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CULTURE OP ETHNOLOGY

CULTURE (S^ ETHNOLOGY

BY

Robert H. Lowie, Ph.D.

Associate Curator, Anthropology American Museum of Natural History

NEW YORK

DOUGLAS C. McMURTRIE

I917

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CONTENTS

I. Culture and Psychology

II. Culture and Race

III. Culture and Environment

IV. The Determinants of Culture

V. Terms of Relationship

Page

5

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47 66 98

PREFACE

This booklet is an attempt at popularization. The first four chapters are practically identical with as many lectures, delivered in 191 7 as the January course offered by the Department of Anthropology of the American Museum of Natural History. The purpose of the January series, which was instituted in 1914 by Dr. P. E. Goddard and the writer, is to acquaint an audience of intelligent laymen with some of the results of modern ethnological work, the emphasis being on principles and problems, rather than on purely descriptive detail. The course, in short, occupies an intermediate po- sition between technical discourses addressed to scientists and the more popular lectures which are designed to furnish mainly entertain- ment. Each year different topics have been chosen and several members of the staff have cooperated. Owing to the dearth of recent ethnological literature reflecting the position of American field-workers, and at the same time accessible to the interested outsider, I was easily persuaded to issue the 191 7 lectures in the present form.

PREFACE

The last chapter may not seem to fit within the scope of this publication. It is obviously more technical than the rest in treatment and may appear to deal with too special a topic. My object, however, was to conclude with a concrete illustration of ethnological method, and I naturally selected a subject to which I had paid considerable attention during the last two years. It is a subject in which Morgan was able to arouse the interest of hundreds of laymen; and I can see no reason why an up-to-date exposition of the problems involved should not be able to hold their attention.

Robert H. Lowie

May, 191 7

I. CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY^

With the beginning of the European war the word 'culture' acquired a sense in popular English usage which had long prevailed in ethnological literature. Culture is, indeed, the sole and ex- clusive subject-matter of ethnology, as conscious- ness is the subject-matter of psychology, life of biology, electricity of a branch of physics. Culture shares with these other fundamental concepts the peculiarity that it can be prop- erly understood only by an enlarged familiarity with the facts it summarizes. There is no royal shortcut to a comprehension of culture as a whole by definition any more than to a compre- hension of consciousness; but as every analysis and explanation of particular conscious states adds to our knowledge of what consciousness is, so every explanation of particular cultural phenomena adds to our insight into the nature of culture. We must, however, start with some proximate notion of what we are to discuss, and for this purpose Tylor's definition in the opening sentence of his Primitive Culture will do as well as any: "Culture ... is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capa- [51

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bilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."

For purely practical reasons, connected with the minute division of labor that has become imperative with modern specialization, ethnology has in practice concerned itself with the cruder cultures of peoples without a knowledge of writ- ing. But this division is an illogical and artificial one. As the biologist can study life as manifested in the human organism as well as in the amoeba, so the ethnologist might examine and describe the usages of modern America as well as those of the Hopi Indians, In these lectures I shall there- fore not hesitate to draw upon illustrations from the higher civilizations where these seem most appropriate.

Indeed, it may be best for pedagogical reasons to commence with an enumeration of instances of cultural activity in our own midst. And since there is a persistent tendency to associate with culture the more impressive phenomena of art, science, and technology, it is well to insist at the outset that these loftier phases are by no means necessary to the concept of culture. The fact that your boy plays 'button, button, who has the button?' is just as much an element of our cul- ture as the fact that a room is lighted by elec- tricity. So is the baseball enthusiasm of our [6]

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grown-up population, so are moving picture shows, this dansants, Thanksgiving Day mas- querades, bar-rooms, Ziegfeld Midnight FolHes, evening schools, the Hearst papers, woman suffrage clubs, the single-tax movement, Riker drug stores, touring-sedans, and Tammany Hall.

These, then, represent the type of phenomena comprised under the caption of culture. They exist, and science, as a complete view of reality, cannot ignore them. But a question ominous for the worker who derives his bread and butter from ethnological investigation arises. All the phe- nomena mentioned and the rest of the same order relate to man, and they relate to man not as an animal but as an organism endowed with a higher mentality. Tylor's definition expressly speaks of 'capabilities and habits'. But there is a science that deals with capabilities and habits, to wit, psychology. Is it, then, necessary to have a dis- tinct branch of knowledge, or can we not simply merge the cultural phenomena in those of the older science of psychology? It is this question that concerns us here. On the answer must de- pend our conception of culture and our attitude towards a science purporting to deal with cul- tural phenomena as something distinct from other data of reality.

[7]

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In seeking light on this subject we must under- stand what sort of problems arise from the con- templation of cultural facts and attempt to con- nect them with the established principles of psychology. A few concrete examples will illus- trate the situation.

One of the striking characteristics of our civilization, a trait of our material culture that is nevertheless an invaluable, nay in- dispensable, means for the propagation of knowledge under modern conditions, is the existence of paper, that is, of a cheap, readily manufactured material for writing and printing. The obvious problem that develops from this fact is. How did we get the art of paper- manufacture? Now we shall search in vain our psychological literature in quest of an ex- planation. Hoffding and James, Wundt and Titchener have no answer to offer. An answer, nevertheless, exists. Europe learnt the art of paper-making from the Arabs, who as early as 795 A.D. had established a paper factory in Bagdad. These in turn got their knowledge from the Chinese, who must be regarded as the origi- nators of the technique. The answer is a per- fectly satisfactory one, but it is obviously not couched in psychological terms: its nature is purely historical.

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Nevertheless, an objection may plausibly be raised here. Though an explanation has cer- tainly been given, it does not account for all as- pects of the phenomena we are considering. There is a psychological basis for each and every one of the events in our historical series. This series we may subdivide into three stages — the in- vention by the Chinese, the borrowing of this inven- tion by the Arabs, and its transmission from Arab to European. Now the two last-named processes of transmission may not suggest the necessity of a special explanation at all. One may think that all that was required was for the Europeans to watch the Arabs and for the Arabs to watch the Chinese, and presto! the thing was done. This indeed, seems to be the view of an influential school of modern ethnologists. But the case is far from being so simple. We know of many instances, in the higher no less than in the lower cultures, corresponding to what the biologist calls symbiosis — a condition where distinct com- munities or countries persist in a division of labor for mutual benefit, each trading some of its intellectual or material products for equiv- alents secured from the other. In many parts of Africa there are fixed markets in which ne- groes from fairly remote localities congregate for the barter of wares, which are thus diffused [9l

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far from their source of origin ; but it is the fin- ished products, not the arts, that are diffused. In New Guinea trading- vessels carry such objects as pottery hundreds of miles from the area of manufacture to natives who remain as ignorant of the ceramic technique as before. In northern Arizona the Hopi Indians occupying three emi- nences not more than eight miles distant from one another have no perfect uniformity of indus- trial knowledge. Pottery, which flourishes on the eastern Mesa, is wholly unknown as an art, though constantly used in its specimens, by the people of the central Mesa; a certain type of basketry plaque is made only at Oraibi village; another type is manufactured exclusively on the central Mesa. Conditions more ideal a priori for a transfer of knowledge than among the prac- tically homogeneous neighboring Hopi groups could not be conceived. Nevertheless, it has not taken place. Cultural diffusion, therefore, can- not be taken for granted. We cannot take one people, place it alongside of another, and effect a cultural osmosis in the same way in which we produce a chemical reaction when two sub- stances are brought together under proper con- ditions of temperature. We are face to face with a selective, with a psychological condition. But when we turn once more to our text-books of psy-

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chology, we again find nothing that fits the case. About choice in general we get ample informa- tion. But we may rummage all the psychologi- cal seminar rooms in the world and yet shall find no reason why the Arabs learned the technique of paper-making from the Chinese instead of ig- noring it or only importing Chinese paper.

Nor are we more fortunate when we turn to psychology for an account of how the original Chinese inventor came to conceive his epoch- making idea. This fact, of course, falls under the heading of 'imagination', and about imagination psychologists have much to tell us. But what, after all, does their interpretation amount to? We learn that imagination, as distinguished from the power of abstract thought, is the power of forming new concrete ideas. Since even the con- crete individual idea is complex, being a product of association, its elements may be linked differ- ently so as to produce new combinations. "The inventor of a new mechanism," says Hoffding, "combines given elements, the laws of whose ac- tivity he knows, into a totality and a connection which has no complete parallel in experience." The scientist tries all possible combinations among his elements of experiences, forming a succession of individual ideas, which are rejected until the one appears that adequately represents reality, [n]

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We need hardly go farther to realize the im- potence of psychological science for illuminating the psychology as well as the history of the paper- making art. The formulation of psychological science is admirable, but it is too general. It ex- plains the invention of the steam-engine and the phonograph, the sewing-machine and the har- vester no less than the origin of paper-making. We, however, do not want to know merely what ultimate psychological processes the invention of paper-making shares with all other inventions whatsoever, but also the differential conditions that produced this one and unique result under the given circumstances. It is as though we asked about a man's character and were told that he was a vertebrate. The type of psycho- logical explanation we want is by no means un- known; however, we shall find its illustrations not in text-books of psychology, but in histories of literature, science, and art. When Taine raises the question how such a bore as Dr. Sam- uel Johnson could conceivably have attained his position in English literature and answers that it is because of the English predilection for ser- mons, he is giving the type of solution — whether right or wrong — that we want to secure for our cultural problem; it explains why the average Englishman, as a member of English society, ac-

[12]

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quires the habit of regarding Johnson in a certain way. When we inquire why Newton closes his treatise on optics with a statement as to the van- ity of human things, our curiosity is satisfied when this expression appears as only one instance of the blending of theological and scientific thought current in his day. It is nonsense to say that these explanations are purely historical; they are psychological, for they take fully into account the subjective attitudes involved in the phenomena studied ; and it is hopeless to expect this sort of explanation from psychological sci- ence, which deals with a quite distinct and far more generalized form of mental activity.

To turn from the technique of paper manufac- ture to a very different cultural feature in order to test the possibility of merging the observed phenomena in the principles of psychology. In several parts of the globe, and most prominently in parts of South America, the aborigines practise a custom known as the 'couvade', which forces the father of a new-born child to subject himself to a period of inactive confinement and a series of rigorously observed dietary and other regula- tions. Let us, for the sake of bringing out the point in high relief, ignore all historical considera- tions and concentrate exclusively on the sub- jective elements involved. , Whence, then, this [13]

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strange and wholly irrational association of ideas between fatherhood and a group of taboos? Now the subject of the association of ideas occupies hundreds of pages in psychological literature, yet all this, in itself valuable enough, material has no bearing on our problem, because it is again far too general. We do not doubt for a moment that the association we desire to have illuminated is due either to contiguity or to a perceived similarity of ideas, but why have we this particular association instead of the limitless multitude of associations that would be equally intelligible by the same formulae?

Again, many aboriginal tribes of Australia are subdivided into two halves, membership in which is inherited through the father, in some cases, through the mother in others. These moieties are what is technically called 'exogamous', i.e., marriage with a fellow-member is strictly forbid- den. The regulation is, indeed, so stringent, the feeling of horror evoked by a transgression so vio- lent, that in former times offenders were promptly put to death. This sentiment is so strong that even when visiting a remote tribe, perhaps a hundred miles away, where there is no possibility of blood-kinship, an Australian will avoid mar- riage with a member of the moiety bearing the same name as his own. Here, surely, there is [14]

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matter for psychology. An Australian has a violent emotional reaction akin to our aversion to incest, and may translate his feelings into the most violent action. Or, looking at the matter from another angle, the Australian exercises an admirable self-control, eschewing on principle marital relations with half the women of his community. Yet all that psychologists tell us of the ethical feelings and the will leaves the prob- lem before us wholly untouched. Why this par- ticular curious feeling developed, what place it occupies in mental life, the psychologist fails to explain. We get, again, simply general formulae about feeling and will that are equally applicable to the case of a man's beating his wife or a boy's resisting the temptations of a lollypop. And this, it must be noted, is dealing with the distinc- tively psychological aspect of the data. Whether the rule in question originated in a common center and thence spread to other tribes, is also a cultural question of great importance, and this historical phase of the subject psychology is avowedly incompetent to deal with. Psychology, then, fails throughout to supply us with the inter- pretation we want. It is as impotent to reduce to really interpretative psychological principles the subjective aspect of cultural phenomena as it is to explain the historical sequence of events. [151

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It is not necessary to multiply examples to establish the point. It is clear that cultural phe- nomena contain elements that cannot be re- duced to psychological principles. The reason for the insufficiency is already embodied in Ty- lor's definition of culture as embracing 'capabil- ities and habits acquired by man as a member of society'. The science of psychology, even in its most modern ramifications of abnormal psychol- ogy and the study of individual variations, does not grapple with acquired mental traits nor with the influence of society on individual thought, feeling and will. It deals on principle exclusively with innate traits of the individual. Now, whether the sharp separation assumed here be- tween the innate and the acquired, between indi- vidual activity as determined by uniquely indi- vidual potentialities and as determined by social environment, can be made in practice or not, one thing is clear : there are phenomena that are ac- quired and in no sense innate, that are socially and not individually determined. When a Chris- tian reacts in a definite way to the perception of a cross, it is clearly not because of an individual psychic peculiarity, for other Christians react in the same way. On the other haiid, we are not dealing with a general human trait since the re- actions of a Mohammedan or a Buddhist will be [i6]

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quite diflferent. Innumerable instances of this sort show that individual thought, feeling and vo- lition are co-determined by social influences. In so far forth as the potency of these social factors extends we have culture; in so far forth as knowledge, emotion, and will are neither the re- sult of natural endowment shared with other members of the species nor rest on an individual organic basis, we have a thing sui generis that demands for its investigation a distinct science. Does it follow from the foregoing that there is no possible relation between psychology and cul- ture, that psychological results are a matter of utter indifference to the ethnologist? In their desire to vindicate for their own branch of knowl- edge a place in the sun, some ethnologists have come very near, if they have not actually reached such a conclusion. To me the case appears in a somewhat different light. Whatever division of labor may be desirable for the economy of sci- entific work, knowledge as a whole knows noth- ing of watertight compartments. Further, the nominally distinct sciences are not subordinated to one another, but coexist in a condition of democratic equality and cooperativeness. We cannot reduce cultural to psychological phenom- ena any more than we can reduce biology to mechanics or chemistry, because in either case [17]

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the very facts we desire to have explained are ignored in the more generalized formulation. But for specific purposes, the student of culture can call for aid upon each and all of the other branches of learning. It is a very important cultural problem whether the natives of South America knew the bronze technique, i.e., whether they consciously produced the observed alloy of copper and tin. But how can the ethnologist solve this problem? Only by requisitioning the services of the chemist.

Now very few would deny that services of the kind rendered by chemistry can also be rendered to the study of culture by psychology. Indeed, most people would at once admit that the rela- tionship with psychology is a priori likely to be far more extensive and thorough-going. A few concrete examples will illustrate how this relation- ship may be conceived.

Among the quaint conceits with which primi- tive cultures abound is that of attaching to particular numbers a peculiar character of sanc- tity. "Everything in the universe," a Crow Indian once told me, "goes by fours." As a matter of fact, most things in Crow religious life are adjusted to this conception. An important ceremonial act is thrice feigned so as to be actually performed at the fourth attempt; [i8]

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religious processions halt four times; songs are sung in sets of four; in mythic tales it is the fourth trial that carries an heroic feat to a successful issue. Now this cultural fact very largely eludes psychological interpretation. The first thing that strikes us is that this feature is no peculiarity of the Crow, but is rather widely distributed among their immediate neighbors and even remote Indian tribes, though jointly occupying a continuous area. Since outside of this region other numbers figure as mystic, we cannot regard the view of the sacredness of Four as a general trait of human psychology but must assume that the concept was borrowed by most of the tribes now holding it. A wider survey teaches us that corresponding, though not identical, conceptions are very common. Seven figures in parts of Asia, Three in European folklore, Five in Oregon and northern Nevada, Six among the Ainu of Yezo, Nine among the Yakut, Ten among the Pythagorean philosophers of ancient Greece, very much as Four does among the Crow. Now the fact that a particular Crow Indian regards Four as a sacred number does not mean that this is an individual peculiarity of his any more than the Christian's reaction to a cross is a proof of some psychological idio- syncrasy. Individually the Crow Indian may [19]

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be quite indifferent to the number and yet he would view it as sacred because he has been taught so to regard it. This is, of course, the vital difference between ethnology and psy- chology which has already been emphasized. Nevertheless, the association must at one time have been formed in an individual mind, whether among the Crow or elsewhere, and the question arises as to what such an association means. Francis Galton showed some time ago that such associations of definite personal characteristics with numbers occur by no means infrequently among Europeans. The phenomenon we are dealing with is thus linked with a group of re- lated phenomena and in so far forth is explained. There are ethnologists who would not admit that such an explanation has anything to do with ethnology. They would contend that as soon as we cease to investigate the group as such we are passing from ethnology, the science of culture, to psychology, the science of indi- vidual minds. This seems an unnecessarily narrow doctrinaire view. Knowledge, as stated above, is not subdivided by hard-and-fast partitions. Interest certainly does not stop at an arbitrary point in the investigation but is centered on a comprehension of the whole phenomenon. Where that phenomenon is an

[20]

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alloy of tin and copper, a decision as to its nature is naturally left to chemistry; it seems not unreasonable that where it is a type of association we should turn for enlightenment to psychology.

Another field supplies an additional illustra- tion. One of the important subjects for ethno- graphic study is artistic form. The ethnologist notes in a purely descriptive way the decorative patterns employed by various tribes, the fact that curvilinear motives are prominent among the Maori of New Zealand while the rawhide bags of Plains Indians are covered with angular paint- ings. Here, once more, it is clear that many of the problems that arise are purely cultural. There are, nevertheless, psychological elements involved that may be misunderstood without psychological knowledge. Let us assume, e. g., that a certain tribe is artistically characterized by a fondness for squares. What does this predilection signify? It is a psychological commonplace that through an optical illusion we exaggerate the height as compared with the width of a rectangle; accordingly, the geometri- cal square does not coincide with the psycho- logical square. This simple piece of information enables us to understand what we are actually dealing with in the case of a square pattern. At

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the same time it sharpens our observation regarding such patterns. It is quite conceivable that in one place tribal taste should prefer the actual square while elsewhere the psychological square occupies the seat of honor. This would be a purely ethnographic fact, yet its discovery might be considerably expedited by some knowl- edge of experimental aesthetics.

Let us turn from mystic numbers and decora- tive designs to another aspect of primitive life. The Turkish tribes of western Siberia have a form of religion based on the belief that certain individuals enjoy the hereditary privilege of acting as intermediaries between their ancestral spirits and the people at large. With the aid of his sacred drum the shaman, as such an inter- mediary is technically called, is able to summon the supernatural beings, cure the sick, foretell the future, separate his own soul from his body and send it to the upper realms of light or the nether regions of darkness. Now, although a particular individual inherits the shaman's office from his father, he receives no formal instruction nor does he make any active preparation for his mission. His call comes in the form of a sudden paroxysm. He is seized with a feeling of languor and a fit of violent convulsions, with abnormal yawning, and a powerful pressure on the chest,

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which causes him to utter inarticulate screams. He begins to shiver with cold, rolls his eyes, sud- denly leaps up and madly circles about until he falls down covered with perspiration and writh- ing in epileptic spasms on the ground. His mem- bers are devoid of sensation, his hands grasp without discrimination red-hot iron, knives, pins; he swallows such objects without suffering the slightest injury, and again ejects them from his mouth. Finally, the prospective seer seizes a shaman's drum and assumes the shaman's ofhce. Disobedience to the spirit's call would spell dis- aster, madness and death amidst the most hor- rible tortures. 2

The naive reaction to this narrative on the part of common sense in the familiar form of common ignorance will probably be that the European traveler who is our authority is a very gullible individual if he believed his native in- formant's statements. How can an individual be seized with such a spasm as that described? How is it possible for him to become devoid of sensa- tion? Nevertheless, nothing is more certain than that the account given is substantially correct. It is simply a particular form of nervous afflic- tion very common throughout Siberia and at- tested by dozens of trustworthy eyewitnesses.^ This Arctic hysteria, as it has been misnamed [23]

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(for there is nothing distinctively Arctic about it), manifests itself principally in two ways. Either the individual falls victim to an indiscrim- inate mania for mimicking the acts of others; or he is seized with the sort of paroxysm described for the Turkish shaman. Nothing is clearer than that in neither case is there usually conscious deception. Sometimes the imitation mania sub- jects the sufferer to ridicule and pain, as when an old woman in imitation of a Cossack, seized a salmon with her teeth, ran up a hill and down again, unable to prevent herself from plunging into the water, though normally she was barely able to walk. Similarly, the numerous hysterical individuals of the other type who do not become inspired shamans cannot possibly derive any ben- efit from their fits.

Abnormal psychology here steps in and teaches us that such trances are involuntary and not the result of fraud, that they occur in our own civi- lization and are accompanied with extraordinary lack of sensibility to pain, in short, psychiatry classifies the observed phenomena and tells us what we are really dealing with. It prevents a misconception alike of the shaman's activities and of the attitude of his people towards him.

When, however, abnormal psychology has so far enlightened us, it has by no means exhausted [24]

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even the purely subjective aspect of the case. How does the prospective shaman seized with his fit know about the shamanistic drum that forms a necessary accessory of his office? How does he know what mode of activity is expected from him? These are not things which he can get directly from his trance for we shall hardly accept the aboriginal theory that he is inspired by the ancestral spirits. He can derive his knowl- edge, however informally, only as the member of a group holding certain definite views as to the shamanistic office. The cultural phenomenon, then, even on its psychological side, comprises a very appreciable plus over and above the facts that psychology can explain, and these additional data accordingly require treatment by another science.

My conclusions as to the relation of psychology to culture are, accordingly, the following: The cultural facts, even in their subjective aspect, are not merged in psychological facts. They must not, indeed, contravene psychological principles, but the same applies to all other principles of the universe; culture cannot construct houses con- trary to the laws of gravitation nor produce bread out of stones. But the principles of psy- chology are as incapable of accounting for the phenomena of culture as is gravitation to ac- [25]

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count for architectural styles. Over and above the interpretations given by psychology, there is an irreducible residuum of huge magnitude that calls for special treatment and by its very exist- ence vindicates the raison d'etre of ethnology. We need not eschew any help given by scientific psychology for the comprehension of specifically psychological components of cultural phenom- ena; but as no one dreams of saying that these phenomena are reduced to chemical principles when chemistry furnishes us with an analysis of Peruvian bronze implements, so no one can dare assert that they are reduced to psychological principles when we call upon psychology to eluci- date specific features of cultural complexes. The 'capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society' constitute a distinct aspect of reality that must be the field of a distinct science autonomous with reference to psychology.

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II. CULTURE AND RACE

If culture is a complex of socially acquired traits, it might appear that race could not pos- sibly have any influence on culture, since by racial characteristics we understand those which are innate by virtue of ancestry. This, however, by no means follows. In order that certain traits be acquired, a certain type of organic basis is an absolute prerequisite; a chimpanzee or a bat is not able to acquire human culture through social environment. From an evolu- tionary point of view it appears, therefore, very plausible at first blush that within the human species, likewise, differences in organization should be correlated with the observed cultural mani- festations of varying degree and complexity. There was, undoubtedly, some stage in human evolution where the organic basis for culture had not yet been acquired. Can the several races be regarded as transitional forms, each possessed of certain capabilities determining and limiting its cultural achievement? This question can be viewed in two ways. Comparative psychology may give us direct information as to qualitative and quantitative racial differences that would affect cultural activity. Or, we may infer such [27]

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differences as the only possible causes for the observed cultural differences. Both modes of ap- proach are helpful for a comprehension of the problem.

Until recent years the psychological evalua- tion of primitive tribes rested largely on the off- hand judgments of travelers and missionaries. With the advent of more exact psychological laboratory methods, these have been, in some measure, applied by competent investigators to aboriginal populations. Unfortunately, the re- sults hitherto secured are somewhat meager. There are technical difficulties, among them the necessity of examining fairly large numbers of in- dividuals in order to get a good sample of the population. Worse still, laboratory methods are most effective in regard to what may be called the lower mental operations, which partake almost more of a physiological than of a strictly psycho- logical character. Clearly enough, what we should be most desirous of knowing is how prim- itive compares with civilized man in logical thought and imagination. But these are pre- cisely the things not readily tested, and here the additional technical difficulty comes in that they can hardly be examined at all without a far more intimate knowledge of the native languages than the investigator is likely to command. Never-

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theless, something has been done and I will at- tempt to present as briefly as possible the essen- tial results, following Thorndike's convenient summary.^

Although some observers have attributed un- usual acuity of sense perception to the more prim- itive peoples of the globe, the investigations of Rivers, Woodworth, and others in the main es- tablish the psychic unity of mankind in this regard. For example, though the Kalmuk are renowned for their vision, only one or two of the individuals tested exceeded the European record, and while Bruner found Indians and Filipino in- ferior in hearing a watch tick or a click trans- mitted by telephone, the fairness of these tests for natives unused to such stimuli has been rea- sonably challenged. In their reaction-time tests, widely diflterent groups were very similar. In the tapping test, measuring the rate at which the brain can at will discharge a series of im- pulses to the same muscle, marked differences were also lacking; but when accuracy as well as rapidity were examined, the Filipino seemed de- cidedly superior to the whites. Optical illusions were shared by all races tested, which indicates, as Woodworth points out, that simple sorts of judgments as well as sensory processes are com- mon to the generality of mankind. Woodworth [29]

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subjected his subjects to an intelligence test, de- manding that blocks of different shapes be fitted into a board with holes to match the blocks. In speed the average differences between whites, Indians, Eskimo, Ainu, Filipino, and Singha- lese are small and there is considerable overlap- ping. On the other hand, the Igorrote and Philip- pine Negrito, as well as a group of supposed Pygmies from the Congo, proved remarkably de- ficient. "This crumb," concludes our investiga- tor, "is about all the testing psychologist has yet to offer on the question of racial differences in intelligence."

It may well be, as Thorndike suggests, that if higher functions were studied, more striking differences would be revealed. But up to date we can simply say that experimental psycholog- ical methods have revealed no far-reaching differences in the mental processes of the several races. Even the Igorrote and Negrito deficiency may be due, Woodworth suggests, to their habits of life rather than to their native endowment.

Since exact methods tell us nothing of those higher operations we are most eager to know about, it might be deemed advisable to fall back on general estimates by the most competent ob- servers. Unfortunately, the personal equation l3o]

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enters here to an extent that completely nullifies the value of individual judgments. Travelers in foreign lands are likely to make quite unusual demands on the capacities of the natives with whose aid they are working, and in this way too frequently arrive at an unfair conclusion as to their mental characteristics. In a corresponding test Europeans might do little better. It is, at all events, remarkable that unbiased observers who are fairly sympathetic and remain in long contact with a primitive people usually entertain a rather favorable opinion of their powers. Thus, Prince Maximilian of Wied-Neuwied, expresses the view that, whether other varieties of man- kind differ or not, the American aborigines are not inferior to the whites, ^ and corresponding es- timates have been made of other races. Still, these are merely personal opinions and we must turn to our second method for possibly more ob- jective, if indirect, evidence on the subject. Are, then, cultural differences necessarily the result of racial differences?

In thus investigating the relations between race and civilization we may fruitfully employ the method of variation. Making the racial fac- tor a constant, we may inquire whether culture, too, is thereby made a constant, and whether a change in racial propinquity is correlated with a [31]

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proportionate change of culture. On the other hand, we may start with culture as a constant and inquire whether each form or grade of culture is the concomitant of definite racial characteristics and whether a change in culture is accompanied by a corresponding change of race.

To begin with the latter method, which may be briefly disposed of: Taking our own type of culture, as represented in western Europe and North America, we find that it is shared by at least one people of quite distinct stock, the Jap- anese, who have already made important con- tributions to the general civilization of the world in such lines as biology and scientific medicine. An obvious objection is that the Japanese are not the originators of our cultural foundation but have borrowed it ready-made (as they once bor- rowed that of China), and merely added a few additional stones to the superstructure. This fact cannot, of course, be questioned, but as soon as we investigate historically the origin of our own modern civilization we find that it, too, is largely the product of numerous cultural streams, some of which may be definitely traced to distinct races or sub-races. Our immediate indebtedness to Rome and Greece has been drilled into us with such fulsomely exaggerated emphasis in our [32]

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schooldays that the less said about it the better for a fair estimate of general culture history. That the Greeks were merely the continuators and inheritors of an earlier Oriental culture, must be considered an established fact. Our economic life, based as it is on the agricultural employment of certain cereals with the aid of certain domesticated animals, is derived from Asia; so is the technologically invaluable wheel.' The domestication of the horse certainly origi- nated in inner Asia; modern astronomy rests on that of the Babylonians, Hindu, and Egyptians; the invention of glass is an Egyptian contribu- tion; spectacles come from India ;^ paper, to mention only one other significant element of our civilization, was borrowed from China. What is right for the goose, is right for the gander; and if the Japanese deserve no credit for having ap- propriated our culture, we must also carefully eliminate from that culture all elements not dem- onstrably due to the creative genius of our race before laying claim to the residue as our distinc- tive product. As Thorndike, among others, has pointed out,^ the races have not remained in splendid isolation, but any particular one has ob- tained most of its civilization from without, and "of ten equally gifted races in perfect intercourse each will originate only one-tenth of what it [33]

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gets." This, to be sure, represents an ideal con- dition, and we have no right to assume gratui- tously that the peoples in contact are all equally gifted; but it is worth noting that momentous ideas may be conceived by what we are used to regard as inferior races. Thus, the Maya of Central America conceived the notion of the zero figure, which remained unknown to Euro- peans until they borrowed it from India; and eminent ethnologists suggest that the discovery of the iron technique is due to the Negroes.

In short, the possessors of a culture are not necessarily its originators; often they are dem- onstrably borrowers of specific elements of the greatest significance. The same culture may thus become the property of distinct races, as is rapidly becoming the case in modern times. Owing to the very extensive occurrence of dif- fusion the question what a particular people or race has originated becomes extremely compli- cated; while it is an established fact that im- portant additions to human civilization have been made by diverse stocks.

It may not be out of place to point out that not only the more tangible elements of culture, but very much subtler ingredients than those hitherto mentioned are shared by distinct groups of mankind. Thus, common to ourselves and the [34]

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Chinese, though strikingly lacking among the Hindu, who, nevertheless, are racially nearer to us, is a marked sense for historical perspective. Common to the ancient Romans, the modern Germans, and the modern Japanese, is the talent for rationalistic organization of administrative af- fairs. We cannot assume under the circum- stances that the Japanese are organically nearer to the Germans than to other Asiatics. These instances seem the more valuable because here borrowing is excluded. The racial factor may in some way be involved; it is conceivable that only with a certain minimum of organic equip- ment could a particular cultural trait be devel- oped or even assimilated. But obviously the same cultural traits may be coupled with differ- ent racial characteristics.

But what results from making race a constant? That no essential organic change has taken place in the human race during the historic period is universally admitted without question by biolo- gists, physical anthropologists, and brain special- ists. Accordingly, when we concentrate our attention on a definite people and follow their fortunes during historic times, we are dealing with a genuine constant from the racial point of view. It requires no very great acquaintance with history to note startling cultural diversity [35]