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如無垢泥池是人無輪迴
 彼虔誠堅固如因陀揭羅
 彼已無憤恨猶如於大地



Editor's Note

With this issue I regret there will be a parting of the ways. After a spare time career spanning exactly forty years, during which I edited and contributed to, first the journals of the London Buddhist Vihāra, then this journal's predecessor for six years, *Pali Buddhist Review*, I have decided that now is the appropriate time to step down from literary responsibilities.

BSR was launched in 1983-84 as a collaborative effort between the Vietnamese Spiritual Advisor based in Paris as head of the worldwide network of Linh-So'n temples, his German pupil, Bhikkhu Pāsādika, and myself. By an act of *kuśalākarma* we were able to meet in London and lay the foundations for a new journal that would specialise in Buddhism, preceded only by A K Narain's launch of the *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, initially based at the University of Wisconsin, which has also appeared twice a year since 1978 (but has subsequently and regrettably dropped its book review section). This situation has remained unchanged: no other journal specialises in this field.

Since inception great strides have been made in production and technical skill: during the first decade of its existence, *BSR* was prepared on an electronic typewriter and only thereafter via the more sophisticated methods of a computer. From 1998 it became the official organ of the newly-formed UK Association for Buddhist Studies but even before this change the entire credit for producing such an attractive periodical goes to Sara Bein-Webb who is also relinquishing her position on the Editorial Board. She wishes to complete her life's ambition of translating all the works of one of the foremost Buddhologists of the 20th century. Etienne Lamotte, whilst I wish to revive my neglected ambition to produce the definitive history of Buddhist studies in Europe.

In content, we can justifiably be proud of the scope of articles and reviews that have appeared over the years. This observation can easily be substantiated with reference to the four quinquennial indexes that have been included with the appropriate journal issue. Numerous papers have been specially commissioned from, in particular, the younger generation of Buddhologists and I hope that this trend will continue. New translations of classic texts have

Frontispiece: the calligraphy in regular style script
(*kai-shu*) by Shi Weimiao, translated into
Chinese by Shi Liaocan, reads:

*Like the earth, he is not hostile,
he is like a locking post, venerable,
with good vows, like a pool without mud.
For one of such a kind there are no
journeyings-on.*

Dhammapada VII, v.95 (tr. K.R. Norman)
© 1997 Pali Text Society

also featured and here thanks are due to the combined pioneer work that has resulted in the serialisation of sūtras from the Ekottarāgama, whilst another enduring feature are K R Norman's reviews of almost every new work from the PTS. Space prevents my mentioning everybody but I would at least like to express my appreciation to those colleagues on the Editorial Board whose advice and guidance have ensured the smooth production of a journal which aims to include material from all the Buddhist traditions. Especial thanks are due to Ven. Thich Tri Nhu (i/c Linh-Sơn, London) who has printed the journal since inception.

Dr Rupert Gethin from the Centre for Buddhist Studies at Bristol University has kindly volunteered to produce the next issue (22,1 – 2005) on an experimental basis in that, thereafter, a decision will be made as to whether it will prove more economical and practical to publish *BSR* on an annual basis. For the time being, the Editorial Address will be c/o this centre, University of Bristol, 3 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1TB (or via e-mail: rupert.gethin@bristol.ac.uk). Dr Elizabeth Harris (whose address appears on the inside back cover) will now handle all subscriptions and be responsible for the mailing lists of both members of UKABS and those subscribing (individually or institutionally) to the journal only. She may also be reached by e-mail: ejharris@gn.apc.org

Finally, I would like to thank everyone who has written or spoken to me over the years, encouraging me in my efforts and offering sound advice which has ensured a firm foundation and continuity of this very special journal.

Russell Webb

* * *

Please note corrections as follows: in *BSR* 20, 1 and 2 (2003) the frontispiece should read 'in official style script (*li-shu*)' rather than 'in seal script'; in Vol.21, 1 (2004), read 'in regular style script (*kai-shu*)' rather than 'in seal script'.

LEGEND AND CULT – CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HISTORY OF INDIAN BUDDHIST STŪPAS PART TWO: THE 'STŪPA OF LAYING DOWN THE BOWS'

MAX DEEG

In Part 1 I discussed the Kaniṣka-stūpa and the legends and names connected with it. The Kaniṣka-stūpa is clearly an example of a monument which had become important in the Buddhist world in the time when the Kuṣāna dynasty reigned over north India. The origin of the stūpa I would now like to discuss probably goes back to a pre-Buddhist stratum¹ and became incorporated, together with its aetiological story, in the Buddhist *geographica sacra*.

This stūpa – or more correctly caitya – is first to be found in connection with the Mahāparinirvāna of the Buddha. In the *Mahāparinirvānasūtra* (MPS) the Buddha, who is dwelling in Vaiśālī and is asking Ānanda to accompany him on a visit to the Cāpāla-caitya, mentions several caityas, memorial stūpa-like constructions, near Vaiśālī as especially pleasant places. It is there that Ānanda fails to ask the Buddha to extend his life. The text is given in translation following Waldschmidt's edition of the MPS(S):

'15. 7 (The Buddha) after having arranged his alms-bowl and garment went to the Cāpāla-caitya. After having gone (there) he sat down at the root of a certain tree and dwelt there during the

¹ The existence of stūpas prior to the Buddha's Nirvāṇa, monuments for his disciples, can already be found in canonical literature; cf. Kevin Trainor, *Relics*, *op. cit.*, p.33, n.4. There are also references to the caityas (P. *cetiya*) of yakṣas (P. *yakkha*) such as Gomataka which the Buddha is said to have visited or to the caityas of the Vṛjjis (P. *Vajji*) whose proper veneration – according to the Buddha in his well-known 'political' advice at the beginning of the MPS – guarantees the prosperity of this tribe-confederation (Trainor, *ibid.*, p.34)

² For the (material and partly functional) identity of stūpa and caitya, see Gregory Schopen. 'The Stūpa Cult and the Extant Pāli Vinaya', repr. in *Bones, Stones and Buddhist Monks*, *op. cit.*, p.90 f. It is almost certain that in our context a caitya is meant to be a pre-Buddhist memorial mound.

day. 8. There the Venerable One spoke to the honourable Ānanda: 9. Pleasing, O Ānanda, is Vaiśālī, the land of the Vrijjis, the Cāpāla-caitya, the Saptāmra(-caitya), the Bahupatṭraka(-caitya)³, the Nyagrodha of Gautama, the Śāla Grove, the Dhurānikṣepāna(-caitya) of the Mallas [and] the Makuṭabandhana-caitya.⁴

The Cāpāla-caitya⁵ occurring in the text has not been explained either etymologically or contextually as far as I know⁶. The caitya⁷

³ The P. reading *bahuputta* seems to be confirmed by the Tib. *bu-mai-po* (Waldschmidt, MPS(S), p.205) and by Faxian's translation *Duozi-zhiti* (T 7, p.191b15).

⁴ Waldschmidt, MPS, p.204; cf. also *Dīgha-nikāya* 3.3.2 (ed. Rhys Davids, Carpenter, PTS, II, p.102). Faxian's translation closely follows the MPS(P) (T 7, p.191b15 f.).

⁵ Transcription *Zhepoluo-ta* 遮婆羅塔 in *Dirghāgama / Chang-aha-jing* 長阿含經, T 1, p.15b16; *Zheboluo-zhiti* 遮波羅支提 in Faxian's translation, T 7, p.191b9; cf. André Bareau, *Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha dans les Sūtrapitaka et les Vinayapitaka anciens. II. Les derniers mois et les funérailles* I, Paris 1970, p.148, who does not give an explanation for the name of the caitya.

⁶ Cf. e.g. Ernst Waldschmidt, *Die Überlieferung, op. cit.*, p.96 ff.; J.J. Jones (trans) *The Mahāvastu* I, London 1949, p.248, n.3, only gives the usual Indian explanation – probably following the commentary to the Pāli (P) *Udāna* (*Udānatthakathā*, cf. G.P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names* I, London 1937, repr. New Delhi 1983, p.863, s.v. Cāpāla-cetiya) or Buddhaghosa's *Dīgha-nikāya* commentary, *Sumaṅgalavilāsini* (ed. W. Stede, p.554) where the cetiyas are explained as vihāras – that the place was inhabited by a yakṣa called Cāpāla, which is not confirmed by the text of the Mvu in question (see below), because the name Cāpāla is already the name of the caitya and not a derivation of a proper name for which we would expect a compound such as Cāpāla-cetiya. This stands true also for the whole list of caityas or stūpas mentioned in this episode.

⁷ The Tibetan Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya gives *mchod-rten*, the usual word for stūpa. MPS(S) and MPS(P) consistently give caitya / cetiya respectively. The age of the idea of the Cāpāla-caitya is shown by an inscription related to a relief from Amarāvati depicting the quoted scene dated to the second half of the first cent BCE: Koitsuka Yutaka, Miyaji Akira (ed.) *Sekai-bijutsu-daizenshū, Tōyōhen*, 13 ('The Big Collection of World Art, Section Eastern Art, 13), Tokyo 2000, p.124 (pl.105), description by Miyaji Akira, p.399 f. 肥塚隆、宮治昭、

seems to have been an important spot for the early Buddhist *geographica sacra* as it is also mentioned in the *Divyāvadāna* (Divy), *Lalitavistara* (Lal)⁹ and *Mahāvastu* (Mvu)¹⁰. It is said to have already been in existence in the lifetime of the Buddha, so in the course of its incorporation into the system of Buddhist monuments, its origin as a memorial monument and the corresponding story must have been projected backwards to the past, into a former life of the Buddha.

世界美大全集、東洋編、第13卷、東京

⁸ Divy. (ed. Cowell & Neil), p.210 ff; this text runs completely parallel with the MPS(S).

⁹ Lal, 24.119 (ed. P.L. Vaidya, Darbhanga 1987, p.323, 1): 'In the eastern part, indeed, of the regions there is a cetiya [= caitya] called Cāpāla, known to be inhabited by victorious arhats, by holy men. These may protect with health and blessing.' The context is the preaching by the Buddha to the first lay-followers, the merchants Trapuṣa and Bhallika, just after having reached enlightenment. On this occasion, he explains to them the blessed spots in the different regions. It is interesting that this event was, as indicated in Part I of this paper, connected with the enshrinement of relics and the construction of the first stūpa (Xuanzang).

¹⁰ Mvu (ed. Senart, I, p.300 = ed. S. Bagchi, Darbhanga 1970, p.245): 'Then the Venerable One came from the big forest to the caitya Cāpāla. The Licchavis asked: "Where is the venerable One?" The monks said: "The Venerable One, O excellent ones, has gone from the big forest to the caitya Cāpāla for a heavenly stay." Thereupon the Licchavis said: "We want to give the caitya Cāpāla to the Venerable One and his community of hearers, we want to present (it to him)".' The context here is the well-known potlatch-like contest in which the Licchavis of Vaiśālī present the Buddha with several caityas or groves after the courtesan Āmrāpālī had earlier presented him with the Śāla Grove. The places which the Licchavis actually give to the Buddha and the Saṅgha are: Mahāvana, Cāpāla-cetiya, Saptāmra-cetiya, Bahuputra-cetiya, Gautamaka cetiya, Kapinahya cetiya, Markaṭahradatīra. There is another reference to a Cāpāla-cetiya in the eastern region (cf. the English trans. by Jones, 3, p.306): the Buddha tells the two merchants Trapuṣa and Bhallika that this shrine should protect them at home and abroad. Jones, in a note to his translation (3, p.294, n.4), calls the shrine 'mythical' and not identical with the Cāpāla-cetiya in the MPS, but it seems that it was meant to be the same cetiya but that there was indeed some confusion about the name. Jones also quotes the form *Acāpāla* in the Lal, which I could not find there.

The Chinese pilgrims Faxian and Xuanzang agree with the MPS tradition by connecting the place where the Buddha gave up his ability to extend his life-span with a stūpa. They give the further information that this stūpa had been built in commemoration of events of an āvadāna-story which is not preserved in any Indian Buddhist text but only in Sino-Buddhist translations, and this story seems to give the clue for an explanation of the name(s) of the stūpa(s) or caityas respectively.

Faxian's¹¹ report runs as follows:

“Three miles to the northwest of the city [of Vaiśālī] there is a stūpa called “Laying down the bow-stick”. The name [comes] from the [following] event: on the upper reaches of the river Gaṅgā there lived a king. A consort of the king gave birth to a piece of meat. The main wife was jealous of her and said: “The birth you [gave] is an evil omen.” Then [she] put the [piece of meat] in a wooden box and threw [it] into the river. Downstream there was a king who was on a pleasure trip. He saw the wooden box [drifting] on the water, opened [it] to have a look and he saw 1,000 infants who had a noble and special [appearance]. Thereupon the king adopted them and raised them. When they had grown up they became brave and strong. Wherever they turned to fight and to conquer the enemy was definitely destroyed [or] subjugated. Finally, they were supposed to attack the kingdom of their original kingly father. Thereupon the king became very depressed. The consort asked the king: “Why are you [so] depressed?” The king said: “That king has 1,000 sons who are unmatchedably brave and strong and are going to attack my kingdom. That is why I am [so] depressed.” The consort said: “O king! Don't be [so] sad. Build a tower in the east of the city. When the robbers come, put me on the tower. Then I will be able to repulse their [attack].” The king did as he had told him. When the robbers arrived, the consort [standing] on the tower addressed them: “You are my children. Why do you act against me in such a way?” They said: “Who are you to say you are our mother?” The consort said: “If you do not believe me. Look upwards and open your mouths!” She then took out her two breasts with her two hands. Out of each breast flowed 500

[streams of milk] pouring down into the mouths of her 1,000 children. [Thereby] they knew that she was their mother and laid down their bow-sticks. The two royal fathers contemplated [deeply] and both became Pratyekabuddhas. The stūpa of the two Pratyekabuddhas still exists. When the Lord afterwards attained enlightenment, he told his disciples: “This is the spot where I laid down the bow[-sticks].”¹² The 1,000 children were the 1,000 Buddhas of the Bhadrakalpa.¹³

Xuanzang gives a similar story, however, without providing or explaining the name of the stūpa:

“It is said that not far from the place where (the Buddha) entered Nirvāṇa there is a stūpa, which is the place where the 1,000 children had seen their father and mother. In former times there was a hermit living hidden in steep valleys. [Once,] in the second month of spring, [the hermit], in a state of excitement, took a bath in the clear water. Soon after that a female deer drank from [the water], conceived and gave birth to a girl of superhuman beauty; only her feet looked like deer-[feet]. When the hermit saw [her] he took her [as his child] and raised her. After some time he ordered her to seek fire. She went to the hut of another hermit and, wherever she put her feet, there were lotus-flowers [coming out of the ground]. When that hermit saw this he was deeply surprised and had her walk around his hut in order to get the fire. The deer-maiden did what she was told, received the fire and went back. At this time the king Brahmadata was out of a hunting trip and saw the flowers. He investigated [the origin] of the footprints. He was highly pleased by the appearance of the girl, took her into his carriage and returned [to the palace]. The astrologers predicted that she would give birth to 1,000 sons. When the [king's] other wives heard this, they were planning plots against her all the time. When the time was ripe she gave birth to a lotus-flower. The flower had 1,000 petals and on [each] petal was sitting a [little]

¹¹ For information about Faxian, cf. Part 1 of this paper.

¹² Zhang 杖 (resp. 仗) without *gong* 弓 can mean ‘bow’ as is shown in Jizang's 吉藏 *Bailun-shu* 百論疏 (T 1827, p.251b) where *dhanuśāstra*, the ‘compendium of archery’, is rendered as *bingzhang-fa* 兵杖法; ‘method of (hand-)ling) the military bow (lit. soldier's stick)’.

¹³ T 2085, p.861c18 ff.

boy. The other wives slandered [her] and claimed that this was a bad omen. They threw [the lotus-flower] into the [river] Gaṅgā and [it] drifted away on the waves. King Uḍḍiyāna was on a pleasure trip downstream, saw the [flower] covered by a yellow cloud [and] floating on the waves, took [it out of the water], opened it and had a look: there were 1,000 little boys [in it]. He raised them and they became strong men. Relying [on the fact] that he had 1,000 sons, he extended his frontiers in all directions. Because his troops were [so] successful, he then turned against this country [Vaiśālī]. When King Brahmaddatta heard this, he was shaken by the fear [that] his military power [could] not resist the opponent, and did not even think of opposing [them]. At this time the deer-maiden, knowing in her heart that those [1,000 warriors] were her sons, told the king: "The enemy is standing in front of the frontiers and everybody, of high and low rank, has lost courage, [but] your majesty's consort with her simple loyalty is able to defeat the strong enemy." The king did not believe her yet and was overwhelmed by fear. Then the deer-maiden climbed on a fortification tower and waited [until] the enemy arrived. After the 1,000 sons with their troops had encompassed the city, the deer-maiden told them: "Do not commit an offence! I am your mother and you are my sons." The 1,000 sons said: "What fraudulent words!" The deer-maiden pressed her breasts with both hands and two streams [of milk] coming out in 1,000 jets entered their mouths in a supernatural way. Thereupon they threw away their arms, returned to their natural family [and] sent the troops back home. Henceforth both kingdoms had a good relationship and the people lived in peace and happiness.¹⁴

From Xuanzang's version it becomes evident that, before the story of the birth of the sons, there was another story of the birth of the mother, the deer-maiden found in several other Buddhist versions of the legend (see below). Therefore, the whole complex in its most extensive version seems to consist of four sub-legends: 1. the birth of the deer-maiden from the miraculous conception of a deer through an ascetic; 2. the deer-maiden, having become

queen, gives birth to a strange foetus (lotus, piece of meat¹⁵) which is abandoned in a river; 3. the foetus is saved downstream by a king (ascetic) and develops into many children who are fostered by the king; 4. the children, grown up, return to their mother's country (attacking) and finally recognise their real parents. Faxian omits the story of the birth of the mother (1).

There is no direct parallel Buddhist story preserved in an Indian language, as far as I know, but there is an episode in the *Avadānaśataka* (AvS) in which at least the motif of the birth from a piece of meat (2) is preserved¹⁶. AvS 68, called 'The Sons' (*Putrā itī*), has obviously changed the motif of the abandoned sons attacking their relatives into a Buddhist edifying tale which has lost its complete narrative tension:

'In Kapilavastu there was a certain Śākya, rich, wealthy... He married a wife from a family similar to his own. He played, had fun, and cohabited with his wife. His wife, while he was playing, having fun, and cohabiting with her, became pregnant. After eight, nine months she delivered. She bore a big, big piece of meat; after the sad parents and the other attendants and relatives living in the house had seen it (they said): "What is this, for heaven's sake, that she has borne?" The householder entered the "lamentation-room", put his cheek in his hand and stayed lost in his thoughts (such as): "Whom can I tell? Who will know what this is?" (Finally) the thought came to him: "The Venerable Buddha is omniscient, seeing everything. I will tell the Venerable Buddha – he will know." He went to the place where the Venerable One stayed. Having gone there he asked the Venerable One. The Venerable One said: "You should not, householder, be afraid of this piece of (meat), do not be afraid! Put the piece of (meat) in a well-prepared piece of cotton, wipe it three times a day with (your own) hands and sprinkle it with ghee. After seven days it will then burst and 100 boys will be

¹⁵ The meaning of the birth of a piece of meat is – seen in the light of Indian in general and Buddhist embryology – one of prematureness because this state (*peśī*) is considered to be one of the first developments of the foetus.

¹⁶ Already L. Féer, *Avadāna-Īataka. Cent legendes bouddhiques...*, Paris 1891, repr. Amsterdam 1979, p.253 f., has pointed out the connections without, however, coming to a consistent analysis and conclusion.

¹⁴ XJ 7, ed. Ji, p.594 f.

born, (who) will become strong athletes.” After having heard (the Buddha say) that, the householder was highly astonished and thought: “A well done acquisition (if) there are sons like these born to me.” Then he did as it was (said). On the seventh day the piece of meat burst and 100 boys were born (from it), all beautiful, fair, pleasant, with all parts of the body and secondary parts of the body, strong athletes.¹⁷

The boys, after having wandered around, finally meet the Buddha¹⁸ and attain arhatship after having been taught by him and having received the permission of their parents to enter the Saṅgha¹⁹. The Buddha then explains to the monks that these 100 beautiful boys have been born from a ball of flesh because they had, in the days of the Buddha Vipasyin, made the vow (*praṇidhi*) to be reborn with a unified mind and body while venerating the stūpa of the Buddha²⁰.

There is even a reflection of the motif of the mother ejecting milk into the mouths of her sons in the AvŚ 78, the story of Kacaṅgalā²¹:

¹⁷ Ed. J.S. Speyer, *Avadānaçataka. A Century of Edifying Tales Belonging to the Hinayāna*, St Petersburg 1902-06, I, p.375 f., 1.5 ff.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.376, 1.6 f.: ‘In the course of time they grew up, became strong and increasingly (powerful) and they all, carried away by their folly of youth, roamed about here and there (until finally) they came to the Nyagrodha Park. There they saw the Venerable Buddha...’

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.376, 1.12 ff.: ‘They, after having seen the truth and having asked their parents for permission, were ordained in the Teaching of the Venerable One. [They]... reached arhatship.’

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.378, 1.3 ff.: ‘Thereupon they all in one state of spirit and single-mindedly made the vow: “By means of this root of merit may we be reborn with one self, with one mind, with one body, with the same deeds, with the same dharma, with the same merit (leading to) the same Nirvāṇa.” (Having spoken) thus at this place, the adoration of the stūpa having been their last action, they faded away... Because of this they were born of one piece of meat.’

²¹ This is the reconstructed form from Tibetan for the Ms.’s *Kavaṅgalā*. The person evidently corresponds to the nun Kajaṅgalā in the Pāli Canon (*Aṅguttara-nikāya* 5.54 ff.) who has, however, no story connected to her (cf. Malalasekera, DPPN, *op. cit.*, I, p.482, s.v.) – the fact that even the commentaries remain silent about the legend seems to indicate that the latter was

‘The Venerable Buddha... was staying at Kacaṅgalā in the Kācaṅgaliya forest. At (this place) Kacaṅgalā was an old woman called Kacaṅgalā. She took a jar and went to the well to fetch some water. There the Venerable One said to the Elder Ānanda: “Go, Ānanda, to that old woman (and) tell (her) that the Venerable One is thirsty and that she should give (him) water!” When Ānanda had spoken to her, she said: “I will bring (him water) myself.” After Kacaṅgalā had filled the jar with water, she went to the Venerable One. Kacaṅgalā saw the Buddha... As soon as she had seen (him) she was filled with maternal love, and streams of milk came out of her two breasts. With arms held up, (shouting) “(My) son, (my) son!” she tried to embrace the Venerable One. The monks kept her back. The Venerable One said: “Do not, monks, keep her back. For what reason? (Because:) 1. She had been my mother (during my) 500 (previous) births, and had with love for me, her son, embraced my limbs. 2. If she was prevented from embracing my limbs, hot blood would flow now instantly from her mouth. 3. I have remembered my (earlier) gratefulness (to her) and observing her longing for the son, and with mercy and sympathy I let (her) embrace my limbs.”²²

The original motherhood of 500, respectively 1,000 sons, is evidently split into the 500 previous existences of the Buddha, but besides that difference, the parallels to the original legend are clearly discernible: mother and son separated, the mother having her son (the Buddha) recognise her by the stream of milk issuing from her breasts²³. With regard to the Buddha, one could claim

only known in the Buddhist world in the first millennium CE.

²² AvŚ, ed. Speyer, 2, p.41 f., 1.2 ff.

²³ The sudden flow of milk from the breast in connection with dramatic events concerning the own son is also found in the story of the evil dreams of the Buddha’s mother announcing to her the imminent Parinirvāṇa of her son (*Mohemoḃe-jing* 摩訶摩耶經, *Fomu-jing* 佛母經). Interestingly enough, the Jainist biography of the Jina Mahāvira has a similar episode: in the *Viyahapannatti* 9.33 the brahmin woman Devāṇandā, who had received the embryo Mahāvira before he had been translocated into the womb of the kṣatriya-woman Tisālā, shows all the signs of pregnancy, including the flowing out of milk from her breasts, after she meets her saint-turned ‘son’ (cf. Walther

that the episode had been de-dramatised by reducing the original motif of milk flowing into the mouth of the child from the breast of the mother to the attempts at embracing the Buddha.

The closest legend which I was able to find in Indian Buddhist literature so far is the legend of the Vṛjjis/Licchavis (P. *Vajjī, Licchavi*)²⁴, e.g. in Buddhaghosa's commentary on the *Majjhimanikāya* which, for means of comparison with other legends, I give here in full:

1. ... There at the city called by the name "at Vesālī". This later through its expansion (*visālī-bhūtata*) came to the name "Vesālī". 2. There is the (following) old story: in the womb of the first queen of the king of Bārāṇasi was a foetus. When she noticed that she informed the king. The king cared for the foetus. The queen, her foetus being taken care of most diligently, entered the birth-chamber when the time to deliver the foetus had come. Towards dawn, the auspicious (hours), the delivery of the foetus began. And at a certain point of these (hours), around dawn, she had given birth to a piece of meat resembling a bandhujīvaka-flower with a lacquered surface. (The queen) thinking: "The king, thinking that the other royal consorts give birth to sons resembling golden images, but the queen (gives birth only) to a piece of meat, will probably directly (*purato*) blame me," and being afraid of (the king's) reproach, she threw that piece of meat into a bowl, closed (it), sealed it with the royal seal and had it thrown into the river Gaṅgā. Though abandoned by men the gods prepared protection. They fixed a golden strip, on which was written by natural vermilion (ink): "(This is) the offspring of the queen of the king of Bārāṇasi." Then, without any trouble such as fear of the waves, they started that bowl (drifting) on the river Gaṅgā.²⁵

Schubring, *Die Jainas*, Tübingen 1927, p.4).

²⁴ Cf. Bimala Charan Law, *Kṣatriya Clans in Buddhist India*, Calcutta 1922, p.17 ff.; the legend is also found in the Sinhalese *Pūjāvaliya*, see R. Spence Hardy, *A Manual of Buddhism in its Modern Development*, Varanasi 1967, p.235 f., note.

²⁵ J.H. Woods, D. Kosambi (ed.), *Papañcasūdanī Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā of Buddhaghosācariya*, Part II, Suttas 11-50, London 1979 (PTS), p.19 ff. (on *Mahā-Sihanāda-Sutta*; I use the diacritic *ṃ* instead of the *ṅ* of the edition).

3. At this time a certain ascetic lived on the shore of the river near the family of a cowherd²⁶. He went down to the Gaṅgā early and saw the bowl coming down (the river) and took it for rags from a heap of dust. Thereupon he saw the slip with characters (written on it) and the royal seal, broke it and saw the piece of meat. Having seen it he thought: "This is probably a (living) foetus, because it is not in a state of bad smell and stink." He took it to his hermitage and put it in a pure space. Then, after half a month, there were two pieces of meat. When the ascetic saw this he treated them even more carefully. Then again, after half a month, each of the pieces of meat developed five growths destined to be hands, feet and heads. Again, after half a month, one of the pieces of meat became a boy looking like a golden image, the other one (became) a girl. Towards these arose paternal affection in the ascetic. And there was milk coming out of his thumb(s). And from that time on (the children) were fed with milk. The ascetic, after he had taken his food, dripped the milk (of his thumb) into the mouths of the children. Whatever entered their stomach was visible as if it had gone into a (transparent) jewel bowl. So they were without (visible) skin (*nicchavi*). Others say: their skin was clinging (so close) (*līṇā chavi*) to each other as if they had been sewn together²⁷. So, by having no skin or by their having skin clinging (to each other), they became named "Licchavis".²⁸

Exactly the same is found in the commentary on the *Ratanasutta* of the *Khuddakapāṭha*, the first part of the *Khuddakanikāya*, the *Khuddakapāṭhapāṭhā-kathā* (also called *Paramatthajotikā*), in the part called *Vesālivatthu* (I was not able to check and quote by page the PTS edition, but compared both versions on the basis of the Chattha Saṅgyana CD-Rom).

²⁶ *gopaka*, or *gopāka* as it occurs later on, in the context here seems to mean not only 'guardian' but is also taken in a more literal sense.

²⁷ This may refer to the state in which the two foetuses were still clinging together as if sewn (*siv-*) to each other in one piece of meat. This interpretation differs from that of Malalasekera, DPPN, *loc. cit.*, who takes *līna* in the sense of 'thin'.

²⁸ The translation of *līnā chavi* is tentatively supported by the Chinese gloss, T 1462, p.743b27: '(the children) were called *Liche-zi* – in Chinese that means "with thin skin (?)" or also "having joint skin".'

4. The ascetic bringing up the (two) children went to the village for alms-begging after sunrise; late in the day he returned. The cowherds, when they realised what business he was engaged in, said (to him): “Venerable Sir! The bringing up of children is an obstacle to those who lead the homeless life; give us the children; we will foster them; do your own work.” The ascetic answered “Very well!” The cowherds prepared the road, threw flowers (on it), raised flags and banners and, with sweet sounding instruments, came to the hermitage. The ascetic said: “(These) children are very auspicious; raise them with care (and), after having raised them, marry them to each other; after having pleased the king with the five products of the cow and having received land (from him) and founded a city, anoint the boy king”, and gave (them) the children. They answered “Very well” and took the children and fostered them.

5. When the children grew up, they played with the other cowherd children (and), on occasions of dispute, hit (them) with hands and feet. They cried. When they were asked by their parents: “Why do you cry?” they said: “These orphans, having been raised by the ascetic, beat us too hard.” Thereupon their parents said: “These children ruin other children, cause them harm. They should not be treated in a friendly way, they should be avoided (*vajjetabba*.)” Henceforth, this area was called “Vajji”²⁹ within a radius of 100 yojanas.

6. Then, after having pleased the king, the cowherds received this area³⁰. They founded a city there, anointed the boy when he was declared sixteen years old and made him king. They married him to that girl and made an arrangement not to lead a bride from outside (into this country) and not to give away girls from here to anybody else (as bride). After their first intercourse, two children were born (to them), a daughter and a son. In the same

²⁹ Here the Chinese differs slightly, giving an explanation for the place where the children quarrelled: ‘The parents answered: “You should stay away from them both.” That is why this playground is called *Bashe* (**Vajja*) – *Bashe* means “to avoid” in Chinese.’ (T 1462, p.743c15 f.).

³⁰ The motif of the king’s donation is not mentioned in the Chinese version, rendering the motifs of the royal seal and the strip with the children’s origin superfluous.

way sixteen times there were born two (children). Therefore not being sufficient to include the splendour of gardens, parks, resting-places and the entourage of the increasing number of their children, they enlarged the city three times in circles of (one) *gavūta* (quarter of a *yojana*). From its gradual extension (*visālikatattā*) (the city) was given the name “Vesālī”...’.

This legend, with all the same details, is also found in the Chinese version of the *Samantapāsādikā*, the commentary on the Vinaya, translated by Saṅghabhadra/Sengjiabatuoluo 僧伽跋陀羅 at the end of the fifth century, the *Shanjian-lü-piposha* 善見律毘婆沙 T 1462, p.743a27-c24³¹, but only a small condensed portion³² of it – the aetiology of Vesālī – is found in the P *Samantapāsādikā*³³.

The interesting fact of the story is that the birth of the children happens in the same way as in the legend discussed so far. The legend as a whole is clearly structured along the possibility of getting etymological explanations for the names *Licchavi*, *Vajji* and *Vesālī* in the framework of the P. If these somewhat illogical elements in the plot are omitted, the basic story runs as follows: queen gives birth to a piece of meat – she throws it into a bowl and then into the river (2) – ascetic finds the piece of meat and fosters it and the children are born from it respectively (3) – the children

³¹ English translation in P.V. Bapat, in collaboration with A. Hirakawa, 善見毘婆沙 *Shan-Chien-P'i-P'o-Sha. A Chinese Version by Saṅghabhadra of Samantapāsādikā, Commentary on Pāli Vinaya*, Poona 1970, pp.285-7.

³² This is clearly shown by the Chinese, which first runs parallel with the P, but then goes on with the legend after stating *Fashi yue*: ‘The master says: Now I will explain in detail the aetiological story of Vaiśālī...’.

³³ Ed. J. Takakusu, M. Nagai, *Samantapāsādikā, Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Vinaya Piṭaka II*, London 1969 (PTS) p.393 (on *Pārājika III*): “At that time the Buddha, the Venerable One, dwelled in Vesālī, in the Mahāvana, in the Kūṭāgārasāla”; what is called here “in Vesālī” (means) in the city of female gender with such a name, having got this name; it is called “Vesālī” on account of its width caused by the augmenting of the encircling walls in order to construct this city.’ The Sinhalese printed editions (Ssp., ed., n.6) add: ‘This is a condensed account – the detailed account following the story of this (explanation) can be found by those who would like to in the *Paramatthajotikā*, the *Khuddakattakathā*, in the commentary on the *Ratanasutta*.’

become rulers of the area obviously donated by their royal father. It seems, furthermore, that even the miraculous milk-feeding of the children has survived in the milk pouring out of the ascetic's thumb³⁴.

Now, the Pāli legend is declared by Buddhaghosa to be the foundation-legend of the Vrijjis/Licchavis of Vaiśālī, and it seems reasonable that the story the Chinese pilgrims relate for the stūpa / caitya near Vaiśālī refers to the same events. If we try to bring the P story to a closer similarity with the legend – omitting, for instance, all the somehow illogical elements caused by the etymological features which would only function restrictively in an Indian language different from P (e.g. Skt) and the fact that by the topical setting of the beginning of the legend in Benares which excluded a returning of the Vajjis/Licchavis to their parental home – reported by the pilgrims, we could construct the following plot: queen gives birth to a piece of meat (2) – she throws it into a vessel and into the river – downstream the piece of meat is found and the (many children) offspring of it are fostered (3) – the children return to their father's kingdom claiming their right – parents and children are happily reunited (4) – giving the possibility for the same explanation for Vaiśālī as a *vrddhi* form of the adjective *viśāla*, 'extensive, broad', because the city had to be adapted to the number of sons having returned to their parent's country.

The other versions of the legend of the deer-maiden and her sons are found in Chinese translations or compilations of Buddhist literature, the oldest being located in the anonymous sūtra from the Late Han period, *Da-fangbian-fobaen-jing* 大方便佛報恩經, T 156, pp.138c25-140c12³⁵; the story plays in Benares (*Boluonai* 波羅奈). 1. Birth of the deer-maiden (*lunü* 鹿女) from a deer and a ṛṣi (*xianren* 仙人): the ṛṣi once washed his garment on a

³⁴ This detail is proved to be original by the Chinese parallel: 'His affection (towards the children) became strong as if they were not different from his own children. By the power of affection out of his two thumbs poured milk; with one (thumb) nourishing the boy and with the other the girl.' (T 1462, p.743b24 f.). The disputing of the children with their comrades may be the surviving element of the fight against the parents.

³⁵ For an abridged version of the story cf. Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes*, op. cit., IV, p.98 f.

stone near a spring in front of his cave. A female deer drank the water from the stone, licked its genitals (p.139a5: *xiaobian-chu* 小便處, lit. 'the spot from where it urinated'), became pregnant and gave birth to a girl who is brought up by the ṛṣi. Wherever the girl put her feet lotus flowers grew from her footprints. The king of Benares once saw her and made her his wife. After some time she gave birth to a lotus (*lianhua* 蓮華) and threw it away into a pond. The king found the lotus and it was discovered that under each of the 500 leaves of the lotus sat a little godly boy³⁶. The parents had them brought up by the 500 consorts in the palace and when the boys had grown up they all became Pratyekabuddhas and finally entered Nirvāṇa after having performed the twin wonder (*shenbian* 神變 / *yamaka-prātihārya*)³⁷. The mother erected stūpas for her sons³⁸. This early Chinese version is very similar to the story found in the AvS, but has preserved more of the sub-stories: 1, 2 (birth of a lotus) and partly 3 (abandoning of the lotus-foetus in a pond under a coral (?))³⁹, where it is found by its own father).

The next Chinese version is found in Kang Senghui's 康僧會 (second half of the third century) collection *Liudu-ji-jing* 六度集經, T 152, p.14a26-c10⁴⁰. It contains all the sub-stories 1-4, giving the full range of the story to be compared with the legend recorded by Xuanzang. It gives a kind of framing story of a widow giving alms to an ascetic and vowing that in her next life she will give birth to 100 sons resembling the sacred man⁴¹.

'The mother (= widow), after she had died, her spirit moved on and became the child of a brahmin. Her spirit accumulated at

³⁶ p.139c19.

³⁷ ... once letting water come out from the upper part of the body and fire from the lower part of the body, (then again) letting water come out from the lower part of the body and fire come out from the upper part of the body... (p.140b27 f.).

³⁸ This story is connected with the Rṣipatana Park, Chin. 聖所遊居 (p.138a26) where the Buddha gave his first sermon.

³⁹ 'At the shore of this flower pond there was a large coral. Under the coral was a lotus flower having sunk into the water.' (p.139c15 f.).

⁴⁰ Translated in Chavannes, op. cit., I, p.80 ff.

⁴¹ This story – with modifications to the plot – is extrapolated in the version 2 of T 203, p.453b2 ff. (see below).

the spot where the brahmin had urinated. A deer licked the urine and became pregnant. When her time came (to deliver) she gave birth to a girl, who the brahmin raised. At the age of ten she had a splendid demeanour and had made progress in learning, (so that she could watch the house and the fire). (But because) she played with the deer she did not notice that the fire was extinguished. (When her) father came home he got angry and ordered her to go and procure fire. The girl went to a village and wherever she put her step a lotus flower sprang up. The fire-keeper told her: "Go three times round my house, (then) I will give you fire." The girl did as told. The flowers sprang off the ground and encircled the house three times. The people passing stopped (and said): "This is indeed too marvellous!" After some time the king got news (of this miracle) and ordered a fortune-teller to evaluate her. The master said: "She is of sacred offspring and (the signs) tell that she has plenty of good omens." The king ordered a wise minister to make enquiries about (who she was) and to invite her with all formalities. Her beauty was so extraordinary that nobody in the palace could match her. She became pregnant and when (the time) came (to deliver) she gave birth to 100 eggs. The queens and royal consorts were indeed very jealous. They provisionally had carved a (piece of) banana tree in the form of a ghost. When the time of birth came close they covered her face with (her hair), painted a bad expression onto a (piece of) banana tree and showed it to the king. All these demonic creatures distorted the truth and the king was persuaded (by their accusations against the queen). The bunch of wicked (women) put the eggs into a bowl, tightly covered its mouth and threw it into the river. Śakra, the lord of the gods, descended from heaven and sealed the mouth and all the gods watched and protected the bowl, made the current stop and placed themselves on the ground (like pillars). The king of the kingdom downstream, standing on his platform, saw from afar a bowl floating down the river, radiating and shining as if there were something supernatural (in it). He took (the bowl out) and had a look. He saw the seal of the lord (of the gods, Śakra) and when he removed it he got hold of the 100 eggs. He ordered (his) 100 wives to keep them warm. When the time had come the bodies developed and 100 boys were born. From birth on they had the knowledge of wise men, understanding (every-

thing) by themselves without being instructed. The brightness of their appearance expanded the world (and) their auspicious signs were rare (to find). Their strength was extraordinary and their combined energy was 100-fold compared with (other) men. The sound of their voices was like the roaring of lions. The king equipped 100 white elephants with bridles made of the seven precious materials and gave them to his divine scions. (He) ordered them to attack the neighbouring countries. The four neighbouring countries surrendered and called (themselves) subordinates. Then they also attacked the country where they were born. The people in this country, (of) high and low (position), were indeed very frightened and trembling. The king said: "Who has the power to throw back this enemy?" His wife said: "May the great king be not afraid. Look from where this enemy attacked the city. Near that spot erect an observation tower (and I will) subjugate the (enemy) for the king." The king looked from where the enemy came from to (attack) and erected an observation tower. The mother mounted the observation tower and raised her voice: "There are three major offences. Not to keep away from temptations (means) to commit culpabilities in this world and the other world, that is the first one. Not to recognise the parents from whom one has been born and to offend piety, that is the second one. To rely (on one's own) strength (and) to kill one's own parents (or) to direct poison against (one of) the three Venerable Ones⁴², that is the third one. (Who) is longing for these three offences, his evilness is unsurpassed. Open your mouths wide. I will show you the credibility (of what I have said) at once." The mother seized her breasts and heaven had (the milk) rush widely into the mouths of (her) 100 sons. Affected by (her) truthfulness, they drank the milk, were moved with feelings and they all said: "She really is our parent." Tears crossed their faces, they folded their hands, walked forward (having dismounted from their elephants), kowtowed and repented (their deeds). The parents and their offspring were united for the first time and were extremely moved. The two countries fraternised and had kindred feelings (for each other). (All the people in) the different directions were happy about that and it had to be called beneficial.

⁴² That is: a Buddha, a Pratyekabuddha and an arhat.

(Because) the children saw that the world was transient and like a chimera, they left their parents and became renunciants, stayed away from the defilements of the world. 99 of the sons became Pratyekabuddhas, (but) one son took care of the country (and when) his royal father died, he became king. He pardoned the criminals, destroyed the prisons (and) demolished the ditches (of the fortifications). He abolished slavery and promoted filial and fraternal piety (and) fostered the orphans. He founded treasuries (to make) great donations. He gave people what they wanted (and) made the ten good deeds⁴⁴ the law of the country. All the people praised (him). The households had pious children, the construction of stūpas and monasteries prospered, donations were given to the śramaṇas. There was recitation of the sūtras (and) religious discussion, none of the four bad (kinds of) speech (were committed). All harmful action ceased (and) lives became longer. The Buddha told all the śramaṇas: “The (son) who stayed to become king, that was me. The royal father was King Suddhodana (and) the mother was Māyā of the Śākya^{44, 45}”.

In another legend collection, the *Za-baozang-jing* 雜寶藏經 (T 203), translated by Ji Jiaye 吉迦夜 / Kimkārya (?) and Tanyao 曇曜 in the middle of the fifth century, even two versions of the legends are found juxtaposed at the end of the first fascicle (卷第一). Their titles are: 1. *Lianhua-furen-yuan* 蓮華夫人緣 (pp.451c9-452b16); 2. *Lunü-furen-yuan* 鹿女夫人緣 (pp.452b17-453b23) and they are both presented by the Buddha to the Saṅgha as examples of filial piety towards father and mother (1: p.451c13 敬重父母) and veneration towards parents and saints (2: p.452b22 供養父母, 供養賢聖) taking place in a remote past (*guoqu-jiuyuan-wuliang-shishi* 過去久遠無量世時 *pūrva-vidūra-asamkhyeya-kalpa*). In both stories it is stated that the mother reacted exactly at the moment the sons wanted to attack with their bows⁴⁶.

⁴³ 十善 *daśa-kuśalakarmāṇi*, such as abstaining from killing, sexual abuse, lies, etc.

⁴⁴ *She Miao* 舍妙 seems to have that meaning here; *Miao* being an old rendering for Māyā and *She* is probably an abbreviated form of *Sheyi* 舍夷 = Śākya.

⁴⁵ p.14b3 ff.

⁴⁶ The 500 strong men took their bows and wanted to shoot, (but) against their

Version 1 gives as place the sub-story 1. the border-region of the Himavat (p.451c16: *Xueshan* 雪山) and as the name of the rsi *Devayana (?) / *Tipoyan* 提婆延. The name of the royal husband of the deer-maiden is given as *Uḍḍiyāna/Udayana (?)⁴⁷ (p.551c 26: *Wutiyan* 烏提延). The number of sons here is 500 and they are born as 500 eggs which the first queen, jealous of the deer-maiden, puts into a case and throws into the Gaṅgā, after replacing the eggs with strips of dough (*mianduan* 麵段)⁴⁸. The name of the foster-father is *Saddharmabodhi (?) / *Sadanpu* 薩耽菩. In this version at the moment the sons want to shoot at their own mother a saint (or saints) comes flying through the air and explains to the sons that they are about to fight against their own parents, the mother than performing the miraculous milk-feeding as a final proof (p.452b9 ff.).

Version 2 is set in Benares/*Boluonai-guo* 波羅奈國 and a mountain called *Xianshan* 仙山 in Chinese, which is obviously a translation for a name corresponding to Rṣipatana⁴⁹, thus corresponding to the version in T 156. The king and royal husband is called *Fanyu-guowang* 梵豫國王 / Brahmādatta rājā, showing the somewhat topical setting of the story. The number of sons here is 1,000. The mothers give birth to a thousand-petalled lotus flower which is put into a case and thrown into the river by the jealous queen, who replaces the lotus flower with a stinking ulcerated

will their hands could no longer bend the bows' (p.452b7 f.). 'Then the 1,000 sons wanted to grasp their bows in order to shoot, (but) against their will they could not grasp (the bows)' (p.453a18).

⁴⁷ It is interesting enough that the enumeration of the cetiyas in the MPS(P) gives an Udena cetiya, P. Udena corresponding exactly with Udayana, Faxian giving the exact parallel *Youtuoyan* 優陀延 in his translation of the MPS. Has the king in this Chinese version preserved the name of the royal father of the Vṛjjis/Licchavis?

⁴⁸ The king's main queen was very jealous of the deer-maiden and said this (to herself): "The king now loves (her) very much. If she gives birth to 500 sons, then his veneration of her will double." Not long after this (the deer-maiden) gave birth to 500 eggs and laid them in a basket. At that time the main queen took 500 strips of dough to replace the eggs, (put) them in the basket, sealed and closed (it) and threw it in the river Gaṅgā.' (p.452a2 ff.)

⁴⁹ Was this originally *rṣiparvata*, P. *-pabbata*: Chinese *-shan* 山?

horse lung⁵⁰. The name of the foster-father is *Uḍḍiyāna/ *Wuqiyan* 烏耆延.

The pre-Buddhist character of the legend – presumed by the fact that the monument connected to it is known as pre-Buddhist by the MPS – may also be indicated by the fact that narrative elements are found not in Indian Buddhism but in the great Indian epos, the *Mahābhārata* (Mbh), and this, notably, not in some side-stories but in outstanding episodes of the main plot. In the *Ādi-parvan*, for instance, we find the story of Dhṛtarāṣṭra's wife Gāndhārī giving birth to a piece of flesh out of which 100 Dhṛtarāṣṭras and the daughter Duśāla is born⁵¹:

Mbh I, p.107.7 ff.: 'Vaiśampāyana said: Gāndhārī once comforted Dvaipāyana, when he had arrived exhausted with hunger and fatigue. Vyāsa granted her a boon. She chose a hundred sons that would be of equal station with her husband and herself. After some time she was with child by Dhṛtarāṣṭra. For two years Gāndhārī bore her foetus without giving birth, and misery beset her. Then she heard that Kuntī had borne a son, splendid like the morning sun; and when she felt the hardness of her own belly she began to worry. Unbeknownst to Dhṛtarāṣṭra, Gāndhārī, fainting with pain, aborted her belly with hard effort. A mass of flesh came forth, like a dense ball of clotted blood, and she made ready to throw it out after she had borne it in her womb for two years. Dvaipāyana divined it and came swiftly; then that best of mumbler of spells saw the mass of flesh. He said to Subala's daughter: "What is this you are about to do?" She truthfully told the great seer her mind: "When I heard that Kuntī had borne her first son, splendid like the sun, I became so miserable I aborted my belly. A hundred sons you granted me before, to be sure, and now this mass of flesh is born to me for

⁵⁰ '(When) the time was full (the deer-maiden), that is when she (was) to give birth to a thousand-petalled lotus flower. When the time had come that she wanted to deliver, the main queen covered her eyes with something, (did) not (let) her hear (anything) and looked herself. She took a stinking, ulcerating horse lung and placed it under the deer-maiden, took the thousand-petalled lotus flower, put it in a basket and threw it in the river.' (p.452c22 ff.)

⁵¹ J.A.B. Van Buitenen, *Mahābhārata, 1 The Book of the Beginning*, Chicago/London 1973, p.244 f.

those hundred sons!" Vyāsa said: And so shall it yet be and not otherwise, Gāndhārī! I have never spoken a lie in jest; should I do it in earnest? Have at once a hundred pots set up and filled with ghee; and sprinkle this ball with cold water. Vaiśampāyana said: When the ball was doused, it fell apart into a hundred pieces, each an embryo the size of a thumb joint; a full hundred and one duly developed one after another from that ball of flesh as time went by. O lord of the people. He then put them in pots and had them watched in well-guarded places. Then the blessed lord told Gāndhārī after how much time the pots were to be broken open. And after taking measures and leaving instructions, the wise and blessed Lord Vyāsa repaired to the rocky Himālaya to perform austerities. Prince Duryodhana was born first in the sequence of them, but Prince Yuddhiṣṭhira was both by birth and by authority the older one. As soon as his son was born, Dhṛtarāṣṭra summoned many brahmins as well as Bhīṣma and Vidura, and he declared, "Prince Yuddhiṣṭhira is the eldest scion in our line. By his own virtue he shall obtain the kingdom, and we shall not demur. But shall this one then become king after him? Tell me truthfully what must be firmly resolved in this matter." When he ceased speaking, Bhārata, there was a sudden outcry on all horizons of gruesome beasts that feed on carrion and of jackals of unholy howls. Remarking these terrible portents everywhere, the brahmins, and also the wise Vidura, spoke, O King: "Clearly this son of yours will spell the death of the dynasty! In abandoning him there is appeasement, great disaster in fostering him! Let ninety-nine sons remain to you, lord of the land, and with the one you shall secure both the world and your dynasty. For the family, abandon one son; for the village, abandon a family; for the country, abandon a village; for the soul, abandon the earth!" Thus spoke Vidura and all the great brahmins, but the king did not do it, for he loved his son. Within a month's time the full one hundred sons were born to Dhṛtarāṣṭra. O king, and over and above the hundred also a girl.⁵²

Comparing the structure of the birth of the Dhṛtarāṣṭras and the structure of the legend discussed here, it is clear that besides

⁵² Mbh 1, 107.7-34.

the striking common element of the birth of many sons out of a ball of flesh, also the elements of abandoning a son who will endanger the continuity of the family or dynasty respectively, are all pointing to the Buddhist legend discussed here; even if this is less clearly brought out at this moment in the Mbh, it is evident that the motif of fighting against one's own relatives is omnipresent and became the overall dominant scenario of the epos⁵³.

There is, besides, another story in the *Vanaparvan* (Mbh 3, 292+293) which reflects the Moses-motif (child being abandoned in a casket thrown into a river and raised by a king)⁵⁴ where the reader is told that Prthā, alias Kuntī, the later wife of Pāṇḍu, had an illegitimate son with the sun-god Sūrya and therefore abandoned him in a basket (*mañjūṣā*) in the river Aśva. From there the basket travelled down into the rivers Carmanvatī, Yamunā and Gaṅgā until it arrived at Campā. The boy was found by Adhiratha, a friend and herald (*sūta*) of King Dhṛtarāṣṭra, who picked him out of the water and fostered him as his son under the name of Vasuṣeṇa or Vrṣa. When he grew up his mother Kuntī learnt of his existence and his foster father sent him to the court of Dhṛtarāṣṭra where the prince made friends with Duryodhana, learned archery (*iṣvastrakarman*) from Drona, became famous for this skill and later on, in the great battle, the opponent of Arjuṇa⁵⁵.

⁵³ It is also remarkable that other structurally similar elements are found in the subsequent plots, such as (Mbh 1, 109) King Pāṇḍu killing a male deer (*mrga*) when mating with its female, the deer turning out to be an ascetic who cursed Pāṇḍu. Further on (Mbh 1, 120) there is the story of the ṛṣi Gautama, who is a skilled archer, whom the apsaras (*devakanyā*) Jālapadī (does the same, 'net-footed', somehow reflect the wondrous feet of the deer-maiden in our Buddhist legend?) tries to seduce, but produces twin sons by having his seed fall on a reed stalk, the sons then become great archers too. Here we may have, split into two different episodes, the reflection of the deer-maiden and the ṛṣi causing her to become pregnant by his semen.

⁵⁴ Hara Minoru, 'Rāma-monogatari to Momotarō-dōwa' ('The story of Rāma and the tale of Momotarō') 原實、ラマ物語と桃太郎童話, in *Studies Dedicated to Professor Atsuuji Ashikaga*, Tokyo 1978 足利氏博士喜壽記念オリエンタル学インド学論集, p.529, has pointed out that there is a similar story of Sītā's birth and abandonment in the non-Vālmiki traditions of the *Rāmāyana*.

⁵⁵ See the translation by Van Buitenen, *The Mahābhārata, 2 The Book of the Assembly Hall, 3 The Book of the Forest*, Chicago/London 1975, p.791. For a

It seems that in the Mbh several motifs and episodes from a legend such as this one discussed here had been used and inserted in the main plot of the epic, but that these elements have been split into two main strings along the line of the personages of the two kings, Pāṇḍu and Dhṛtarāṣṭra, and their two wives, Kuntī and Gāndhārī: the birth of the Dhṛtarāṣṭras – who later fight their relatives (!) and so fulfil the prophecy of Vidura imposed on Dhṛtarāṣṭra if he did not abandon Duryodhana – and the birth and abandonment of Vasuṣeṇa who later returns to his mother's home and finally fights against his relatives including his half brothers and the Pāṇḍavas. In both cases, however, the children born under special circumstances fight as adults their own relatives until the bitter end – a difference to the Buddhist legend's happy ending but a necessary consequence of the logic of the epic.

Finally, another version of a Vaiśālī legend from the third tradition of India reflecting some of the motifs which are found in the aetiological legend of the pilgrims has to be mentioned. It is found in the first of the last five *upāṅgas* of the Jaina Canon, in the first *varga* (Pkt *vaggio*) of the *Nirayāvaliāo* (Skt *Nirayavālikā*)⁵⁶. It is the legend of the Rahamusala battle (Skt *Rathamusala*), the battle between King Ceḍa'a/Ceḍaga, king of Vesālī (and of the Lecchāi/Licchavis which are mentioned together with the Mallas as the main parts of the army of Ceḍaga), and his grandson Kūṇiya/Kuṇiya, king of Campā. Kūṇiya is born under strange circumstances as the first son of King Seṇiya of Campā and Queen Cellaṇā, the daughter of King Ceḍaga: when Cellaṇā was pregnant with Kūṇiya, in the third month she has the strange desire to eat the flesh of the belly (*uyaravalīmamsa*) of her husband. The queen's desire is finally satisfied by a trick of her stepson Abhaya who pretends to cut out flesh from his father's belly, while in reality he offers the queen flesh from a slaughterhouse. After that

study of this episode, cf. Hara Minoru, 'Indo no 'Nichirin-shinwa' – Karuna-densetsu wo megutte' ('The Indian sun-myth – on the legend of Karna') インド白輪神話 - カルナ傳説をめぐって, in *Tōhō* (The East) 2 (1986), pp.92-111.

⁵⁶ I am using the edition and English translation by A.S. Gopani and V.J. Choksi, *Nirayāvaliāo (The Last Five Upāṅgas of the Jain Canon)*, Ahmedabad 1934; for further information, cf. Mohanlal Mehta, K. Rishabh Chandra, *Prakrit Proper Names, Part 1*, Ahmedabad 1970, p.264 f., s.v. *Ceḍaa* and *Cellaṇā*.

Cellaṇā has bad feelings about the foetus in her uterus which has eaten the flesh of his own father and wants to abort the foetus. Being unable to press it out of her belly, after nine months a boy is born. Cellaṇā, thinking that the offspring who has eaten the flesh of his progenitor will probably destroy his own family, has the boy thrown on a dung hill (*ukuruḍiyā*, Skt *utkarikā*). The king finds the boy because a strange light is radiating from the spot where he was thrown and the boy is taken back to the royal palace and is called Kūṇiya⁵⁷. Because the boy's upper finger-joint (*aggaṅguliya*) has been hurt when he was thrown on the dung hill he cries; his royal father appeases him by having him suck blood from his own fingertip and afterwards does so whenever the boy cries. When the boy has finally usurped his father's throne, he also wants to have two precious items in the possession of his younger brother Vehalla, a necklace and an elephant. Vehalla flees into the protection of his grandfather's kingdom and Kūṇiya attacks his relatives to get hold of the two desired items.⁵⁸

So, in that somewhat strange Jaina story⁵⁹, we find the now well-known motifs of 1. battle between relatives⁶⁰, 2. strange birth

Deeg – Legend and Cult : 2. The Stūpa of Laying Down the Bows

and abandonment of the protagonist⁶¹, 3. the drinking of liquid by the protagonist from his parent's body: the fact that the baby, babies in the P legend respectively, sucks the finger of his father, adoptive father, the ascetic, respectively is an interesting parallel between the Jaina story and the aetiological legend in the P commentary, though the sucking of milk from the finger is turned into the quite odd motif of sucking blood in the Jaina story which is, on the other hand, of consequence in the framework of the whole plot⁶². The geographical setting of the fight at Vesālī seems to indicate that this Jaina story was basically related to the legend under discussion here.

Going back to the Cāpāla-caitya and the other caityas mentioned in the MPS, there is no question that the *bahuputraka-stūpa/bahuputtaka cetiya* of the Skt and P texts – *bahupattraka* of the MPS(S) (and the Divy) is to be considered as a 'mistake' and goes back to the same name as proved by the Tibetan – stands in connection with the discussed legend: it is the stūpa or caitya which was built in commemoration of the avadāna of 'many sons' (*bahuputra*)⁶³.

On the other hand, the *dhūraṅikṣepaṇa-caitya* (or –*stūpa*) of MPS(S) and Divy seems to relate to the legend too – as Rhys Davids has already pointed out in a short note⁶⁴. As the MPS(P) does not have this name, it is reasonable that the name which has

⁵⁷ The text gives an aetiological-etymological explanation of the choice of this name: the boy was hurt by a cock's feather (*kikkuḍa-piccha* 'a); this 'etymology' is rather weak here from the standpoint of phonetic similarity: *Kū(ṇiya)*: *ku(kkuḍa-)*.

⁵⁸ On the possible historical background of this battle, see H. Jacobi, 'Buddhas und Mahaviras Nirvana und die politische Entwicklung Magadhas zu jener Zeit', in *Sitzungsbericht der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, hist.-phil. Kl.*, Berlin 1930, pp.557-68 (repr. in H. Jacobi, *Kleine Schriften* 2, ed. B. Köhler, Wiesbaden 1970, pp.803-15). Kūṇiya is for the Jaina tradition the name of Ajātaśatru who, according to the MPS, wants to attack the Vṛjjis. So it seems that parts of the aetiological story of the Vṛjjis/Licchavis were inserted into the Jaina legend of the battle of Ajātaśatru-Kūṇiya against the state of Vaiśālī.

⁵⁹ Jacobi, 'Buddhas u. Mahaviras', *op. cit.*, p.566, calls it a 'märchenhaft entstellte Kunde'.

⁶⁰ It culminates here in the killing of ten (*sic*) half-brothers of Kūṇiya through the arrows (*sic*) of Ceḍaga (Jacobi, *op. cit.*, p.567), turning the story to a dramatic end and reversing the motif of the bow to the party attacked; despite the setback for Kūṇiya he finally conquers Vaiśālī (*loc. cit.* and J. Deleu, *Vijāhapannatti (Bhagavai). The Fifth Anga of the Jaina Canon, Introduction, Critical Analysis, Commentary and Indexes*, Delhi 1996, p.140 ff.).

⁶¹ If the connection between the various legends is accepted it seems clear that the efforts of the queen aborting the foetus is a kind of reflection of the birth of a piece of meat (*mamsapeśi*) in the other cases – in fact, according to Indian embryology, it would have come out as a ball of flesh in the case of a successful abortion – and it seems that therefore the strange motif of eating flesh from one's own husband's body is related to the motif of the piece of meat!

⁶² The boy has eaten what was thought to be the flesh of his father in the maternal womb, so it is of consequence in a way of analogical thinking that he is appeased only by a part of his father's body. This, of course, was somehow considered as the reason why the boy finally attacks his relatives, proving the fears of Queen Cellaṇā to be true.

⁶³ The only clear reference to this connection I know is that of Hori in his commentary on Xuanzang's XJ: Hori Kendoku, *Kaistesu-saiikiki*, Toyoshima 1912, p.532, 堀謙徳, 解説西域記, 豊島.

⁶⁴ T.W. Rhys Davids, 'Fa Hien's "Fire-Limit"', in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1891), pp.337-9.

no correspondence in the MPS(S) is the alternative one: *sāraṅ-dada*, which could have been interpreted as Skt **sāraṁdada*⁶⁵ in the meaning of 'giving (away) the arrow(s)',⁶⁶ in connection with the aetiological story respectively: laying down (*nikṣepaṇa*) the bows (*dhura*?⁶⁷).

It seems that the text tradition (MPS) has split the various names or epithets for the same caitya or stūpa into several monuments because the context was not understood by the redactor or redactors. This is somehow understandable because the differences in the various texts mentioning the episode show that the nucleus must have been concentrated on monuments or on a monument. Caitya in the context of the texts is used in a pre-Buddhist sense⁶⁸, which then must have been originally connected with something which should have been recollected – something which the Buddhist texts do not mention because it was presupposed to be known or because it was not known exactly.

The accounts by the pilgrims who only report one stūpa in the area of Vaiśālī, whose aetiological story fits with the names explained above and given in the lists of the Indian texts, would suggest that at least in the period of the pilgrims – that is, from the

Gupta period on – but probably also before and possibly following a tradition differing in this one point, one caitya was still shown as connected with the legend of the deer-woman and her numerous sons. If this is the case, the name *cāpāla* in the MPS should also be connected semantically with the aetiological story. Trying to follow the logic of the old analysts – who were *nairuktas* in the traditional sense, following more of a semantic-contextual line than performing a strict formal linguistic analysis⁶⁹ – one can split the name into two elements *cāpa-* and *āla*; the first element is a word for 'bow',⁷⁰ rather unusual in Skt literature⁷¹ but already used in the Mbh, where we also find – as we have seen above – fragments of the avadāna.

The second part of the word *-āla*, however, is not so easily explained as corresponding to 'laying down (the bows)' as Faxian terms it. It could have been analysed as belonging to the root \sqrt{la} - with the prefix *ā-* which is found in the *Dhātupāṭha* (Dhātup)⁷².

⁶⁹ Cf. for that kind of 'etymology'. M. Deeg, *Die altindische Etymologie nach dem Verständnis Yāskas und seiner Vorgänger: eine Untersuchung über ihre Praktiken, ihre literarische Verbreitung und ihr Verhältnis zur dieterischen Gestaltung und Sprachmagie*, Dettelbach 1995, and for the tradition: Eivind Kahrs, *Indian semantic analysis – The 'nirvacana' tradition*, Cambridge 1988. Many Chinese translations of Indian names – not least made by the pilgrims who had been studying in Buddhist academic centres – and their later Tibetan successors clearly indicate through their work that the *nairukta-* or *nirvacana-* method of explaining Indian words had a living tradition despite the fact that no texts of this type were produced after Yāska's *Nirukta*.

⁷⁰ Cf. Böhtlingk & Roth, *Sanskrit Wörterbuch*, *op. cit.*, 2, p.990 s.v.; 1, p.223a, s.v. The word has relatively few correspondences in Middle-Indo-Aryan or new Indo-Aryan dialects; cf. R.L. Turner, *A Comparative Dictionary of Indo-Aryan Languages*, Oxford 1966, p.257b, no.4746, s.v.

⁷¹ It is, however, found in the Buddhist synonymic dictionary, *Nānalingānuśāsana* by Amarasimha, known as *Amarakośa*, 2.83 (edition V. Jhalakikar, 1907, repr. Delhi 1990, p.200; on the dictionary in general see C. Vogel, *Indian Lexicography*, Wiesbaden 1979, p.309) where *cāpa* in the *dvandva dhanuś-cāpau*, introducing the lemma, may point out some common use of the word.

⁷² Cf. also the Chinese translation of Upāli as *Jinqu* 近取 or *Jinzi* 近執 – 'close' (*upā-*) and 'to take, to grasp' (*-li*) – which shows that in this name too the element *-li* was probably taken as belonging to *lā-*.

⁶⁵ Faxian, T 7 p.191b15, has *Suoluo-zhiti* 娑羅支提, which could be either *Śāla-caitya* or *Śara-caitya*. The final element *-dada* may, however, also just be a twisted form in P; cf. the Skt epithet *puran-tara* : P *purin-dada* of the Buddha in the *Varṇasātan*: E. Waldschmidt, *The Varṇasātam. An Eulogy of one hundred Epitheta of Lord Buddha spoken by the Gṛhapati Upāli(n)*, Göttingen 1979, p.17.

⁶⁶ Another possibility would be – if there is a correspondence to the epithet P *purindada* and if the PTS Dictionary (p.469a, s.v.) is right to interpret P *purindada* as an original Vedic *puram-darā*, 'fortress-breaker' – to analyse the name as 'breaking (*dr = dara*) of arrow(s)'.

⁶⁷ *Dhura* usually means 'yoke, pole, burden' – the term *dhurānikṣepaṇa* being quoted in Monier-Williams. *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Oxford 1899, repr. Delhi 1990, p.517b, s.v. – but if it is really connected with the legend discussed here it could either have had a metaphorical sense: the sons laying down their burden of killing, or *dhura* here bears the meaning – although not found elsewhere – 'bow' (the stick of the bow corresponding to Faxian's *zhong*). Or is *dhurā-* only a misunderstanding (misreading) of an original *dhanu* ?

⁶⁸ This has already been remarked by Eugène Burnouf, *Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme indien*, 2 Paris 1876, p.66, n.1, in his translation of the Divy text.

That this root was evidently used for etymologising Skt words ending in *-la*, is shown by the story of the name of Ceylon, *Siṃhala*, given by Xuanzang. The meaning of *ā-lā-*, especially because it does not occur together with a prefix *ā-*, is not easy to determine, but the Dhātup gives for the root a rendering (*ādāne* '[in the sense of] to take') which would not fit very well with the expected meaning but would mean just the opposite. There is, however, no doubt that $\sqrt{lā-}$ is only a variant of the more common but also defective root $\sqrt{rā-}$, 'to give (away)',⁷³ so that it seems that the differentiation made by the Dhātup between $\sqrt{rā-}$, 'to give (away)', and $\sqrt{lā-}$, 'to take', is an artificial one. Holding that $\sqrt{dā-}$, 'to give', affixed with *ā-* gets the meaning 'to take', a semantic shift from 'to take' to 'to give' in the case of $\sqrt{lā-}$ is quite possible, especially because the meaning-entry in Dhātup was not definite about the basic meaning, which can be seen from the variant (*dāne*)⁷⁴. There is also the possibility – more elegant though avoiding a verbal etymon of the last member – that the name was analysed as *cāpa* + *alam* in a kind of syntactical explanation meaning '(do) away with the bows!' which would fit with the aetiological story as well. Whichever of these two 'etymologies' was really made up by the aetiological expounders, either of them would have been in perfect harmony with the climax of the aetiological story and – even more important – would be the exact counterpart of Faxian's translation of the respective stūpa: *Fang-gongzhang* 放弓杖, the '(stūpa of) releasing the bows'.

That the name was also explained in a different way is shown by the anonymous MPS, T 6 (p.180b12), where we find *Ji-ji-shendi* 急疾神地, the 'sacred spot "swift"', *cāpāla* being interpreted as a

⁷³ Cf Chlodwig H. Werbam *Verba Indoarica, Die primären Wurzeln Sanskrit-Sprache, Par I: Radices Primariae*, Vienna 1997, p.313 f., s.v. *rā*³⁴⁰ 'schenken, Gewähren, (preis)geben'. The argument of M. Mayrhofer, *Kurzgefaßtes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen*, III, Heidelberg 1976, p.99, s.v. *lāti*, repeated in *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen* 2, Heidelberg 1994, p.443, s.v. *RĀ*¹, against Renou for an etymologically different root because the 'semantische[n] Differenz' does not take into account the artificiality of the Dhātup entry.

⁷⁴ Cf. Böhtlingk/Roth, *Sanskrit Wörterbuch*, op. cit., s.v. 1. *lā*, but also 2. *lā*; das Nehmen, das Geben'.

derivation of *capala*, 'swift, swaying, mobile'⁷⁵.

What kind of story was this legend that was remembered for such a long period in the area around Vaiśālī and that was marked by a monument that – despite the aetiological legend having been forgotten in general – kept on appearing in Buddhist literature?

The area near Vaiśālī was the dominion of the former Vṛjji/Licchavi clan to which also belonged the caityas mentioned in the MPS. The legends given by Faxian and Xuanzang do not mention the name of the clan in the context of the story but, from the version found in the P commentaries, it is clear that the stories must go back to a common source. This original legend was – I think – the aetiological story of the origin of the Vṛjjis/Licchavis.

As everywhere else in the world⁷⁶ the Indian noble clans also claimed descent from to ancestors who had come from very special origins or circumstances⁷⁷. In the case of the Vṛjjis/Licchavis, who were obviously proud of being a kind of aristocratic confederation without a clear royal house, such an aetiological story about their own origin would naturally have involved an explanatory element giving the reason for there being no absolute monarchy with one ruler or ruling house but a confederation of several clans. The name of the city, Vaiśālī/Vesālī, then – as can be seen from the legend in the P commentary – was also clearly connected with the purpose of not only explaining why the city was so huge but also of giving the reason for this: because the Vṛjjis/Licchavis were so numerous.

Now, if the caityas mentioned in the MPS are related to the aetiological legend about the origin of the Licchavis, it is clear by their names that this legend must have existed in a form similar to those reported by the Chinese pilgrims (and in other Chinese versions) with the elements of many sons (*bahuputrakā*), the laying down of the bows (*cāpāla*, *dhūraṇiḥsepaṇa* = *dhanuṇiḥse-*

⁷⁵ This is not very conclusive from the standpoint of Skt word formation, because it presupposes two *vrddhis*, of the stem and of the formant.

⁷⁶ To give only a few examples, the story of Romulus and Remus, the already mentioned similar story of Moses, etc.

⁷⁷ E.g. Siṃhala, the ancestor of the Ceylones, the founder of the Khotanese kingdom, etc.

pana?⁷⁸) or arrows (*śaradada*) and even the name of the royal father (*progenitor princeps*) may have been preserved in the Udena cetiya of the P list. The fact that there was a whole band of sons, young warriors, in the legend of the origin of the Licchavis would fit perfectly to explain the coming into existence of an aristocratic clan 'republic' that the Vrijjis are thought to have formed. Even in the days of the Buddha the young Licchavis were renowned for their hunting with bow and arrow⁷⁹ which could point to 'Jungmännerbünde',⁸⁰ institutionalised in respect of the origins of the clan. The Pāli aetiology for the name of Vesālī would – with 100, 500 or 1,000 sons coming home – even attain a higher degree of plausibility than with the regular birth of children.

The historical setting seems to be that the caitya or stūpa of 'laying down the bows' or 'Many sons' referred to the old legend of the Vrijjis/Licchavis as it is related by Faxian and Xuanzang near Vaiśālī and it was thought to have been there that the Buddha gave up his will to extend his lifetime. It was well established from about the beginning of the Christian era – the period when texts such as the Divy, Mvu, AvŚ, Lal are supposed to have been composed. It still flourished under the Guptas when Faxian was travelling; in that time the name and its meaning in connection with the story were still known and explained in the local tradition. This local legend in a Buddhicised form then found its way into the Buddhist narrative literature (Chinese versions, AvŚ) while other elements can be found in the narrative tradition of the Hindus and

Jainas. Monument and legend and their connection finally fell into oblivion from the seventh century CE: Xuanzang did still know the story of the monument but does not refer either to the name and exact position of the monument⁸¹ or to the laying down of the bows. Yijing, Huichao and Wukong do not refer to the existence of such a place – which is not very surprising with even the Parinirvāṇa-stūpa of Kuśinagara having fallen into a state of decay in their days.

To conclude the discussion about the two stūpas: it is usually assumed that Buddhist stūpas were once built as symbols of the Dharma or – in a more philosophical-buddhological framework of interpretation – as a representation of the Buddha's presence after his Nirvāṇa. Too little attention has, however, been paid to the fact that some of the stūpas and the stories of their Buddhist origin – usually in the form of jātaka- or avadāna-like legends – and sometimes their interaction have a history of their own. A successful interpretation of these monuments can only be given by a careful evaluation of textual (usually, and for the Indologist unfortunately, not Indian), philological (which means here the analysis of names and their meaning) and archaeological data, which in some cases should be able to elucidate each other and enable the historian to write a puzzle-stone – be it only fragmented – in the history of Indian Buddhism, this being the only way to do it.

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⁷⁸ The Tib. *brtson-pa-gtoñ-ba* for *dhuraṃ kṣip-/tyaj-/muñj-* follows the Skt closely.

⁷⁹ *Aṅguttara-nikāya* III, 75 f.: While the Buddha dwells in the Mahāvana a group of young Licchavis with the bows prepared and surrounded by their hounds (*sambahulā Licchavikumārakā sajjāni dhanukāni* (Mss and Buddhaghosa in the Comm: *dhanūni*) *ādāya kukkurasāṅghaparivutā*) roam the forest. When they see the Buddha resting under a tree, they lay down their bows (*sajjāni dhanukāni nikkhipitvā*), restrain their dogs and revere the Buddha.

⁸⁰ This may be the background to why the Licchavi Mahānāma subsequently warns the Buddha of the rude and reckless behaviour of these young Licchavis; Buddhaghosa in his commentary on the passage claims that these young men will later on belong to the ruling class of Vajjis: ... *vaḍḍhissanti Vajjirājāno* (H. Kopp, ed., *Manorathapūranī. Commentary on the Aṅguttara Nikāya* III, London 1966, p.261).

⁸¹ It is highly probable that all the shrines (caityas) mentioned in the MPS and other texts have been located near the area of the Aśoka pillar of Baikhra where several archaeological remains can be found: a ruined stūpa and sites which have been identified with the Mahāvana vihāra and the Markaṭahradatīra also mentioned in the Mvu (see above); see Alexander Cunningham, *Archaeological Survey of India, Four Reports Made during the Years 1862-63-64-65*, Indian repr. Delhi 1972, p.58 ff. (see also plate XXI); the fact that the pillar bears no inscription may indicate that Aśoka wanted to pay homage to a spot which was not directly connected with the Buddha. A final identification of the archaeological sites in the area with Buddhist legends must of course be preliminary, but the position of the place (some 100 m northwest of old Vaiśālī; cf. Faxian's geographical setting) and the textual evidence may indicate that this was the area where at least some of the clan-caityas of the Licchavis mentioned in the texts could have been situated.

AN OUTLINE OF THE YOGĀCĀRA-VIJÑĀNAVĀDA
SCHOOL OF INDIAN BUDDHISM

PART TWO

ERIC CHEETHAM

Part One of this article set out certain of the doctrinal features of Yogācāra as well as basic practices. Part Two now completes these topics based on the same source material as used in Part One.

THE EIGHTEEN *DHĀTUS* (ELEMENTS); THE ALL

It has been shown here already that the six triads of the eighteen *dhātu* scheme (see diagram) are part of the Buddha's original set of teaching formulas. These, and the elaborations in the Abhidharma texts, are part of Yogācāra's pedigree from the early mainstream teaching. Asaṅga presents the explicit version of this same eighteen *dhātu* scheme in his *Abhidharmasamuccaya*⁸⁰.

The Yogācāra scheme of *dhātus* combines with two other ancient formulas, the five *skandhas* and twelve *āyatanas* (faculties and fields). As the *skandhas* and *āyatanas* are names for particular collections of dharma elements, when brought together within the eighteen *dhātu* framework they represent all dharma activity as a whole. Indeed Chapter One of Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* sets out this combined scheme in detail, together with definitions of each of the dharmas involved.

The formula of the eighteen *dhātus* comprises six triads of elements: the five senses, i.e., organ, object and consciousness for each sense faculty of seeing, smelling, tasting and touching. Added to these is the sixth triad, which consists of mental organ, mental object and mental consciousness. The complete layout is given in the following diagram.

⁸⁰ *Abhidharmasamuccaya* trans., *op. cit.*, Part I, Ch. One.

THE EIGHTEEN *DHĀTUS* IN YOGĀCĀRA

1. <i>cakṣurdhātu</i> (eye element)	2. <i>rūpadhātu</i> (form element)	3. <i>cakṣurvijñānadhātu</i> (visual consciousness element)
4. <i>śrotradhātu</i> (ear element)	5. <i>śabdadhātu</i> (sound element)	6. <i>śrotravijñānadhātu</i> (auditory consciousness element)
7. <i>ghrānadhātu</i> (nose element)	8. <i>gandhadhātu</i> (odour element)	9. <i>ghrānavijñānadhātu</i> (olfactory consciousness element)
10. <i>jihvādhātu</i> (tongue element)	11. <i>rasadhātu</i> (taste element)	12. <i>jihvāvijñānadhātu</i> (gustatory consciousness element)
13. <i>kāyadhātu</i> (body element)	14. <i>sprastavyadhātu</i> (tangibility element)	15. <i>kāyavijñānadhātu</i> (tactile consciousness element)
16. <i>manodhātu</i> (mental organ element, <i>manas</i>)	17. <i>dharmadhātu</i> (mental objects element)	18. <i>manovijñānadhātu</i> (mental consciousness element)
	i.e. <i>vinīyata</i> (special) <i>kuśāla</i> (wholesome) <i>akuśāla</i> (defiled, unwholesome) <i>upakleśa</i> (secondary defiled/unwholesome) <i>anīyata</i> (indeterminate) <i>cittaviprayukta saṃskāra</i> (distinct from other mentals) <i>asaṃskṛta</i> (unconditioned)	

For the early schools the sensory objects were real entities which existed externally. Similarly, all the other *dhātu* combinations consisted of real fundamental elements (*dharma*) which appeared in consort with others and then disappeared⁸¹ only to be replaced immediately by further clusters of dharmas.

Asaṅga and Vasubandhu only go along with this so far. Yogācāra recognises all the dharmas, as we shall see, and even adds some to the Sarvāstivādin lists. In particular, Asaṅga uses the

eighteen *dhātu* scheme as an all-embracing framework for all dharmas, i.e. Saṃsāra. Again, an important dharma addition is made. This is *manas*, the seventh consciousness. The fundamental difference, however, is that Yogācāra does not regard any of these dharma elements as being independent and really existing externals or internals. Instead, they are simply outflows from the *ālayavijñāna* by means of engendering seeds (*bīja*).

Vasubandhu expresses this in brief. He says that the sensory consciousnesses depend upon the *ālayavijñāna* and they manifest subject to causes and conditions⁸². This refers to the Yogācāra teaching of *vijñaptimātratā*, sometimes called 'representation only'. This topic will be expanded below, but at this point it is necessary to consider the main Yogācāra additions, one of which is within the eighteen *dhātus*. They are the seventh and eighth consciousnesses.

Manas, the seventh consciousness, is a dharma and is part of the eighteen *dhātu* scheme. It is located at number 16, the triad of mentality. As such it is numbered among the Yogācāra list of dharmas (see appendix list, No.89).

Although *manas* is listed as a dharma, its functions suggest it is not a single momentary entity as described in the old Abhidharma texts. *Manas* has multiple functions as described here earlier. Vasubandhu states⁸³ that *manas*, the seventh consciousness, cogitates and deliberates. It also receives input from all the other consciousnesses and is closely associated with a variety of defilements⁸⁴ in its *parikalpita* state. So, as a thought-centre applying examination and judgement to all this input, *manas* could be argued to be more than a single entity. The texts do not expand on this but it could be surmised that either *manas* is a 'cluster' of various dharmas, or the whole concept of dharmas was amended in the Yogācāra scheme of things. One thing is clearly expressed and that is that *manas* has the *ālayavijñāna*, the eighth conscious-

⁸² Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*, v.15, quoted in DMC, p.cxxxi.

⁸³ *Triṃśikā*, v.2, quoted in *ibid.*, p.cxxiii.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, pp.289-303.

⁸¹ *Kośa*, Ch.1, pp.5 and 6.

ness, as its basis and support as well as its object⁸⁵.

The *ālayavijñāna*, the eighth consciousness, however, does not figure specifically in any of the eighteen *dhātus*. This may be because of its definition as being the cause and conditions⁸⁶ of all the elements. Here we probably have a reference to the *bījas*, which constitute the *ālayavijñāna*, these being the progenitors of all dharmas.

On the other hand, the eighteen *dhātus* do not include the conditioned/unconditioned dharmas within number 17, the *dharma-dhātu*⁸⁷. On this matter Yogācāra diverges from the early schools. In these, the *asamskṛta* dharmas were shown as distinctly separate from the five *skandhas* which, in both Yogācāra and mainstream, are part of the eighteen *dhātus*. There is some explanation of this by Asaṅga, who says that all the *dhātus* are 'knowable' (*jneya*)⁸⁸ and thus can presumably incorporate the eight *asamskṛta* dharmas. A point, however, not readily explained is this: if the *asamskṛtas* are dharmas, they have to be engendered by *bījas* (seeds) which can only come from the *ālayavijñāna*. The question is how is this possible for unconditioned elements which are said to have no independence or relationship with anything else? For example, is Nirvāṇa produced by a *bīja*? Doubtless there is a quite satisfactory answer to this but, so far, it has eluded this writer.

The accompanying *dhātu* diagram sets out the eighteen *dhātu* scheme and its contents. The first five triads (Nos 1-5) have sufficient operational clarity to make further explanation unnecessary. Except in one regard. Again, Yogācāra deviates from the earlier Abhidharmas by placing the sensory organs in the first place of the triads (Nos 1, 4, 7, 10 and 13). The early schools explained the sensory process as a linkage between object, organ and consciousness. The object impinging upon, or being sought out by, the organ engenders a sensory result which is impressed on the corresponding consciousness. It seems that the Yogācāra

⁸⁵ *Triṃśikā*, v.5, quoted in *ibid.*, p.cxxv.

⁸⁶ *Abhidharmasamuccaya* trans., *op. cit.*, p.59.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p.23.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p.30.

reverted to the Buddha's original sequence⁸⁹ here. In any case, all these elements arose from the *bījas* in the *ālayavijñāna* in related combinations, so that a primary, external object was redundant.

It is the last of the six triads that need some comment. With the addition of the dharma *manas* to *manodhātu*, No.16, the number of dharma consciousnesses within the eighteen *dhātus* is increased from six to seven. The eighth consciousness, the *ālayavijñāna*, is not part of the dharma list or the *dhātu* scheme. The second item of the sixth triad, i.e. No.17, is a collection of all the remainder of the Yogācāra dharmas as indicated by the headings appended to it.

With all this in mind it seems to be the case that Yogācāra made abundant use of the Buddha's original eighteen *dhātu* scheme, with modifications which were dictated by the deep Dharma's revelations it unearthed. With Yogācāra, then, the eighteen *dhātus* combine all the dharmas of Saṃsāra, both conditioned and unconditioned, As a consequence the *skandhas* and all the *āyatanas*, being collective names for particular dharmas, found a place within the overall *dhātu* scheme. The essential difference between this and the earlier schemes is that all of it is *cittamātra* (only mind-made), i.e., the product of *bījas* (seeds) emerging from the *ālayavijñāna*. In the *parikalpita* realm this situation is not known although it is never absent. Only by progress through the realm of *paratantra* to the *pariniṣpanna* perceptions can reality be known.

It may be for this reason that Yogācāra has ambivalent attitudes towards these dharmas, e.g., the *asamskṛtas* and the *viprayuktas* and *manas*. If all dharmas are empty and mind-made, precision is superfluous except in the *parikalpita* realm.

THE YOGĀCĀRA DHARMA SYSTEM, A SCHEME OF DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE.

The Yogācāra system of basic doctrine and practice, like all the early schools of Indian Buddhism, incorporated a dharma scheme of some kind. That is to say, a collection of fundamental elements

⁸⁹ *Saṃyutta-nikāya* IV, 15.

of conscious existence (*dharma*), each of which had specific functions and associations. At one time, opinions were expressed that the dharma schemes were the work of later masters and were not part of the original teachings of the Buddha. There are, however, many references to dharmas in the Pāli canonical texts and a part of these has already been presented above. Some of the difficulty has arisen because of the varied equivalents given for the word *dharma/dhamma* in English textual translations. An example of this can be seen in the various translations of the text of the *Dhammapada* I, one of which is quoted in the previous section⁹⁰. This first verse is critical evidence for dharmas being part of the Buddha's teaching, yet the English rendering completely confused the meaning by not supplying the Pāli term and also by imprecise and various English words like 'thoughts'. Another text can supply further evidence in this regard. It is related in the Pāli Vinaya-pitaka and elsewhere⁹¹, where Aśvajit, one of the Buddha's first disciples at Vārāṇasī, met Śāriputra before the latter joined the Buddha's following. Śāriputra asked Aśvajit who his teacher was and what teaching he followed. Aśvajit answered in a short verse as follows:

*Ye dharmā hetu prabhavā hetun teṣam tathāgato āha
teṣāṃ ca yo nirodho evaṃvādī mahāśrāmaṇaḥ*

Translating from Lamotte's French, this can be rendered as:

'Of dharmas which arise from a cause
The Tathāgata has proclaimed
The cause as well as their stopping'.
Thus teaches the great ascetic.

Śāriputra was so impressed by this terse statement about the arising and stopping of dharmas that he went straight to Sākyamuni for more. The rest, as they say, is history.

Bearing in mind the place and the persons involved in this

⁹⁰ See Part One, The three turnings of the Dharma Wheel, p.[22], n.73.

⁹¹ *Vinaya* I, p.40; also in E. Lamotte's translation of the *Mahāprajñā-pāramitopadeśa: Le Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna* II, Louvain 1949, 1967, p.631, n.1., and in *Mahāvastu* III, p.62.

episode, one cannot get much closer to the original teaching than this. But, as mentioned, there are considerably more textual references to dharmas which can be found in the Buddha's recorded pronouncements. They would be tedious to quote in detail, but some of the reference details are given in the footnote below, to be consulted if required⁹².

So again, Yogācāra will be seen here as adopting and adapting original and early canonical teaching to a deeper and more explicit system, though one which is undisputedly derived from its Buddhist precursors and from Buddha originals.

On this evidence the dharmas and their groupings are not just the product of academic embellishment by idle monks in a hot climate. Doubtless this also took place. But it is clear that dharmas were fundamental to the original teaching of the Buddha as well as to the early Abhidharma masters.

Why then are dharmas so important? In the first place they are the result of Buddhist psychological analysis which lays bare the actual entities causing the suffering of all beings. Secondly, once dharmas are brought into view they can be pacified by special practices and, as a result, according to the final passages of the *Satipaṭṭhāna*, Nirvāṇa can be attained within seven days.

For these and other reasons dharmas remain fundamental to Yogācāra just as they did with its forbears. The more profound insights of Yogācāra, however, required some changes to the old usages. Nonetheless, Yogācāra never lost sight of the primary purpose of bringing dharmas into view. Dharmas always were the basis of right effort, and to facilitate this practical end, i.e., the acquiring and sustaining of wholesome dharmas and the elimination of the defiled and unwholesome variety, the dharma listings were divided into separate categories. For Yogācāra these are:

citta (mentals)

⁹² *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation (Satipaṭṭhāna)*, tr. Nyanaponika Thera, Colombo 1954, pp.125, 139-40; *Samyutta-nikāya* II, 25, and *Kośa*, Ch.3, p.72; *Kośa*, Ch.2, pp.215, 310; *ibid.*, Ch.1, p.11; Lamotte, *Traité* II, *op. cit.*, p.912, quoting the *Sūtrālaṅkāra*.

caitasika (mental associates)
rūpa (physical faculties)
viprayukta (distinct from other mentals)
asaṃskṛta (unconditioned)

The largest of these categories is the second, the *caitasika*. This is subdivided into sub-sections which comprise over fifty separate dharmas. The sub-sections include dharmas classified as good/wholesome, bad/defiled, and indeterminate. Such subdivisions are intended as an aid to right cultivation, as mentioned earlier.

Before turning to a detailed presentation of the Yogācāra dharma scheme, it is necessary to set out one of the major Abhidharma developments which Yogācāra accepted. The *Abhidharmakośa* explains the purpose of Dharma/dharma practice. Vasubandhu says⁹³ that without the discernment of dharmas, i.e., bringing them into awareness, there is no subjugation of the passions (*kleśa*), and hence there is no release from Saṃsāra. Here is a concise statement of doctrine and necessary practice which Asaṅga would rework later. Indeed it can be seen as the *raison d'être* of all dharma schemes in mainstream Hinayāna and Mahāyāna.

The dharma topics above which Yogācāra took over had a further outcome. It is the doctrine of the *dharmasaṃtāna*, or mental series. This is a combination of the basic themes of no-self (*anātman*) and impermanence (*anityatā*). It means, generally speaking, that although dharma elements are real (for the *Abhidharmakośa*), they appear and disappear with minute duration. Consequentially, change, rapid or otherwise, is a constant and therefore the dharmas exist in a related sequence with no permanent self/soul. Vasubandhu expressed the case precisely, so his short statements are worth quoting:

'By series (*saṃtāna*) we understand material and mental elements uninterruptedly succeeding each other in a procession which has action as originating cause.

The successive moments of the procession are different,

⁹³ *Kośa*, Ch.1, p.5, v.3.

therefore there is evolution (*pariṇāma*), transformation of the series'.⁹⁴

Again, Vasubandhu notes:

'Dharmas, being momentary, exist in series...'.⁹⁵

Yogācāra would agree with the basic idea of this, which they called *cittasaṃtāna*, but its explanation of exactly what the statements meant would differ. This is due to the emergence of its special doctrine of the *ālayavijñāna*, *bīja* and *vāsanā* which made a linear production of successive dharmas obsolete. For Yogācāra there certainly was succession and transformation, but these were dependent upon the seeds (*bīja*) from the developments in the *ālayavijñāna* and *vāsanā*. In this case, therefore, the result was similar but the direction of the causal production differed.

Another feature of dharma activity linked to the *dharma-saṃtāna* is the notion of 'clusters' of dharmas. This too is accepted in the Yogācāra dharma scheme. This notion is implicit in the circumstance that no dharma is considered to arise singly and alone. Always there are accompanying conditions (*pratyāya*) and associates. The Abhidharma text specifies a basic twenty-seven dharmas in every dharma cluster⁹⁶. A further ten dharmas are added to this if one accounts for the category of *mahābhūmikas* which are present at every moment⁹⁷. Thus every single dharma becomes a multiple entity by reason of its necessary associates. One of the old categories of Sarvāstivādin dharmas emphasises this factor. This is the category of *samprayuktas*, i.e., mental associates indicating the group of dharmas which are capable of linkage to form a cluster. Yogācāra employs the same theme by its term *citta/caitta*, i.e., mentals and mental associates. An example of Yogācāra usage has been shown above concerning the multiple entity of *manas*.

So much for similarities and adoptions by Yogācāra from the

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, Ch.9, p.296

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, Ch.3, p.33.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, Ch.2, p.194 and n.3.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, Ch.2, p.153.

Sarvāstivādins and others. Now we can turn to what the Yogācārin changed in their own dharma scheme to take account of its deeper perceptions of the Dharma in general.

Perhaps the most important change by the Yogācārin to the meaning of the dharma scheme was that they denied the existence of external objects as separate from the mind, *citta*. Asaṅga puts the case for this, i.e., for *vijñaptimātratā* in his *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*. He quotes Mahāyāna sūtras to the effect that the whole world is nothing but mind (*citta*) and that there is no external object⁹⁸. In respect of dharmas and *dhātus* this means that the *rūpadharmas*, i.e. *dhātus* Nos 2, 5, 8, 11 and 14, are not external to the perceiver. This is emphasised, again by Asaṅga, when he explains the form element (*rūpadhātu*) and visual consciousness element (*caḥsurvijñānadhātu*). What happens is that the eye perceives forms and then visual consciousness reacts to that visible form; it is also (and this is crucial) the result of accumulated seeds arising in the *ālayavijñāna*⁹⁹. All the sense consciousnesses arise from the store consciousness and that is why all of that is projected notions only (*vijñaptimātra*)¹⁰⁰. Even more radical is Vasubandhu when he writes¹⁰¹ that neither the *ātman* nor dharmas exist and so all is mere consciousness.

All the pre-Mahāyāna schools taught *anātman* but that dharmas were real. In Yogācāra (Vasubandhu) dharmas too are not real existents. That is not to say that they are not there. They are 'mind-made' and all arise from the *ālayavijñāna* by means of active seeds (*bija*).

So, despite the protestations that dharmas do not exist, Yogācāra then sets out to define and categorise each of its 103 factors in its dharma scheme! This is not as aberrant as it seems because, as will be seen and as already shown in the section on *bahuśruta* and dharma practice, all dharmas have a purpose. This purpose is to become the means to pass out of the *parikalpita* realm, where

the defiled dharmas are rampant, and into the *paratantra* and *pariniṣpanna* realms, where the dharmas can be perceived as they really are: empty (*sūnya*) and markless (*animittā*), and where in their real nature they are all the same (*samatā*).

This perception is only reached in the upper levels of the bodhisattva stages where dharma activity is then a pure (*anāsrava*) process and leads to a fundamental turning around in the depth of consciousness (*asrāyaparāvṛtti*). In order to attain that close approach to full enlightenment the dharmas have first to be identified and then cultivated through the perfections (*pāramitā*). This, of course, starts in *parikalpita* where false imagination dominates. Hence the necessity of penetration to the operation of dharmas (*dharmapṛavicaya*) and so they all have to be brought into view, defined and employed by right effort.

For this purpose lists of both the Sarvāstivādin and Yogācāra dharmas are appended. Here, some of the special features of the Yogācāra scheme are presented.

Controversially perhaps, although the store consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) is called the eighth consciousness in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* and elsewhere¹⁰², the Sanskrit stanzas of Vasubandhu do not call it so¹⁰³. Its names have been given to us here as *vipākavijñāna* and *sarvabijavijñāna*. Added to this the *ālayavijñāna* does not figure in either the eighteen *dhātus* or in the Yogācāra list of dharmas, although *manas* appears in both. It may be postulated from this that the *ālayavijñāna* is not a dharma, at least in the generally accepted sense of that word. Some of the definitions of the *ālayavijñāna* given by Asaṅga appear to support the idea that it cannot be a dharma.

For example, Asaṅga says in his *Mahāyānasamgraha* that all produced dharmas arise from the store consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) and they are then formed into the chain of dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*)¹⁰⁴. Further on in the same text Asaṅga

⁹⁸ SVG, pp.92-4.

⁹⁹ *Abhidharmasamuccaya* trans. *op. cit.*, p.4.

¹⁰⁰ *Triṃśikā*, v.15, quoted in DMC, p.cxxxiii.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, v.17, in *ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, v.2, quoted in *ibid.*, p.cx.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.251.

¹⁰⁴ SGV, p.37

says that the *ālayavijñāna* as retribution consciousness holds all the seeds (*bīja*) and because of this all the destinies and existences arise from this consciousness¹⁰⁵.

The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* expands these by stating that the retribution consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) is homogenous, continuous and capable of sustaining body and life and preventing these from being interrupted¹⁰⁶. Again, it states that this consciousness is called *ālayavijñāna* because it includes all defiled dharmas¹⁰⁷.

These definitions, among a number of others, make it difficult to see how the *ālayavijñāna* can be reckoned among the other single function elements of very short duration, especially in view of the negative evidence that it does not figure in the eighteen *dhātus* or the Yogācāra dharma list. So, whether or not it is the eighth consciousness, it can hardly be of the same kind as the other seven consciousnesses. By its function and titles it seems to be unique and of a different nature to the dharmas contained in the eighteen *dhātus*.

The Yogācāra dharma list is arranged under the five headings of the *skandhas*¹⁰⁸. The group of mental associates (*samprayukta*) comprises *skandhas* two, three and four. They include such sub-groups as the wholesome (*kuśāla*) and unwholesome (*akuśāla*) and the derived and secondary defiled dharmas (see dharma list). In all, this group is composed of fifty-five separate dharmas, which is over half the total. This is the group which produces most of the 'clusters' and, because all the defilements and passions arise from it, it is a major constituent of the realm of *parikalpita*. As such, it provides the focus for most of the early dharma practice.

Also included among the fourth *skandha* are the dharmas of the 'distinct from other mentals' (*cittaviprayuktasamskāra*) sub-section. This is a strange example of Yogācāra adaptation. The original Sarvāstivādin list contained thirteen of these. The Yogā-

cāra, despite its seeming ambivalence on dharmas in general¹⁰⁹, adds ten more to these making a total for this sub-section of twenty-three. The Yogācāra additions themselves are also rather strange. Such items as rapidity (*java*, No.83) and succession (*anukrama*, No.84), time (*kāla*, No.85) and region (*deśa*, No.86) once again do not seem to conform to the general idea of a dharma as an irreducible element of conscious existence. On the other hand, as part of the *skandhas* they do seem to connect the so-called personality (*pudgala*) to the surrounding world. All the dharmas of the *skandha* groups are conditioned (*samskrta*). The last group of the set is outside the group of the *skandhas* but is contained within the eighteen *dhātu* framework.

This is the section of the unconditioned (*asamskrta*) dharmas. Here again Yogācāra expanded the original three dharmas to eight. Comment has already been made on this section above. The Yogācāra additions comprise three types of suchness (*tathatā*) and two extra types of 'stopping' (*nirodha*). Why these extra are necessary seems problematical and, anyway, how can there be more than one kind of suchness? This, together with the already mentioned difficulty of unconditioned, i.e. unrelated and unconnected, dharmas being produced by *bījas* from the *ālayavijñāna* makes the additions to this section strange indeed. Further comment will be made in these questions below.

Regarding the detail of the practice dimension of dharmas, this can now be set out. There will be little surprise if it is said that the preliminary practice system in Yogācāra is similar to that of the earlier schools, i.e., to bring dharma elements into focus and build a body of good roots, i.e., wholesome dharmas, to sustain more advanced practices. Such is the first of the old progressive phases of the five paths (*mārga*). The first path is called *sambhāramārga*, or path of acquiring equipment. This preparatory stage is also part of the Yogācāra bodhisattva process in that it is necessary to accumulate the *mokṣabhāgiyas* (dharmas of or aids to deliverance). These are faith (*śraddhā*), energy (*vīrya*), mindfulness (*smṛti*) and

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p.39.

¹⁰⁶ DMC, p.227.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.185.

¹⁰⁸ *Abhidharmasamuccaya* trans., *op. cit.*, pp.1-25.

¹⁰⁹ *Triṃśikā*, v.1.

some wisdom (*prajñā*)¹¹⁰. These are all dharmas as can be seen by the notes attached.

The process continues by entry into the second path called *prayogamārga* (path of preliminary or focused exercise). This comprises four more features common to both mainstream Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, i.e., the *nirvedahbhāgiyas*.

In Yogācāra, however, these four features have the same names as before but their definitions and aims vary. The four are called *uṣmagata* (heats), *mūrdhān* (summits), *kṣānti* (patience) and *laukikāgradharma* (supreme worldly dharmas). All eight together are the ingredients of the good roots (*kuśalamūla*)¹¹¹. The aim of these practices in Yogācāra is described and clearly set out in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. The aim is to gain access to the third path, the path of vision (*darśanamārga*), and for that the ingrained conception of subject and object needs to be removed¹¹². If successful they lead to the realisation that these dharmas do not exist other than as *vijñaptimātra* (mere notional projections)¹¹³.

The next stage of this process is called *darśanamārga*, the third of the five paths. Here the first 'vision' of reality is gained with the appearance of *nirvikalpajñāna*, i.e., knowledge free from false imagination and discrimination. This reveals the two *sūnyatās*, i.e., of *pudgala* and of dharmas¹¹⁴.

In the same stage of *darśanamārga*, as a conclusion of the stage, the higher comprehension (*abhisamāya*) is attained¹¹⁵. This amounts to an actual realisation of the non-duality of all dharmas and the real¹¹⁶ meaning of the Dharma and the Three Jewels. On completing the *darśanamārga* there is entrance into the first of the

ten stages (*bhūmi*)¹¹⁷ which is sometimes referred to as the path proper, i.e. all preliminaries are fulfilled and the progress through the stages has begun. At this point also calming (*samatha*) and insight penetration (*vipaśyanā*) continue to function as described above in the section on *bahuśruta*. At the *darśanamārga* stage and beyond, however, insight penetration predominates¹¹⁸.

Now, from the first *bhūmi* onwards the unobstructed knowledge (*nirvikalpajñāna*) is constantly activated. The presence of this special insight-knowledge is established when *prajñāpāramitā* is attained in the sixth *bhūmi*. This form of perfected insight cuts off forever the secondary defilements and the seeds (*bija*) of the grasping at subject and object (*grāhakaugrāhya*)¹¹⁹. This cutting off contributes to the eventual demolition of the two barriers (*āvaraṇa*) of defiled dharmas (*kleśā*) and false or incomplete knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*)¹²⁰. Here we have the start of the fruition of all the earlier acquired knowledge of the dharma elements and the practice of right effort (*samyagvāyāma*) to subdue defilements.

By these processes of passing through the stages (*bhūmi*), one of Yogācāra's primary goals is achieved. It is the 'transformation of the base (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*)'. The base referred to is the fundamental stratum of both pure and impure dharma activity as well as the *bijas* which produce them in the *ālayavijñāna*.

These various attainments just prior to the 'transformation of the base' mark a convergence, in some respects, of the doctrines of the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. The stage of the sixth perfection involves *prajñāpāramitā* (perfect insight-knowledge) and this conveys the comprehension that all dharmas are marked by emptiness (*sarvadharmasūnyatālakṣaṇa*). Indeed they are emptiness itself. This in turn brings about the full acceptance that dharmas do not arise (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*). With that, the crucial and specific Yogācāra theme of the 'transformation of the base' (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) comes to be.

¹¹⁰ DMC, p.679.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p.681.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.691.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.699.

¹¹⁶ SGV, p.160.

¹¹⁷ DMC, p.701.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.695.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.703.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.705.

All this may serve to illustrate how dharma schemes underlie most of Yogācāra doctrine and practice and, of course, most of the rest of Indian Buddhism. For Yogācāra in particular the point reached at this stage is tantamount to entry into *pariṇiṣpanna* (ultimate reality). It should be noted, however, that defiled dharmas of all kinds constitute the *parikalpita* experience. Yet it is the true nature of these same dharmas which emerges in the higher stages.

Beyond that, as we shall see next, the true dharma nature takes on its supreme form, the fulfilment of the original aspiration to perfect enlightenment, the final flowering of the *bodhicitta*.

THE DHARMAS AND THE DHARMAKĀYA

After passing through the series of the path of vision (*darśana-mārga*) the next ascending sections are the six perfections (*pāramitā*) within the corresponding bodhisattva stages (*bhūmi*). All of this is part of the fourth of the paths called *bhāvanāmārga*, meaning path of continuous cultivation, or bringing into existence. This too refers to the dharmas, and the changes to them which are brought about in this process produce some very advanced staging posts in these higher levels of the Way.

The first concern here seems to be to overcome the barrier (*āvaraṇa*) of the defilements/passions (*kleśā*) still remaining. By repeated access to the unobstructed knowledge (*nirvikalpaka-jñāna*) both barriers of defiled dharmas and incomplete knowledge (*kleśa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa*) are dissipated and entry into the *pariṇiṣpanna* realm is gained. This highly charged cultivation of good and special dharmas, i.e., *prajñā*, opens the way to purifying the *ālayavijñāna* of defiled seeds (*bīja*) and results in the 'inner transformation or turning of the base' (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*)¹²¹.

It is of some interest to note that in this same *bhāvanāmārga* not only is perfect wisdom gained at the sixth *bhūmi*, i.e. full comprehension of *sūnyatā*, but the Śrāvaka path to Nirvāṇa is also fulfilled¹²². This seems to refer back to the statements in the

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p.707.

¹²² SGV, p.262-3.

Samdhinirmocanasūtra already mentioned concerning the three turnings of the Wheel by which both major branches of the Dharma (Śrāvaka and Mahāyāna) are incorporated in the explicit teaching of the third turning.

Such constant cultivation of dharmas produces the 'inner transformation' (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) which can be of six kinds¹²³. These different kinds concern the purification of the dharma stream, the fading of the false and the appearance of reality by overcoming the final barriers (*āvaraṇa*). The sixth kind is actually defined as where the bodhisattva penetrates to the lack of self-existence of the dharmas (*dharmanairātmya*) and realising that Saṃsāra is forever calm and should not be abandoned¹²⁴.

By this point in the bodhisattva process several kinds of what are usually lumped together as 'meditation' have been either perfected or highly refined and concentrated. These are practices already prescribed here such as *dharmapracaya*, *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, *samādhi* and *dhyāna*. The last practice will have already been perfected by the fifth *pāramitā*. This allows access to the sixth, *prajñāpāramitā*, which is the pattern throughout, i.e., specific types of 'meditation' practice produce the highest goals in the upper stages. This means that such meditative practices have to be cultivated and intensified as the first *bhūmi* is approached. From this point on the defiled dharmas (already perceived and worked upon earlier) are gradually transformed and their *bījas* eliminated from this particular *dharmasaṃtāna*¹²⁵.

As if to reinforce the notion that the dharma elements are central to this whole process it is said¹²⁶ that all ten *bhūmis* have a self-nature comprising all the good conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) and all the unconditioned dharmas. Furthermore, accession to the tenth and final *bhūmi* provides mastery of all dharmas¹²⁷.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p.263.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ DMC, p.723.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.711.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.741.

A clear distinction is made between seeds (*bīja*) and their respective dharmas when manifesting. An example is given that the arising of some defiled (*kliṣṭa*) dharmas is cut off at the stage of the first *bhūmi*, whereas the defiled seeds (*bīja*) are cut off progressively by means of special meditation practice during the passage through all the ten *bhūmis*¹²⁸. Thus the seeds (*bīja*) which can give rise to supreme enlightenment (*anuttarasamyaksambodhi*) can only operate when the two barriers (*āvaraṇa*) of defilement (*kleśa*) and incomplete profound knowledge (*jñeya*) are cleared away¹²⁹.

All this is part of the continuing process of dharma purification which lies at the heart of the 'transformation of the base' (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*). Indeed the word 'base' (*āśraya*) is said to be the store consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*)¹³⁰ wherefrom all the seeds (*bīja*) arise. And the purpose of it all is suggested when it is said that the Buddha's body of enjoyment (*sambhogakāya*) is produced by part of the process of the 'transformation of the base' (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*)¹³¹.

The purifying of the dharmas is again referred to when it is said that of the eighteen *dhātus*, i.e., the person and the whole of Samsāra, Nos 1-15, are always impure (*sāsrava*) until full *bodhi*. But Nos 16, 17, and 18 can be either pure or impure. For a Buddha, however, all eighteen *dhātus* are pure¹³². Here, the Buddha is usually referred to as the *dharmakāya*, a term redolent with several meanings. In this context it is defined as the three bodies (*trikāya*), i.e., the body of true nature (*svabhāva*), the body of enjoyment (*sambhogakāya*) and the appearance body (*nirmānakāya*)¹³³. Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*¹³⁴ states with finality that

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.743.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.767.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.705.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p.797.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p.789.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p.793.

¹³⁴ *Triṃśikā*, v.30.

ultimate attainment is the pure *dhātu*, i.e., the *dharmakāya*¹³⁵.

This *dharmakāya* is also said to be the support and base (*āśraya*) of sovereignty over all dharmas¹³⁶. And yet the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* states¹³⁷ that the *dharmakāya* appears when both the *ālayavijñāna* and the *bījas* are stopped. This supreme state, i.e., the real body of the Buddha and supreme enlightenment, is attained by the unobstructed knowledge and penetration (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) focused upon the deep teaching/Dharma of the major Mahāyāna sūtras plus the fulfilment of passage through all ten *bhūmis*. Here is a clear reference to the previously mentioned main practice system of the triple gnosis (*śruta, cinta, śamatha/vipaśyanā*)¹³⁸.

In all this, both Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are elaborating in what had earlier been presented in such basic Mahāyāna sūtras as the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* and the *Sūtraṅgamasamādhi*. In these can be found statements such as: The true nature (*tathatā*) of the Tathāgata and the *tathatā* of all dharmas are single, non-dual, not divided¹³⁹. Or: Tathāgatas are neither born nor die because of their complete synonymity with the true nature of dharmas¹⁴⁰.

Such is the unsurpassed peak (*bhūtakoti*) of all Mahāyānist endeavour. All the details above sets out the means whereby this supreme aim is attained. It should therefore not be wondered at that the dharma elements should figure so prominently throughout the whole process. In doing so, of course, Yogācāra also continues and consolidates the similar tradition among the very earliest Indian Buddhist schools, even the recorded teaching of the Buddha himself. The sublime aim of the further teaching, i.e., that of the first Mahāyāna sūtras, is the reason why Yogācāra

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ SGV, p.266.

¹³⁷ DMC, p.797.

¹³⁸ SGV, pp.274-5.

¹³⁹ E. Conze, tr. *The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines*, Calcutta 1958, p.114.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. *Sūtraṅgamasamādhisūtra* trans, *op. cit.*, p.166.

constantly emphasises attention to dharmas, i.e., *dharmapracicaya*. Right effort (*samyagvāyāma*) in this area produces insight-knowledge (*prajñā*) and *prajñā* opens the gate to all the rest.

* * * * *

Several concluding remarks may now be in order. On the basis of the textual extracts given above, the two main themes of the article have been outlined. Of course, much more textual material could have been used, but it is hoped that the extent has been sufficiently wide and apposite to underpin the main propositions. These are that the main Yogācāra doctrines are derived from and are extensions of the topics of the Buddha's recorded teachings and of the mainstream Indian Buddhist schools.

Also, that Yogācāra presents a coherent system of doctrine which is closely allied to necessary and related practice. Indeed here, as in earlier schools, doctrine and practice are inter-related and inter-dependent. The difference between Yogācāra and the earlier mainstream Hīnayāna is that the Yogācāra is dependent upon and elaborates the deep teaching of the first Mahāyāna sūtras. This reflects Aśaṅga's own experience (and that of his brother Vasubandhu) of being grounded in the Sarvāstivāda and then progressing into the further teaching of first phase Mahāyāna.

Despite the amount of detailed exposition here, there remain some very puzzling and unresolved questions (it is ever so).

Having just outlined the dharma scheme of Yogācāra, it may be as well to start here.

The question arising is: what is the status and qualities of a 'dharma' in Yogācāra? In the early Abhidharma the answer was clear. A dharma is an element which lasts only an instant and is immediately replaced by another. Even so, each dharma has different characteristics and a karmic outflow. For Yogācāra, dharmas have no external existence and are all 'mind made'.

Furthermore, although *manas* is listed as a dharma which is within the eighteen *dhātus*, its functions, as defined, cannot be carried out by a single, instantly disappearing entity. For *manas* to

be a dharma it has to have qualities of considerable duration, or to be a complex or cluster of related dharmas.

Turning to the group of *cittaviprayuktas*, items such as Nos 83, *java* (rapidity), and 84, *anikrama* (uniform succession), and 88, *sāmagrī* (totality of causes and effects), do not fit into the usual idea of a single dharma element.

Again, why add so many dharmas to the old list if, as Vasubandhu says, dharmas do not exist? And, strangely, most additions are made to the most problematic groups, i.e., *viprayuktas* and *asamskṛta* dharmas. The latter raise their own difficulties. They are classified as dharmas and therefore are brought into being by seeds in the store consciousness. Yet by definition these dharmas are non-arising and unconditioned and so cannot be produced.

One speculation to conclude. Aśaṅga is said by some to have been the founder of the Tathāgatagarbha school as well as of the Yogācāra. The Tathāgatagarbha teaching followed quickly upon the establishment of Yogācāra. According to Tathāgatagarbha texts the final phase of the process is the transformation of the refined dharmas into their intrinsic purity and true nature. At that point the pure Tathāgatagarbha is revealed, although it is always present. Is Aśaṅga further refining his Yogācāra theme of the *āśrayaparāvṛtti* by introducing the Tathāgatagarbha? If so, it may be questioned whether the *ālayavijñāna* and the Tathāgatagarbha are not similar or even the same.

The 75 dharmas of the Sarvāstivādins
from Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*

Section I. The 72 *samskrta* (conditioned) dharmas (A,B and C)

A The 11 dharmas of the *rūpaskandha* are:

<i>visaya</i> (domain)	<i>indriya</i> (organ)
	or
(visible) 1. <i>rūpa āyatana</i> (faculty)	6. <i>caḥsur āyatana</i> (faculty)
(sound) 2. <i>śabda āyatana</i> (faculty)	7. <i>śrotra āyatana</i> (faculty)
(odour) 3. <i>gandha āyatana</i> (faculty)	8. <i>ghrāna āyatana</i> (faculty)
(taste) 4. <i>rasa āyatana</i> (faculty)	9. <i>jihvā āyatana</i> (faculty)
(tangible) 5. <i>spraṣṭavya āyatana</i> (fac)	10. <i>kāya āyatana</i> (faculty)
and	11. <i>avijñapti</i> (unmanifested act)

B The 60 dharmas of *saṃskāraskandha*

B1 The 46 *saṃprayuktadharmas*, i.e. associated with thought

- i. 10 *mahābhūmikas*: 12. *vedanā* (*skandha*) feeling, sensation
(great, always present) 13. *saṃjñā* (*skandha*) perception, notion,
[idea
14. *cetanā* volition, will, intention
15. *chanda* desire for action
16. *sparśa* contact (qualified as contiguity)
17. *smṛti* recollection, memory, mindfulness
18. *prajñā* insight/wisdom
19. *adhimokṣa* approval, acceptance, re-
[cognition
20. *manaskāra* fixing attention
21. *samādhi* concentration, one-pointed
[focus
ii. 10 *kuśalamahā-* 22. *śraddhā* acquiescence, faith, adherence,
bhūmikas [confidence (in)
(wholesome) 23. *vīrya* energy
24. *upekṣā* equanimity, balanced com-
[posure
25. *hrī* respect, veneration of virtuous
[qualities/persons

26. *apatrāpya* dread of bad acts
27. *alobha* greedlessness, no greed
28. *adveṣa* hatelessness, no hate
29. *avihiṃsā* no-injury, harmless
30. *praśrabdhi* aptitude, dexterity
31. *apramāda* diligence, persistent effort
iii. 2 *akuśalamahā-* 32. *āhrikyā* disrespect, lack of regard for
bhūmikas [virtue
(unwholesome) 33. *anapatrāpya* disregard of bad repute, no
[dread
iv. 6 *kleśamahābhū-* 34. *moha* ignorance, delusion
mikas laziness, indolence, sloth
(defiled, bad) 35. *kauśīdya* sloth, sluggishness
36. *styāna* negligence, carelessness
37. *pramada* non-belief
38. *āśraddhya* agitation/restlessness
39. *auddhatya* 40. *īrsyā* envy
v. 10 *parittakleśa-* 41. *mātsarya* avarice
bhūmikas or anger, irritation
upakleśas hypocrisy
(derived from deceit
defilements) 42. *krodha* dissimulation, fraudulence
43. *mraḥṣa* pride, self-esteem
44. *māya* obstinate approval of mis-
45. *śāthya* [deeds
46. *māda* enmity, hatred
47. *pradāśa* active hostility, harmfulness
48. *upanāha* regret, remorse
49. *vihiṃsā* languor, torpor
vi. 8 *aniyatas* 50. *kaukrtya* discursive mental enquiry
(indeterminate) 51. *middha* judgement, assessment
52. *vitarka* attachment, desires
53. *vicāra* mental disturbances and
54. *rāga* [irritation
sometimes clas- 55. *pratigha* arrogance, conceit, self-ag-
sified as *upa-* 56. *māna* [grandisement
kleśas (v.above) 57. *vicikitsā* doubt

B2. The 14 *cittaviprayuktas*, i.e. dissociated from thought

58. *prapti* possession and retention
 59. *aprapti* non-retention, non-possession
 60. *sabhāgatā* compatibility, similarity of [type
 61. *asamjñika* unconsciousness, unaware- [ness
 62. *asamjñisamāpatti* meditative state of unconsciousness, attain-
 [ment of consciousness
 63. *nirodhasamāpatti* meditative state of stopped thought and [mental activity
 64. *jīvita* life force, quality of continuity
 65. *jāti* birth, arising, production
 66. *sthiti* duration, abiding
 67. *jarā* ageing, decay
 68. *anityatā* impermanence, instability
 69. *nāmakāya* names that prompt ideas
 70. *padakāya* meaningful phrases
 71. *vyañjanakāya* syllable, vowel and con- [sonant sounds

C 72. *vijñānaskandha* is a single dharma – simple, unmixed consciousness of a particular object.

Section 2. The three *asamskṛtas* (unconditioned) are:

73. *ākāśa* space
 74. *pratisamkhyānirodha* total stopping by (= Nirvāṇa) [insight
 75. *apratīsamkhyānirodha* stopping/disjunction by lack of [cause

Asaṅga's List of Yogācāra dharmas
 as contained in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*¹⁴¹

1. *samskṛta* dharmas

The five *skandhas* (aggregates, conditioned)

Skandha one, rūpa dharmas (aggregates of matter)

The 10 *āyatanas*

dharma number

1. *caṅsuradhātu*, eye element
2. *śrotradhātu*, ear element
3. *ghrāṇadhātu*, nose element
4. *jihvādhātu*, tongue element
5. *kāyadhātu*, body, touch, tactile element
6. *rūpadhātu*, form element
7. *śabdadhātu*, sound element
8. *gandhadhātu*, odour element
9. *rasadhātu*, taste element
10. *spraṣṭavyadhātu*, tangibility element

dharma types and numbers in *skandhas* two, three and four

a = 5 *sarvatraga*, universal

b = 5 *vinīyata*, special

c = 11 *kuśāla*, wholesome

d = 10 *akuśāla*, unwholesome, defiled

e = 20 *upakleśa*, secondary unwholesome

f = 4 *aniyata*, indeterminate

Total 55 dharmas in *skandhas* two, three and four

a = *sarvatraga*, universal

Skandha two, *vedanā* (aggregate of feeling)

11) a. *vedanā*, sensation

Skandha three, *samjñā* (aggregate of perception)

12) a. *samjñā*, perception

¹⁴¹ *Abhidharmasamuccaya* trans., *op. cit.*

Skandha four, *saṃskāra* (aggregate of formations)13) a. *cetanā*, volition aroused by contact with the organs14) a. *manaskāra*, attention15) a. *sparsā*, contactb = 5 *vinīyata*, special16) b. *chanda*, desire17) b. *adhimokṣa*, resolve18) b. *smṛti*, recollection/mindfulness19) b. *samādhi*, concentration20) b. *prajñā*, insight-wisdomc = 11 *kuśala*, wholesome21) c. *śraddhā*, confidence22) c. *hrī*, respect (self respect)23) c. *apatrāpya*, integrity (modesty)24) c. *alobha*, non-covetousness (absence of greed)25) c. *adveṣa*, non-hatred (absence of hatred)26) c. *amoḥa*, non-delusion (absence of delusion)27) c. *vīrya*, vigour28) c. *praśrabdhi*, aptitude29) c. *apramāda*, vigilance30) c. *upeksā*, equanimity31) c. *avihiṃsā*, non-injuryd = 10 *akuśala/kleśa*, unwholesome, defiled32) d. *rāga*, greed33) d. *pratigha*, irritation34) d. *māna*, conceit35) d. *avidyā*, ignorance36) d. *vicikitsā*, doubt37) d. *satkāyadrṣṭi*, view of individuality38) d. *antagrahādrṣṭi*, idea of grasping extreme views39) d. *drṣṭiparāmarśa*, adherence to views40) d. *śīlavrataparāmarśa*, adherence to observances/rituals41) d. *mithyādrṣṭi*, false viewse = 20 *upakleśa*, defiled/unwholesome42) e. *krodha*, anger43) e. *upanāha*, enmity44) e. *mṛakṣa*, hypocrisy45) e. *pradāsa*, vexation46) e. *irṣyā*, envy47) e. *mātsarya*, avarice48) e. *māyā*, deception/illusion49) e. *śāṭhya*, dissimulation50) e. *māda*, pride51) e. *vihiṃsā*, violence52) e. *āhrikyā*, shamelessness53) e. *anapatrāpya*, non-integrity54) e. *styāna*, torpor/inertia55) e. *auddhatya*, agitation56) e. *āśraddhya*, lack of confidence57) e. *kausīdya*, indolence58) e. *pramāda*, negligence59) e. *muṣitasmrītā*, forgetfulness60) e. *asāmprajānya*, wrong understanding61) e. *vikṣepa*, distractionf = 4 *aniyata*, indeterminate62) f. *middha*, drowsiness/langour63) f. *kaukrtya*, remorse64) f. *vitarka*, discursive mental enquiry65) f. *vicāra*, mental judgement*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra* (distinct from other mentals)66) *prāpti*, possession67) *asamjñīsamāpatti*, attainment of non-perception68) *nirōdhasamāpatti*, attainment of non-sensation69) *āsamjñīka*, state of non-perception70) *jīvitendriya*, the life faculty71) *nikāyasabhāga*, similarity of types72) *jāti*, birth73) *jarā*, ageing74) *sthiti*, duration75) *anityatā*, impermanence76) *nāmakāya*, names77) *pādakāya*, words78) *vyañjanakāya*, consonants

- 79) *prthagjanatva*, the status of an ordinary man
- 80) *pravṛtti*, turning over process
- 81) *pratiniyama*, distinction (of *karman*), diversity
- 82) *yoga*, conformity of causes and effects
- 83) *java*, rapidity
- 84) *anukrama*, uniform succession
- 85) *kāla*, time
- 86) *deśa*, region (of space)
- 87) *saṃkhyā*, number
- 88) *sāmagrī*, totality (of causes, effects and conditions)

Skandha five, *vijñāna* (aggregate of consciousness)

- 89) *manas*, mind centre, mental organ
- 90) *caṅsurvijñāna*, visual consciousness
- 91) *śrotravijñāna*, auditory consciousness
- 92) *ghrānavijñāna*, olfactory consciousness
- 93) *jihvāvijñāna*, gustatory consciousness
- 94) *kāyavijñāna*, tactile consciousness
- 95) *manovijñāna*, mental [object] consciousness

2. *asamskṛta* (unconditioned) dharmas

- 96) *kuśaladharmatathatā*, the suchness or essential nature of favourable things
- 97) *akuśaladharmatathatā*, the suchness of essential nature of unfavourable things
- 98) *avyākṛtadharmatathatā*, the suchness of neutral things
- 99) *ākāśa*, space
- 100) *apratisaṃkhyānirodha*, lack of causes, cessation obtained without acquired insight
- 101) *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*, stopping by insight
- 102) *āniñjya*, the immobility of sensations
- 103) *saṃjñāvedayita [nirodha]*, the cessation of perception and feeling

VIMALAKĪRTI IN CHINA*

PAUL DEMIÉVILLE

(translated by Sara Boin-Webb)

Besides the importance it holds in the perspective of Indian Buddhism, the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* (Vkn) is of interest in that it is one of the rare Buddhist works which were truly integrated into the Chinese cultural patrimony. In the literary and artistic field, as well as that of philosophy and religion, it was of considerable influence in China. It was much read, by the laity as well as monks, and with no distinction between schools or sub-schools: it made way for an abundant exegesis, very diverse in tendencies or nuances, of which only a small part remains. It never ceased to inspire Chinese poets, painters and thinkers. Through its contents as well as its form, there is hardly any foreign text, before modern times, which so touched Chinese sensibilities.

The doctrines of the *Prajñāpāramitā*, close as they are in certain regards to ancient Taoism, take on in the Vkn an aspect infinitely better adapted to Chinese taste than the interminable developments of the large Sanskrit summaries which contained thousands or myriads of *ślokas*, or than the increasingly condensed manuals, *Vajracchedikā*, *Hṛdaya*, etc., whose redaction veers towards mnemotechnical preservation for initiates. It is not surprising that one of the first Chinese literati who took an interest in these doctrines, the statesman Yin Hao of the Eastern

* [Translator's note:] This article first appeared in French as Appendix II in Étienne Lamotte's translation of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, *L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti* (Bibliothèque du Muséon, vol. 51) Louvain 1962, pp.438-55. At the time I translated the latter into English, we were unable to obtain permission to include an English version of Demiéville's article (reprinted in the author's *Choix d'Études Bouddhiques*, Leiden 1973), which we are now, somewhat belatedly, able to do, permission having been gratefully received from Brill NV., Leiden. References are to my English translation, *The Teaching of Vimalakīrti* (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, vol.XXXII), London 1976, repr.1994.

Chin (d. 356), after having suffered political and military reverses set to reading Buddhist texts in his old age, preferred the Sūtra of Vimalakīrti to the Prajñāpāramitā texts which he found either too long or too short¹.

The Vkn is a work of art. The scene-setting is conducted with the skill of a dramatist. The dialogue sparkles and recalls the expository methods of Confucius, Mencius and Chuang-tzu. The most abstruse theories are illustrated by lively anecdotes beloved of the Chinese. Paradox and irony are handled by a masterly hand, such as in the famous episode of Śāriputra, that holiest of holy men of the Small Vehicle, the foremost of the Buddha's disciples in wisdom (*prajñāvatām agra*), whom a malign goddess covers in flowers which he cannot shake off and who ends up seeing himself changed into a woman (Ch. VI). This story, aimed at scandalising the orthodox², was nonetheless to inspire one of the most gracious rituals of Chinese and Japanese liturgy, that of the scattering of flowers (*san hua*). The puritanical clericalism of the Hīnayāna, so contrary to Chinese ethics, was the subject of a subtle satire. The only one of the interlocutors to find grace in the eyes of Vimalakīrti is the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, the crown prince (*kumārabhūta*) who bore five twists of hair (*pañcacīraka*) whereas the monks with shaven heads, śrāvakas or arhats, are derided (Ch. III). Was the author of this glorification of the layman a layman himself? Vimalakīrti is, basically, aggressively lay³: a 'retired gentleman'

¹ *Shih-shuo hsün-yu*, IB, p.23b (Ssu-pu ts'ung k'an ed.). Cf. E. Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China*, Leiden 1959, p.131.

² By praising Vimalakīrti as highly as the Buddha himself, the sūtra thus shocked the hierarchal sense of the orthodox Chinese, as it appears from a text by Fu-li of the T'ang (T 211, p.551a) cited by Ch'en Yin-ch'ueh in his 'Postface au texte de Touen-houang d'une "amplification" du chapitre du Sūtra de Vimalakīrti intitulé "Les questions de Mañjuśrī sur la maladie"', *Bulletin de l'Institut de recherches d'Histoire et de Philologie de l'Academia Sinica* II, Peking 1930, pp.6-7.

³ The least paradox attached to Vimalakīrti is none but the size of his dwelling, 'ten feet square' (*fang-chang*), recorded in the ruins of Vaiśālī by the T'ang Chinese travellers, which in China became a designation of the monastic cell, then of the monks themselves or more especially of the head abbots of

(*chü-shih*), as an *upāsaka* is called in Chinese, a 'householder', learned, rich, respected, a guildsman, a businessman whose dealings do not dirty the hands, a benefactor who, if necessary, haunts bad places there to do good works, but without any impure contact defiling him any more than mud defiles the lotus (Ch. II). He resolves the old Chinese dilemma between activism and quietism (*tung* and *ching*); Śāriputra's passive meditation (Ch. III, 3, p.43) is the subject of censure which during the T'ang period the anti-quietists of the southern branch of the Dhyāna school were to highlight⁴. Vimalakīrti participates in the action without ceasing to be in quietude; he adapts himself to every situation, 'responds', reacts to every external appeal without being concerned. His reflexes are so disinterested, his freedom so perfect, he displays such mastery of himself and the world that the laws of common morality, even those of nature, mean nothing to him. At his command rice increases to feed the visitors who come to his room, and the latter grows to the size of a universal auditorium. Such wonders are qualified as inconceivable, 'unthinkable' (*acintya*). As the commentator Seng-chao⁵ observed, the notion of 'unthinkable' is at the heart of the sūtra. All duality is declared illusory, every logical contradiction dodged; the third party is not excluded, categories of normal thought are transcended; all discursiveness is vain. The path of deliverance passes by the passions; Enlightenment is the round of rebirth itself. Opposites are reconciled. The truth is 'unthinkable' and derives from silence. One might well be reading Chuang-tzu. Perhaps it is unwarranted to attribute to Vimalakīrti 'the virtues of a literate Confucian and the bearing of a Taoist aristocrat'⁶. In any case, it is quite clear that such a type of Buddhist had everything to beguile the Chinese literati, so reasonable that the last word in philosophy was for them always to deny reason.

It is indeed among the literati nourished by Taoist philosophy,

monasteries. Cf. Vkn trans., pp.cii-ciii.

⁴ See, for example, J. Gernet, *Entretiens du maître de Dhyāna Chen-houei du Ho-tsö* [670-762], Hanoi 1949, pp.5, 35, 58.

⁵ T 1775, p.327c27-28.

⁶ J. LeRoy Davidson, *The Lotus Sūtra in Chinese Art*, Yale University 1954, p.38.

in the intelligentsia of the Eastern Chin (317-420), that the Vkn was to claim its first success in China. At that time, the Sanskrit text had already been translated at least three times; about the middle of the fourth century, the Chinese monk Chih Min-tu made a synthetic edition of it⁷. Chih Min-tu was known through his own exegesis of one of the theories of the Prajñāpāramitā, interpreted in the spirit of specifically Chinese gnosticism known as the Dark Learning (*hsüan-hsüeh*), which had been in fashion since the revival of Taoist philosophy at the end of the Han⁸. He was in contact with the circle of aristocrats who had emigrated into the region of the lower Blue River and Chekiang after the fall of the Western Chin⁹, and cultivated the philosophy of the Dark Learning while combining it with Buddhist ideas mainly taken from the Prajñāpāramitā (or the Vkn).

His colleague Chih Tun (Chih Tao-lin 314-366) also frequented the great minds of the south, particularly the group of literati who resided in the region of Kuei-chi, near Shao-hsing in present-day Chekiang. Chih Tun excelled in the art of philosophical debate as it was practised by this group under the name of 'pure conversation' (*ch'ing-t'an*): somewhat like the salon conversations of Mallarmé, but which took place in a less enclosed atmosphere, since nature, the open air of the mountains, the beauties of the countryside were always appreciated by those Chinese given to subliminal abstraction. Chih Tun had written, taking his inspiration from the Vkn¹⁰, a short treatise on the identity of matter (*rūpa*) and emptiness (*śūnya*) or, in the terms then in usage in Chinese philosophical problematics, of the world of 'there is' (*yu*) and that in which 'there is nothing' (*wu*). When

he had completed this composition, he showed it, we are told, to one of the literati of the group from Chekiang, Wang T'an-chih, a Confucian who nonetheless was prejudiced against the Buddhist clergy and the philosophy of Chuang-tzu on which Chin Tun was then the greatest specialist. Wang T'an-chih, having read the treatise, said not a word. 'Would this be,' Chih Tun asked him, 'because you have understood in silence?' To which the scholar replied: 'Mañjuśrī is no more! So who would be capable of appreciating you?'¹¹ This short passage of arms is rich in implications, in the style of 'pure conversation'. The 'silent understanding' is an allusion to one of the passages in the *Lun-yü* (VII, 2) which could be understood in a metaphysical or mystical sense and which the adherents of the school of Dark Learning delighted in emphasising. As for Mañjuśrī, this is obviously refers to the passage in the Vkn (Ch. VIII, 33, trans., pp.202-3) in which, questioned on non-duality, he declares that one can only answer with silence. Vimalakīrti's 'thundering silence', as commentators have called it, like the 'lion's roar', had greatly impressed the Chinese who found in it an echo of the 'forgetting of the word' (*wang yen*) recommended by Chuang-tzu to whomever wanted to communicate with the absolute. Also described for us¹² is a debate, like those still practised in Japan and Tibet (where they have become a ritual), which was held at the residence of the Prince of K'uai-chi, the future Emperor Chien-wen (371-372), between Chih Tun and another great scholar from K'uai-chi, the poet Hsü Hsün, and which dealt with the doctrines of the Vkn.

The greatest writer of this group, Hsieh Lung-yün (385-433), well-known for his works on Buddhism as well as for his admirable landscape poems¹³, was also interested in Vimalakīrti. He devoted

⁷ See Vkn trans, p.xxx-xxxi.

⁸ Zürcher, *Buddhist Conquest*, pp.100-2; see also my article of 'La pénétration du bouddhisme dans la tradition philosophique chinoise', *Cahiers d'histoire mondiale* III, 1 (Unesco, Neuchâtel 1956), pp.24-6.

⁹ Sun-ch'ò (ca. 300-380) wrote his praise in verse (Zürcher, p.352, n.78)

¹⁰ Placed on the lips of the Bodhisattva Priyadarśana, version by Chin Ch'ien, T 474, ii, p.531b7. It seems that half a century later the Chinese collaborators of Kumārajīva remembered the terms used by Chih Tun in their new translation of this passage, T 475, ii, p.551a20, Vkn trans., p.195 (Zürcher, p.362, n.215).

¹¹ *Shih-shuo hsin-yü*, IB, p.19b. On Wang T'an-chih's prejudice regarding Chih Tun, cf. Zürcher, p.119

¹² *Shih-shuo hsin-yü*, IB, pp.23b-24a (Zürcher, pp.118, 132, 134).

¹³ On Hsieh Ling-yün, cf. *Annuaire du Collège de France* 61^e année (1961), pp.293-5. In his preface to the *Chao-lun*, Hui-ta of the Ch'en (557-589) places him at the head of eight hundred great *dānapatis* of the *Chao-lun* era (T 1858, p.105b2).

a 'eulogy' in verse in hymnic style¹⁴ to the ten comparisons in the sūtra (ball of foam, bubble, mirage, etc., Ch.II, 9), and there is recorded of him, admittedly much later, an anecdote which was current in the Buddhist circles of Canton¹⁵. At the time of his tragic execution in the public marketplace of that town, in 433, Hsieh Ling-yün, who had a fine beard, purportedly gifted it to a monastery bearing the name of Jetavana (Chih-yüan ssu), so that it could adorn a statue of Vimalakīrti. The latter must therefore have appeared from then on in the Chinese temple iconography, and with the long beard of a Chinese sage as he was often to be depicted later. The first image of Vimalakīrti was supposedly the work of the great painter of the time, Ku K'ai-chih (ca 345-411), who also frequented the K'uai-chi circle and was linked with the family of Hsieh Ling-yün: 'He was the first to create an image of Vimalakīrti; he depicted him with a clear (spare) and emaciated look, which showed his sickness, leaning on an arm-rest and forgetting the word'¹⁶. These last two expressions come from Chuang-tzu, who used them to describe Taoist ecstasy; the Taoist cult was practised in a hereditary way in Ku K'ai-chih's family. However, perhaps the attitude he had given to the sage was rather inspired in him by that of the adherents of 'pure conversation', of which Vimalakīrti was to become a kind of paragon or patron. The painting was done on a wall of the Wa-kuan ssu, a monastery founded in about 363-365 in Nankin, the capital of the Eastern Chin. We are told that the monks made an appeal for funds to the

¹⁴ T 2103, vx, p.200a. It is already Kumārajīva's version (T 475, I, p.329b15-21) which seems to follow Hsieh Ling-yün. He groups in twos four of the comparisons to reach a total of ten.

¹⁵ It is recorded in a collection of T'ang anecdotes, the *Sui-T'ang chia-hua* by Liu Su (ap. *T'ang-jen shuo-hui*, ed. 1869, fasc.II, p.7a), with regard to an imperial princess who, at the time of Chung-tsung (705-710), had the beard brought from Canton to Ch'ang-an by 'relays at the gallop' to amuse her in her games. Also see Yeh Hsiao-hsüeh, *Hsieh Ling-yün shih-hsüan*, Shanghai 1957, pp.180 and 215.

¹⁶ Chang Yen-yüan, *Li-tai ming-hua chi* (847), text and translation in W.R.B. Acker, *Some T'ang and pre-T'ang texts on Chinese painting*, Leiden 1954, p.193. Cf. also O. Siren, *Chinese Painting ... I*, London 1956, p.28; A.C. Soper, *Literary evidence for early Buddhist art in China*, Ascona 1959, pp.35-6.

worthies of the imperial court. Ku K'ai-chih put down his name for the largest sum, a million sapeks. When his payment was claimed, he asked that a wall be prepared and shut himself in for more than a month. Before 'pointing up the eyes' to give life to his portrait, he invited the monks to make visitors pay at the rate of one hundred thousand sapeks on the first day, fifty thousand the next, and what they liked on the third. The million was quickly reached¹⁷. The greatest painters of the Southern Dynasties, Lu T'an-wei in the fifth century, Chang Seng-yu in the sixth, attempted to imitate his masterwork, without either being able to equal it. The paintings by Ku K'ai-chih, Lu T'an-wei and Chang Seng-yu were preserved until the T'ang period when, during the great proscription of Buddhism in 845, that by Ku K'ai-chih was transported to a temple in present-day Chenkiang, downstream from Nankin, from where it was again transferred, some years later, to the T'ang imperial collection. The poet Tu Mu had ten copies of it made before it was transferred to Chenkiang¹⁸. All this had disappeared before or under the Sung (960-1280).

It is therefore mainly in the second half of the fourth century that we see the Vkn gain favour in the scholarly circles of the Eastern Chin, in south-east China; it was clearly adopted there as one of the texts that all highly cultured Chinese should know. One can imagine the sensation that must have been caused in those circles - most particularly in the community of Lushan, on the middle Blue River, whence towards the end of the fourth century

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Acker pp.378-9.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Acker, pp.193, 372, 376, 379. Cf. also P.Pelliot, 'Les transferts de fresques...', *Revue des arts asiatiques* V, 1928, p.207, and 'Les déplacements de fresques...', *ibid.* VIII, 1934, p.218. The temple in Chekiang was burnt down under the Northern Sung in 1100; only one of its buildings survives in which Mi Fu (1051-1107), the famous painter and art critic, in the first years of the twelfth century set up his studio which he gave the name of Vimalakīrti (*Ching-ming-chai*); cf. Acker, pp.375, n.5, 382. - There is also mention in the *Chen-kuan kung-ssu hua shih* by P'ei Hsiao-yüan of a scroll illustrating the Vimalakīrti Sūtra, painted by Chang Mé of the (Eastern, 317-420) Chin, as well as of a *pien-hsiang* by Yüan Ch'ien of the Sung (420-478) who purportedly illustrated more than five hundred scenes from the sūtra; cf. Soper, *op. cit.*, pp.35, 57.

the centre of Buddhist intellectuality had moved – by the new translation of the Sanskrit text compiled in the north, at Ch'ang-an, under the auspices of those potentates of barbarian origin who had forced the Chinese legitimacy to leave their country in the south-east with their nobility and élite. For this translation, Kumārajīva benefited from the co-operation of every-thing that Buddhism then considered the most cultivated in northern China. At the head of an impressive team of collaborators, including twelve hundred monks expert in matters of doctrine (*i-hsüeh*), was the great Seng-chao (374-414)¹⁹, the strongest philosophical brain of the period, a precocious and fulgent genius who, since childhood, had acquired the very best of Chinese culture; he had studied the classics and historians, then the Taoist philosophers, before converting to Buddhism precisely through having read the *Vkn*²⁰. He himself specifies that Kumārajīva's Chinese redactors should pay particular attention to the style of the new translation²¹. This translation is one of the most brilliant of the whole Chinese Canon; its high literary quality had a great deal to do with the lasting acclimatisation of the sūtra in China. Commentaries were written by the best disciples of Kumārajīva, Seng-chao himself, Chu Tao-sheng (d. 434), famous for his flamboyant theories on 'suddenness' and on *bodhi* that can be accessible to those damned by predestination (*icchāntika*), Hui-jui (alias Seng-jui, 352-436), of whom only a preface remains²², Tao-jung²³, and doubtless yet others, without counting all those who devoted themselves to the oral explanation of the text²⁴. From this first

harvest of Chinese exegesis, nurtured by oral teachings from Kumārajīva, but the Sinological interest of which far exceeds the Indological value, there exists only a combined commentary in the name of Seng-chao, and which includes glosses attributed by name to Kumārajīva, Seng-chao, Chu Tao-sheng, Hui-jui and Tao-jung²⁵; this is an important document on the evolution of thought, not only Buddhist, in China at that time.

From then on we would see commentaries proliferating throughout China, in the south as well as the north: at first rather in the south where, alongside numerous monks, many laymen set their hand to the work of exegesis; among them we find imperial princes such as Hsiao Tzū-liang (460-494), of the Southern Ch'i, and even emperors such as Kao-ti of the same dynasty (479-502) or Wu-ti of the Liang (502-549) whose eldest son, Hsiao T'ung (501-531) compiler of the *Wen-hsüan* anthology, had taken as his secondary honorific name (*hsiao-tzū*) the first two syllables of Vimalakīrti's name in Chinese, *Wei-mo*. Their commentaries are unfortunately lost, like most of those of that period²⁶. It was

p.83, Kasuga Reichi lists some thirty disciples of Kumārajīva who were devoted to the study of the sūtra.

¹⁹ 'The annotated Sūtra of Vimalakīrti', T 1775. This work would have been compiled at a comparatively late date, perhaps under the T'ang in 760 (Tsukamoto in *Jōron kenkyū*, p.147). A certain number of glosses by Chu Tao-sheng have been translated by W. Liebenthal in *Monumenta Japonica* XII, Tokyo 1956, pp.74-100.

²⁰ The first commentaries preserved whole, after that of Seng-chao and the others, are those of Hui-yüan (523-592), T 1776, and Chih-i (538-598), T 1777, both of the Sui. Anonymous fragments of the Northern and Western Wei (386-556) have been rediscovered at Tun-huang, in manuscripts dating from 500 (T 2786) and 539 (T 2769, with a note from the Northern Chou, 562); cf. Yabuki Yoshiteru, *Meisha yōun*, Tokyo 1933, p.22, or Ono Gemmyō. *Bussho kaisetsu daijiten* XI, Tokyo 1935, pp.116b, 123b. For a formidable bibliography of Chinese exegesis, including lost works, see the introduction by Fukaura Masabumi to the Japanese translation of Kumārajīva's version in 'Budé bouddhique', *Kokuyaku issaikyō*, Kyōshū-bu, VI, Tokyo 1932, pp.304-7, and especially the work by Kasuga cited above, n.24. At the end of the Sui period (613), we can mention the commentary by Prince Shōtoku (T 2186), the first patron of Bud-

¹⁹ Dates by Tsukamoto Zenryū, *Jōron kenkyū*, Kyoto 1955, pp.120-1 (English translation in *Silver Jubilee Volume of the Zinbun-Kagaku-Kenkyūsyō*, Kyoto 1954, pp.581-3).

²⁰ Lives of Seng-chao in the *Kao-seng chuan*, T 2059, vi, p.365a, and in a T'ang commentary rediscovered in Tun-huang, T 2778, p.510a-b.

²¹ Prefaces by Seng-chao, T 1775, p.327b13-15, and *Ch'u san-tsang chi-chi*, T 2145, viii, p.58b15-17. Cf. *Vkn* trans., p.xxxii.

²² *Ch'u san-tsang chi-chi*, T 2145, viii, pp.58c-59a. On Hui-jui, cf. Wright in *Liebenthal Festschrift*, Santiniketan 1937, pp.272-97.

²³ *Kao-seng chuan*, T 2059, vi, p.363c.

²⁴ In his 'Introduction to the history of studies on the Vimalakīrti Sūtra in China', *Tōhō gakuho* (Journal of Oriental Studies) XII, iv, Kyoto, March 1942,

under these two dynasties, the Ch'i and the Liang (479-556) that the exegesis of the Vkn was at its most flourishing in the period of the Southern Dynasties, so much so that, according to gossip reported by the philosopher Chu Hsi (1130-1200), who was fiercely opposed to Buddhism and had the cheek to attribute to Chinese forgers anything that he dared not consider devoid of any value in Buddhist literature, this sūtra was supposedly a forgery concocted in the entourage of Prince Hsaio-Tzu-liang²⁷.

In the north, under the Wei of the T'o-pa clan (Northern Wei, 386-534) who had succeeded the Ch'in of the Yao clan (Later Ch'in, 384-417), protectors of Kumārajīva, and other somewhat ephemeral small barbarian dynasties, the Vkn was to know a fortune of another kind than that in the south-east, but no less illustrious. Here, relations were closer with India and Central Asia; the leaders were not pure Chinese, their reactions to Buddhism were not the same as in Nankin or Chekiang. Hardly any of the commentaries written under the Northern Wei, which do not seem to have been very numerous, remain²⁸; from the beginning of the fifth century, the intellectual elements of the Buddhist community had for the most part surged back to the south. However, the iconographical documentation leaves no doubt about the diffusion of the Vkn in the Wei empire. In the rock sculptures of Yun-kang, as from the mid-fifth century, then more often in those of Lung-men, near Loyang where the dynasty transferred its capital in 494, we see the appearance of the couple, Vimalakīrti and Mañjuśrī, sometimes combined with portrayals of the Buddha Śākya flanked by two bhikṣus or again two bhikṣus and two bodhisattvas, as if Vimalakīrti was a match in the predication of the Great Vehicle to the Buddha of the two (or three)

dharma in Japan, who quotes Seng-chao, Chu Tao-sheng, etc.; he was assisted by foreign monks.

²⁷ Kasuga, pp.86b-87a; cf. G.E. Sargent, 'Tchou Hi contre le boaddhisme', *Mélanges de l'Institut des Hautes Études chinoises* I, Paris 1955, p.5, note.

²⁸ See n.26. The exegesis flourished more among the Northern Ch'i (550-577) where iconographical and epigraphical documentation equally abounds. Cf. Kasuga, pp.94a-96a; Matsumoto Eiichi, *Tonkōga no kenkyū*, Tokyo 1937, p.149; Soper, *Literary evidence*, p.133.

Vehicles. Should we see in this illustrations of the teaching of the Single Vehicle (*ekayāna*) as it is taught by the Lotus Sūtra (*Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*)?²⁹ In fact, in these same sculptures, the questioners of the Vkn are still more often found to be associated with the propounders of the Lotus, the Buddhas Śākya and Prabhūtaratna. In the Wei caves at Lung-men, Vimalakīrti and Mañjuśrī appear above niches in which are enthroned either Śākya and his acolytes, or the two Buddhas of the Lotus. This is notably the case for the cave known as Pin-yang, which is purportedly due to the emperor Shih-tsung (Hsüan-wu-ti, 500-515); indeed, in 509, in one of the halls of the palace in Loyang, this emperor personally explained the Vimalakīrti Sūtra to his assembled clergy and courtesans³⁰. Also translated by Kumārajīva, the Lotus Sūtra thus shared with the Vimalakīrti the favour of the Chinese faithful, until the arrival of soteriological doctrines based on devotion to Maitreya, then to Amita. Scenes from both sūtras are equally found combined in the decoration of steles or icons of

²⁹ This is suggested by Tsukamoto Zenryū in the lengthy study he devotes to 'Buddhism of the Northern Wei as it appears in the cave art of Yun-kang and Lung-men', forming a chapter of his book 'Studies on the history of Chinese Buddhism: the Northern Wei' (*Shina bukkyō-shi kenkyū: Hoku Gi hen*), Kyoto 1942, p.543. – On Vimalakīrti and the Lotus Sūtra in the Wei iconography, see also LeRoy Davidson, *The Lotus Sutra, op. cit.*, pp.32-5, 50-3. In *La Chine et son art*, Paris 1951, p.106, R. Grousset writes that the monk T'an-yao, promoter of the cave sanctuaries of Yun-kang, [tr.] 'based his doctrine on the *Lotus of the Good Law* and on the teachings of the Arhat[!] Vimalakīrti', and refers in a note to one of my articles in which I say nothing of the sort, for the good reason that I have never seen anything on it (not even in the long chapter devoted to T'an-yao in the book by Tsukamoto, pp.1131-65). – Chavannes did not recognise Vimalakīrti in either Yun-kang or Lung-men. With regard to the Pin-yang cave, he writes that the two personages, one of whom holds 'a fly-whisk' and the other 'a branch' (probably the *t'an ping* mentioned in the 894 inscription), must have been 'two famous Buddhist scholars' (*Mission archéologique* I, p.556).

³⁰ *Wei shu*, viii, Annals of Shih-tsung, 2nd Yung-p'ing year. Cf. Tsukamoto, pp. 395 and 530; Kasuga, p.97a, n.3. – The Pin-yang cave was wrecked by plunderers, and the figure of Vimalakīrti is now to be found in the United States (Sickman and Soper, *The Art and Architecture of China*, Pelican History of Art, 1956, p.294).

the Northern or Eastern Wei. On the reverse of a bronze in the Umehara collection in Tokyo, dating from 482 and therefore more or less contemporary with the Yun-kang sculptures, we see Sākya and Prabhūtaratna flanked externally by Vimalakīrti and Mañjuśrī³¹. A stele from Ho-nan, a little later (mid-sixth century) and at present preserved in New York, consists of the Buddha preaching at the top and, in the lower register, Vimalakīrti and Mañjuśrī flanking the scene of Śāriputra and the goddess of the flowers³². This association seems to have been quite general in the China of the Southern and Northern Dynasties³³. Under the Sung, about the middle of the fifth century, the monk P'u-ming had the penitential task of chanting the two sūtras³⁴. In the same period (459), the monk Seng-ch'ing, born of a Taoist family, conducted his self-cremation in front of an icon of Vimalakīrti which he had made with his own hands, in the presence of the Prefect of Shu (Ch'eng-tu in Szü-ch'uan) and a large public; in fact, it is usually on the authority of the Lotus Sūtra that the practices of self-cremation are carried out³⁵.

We are now in a very different atmosphere from that of the educated philosophers of the Eastern Chin who had been the first

³¹ LeRoy Davidson, pp.32-3 and pl.3.

³² A. Priest, *Chinese Sculpture in the Metropolitan Museum of Art*, New York 1944, pp.30-3 and pl.40-52. Cf. LeRoy Davidson, pp.36-7 and pl.15, which mentions several other similar steles preserved in the United States; Sickman and Soper, pp.58-9 and pl.44.

³³ According to Soper, *Literary evidence*, p.221, the Vimalakīrti Sūtra was, after the Lotus, the most often cited sūtra in the *Kao-seng chuan* (T 2059, beginning of the sixth century): twenty-eight times (a half less than the Lotus). My own index of the *Kao-seng chuan*, compiled by a good Japanese archivist, records twenty-three mentions of the Vimalakīrti as against fifteen of the Lotus. In the *Hsü kao-seng chuan* (T 2060, ca. 667), there are no more than twelve mentions of the Vimalakīrti as against one hundred and forty-nine of the Lotus.

³⁴ *Kao-seng chuan*, T 2059, xii, p.407b; cf. Soper, p.225.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, xii, p.405c; cf. J. Gernet, 'Les suicides par le feu chez les bouddhistes chinois du Ve au Xe siècle', *Mélanges de l'Institut des Hautes Études chinoises* II, Paris 1960, p.527 [Engl.trans. by S.Boin-Webb in D. Keown, ed., *Buddhism and Suicide*, in preparation].

to extol Vimalakīrti in China. The worship of the holy layman circulated among the people. We note cases of bibliolatriy. At the beginning of the seventh century (618), in Chi-chou in Hopei, a devotee was stricken with a serious illness because he had torn a manuscript of the sūtra, and was only cured after having offered forty new scrolls³⁶. The recitation of the sūtra procures supernatural powers: exorcism of demons, curing of the sick, rescues at sea³⁷.

Further evidence of the popularisation of the Vkn is supplied on the literary level by manuscripts of the T'ang or of the Five Dynasties (ninth-tenth centuries) rediscovered in Tun-huang. The 'romancing' of the sūtra had, moreover, started in the period of the Southern and Northern Dynasties. Chi-tsang of the Sui (549-623) refers in his commentaries to Chinese apocrypha in which Vimalakīrti is endowed, as is appropriate for the hero of a romance, with a properly constituted family, grandfather, parents, wife and children³⁸, whereas, in the sūtra itself (trans, Ch.VII, 6, p.180), he expressly refuses to answer questions posed to him concerning his family: his mother, he says, is *prajñā*, his father *upāya*, etc. However, in the Tun-huang documents, it is quite another matter. Kumārajīva's version gives way here to one of those developments in (recited) prose and (chanted) verse which are called 'texts of scenes' (*pien-wen*) and which, aimed at illiterate or barely literate listeners, are the origin of literary narrative in vulgate Chinese and of the Chinese novel. It was a work apparently without precedent in Chinese narrative literature, as much through its wide and epic tone, Indian-style, as its extra-

³⁶ *Ming-pao chi* cited in *Fa-yüan chu-lin*, T 2122, lxxix, p.877b, and *T'ai-p'ing kuang-chi*, 1926 ed., cxvi, p.32a-b.

³⁷ Fukuara, *Kokuyaku issaikyō*, Kyōshū-bu, VI, p.307. The institution of the Japanese ritual called the 'Vimalakīrti assembly' (*Yuima-e*) dates from the curing at Nara, in 656, of the minister Fujiwara no Kamatori thanks to the recitation of the chapter on sickness, recommended to the empress Saimei by a Korean nun; cf. M.W. de Vissier, *Ancient Buddhism in Japan*, Leiden 1935, pp.10, 596 ff.

³⁸ Cf. Tch'en Yin-k'ue (above, n.2.), p.429. These apocrypha no doubt led to the development of the details of (supposed?) Indian texts such as the 'epigonical' sūtras, T 477-480, on which see Vkn trans, pp.cvi-cvii.

ordinary size: some thirty scrolls or *volumina* (*chüan*), of which numerous fragments exist, without counting prologues in verse (*ya-tso wen*) which serve to introduce the sessions, with chanted invocations which the listeners repeated in chorus. The proportions of the development were up to forty times larger than the canonical text³⁹.

The 'texts of scenes' were sometimes illustrated by 'depictions of scenes' (*pien-hsiang*), painted on scrolls which the reciters or their assistants exposed to the public eye along with the recitation, as is still done in Japan, Tibet, Italy and other countries where the art of oral story-telling survives. They were also painted on the walls of temples; the rock sanctuaries of Tun-huang include fifteen *pien-hsiang* from the Vkn illustrating all kinds of scenes taken from some ten chapters: sometimes the holy man is lying on his sick-bed, at others he is debating with Mañjuśrī, etc.⁴⁰. The latter is usually holding a *ju-i*, a kind of sceptre which, at the outset, seems to have served as a back-scratcher and which was also used in China as a 'play-thing' well before it became an attribute of Buddhist monks⁴¹. As for Vimalakīrti's attribute in Chinese iconography, rather than a fan as Western archaeologists often define it, it was a fly-whisk, an instrument of purification such as was wielded by the adherents of 'pure conversation'; it is designated in Chinese by terms which have nothing to do with Buddhism either, 'deer's tail' (*chu-wei*), 'conversation stick' (*t'an-ping*), etc.⁴². One

³⁹ Cf. *Annuaire* du Collège de France, 60e année (1960), pp.319-20, and 61e année (1961), pp.297-8. See also Tchen Tchen-to, *Tchong-kouo sou wen-hiue che*, Shanghai 1938, pp.182-216, and the article by Tch'en Yin-k'ue cited above, n.2. Critical edition of the texts in *Tun-huang pien-wen chi*, Peking 1957, pp.517-646, 829-32.

⁴⁰ Matsumoto, *Tongōka no kenkyū*, pp.143-64 and pl.46-54. See also B. Gray, *Buddhist cave-paintings at Tun-huang*, London 1959, pp.49, 60, 67, pl.31, 48-9, 56, and the collection of photographic plates at the Tun-huang Institute *Tun-huang pi-hua*, Peking 1959, pl.99-100, 106, 116-17, 1141, 175-6, 203 (cf. *T'oung Pao* XLVIII, 1961, pp.469-71, 475).

⁴¹ Zürcher, *op. cit.*, p.407, n.59 ('p.47' of *T'oung Pao* XLVIII, p.469, is a misprint).

⁴² *Ibid.*, p.351, n.60. See also details in the Sino-Japanese dictionary by Morohashi, pp.10951d and 13507d. Cf. Vkn trans., p.113.

of the most exploited scenes is that of the goddess of the flowers⁴³. We also see the magic bowl, surrounded by five personages who must represent the five hundred householders of Vaiśālī, Ratnakūta and the others⁴⁴. I know no finer Vimalakīrti than that of cave 149, which dates from the T'ang⁴⁵. It gives an idea of what must have been masterworks of the great painters of the period, Wu Tao-tzü, Sun Shang-tzü, Liu Hsing-ch'en, Yang T'ing-kuang and yet others who had depicted Vimalakīrti on the walls of monasteries in both capitals, Ch'ang-an and Loyang⁴⁶. Later on, too, the theme of Vimalakīrti was always to be treated with partiality by Chinese painters⁴⁷.

It was the same with the poets. It is well known that Wang Wei (701-761) took as his personal honorific the two syllables Mo-chieh which, preceded by Wei, his official personal name, form the Chinese transcription of the name of Vimalakīrti. One can only suppose that he was guided in this play on words by his mother, a

⁴³ For example Gray, pl.48.

⁴⁴ Gray, pl.31B; *Tun-huang pi-hua*, pl.100. Nevertheless, it is not evident that these personages are five in number as Gray says, p.50.

⁴⁵ Numbering by P. Pelliot; 103 according to the Tun-huang Institute. Cf. Pelliot, *Les grottes de Touen-houang* VI, pl.324 (Matsumoto, pl.46a and pp.145, 150). There is a superb photograph of details in *Tun-huang pi-hua*, pl.141. It is mistakenly, it seems, that Gray (pp.25-6) attributes to this cave No.322 of the Tun-huang Institute.

⁴⁶ As well as other large towns such as Ch'eng-tu. Cf. Matsumoto, pp.162-3; Kasuga, p.108a-b; Acker, pp.257, 272, 289, 361, etc. Mention can be made here of the scene from the Vimalakīrti Sūtra modelled in clay, about the beginning of the eighth century (711), at the base of the five-storied stūpa of the Hōryūji, near Nara, and which is doubtless an imitation of the *pien-hsiang* of the T'ang, with details recalling the Tun-huang paintings (see, for example, Matsumoto, pp.163-4 and fig.33).

⁴⁷ Li Lung-mien under the Sung, Indra (Yin-t'o-lo) under the Sung, Indra (Yin-t'o-lo) under the Yüan, Lo Ping under the Ch'ing, etc. Cf. Kasuga, p.111; Visser, pp.594-5; Matsumoto, p.163, notes according to the *Hsüan-ho hua-p'u* ten paintings of Vimalakīrti that existed in the collection of the emperor Hui-tsung of the Sung in the Hsuan-ho period (1119-1126). The Li Lung-mien in the National Museum of Tokyo is far from having the vehement energy of the Tun-huang portrait (cf., e.g., A. Guiganino, *La pittura cinese*, Rome 1959, pl.147).

fervent adherent of the Dhyāna-master Pu-chi (652-739), of the northern branch of the Dhyāna school⁴⁸. Wang Wei composed in his sumptuous prose the inscription on a stele of Hui-neng (638-713), patriarch of the southern branch, and allusions to Vimalakīrti abound in it⁴⁹. In two poems which he addressed to one of his sick friends, an *upāsaka* named Hu (Hu *chu-shih*), when sending him a gift of rice, he alludes to theories in the *Vkn* on sickness and on the magic rice of the *Sugandhakūṭa*⁵⁰. Another great T'ang poet, Po Chū-i (772-846), was called on in 826 to represent Confucianism in an inter-religious debate held before the emperor Ching-tsung on the occasion of his birthday: he chose as subject the passage of the sūtra (Ch. V, 10) on Mount Sumeru entering a mustard-seed; and in a poem written in his old age, when he was sick, he compares himself to Vimalakīrti⁵¹. We could go on forever citing all the Chinese poets who celebrated Vimalakīrti. As an example, I will attempt to translate a northern Sung piece, dedicated by Su Shih (Su Tung-p'o, 1036-1101) to a statue

⁴⁸ Liou Kin-ling, *Wang Wei le poète*, Paris 1941, p.15. The Vimalakīrti Sūtra is often quoted by T'ang Dhyāna-masters, who were in many ways closely linked to the Taoistic tradition of the Buddhism of the Six Dynasties. The most frequently invoked passages are those where it is a question of Vimalakīrti's silence, the obtaining of deliverance though misdeeds and, in the southern branch, (Hui-neng, Shen-hui, Huang-po, Lin-chi, etc.) the condemnation of Śāriputra's quietism. Commentaries on the sūtra by Dhyāna adherents were few in number and are, moreover, nearly all lost (Kasuga, pp.105b-107b); the school hardly ever practised exegesis.

⁴⁹ *Wang Yu-ch'eng chi chien-chu* (1736), re-ed. Shanghai 1961, pp.446-9. This inscription was composed at the request of Shen-hui (670-762), a disciple of Hui-neng and friend of Wang Wei. Cf. U. Hakuji, *Zenshū shi kenkyū* II, p.176; Gernet, *Entretiens de Chen-houei*, p.62, n.3.

⁵⁰ *Wang Yu-ch'eng chi* III, pp.8a-9b (Szü-pu ts'ung-k'an ed.) According to a note which might date back to the original edition of poems by Wang Wei, these two pieces imitate the manner of Wang the *brahmacārin* (Wang Fan chih), a Buddhist poet of the vulgate to whom are attributed a large number of texts rediscovered in Tun-huang and which seem to date from the eighth-ninth centuries (cf. *Annuaire* du Collège de France, 57e année (1957), pp.354-7; 58e année (1958), p.386-90; 59e année (1959), pp.437-8).

⁵¹ A. Waley, *The Life and Times of Po Chū-i*, London 1949, pp.170, 175.

modelled by a T'ang artist, Yang Hui-chih, and which he had an occasion to admire in the monastery of Fung-hsiang, not far from Ch'ang-an in Shensi, where he lived from 1061 to 1064⁵²:

THE IMAGE OF VIMALAKĪRTI
MODELLED BY YANG HUI-CHIH OF THE T'ANG
AT THE MONASTERY OF THE CELESTIAL PILLAR

Formerly Tzū-yü, sick, was about to die,
When Tzū-ssü went to question him,
Tzū-yü slackly dragged himself towards a well, where he settled,
'What has Creation done with me!'⁵³ [sighing:

Now, when I see this Vimalakīrti, ancient model,
With his prominent sickly bones like dessicated tortoises,
I know that the perfect man goes beyond births and deaths⁵⁴,
Since his body is but a transformation like a floating cloud⁵⁵.

Worldly people, assuredly, are plump and fine-looking;
Their body is not sick, but their spirit is meagre.
In this old man, the mind is intact, the basis is sure;
While talking and laughing, he would make a thousand
[bears recoil⁵⁶.

When he was alive he was questioned on the Law;
Lowering their heads, they were quiet: it is in spirit that
His image today stays ever silent; [each knew⁵⁷.

⁵² *Tung-p'o hsien-sheng shih* III, pp.10b-11a (Szü-pu ts'ung-k'an ed.). Yang Hui-chih was an eighth-century painter who, in despair at never equalling his friend and rival Wu-Tao-tzū, ended by burning his brushes and becoming a modeller (cf. Acker, *texts*, p.280, n.7). Wu Tao-tzū himself also purportedly modelled statues of Vimalakīrti and Mañjuśrī (Pelliot, *T'oung Pao* XXII, 1923, pp.287-8).

⁵³ *Chuang-tzu*, Ch. VI, ed. Wieger, p.256. Tzū-yü was a 'fool' with a deformed body and the soul of a saint.

⁵⁴ *Chih-jen wai sheng-ssü*, a mixture of Taoist and Buddhist expressions.

⁵⁵ Cf. Vimalakīrti Sūtra, T 475, I, p.539b20 (trans., Ch. II, 9, p.34).

⁵⁶ That is, a thousand heroes. An allusion to a poem by Tso Ssü of the Chin (d. 306) on historical themes, in which there is a question of the sage Lu Chung-lien who, during the siege of Han-tan, about 257 BCE, made the Ch'in army recoil through his discourses (*Wen-hsüan*, xxi; cf. *Shih-chi*, lxxxiii).

He remains as he was before his death.

The old countrymen, the village women, spare him not a look;
Sometimes a field rat comes to bite his moustache⁵⁸.
The sight of him makes distraught men flee⁵⁹:
So who will question the wordless master for me⁶⁰?

The Sung poet's attitude is remarkably close to that of the first Chinese literati who, six or seven centuries earlier, had known and adopted Vimalakīrti. The latter remains for Su Shih a type of sage in Taoist style, incomprehensible to the common worldling: the 'field rats' have nothing to do with this aristocrat of holiness. In fact, his popularisation was never to go very far. In contrast to other *pien-wen* which are at the origin of the vulgate literature of modern times, the large development rediscovered in Tun-huang was to have hardly any posterity in the Chinese novel or theatre⁶¹. We have to wait until our own times for Mei Lan-fang, the greatest actor in contemporary China (1893-1961), to stage the episode of the goddess of the flowers⁶² which, however, like the rest of the sūtra, lends itself so well to dramatisation that one might wonder if there did not exist in India or Serindia theatrical versions of the 'philosophical drama' of Vimalakīrti.

⁵⁷ An allusion to Vimalakīrti's silence, as it was interpreted by the Dhyaṇa school: supreme knowledge is of the spirit, not of the letter; each person must realise this for him/herself.

⁵⁸ An allusion to Hsieh Lung-yün's beard ('moustache' because of the rhyme).

⁵⁹ Cf. *Chuang-tzu*, Ch. VII, ed. Wieger, p.266, where it is a matter of a fortune-teller who claimed to predict people's death but who, confused by the master of Lieh-tzū, ended up by 'fleeing distraught'.

⁶⁰ A play on words on the term *chieh*, 'to question, search', which is also the last syllable of Vimalakīrti's name in Chinese.

⁶¹ This is what is remarked by Tch'en Yin-k'ue in his article cited above (n.2).

⁶² *T'ien-nü san hua*, of which there exists a Pathé-China recording. According to Tcheng Mien, *Répertoire du théâtre chinois moderne*, Paris 1929, p.148, this play was created in Peking in 1921. However, I saw Mei Lan-fang act in it in 1920, and a summary can be found (pp.79-80) as well as a fragment of it (pp.137-8) in the small work on Mei Lan-fang published in 1918 by the Chung-hua shu-chū in Shanghai, in which it is expressly confirmed that this play was an original creation by the distinguished actor.

ONCE UPON A PRESENT TIME: AN AVADĀNIST FROM GANDHĀRA[†]

TIM LENZ

When Captain James Cook set sail from Plymouth on 12 July 1776, he was charged with the secret mission of circumnavigating the globe at the highest possible latitude in the southern hemisphere to search for Terra Australis Incognita, establish British dominion over newly discovered islands or continents, look for new sources of plants, animals, and minerals suitable to quench the British thirst for lucrative items of trade, and make friends with the indigenous inhabitants of the new world¹. Cook left port armed with astronomers, naturalists, artists, a landscape painter, as well as four chronometers, and ultimately he left the world a detailed account of the land, the people, the plants, and the animals encountered during the course of his journey. Unlike Cook, when the earliest followers of the Buddha set out from the eastern Indian heartland of Buddhism armed with the religious paraphernalia – texts, Buddhist legends, and relics – that would serve to

[†] The title of this communication alludes to Jan Nattier's *Once Upon a Future Time: Studies in a Buddhist Prophecy of Decline*, a work that inspired me to discover certain attributes of the Gandhāran avadānist that I might otherwise have missed. Thanks go to Professor Nattier for her comments on an early draft. Thanks also go to Dorothy Lenz and Darcy Dye for their help in ensuring that my observations were rendered into a form that would be intelligible to more readers than a dozen specialists in Gandhāran philology.

¹ W. Goetzmann, *New Lands, New Men: America and the Second Great Age of Discovery*, New York 1987, p.44.

propagate the Buddha's teachings in distant lands, they apparently traveled without an entourage. The early Indian Buddhist monks left no maps, no journals, and no pictures portraying what they did or what they encountered on their travels. There is, therefore, practically nothing with which a scholar of early Buddhism can draw upon to bring to life the lives of the countless monks and nuns who helped to make Buddhism one of the world's great religious traditions. But with clues gleaned from sources such as early manuscripts, archaeological excavations, and artistic remains, a researcher sometimes can painstakingly reconstruct some aspect of the life of a member of the early Buddhist community.

The possibilities of making such a reconstruction have been increased in recent years with the discovery of hitherto unknown collections of early Buddhist manuscript fragments. Such collections afford researchers the opportunity to search for clues with which to reconstruct early Buddhist history by means of analytic methods that would otherwise yield little new information. With early Buddhist manuscripts in hand, we can analyze the physical condition of the documents and ponder the significance of their origin in order to discover clues with which to uncover some of Buddhism's lost past. Specifically, we can study the handwriting of their scribes, catalogue the kinds of writing errors made in their texts (e.g., crossed out letters), discover the genres represented among their texts, assess how their texts are arranged, consider the relevance of their geographic association, and of course, examine the content of their texts. From such analyses, as will become clear, we can deduce information that is unattainable from the usual sources consulted by scholars of early Buddhist history and culture, such as published editions of Buddhist texts, reports of archaeological excavations, and analyses of artistic remains.

The kind of information that can be gleaned from manuscript fragments can be demonstrated by an examination of some of the texts from a collection of Kharoṣṭhī manuscripts recently acquired

by the British Library. These documents were acquired by the British Library's Oriental and India Office Collections in September 1994. The collection consists of twenty-nine fragments of birch bark scrolls written on both the recto and verso in the Kharoṣṭhī script and the Gāndhārī language. The scrolls contain texts from a variety of Buddhist genres, including didactic poetry, scholastic commentary, doctrinal analysis (*abhidharma*), and previous-birth stories (*jātaka/avadāna*).² They are written in a language that is generally similar to that of the famous 'Gāndhārī Dharmapada', critically edited by John Brough, which was until recently the only Gāndhārī manuscript available for scholarly study. The recent discovery of these scrolls confirms the existence of a Gāndhārī Buddhist canon, which was postulated more than a century ago though only proved with the recent manuscript find.³ The new manuscript fragments can probably be dated to the first half of the first century CE,⁴ making them the earliest Buddhist

² Jātakas are commonly distinguished from avadānas as follows: Jātakas concern the past lives of the Buddha whereas avadānas may be about past lives of the Buddha or other figures, including kings, ministers, brahmins, monks, disciples, and commoners. Such a distinction generally holds true in well-known texts such as the Pali *Jātakatthavappanā* and the Sanskrit *Divyāvadāna*, but the complexities of the historical development of this type of literature probably are belied by this rather simple distinction. See T. Lenz, *A New Version of the Gāndhārī Dharmapada and a Collection of Previous-Birth Stories: British Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragments 16 + 25*, Seattle 2003, pp.92 and 108 for an edition of Fragments 16 + 25 and for comments relating to this matter.

³ See R. Salomon, *Ancient Buddhist Scrolls From Gandhāra: The British Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragments*, Seattle/London 1999, pp.156-7 for comments concerning the Gāndhārī canon.

⁴ R. Salomon, *A Gāndhārī Version of The Rhinoceros Sūtra: British Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragment 5B*, Seattle 2000, pp.xi-ii.

manuscripts discovered to date⁵. The British Library collection is particularly important for our purposes, for it contains a sizable collection of texts written by a single author. When analyzed, these texts provide unique clues with which we can deduce something of the otherwise undocumented life of their author.

From the circumstances of the British Library collection's discovery, we can determine the location of the home of the monk with whom we are concerned. According to hearsay reports, the British Library manuscripts were found in Haḍḍa, a small village near present day Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan. This village is located in the heart of Gandhāra, the region between the Suleiman Mountains in Afghanistan and the Indus River in Pakistan (see fig. 1)⁶, where the Kharoṣṭhī script and Gāndhārī language flourished from approximately the third century BCE through the third century CE⁷. Although the origin of the manuscripts is unknown with any degree of certainty, the large number of Gāndhārī manuscripts that have been found at Haḍḍa and other sites in the Jalalabad Plain, lends some credibility to the hearsay reports⁸. Thus, we can tentatively assume that our author was a Gandhāran Buddhist monk who lived in Haḍḍa.

This Gandhāran monk from Haḍḍa is known only through portions of six texts that are preserved on British Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragments 1, 2, 3, 4, 12 + 14 and 16 + 25⁹. To date, only the text

⁵ See Salomon, *Ancient Buddhist Scrolls* for a comprehensive introduction to the British Library Kharoṣṭhī fragments.

⁶ The map in figure 1 is reprinted from *ibid.*, p.2 with permission from the University of Washington Press.

⁷ R. Salomon, *Indian Epigraphy: A Guide to the Study of Inscriptions in Sanskrit, Prakrit, and the Other Indo-Aryan Languages*, New York 1998, pp.46-7.

⁸ Salomon, *Ancient Buddhist Scrolls*, p.68.

⁹ See *ibid.*, § 2.3 for general descriptions of these fragments.

on Fragments 16 + 25¹⁰, lines 174-84 of Frag. 1¹¹, lines 1-7 (recto) of Fragment 2¹², lines 1-11 (verso) of Frag. 3¹³, and the first five lines of the text on Frag. 12 + 14¹⁴ have been critically edited. In addition, preliminary transcriptions of all of the texts written by this monk, as well as translations and lexicons for the texts on Fragments 2, 3, and 12 + 14 have been produced¹⁵.

Like many other Buddhist manuscript texts, the aforementioned ones bear no name or biography of their authors. But unlike other manuscript texts, which are largely scribal copies of well-established texts, our Gāndhārī texts are apparently written in their author's own hand. In other words, our Gāndhārī works are Buddhist texts that were learned and memorized by our scribe and subsequently set down by him in written form. All the texts in question, save one, are written in a single hand consisting of large, flowing letters, which are the source of the very non-monastic nickname we have conferred upon their author, 'Big Hand'¹⁶. The sole text of Big Hand that was not written completely in his own hand (Frag. 4) is one that was begun by a monk with a distinctive thin, slanting, vertically elongated hand¹⁷ and apparently completed by Big Hand.

That Big Hand is both author (though not necessarily the

¹⁰ Lenz, *op. cit.*, Part II.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, appendix 3; see also Salomon, *Ancient Buddhist Scrolls*, pp.145-9 for comments on another portion of this text.

¹² Salomon, *ibid.*, pp.141-5.

¹³ Lenz, *op. cit.*, appendix 2.

¹⁴ M. Allon, *Three Gāndhārī Ekottarikāgama-Type Sūtras: British Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragments 12 and 14*, Seattle 2001, appendix 2.

¹⁵ All translations and transcriptions used in preparation of this article are my own.

¹⁶ See Lenz, *op. cit.*, Ch. 8 for an examination of Big Hand's handwriting.

¹⁷ Salomon, *Ancient Buddhist Scrolls*, pp. 45 and 54).

original composer) and scribe of these texts is evident from the copious number of textual corrections that stand in his texts, errors that probably would have been expunged by a professional copyist who was merely reproducing a previously written text. For example, in his text on British Library Fragments 12 + 14¹⁸, a portion of a line of writing (l. 82) has been crossed out (see fig. 2). In another line (l. 98), Big Hand apparently had difficulty writing the verb *hokṣadi* (𑀅𑀓𑀭𑀢𑀺, 'will be', √*bhū*, 3rd pers. sing. fut.), for he apparently wrote *hokṣavidi* (𑀅𑀓𑀭𑀢𑀺𑀢𑀺) and then, for some unknown reason, crossed out *vi* and *di*, the final two letters of the word (see fig. 3). Furthermore, in the text on Fragments 16 + 25, Big Hand wrote a large punctuation mark, apparently consisting of six circles arranged in two columns of three circles each, to indicate the end of a section of text. Such punctuation marks are not unusual in Big Hand's writings, but this one is written over the top of a previously written letter (see fig. 4)¹⁹. The syllable *ga* (𑀕𑀺) or perhaps *ge* (𑀕𑀺) is obscured but visible beneath the well-preserved left column of circles²⁰.

Besides indicating that he is an author as well as a scribe, the corrections in Big Hand's texts suggest that he does not have complete mastery over the material that he is writing. The crossed out letters (Frgs. 12 + 14) and punctuation marks written over the top of other letters (Frgs. 16 + 25) are reminiscent of student life before the advent of the word processor, when early drafts of handwritten papers were filled with crossed out words, sentences, and sections. In this light, we might regard Big Hand as a student, perhaps a very young monk struggling to become fluent with one

genre of Buddhist literature. Such a characterisation is hypothetical, but there is some internal evidence suggesting that Big Hand was a student.

A comparison of Fragments 12 + 14 with Fragments 16 + 25 shows fairly clearly that much like an 'ideal student' today, Big Hand has the ability to learn from his mistakes. In addition to the obvious difficulties of writing suggested by the crossed out letters, his text on Fragments 12 + 14 shows stylistic inconsistencies that are absent in the one on Fragments 16 + 25. The texts on both of these scroll fragments are *avadāna*-type texts, consisting of a numbered series of brief story summaries, or skeleton texts, that presumably were known to their author in much more fully developed forms. Typically the summaries include a one- or two-sentence introduction, a description of a few important scenes, a concluding abbreviation formula telling the reader that he should be able to expand the story for himself with reference to the supplied summary²¹, and a story number. For example, one of Big Hand's stories (Frgs. 16 + 25, ll. 18-23) concerns a previous life of the Buddha as a shipwrecked merchant who sacrifices his life to save his shipmates from drowning:

[18] A previous birth of the Buddha. Thus it was heard. [19] The Buddha was a merchant, a merchant of the great ocean. Supplies were [20] collected by him. He set out on the great ocean. The ship was destroyed. [21] The merchant met his death on the surface (*of the ocean). It was a favour... The merchant himself [22] was set down here on the shore. He killed himself. Thus the previous birth ((**pūrva*)*yoga*). Expansion should be according to the model. [23] It should be told. (*Story number) 1²².

¹⁸ Jason Neelis (University of Florida) is currently preparing a critical edition of Fragments 12 + 14.

¹⁹ Figure 4 is reprinted from Lenz, *op. cit.*, p.124, with permission from the University of Washington Press.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 102; for further discussion, see § 7.8.

²¹ For further discussion, see *ibid.*, § 7.2.

²² 18. ... *bosisatvaprovyoge ev[o]*

For purposes of this discussion, the above story's abbreviation formula and its story number are of particular interest. The sentence 'Expansion should be according to the model' (*vistare ya āyupamaṇo siyadī*) apparently became a standard abbreviation formula in this genre. It occurs in most of the avadāna-type texts in the British Library Kharoṣṭhī collection, probably occurring four times in Fragments 16 + 25 alone²³. The stories included in the avadāna-type texts are also numbered with a story number that is almost always placed at the end of a story following one or more circular punctuation marks (see fig. 5)²⁴.

In Big Hand's text on fragments 12 + 14, however, the aforementioned abbreviation formula and numbering pattern show unusual variations. For example, at the end of story number 7 (l. 107), Big Hand concludes with a truncated form of the standard formula 'Expansion should be according to the model' (*vistare ya āyupamaṇo siyadī*): 'Expansion according to the model' (*vistare ya āyupama*). Although the words making up the shortened formula are familiar components of the longer one, the second term lacks its final syllable: *ya āyupama* rather than *ya āyupamaṇo*

19. *ṣuyadī* ◦ *boi[sa]tvo* ◦ *vaniage [ho-]* /// (**vadī maha-*) /// *[sa]mudr[ava]nige t(*a)no pañ[o]*

20. *samudanido mahasamudro adirno [ya-]* /// (**napatra*) /// *bhirno vaniaga tala vi-*

21. *layam=avarnage [p](*ra)cagaran(*o)* ◦ *hova[di]* /// + + + /// *[sa]rya [va]niaga śpagam=iśa*

22. *tirami* ◦ *liśavido* ◦ *apano hado* ◦ *evo* /// (**prova-*) /// *[yo]go vistare ya* ◦ *ṣayupamaṇo si-*

23. *yadī vatava* ◦ 1 (*ibid.*, p.150; see also § 11.2.2 for notes and interpretation and pp. 212-6 for Sanskrit and Chinese parallels).

²³ Two cases are partially reconstructed; see *ibid.*, § 11.1.

²⁴ Figure 5 is reprinted from *ibid.*, p.103, with permission from the University of Washington Press.

(see fig. 6)²⁵. In other words, it is spelled incorrectly and rather than writing 'according to the model', Big Hand wrote something like 'according to the mod'. This misspelling is rather surprising for such a common word, and for one that is apparently rendered correctly everywhere else in Big Hand's texts (though other examples may be found after all his texts are critically edited).

Another unusual story ending occurs in story number 6. Here, the story includes the final circular punctuation mark and story number, but lacks the usual concluding abbreviation formula. This is striking. All the other avadānas written by Big Hand for which the end of the story is clearly preserved do have such a final abbreviation formula. However, in a few cases where the text is only partially preserved (particularly in Frag. 4) it is not always obvious whether or not such a formula was included²⁶. In any case, the lack of an abbreviation formula at the end of an avadāna is outside of the normal pattern of Big Hand's work.

In contrast to the text on Fragments 12 + 14, the one on Fragments 16 + 25 is generally free of the kinds of unusual features discussed above. There are no crossed out passages, the story numbering patterns are regular (only numerals are used), and the final abbreviation formula is more often than not the standard one: 'The expansion should be according to the model'.

²⁵ The reproduction here is very difficult to read. The reading is clearer on the original colour digital image supplied by the British Library.

²⁶ Thanks go to Jason Neelis for sharing his notes on the abbreviation formulae used in Fragment 4. It should be noted that at least two of the stories in Big Hand's text on this fragment end with something other than formulae commonly seen in Big Hand's texts. Since the text is badly damaged, I am unable to determine whether this is because the stories lack final abbreviation formula or whether they include formulae that are somewhat different from the ones used elsewhere in Big Hand's writings. This may or may not be clarified after Fragment 4 is critically edited.

The consistency of the text on Fragments 16 + 25 seems to indicate that Big Hand has a greater command of writing avadāna-type stories than he had when he wrote the text on Fragments 12 + 14. In other words, he seems to have learned from past mistakes and has, therefore, written a cleaner text.

Since it appears that Big Hand improves his writing with practice, we can hypothesize that he is a student of his craft rather than a master. Given the kind of errors and inconsistencies that occur in some of his texts (crossed out letters and passages, unusual numbering patterns and abbreviation formulas), it is tempting to describe him as a young novice, perhaps the equivalent of a modern-day high school student. But such a characterisation would be premature without access to biographical accounts or diary entries, which Big Hand unfortunately did not see fit to produce.

In any case, another feature of Big Hand's work that appears to mark him as a student is that in nearly all of his texts there are one or more interlinear notations stating that the text has been 'written' (*likhidago*). Seven such notations are written on five different scrolls (for one example, see fig. 7), apparently added after Big Hand had completed his texts:

1. It is written ((**li*)*kh*(**i*)*dago*, Frag. 1, l. 130a)
2. Now, all is written, (*likhidago aco sa[rvo]*, Frag. 1, l. 172a)
3. Now, all these avadānas are written (*sarva ime avadāna [aca] (*likhidaga)*, Frag. 2, r, between ll. 8 and 9; see fig. 8; see also Salomon 1999: pl. 15)
4. All is written (*likhidaga sarve*, Frag. 3, above l. 1 (verso); see Lenz 2003: Fig. 18)
5. Written (*likhidago*, Frags. 12 + 14, between ll. 75 and 76; Allon 2001: pls. 4 & 7)
6. All is written (*likhidago sarvo*, (Frag. 12 + 14, l. 77;

Allon 2001: pls. 4 & 7)²⁷

7. Now the avadānas are written (*likhidage aca avadāne*, Frags. 16 + 25, l. 18)²⁸

These notations are subject to various interpretations, but the fact that they are found exclusively in avadāna-type texts and that two of the notations, numbers 3 (see fig. 8) and 7, specifically refer to avadānas strongly suggest that all the notations refer to the avadāna texts rather than generally to their respective manuscripts. If this is the case and if Big Hand was a student rather than a master, the notations might best be interpreted as proofing marks of a teacher or inspector, indicating that the stories were satisfactorily written by one of his students²⁹. Accordingly, Big Hand's text can be viewed as a student's writing assignments and the inspector's notation as something akin to the grading mark that modern-day professors place at the top of completed student papers.

If we accept the ideas that Big Hand was a student and that his texts are completed writing assignments, we can determine the focus of his studies by assessing the range of literary genres represented in his texts. Since Big Hand's extant works are exclusively avadāna-type texts, we can surmise that he probably was studying to become a specialist in this type of literature. Such avadāna specialists are mentioned elsewhere in Buddhist literature. In two verses in the *Kalpadrūmāvadānamālā*, an anthology of avadāna-type stories, they are called 'avadānists', *avadānika* or *avadānārthakovidā* in Sanskrit:

²⁷ Salomon (*Ancient Buddhist Scrolls*, p.76) and Allon (*op. cit.*, p.303) transcribe *likhidago sa[rvo]*, but *sarvo* is clearly visible on Allon's plates 4 and 7.

²⁸ This list was compiled by Salomon (*loc. cit.*). No. 7 corrected from *likhitage*.

²⁹ Lenz, *op. cit.*, §§ 7.8 and 7.10; for an alternative analysis, see Salomon, *Ancient Buddhist Scrolls*, § 4.2.

From dharmic actions, beings obtain bliss.
 From evil action, they are allotted suffering.
 From mixed action, they come to enjoy mixed fruits.
 Thus speak the avadānists³⁰.

By the measure of qualities and dharma,
 There are no standards of caste at all.
 Thus proclaim the Buddhist avadāna-experts³¹.

If our interpretation of Big Hand's work is correct, his texts would represent a unique collection of avadāna-type stories written by a student who is studying to become an avadāna specialist, that is to say, an avadānist like the ones mentioned in the *Kalpadrūmāvadānamālā*.

Even though Big Hand's avadāna texts are unique and exciting finds for a modern-day Buddhist studies scholar, the texts that we have probably were little prized by members of the Buddhist community other than by the avadānists themselves. Although there is no direct evidence in this regard, physical evidence suggests that our avadāna-type texts were considered as secondary to other types of Buddhist literature, which is not too surprising for works that may have been student writing assignments. All of the

avadāna-type texts appear as the second text on scrolls made up of two texts, suggesting that they were not primary. The first text on a scroll that contains two texts is always a formal Buddhist text, such as a didactic or popular poetry text (e.g., Dharmapada)³² or a canonical sūtra text (e.g., Ekottarikāgama-type sūtra)³³. Typically, the avadāna texts commence immediately after the first text on a scroll, fill up any remaining space on the recto, and then continue onto and presumably fill the verso, though this remains hypothetical because only the beginning portions of our texts have been preserved. One possible explanation for this state of affairs is that avadānists were 'scavengers' who had to search for and appropriate unused space on scrolls containing previously written texts³⁴. In any case, because the avadāna collections are invariably the second text on scrolls containing two texts, they do not appear to have been held in as high esteem as the more formal texts that preceded them. This also might indicate something of the status of Big Hand and his fellow avadānists in the Buddhist community, but there is no indication in the manuscripts that such a hypothesis is warranted.

But even though our Gāndhārī specialist's written work may not have been accorded high status in the Gandhāran literary hierarchy and his personal status might not have been extremely high in the monastic hierarchy, we can, nevertheless, deduce that his work did fill an important niche in the monastic community. A still widely held view concerning avadāna-type literature is that it is not serious Buddhist literature and was not really studied by monks; it was a literature for laymen and for the winning of

³⁰ Translated by John Strong ('The Buddhist Avādanists and the Elder Upagupta,' in *Tantric and Taoist Studies in Honour of R. A. Stein*, Brussels 1981, p.867); punctuation added.

*dharmataḥ sukhino bhūtāḥ pāpato duḥkhabhāgināḥ.
 miśrato miśrabhuktāra ity uktam avadānikaiḥ.* (Vaidya, *Avadāna-śataka*, Darbhanga, 1959: *Kalpadrūmāvadānamālāyām* v. 106, p.272)

³¹ *Loc. cit.* I have changed Strong's translation of *guṇadharmapramāṇena* from 'By measure of dharmic qualities' to 'By the measure of qualities and dharma.'

*guṇadharmapramāṇena jāter naiva pramāṇatā.
 tathā ca procyate bauddhair avadānārthakovidaiḥ.* (v. 162, p.275)

³² See Lenz, *op. cit.* for an edition of the Dharmapada.

³³ See Allon, *op. cit.* for an edition of the Ekottarikāgama Sūtra.

³⁴ Credit for the outlines of this interpretation (also mentioned in Allon, *ibid.* p.3 and Lenz, *op. cit.*, p.108) goes to Richard Salomon (see *Ancient Buddhist Scrolls*, p.35).

converts. No doubt, this is true up to a point. Some of our Gāndhārī stories seem to be especially aimed at laymen. The most obvious example of this comes from Fragments 12 + 14:

Thus it was heard. The Kardamaga King's father was named Kardamaga. He was born in the womb of a pig. An exceedingly stingy mind. All should be according to the model³⁵.

The message of this story seems obvious, even though the literary style is extremely terse: 'Be stingy with regard to the Buddhist monastic community at your peril.' Presumably, such a story would have been 'expanded' in front of a non-monastic audience in order to obtain monetary support or other political favor.

On the other hand, Big Hand wrote one story that apparently is intended for much loftier purposes. The story in question is about a magic contest between a white (*indra mayagara*) and black (*śabari mayagara*) magician, wherein the black magician brings about darkness and the white magician overcomes the darkness with light. Such a story could conceivably be used for any number of purposes, but after its conclusion in the written text, there is a notation telling exactly what the story is to be used for: 'Understanding of impermanence. With regard to the characteristic of impermanence, all should be told.'³⁶ Though the significance of this notation is debatable, it seems to me that it implies a 'serious Buddhist' discussion that most likely would have taken place within the monastic community. Thus, from the aforementioned two stories we can deduce that Gāndhārī avadānists' oratorical skills

³⁵ 86. . . . evo śrūyādi kadamagasa rayasa ka(*dama-) ///
 87. go namo pido hovadi so suarayonige u(*va) ///
 88. gado adivamaca[rimadi] sarvo ya'ayu[p] /// (*amano)
³⁶ 172. anicada parigarmo sarvo matr[ida]vo ? ///
 172.5. likhidago aco sarvo ? ? ? ///
 173. anicadalakṣanami sarvo ° [matri] /// (*davo)

were probably put to use instructing both monks and laymen (in Big Hand's case, training to instruct monks and laymen). Avadānists must have been instructors who always had a story at the ready to ram home an abstruse doctrinal point or to coax an Indo-Scythian king into donating a bag of drachmas to the Buddhist cause.

Thus, even in the absence of paintings, sketches, scientific treatises, and diaries, such as those produced by Captain Cook and his entourage, we are able to reconstruct something of the life of one Gandhāran storyteller, the avadānist Big Hand. The reconstruction is admittedly incomplete, but we still have three other avadāna-type texts in the British Library collection that wait critical editing and other manuscripts from places such as Merv, Afghanistan (e.g. the so-called Bairam-Ali manuscript) which should provide useful comparative material and further information with which to fill out our initial attempts at drawing a character sketch of one ancient Gandhāran monk. With further examinations of Buddhist manuscripts – comparing manuscripts, cataloguing story themes, assessing the percentages of local and "traditional" stories contained in our collection, identifying the historical data (e.g., royal names) preserved in our stories, and accounting for the physical circumstances and condition of our manuscripts – solutions to many unsolved riddles surrounding the monastic life and career of Big Hand and his fellow avadānists may yet be discovered: To what end does Big Hand specialise in avadāna-type literature? What kind of audience would be interested in listening to Big Hand's stories? Which Buddhist doctrines are illustrated by Big Hand's stories? What is Big Hand's status within his monastic community? How was Big Hand chosen to be an avadānist, a specialist in avadāna-type literature? Our manuscripts hold the key to answering such questions, though, of course, information gleaned from these sources must necessarily be supported by archaeology, art history, epigraphy, literary criticism, and numismatics. In any case, further creative explorations into

uncharted Buddhist-manuscript territory will undoubtedly bring to light solutions to many intriguing mysteries associated with the study of early Indian Buddhism that previously the mists of antiquity have caused to remain unsolved.

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Transcription Key

- [] An unclear or partially preserved akṣara (graphic syllable) whose reading is uncertain.
- (*) A lost or illegible akṣara that has been conjecturally restored on the basis of context, parallel citation or other means.
- .
- A missing portion (consonantal or diacritic vowel sign) of a partially legible akṣara. For example, .e represents an akṣara in which the vowel diacritic *e* is visible, but the consonant to which it was attached is lost or illegible; *g*. signifies the consonant *g* is legible, but incomplete so that it cannot be determined whether or not a vowel diacritic was attached to the syllable.
- ? An illegible, but visible or partially visible akṣara.
- + A missing akṣara that would have appeared on a lost or obscured portion of the scroll. A series of these symbols indicates the approximate number of lost syllables, one + sign being equivalent to one akṣara.
- /// Beginning or end of an incomplete line.
- A small dot or circle used in the original text to indicate word, sentence, verse, half verse or other minor unit divisions.
- A large circle, a design of circles or other large circular or square design used in the original text to mark sectional divisions.
- = A word break within an akṣara: used in phrases such as *karyam=ido*, in which the final consonant of the preceding word and the initial vowel of the following are written as a single syllable (*mi*).

Lenz – Once Upon a Present Time

Figures




Fig. 1. Map of Gandhāra proper (dark gray), Greater Gandhāra (light gray), and surrounding territory.



Fig. 2. Crossed out text from Fragments 12 + 14, line 82:
dravado // evo-ko kurigo [viva] spa ? ?



Fig. 3. Frags. 12 + 14, line 97: *hokṣavidi*.



Fig. 4. Six-circled punctuation mark from Fragments 16 + 25.



Fig. 5. Story numbering in Fragments 16 + 25: number 1 (!) in l. 23 and number 2 (!) in l. 27.




Fig. 6. Truncated abbreviation formula: *vistare yaṣayupa[ma] 7 O*.



Fig. 7. Story numbering and abbreviation formula, avadāna 3, Fragments 12 + 14.



Fig. 8. *Likhidago* notation written in small letters between lines of text (Frag. 2): *sarva ime avadana [aca] (*likhidaga)*.

Translated from the Chinese Version by
Thích Huyên-Vi and Bhikkhu Pāsādika
in collaboration with Sara Boin-Webb

Twelfth Fascicle
Part 21
(The Triple Gem)

9. 1 '... What is the enjoyment of forms? [Let us] suppose [someone] sees a girl either of noble descent (*kṣatriyajāti*), of brahminic descent or of a householder's (*gr̥hapati*) family, fourteen, fifteen or sixteen years old, neither tall nor short, neither plump nor thin, neither [too] fair nor [too] dark, being respectable and of incomparable [beauty] seldom to be found in the world. Hardly has one seen her complexion when one experiences pleasure and joy (*sukhasaumanasya*) – this is called enjoyment of forms.

How do forms create sheer distress? If one sees that "girl" again after [a time], being eighty, ninety or even a hundred years of age, her complexion has totally changed; with the passage of time her vigour is gone, her teeth are broken and her hair is as white as snow; her body is blotchy², the skin is flaccid, the face all wrinkles, the spine deformed, the body [resembling] a creaking and groaning old cart; [with] shaking frame she stumbles along, leaning on a stick. What do you think, bhikṣus? [The girl endowed with] such a pleasing (*ramya*) appearance before and afterwards having totally changed, is that not sheer distress? – It is, Exalted One, replied the bhikṣus. – That is how forms create sheer distress, the Exalted One [went on] saying to the bhikṣus.

Moreover, if one sees that woman with her body exposed to great affliction, being confined to bed³, incontinent and unable to rise and stand, what do you think, bhikṣus? [The girl] originally [being endowed with] such a pleasing appearance and now exposed to this

1 See T2, 605b18 ff.; Hayashi, p. 201 ff.

2 垢界, lit.: 'bounded by stains'; cf. M I, p. 88: *tilakāhatagattim* (Burmese and Nālandā readings to be preferred: *ogattam*): 'with her body affected with spots'.

3 Lit.: 'bed-mattress'.

affliction, is that not sheer distress? – It is, Exalted One, replied the bhikṣus. – That is how forms create sheer distress, the Exalted One [went on] saying to the bhikṣus.

Furthermore, bhikṣus, if one sees that woman's body, broken up, lifeless and on its way to the cemetery⁴ – how is that, bhikṣus? Formerly beholding that pleasing form and now – what a transformation! When in this [situation one's] mind experiences pleasure and pain⁵ welling up, is that not sheer distress? – It is, Exalted One, replied the bhikṣus...

And again, if one sees that woman in one place being dead for one day, two, three, four, five, up to seven days, her body being bloated, putrid, nauseating and decomposing – how is that, bhikṣus? That originally pleasing form which has now undergone this transformation – is that not sheer distress? – It is, Exalted One, replied the bhikṣus...

In addition, if one sees [how] crows and magpies, kites and vultures come [near], squabbling with [each other] over that woman [as their] prey, or [if] one sees [her] either being devoured by foxes, dogs, wolves [or] tigers or being [infested and] fed on by mosquito larvae, rapidly worming [their way into the flesh, and by other] extremely small wriggling worms – how is that, bhikṣus? Originally she was endowed with such a pleasing appearance, and now she has undergone this transformation! When in this [situation one's] mind experiences pleasure and pain welling up, is that not sheer distress? – It is, Exalted One, replied the bhikṣus...

Additionally, if one sees that woman's body half eaten away by birds [of prey] and worms, [with its] bowels, stomach, bloody flesh [and various kinds of] impure substances [exposed]... That is how forms create sheer distress, the Exalted One [went on] saying to the bhikṣus.

4 Lit.: 'grave - intermediate space'. For the Chinese 塚間 is, of course, an area of land for burying the dead whilst the ancient Indian *śmaśāna* / *susāna* was 'a place where the corpses were left to rot' (after PTSD).

5 I.e. the ambivalence of feelings due to one's remembering that 'girl of incomparable beauty' and one's being shocked to witness the said transformation.

Furthermore, if one sees that woman's body without flesh and blood, the bare skeleton with its bones [still] joined together... That is how forms create sheer distress... if one sees that woman's body without flesh and blood and only [with dry bones] held together by tendons [like] a bundle of firewood⁶... That is how forms create sheer distress... if one sees [the remains] of that woman's body, [viz.] disconnected bones scattered in different places – here a bone of the foot, there a humerus, here a...⁷ bone, there (T2, 606a) a hip bone, ribs, a shoulder blade, vertebrae of the neck and the skull⁸... That is how forms create sheer distress... if one sees the shining white or dove-grey bones of that woman's body... That is how forms create sheer distress... if one sees the dry bones of that woman, after countless years putrid, rotten and [finally] indistinguishable from earth... That is how forms create sheer distress.

Moreover, these forms are impermanent (*anitya*), [subject to] change (*pariṇāma*) and ephemeral (*acira*); there is nothing that remains young. That is how forms create sheer distress.

How should one escape from forms? When someone succeeds in giving up and getting rid of all stupefaction (*mūrchā*) with regard to forms, this is called giving up with regard to forms. As for forms, the so-called śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics] cling to them; they do not know of [their entailing] sheer distress, and they do not overcome [clinging] because they do not know [forms] in accordance with fact (*yathābhūtam*). They are not [real] śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics and] do not [really] know of the deportment pertaining to them, being unable themselves to realise [the ultimate goal] and perfect mastery over themselves. The śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics] who, as for forms, do not cling to them, profoundly knowing of [their entailing] sheer distress, certainly know [how] to overcome [all attachment]. That is what is called with śramaṇas and brahmin

6 For a parallel to the present context also containing this simile (not found in Pāli), see Bh. Pāsādika, 'The Smṛtyupasthānasūtra of the Ekottarāgama Translated from the Chinese Version', in: C.P. Sinha, K. Prasad *et al.*, *Facets of Indian Culture*, Gustav Roth Felicitation Vol., Patna 1998, p. 498.

7 According to CBETA, the character consisting of the radical 肉 + 𪛗 is a doubtful reading which Hayashi (p. 203) replaces by the character consisting of the radical 肉 + 卑 (T2, 606, n. 40) ('spleen (bone') (*sic*)).

8 CBETA emends 觸 to 觸.

[ascetics their] knowing of the deportment pertaining to them; by themselves they realise⁹ [the ultimate goal] and perfect mastery over themselves. This is what is meant by giving up [stupefaction] with regard to forms.

What is that which [has been] referred to as enjoyment of feelings? When there is a bhikṣu experiencing a pleasant feeling, he knows, "I am experiencing a pleasant feeling." When experiencing a painful feeling, he knows, "I am experiencing a painful feeling." When experiencing a neither painful nor pleasant feeling, he knows, "I am experiencing a neither painful nor pleasant feeling." When experiencing a pleasant sensual (*sāmiṣa*) feeling, he knows, "I am experiencing a pleasant sensual feeling." When experiencing a painful sensual feeling, he knows, "I am experiencing a painful sensual feeling." When experiencing a neither painful nor pleasant sensual feeling, he knows, "I am experiencing a neither painful nor pleasant¹⁰ feeling." [When experiencing] a painful spiritual (*nirāmiṣa*) feeling, he knows, "I am experiencing a painful spiritual feeling." [When experiencing] a pleasant spiritual feeling, he knows, "I am experiencing a pleasant spiritual feeling." When [experiencing] a neither painful nor pleasant spiritual feeling, he knows, "I am experiencing a neither painful nor pleasant spiritual feeling."

Moreover, when the bhikṣu is experiencing a pleasant feeling, he does not experience a painful feeling; and he does not experience a neither painful nor pleasant feeling either; at that time he [knows], "I am just experiencing a pleasant feeling." When he is experiencing a painful feeling, he does not experience a pleasant feeling; and he does not experience a neutral feeling either; [at that time he knows, "I am] just experiencing a painful feeling." When the bhikṣu is experiencing a neither painful nor pleasant feeling, he does not experience

9 I.e. 己身作證 (*ātmanā sāksāt-√kr*); at T2, 605b17 for 己身 read 己身 (unnoticed both in Hayashi and CBETA). Consequently, at BSR 21, 1 (2004), p. 63, l. 16, for 'They have given [rise] to their realising...' read 'By themselves they realise...' Cf., in this context, M. Hara on J.W. de Jong who 'kept insisting on the need for a critical edition of the *Taiṣhō Tripitaka*'; see H.W. Bodewitz, Minoru Hara (eds.), *Gedenkschrift J.W. de Jong*, Tokyo 2004, p. XIX.

10 Whereas at the beginning of the sentence 'neutral' and 'sensual' were not considered incompatible with each other, here 'sensual' is omitted because, perhaps, a neutral feeling was thought to exclude a sensual one.

either a pleasant or a painful feeling; [at that time he knows, "I am just experiencing a neutral feeling."¹¹ Again, feelings are indeed impermanent and subject to change. So considering the impermanence of the feelings certainly being subject to change – that is how feelings create sheer distress.

How should one escape from feelings? When someone succeeds in giving up and getting rid of all stupefaction with regard to feelings, this is called giving up with regard to feelings. As for feelings, those śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics] who cling to them, do not know of [their entailing] sheer distress, and they do not overcome [clinging] because they do not know [feelings] in accordance with fact. They are not [real] śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics and] do not [really] know of the deportment pertaining to them, being unable personally¹² to realise [the ultimate goal] and perfect mastery over themselves. The śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics] who, as for feelings, do not cling to them, profoundly knowing of [their entailing] sheer distress, certainly know [how] to overcome [all attachment]. That is what is called with śramaṇas and brahmin [ascetics their] knowing of the deportment pertaining to them; personally they realise [the ultimate goal] and perfect mastery over themselves. This is what is meant by giving up [stupefaction] with regard to feelings.

In addition, bhikṣus, if a śramaṇa or brahmin [ascetic] does not discern (*vi-√jñā*) painful, pleasant or neutral feelings and does not know [them] in accordance with fact, but if they teach [other] persons, such action is improper. If a śramaṇa or brahmin [ascetic] succeeds in giving up [clinging to] feelings [by dint of] knowing [them] in accordance with fact and if he inspires [other] persons through his teachings to become detached from them [too], this is correct and

11 Whilst in the Pāli discourse the feelings experienced in the *jhānas* are referred to, this part of EĀ, being a close parallel to the EĀ version of the Smṛty-upasthānasūtra (see above n. 6, *op. cit.*, p. 499) on the contemplation of feelings, is inconsistent. The two EĀ paras. on feeling surely represent a textual corruption; for 'contemplation of feelings' does by no means correspond to 'enjoyment of feelings'.

12 Cf. n. 9 above; here instead of 己身, maybe for the sake of stylistic variation, 以身 (*ātmabhāvena*) is found. As for stylistic variation, against Pāli usage, cf. also BSR 21, 1, p. 60, 'wretchedness' (after Hirakawa, p. 66: 過= *atyaya...*, *ādinava*), and *ibid.*, p. 61 ff., n. 11, 'distress' (患惱).

proper. This is what is meant by giving up [stupefaction] with regard to feelings.

Now, bhikṣus, I have availed myself of [the occasion] to speak about sense-pleasures, one's clinging to and enjoying them, about their creating sheer distress and about those who succeed in giving them up. I have spoken likewise about forms, one's clinging to and enjoying them, about their creating sheer distress and about [those who] succeed in getting rid of [all stupefaction] with regard to forms; [I have] availed myself of [the occasion] to speak about feelings, one's clinging to... them, ... succeed in giving up [clinging to] them. As to what behoves all Tathāgatas to do, viz. to teach (caus. - *pra-√jñā*), I have discharged [my duty] now. [You should] always practise mindfulness; meditate under trees, wisely reflect (*manasi-√kr*) in empty places, do not be negligent. That is what I [would like to] bring home [to you] (*sam-anu-√śās*).¹³ – Having listened to the Exalted One's words, the bhikṣus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.'

10. 'Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvastī, at Jetṛ's Grove, in Anāthapiṇḍada's Park. Then the Exalted One said to the bhikṣus: There are three [things] that are inevitably insecure. Which three? Inevitably insecure are a) one's body, b) one's life and c) one's property. These, bhikṣus, are the three [things] that are inevitably insecure. Now, bhikṣus, in regard to the three [things] being inevitably insecure, one should search for [three kinds of] skilful means so as to realise three [kinds of] complete security. Which are the three? [There are the skilful means of someone] in quest of complete security a) [in regard to] one's body, b) life and c) property that are inevitably insecure. And what is [the skilful means of someone] in quest of complete security a) [in regard to] one's body that is inevitably insecure? It is reverence (*gaurava*),

13 As for the concluding exhortation addressed to the bhikṣus which is not found at M I, p. 90, see the Pāli parallel at, for instance, A IV, p. 139: *yaṃ bhikkhave satthārā karaṇīyam... kataṃ vo taṃ | etāni bhikkhave rukkhamūlāni etāni suññāgārāni | jhāyatha... mā pamādattha... ayaṃ vo amhākaṃ anusāsanti |* Cf. E.M. Hare, *Gradual Sayings* IV, PTS 1935, p. 94: 'Monks, the work to be done by a teacher for his disciples, ... that has been done for you by me... at the foot of these trees... (make ye your habitations)! ... Be not slothful! ... This is our command to you.'

worship (*vandana*) and, in due time (*yathākālam*), enquiring into [the Dharma] (*pariprcchā*).¹⁴ This is [the skilful means of someone] in quest of complete security [in regard to] one's body...

What is [the skilful means of someone] in quest of complete security b) [in regard to] one's life that is inevitably insecure? As for [this kind of skilful means, it is spoken of] when a son or daughter of good family, as long as life lasts¹⁵, does not kill any living being, does not brandish (*pra-√kṣip*) either a sword or a cudgel, being always guided by modesty (*lajjā*) and with a heart [full of] friendliness (*maitrī*) and compassion (*karuṇā*) encompassing all living beings; when [he or she], as long as life lasts, does not steal [anything], always intent upon generosity (*dāna*) and with a heart unstained by stinginess;¹⁶ when [he or she], as long as life lasts, neither is licentious nor [induces] others to be so; ... as long as life lasts, does not tell lies, being always intent upon absolute honesty and without cheating anybody in the world;¹⁷ ... and does not drink alcohol, [thereby] avoiding getting befuddled and [thus being able] to maintain the observance of the Buddha's moral training. This is [the

14 This first skilful means is reminiscent of v. 8 of the Maṅgalasutta: *gāraḥ ca nivāto ca... kālena dhammassavanam* | As for the 'act of hearing / learning' being connected to 'enquiring', see *Khuddaka-Pāṭha* together with its commentary *Paramatthajotikā* I (PTS 1915), p. 148: *kalyāṇamitte... te kālena upasamkamitvā paripucchati paripaṇḥatīti* |

15 壽形壽 rendering *yāvajjīvam*, seems peculiar to EĀ.

16 Cf. D I, pp. 4, 63: *pāṇātipātāṃ pahāya pāṇātipātā paṭivirato... nihita-daṇḍo nihita-sattho laj्ji dayāpanno sabba-pāṇa-bhūta-hitānukampī viharatīti* | ... *adinnādānaṃ pahāya adinnādānā paṭivirato... dinnādāyī dinna-pāṭikāṅkhī athenena suci-bhūtena attanā viharatīti*. See M. Walshe, *Thus Have I Heard*, The Long Discourses of the Buddha, London 1987, pp. 68, 99f.: 'Abandoning the taking of life, he dwells refraining from taking life, without stick or sword, scrupulous, compassionate, trembling for the welfare of all living beings... Abandoning the taking of what is not given, ... awaiting what is given, without stealing.' – It is noteworthy that in this place, with reference to the second *śīla*, EĀ includes the concept of generosity, being a useful hint relevant to the question of the EĀ school affiliation.

17 *Ibid.*: *musā-vādaṃ pahāya musā-vādā paṭivirato... sacca-vādī sacca-sandho... avisamvādako lokassāti* | Walshe 1987, *ibid.*: 'Abandoning false speech,... dwells refraining from false speech, a truth-speaker, one to be relied on,... not a deceiver of the world.' – At Hayashi, p. 205, the second kind of skilful means is omitted.

skilful means of someone] in quest of complete security [in regard to] one's life...

What is [the skilful means of someone] in quest of complete security c) [in regard to] one's property that is inevitably insecure? As for [this kind of skilful means, it is spoken of] when a son or daughter of good family, as long as life lasts, is always intent upon generosity towards śramaṇas, brahmin [ascetics] and all those living in poverty, giving food to those who require it, providing broth¹⁸ to those who need it, [providing] robes¹⁹, food, lodging, medicine for treating the sick²⁰, accommodation and a place to live [either in] a city [or in] a suburb; [when he or she, as long as life lasts,] supplies indeed everything that is needed. Suchlike is [the skilful means of someone] in quest of complete security [in regard to] one's property that is inevitably insecure. It is, bhikṣus, by dint of these [three kinds of skilful means] that one aspires to the three [kinds of] complete security [in regard to] the three [kinds of] inevitable insecurity just mentioned. – Then the Exalted One uttered the following verses:

Knowing that one's body is inevitably insecure and that,
Of course, the same holds true of one's life, and that
One's property is subject to wastage, one should aspire
To complete security. It is extremely difficult to obtain a
Human body; before long one's life comes to an
End and the fate of one's property will be destruction.

[So] one [should] happily be intent upon generosity. –

After listening to the Buddha's words, the bhikṣus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.²¹

18 For 漿 Hayashi reads 漿 (encouragement).

19 Cf. BSR 18, 2 (2001), p. 219, n. 5.

20 *Ibid.*, n. 6.

21 Two places in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra suggest that the present EĀ *sūtra* might have been their source:

a) *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa II*, Sanskrit MS of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa preserved at the Potala Palace, transliterated by the Taisho University 'Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature', Tokyo 2004, p. 172: *asārāt sārādānābhīnirhṛtaḥ kāyajīvitabhogapratilambhaḥ...* b) *Ibid.*, p. 176: *yasya dāyakasya dānapater yādṛśī ta-thāgate dakṣiṇīyasamjñā tādrśī nagaradaridre nirnānātvena samā mahākaruṇācittena vipākāpratīkāṃkṣanatayā parityāgaḥ...*

See *The Teaching of Vimalakīrti*, from the French translation by Étienne Lamotte, rendered into English by Sara Boin, PTS 1976, repr. 1994, pp. 108, 112: '(the offering of the giving of the Law consists of)... the gains of body, life

Addendum to EĀ XXVI, XXVII

As for the narrative of Nayātikrama and Dharmaruci, alias Sumati and Mati, in BSR 16, 2 (1999), pp. 207-14, and BSR 17, 1 (2000), pp. 39-47, see D. Schlingloff who extensively deals with the topic in Buddhist art in his *Ajanta – Handbuch der Malereien / Handbook of the Paintings, Erzählende Wandmalereien / Narrative Wall Paintings*, 3 vols., Wiesbaden 2000 – vol. 1, No. 72: Sumati, pp. 407-14.

and riches (*kāyajīvitabhogalābha*) resulting from the action of taking for the substantial that which is not substantial (*asāre sārōpādānam*)... The giver (*dāyaka*) who bestows his gifts on the poor of the town (*nagaradaridra*) while thinking that they are as worthy of offerings (*dakṣiṇīya*) as the Tathāgata, the giver who gives to all without making distinctions (*asaṃbhinnam*), impartially (*samacittena*), with great goodwill (*mahāmaitrī*), great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), and without expecting any reward (*vipākaniḥsprha*), this giver, say I, fully performs the offering of the giving of the Law (*dharmayajñaṃ paripūrayati*).¹ See also R.A.F. Thurman, *The Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti*, University Park & London 1976, p. 40 f.: a) '(The Dharma-sacrifice consists) of the gain of body, health, and wealth, consummated by the extraction of essence from the essenceless... b) The giver who makes gifts to the lowliest poor of the city, considering them as worthy of offering as the Tathāgata himself, the giver who gives without any discrimination, impartially, with no expectation of reward, and with great love – this giver, I say, totally fulfills the Dharma-sacrifice.' – See also Thurman's n. 34 on p. 122: '... The three indestructibles are infinite body, endless life, and boundless wealth... the body, health, and wealth here referred to are not mundane in nature, but refer to the true body, etc., of the Buddha.'

The above second passage of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra might have been inspired by the third kind of skilful means of the EĀ sūtra, consisting of generosity equally practised towards ascetics and 'all those living in poverty'.

~ REVIEW ARTICLE ~

NOMINAL PERSONS AND THE SOUND
OF THEIR HANDS CLAPPING¹

KARMA PHUNTSO

The butter tea was ready. It was specially prepared for this occasion by my room teacher (*shag rgan*). A senior Geshe (*dge bshes*) accompanied me to the abbot's residence. As we entered, I made three full prostrations (*brkyangs phyag*), offered a silk scarf (*kha dar*) and kneeled as instructed while the Geshe presented me to the abbot with the flask of tea. Momentarily, the abbot's attendant served the tea to all three of us in small china cups. I was not supposed to sip it but gulp it down at once. It almost burnt my tongue and throat. The abbot asked me few questions, to which the Geshe replied on my behalf. The abbot was particularly pleased to have a postulant from Bhutan, a country poorly represented in Geluk (*dge lugs*) monasteries. With no physical or mental unfitness to bar me from the holy community, he gave his blessings for my admission to the Jay College of Sera Monastery².

George Dreyfus's *The Sound of Two Hands Clapping* gives a vivid and extensive account and analysis of the education that follows the initiation I have undergone like many tens of thousands

¹ *The Sound of Two Hands Clapping*. The Education of a Tibetan Buddhist Monk. George B.J. Dreyfus. University of California Press, Berkeley 2003. xv, 445 pp. Hb £40/\$60. ISBN 0-520-23259-3. Pb £17.95/\$24.95. ISBN 0-520-23260-7.

Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy. Tsongkhapa's Quest for the Middle Way. Thupten Jinpa. RoutledgeCurzon, London 2002. 248 pp. £45. ISBN 0-7007-1279-8.

The two books relate to Geluk monastic education, the first is concerned with pedagogy and educational practices, the second with Madhyamaka, the most important content of such education.

² The Sera Monastery in exile is located in Byllakuppe, two hours' drive west of the city of Mysore, South India.

of Gelukpa monks. Interweaving his rich personal experience with the penetrative analysis of an established academic in his field, the author presents a thoroughgoing study of Tibetan monastic education, particularly in the Geluk tradition, mixed with a saga of his own spiritual and educational journey in that tradition. An impressive work, Dreyfus's *The Sound of Two Hands Clapping* reveals the formalities, modalities, strengths, weaknesses, challenges and prospects of the scholastic training prevalent in the major seats of the Geluk school. It captures the aspirations, occupations, lifestyle and achievements of monks in Geluk scholastic centres and his personal quest for Buddhist scholarship in such a milieu.

Dreyfus's odyssey culminated in the highest degree of academic honour the Geluk tradition offers, making Dreyfus, also known as Geshe Sangay Samdrup, the first Western person to obtain a traditional Geshe title. This book, as he rightfully claims (p.5), treats the subject both from within and without, integrating rich personal experience with the academic skill of analytical and comparative thinking. It combines the criticality and inquisitiveness of an enquirer outside the tradition with the in-depth understanding and familiarity of a member within the tradition.

He starts by giving a comprehensive history of the Tibetan monastic and scholastic tradition and the organisation and maintenance of monastic institutions, and the moving account of how his own membership began. He leads the reader on an intellectual journey into the long and arduous system of Tibetan education, for which the Geluk school in particular is well known. Discussing the religious, pedagogical, social and political strands of the educational process culminating in the degree of Geshe and, finally, the dynamics of change with which it is confronted in a globalised world and scattered diaspora, Dreyfus's work is aimed at portraying a complete and clear picture of the Tibetan monastic education. No-one so far has undertaken such a project and only a few such as this author have the knowledge and means to do it successfully.

Dreyfus's account, as he duly reminds us, is focused on the three seats of the Geluk tradition, which are debating institutions

(*rtsod grwa*) run in the style of corporates. Apart from minor reforms, the seats in India have retained the traditional form of administrative, social and pedagogical practices. The Nyingma (*nying ma*) monastic college at Namdrolling³, which Dreyfus chose to represent the commentarial institutions (*bshad grwa*), is however a modern establishment styled on the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath. It is truly the best centre for an all round Tibetan Buddhist education focusing on the Nyingma tradition but, except for its pedagogical practice, it is run like a boarding school and thus does not reflect the settings of a traditional commentarial institution. Like the thriving centres at Serta and Yachen in Tibet today, most institutions belonging to the commentarial tradition consisted of unstructured shanties built by independent disciples and devotees encamped around a charismatic lama and lacked a proper administrative and curricular organisation. Thus, the monastic centres discussed here do not represent the set-up of and the lifestyle and education in most Tibetan monasteries, much less all.

In the course of his explanation of the Tibetan monastic politics and the religious education imparted therein, Dreyfus exposes for us a number of underlying assumptions about Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. In particular, he targets the 'virtual' image people of the West have of Tibetan monasteries as sanctuaries of peace and tranquillity filled with compassionate and enlightened souls. Far from being islands of peace and spirituality that most outsiders imagine, he tells us that they are 'oceans housing all kinds of fishes' (p.38). He shows us their human side with its shortcomings (gun culture, p.55, punk monks, p.38, corporal punishment, p.58, materialism, pp.58, 256, etc.) despite the rigorous religious training, which involves much hardship and austere living. Dreyfus even compares the severe discipline of the monasteries to an army boot camp training. This naturally leaves the reader wondering why the means and the end do not meet. Why do Tibetan monasteries, notwithstanding the intensive training in one of the world's most pacifist and non-materialistic civilisations, have a significant

³ The college officially known as Ngagyur Nyingma Institute is part of Namdrolling, the largest Nyingma monastery in exile.

number of bellicose and materialist monks? My teachers told me that the monks of Darge monastery in Kham were almost all armed with guns, as were the gangster monks (*ldab ldob*) in the three seats in Central Tibet⁴. It is not at all rare to come across rows and fights in the big monasteries. I have myself witnessed dozens of bloody confrontations between monks during my eleven years at Sera and Namdrolling, in strong contrast to merely two instances of shoving in rowdy bops during six years at Oxford. Tibetan history also contains numerous episodes of large-scale monastic violence.

Dreyfus, like Goldstein, explains such ills as unfortunate elements concomitant with 'mass monasticism'⁵. They are by-products of being 'the big ocean'; to give the common Tibetan religious idiom, the *dge 'dun 'dus pa rgya mtsho*. However, one may also add to this the inefficiency in the methods of education to civilise the students. The educational curricula and pedagogic techniques, particularly in the first few years of training in the main Geluk centres, are very professional and technical in nature rather than practical and liberal. Although the topics studied mostly consist of serious Buddhist metaphysics and soteriology, they are taught in a highly theoretical and pedantic style and are largely an extrovert art of academic learning rather than a religious training internalised to tame the mind and improve one's personality, or an education to broaden the perspectives of the pupil.

Geluk monks, as Dreyfus points out, spend years in the monasteries without even knowing what precepts they are supposed to observe (p.114). It is not rare to find a monk running into his fourth year in a Geluk monastery still not knowing what the ten virtuous and ten non-virtuous actions are. Similarly, in many non-Geluk monasteries such as the Dratshang (*grwa tshang*) of Namdrolling and Central Monk Body of Bhutan, monks have to devote almost all their time to liturgical training and duties so that

⁴ Personal communication with Khempo Pema Sherab, 1995.

⁵ Goldstein, 'The Revival of Monastic Life in Drepung' in M. Goldstein and M. Kapstein, *Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet: Religious Revival and Cultural Identity*, Berkeley 1998, pp.18-19.

they seldom have the opportunity and means to learn and practise the Buddhism of principles and values. Many do not even know the most fundamental of Buddhist concepts and values. Thus, most monasteries hardly succeed in imparting to their monks a value education and a philosophical and moral training such as the one classically exemplified in the sequential cultivation of three kinds of discriminative knowledge (*shes rab rnam gsum*).

In Part II, Dreyfus studies the early educational practices and curricula in the monastic centres assessing the roles of literacy and memorisation. He looks into what constitutes literacy and how it is obtained and utilised in Tibet. He also gives a vivid picture of the memorisation exercises, underlying their importance in traditional education and the benefits he has personally reaped from adopting them (pp.96-7). Highlighting the vocality of Tibetan monastic education, here again, Dreyfus's account destroys the Western imagination of Tibetan monasteries as oases of quiet and peace. He shows how they are full of a cacophony of sounds from memorisation drills, ritual chanting, monastic music and the clapping of hands, thudding of feet and the roars and screams coming from the debate courtyards.

Dreyfus then discusses the monastic curriculum and the roles of commentary, interpretation, authority, oral transmission, meditation and their interrelationship in Tibetan Buddhist scholarship. He provides a clear survey of the scholastic curriculum in the major seats of the Geluk tradition, presenting both its strengths and weaknesses. His clarification on the excesses of *yig'ha* manuals in the Gelukpa curriculum is particularly interesting given the qualms about it among non-Geluk Tibetan scholars and Western academics. However, the curriculum at Namdrolling, contrary to Dreyfus's claim, is not centred on the collection of thirteen texts of mKhan po gZhan dga', who he also confuses with gZhan phan mTha' yas, the founder of Srīsiṅha College at rDzogs chen (p.148). Of the thirteen texts associated with mKhan po gZhan dga', the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is not in the curriculum, nor is Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* included in the list. Thus, texts within gZhan dga's collection do not constitute even one third of the volume of the curriculum of Namdrolling's college. Curricula

at rDzong gsar and rDzogs chen monastic colleges, however, are said to have been centred on the thirteen texts.

Another comparison that can be made between the two traditions, which Dreyfus does not undertake in detail but which is very interesting and educationally significant, concerns moral guidance, which does not form part of the monastic curriculum *per se*. It is often given before, after or outside the structured curricular lessons. In the Geluk monasteries, such guidance focuses on how to cherish one's own tradition, to show commitment to one's system and to serve one's monastery. Membership in the monastery is taught to be seen as a privileged status and service to the monastery as a noble deed. This inculcates a strong sense of attachment and belonging to the monastery.

Like the answer Dreyfus received to his queries about meditation (p.169), my teachers, who were leading Geshes in Sera, warned me that undertaking meditation with the hope of gaining enlightenment in our degenerate age is too ambitious. Were one to go and stay like Milarepa in the snows, one might only freeze to death. The prudent thing to do now is to study in the monastery, contribute to its communal success and pray to reach enlightenment when Maitreya comes to save the world. Such advice deeply influences the students, making them both attached to the monastery and cordial and committed members. I remember one new monk in Sera gazing at the three-thousand strong assembly from the corner of the hall and remarking, 'What a great fortune to be sitting with this holy congregation!' It is primarily such admiration of their monastic community that has helped Gelukpa monasteries to thrive socially and economically. Some monks work as vendors for many years to throw a good party for the whole monastery, while others sacrifice their whole life for the monastery engaging in some drudgery. The Geluk monks are particularly well-known for conducting their public relations with much civility.

In contrast, non-Gelukpas are less occupied with the success of their monastic communities. At every session in commentarial colleges such as the one at Namdrolling, moral guidance is given routinely before the curricular lessons in the form of preliminaries

known as *kun slong kun spyod kyi rims pa*, the procedure of intention and behaviour. Students are reminded of what intentions and behaviours they should avoid and what they should cultivate in pursuit of the Dharma in general and for the lesson in particular. The length and style vary from teacher to teacher but the students are always reminded to generate *bodhicitta* and frequently to reflect on the four points of mind turning (*blo ldog rnam pa bzhi*): the rarity and preciousness of humanhood, the impermanence of life, the flaws of Saṃsāra and the infallibility of karma.

Monks are also frequently told how important it is to internalise the Buddhist doctrine through practice and to meditate on it after learning it theoretically. In stark contrast to the Geluk attitude mentioned above, the Nyingmapas believe that drastic spiritual developments are possible even today and claim that rDzogs chen teachings have become more effective in the degenerate age so that Buddhahood is obtainable even in one lifetime. Thus, all worldly pursuits are discouraged and meditation taught to be the most important undertaking after scholastic training. Such exhortations instil in the students a strong inclination for unworldly spiritual goals, giving rise to a great number of practitioners. However, as a consequence Nyingma monks tend to be socially inept and their monasteries are run very poorly with much less solidarity and cohesion than the Gelukpas.

Thus, the advice and admonitions received as an adjunct to the actual curricular teachings and the values and achievements idealised in their communities play a major role in shaping their personalities and outlooks. Although the contents of the curricula in Gelukpa and Nyingma generally are not very different, there is certainly an ideological gap between the two, resulting from the difference in these kinds of approaches and priorities.

Chapters 10, 11 and 12 form the crux of *The Sound of Two Hands Clapping*. Dreyfus gives an elaborate account of the nature of Tibetan debate and its formulation in the greater context of Indian and Western forms of logic and dialectics. Discussing the procedures and rules of debate, he depicts the ritual that Tibetan debate is, with its theatrical physical conduct and verbal exchanges, which often escalate into a spectacle involving much ag-

gression and abuse, and occasionally blows. He explores the study and teaching of debate through the Collected Topics and its subsequent role in and relationship with the study of subjects such as epistemology and Madhyamaka. An account of the long Geluk educational process is unfolded, interwoven with the art of debate which is its main thread.

Dreyfus's exposition is thorough and captivating, except perhaps for a rather simplistic remark that Geshe is the highest degree awarded by Tibetan Buddhist monastic universities/institutions (pp.2, 254). Although there is some truth in it, it simplifies the complexity of Tibetan educational systems, which his book seeks to unravel and does so successfully. There is no one common standard for degrees in Tibet and Geshe, as an abbreviation of *dge ba'i bshes gnyun* (Sanskrit: *kalyānamitra*) as he notes (p.254), does not always refer to a degree. It is often used as a title, such as the titles of Lopen (*slob dpon*) and Khenpo (*mkhan po*). Moreover, the Geshe title in Geluk monasteries is sometimes conferred on people with no proper academic credentials, as suggested by the pejorative epithet Tongo Geshe (*gtong sgo dge bshes*) or Party Geshe. Dreyfus passes over this in silence but there is a significant number of Geshe titles given to candidates who go through a symbolic exam and throw a party for the monastery.

In the final chapter of Part II, Dreyfus investigates whether Tibetan debate is merely a pedagogical exercise or constitutes critical enquiry. Maintaining the two cases to be a matter of personal opinion and pedagogical style, he argues that some Geluk scholars consider debate merely as a mnemonic tool and intellectual exercise to internalise pre-given truths. Geshe Rabten is portrayed as a teacher of this category who believed in debate and, for that matter, any educational enterprise as instruments to internalise rather than enquire, and to reiterate rather than reveal. On the other hand, Geshe Nyima, the scholar who had to hold his right eyelid with his finger, is seen as an epitome of the latter type who advocated a degree of Socratic enquiry. Gen Nyima, Dreyfus tells us, excelled in the art of questioning and accepted no answer as final. He rejected absolute views and kept 'the pragmatic dimension of the inquiry in sight' (p.288).

Dreyfus continues the discussion of the role of critical thinking and the room for rationality in Geluk monasteries in Part III of his book. He first assesses the role of rational enquiry in Tibetan monasteries, placing it in the greater context of Tibetan world view and juxtaposing reason and rationality with popular cultures. From the many popular beliefs, the author elaborates on spirit worship, a practice that is deeply engrained in Tibetan society. Both here and elsewhere⁶, Dreyfus poignantly narrates the controversy surrounding the cult of Shuk-den (*shugs ldan*), which has divided the Gelukpa community and resulted in the ruthless murder of one of his teachers. Describing this dispute, in which Tibetan virtuosi of the highest order such as the Dalai Lama and his teacher were involved, Dreyfus remarks that Tibetan scholars saw no conflict between rationality and belief in spirits and many things scientifically unproven. He concludes that Tibetan reason and rationality are thus deeply embedded in their order of the world and culture. He could perhaps have said a little more on how in fact the Tibetans use their reason and rationality to support such beliefs and world order, as they do to prove previous and next lives.

Next, the author explores the limit of rationality in Tibetan monasteries and the constraints imposed internally by the rigidity of scholasticism and externally by orthodoxy influenced by socio-political concerns. He shows how Tibetan scholasticism is progressive in that it evolves through re-interpretation and re-appropriation, but only within the limits set by orthodoxy. Debate and enquiry are constrained by social and political factors. He cites the case of Gedun Choephel (pp.284, 314), the maverick Geluk scholar, and Gen Nyima and Palden Drakpa to illustrate this grip of orthodoxy. Dreyfus concludes by giving a brief overview of his study of Tibetan scholasticism and goes into an account of changes taking place in the scholastic centres driven by both globalising trends and socio-economic factors. He also recounts his departure from the monasteries and his experience at university where he missed debate but broadened his knowledge

⁶ Dreyfus, 'The Shuk-den Affair: History and Nature of a Quarrel', *JIAS*21/2, 1998, pp.227-70.

of Tibetan Buddhism through exposure to other traditions. The book ends with sixty pages of very informative endnotes, bibliography and an index but has numerous typographical errors in the Tibetan transliteration (pp.57, 59, 65, 83, 84, etc.).

The Sound of Two Hands Clapping is certainly a great achievement and a compelling read and Dreyfus, as always, treats his subject with much passion and rigour. A personal story intertwined with an intellectual journey into one of the world's most exotic educational traditions, the book is both a unique and a significant contribution to the field of Tibetan studies. Dreyfus may have failed to be a Geluk protégé of his teachers (p.331), but he has certainly succeeded in revealing their life and wisdom and explaining the intricacies and complexities of their culture with a remarkable zest. This book is indispensable for those wishing to understand Tibetan scholasticism in general and the art of learning by clapping two hands in particular.

* * *

While George Dreyfus is the first Western Geshe, Jinpa is the first traditional Geshe Lharampa (*dge bshes lha rams pa*) to obtain a doctorate from a famous Western academic establishment. Jinpa was a star scholar of Gaden monastery even before he became the personal interpreter for the Dalai Lama, a role that earned him a high reputation. At the end of Jinpa's final exam, a prominent Geshe of Gaden is said to have taken off his hat and made a wish publicly that Gaden be filled by personalities like Jinpa (to which one may also add that later, when Jinpa renounced his monkhood and married his wife, some witty monks of Gaden, with playful irony, remarked that the wish of the old Geshe never come true, lest Gaden would have no monks left).

Jinpa's illustrious career continued with his study at Cambridge University, which culminated in his doctoral degree. *Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy* is a revised version of his doctoral dissertation entitled 'Self, Persons and Madhyamaka

⁷ See also his other major work, *Recognizing Reality, Dharmakirti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations*, Albany 1997.

Dialectics: A Study of Tsongkhapa's Middle Way Philosophy'. Combining his profound understanding of Tsongkhapa's thought, which he obtained through his monastic training in Tsongkhapa's writings as 'a living tradition', and his extensive comprehension of philosophical literature, which he gained later, Jinpa presents a lucid and penetrating exposition of some selected topics of Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka thought. Thus, he integrates the two approaches of what he calls his 'native's point of view' and 'contemporary philosopher's point of view' (pp2-3) in reconstructing and reformulating Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka theories in a contemporary philosophical language.

The Introduction and Chapter I discuss the historical backdrop and context for development of Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka theories, as well as the textual context and the methodology for Jinpa's re-appropriation and articulation of them. He emphasises that much of the time, he 'listens to Tsongkhapa' (pp.2, 15) and lets Tsongkhapa speak through 'his own voice' (p.5) uncluttered by later scholastic literature, which has dominated the Geluk study of Madhyamaka both in the traditional monasteries and the West, or with too much digression into what Tsongkhapa's critics have to say. He chooses to undertake a holistic reading of Tsongkhapa by seeking the intended meaning and overall cohesion and consistency in Tsongkhapa's philosophical enterprise.

A very intriguing observation Jinpa makes in this regard is his distinction of Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka vis-à-vis Geluk Madhyamaka (p.5). It is particularly interesting in that it comes from someone of Jinpa's background and authority. The traditional Geluk scholars would reject such a distinction for it implies divergences between them and the founder, quite against their claim and belief. It is all the more significant because non-Gelukpa authors such as Mipham have also made a similar division between Tsongkhapa and a few other Gelukpas such as lCang sija on the one hand and the mainstream Gelukpas on the other with regard to their ultimate understanding of Emptiness. One Nyingma mKhan po, brTson 'grus Phun tshogs, who also received training at Sera, went so far as to brand the mainstream Gelukpas as Neo-Gelukpas who have discarded Tsongkhapa's

thoughts and who deceive the naïve with self-invented false reasoning⁸.

Another assertion that Jinpa makes, which begs further explanation, pertains to the portrayal of Tsongkhapa as a great/foremost 'reformer' (pp.1, 12), although not a revolutionary (p. 12). Many authors on the Geluk tradition seem to indulge in using this epithet for Tsongkhapa⁹ while others tend to be cautious. Still others disapprove of its use and have argued against it¹⁰. The problem is partly due to the linguistic gap. There is no Tibetan equivalent for the English terms 'reform' or 'reformer'. Applications of such terms thus undoubtedly risk arbitrary imposition of an *emic* term across cultures as though it were *etic*. Tsongkhapa, truly an eminent luminary of Tibet, can rightly be attributed with regeneration and revitalisation (which Jinpa emphatically does) for the contributions he made and the changes he brought to Buddhism in Tibet. But on what grounds can we call Tsongkhapa a reformer while many other masters such as Milarepa, Klong che pa, Dol po pa, etc., are not? *Shing rta'i srol 'byed cher mo*, the concept which Jinpa refers to, is itself of very loose application varying from context to context and people to people.

The rest of Chapter I spans the qualms Tsongkhapa had about the Madhyamaka theories prevalent during his day, and how he arrived at his own understanding and interpretation of 'the perfect middle way'. Tsongkhapa, Jinpa says, was first and foremost concerned with a lack of analytical and philosophical rigour in Tibetan thinking. Jinpa depicts a picture of pre-Tsongkhapa Madhyamaka scholarship in Tibet as being marred by a philosophical

⁸ mKhan po brTson 'grus Phun tshogs, *Sher phyin 'chad pa'i sngro n 'gro*, Byllakuppe 1996, p.2: Blo bzang grags pa'i dgongs pa rtsa ltar dor // rang bzos ltar snang ngs pa'i 'phrul 'khor gyis // byis pa 'drid pa dge ldan gsar pa'i gzhung 'gzur gnas blo ldan su yis yid rton 'os //

⁹ See for instance A. Wayman (tr.) *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real: Buddhist Meditation and the Middle View*, New York 1978, p.8.

¹⁰ See, for instance, Leonard van der Kuijp, *Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology: from the eleventh to the thirteenth century*, Alt- und neu-indische Studien 26, Wiesbaden 1983, pp.24-5.

naivety derived from a literal reading of Madhyamaka literature and by an anti-rationalism inspired by an epistemological scepticism and tantric mysticism. Jinpa contrasts Tsongkhapa's highly philosophical and rational approach to this existing trend of his precursors, whom he criticises.

There is certainly no denying that Tsongkhapa excelled in the art of rational and critical enquiry and undertook his Madhyamaka analysis with much philosophical rigour. It is also true that he rightly accused some opponents, particularly practitioners and meditators, of insufficient rationalisation and of their inclination towards non-analytical quietist meditation. However, would it be justified to tax the Mādhyamikas who preceded Tsongkhapa in general, including a great number of Sakya (*sa skya*), Kaḍyu (*bka' rgyud*) and Nyingma scholars, with a literal reading of Madhyamaka literature, philosophical naivety and anti-rationalism?¹¹ Would Tsongkhapa have described his opponents with such words?

What Tsongkhapa considers literal reading was to the early Tibetan Mādhyamikas direct reading of the texts without any paraphrastic qualifications such as 'intrinsically existent' or 'conventionally non-existent', which the Gelukpas profusely added. They did not see the need for such paraphrases in the context of Mādhyamika analysis. However, this does not turn them into scholars who stubbornly adhered to the literal meaning of the words without allowing any implied, contextual or figurative use of language. Furthermore, most of the early Mādhyamikas were also staunch rationalists, often conflating Candrakīrti's ontology and Dharmakīrti's epistemology and distancing themselves from Hwa shang's Quietist/Simultaneist tradition. The problem of the over-broad negation that Tsongkhapa accused them of implies their excessive use of deconstructive analysis rather than the lack of it. The denial of the validity of everyday experience and of any thesis in Mādhyamika analytical discourse, which these scholars underscored, is a conclusion reached through a rigorous philosophical

¹¹ See also Jinpa, 'Tsongkhapa's Qualms about Early Tibetan Interpretations of Madhyamaka Philosophy', *The Tibet Journal*, 24.2 (1999), pp.1-28.

and rational enquiry. Thus, to accuse them of being philosophically naïve and anti-rational is, to say the least, a little amiss.

Jinpa gives a succinct discussion of Tsongkhapa's deep concern about the no-thesis viewpoint and quietist trends and the consequent development of Tsongkhapa's own Madhyamaka thought, discussing its originality and the process through which Tsongkhapa arrived at it. The most crucial point of this process is of course Tsongkhapa's vision and consultation of Mañjuśrī, which Jinpa suggests could be seen as a methodological procedure. This mystical experience, for a tradition which claims the centrality of rationality and analytical acumen and disdains others for the lack of such, is ironically the milestone with which to define Tsongkhapa's novel understanding of Emptiness and bring about profound changes in his philosophical thought.

In Chapter II, Jinpa surveys Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka hermeneutics, giving a list of strategies he used in delineating the parameters of negation at the beginning of the chapter (p.38). The most original hermeneutic strategy Tsongkhapa and his followers formulated with much urgency and repetition is perhaps the identification of the Madhyamaka object of negation or negandum. Tsongkhapa accused his precursors of over-broad delimitation of Madhyamaka negandum and underscored its exact identification. The negandum of Madhyamaka reasoning, according to him, is limited to ultimately, hypostatically or intrinsically an existent entity (see Jinpa's Table 1). As a corollary, Tsongkhapa and his followers also stressed the application of qualifications such as 'ultimately' and 'hypostatically existent' to the negandum. These endeavours at narrowing the object of negation down to a reified construct and leaving the empirical phenomena unscathed by Madhyamaka analysis then tie up with his famous assertion of the validity of conventional reality. It is these points which the later Gelukpa critics, such as Go rams pa bSod nams Senge, Zi lung pa Śākya mChog ldan, 'Ju Mi pham rGya mtsho and A mdo ba dGe 'dun Chos 'phel, attacked, accusing the Gelukpas of restraining the thoroughgoing Madhyamaka dialectic and its spiritually therapeutic impact by diverting its deconstructive analysis to a hypostatized target isolated from our day-to-day empirical world.

Chapter III contains a discussion of the pan-Buddhist concept of No-self and Tsongkhapa's hermeneutic manoeuvres for integrating his rather heterodox assertion of the conventional self, which is the object of our instinctive thought 'I am'. Jinpa says (p.72) that Tsongkhapa, in contrast to the standard Buddhist view, adopts what might be called in modern Western philosophical terms a non-reductionist view. In the course of identifying the person and self that is rejected and maintained in Tsongkhapa's thought, Jinpa explains the nuances of the latter's distinction of person and selfhood into an eternal, unitary and autonomous self (*rtag gcig rang dbang can gyi bdag*), a self-sufficient substantial self (*rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod kyi bdag*), an intrinsically existent self (*ngo bo nyid kyus grub pa'i bdag*) and a conventional self (*tha snyad kyi bdag*). He only maintains the last category.

This is followed by a concise exposition of the five- and seven-fold deconstructive reasoning used by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti to refute the concept of self and an analysis of Tsongkhapa's concept of intrinsic nature. Jinpa's clarification is outstanding on Tsongkhapa's understanding of *rang mtshan* as unique particulars, unique properties and intrinsic nature (p.95), the last of which a Mādhyamika rejects according to Tsongkhapa, and the distinction of 'being intrinsic nature' and 'being existent by means of intrinsic nature'. Tsongkhapa uses the latter scheme particularly to harmonise rationally the general Madhyamaka denial of intrinsic nature and the paradoxical presentation of Emptiness as intrinsic nature in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XV/2.

Chapters IV and V deal with Tsongkhapa's radical assertion of conventional person or self, the mere 'I', and his criteria for conventional existence. Jinpa critically explores how Tsongkhapa, in the absence of an intrinsic person, which is annulled by Madhyamaka scrutiny, theorises a conventional self *qua* person that is the agent for all our moral actions and spiritual endeavours. No Buddhist, save perhaps the Vātsīputrīya personalists, would have argued so emphatically for the existence of self *qua* the object of I-consciousness. This position, which Jinpa calls conventional realism (pp.116, 168, 176), seems at least *prima facie* to go right to the heart of the nominalism which Buddhists generally adopted *apropos* of self and personhood. Moreover, by theorising

the conventional status of self and person and by probing into the status of conventional reality, isn't Tsongkhapa himself succumbing to an implicit reification and the essentialist tendency which he accused other Buddhists of espousing? Can his acclaimed nominalism and conventionalism (p.117) be sustained in the midst of his verification and objectification of the self that almost all Buddhists reject? In defining the self as a nominal construct, which is an atemporal generality separate from the aggregates, how accurate is Tsongkhapa's presentation of the worldly conventional view of self? An astute metaphysician might also argue about the compatibility of such a self with the empirical role a person plays as a moral agent. Jinpa's articulation of Tsongkhapa's thought is both stimulating and thought-provoking, arousing many questions such as these.

Questions can also be raised on Tsongkhapa's concept of convention and its degree of objectivity, but such would escape the purpose of this review. The crux of Tsongkhapa's conventional theory is of course his three criteria for what is conventionally existent (p.157). However, his definition is circular in that one must first establish what it is to be familiar with conventional cognition and agree on a valid conventional knowledge in order to understand what is conventional. Critics such as dGe 'dun Chos 'phel have also argued that this presupposes some form of homogenous and absolute conventional standard and authority among sentient beings, which is impossible¹². The mention of the ultimate analysis, which probes into the real nature of things, among the criteria for conventional existence also risks conflating the two perspectives of the ultimate and the conventional, a fault which Tsongkhapa accuses others of committing.

Jinpa further explains Tsongkhapa's nominalism through the metaphor of illusion and what may be called his scholastic interpretation of the metaphor in two ways. This is followed by a discussion of Tsongkhapa's procedures of avoiding the extremes of absolutism, nihilism and relativism and the soteriological dimen-

¹² See A mdo dGe 'dun Chos 'phel, *dGe 'dun chos 'phel gyi gsung rtsom II*, Lhasa 1994, pp.275-85.

sion of No-self and reasons pertaining to it. While proceeding with the rejection of relativism, Jinpa mentions that 'Tsongkhapa does not reject the reality *out there*' (p.175). This in a way succinctly summarises Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka ontology and his theory of self and personal identity. This also leaves readers, like his critics, with much disquiet and dissatisfaction. In singling out a hypostatic intrinsic nature as the only philosophical villain to be annihilated and in leaving the empirical world unscathed and indeed validated, and our ordinary sense of self and the world veritably confirmed, Tsongkhapa's description of things as nominal and fiction-like still eludes us and sounds like mere rhetoric.

Nonetheless, Jinpa succeeds in revealing Tsongkhapa's complex and abstruse standpoints with great clarity and acumen. This is a pioneering work on the topic of personal identity in Tibetan philosophy and, for all those interested in Tsongkhapa, it unravels the most intricate of the thoughts of that lofty figure of Tibet. It will be a long time before another Tibetan will explain his philosophical heritage with comparable insight and articulacy. My only disappointment is the book's price which puts it beyond the reach of many people, particularly in Asia. Yet, all in all, it is a remarkable work.

Karma Phuntsho

BOOK REVIEWS

Index to the Visuddhimagga. Compiled by Y Ousaka and M. Yamazaki. Pali Text Society, Oxford 2004. vi, 505 pp. £26.50. ISBN 0 86013 414 8.

Only a few months after the publication of their *Index to the Jātaka*, Professors Ousaka and Yamazaki have produced an index to the *Visuddhimagga*.

As Dr Cone makes clear in the preface, this is an index of the PTS edition as it stands, including its wrong readings and misprints, although a few unambiguous misprints have been corrected. For the most part, however, even obvious errors have not been rectified. The result of this is that a printing error such as *ādikusalānaṃ* (4, 28) is listed as such, instead of being listed as the two words *ādi* and *kusalānaṃ*.

As in the compilers' previous work, line numbers are shown by a superscript numeral after the page number, instead of following the *Critical Pāli Dictionary's* pattern of having a lower case numeral in a smaller font size. Occurrences of words in verses are not distinguished from their use in prose, so there are no examples of the strange addition of an asterisk to a page number, which was found in their earlier work.

Dr Cone hopes that this index will prove a valuable tool for anyone preparing a new edition of the *Visuddhimagga*. At the very least, the existence of the index and the electronic version of the *Visuddhimagga* upon which it is based will enable the PTS to offer a corrected reprint in due course with (dare we hope?) the paragraph numbers of the Harvard Oriental Series edition inserted. This would make cross-referencing between the two editions and Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli's translation immeasurably clearer.

Anyone wishing to make a corrected version, as opposed to a revised version, of *Visuddhimagga* will find that this index immediately draws their attention to anomalies. For example, the juxtaposition of *pavattitanāmarūpaṃ* and *pavattitanāmarūpaṃ*, occurring in close proximity (at 43, 2, 22, 30 and 413, 8 respectively), will show the need to check, and correct, the text.

Book Reviews

Usage of this index will very soon enable readers to appreciate more fully the compilers' achievement in producing this invaluable aid to the study of Buddhaghosa's masterpiece.

K.R. Norman

Dana: Giving and Getting in Pali Buddhism. Ellison Banks Findly. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 2003. xvi, 432 pp. Rs 495. ISBN 81-208-0287.

Findly draws together diverse material in this book to offer an in-depth study of a practice central to Theravāda Buddhism: the giving of food and other requisites to the monastic Sangha by lay people. This specific focus is underscored by her initial definition of the term *dāna* as 'donation' (p.xiii), which draws on the Latin parallel to the Pāli term rather than the more popular concepts of generosity and giving.

The book is divided into nine chapters. There is a good deal of overlap between them and some repetition. Broadly speaking, the first two focus on the socio-economic and religious context in which the Buddhist practice of *dāna* developed. The next four explore the dynamics of the donation itself, for example the relationship of interdependence between ordained and lay fostered by *dāna* on both material and soteriological levels. The main focus of the remaining chapters is the monastic Sangha: its attitude to property; its strategies for encouraging *dāna*; and lastly, 'The Renunciant as Facilitator: The Case of Ananda'.

Three important strands of exploration are woven together throughout the book: the Vedic antecedents to and parallels with *dāna* that were consciously exploited by the new Buddhist movement; the socio-economic context in which the practice of *dāna* developed; the place of *dāna* in the Dhamma, within the path towards liberation. I will take an example of each strand as illustration of the book's content.

The word *piṇḍa* (lit. lump of food, in early Buddhism, alms given as food), Findly suggests, entered Buddhism laden with 'Vedic baggage' (p.131), particularly its presence in the funeral and ancestral rites enacted prior to and after the death of a father to 'preserve lineage and augment family property' (p.132). Draw-

ing on research by David Knipe into the Vedic practice, she parallels this use – an offering to the dead for the benefit of the dead person as well as the donor – with its subtly transformed Buddhist use, ‘the transmutation of food into a new rebirth, not for himself (the *bhikkhu*) but for the donor’ (pp.135-6). Her implication is that the antecedent uses of the term played positively into the message the monastic Sangha wanted to convey: that food given to it benefited the giver soteriologically by creating the conditions for a better rebirth.

Findly maps a socio-economic context for the development of *dāna* that was characterised by the rise of the wealthy, middle class *gahapati* (householder), and a market-orientated culture in which the choice of both religion and objects of patronage were beginning to operate at the level of the individual rather than the family or community. She then looks at the guidelines of behaviour that eventually became the rule of discipline (Vinaya) for the Buddhist renunciant community through the lenses of this data. Her point is that Vinaya studies should not be done without taking into account the demands of this competitive environment, in which the support, and by extension the surplus wealth, of the laity had to be won and retained through good marketing techniques, if the survival of the movement was to be assured. It is not only rulings about clothing and external behaviour that she is thinking of, but also the early emphases on moderation (the Middle Way) and egalitarianism. Both, she argues, served to shape ‘a public etiquette conducive to donor expectations’ (p.34), the whole emerging as a way of ‘drawing donor attention to the worthiness of the recipient’ (p.35).

To pass to the last strand, the author identifies non-attachment as the point where the practice of *dāna* feeds into the soteriology inherent in the Dhamma. In what she terms a ‘brilliant move’ by the shapers of early Buddhism (p.194), wealth is not condemned – that would have alienated the very people the movement wanted to attract as donors – but attachment to wealth. And by offering itself as the ‘field’ through which non-attachment could be practised and the fruits anticipated, the monastic Sangha again secured its own survival. Findly uses the term ‘contract’ to define this relationship the donor ensures the viability of the on-going monastic Sangha through material support; the Sangha

offers itself in an act of compassion as the means through which lay people could work towards the uprooting of causes of suffering. Both sides ‘purchase’ something from each other.

The question that arose for me in reading this book was: how much of Findly’s material is new? Much of her sociological and historical material is taken from secondary sources, from authors such as Uma Chakravarti, Binayendra Chaudhury, George Erdosy, Richard Gombrich, S.C. Misra and Romila Thapar. This secondary material is fused with extensive references to the Pāli Canon and Vedic Sanskrit texts, drawn both from translations and from the Pāli and Sanskrit originals. For instance, Chapter 3 (Resources to Requisites: Gifts to the Gone Forth) has 342 end-notes, the majority of which contain unmediated references to Pāli and Sanskrit terms.

The conclusion I came to was that the strength of this book lies not so much in the groundbreaking nature of its content but in the thoroughness of the author’s treatment of her subject and in the way in which she combines, on the one hand, the sociological and the textual and, on the other, knowledge of the Theravāda Canon and Vedic Sanskrit texts. It is this combination that gives rise to the new.

Truly original work lies scattered throughout the book. On the evidence of the bibliography, the author has already re-worked some of this for specialist journals, for example why the term *arahant* is normally not applied to nuns in the Pāli texts (pp.226-31), and the important role of women as donors in the economic context of Early Buddhism (pp.58-80). Then there is the treatment of Ānanda at the end of the book. Drawing on and going beyond a 1978 doctoral thesis by Michael Freedman, Ānanda is presented as a facilitator of *dāna* through his warm interactions with lay people and also the ‘canon’s earliest critique of the *arahant* ideal’ (p.394) in that his evident *anukampā* (sympathy for others) and lack of selfhood are not adequate alone, within the Theravāda system, for him to attain Nibbāna.

There were points in this book when I expected the author to take a more discriminating attitude to the Pāli texts. For instance, the *Cakkavatti Sihanāda Sutta* of the Dīgha-nikāya is wrongly employed to prove that the prospects for society are dismal ‘where there are no donors’ and no generosity (p.197), in disregard of the

fact that the main focus of the sutta is what happens when the state fails in its duty towards the poor. At other points an over-literalist interpretation of the texts risks simplification. However, these instances are outweighed by a broadly judicious use of the texts and secondary sources.

I welcome this book because of the wealth of material it brings together on an important topic that has often been overlooked.

Elizabeth Harris
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Ordinary Images. Stanley Abe. University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2002. xxvi, 373 pp. \$65.00/£45.50. ISBN 0-226-00044-3.

Stanley Abe is already known as an established expert on East Asian Buddhist art with a particularly sharp eye for historiographical issues. But this book, an outstanding work of revisionist scholarship, will undoubtedly ensure that he becomes one of those authors who stamp their mark indelibly on their field within Buddhist Studies in such a way that all future researchers will have to be familiar with their writings.

The territory covered is itself a familiar one – the introduction of the Buddhist religion to China – and one might have thought that in the wake of the text-based scholarship of such giants as Erik Zürcher, to say nothing of great art historians such as Alexander Soper, there would be little chance of surprising us with a completely new perspective on the topic. Abe, however, has derived a great deal of benefit from recent archaeology, a science which has now put in our hands a much wider spread of evidence for early Chinese Buddhist material culture than was formerly provided by the relatively few highly regarded pieces of sculpture that were carried off from China to various locations overseas during the early twentieth century. This allows him consistently to challenge the rather narrow perspective of our textual sources which reflect, if not solely the view of the ruling elite, then at best the largely complementary outlook of those members of the Sangha whom the elite found to be congenial companions. At the

same time the range of his textual references shows that he is also prepared to incorporate research based on hitherto under-utilised material for the period, such as Taoist sources, rather than base his interpretations on material evidence alone. In fact, one of the main functions of his work is to question existing assumptions and hypotheses, and to stress just how much the new material evidence confronts us with phenomena that we never knew before and indeed have great difficulty in explaining.

To demonstrate how this project is carried out over the full span of almost half a millennium covered by the book would be rather a lengthy business. As an example, however, let us look at Abe's treatment of the very beginnings of some sort of Buddhist presence in Chinese material culture, a topic addressed in his second chapter (the first is effectively a short introduction to the work as a whole), entitled 'Small Beginnings'. Here right from the start the scholar has to deal not simply with a dearth of texts but also with considerable uncertainties as to their reliability. On pp. 13-14, for example, some researchers might prefer not to adduce the Scripture in Forty-two Sections as evidence for Chinese Buddhism in the second century CE, especially when reliable evidence for its existence only emerges two centuries later, and when an apparent second-century quotation from the text can be explained in other ways – as is done on p.83 of the anonymous article on the dating of this text reprinted in Zhang Mantao, ed., *Xiandai Fojiao xueshu congkan* II (Taipei 1979), pp.69-84. Similarly, in the annotation (p.320, n.9) to p.13, it may eventually turn out to be inappropriate to assume that in 166 CE it was the Yellow Emperor and Laozi who were being conjointly worshipped with the Buddha – as is done here apparently on the grounds that the two Chinese sages were linked more than three centuries earlier at the start of the dynasty – and perhaps rather better to write, as on p.14 with reference to the earlier joint worship of the Buddha in 65 CE, that the Chinese counterpart of the imported figure was 'Huang-Lao', i.e. literally 'Yellow-Old'. To judge from some of the overtones of the word 'yellow' during this era, one possible interpretation of this compound might be that the now divinised Laozi (an advance in status certainly well attested for the second century CE, as Anna Seidel showed in her 1969 EFEO

monograph) was regarded as a ruler over what had earlier been known as the Yellow Springs, the world of the dead.

This alternative analysis may be of some relevance to Abe's subsequent discussion of very early images of the Buddha that occur in funerary contexts, especially in what was then the south-west of China, present-day Sichuan. How Sichuan may have been in contact with the Buddhist world is something of a puzzle, though a trade route to India via Yunnan to the south had attracted attention earlier in the dynasty, as is well known from the *Shi ji*, 129, presented in English e.g. in Jeanette Mirsky, ed., *The Great Chinese Travelers* (Chicago 1964), pp.19-20. The same source (Mirsky, p.18), however, also points out that the Yuezhi people, who were instrumental in establishing the Kushan empire after migrating west from the borders of China, left behind some of their kin in the neighbourhood of present-day Xining, Gansu. They seem to have retained a somewhat separate identity even in the second century CE, to judge from the materials noted in Miyakawa Hisayuki, *Chūgoku shūkyōshi kenkyū* (Kyoto 1983), pp.117-18, and Rafe de Crespigny, *To Establish Peace I* (Canberra 1996), p.9, n.27, and could have been responsible for carrying trade and maybe new beliefs from the Kushan empire on to the south. Alternatively, some would see Buddha images as related to the arrival of coinage – thus for example Huiyi, 'Fo yu qian de yinyuan', *Fojiao wenhua*, 1993.1, pp.28-9. As an argument against this hypothesis it is certainly true to state that none of the Kushan coins bearing a Buddha image has been found in China, as Abe quite understandably points out (p.100). But startlingly enough, Chinese lead ingots bearing clumsy imitations of the Greek script of Bactrian (perhaps early Kushan) coins dating to a period covering the first century BCE to the first century CE equally certainly have been found, and are now published in Annette L. Juliano and Judith A. Lerner, *Monks and Merchants* (New York 2001), p.37. This discovery illustrates better than most examples the rather random state of our knowledge at this point in the development of Chinese archaeology, which remains as yet quite unsystematic, and the subsequent uncertainties of a situation in which an *argumentum ex silentio* is often the only one available.

In the light of such disadvantages, Abe's own preference is, commendably enough, to be cautious and to view the Buddha

images of Sichuan on the walls of tombs or on funerary objects known as 'money trees' simply as performing a rather generalised function, perhaps of an apotropaic nature, that may reflect little or no firsthand knowledge of the Buddhist religion at all. He is particularly hesitant to accept the recent hypothesis of Wu Hung who, in part as a result of the passages linking the two already noted above, sees the Buddha as substituting for Laozi in an originally aniconic Celestial Master form of proto-Taoism. Wu Hung's arguments, while subtle, certainly seem to assume a degree of unity in Sichuanese proto-Taoism in the second century CE that is rather undermined by Anna Seidel's work also alluded to above, in which the *Lao bianhua jing*, a prime piece of evidence for Laozi's divinisation, is shown to stem from another and evidently quite distinct Laozi worshipping group active in Sichuan at the same time as the early Celestial Masters. And Abe does stress that the 'money tree' objects show a confusing selection of alternative figures, primarily either a bear or the popular contemporary high goddess, the Queen Mother of the West, in slightly different positions. The Buddha image, it seems, equates in its position with the bear a mere guardian figure if ever there was one, since there are no high bear gods in China.

This may, however, be a slightly misleading way to look at the problem, if the aniconic alternative to the Queen Mother of the West was perhaps being represented either by an agent or by a foreign avatar. And Abe's observation (pp.47-8, 49) that the Buddha seems never to occur together with the Queen Mother of the West has a curious echo in an overlooked textual source making a distinction with regard to their different jurisdictions between the Queen and another figure, namely the well-known compilation by Zhang Hua (ed. Fan Ning) *Bowu zhi jiaozhu* 9 (Beijing 1980), p.104: 'Laozi says the ten thousand people all belong to the Queen Mother of the West; only the fates of kings, sages, true men, immortals, and men of the Way belong above to the Lord of the Nine Heavens.' If we wish to regard the bear as an agent of this more powerful figure, then there is certainly second century CE evidence that has been interpreted to mean that the envoy of the god of the dead, as Anna Seidel noted with regard to the identification made by Hayashi Minao cited on p.698 of her 1987 study of religion in Han tombs, may have an ursine

appearance. As for the Buddha as Lord of the Dead, in 1949, long before any archaeological evidence was uncovered, the Chinese historian Chen Yinke penned a note in his *Jinming gao congkao erbian* (Shanghai 1980), p.82, in which he interpreted a reference in *San Guo zhi* 12 (p.388 in the Beijing edition) as indicating that that was precisely the status of the Buddha for at least some ordinary believers of the third century CE. Though this evidence requires careful reconsideration, it does provisionally suggest that despite Abe's reservations, Wu Hung may at least be on the right track with his hypothesis, and that it might have some merit in a modified form.

Of course, Abe is in all likelihood more than fully justified in his caution at other points, as for example when he goes on in the same chapter to examine the apparently rather trivial Buddhas decorating the so-called *hunping* funerary jars from further east in China. His treatment in the subsequent chapters of the puzzling steles of fifth century northwest China, and of what has been seen as the 'Buddho-Taoist' art of the Northern Wei, certainly takes us into periods when at least some people, even if only a few monks, knew much more precisely what Buddhism was all about, and which do not entail quite the same degree of puzzlement when it comes to relating religion to material evidence. But by exploring some of the complexities involved in studying the 'Small Beginnings' of Chinese Buddhism, I hope I have indicated both the scale of the problems that Stanley Abe has taken on, and the outstanding value of his consistently careful and astute scholarship. Any future researchers who care to venture into this very challenging academic territory will most assuredly learn a very great deal from this volume, even should they not end up agreeing with its author at every single point.

T. H. Barrett
(SOAS)

~ Please note substantial changes from 2005 ~

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