UN military observers continue to patrol the cease-fire line in Kashmir, and the UN is still working on the broad political aspects of the problem.

In the Greek case, as in our imaginary X-Y example, the UN commission was unable to tackle the mediation problem, owing to the refusal of one side to cooperate. The Greek case arose from the complaint of the Athens government that Greek Communist guerrillas under General Markos were receiving aid from the Soviet satellite states to the north, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Although the Communist governments refused to recognize the authority of the commission, their aid to the rebels gradually trickled out, and the problem was to all intents and purposes solved. The United States-Greek aid program and the timely defection of Yugoslavia from the Kremlin were perhaps

mainly responsible for producing this happy result. It is generally conceded, however, that the presence of the UN commission, with military observers patrolling the northern frontiers of Greece, was an important contributory factor.

Whether or not the UN is allowed to mediate a dispute, great importance is attached to having UN representatives on the spot to get and report the facts. Fact-finding was significant in Indonesia, Kashmir and Greece; but nowhere was it more significant than in Korea.

The Case of Korea

A temporary UN commission was sent to Korea late in 1947—two and a half years before the outbreak of the Korean war. Its purpose was to observe elections for an all-Korean government which would end the artificial division of the country at the 38th Parallel. When the Communist authorities refused entry to the northern part, the commission proceeded with its assignment in the South and observed the elections which led to the establishment of the government of the Republic of Korea.

Later, when tension mounted at the 38th Parallel, the General Assembly asked a successor commission to continue observation and specifically to report any developments which might lead to military conflict. Military observers appointed by the commission were at work in Korea, gathering information of incidents and disturbances, several months before the outbreak of hostilities.

They were still there in June 1950, when the Communist armies struck. The commission then was able to render an immediate report. The prompt receipt by the secretary-general of a first-hand report of UN representatives was of great importance in clarifying the issues and fixing responsibility for the aggression. It exposed—as no report of any single government could possibly expose—the fraud behind the Soviet claim that the “Syngman Rhee clique” had started the war. It enabled the UN to act immediately without a lengthy debate to establish the facts.

In passing, one might recall one additional fact about the UN

Korean commission: one of its seven members was India. Possibly no outsider ever will know whether this helped win Indian support for the Security Council resolution determining that a breach of the peace had occurred and calling upon the aggressor to withdraw. It seems very possible that it did. In any event, there are strong practical reasons for the "wide geographical representation" which UN diplomats try to achieve when they establish a commission.

'Peacemaking' and 'Collective Measures'

Mention of India recalls another instructive feature of our imaginary case of Country X versus Country Y: the role of India in drafting the final resolution.

In our telling of the X-Y case, the idea of using a carrot as well as a stick emerged first as a British suggestion when the American ambassador called on the foreign secretary at the close of Act I. In all probability the carrot idea originally was advanced by India at the Commonwealth meeting which preceded the foreign secretary's interview with the ambassador.

British diplomats, as one of them has said, usually think "in Commonwealth terms." The neutralist Asian ingredient in Commonwealth thinking, supplied by India, Pakistan and Ceylon, often accounts for its middle-of-the-road character. A Commonwealth position on any political question must reconcile the interests of peoples of the North Atlantic area (with strong ties to the United States and Western Europe), of South Africa, South Asia and the Southwest Pacific. The Commonwealth is indeed "the cradle of many compromises."

In debate on cold-war questions, India usually strives to emphasize the UN's "peacemaking" functions rather than its "collective security" functions. This was evident throughout the Korean war, especially after the intervention of the Chinese Communists. At the instigation of India and other Commonwealth states influenced by Indian thinking, every major General Assembly resolution adopted thereafter on Korea contained a big carrot as

well as a stick (sometimes, in the American view, a stick that was quite small). An example is the resolution of February 1, 1951. The "stick" was the naming of Communist China as an aggressor and the expression of the UN's determination to continue its action against aggression. The "carrot" clause established a Good Offices Committee to seek a cessation of hostilities by peaceful means.

It is important to bear in mind this tendency of the Asian powers and now, to an increasing extent, of the leading Commonwealth powers to give at least equal if not greater stress to the "peacemaking" as against the "collective measures" functions of the UN. This often is an important factor in determining how the UN will work in any dispute involving cold-war questions.

The Important Two-Thirds

It is clear that in the political field the UN does *not* work the way the authors of the Charter expected that it would.

As it became apparent that the Security Council would be unable to carry out its primary responsibility for peace and security, these all-important functions passed largely to the General Assembly, as we have already seen. The transfer has been applauded, and with good reason, on the grounds that the General Assembly is a "veto-free" body. But the voting procedures of the General Assembly present difficulties of a different kind. Knowledge of these procedures is crucial to an understanding of how the UN works nine years after San Francisco.

Article 18 of the Charter states that decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. The article then enumerates certain categories of "important questions"; and one category is "recommendations with respect to the maintenance of peace and security."

Thus, if 60 members are present and voting, the necessary majority for adoption of a resolution on a "peace and security

question" is 40. Twenty-one votes, at most, are needed to block a resolution—usually less, since a number of members commonly are absent or abstain.

'Bloc'-Building

Delegates to the General Assembly habitually think in terms of "blocs" of votes—for example, the Latin American, Commonwealth, NATO and Arab-Asian blocs. The blocs are not by any means always solid, but in various combinations they often form the core of the magic majorities of "two-thirds of those present and voting." The combinations are formed on the basis of common interest. The sponsor of a resolution must try to identify a common interest of two-thirds of the voting members and express it in his resolution in order to command the necessary majority. It is a difficult and delicate task.

The Latin American bloc alone has 20 votes. The Arab-Asian group, when it holds fast, commands 13. The Commonwealth states, together with those of Western Europe and Scandinavia, which often act in concert with the Commonwealth, usually can muster 12 to 14. Any one of these blocs can, if it picks up a few "stragglers" from other groups, defeat a General Assembly resolution. When and if they are in opposition to the United States, they almost invariably can count on five votes from the Soviet group.

Thus, the Soviet Union has, in effect, one-quarter of a veto in the General Assembly. If it can find a group with the other three-quarters (15 or 16 votes at the most), it can paralyze the Assembly.

The United States, when it has solid Latin American support, as it often has on political questions, has the power to prevent action of the Assembly. It used this power in August 1953 to block a seat for India at the Korean peace conference.

In voting on certain types of questions two or more blocs often merge in a superbloc, as do the Arab-Asian and Latin American

states on many issues affecting the economic or political development of underdeveloped countries. On these questions they almost invariably pick up the five Soviet votes.

The NATO group combines some Commonwealth and Western Europe powers. It usually holds together on East-West cold-war issues and attracts a number of votes from the other non-Soviet groups.

During the fighting in Korea an interesting bloc was formed known as "the sixteen." It consisted of all UN member states having troops under the Unified Command in Korea. Whenever the Korean question is under discussion in the UN, "the sixteen" are in close and continuous consultation. During critical debates, their representatives met together privately almost every day.

Keeping the Score

Many UN diplomats carry "score cards" listing member countries by blocs. They tabulate advance indications as to how each country stands on important issues. Then, when time is short, they can tell at a glance "who needs to be persuaded."

At luncheons, dinners and receptions, where UN "politicking" goes on incessantly, it is not uncommon to see an adviser steal a glance at his score-sheet and then "buttonhole" a member of a "doubtful" delegation. Raiding "the other fellow's bloc" of votes has become a high art.

When important questions are pending, the game is played not only at UN headquarters but also in many of the foreign ministries of the world. Suppose Delegate A, for example, feels that a push from higher up is needed to sway Delegate B's vote. Delegate A then cables home asking his Foreign Office to order its ambassador in Country B to try to persuade the Foreign Office of Country B to change its position and issue the necessary instructions. The give-and-take of the "diplomatic preparation," with consequent negotiated changes in resolutions, often continues until a few hours before an important vote.

Blocs within United Nations

NATO GROUP	
UNITED STATES	
CANADA	
U. K.	
FRANCE	
NORWAY	
DENMARK	
ICELAND	
BELGIUM	
NETHERLANDS	
LUXEMBOURG	
TURKEY	
GREECE	

ARAB-ASIAN BLOC	
EGYPT	INDIA
SYRIA	PAKISTAN
LEBANON	BURMA
SAUDI ARABIA	THAILAND
AFGHANISTAN	INDONESIA
IRAQ	YEMEN
IRAN	

SOVIET BLOC	
U.S.S.R.	
UKRAINIAN S.S.R.	
BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R.	
POLAND	
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	

COMMONWEALTH BLOC	
UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
NEW ZEALAND	AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AFRICA	INDIA
PAKISTAN	

LATIN AMERICAN BLOC	
MEXICO	VENEZUELA
GUATEMALA	COLOMBIA
HONDURAS	ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR	PERU
NICARAGUA	BRAZIL
COSTA RICA	PARAGUAY
PANAMA	BOLIVIA
CUBA	URUGUAY
DOMINICAN REP.	ARGENTINA
HAITI	CHILE

THE SIXTEEN	
UNITED STATES	BELGIUM
CANADA	LUXEMBOURG
U.K.	GREECE
AUSTRALIA	TURKEY
NEW ZEALAND	THAILAND
SOUTH AFRICA	PHILIPPINES
FRANCE	ETHIOPIA
NETHERLANDS	COLOMBIA

The action, interaction and counteraction of the major blocs dominate the proceedings of the General Assembly. "The supreme object of the exercise," as one UN diplomat puts it, "is to get the necessary two-thirds. It is the most important fact of life in the General Assembly."

It is particularly important to the United States—for American leadership in the UN of today depends on our continued ability to put forward a program which will command the necessary two-thirds support.

The U.S. and Future of the UN

THE STORY IS TOLD THAT AN EMINENT STATESMAN recently was speculating about the future. He referred to the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, the possible development of a cobalt bomb—and to the further possibility that these might be placed in the warheads of intercontinental guided missiles. “In short,” he concluded, “the time might be soon at hand when it will be possible to exterminate the human race—without risking the life of a single aviator.”

Some feel that in times such as these it is idle to talk about the future of anything. Others reach a different conclusion—that it is more than ever necessary and urgent to talk about the future of the UN.¹

The next year or so will be “open season” for discussion of the UN. For under Article 109 of the Charter the UN General

¹This chapter has been adapted, with permission of the American Assembly, from an article by Mr. Brown in *The US Stake in the UN: Problems of United Nations Charter Review* (New York, American Assembly, Columbia University, 1954).

Assembly at its tenth session in the autumn of 1955 will have to decide whether to call a General Conference of member states to review the present Charter.

Should Charter Be Amended?

According to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the United States government now expects to be in favor of calling a review conference, and in all probability there will be one. He hopes that public discussion and debate in coming months will show the direction in which the American people want their government to move. American participation in the UN, he says, "is far more than a technical matter." It must carry with it "the full support and sympathy of the American people."

Many Americans favor holding a review conference in the belief that there are real possibilities of adopting amendments which will strengthen the UN. Others, agreeing with Mr. Dulles that America's participation in the UN must be wholehearted, are skeptical of the value of a Charter review conference. They argue that the present Charter is an adaptable instrument and that its continued evolutionary development offers the most realistic hope of meeting the needs of our times.

These observers feel the San Francisco Conference produced a wider area of international agreement than could be obtained now. It follows, in their view, that any revision is likely to be "revision backwards rather than forwards." They fear that American advocacy of far-reaching amendments might widen disagreement among the peoples of the free world to the profit of the Soviet Union. They warn that if the American people are encouraged to concentrate on drafting a blueprint for Utopia, there is grave danger that the ensuing disappointment and disillusionment will weaken the position of the United States in the world.

Mr. Dulles agrees with many of these arguments. He has warned against trying to write an entirely new Charter. If the ties of the UN are broken, he says, it will not be easy "to bring together in a new organization any large percentage of the present member-

ship." And he concludes: "The United Nations as it is, is better than no United Nations at all."

Nevertheless, Mr. Dulles is "not at all hopeless of being able to bring about some Charter amendments of importance, despite the existence of a Soviet veto." He points out that at San Francisco the Russians had a veto over changes in the formulas agreed upon at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1944; yet they accepted some changes which were not to their liking.

Self-Interest of the U.S.

Let us now examine, in the light of the self-interest of the United States, some of the issues which are likely to arise in discussions about the future of the UN.


The term "self-interest of the United States" is subject to various interpretations. There probably will be wide agreement that in foreign policy it involves the fostering of a world environment in which "the great American experiment in freedom" may go forward. But Americans differ among themselves when they try to describe this "experiment" in any detail.

During World War II, if you asked a hundred GI's what they were fighting for, you were likely to get a hundred different answers. Each answer would light up one facet of the American experiment, and all the answers taken together probably would add up to more or less one thing: the freedom of each in a free society and under a free government to live his own life in his own way, with a maximum of opportunity and a minimum of restraint. And the answers would illuminate another essential characteristic of our experiment: that Americans can and do disagree without attempting to force their views on one another.

East-West Clash in Nuclear Age

The job of fostering a world environment favorable to the American experiment is more difficult today than at any previous time in this country's history.

Countries That Could Not Join UN



For the environment, as most would readily agree, is threatened by Soviet expansion; and the threat is so great that serious talk is often heard of the possible outbreak of World War III. But war today can be absolute war. In this nuclear age, the scientists say, the destruction of life on this planet is within the limits of technical possibility.

The two things Americans value most—human liberty and human life—are in peril. Soviet expansion imperils human liberty. A world war fought with modern weapons imperils human life. Americans are prepared to go to war, total war if necessary, to defend liberty. But they must find a way to avoid war—or, at any rate, total war—to defend life.

It is a fearful dilemma. No wonder the nuclear age has also been called the "age of anxiety." President Eisenhower said recently that modern methods of war hold such terror that the human mind may not be able to "take it."

Many Schools of Thought

Americans react to the dilemma in various ways. At one extreme are those who say: "Let's have it out with the Russians now and get it over with." Some of this school would, and others would not, "kick the Russians out of the UN" first. Some would have the United States withdraw from the world organization.

At the other extreme are those who feel that world government is the only solution. They differ among themselves as to method and timing. Some of these are supporters of a UN Charter review conference, saying that if one is held, it will present the great opportunity. To the argument that the Russians and others would never agree, they reply: "Nothing is lost by trying. A beginning must be made. In the hydrogen age the national state is obsolete."

Between the two extremes is a large group who urge continued "firmness with moderation." They would have America go along substantially "as is," preparing for war if necessary but working for peace if honorable peace can be obtained. They differ among themselves on this or that policy. With respect to the UN, most accept the fact that it is a "going concern." Some would supplement it with "Atlantic Union." Some would strengthen it by "evolutionary methods" under the present Charter. Some would try to improve the Charter at a review conference.

Most of the middle-of-the-roaders agree that in the UN America has a valuable opportunity to show that the so-called East-West struggle is not so much a conflict between two superpowers as it is a conflict between the Soviet world and all free peoples who want to stay free. In the UN, writes Secretary Dulles, America has given the lie to the idea "that the struggle going on in the world was precipitated by the ambition of the United States to

gain dominance. . . . The struggle came to be seen . . . as involving the small countries that wanted to stay free."

Many in all these groups are keenly aware of the dilemma of preparing to defend liberty in a war which may destroy life. They face up to the dilemma in various ways.

One Answer: UN Plus Coalition

The dilemma was not foreseen at San Francisco in 1945. At that time the U.S.S.R. was still a wartime ally, and the first atomic bomb had not been exploded. The security provisions of the UN Charter were based on the assumption of great-power unanimity. Article 43 contemplated the creation of an international military force under the Security Council to keep peace.

Soviet intransigence upset these calculations. The answer to the Soviet challenge was an elastic and growing entity, a "coalition of free nations" grouped around the United States. The opponents of Soviet expansion sought—and found—in other provisions of the Charter ways to build their defenses. One of these provisions was Article 51, the "collective self-defense article," under which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other defense pacts were formed. In Article 10 and others were found the broad residual powers of the General Assembly which enabled the Assembly to assume growing responsibilities for peace and security. The Assembly was developed to a point where, in the words of Mr. Dulles, it can "play a decisive role" when the Security Council is paralyzed by a veto.

It has been said that the heart of the UN now lies in the General Assembly and its power in the coalition of free nations and their willingness to resist Soviet aggression in defense of the principles of the Charter.

Few would deny that the coalition is a very real deterrent to Soviet aggression. There is wide disagreement, however, about its power of cohesion and about its relationship to the UN.

One distinguished scholar, Hans Morgenthau, says the coali-

tion functions in some respects as "a new United Nations" within the framework of the old. Others argue that the concept of a coalition directed against one of the great powers is fundamentally contrary to the UN concept. They say that the policy of "keeping one foot in the coalition and the other foot in the UN" is a dangerous straddle.

'Shield and Sword' of UN

A third view is that the UN, over and above the detailed Charter provisions for the maintenance of peace and security, represented first and foremost an effort to establish international law and order. Under this theory the law of the Charter would require that law-abiding members contrive to curb lawless states, be they big or small. The loyal must protect the community against the disloyal. The coalition is not directed against any power as such, say the proponents of this view; it is directed against international gangsterism. It is neither a "new United Nations" nor a competitor of the old United Nations. It is the shield and sword of the Charter.

The shield and sword may be buckled on at any time, they say, under an "executive military authority" which could be created as needed at the request of the General Assembly. An important UN committee recommended this device in 1951, as we have seen.

Under United States leadership the coalition has grown. The world-wide Soviet menace has inspired us to form a world-wide line of defense.

At the core of the coalition stand the North Atlantic Treaty powers. Greece and Turkey have been added to the original membership of the United States, Canada, Britain and Western European states. Ranged around the core are the "old Commonwealth," the Latin American republics, and individual states such as the Philippines. The outer rings can be thought to include all recipients of American and British military aid—Yugoslavia, Pakistan and Thailand, for example.

Near the periphery are the so-called neutralist states of South Asia and the Middle East. Optimistic observers feel most of them would act with the coalition in a showdown; others are doubtful. There is general agreement that these countries would resist Soviet aggression against their own territory and probably would, in such event, welcome the support of the coalition. Therefore, they are considered important counterweights to Soviet power in highly strategic areas.

Efforts are constantly being made to bring the "neutralist" states into closer cooperation with the coalition—particularly, in 1954, in Southeast Asia, where Indochina has been gravely menaced.

The line of defense against Soviet aggression seems to have no end—not at the Elbe nor the Bosphorus nor the Indus nor the Ganges nor the Red River Delta nor anywhere else. The peoples whose support is sought live on every continent; their lands are washed by every sea. The word "free" in "coalition of free peoples" has come to mean "free of Soviet domination." It includes about two-thirds of the human race.

As manager, coach, trainer, cheerleader and "clean-up hitter," the United States faces a supremely difficult task in holding the coalition together. The institutions and interests of the free peoples are as diverse as their names.

Among them are battle-weary European peoples, who only yesterday were scorched by war fought on or over their own soil, who do not have a stockpile of nuclear weapons, who need not wonder whether they are within the reach of enemy bombers—Soviet jet bases are a few minutes' flying time away.

Among them, too, are the renascent peoples of Asia and Africa, no longer content to exist as "the mere material of other men's virtues"; more interested, as one of their UN delegates once said, in four sandwiches than in four freedoms; less concerned with international communism than with poverty, disease, illiteracy and "colonial" oppression.

Can Coalition Hold Together?

The "nationalist revolution"—the struggle for "status" and a better life in Asia and Africa—threatens to split the free world in two. Soviet propagandists are busy night and day trying to widen the split.

The conflict *between* European and Asian powers sometimes is matched in intensity by conflict *within* one of the groups—for example, the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

How, it may be asked, can such a coalition be held together?

Those who are skeptical about collective security say it cannot be held together, that its inner contradictions will tear it apart. Some say the task of holding the coalition together is rendered more difficult by the airing of its inner conflicts in the forum of the UN. They feel that UN debates on colonial issues, for example, create needless tension and give the Soviet Union the opportunity to exploit free-world differences.

Some feel that the UN and the coalition are mutually supporting. They say that with self-restraint and self-discipline, the United States as a loyal member of the UN can give other members of the coalition confidence in our leadership.

Some go farther and argue that America's call to arms can have meaning for the free peoples only as a call to defend a cooperative world order, offering all loyal members clear advantages which are worth defending from their point of view as well as from ours. They say that the way to create this mutuality of interest is to make the UN function on all cylinders—under the present Charter or under an improved Charter.

Should Russia Be Expelled from UN?

Then another question arises: If the UN and the coalition are so intimately related, why not expel the Russians so that the UN and the coalition can really go to work?

There are those who urge such a course. Technically, the expulsion of a permanent member of the Security Council against

the wishes of the member is not possible under the present Charter; but the same result could be accomplished by starting from scratch and founding a new organization.

Others feel that the expulsion of the Russians would destroy the UN and the coalition; that "neutralist" states and possibly others would scatter and seek shelter; that if we urged such a course, some of America's closest allies would lose confidence in our leadership.

Why, some ask, would America's allies lose confidence? And what difference would it make if they did? In this world, they say, "the men must be separated from the boys."

The Great Dilemma

These questions bring the discussion back near its starting point: the dilemma of seeking peace in the nuclear age by preparing for nuclear war; the dilemma of protecting human liberty by preparing for a war which may end human life; the difficulty of persuading people who live in certain reach of Soviet bombers that it is in their interest to resist Soviet threats.

The advocates of "firmness and moderation" say that the coalition is based on the confidence of its members that while they prepare themselves for total war, they have a reasonable chance of obtaining an honorable peace. They say that while we are building up our armed strength, we must go on seeking a way of living at peace, even with Russia.

All the philosophers and all the saints together cannot tell us a sure way of doing this, or indeed whether it can be done at all. But every commencement speaker tells us we must try, even when the outlook is darkest. Mr. Dulles, in a speech on May 15, 1954, which almost wrote off the possibility of peaceful coexistence, nevertheless added emphatically: "No man has a right to assume that he sees the future so clearly that he is justified in concluding that war is inevitable or that methods of conciliation are futile. . . . We shall persist in our efforts to negotiate."

Advocates of preventive war say this is the language of conscience, of morality—a luxury America can no longer afford. Others say such morality is practical; that if America did not persist in efforts to negotiate an honorable settlement, the coalition would fall away in terror of the outcome and America would be left to fight or negotiate alone—on perilously unequal terms. In the summer of 1954 Joseph C. Harsch of *The Christian Science Monitor* wrote that without a coalition America would be a second-rate power in relation to the combined strength of the Soviet Union, Communist China and their dependencies.

Middle-Road View

The middle-of-the-roaders say there may be a chance, if we are wise and lucky, to avoid an early showdown, to gain time to look for ways of living honorably at peace in the same world with Russia. They point out that in the cold war the ordinary streams of East-West diplomacy have frozen over; that the UN is the only place where continuous contact between the two worlds is possible. "The Charter of the United Nations," Hans Morgenthau writes, "is a roof, however leaky, under which East and West can still dwell together, however divided by curtains of different descriptions."

Success, the middle-of-the-roaders say, cannot come in a hurry; it probably will elude us if we try to force the pace. They say it may come by internal collapse in Russia; or by slow evolution producing a series of challenges to which we shall respond with wisdom and invention. Some say the important challenges will require of us the courage not to remain locked in our present modes of thought—the courage to seek and use new procedures and new forms in fostering a habitable environment for the American experiment.

What the new forms and procedures will be, they say, cannot be foretold: we must keep our eyes and minds open.

One thing is certain. There are no easy answers to the great

problem of peace and war, which has challenged mankind since long before the advent of nuclear weapons—indeed, throughout history.

The UN is an institution where we may seek the answers in the company of our fellow men, where we may share our wisdom with others and try to learn from them as we hope they will learn from us. The UN is capable of growth and development. With strong American support it may, in the long run, be capable of doing fully the job it was meant to do—the job of keeping the peace.

If Americans are wise, they will seize every opportunity to make the UN work.

Talking It Over

IN THIS DISCUSSION GUIDE YOU WILL FIND discussion topics, reading references, and suggestions for visual aids¹ arranged for eight weekly meetings. These can be contracted or expanded according to the time at your disposal and the special interests of those who are participating in the discussion.

If you need any help or guidance to set up a discussion group or organize the special project suggested at the end of this discussion outline, write to Dorothy B. Robins, Consultant on Special Programs, Foreign Policy Association, 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, New York.

Discussion Questions

1. The U.S. and the UN

It has been said, "The UN is so important to America that if we didn't have it, we'd have to create it."

What is this country's stake in the UN? To what extent are the aims of American foreign policy identical with those of the UN as stated in Chapter I of the Charter? How have American representatives in the UN sought to advance America's purposes through the world organization? Have they succeeded? What has hampered them? Is American security strengthened by active par-

¹ All films are 16mm, sound, and in black and white.

ticipation in the UN? How is American leadership of the free world asserted through the UN?

READING REFERENCES

- Cheever, Daniel S., and Haviland, H. Field, Jr., *Organizing for Peace*. Boston, Houghton, 1954.
- Cheever, Daniel S., "The Role of the United Nations in the Conduct of American Foreign Policy." *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (April 1950), pp. 389-404.
- Cohen, Benjamin V., "The Impact of the United Nations on United States Foreign Policy." *International Organization*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 1951).
- Dulles, John Foster, *War or Peace*. New York, Macmillan, 1950.
- Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Revision of the United Nations Charter, September 1, 1950*. Senate Report No. 2501, 81st Cong., 2nd sess.
- Richardson, Channing B., "The United States Mission to the United Nations." *International Organization*, Vol. 7 (February 1953), pp. 22-34.
- The US Stake in the UN: Problems of United Nations Charter Review*. New York, The American Assembly, Columbia University, 1954.

VISUAL AIDS

- Pattern for Peace—Charter of the United Nations*. British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, N.Y. Made in 1947. 15 min. Rental, \$2.50. Portrays the structure and purposes of the United Nations through an analysis of the work of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the various commissions designed to assist in the task of forging world peace.

2. Keeping the Peace

The authors of the Charter contemplated an organization through which international disputes could be settled before they led to open conflict. But they did not stop there. If and when breaches of the peace occurred despite efforts at pacific settlement, then member states were to take collective measures to restore the peace. And when "collective security" was a reality, the regulation of national armaments was to follow.

How has this worked out in practice? Have Soviet vetoes really paralyzed the UN as an agency for keeping the peace? How successful has the UN been in mediating international disputes? What kind of machinery seems to be most effective for mediation and conciliation? What is the role of observation and fact-finding? Does failure to create an international force under Article 43 of the Charter mean the UN cannot deal with breaches of the peace? To what extent can the UN rely on the creation of an "executive military authority" to meet a breach of the peace in the future? What are the important lessons for Americans to learn from efforts to control and regulate armaments through the UN?

READING REFERENCES

- Cheever and Haviland, cited, Chapters 15 and 16.
Dulles, cited.
Everyman's United Nations, 4th ed. New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1953, pp. 39-167.
Goodrich, Leland M., "Korea: Collective Measures Against Aggression." *International Conciliation* No. 494. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 1953.
The US Stake in the UN, cited. See especially Chapter 3, "The Struggle for Peace and Security," by William R. Frye.

VISUAL AIDS

- The United Nations and World Disputes*. Produced by the United States Army. Distribution through many university film libraries. Made in 1950. 10 min. Reviews four major disputes that since 1945 have threatened world peace—Indonesia, Palestine, India and Korea—and demonstrates how the UN was successful in resolving each one.

3. Economic and Social Cooperation

The Charter is based on the idea that it is not enough for the UN to serve only as the world's policeman. Member states must cooperate in trying to remove the underlying causes of political unrest: poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, international misunderstanding and the like.

What practical steps have been taken through the UN to carry out these aims? What are the results to date? What interest does the United States have in future UN activities along these lines? What are the relative advantages to this country of bilateral and multilateral assistance to other nations?

READING REFERENCES

- Cheever and Haviland, cited, Chapters 18 and 19.
Goodrich, Leland M., and Hambro, Edvard, *Charter of the United Nations—Commentary and Documents*, 2nd and rev. ed. Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1949, pp. 38-40 and Chapters IX and X.
Laves, Walter, "Eight Years of UNESCO Progress." *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 28, No. 730 (June 22, 1953).
Sharp, Walter R., *International Technical Assistance*. Chicago, Public Administration Service, 1952.
The US Stake in the UN, cited, Chapter 4, "The Struggle for a Better Life," by Isador Lubin and Robert E. Asher.

VISUAL AIDS

- Article 55*. United Nations Film Division. Made in 1952. 10 min. Rental, \$2.50. Shows the technical assistance given to Bolivia under Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, which provides for the UN to promote economic and social development in order to seek the creation of conditions of stability and well-being necessary for peace among nations.

4. Administration of Dependent Areas

There are more than 200 million people living in the 80 non-self-governing territories on which UN member states have transmitted information under Chapter XI of the Charter. About 18 million live in the 11 trust territories administered under Chapter XII of the Charter. Administering powers have undertaken to promote the political, economic, social and educational development of these peoples and their progressive development toward self-government. Discussion in the UN has revealed a wide split between the views of "administering" and "nonadministering" governments.

Do the present processes of the UN tend to widen or narrow this split? What are long-range aims of the United States in relation to dependent areas? How do these aims affect—and how are they likely to be affected by—the pursuit of strategic objectives in the cold war? If there is conflict between the two, how can the United States work through the UN to resolve the conflict? Can better ideas be developed and put into practice through the UN to assist dependent peoples toward self-government? How can present UN machinery in this area be made more effective?

READING REFERENCES

Cheever and Haviland, cited, Chapter 23.

Dulles, cited, Chapter 7.

Everyman's United Nations, cited, pp. 277-306.

Wieschoff, H. A., "Trusteeship and Nonself-governing Territories," in Clyde Eagleton and Richard N. Swift, eds., *1952 Annual Review of United Nations Affairs*. New York, New York University Press, 1952, pp. 117-134.

VISUAL AIDS

Birthday for Eritrea. United Nations Film Division. Made in 1953. 10 min. Rental, \$2.50. Shows how the United Nations has guided Eritrea to become a self-governing country after terminating its status as an Italian colony.

5. Rise of General Assembly

The search for a way of getting around the Soviet veto has led UN members to place greater reliance on the General Assembly as an agency for the maintenance of peace and security.

How does this development alter the position of the United States in the UN? Does it make the UN more or less important as

a forum for rallying the free world in defense of Charter principles? How effective can the General Assembly be in the long run in "plugging the hole" left by the decline of the Security Council? What is the importance for the United States of the multilateral diplomacy and the "bloc-building" which characterize the operations of the General Assembly?

READING REFERENCES

- Goodrich, Leland M., "Development of the General Assembly." *International Conciliation* No. 471. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 1951.
- Haviland, H. Field, *The Political Role of the General Assembly*. United Nations Studies No. 7. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951.
- Morgenthau, Hans J., "The New United Nations and the Review of the Charter." *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 1954).
- The US Stake in the UN*, cited, Chapters 2 and 3.
- "Uniting for Peace Resolution"—Statement by John Foster Dulles before the First Committee of the General Assembly, October 9, 1950. *Department of State Bulletin*, October 30, 1950, pp. 687-690.

VISUAL AIDS

Town Meeting of the World. Produced by the United States Army. Distribution through many university film libraries. Made in 1952. 30 min. Defines the General Assembly of the United Nations as a "town meeting of the world," and explains its functions, organization and operations.

6. Regionalism and the UN

The UN Charter fully recognizes the important role which must be played by regional agencies in the maintenance of peace and security. In view of the Security Council's inability to discharge its "primary responsibility" in this field, member states have more and more tended to rely on regional and collective self-defense arrangements sanctioned by the Charter.

What is the proper role of regional and collective self-defense agencies in the maintenance of peace and security? How are they related to the UN? Is the American policy of "keeping one foot in the UN and the other foot in the coalition" a "dangerous straddle," as some have asserted? Or do collective self-defense arrangements really strengthen the UN? How can these arrangements be made to serve the purposes of the UN more effectively?

READING REFERENCES

- Beckett, Sir William Eric, *The North Atlantic Treaty, the Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations*. London, London Institute of World Affairs, Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1950.

Cheever and Haviland, cited, Chapters 24-27.

Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace, *Regional Arrangements for Security and the United Nations*. Eighth report and papers presented to the Commission. New York, 1953.

Dulles, cited, Chapter VIII.

Furniss, Edgar S., Jr., "The United States, the Inter-American System and the United Nations." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 65 (September 1950), pp. 415-30.

VISUAL AIDS

Alliance for Peace. Produced by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe. Free loan from United States Army, Navy, or Air Force. Made in 1952. 38 min. Explains the background, mission and objectives of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, composed of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries.

7. Growth of an International Community

It has been said that mankind can never be free of the fear of war until a real international community is formed. Such a community can only be formed slowly, on the basis of common interests. Some observers assert that the growing sense of world community which can be perceived in the UN represents the best hope of "saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

What factors are at work in the UN tending to create this sense of international community? Is it desirable to encourage their development? What are the essential conditions for the formation of a world community? Does the United States have an interest in the formation of such a community? What is the role of national states in a world community?

READING REFERENCES

Cheever and Haviland, cited, Chapter 29.

Dulles, cited, pp. 65-73.

Feller, A. H., *United Nations and World Community*. Boston, Little, 1952.

Wright, Quincy, *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1954.

VISUAL AIDS

World Without End. Produced by UNESCO. Made in 1953. 45 min. Rental, \$7.50, from Brandon Films, 200 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y. Depicts the work of UNICEF, FAO, ILO, WHO and UNESCO in combating the fundamental ills of the world which contribute to division and strife. Work in Mexico and Thailand is portrayed.

8. U.S. and Future of UN

The possibility that the tenth session of the UN General Assembly will call a Charter review conference raises important

questions for Americans. Can the UN grow and develop under the present Charter, as some say it is growing and developing, to meet the challenges to come? Are amendments to the present Charter necessary or desirable? Can desirable amendments be adapted without a review conference? What could be gained—or lost—at a review conference? Would a “free-for-all” conference lead to “revision backwards rather than forwards?”

READING REFERENCES

- Clark, Grenville, and Sohn, Louis B., *Peace Through Disarmament and Charter Revision*. “Preliminary print.” Concord, New Hampshire, Grenville Clark, July 1953.
- Gross, Ernest A., “Revising the Charter: Is it Possible? Is it Wise?” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 32 (January 1954), pp. 203-16.
- Hamilton, Thomas J., “U.S. and U.N.—The Choice Before Us.” *New York Times Magazine*, March 22, 1953.
- Morgenthau, cited.
- Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Revision of the United Nations Charter, September 1, 1950*. Senate Report No. 2501, 81st Cong., 2nd sess.
- Romulo, Carlos, “The UN is Dying.” *Colliers*, July 23, 1954.
- The US Stake in the UN*, cited.

VISUAL AIDS

- Grand Design*. United Nations Film Division. Made in 1951. 9 min. Rental, \$2.50. Reviews the problems which have been faced by the United Nations and its specialized agencies during the six years from 1945 to 1951.

UN Choral Reading

The Preamble to the United Nations Charter is one of the great expressions of the hope of mankind for the peace of the world. The reading of this statement at the opening of any United Nations holiday, civic occasion, radio or television program, club meeting, school assembly program or conference sets an inspirational note for the larger program which is to follow.

This reading can be done effectively by a speaking chorus or an antiphonal presentation. Carried out under the direction of a speech teacher or person interested in dramatics, the reading may be offered by a quartet or any larger chorus.

The Foreign Policy Association . . .

is an impartial, nonprofit, membership organization. It was founded in 1918 "to carry on research and educational activities to aid in the understanding and constructive development of American foreign policy." It does not seek to promote any one point of view toward international affairs. Any views expressed or implied in its publications are those of the author and not of the Association.

The Headline Series . . .

gives its readers enough unbiased background information in understandable form so they can make up their own minds intelligently on the great international questions of the day.

Membership . . .

in this national Association is open to everyone sincerely interested in developing a constructive American policy. Regular Membership at \$6.00 a year includes both the *Headline Series* and the *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, a complete report and analysis of current international events. A special rate of \$3.50 is available to students. For information about the Association's activities in local communities and other special membership privileges, please write . . .


The Foreign Policy Association

National Office

345 East 46th Street

New York 17, N. Y.

<i>The Headline Series</i>	<i>No.</i>
Our Stake in World Trade	106
India Since Independence	105
Burma: Land of Golden Pagodas	104
Canada: A Great Small Power	103
The New Japan	102
Problems of East-West Settlement	101
The U.S. and Latin America	100
China and the World	99
The Emergence of Modern Egypt	98
Europe's Quest for Unity	97
Mexico: Land of Great Experiments	94
How to Make Friends for the U.S.	93
Africa: New Crises in the Making	91
The Story of U.S. Foreign Policy	90
Israel: Problems of Nation-Building	89
The UN: How and When It Works	88
Germany: Promise and Perils	82
France: Setting or Rising Star	81
<i>. . . and many other titles</i>	



number 107

FOREIGN POLICY

ASSOCIATION

In the next issue

Russia After Stalin

by Philip E. Mosely

