

CONTENTS

Frontispiece

The Earliest Chinese Translations of Mahāyāna Buddhist Sūtras: Some Notes on the Works of Lokakṣema — <i>Paul Harrison</i>	135
A Note on the Concept of 'Rūpa' and the Origins of Buddhist Art — <i>Anupa Pande</i>	179
Two Buddhisms Reconsidered — <i>Charles S. Prebish</i>	187
Comments on 'Is Early Buddhism Atheistic?' by David J. Kalupahana — <i>Lal Mani Joshi</i>	207
Editorial Note	212
Ekottarāgama (XV) — <i>tr. Thích Huyền-Vi</i>	213
News and Notes	223
Obituaries: André Bareau; Jan Ergardt	225
Book Reviews	227

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THE EARLIEST CHINESE TRANSLATIONS OF MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHIST SŪTRAS:

SOME NOTES ON THE WORKS OF LOKAKṢEMA¹

Paul Harrison

INTRODUCTION

One of the most striking examples of intercultural influence in history is furnished by Buddhism, which, having originally sprung up in India, was transplanted to China, where it took root and flourished with remarkable vitality. More than anything else it was Buddhism which bridged the gap between these two great centres of Asian civilisation, and among the means by which it achieved this an important place must be assigned to the propagation in China of the religion's sacred writings. By the time it reached

¹ The following paper was first presented as a seminar in the Humanities Research Centre at Australian National University, Canberra, in October 1979, and was initially intended to announce a major research project on early Mahāyāna sūtra literature, with special reference to the works of Lokakṣema. In the years since then, the paper has circulated privately, but for a number of reasons the 'Lokakṣema Project' has progressed much more slowly than originally envisaged. Although a small number of books and articles related to it has been published, it is clear that the results of the project as a whole will not see the light of day for some time. In view of this I have accepted the suggestion of Mr Russell Webb, editor of *BSR*, to publish a lightly edited version of the original paper, since I believe that, while it is very much a preliminary survey, it contains much material of interest to those currently working in the field. Although some of this material has appeared in my article 'Who Gets to Ride in the Great Vehicle? Self-image and Identity Among the Followers of the Early Mahāyāna,' (*Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 10,1 (1987), pp. 67-89), the amount of overlap between the two papers is, I think, insufficient to detract from the usefulness of its publication here, as a kind of bibliographical progress report on the 'Lokakṣema Project,' with the original wording revised to take account of recent publications in the area and changes in my own thinking on various matters.

Frontispiece: the calligraphy in Sino-Vietnamese characters (Nôm) by Ven Thích Huyền-Vi reads:

*"There is no suffering and no cause
[of suffering]; no cessation [of suffering]
and no path [to the cessation of suffering].
There is no realization and no attainment,
because there is nothing to be attained."*

The seals engraved by Ven. Bhikkhu Dhamma-
vīro, Thailand, convey the same meaning as the
calligraphy.

China Buddhism had already produced an immense corpus of texts, and was to produce a great deal more. The task of translating all this material into Chinese was carried on century after century, with steadily increasing sophistication. The product of this long labour of scholarship and religious zeal, in the form of the various printed editions of the so-called Chinese Buddhist 'Canon' (Ta-tsang-ching 大藏經) is truly massive in its extent, and, given the poor survival rate of Buddhist literature in its country of origin, is also of great value, in that it preserves much that would otherwise have been lost for ever.

My concern in this paper is with the very beginnings of this process. We do not know exactly when and how Buddhism first arrived in China, although it is generally assumed that it did so around the first century of our era. For this early period of Chinese Buddhism the amount of historical evidence at our disposal is rather sparse,² but we do have some material relating to the latter half of the second century C.E., when the religion, which must initially have been confined to merchants, envoys and other foreigners resident in China, had acquired native converts in sufficient numbers to make the translation of its sacred texts into Chinese a worthwhile proposition. We know of about a dozen translators—a mixed group of Parthians, Sogdians, Indians and Indo-Scythians—who were working during the turbulent and bloody years preceding the final collapse of the Later Han dynasty in 220 C.E.; and, to our good fortune, some of their translations have survived. Although the leading figure among these early missionaries was undoubtedly the Parthian An Shih-kao 安世高, who arrived in Lo-yang in 148 and

2 For an evaluation of this evidence and a discussion of the early period see E. Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China* (Leiden 1959), pp. 18-43.

spent the next twenty or so years translating Mainstream Buddhist sūtras, the object of my attention in this paper will be the Indo-Scythian translator Chih Lou-chia-ch'an 支婁迦讖, whose name is usually Sanskritised as Lokakṣema (other reconstructions have been advanced, but there is insufficient space to go into the problem here). We know virtually nothing of this man's life. Originally a subject, we may assume, of the Kuṣāṇa Empire, Lokakṣema arrived in Lo-yang at the end of the reign of Emperor Huan 桓 (146-168), and is said to have produced his translations under Emperor Ling 靈 (168-189). The names of some of his collaborators have been preserved, along with a few details about the manner in which he went about his work; it is thus revealed that right from the beginning the translation of Buddhist texts into Chinese was a group effort. The number of translations attributed to Lokakṣema has swollen with the passage of time, but the oldest surviving and most reliable catalogue of sacred texts, the *Ch'u san tsang chi chi* 出三藏記集 (T 2145; hereafter *CSTCC*; completed ca. 515 by Seng-yu 僧祐), puts the total at fourteen. At least eight, perhaps nine, of them have come down to us; but of these only two have extant Sanskrit versions.

Whereas An Shih-kao worked solely on Mainstream Buddhist material, the sūtras which Lokakṣema translated all appear to have belonged to the Mahāyāna, and thus he is generally credited with the introduction of that strain of the religion into China. To be sure several other Mahāyāna sūtras translated at the end of the Han have survived, but our inability to date them any more accurately than this means that we must continue to regard Lokakṣema's extant translations as the earliest dateable literary evidence of the Mahāyāna.

In modern times there has been relatively little scholarly notice

taken of these literary relics of Later Han Buddhism, which were seen—not without some justice—as obscure and clumsy pioneer efforts, insufficiently faithful to their Indian originals, and easily passed over in favour of later and better translations of the same texts. It was Dr E. Zürcher who first drew attention to their full significance, in a paper entitled 'A New Look at the Earliest Chinese Buddhist Texts' which he delivered at the Leiden Symposium on State, Ideology and Justice in Early Imperial China, Sept. 1-5, 1975. In outlining the important results which could be expected from a close study of the translations of An Shih-kao, Lokakṣema and other foreign missionaries, Zürcher pointed out that it would be risky to attempt to draw conclusions concerning the characteristics of Han Buddhism on the basis of the doctrinal content of the texts, and concentrated instead on their linguistic aspects, which, in his view, are far from insignificant. For these translations were made by and for a semi-literate public, and were in most cases intended to be comprehensible when recited; the language in which they are composed is relatively free of *wen-yen* 文言 (Classical Literary Chinese) elements, and very close to the vernacular idiom of the time. On the basis of the linguistic and terminological peculiarities of surviving Han dynasty Buddhist texts Zürcher was able not only to confirm and expand upon findings in the field of Chinese historical linguistics, but also to advance certain hypotheses concerning the nature of Han Buddhism and the social milieu in which it functioned.³

3 The purely linguistic section of Zürcher's paper was published as 'Late Han Vernacular Elements in the Earliest Buddhist Translations,' *Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers Association* 12, 3 (Honolulu Oct. 1977), pp. 177-203. Most of the remainder has only recently appeared as 'A New Look at the Earliest Chinese Buddhist Texts' in K. Shinohara and G. Schopen, eds., *From Benares to Beijing: Essays on*

Zürcher's study was an invaluable contribution to the history of Buddhist literature, and I wish here to make full acknowledgement of the assistance and inspiration I have derived from it. The present paper, however, is somewhat different in scope and intention, being concerned exclusively with Lokakṣema's translations of Mahāyāna sūtras, and directed towards an eventual delineation of their content, doctrinal and otherwise, not so much for what that may tell us about the preoccupations of nascent Chinese Buddhism—although, as Zürcher has pointed out, there are indeed lessons to be learned in that regard—but rather for what it may tell us about the milieu in which the sūtras were composed in the first place.

Now, insofar as the origin and early development of Mahāyāna Buddhism have been matters of considerable speculation and debate, these archaic translations may, as that movement's oldest surviving documents, be expected to provide us with new material for discussion, and perhaps even with a few answers. One particularly bedevilled aspect of the whole problem is that of chronology: we have no clear idea of when the Mahāyāna arose, and the only basis we have for dating any given item from its enormous corpus of sūtra-literature is the date of its first translation into Chinese. Since we cannot assume a set lapse of time between the composition of a sūtra in Greater India and its appearance in China, when it comes to assigning a date to these texts and the developments they embody we are groping in the dark. For the same reason it cannot be supposed that because Lokakṣema's sūtras were the first to be translated into Chinese, they were also the first to be written. In fact their level of development, both in form and in content, shows

Buddhism and Chinese Religion in Honour of Prof. Jan Yün-hua (Oakville 1991), pp. 277-304.

that such is not the case—that the Mahāyāna reached China in full bloom, with perhaps several centuries of growth behind it, while the texts with which it made its initial impact there, far from being the first outpourings of the movement, represent a fairly advanced stage in a long literary tradition.⁴ What then, one may well ask, is the point of subjecting this material to close examination? In short, it is this: given the paucity of our resources for attempting a periodisation of this literature, these translations by Lokakṣema, despite all their inadequacies as translations, will at the very least give us some idea of what stage of development the Mahāyāna had reached by the middle of the second century C.E., what practices it had incorporated and what doctrines it was enunciating by that time. Further, the discovery of resemblances in form and content in other sūtras translated by the contemporaries and successors of Lokakṣema may enable us to determine certain internal relationships in this large and unwieldy body of materials, and to pinpoint doctrinal developments and shifts of emphasis. For such an investigation Lokakṣema's works constitute a convenient point of departure, and are thus well worth our consideration.⁵

4 For this reason I prefer to characterise most of these texts as 'Early Middle Mahāyāna.'

5 Another significant aspect of Lokakṣema's translations is a linguistic one. His works contain a large number of transliterated proper names, technical terms, etc., and although these have been cited extensively in research into the history of Chinese phonology by Karlgren and others, there has, to the best of my knowledge, been no attempt to make a thorough and systematic study of them with a view to proceeding in the other direction, i.e., to reconstructing the phonology of the original language of Lokakṣema's sūtras, which may well have been a Prakrit (a dialect of Sanskrit). In view of the fact that we are not sure what this original language was, while at the same time there is much disagreement over the sound system of Han Chinese, such research is likely to entail working from one unknown to another. Nevertheless, despite all the obscuring factors, some interesting results might emerge.

Any systematic examination of Lokakṣema's *oeuvre* must begin with the authentication of those translations currently attributed to him. Fortunately this has already been done by Zürcher (see most recently his 'A New Look at the Earliest Chinese Buddhist Texts,' pp. 298-300), with whose conclusions I am in substantial agreement. I differ only in believing that the archaic translation of the *Drumakinnararājapariprocchā*, which he maintains as a doubtful case of attribution, may be ascribed to Lokakṣema with few reservations; and that the ascription of the translations of the *Pratyutpannasamādhi* and the *Akṣobhyavyūha* to Lokakṣema ought to be qualified in some way (see below). There is of course always room for further work on this question; but a preliminary investigation yields a fairly solid corpus of nine works, which are listed and described below.

Although I have attempted to cite all the more important versions of the sūtras in question, the following notes on the texts translated by Lokakṣema are by no means intended to be a complete bibliography; for example, I have not given the Mongolian versions, nor, in most cases, the many Japanese translations (e.g., in the *Kokuyaku issaikyō*).

EXTANT TRANSLATIONS BY LOKAKṢEMA

- 1 *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (Abbreviation: *Aṣṭa*)
The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines

T 224 *Tao-hsing (pan-jo) ching* 道行(般若)經, 10 *chüan*

This is the only case of a work whose attribution to Lokakṣema is completely unproblematic. The unanimity of the Chinese Buddhist bibliographers in this regard goes right back to Tao-an 道安 (314-385), who unhesitatingly ascribed the text to the Indo-Scythian

master (see *CSTCC*, 6b7-27). Further, the text as we now have it gives us no cause to question the traditional attribution, or to suspect any major subsequent modifications: the style is homogeneous, the terminology employed is relatively uniform. Therefore T 224 may be used as a touchstone for determining the authenticity of all other works currently ascribed to Lokakṣema.

The colophon to the translation has been preserved in the *CSTCC* (47c4-9). It informs us that the translation was made (completed?) on October 26, 179 C.E.; that Lokakṣema worked on it together with the Indian *śramaṇa* Chu Fo-shuo 竺仏朔 (the variant Chu Shuo-fo is more common but, it seems to me, less likely), who had brought the text from India and who on that occasion recited the original (either from a manuscript or from memory); and that Lokakṣema's oral rendering in Chinese was taken down in writing by several Chinese assistants.

The *Aṣṭa*, a long work written entirely in prose, is one of the most important Mahāyāna sūtras. Now widely regarded as the oldest Prajñāpāramitā ('Perfection of Wisdom') text, on which all others are in one way or another based, it is itself the product of a long process of textual development and accretion.⁶ It is dated ca. 100 B.C.E. to 100 C.E. As the title suggests, the sūtra is devoted mainly to an exposition of the nature, the practical application, the advantages and implications of the perfection of wisdom. Although the other five perfections of the Mahāyāna—giving (*dāna*), morality (*śīla*), patient acceptance (*kṣānti*), vigour (*vīrya*) and meditation (*dhyāna*)—are also referred to, the emphasis is on wisdom (*prajñā*),

6 See, e.g., L. Schmithausen, "Textgeschichtliche Beobachtungen zum 1. Kapitel der *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*," in L. Lancaster and L.O. Gomez, eds, *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems: Studies in Honor of Edward Conze* (Berkeley 1979), pp. 35-80.

by which is meant that faculty which realises the true nature of phenomenal existence. This true nature is expressed above all by the word 'emptiness' (*śūnyatā*), a term which signifies the absence of essence or 'own-being' (*svabhāva*) in the objects of our experience; this is not to be confused with non-existence. Thus the true nature of reality is beyond expression, not amenable to intellectual apprehension and reification (although we constantly engage in this kind of activity), but it can be grasped by perfect wisdom, and when it is grasped in its fullness, we are awakened. Such is the essential message of the Prajñāpāramitā literature. However, like most Mahāyāna sūtras the *Aṣṭa* is no systematic treatise, and a wide range of topics and themes is dealt with in the text. Since the work is well known, there is little point in going into detail here; for a brief summary the reader is referred to E. Conze, *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature* (2nd ed., Tokyo: 1978), pp. 48-49. There is also an English translation from the Sanskrit by Conze, now badly in need of replacement: *The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and its Verse Summary* (2nd rev. ed., Bolinas 1975).

When we compare T 224 with later versions of the *Aṣṭa* we find that the contents of the sūtra have undergone considerable modification over the centuries, even though the broad outline has remained much the same. For example, the long story of the bodhisattva Sadāprarudita's search for the perfection of wisdom, which occurs towards the end of the Sanskrit text, is also present in T 224, albeit in a different form. Nowadays this is thought to be one of the latest accretions to the basic text.

The survival of so many different translations of the *Aṣṭa* has enabled scholars to plot its gradual evolution; see especially L. Lancaster, 'The Oldest Mahāyāna Sūtra: Its Significance for the

Study of Buddhist Development,' *The Eastern Buddhist* NS VIII, 1 (1975), pp. 30-41. In this study (and elsewhere) Lancaster attempted to throw light on the doctrinal development of the Mahāyāna by comparing Lokakṣema's and other early translations with later versions of the *Aṣṭa* and noting the relative occurrence of certain key doctrinal terms; in doing so he found that in its earlier forms the sūtra appeared to be much closer to the Mainstream position on various aspects of doctrine. Although such an approach yields significant results, it does rely heavily on an argument *ex silentio*, and should not be pursued without a preliminary study of the total content of all of Lokakṣema's translations. Further, the exact relationship of the first three Chinese versions of the *Aṣṭa*, which is still undetermined, has an important bearing on the problem.

OTHER EXTANT VERSIONS

CHINESE:

T 225 *Ta ming-tu ching* 大明度經, 6 *chüan*

The current attribution of this text to Chih Ch'ien 支謙 (active ca. 220-250) has been called into question; see L. Lancaster, 'The Chinese Translation of the AṢṬASĀHASRIKĀ-PRAJÑĀ-PĀRAMITĀ-SŪTRA Attributed to Chih Ch'ien,' *Monumenta Serica* XXVIII (1969), pp. 246-257.

T 226 *Mo-ho pan-jo ch'ao ching* 摩訶般若鈔經, 5 *chüan*

Attributed to T'an-mo-p'i 曇摩婢 (Dharmapriya?) and Chu Fo-nien 竺仏念, dated 382. However, the authorship and date of this translation are also in doubt.

T 227 *Mo-ho pan-jo po-lo-mi ching* 摩訶般若波羅蜜經, 10 *chüan*

Translated by Kumārajīva, 408.

T 220 *Ta pan-jo po-lo-mi-to ching* 大般若波羅蜜多經, 600 *chüan*.

Translated by Hsüan-tsang 玄奘 between the years 659 and 663, this massive compendium of Prajñāpāramitā texts includes two versions of the *Aṣṭa* (as Parts 4 & 5). The first, occupying *chüan* 538-55, represents a later form of the text, while the second (*chüan* 556-65) is based on an earlier form.

T 228 *Fo-mu ch'u-sheng san-fa-tsang pan-jo po-lo-mi-to ching* 仏母出生三法藏般若波羅蜜多經, 25 *chüan*

Translated by Shih-hu 施護, 985.

SANSKRIT AND TIBETAN versions are also in existence. For information on these, and on the various commentaries, translations and studies relating to the *Aṣṭa* see E. Conze, *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature*, pp. 46-53.

2 *Pratyutpannabuddhasaṃmukhāvasthitasamādhisūtra (PraS)*
The Samādhi of Direct Encounter with the Buddhas of the Present

T 418 *Pan-chou san-mei ching* 般舟三昧經, 3 *chüan*

The authorship of this work has been the subject of much debate. It is well established that Lokakṣema did indeed produce a Chinese version of the sūtra; it is the only other text apart from the *Aṣṭa* for which Tao-an definitely attributed a translation to him (all

the other ascriptions in Tao-an's catalogue were qualified with the phrase 'appears to be a translation by Lokakṣema'. Further, the CSTCC (48c9-16) has preserved an old colophon to a translation entitled *Pan-chou san-mei ching* which tells us that it was made (or consecrated?) on Oct. 26, 179 (the same date as that given for No. 1) at Lo-yang. The colophon is somewhat obscure, but the procedure it describes seems to have been the same as that adopted for the *Aṣṭa*. Chu Fo-shuo recited the original text; Lokakṣema translated it orally, producing, we may suppose, a fairly rough Chinese rendering; this was passed on to a Chinese assistant called Meng Fu 孟福, who converted it into passable Chinese; and then, from Meng Fu's dictation, the finished product was taken down in writing by another Chinese assistant called Chang Lien 張蓮. The question that arises is this: is the present *Pan-chou san-mei ching* the same as that described in the colophon and mentioned by Tao-an? The problem is complicated by the existence of two redactions of the text, Redaction A (which goes up to the middle of *p'in* IV only) being preserved in the Korean edition of the Chinese Tripitaka, Redaction B (which is complete) being found in the editions of the Sung, Yüan and Ming dynasties. An examination of the style and terminology of the text in both its redactions indicates that Redaction A is probably a fragment of Lokakṣema's original translation, while Redaction B represents a later revision of A, a revision which could well be the one which the abovementioned colophon tells us took place at Hsü-ch'ang 許昌 in the year 208. The Han capital had been removed to Hsü (renamed Hsü-ch'ang in 221) in 196, Lo-yang having been abandoned in ruins in 190. It is very probable that the Buddhist community of Lo-yang had shifted as well. Without going into the details here, we may with certain reservations assign

the greater part of T 418 (excluding the verse *gāthās* of Redaction B) to Lokakṣema.⁷

The *PraS*, written in a mixture of prose and verse, is set in the Bamboo Wood at Rājagṛha, where the Buddha explains to the householder-bodhisattva Bhadrāpāla the specific state of meditative concentration (*samādhi*) which gives the sūtra its name—the practice by means of which devotees are able to focus their mental powers so that they perceive themselves transported to other Buddha-fields (or 'worlds') to see the particular Buddhas of the present who hold sway there and to hear the Dharma which they expound. They are supposed to retain whatever truths they thus hear expounded, and when they emerge from meditation they are called upon to communicate them to others. Although in this way the products of the experience are not to be dismissed as mere wild fantasy, the *PraS* is at pains to emphasise the true nature of the meditative vision: that there is no actual movement of physical bodies from one place to another, that the whole experience, in all its vividness, is as mind-created as dreams are. To our way of thinking there seems to be a contradiction here, when the reality of something is denied, yet its importance is affirmed. However, to the Buddhists no such contradiction exists, since the 'reality' of meditative or dream experiences is not denied; rather, these are accorded the same status as our ordinary waking experience, to which our conventional notions of 'real' and 'unreal' are equally inapplicable. In the *PraS*

7 For a full discussion of the complicated textual problems sketched here, see my *The Samādhi of Direct Encounter with the Buddhas of the Present* (Tokyo 1990), pp. 221-49. My English translation of T 418 will eventually appear in the English Translation of the Chinese Tripitaka being published under the auspices of the Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai, Tokyo.

this is achieved by applying the tenets of the Prajñāpāramitā; thus the sūtra often proceeds from discussing the *samādhi* to interesting statements on the nature of all *dharmas* (*dharmas* being the basic factors of phenomenal existence), which are 'empty,' incapable of being apprehended, and so on. Although this is the main thrust of the sūtra, there is much other material. Particularly noteworthy is a long section in the middle of the text which defines the social behaviour, moral attitudes and intellectual understandings required of (in succession) ordained male and female followers of the Mahāyāna (i.e. *bhikṣus* and *bhikṣuṇīs*) and male and female lay practitioners (*upāsakas* and *upāsikās*). Like many other Mahāyāna sūtras the *PraS* places great emphasis, either explicitly or implicitly, on the position of the lay practitioner or 'householder' bodhisattva. One might also mention the appearance in the text of the Buddha Amitābha, who is held up as an example of the many 'Buddhas of the present' who can be made the object of the *samādhi*; this in fact is our earliest dateable reference to the cult of Amitābha, which was to evolve into the very important 'Pure Land' sects of China and Japan.⁸

OTHER EXTANT VERSIONS

CHINESE:

T 417 *Pan-chou san-mei ching* 般舟三昧經, 1 *chüan*

Attributed from the earliest times to Lokakṣema, this text is clearly not an independent translation of the *PraS*, but a later

8 For a fuller treatment of the content of the *PraS*, see *Direct Encounter*, pp. xvii-xxvii, and P. Harrison, 'Buddhānusmṛti in the *Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṃmukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra*,' *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 6 (1978), pp. 35-57.

abridgement of Redaction B of the larger *Pan-chou san-mei ching*. Its unknown compiler has occasionally revealed his hand by mistaking the import of the original version; and his use of a more modern 'translationese' enables us to date the work to around 300 A.D. or later.⁹

T 419 *Pa-p'o p'u-sa ching* 拔陂菩薩經, 1 *chüan*

This anonymous and partial translation—it contains only the first six chapters (Tibetan reckoning) of the *PraS*—seems to have been made at the end of the Han or soon after.

T 416 *Ta-fang-teng ta-chi-ching hsien-hu-fen* 大方等大集經賢護分, 5 *chüan*

Translated in early 595 by Jñānagupta and his colleagues at the Sui capital of Ch'ang-an, this is by far the fullest and most readable Chinese version of the *PraS*. As the title indicates, the sūtra was by then regarded as part of the great sūtra-collection, the *Mahāsaṃnipāta*.

Large chunks of the *PraS* are also quoted or paraphrased in the **Daśabhūmivibhāṣāśāstra* and (to a much lesser extent) in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*, both attributed to Nāgārjuna. The Sanskrit originals of these works have been lost, but Kumārajīva's translations survive: *Shih-chu p'i-p'o-sha lun* 十住毘婆沙論 (T 1521) and *Ta-chih-tu lun* 大知度論 (T 1509). For full references to their citations of the *PraS* see my *Direct Encounter*, pp. xxiv-xxv.

9 See P. Harrison, *Direct Encounter*, pp. 250-4.

TIBETAN:

The Tibetan version of the *PraS*, entitled *Da ltar gyi sangs rgyas mngon sum du bzhugs pa'i ting nge 'dzin*, seems to have been in existence by the beginning of the 9th century, when it was revised and edited by Śākyaprabha and Ratnarakṣita. An edition of this version, based upon the Derge, Narthang, Peking and Lhasa editions of the Kanjur, was published by me as *The Tibetan Text of the Pratyutpanna-Buddha-Saṃmukhāvasthita-Samādhi-Sūtra* (Tokyo 1978). This is the edition which was translated into English in my *Direct Encounter*, Appendix C of which (pp. 303-12) also presents the readings of the Stog Palace Manuscript Kanjur version of the text.

SANSKRIT:

The Sanskrit text of the *PraS* has been lost, except for one manuscript folio found in Central Asia at the turn of the century and published as the 'Bhadrapāla Sūtra' in A.F. Rudolf Hoernle, ed., *Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature* (Oxford 1916; repr. Amsterdam 1970, Delhi 1988), pp. 88-93 (see also Addenda, pp. 410-11). Appendix B of my *Direct Encounter* (pp. 273-302) contains a new edition, translation and study of this manuscript fragment of the *PraS*.

3 *Drumakinnararājaparipṛcchāsūtra* (DKP)

The Questions of Druma, King of the Kinnaras

T 624 *Tun chen-t'o-lo so-wen ju-lai san-mei ching* 純真陀羅所問如來三昧經, 3 *chüan*

Despite the confusing bibliographical data on this work, its

traditional attribution to Lokakṣema is supported by the Buddhist scholar Chih Min-tu 支敏度 in his introduction (written ca. 301) to a synoptic edition of the *Śūraṃgamasamādhisūtra* (see *CSTCC*, 49a22). An examination of the text gives us no cause to overturn this attribution: style and vocabulary accord in almost every respect with that of the *Tao-hsing ching* (No. 1), although there is evidence of the reviser's hand (most notably in the substitution of translations for transcriptions of some proper names). Therefore we may safely regard it as the product, if not of Lokakṣema himself, then certainly of members of his school, who were probably also responsible for the minor revisions which can be detected.¹⁰

Written in alternating prose and verse, the *DKP* is a long and elaborate text rich in doctrinal content and dramatic incident. The action takes place on the Vulture Peak near Rājagṛha; the main characters, apart from the Buddha himself, are the Kinnara king Druma and the bodhisattva Devamauli (or Divyamauli). The central theme of the sūtra is the career of the bodhisattva, and this is taken up again and again from various angles. The core of the sūtra consists in a long exposition of the correct way for bodhisattvas to practise the six perfections, to which the 'perfection of skill in the use of stratagems' (*upāyakaśalyapāramitā*) is added as the seventh. *Upāyakaśalya* plays an important part throughout the sūtra, as does the concept of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), and there is much material on the nature of all *dharma*s. The superiority of the bodhisattva-vehicle is dramatically contrasted with the way of the Hearers (*śrāvakayāna*).¹¹

10 Cf. E. Zürcher, 'A New Look,' p. 300.

11 For a brief synopsis of the content of this text, see P. Harrison, *Druma-kinnara-rāja-paripṛcchā-sūtra: A Critical Edition of the Tibetan Text (Recension A) based*

OTHER EXTANT VERSIONS

CHINESE:

T 625 *Ta-shu chin-na-lo-wang so-wen ching* 大樹緊那羅王所問經, 4 *chüan*

Translated by Kumārajīva in the first decade of the 5th century, this version of the *DKP* was based on a text substantially in agreement with that used by Lokakṣema.

TIBETAN:

Mi 'am ci'i rgyal po ljon pas (or: sdong pos) zhus pa.

Translated and revised by Dpal gyi lhun po and Dpal brtsegs, this Tibetan version of the *DKP* appears in the *Ldan* (or *Lhan*) *dkar ma* catalogue. It must therefore have been in existence at the beginning of the 9th century. My critical edition of Recension A of this text has recently been published by the International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo (see above, n. 11).

4 *Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinodanāsūtra* (*AjKV*)

The Dispelling of Ajātaśatru's Remorse

T 626 *A-che-shih wang ching* 阿闍世王經, 2 *chüan*

Tao-an's tentative attribution of this work to Lokakṣema is supported by Chih Min-tu in the preface to his synoptic edition of the *Śgs* (see above under No. 3), and borne out by an examination of its style and terminology.

Written almost entirely in prose, the *AjKV* betrays its patchwork

on *Eight Editions of the Kanjur and the Dunhuang Manuscript Fragment* (Tokyo 1992), pp. xiii-xvi. An English translation and study of this sūtra is in progress.

method of composition more than most other Mahāyāna sūtras, consisting as it does of a number of loosely related elements which have been adapted and strung together to make up quite a long text. By chance one of these elements has survived in its unassimilated form (see below, T 629), and furnishes us with a rare example of the kind of raw material which the followers of the Mahāyāna used to construct their 'expanded' texts.

The principal theme of the *AjKV* is the glorification of wisdom (*prajñā*) as expounded and personified by the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī. In several spectacular dramatic episodes, most notably that of the 'hurling of the bowl,' the sūtra demonstrates the magnificence of Mañjuśrī's magical powers and his superiority to the great disciples, especially Śāriputra and Mahāmaudgalyāyana, representatives of the inferior dispensation, i.e. the 'Hīnayāna.' At one point it is revealed that even Śākyamuni and the other Buddhas of the past owe their elevation to Buddhahood to Mañjuśrī's teaching, and this bodhisattva is referred to as the 'father and mother of the Buddhas.' This usage indicates that he is functioning here as the incarnation of the perfection of wisdom. In some of the sūtra's more didactic passages we find Mañjuśrī delivering expositions on such topics as the omniscience of the Buddhas, the nature and use of *dhāraṇīs*, the 'canon' of the bodhisattvas (*bodhisattva-piṭaka*), and the Wheel of the Dharma which never rolls back. However, the core of the sūtra consists in his conversations with King Ajātaśatru. In these he attempts to reveal the true significance of the remorse which Ajātaśatru feels at having caused the death of his father, Bimbisāra, in order to usurp the throne of Magadha. After much discussion and practical demonstration Mañjuśrī manages to convince Ajātaśatru that since all *dharma*s are empty, wrong actions and the retribution

they incur are also empty, and have no power to affect the mind that sees them for what they are. Initially overwhelmed by the thought of the infernal torment which lies in store for him, Ajātaśatru at last comprehends that there is no self to suffer any such fate; attaining the realisation that no dharmas are ever produced (*anutpattika-dharmakṣānti*), he has his eventual rise to Buddhahood predicted for him by Śākyamuni. Behind this pious tale with its many dramatic flourishes and embellishments lies a concerted attempt to apply the doctrine of emptiness to the problems of morality.¹²

OTHER EXTANT VERSIONS

CHINESE:

T 627 *Wen-shu-chih-li p'u-ch'ao san-mei ching* 文殊支利普超三昧經, 3 *chüan*

Translated by Dharmarakṣa (late 3rd century), this version of the *AjKV* is much the same as that translated by Lokakṣema. Dharmarakṣa's rendering is somewhat fuller than his predecessor's, and also more 'Chinese.' Often it succeeds in being more obscure as well. The few *gāthās* are translated into verse, and the text is divided into 13 chapters.

T 628 *Wei-ts'eng-yu cheng-fa ching* 未曾有正法經, 6 *chüan*

This much more readable translation of the *AjKV* was made by Fa-t'ien 法天 late in the 10th century. Although Fa-t'ien's text does not differ in basic structure from the two earlier versions (there are

12 An English translation of the Tibetan version of this text is in progress. Lokakṣema's version (T 626) has also been translated into modern Japanese by Akira Sadakata, *Ajase no satori* (Kyoto 1989).

a few minor re-arrangements of material in the *parīdanā*), it does have one outstanding feature: all references to patricide and matricide have been completely obliterated. Ajātaśatru is now represented as coming to the Buddha with doubts of a general nature, and nowhere do we find any mention of his parricide or of his anxiety over the hellfire to which it has condemned him. The earlier versions also contained an episode in which a matricide is accepted into the Order by the Buddha, becomes an Arhat, and undergoes Parinirvāṇa by self-immolation. In Fa-t'ien's version this man is simply designated as a person who has 'committed the crime of murder.' In the earlier versions Mañjuśrī conjures up a phantom who slays his own parents in full view of the matricide so as to identify himself with him and persuade him to go and visit the Buddha. In Fa-t'ien's translation the phantom merely announces to the 'real' murderer that he himself is also guilty of the same crime, but no murder is depicted. This careful bowdlerisation of the *AjKV* was probably carried out by Fa-t'ien himself, in order to make the sūtra conform more closely to Chinese notions of filial piety, since the Tibetan translation agrees substantially with the earlier Chinese versions of the text by Lokakṣema and Dharmarakṣa.

T 629 *Fang po ching* 放鉢經

This anonymous translation is not really a version of the *AjKV* at all, nor is it a fragment of it (as, for instance, T 419 is a fragment of the *PraS*). It is, rather, a short sūtra in its own right, which has been modified by the compiler(s) of the *AjKV* and then inserted into the larger work. Substantial differences in content and in the ordering of the material make any other explanation difficult.

Set in the Jetavana in Śrāvastī (the *AjKV* is set on the Vulture Peak and in nearby Rājagṛha), the *Fang po ching* contains two

main elements: the spectacular miracle of the 'hurling of the bowl' (hence the title of the sūtra), in which Mañjuśrī features so prominently, and the *avadāna* of Śākyamuni, in which he is set on the path to Buddhahood at the instigation of Mañjuśrī.

Since it appears in Tao-an's catalogue (compiled 374 C.E.), this work is usually assigned to the third or fourth century C.E. However, an examination of its terminology and style reveals that these are remarkably similar to Lokakṣema's translations (one notable exception is the use of *chung-sheng* 衆生 for *sattva*): we even find the absence of the opening formula *wen ju shih* 聞如是 (Skt. *evaṃ mayā śrutam*). In view of this we should, I think, regard the *Fang po ching* as a product of Lokakṣema's school.

TIBETAN :

Ma skyes dgra'i 'gyod pa bsal ba.

Since the translation appears in the *Ldan* (or: *Lhan*) *dkar ma* catalogue, it must have been in existence around the beginning of the 9th century. The colophon to the text says only that it was revised by Mañjuśrīgarbha and Ratnarakṣita. To be found in the following editions of the Kanjur:

Peking Mdo Tsu 220a5-281a5 (Vol. XXXV, No. 882)¹³

Lhasa Mdo Ma 323a1-413a7 (Vol. 62, pp. 162-209)¹⁴

Derge Mdo Tsha 211b2-268b7

Narhang Mdo Ma 339a4-427b5

13 Information in parentheses refers to D.T. Suzuki, ed., *The Peking Edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka* (Tokyo-Kyoto 1955-61).

14 Information in parentheses refers to H. Eimer, *Die Xeroxkopie des Lhasa-Kanjur/ The Xerox Copy of the Lhasa Kanjur* (Tokyo 1977).

5 Part of the *Avataṃsakasūtra*

T 280 *Tou-sha ching* 兜沙經, 1 *chüan* (TSC)

Since it is not known what Sanskrit word the Chinese *tou-sha* transliterates, it is impossible to determine the original title of this sūtra. In a modified form the text appears as part of the massive *Avataṃsakasūtra*; it is therefore possible that it is similar in status to the *Fang po ching* (see above, No. 4).

Written entirely in prose, the *TSC* is such a short work that a summary of it may conveniently be given here. The action takes place in Magadha, shortly after the enlightenment of the Buddha. In attendance are a large assembly of bodhisattvas, who wish to see the Buddha-fields in the ten directions and the Buddhas working in them. By an exercise of his magic power Śākyamuni reveals to the bodhisattvas one Buddha-field in each of the ten directions; the names of the fields and of their Buddhas are given, and from each field comes a bodhisattva with a large retinue to pay homage to Śākyamuni. The names of these ten bodhisattvas are also given; the first is Mañjuśrī.

In the second part of the sūtra Mañjuśrī enlarges upon the inconceivable number of Buddhas in the universe and upon the multiplicity of their names.

Finally, in the third part of the text, Śākyamuni emits a miraculous beam of light which illuminates the entire universe with its myriad continents, mountain ranges and celestial realms. Its unity under his dominion is described. The text ends abruptly with a list of the ten bodhisattvas and ten Buddhas who appeared earlier.

Tao-an originally ascribed the *TSC* to Lokakṣema on the basis of an examination of its style. There is no good reason for us now not to accept his judgement. From the point of view of subject

matter it is difficult to see why the text was translated in the first place, consisting as it does mainly in a lesson in Mahāyāna cosmology. Perhaps this was Lokakṣema's intention. For us, however, the *TSC*'s chief value lies in its abundance of transliterated proper names.

OTHER EXTANT VERSIONS

CHINESE:

T 278 *Ta-fang-kuang fo hua-yen ching* 大方廣佛華嚴經, 60 *chüan*

This translation of the *Avatamsaka* by Buddhahadra (early 5th century) contains a modified form of the *TSC*. In Chapter III (如来名號品) we find Parts 1 and 2 of the original work, with Part 2 being considerably expanded; while in Chapter V (如来光明覺品) we find a version of Part 3—see T 278, 418a25-420b4; 422b17-c10.

T 279 *Ta-fang-kuang fo hua-yen ching* 大方廣佛華嚴經, 80 *chüan*

This second translation of the *Avatamsaka* by the Khotanese Śikṣānanda (active in China during the years 695-710) preserves the *TSC* in the same form as the earlier version (T 278), i.e., spread out over Chapters VII (如来名號品) and IX (光明覺品)—see T 279, 57c22-60a12; 62b15-c10. For an English translation of the relevant sections from this Chinese version, see Thomas Cleary, trans., *The Flower Ornament Scripture: A Translation of the Avatamsaka Sūtra*, Vol. I (Boulder 1984), pp. 270-75, 282-3.

TIBETAN:

Sangs rgyas phal po che

Translated, revised and edited by Jinamitra, Surendrabodhi and Ye shes sde (early 9th century), the Tibetan version of the *Avatamsaka* contains the material corresponding to the *TSC* in Chaps. XII (*Sangs rgyas kyi mtshan shin tu bstan pa*) and XIV (*De bzhin gshegs pa'i 'od zer las rnam par sangs rgyas pa*). These chapters appear in the following editions of the Kanjur:

Peking Phal chen Yi 189b1-197a5, 206a8-219a6 (Vol. XXV, No. 761)

Lhasa Phal chen Ka 256a5-269a7, 279b4-297b7 (Vol. 41, pp. 130-6, 141-151)

Derge Phal chen Ka 175b3-184b1, 191a7-203b2

Narhang Phal chen Ka 259a5-272a7, 282b3-300b4

6 *Lokānuvartanāsūtra (LAN)*

Conformity With the Way of the World

T 807 *Nei-tsang pai-pao ching* 內藏百寶經

Tao-an's tentative ascription of this text to Lokakṣema is totally justified: the work carries most of the hallmarks of his style. The *LAN* is a short sūtra which, as the Tibetan version shows, was written entirely in verse. Lokakṣema's translation is, characteristically, in prose, but I think we may safely assume that the original from which he worked was in verse form too. The *Nei-tsang pai-pao ching* is the only Chinese translation of this text.

The *LAN* is set on the Vulture Peak near Rājagṛha. In response to a request from Mañjuśrī, the Buddha explains the true nature of his appearance among human beings. As an expression of his skill in the use of stratagems (*upāyakauśalya*) he conceals his real powers and attributes and conforms to the way of the world in performing

the work of a Buddha. A typical verse runs:

The Buddha's body never succumbs to illness, yet he manifests illness, summons doctors, and takes medicine. The giver of the medicine gains incalculable merit. It is to conform to the way of the world that he enters into a manifestation of this kind.

This last sentence occurs as a refrain after each item. Approximately 100 aspects of the Buddha's life and teachings are dealt with.

For a study of this text, in particular of the verses from it which appear in the *Mahāvastu* and the *Prasannapadā*, see my 'Sanskrit Fragments of a Lokottaravādin Tradition,' in L.A. Hercus *et al.*, eds., *Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor J.W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday* (Canberra 1982; reprinted Delhi 1984), pp. 211-34.

OTHER EXTANT VERSIONS

TIBETAN:

'Jig rten gyi rjes su 'thun par 'jug pa

This Tibetan version in 113 verses was translated, revised and edited by Dānaśīla, Jinamitra and Ye shes sde at the beginning of the 9th century.

A full edition and translation of this text, accompanied by a translation of Lokakṣema's Chinese rendition and an introduction to the content of the *LAN*, is in preparation. For a preliminary discussion of the textual problems relating to the Tibetan version, with full bibliographical references to various editions of the Kanjur, see P. Harrison, 'Meritorious Activity or Waste of Time? Some Remarks on the Editing of Texts in the Tibetan Kanjur,' in Shoren Ihara and

Zuihō Yamaguchi, eds., *Tibetan Studies / Narita 1989: Proceedings of the Fifth International Seminar on Tibetan Studies, Narita, Japan, August-September 1989* (Tokyo 1992), pp. 77-93.

7 The Sūtra of Mañjuśrī's Questions Concerning the Bodhisattva Career (Skt.title unknown)

T 458 *Wen-shu-shih-li wen p'u-sa-shu ching* 文殊師利問菩薩
署經, 1 *chüan* (WWP)

This interesting and enigmatic text, which is written entirely in prose, carries all the hallmarks of Lokakṣema's style, and may be ascribed to him without hesitation. However, the lack of any other known version of the sūtra means that its obscurities are especially difficult to penetrate. Even its name is a mystery—the present title appears to have been based on a remark made by Śākyamuni to Śāriputra right at the beginning of the sūtra (see 435b8), yet in the whole work Mañjuśrī is only mentioned twice, and in the third person at that; he certainly never asks any questions. In fact, the sūtra seems to refer to itself as the *Ta-sa-a-chieh-shu* 怛薩阿竭署 (Skt. *Tathāgata-caryā?*), while the character who puts most of the questions to the Buddha is Śāriputra. It should also be noted that there is no formal beginning to the sūtra; but it is clear from later references that the action takes place in the *ārāma* of Anāthapiṇḍada in the Jetavana at Śrāvastī. What is particularly interesting is that no bodhisattva takes part, or (with the exception of Mañjuśrī) even appears to be present; the Buddha discusses the career of the Tathāgata, the bodhisattva-vow (referred to as being 'armed with the great armour') and the Mahāyāna with his disciples and with a group of 500 brahmins who come out from Śrāvastī. This may indicate that T 458 is one of the most primitive Mahāyāna sūtras

which we possess.

As Zürcher pointed out in his original study of these texts, the exposition of the *WWP* is presented in terms of the doctrine of emptiness, with the paradoxical mode of expression characteristic of Prajñāpāramitā literature; and there are interesting similarities to the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*.

OTHER VERSIONS: None known.

8 *Kāśyapaparivarta (KP)* The *Kāśyapa* Section

T 350 *I-yüeh mo-ni-pao ching* 遺日摩尼宝經, 1 *chüan*

Despite considerable confusion in the Chinese bibliographies over the title of this work, its style and terminology accord so closely with other translations by Lokakṣema that the current attribution to him is to be maintained.

Along with the *Aṣṭa* the *KP* is the most influential of the sūtras rendered into Chinese by the Indo-Scythian master; and, as in the case of the *Aṣṭa* the Sanskrit text has come down to us. There are interesting affinities with T 458 (see above, No. 7): T 350 is also set in the Jetavana at Śrāvastī (but note that in all other versions of the *KP*, including the Sanskrit, the action takes place on the Vulture Peak); the Buddha explains the bodhisattva-career to his disciples (in the *KP* the chief interlocutor is Mahākāśyapa), but no active part is taken by any bodhisattvas, even though a group of them is said to be present. A distinctive feature of the sūtra is its emphasis on ethics.

The present Sanskrit text is in a mixture of prose and verse, but nearly all the verse passages are unrepresented in Lokakṣema's

text. However, at one point (Sections 136-7) there are some verses which he has characteristically rendered in prose.

The *KP* has been much studied by modern scholars. An extensive bibliography of these studies compiled by Bhikkhu Pāsādika appears in *Buddhist Studies Review* 8, 1-2 (1991), pp. 59-70. We are particularly indebted to Friedrich Weller for his annotated translations of various versions of the text, which show how much it has expanded and developed over the centuries. For Weller's German translation of T 350 see 'Kāśyapaparivarta nach der Han-Fassung verdeutscht,' *Buddhist Yearly* 1968/69 (Halle 1970), pp. 57-221.

OTHER VERSIONS

CHINESE:

T 351 *Mo-ho-yen pao yen ching* 摩訶衍宝嚴經, 1 *chüan*

Anonymous; usually assigned to the 4th century (Chin 晉 dynasty). See Weller's translation, 'Kāśyapaparivarta nach der Djin-Fassung verdeutscht,' *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung* XII (1966), pp. 379-462.

T 310 *Ta-pao-chi ching* 大宝積經, 120 *chüan*

This complete translation of the *Mahāratnakūṭa*, the sūtra-collection of which the *KP* later became a part, contains as Section 43 the P'u-ming p'u-sa hui 普明菩薩会, an anonymous version of the *KP* which is usually assigned to the 4th century (Ch'in 秦 dynasty). See Weller, 'Kāśyapaparivarta nach der Tjin-Übersetzung verdeutscht,' *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig* XIII (1964), Gesellschafts- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe, Heft 4, pp. 771-804. An English

translation (with omissions) appears in Garma C.C. Chang, ed., *A Treasury of Mahayana Sutras: Selections from the Mahāratnakūṭa Sūtra* (University Park, Penn. 1983), pp. 387-414.

T 659 *Ta-ch'eng pao-yün ching* 大乘寶雲經, 7 chüan

Attributed to Seng-chia-p'o-lo and Man-t'o-lo-hsien, both active at the beginning of the 6th century, this Chinese version of the *Ratnameghasūtra* contains the *KP* as its seventh chapter.

T 352 *Ta-chia-she wen ta-pao-chi cheng-fa ching* 大迦葉問大寶積正法經, 5 chüan

Translated by Shih-hu 施護 in the year 986. See Weller's 'Die Sung-Fassung des Kāśyapaparivarta,' *Monumenta Serica* XXV (1966), pp. 207-361.

SANSKRIT:

The Kāśyapaparivarta, A Mahāyānasūtra of the Ratnakūṭa Class, ed. by A. von Staël-Holstein (Shanghai 1926)

This is based upon a single Sanskrit manuscript of the *KP* which was found near Khotan in Central Asia towards the end of the 19th century. Von Staël-Holstein's pioneer edition (which includes the Tibetan and four Chinese versions) has since been supplemented by other manuscript finds. See J.W. de Jong, 'Sanskrit Fragments of the Kāśyapaparivarta,' *Beiträge zur Indieforschung Ernst Waldschmidt zum 80. Geburtstag gewidmet* (Berlin 1977), pp. 247-255. It is reported that a new edition of von Staël-Holstein's manuscript is being prepared in Russia by Bongard-Levin and Vorobyeva-Desyatovskaya (see *Buddhist Studies Review* 4, 2 (1987), p. 139).

Translations from the Sanskrit include:

German:

Friedrich Weller, *Zum Kāśyapaparivarta*, Heft 2, Verdeutschung des sanskrit-tibetischen Textes (*Abhandlungen der sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Philologisch-historische Klasse, Band 57, Heft 3*) (Berlin 1965).

English:

Bhikkhu Pāsādika, *The Dharma-Discourse of the Great Collection of Jewels, The Kāśyapa Section*, published serially in *Linh Són Publication d'Études Bouddhologiques*, No. 1 (Nov. 1977), pp. 26-41; No.2 (Feb. 1978), pp. 31-42; No. 3 (May 1978), pp. 41-48; No. 4 (Aug. 1978), pp. 34-42; No. 5 (Nov. 1978), pp. 28-39; No. 6 (Feb. 1979), pp. 35-45; No. 7 (May 1979), pp. 27-37; No. 8 (Aug. 1979), pp. 31-43; and No. 9 (Nov. 1979), pp. 26-41. In addition, a new annotated English translation is currently being prepared by Gadjin Nagao and Jonathan Silk.

Japanese:

Gadjin Nagao and Hajime Sakurabe, 'Kashōbon,' in *Daijō butten*, Vol. IX (Tokyo 1974), pp. 5-124.

TIBETAN:

'*Od srung gi le'u*

Translated, revised and edited by Jinamitra, Śilendrabodhi and Ye shes sde at the beginning of the 9th century. This version appears in von Staël-Holstein's edition, and is found in the following editions of the Kanjur:

Peking Dkon brtsegs 'I 100b3-138a6 (Vol. XXIV, No. 760.43)

Lhasa Dkon brtsegs Cha 211a6-260b5 (Vol. 40, pp. 106-131)

Derge Dkon brtsegs Cha 119b1-151b7

Narhang Dkon brtsegs Cha 208a2-261a2

9 *Akṣobhyatathāgatasavyūhasūtra* (AKTV)
The Magnificence of the Tathāgata Akṣobhya

T 313 *A-ch'u-fo-kuo ching* 阿閼仏国經, 2 *chüan*

The current attribution of the *A-ch'u-fo-kuo ching* to Lokakṣema must be viewed with some suspicion, since the text contains certain stylistic features which are quite uncharacteristic of him. It may be significant that it shares some of these features with T 418. We find, for example, a greater use of transliterations—in cases where Lokakṣema usually employs transliterations—e.g. *chuan-lun-wang* 轉輪王 for *cakravartin*, *ju-lai* 如来 for *tathāgata*, *yüan-i-chüeh* 緣一覺 for *pratyekabuddha*. Also notable is the use of *chung-sheng* 衆生 for *sattva* and *shan-pen* 善本 for *kuśalamūla*. The considerable number of these uncharacteristic renderings (despite stylistic similarity in other respects) makes it necessary for us to examine the text more closely at a later date. However, on preliminary inspection it appears that T 313 is either a translation by Lokakṣema which has been subsequently revised, or the work of one of his contemporaries or disciples. It is, however, certainly an old text.

The *AKTV*, a medium-length work composed entirely in prose, is also in terms of content the most uncharacteristic of the sūtras ascribed to Lokakṣema. Although there are frequent references to the perfection of wisdom and to the other perfections, one finds hardly any trace of the long passages on the doctrine of emptiness and its realization which are such a feature elsewhere. Seemingly unconcerned with the major emphases of the Prajñāpāramitā literature,

the *AKTV* deals in a relatively systematic fashion with the Buddha Akṣobhya and his Buddha-field Abhirati, which lies to the east of our world. On the Vulture Peak near Rājagṛha Śākyamuni relates to the disciple Śāriputra the former vows of Akṣobhya and his setting out upon the bodhisattva path; the circumstances of Akṣobhya's awakening as a Buddha; the characteristics of his Buddha-field, the 'paradise' Abhirati; the attributes and powers of his *śrāvakas* and bodhisattvas; the circumstances of his Parinirvāṇa; the manner in which beings can ensure that they are reborn in Abhirati; and the advantages of such a rebirth. The *AKTV* is thus a text which has strong affinities with the much more influential *Sukhāvativyūhasūtra*, which describes the glories of Sukhāvati, the western paradise of the Buddha Amitābha.

OTHER EXTANT VERSIONS

CHINESE:

T 310 *Ta-pao-chi ching* 大宝積經, 120 *chüan*

Compiled by Bodhiruci around the beginning of the 8th century, this Chinese version of the sūtra-collection entitled *Mahāratnakūṭa* contains the *AKTV* as its sixth section (Pu-tung ju-lai hui 不動如来会), occupying two *chüan* (19 & 20). In basic structure Bodhiruci's version does not differ substantially from T 313, except that it has a proper ending—in T 313 the sūtra ends abruptly in the middle of a passage about the value of its own propagation. An English translation of this text may be found in Garma C.C. Chang, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 315-338.

TIBETAN:

De bzhin gshegs pa mi 'khrugs pa'i bkod pa

Translated, revised and edited by Jinarnitra, Surendrabodhi and Ye shes sde at the beginning of the 9th century. To be found in the following editions of the Kanjur:

Peking Dkon brtsegs Dzi 1-80a5 (Vol. XXII, No. 760.6)

Lhasa Dkon brtsegs Kha 1-115a1 (Vol. 36, pp. 2-59)

Derge Dkon brtsegs Kha 1a1-70a7

Narhang Dkon brtsegs Kha 1a1-112a1

For a partial French translation of this text, see J. Dantinne, trans., *La splendeur de l'Inébranlable (Akṣobhyavyūha)*, Tome I (Louvain-la-Neuve 1983).

LOST TRANSLATIONS BY LOKAKṢEMA

Lokakṣema is also said to have made translations, now lost, of the following works:

10 *Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra* (Śgs)

Lokakṣema's translation of this sūtra (said to have been made on Jan. 16, 186) is well attested (see *CSTCC* 6b11; 49a18), but the only Chinese version to have come down to us is that of Kumārajīva. The sūtra is also extant in Tibetan. For full bibliographical details and a French translation of Kumārajīva's version see Étienne Lamotte, *La Concentration de la Marche Héroïque (Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra)* (Brussels 1965). An English translation of Lamotte's work by Sara Boin-Webb is forthcoming.

11 *Kuang-ming san-mei ching* 光明三昧經, 1 *chüan*

The Sanskrit title of this sūtra is lost, as is Lokakṣema's translation

of it. There is only one version in existence: T 630, *Ch'eng-chu kuang-ming ting-i ching* 成具光明定意經, 1 *chüan* (abbreviation: *CKT*), attributed to Chih Yao 支曜, a contemporary of Lokakṣema. The text displays interesting affinities with the *PraS*.

Tao-an also tentatively ascribed to Lokakṣema translations bearing the titles *Hu pan-ni-huan ching* 胡般泥洹經 (*Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*?) and *P'ei-pen ching* 字本經. No definite identification of these can be made.

THE CONTENT OF LOKAKṢEMA'S WORKS

A definitive description and evaluation of the content of Lokakṣema's translations cannot be made until they have all been rendered intelligible in their entirety and have been compared in detail with later versions of the same sūtras. Since the present paper was originally conceived as a preliminary survey based on a cursory reading of the texts in question, only a brief and unsystematic sketch of their themes is presented here, without precise references.¹⁵ Some distortions and omissions are inevitable. This is especially so because the more theoretical or 'philosophical' passages are by their very nature the more obscure; only upon careful examination will these yield their secrets.

Perhaps the most salient characteristic of Lokakṣema's works is that although they obviously reflect an early stage of the Mahāyāna, they are not the products of its primitive or initial phase. This is not to say that the texts do not contain some very old elements which

15 A selection of these themes (with precise references) has been addressed in P. Harrison, 'Who Gets to Ride in the Great Vehicle?'

may date back to the beginnings of the Mahāyāna, whatever and whenever those were. Rather, the overall content and presentation of the sūtras indicate that by the mid-second century C.E. the movement had already come some distance, and one may point out many well-developed features.¹⁶

First of all, in the area of buddhology we find that the historical Buddha (in this paper I have referred to him as Śākyamuni) is represented as the illusory manifestation of a much grander, if not transcendental, figure (see especially the *LAn* and the *AjKV*). His physical body is thus relatively insignificant: what are important are the cognition with which he is endowed (*buddhajñāna*; often referred to as 'omniscient cognition,' *sarvajñajñāna*) and the body of truths which he represents and personifies. In this respect the occurrence and use of the term 'body of dharmas' (*dharmakāya*) in Lokakṣema's works merit careful study.¹⁷ Also significant is the concept of *anubhāva*, the 'might' or 'authority' of the Buddha (Lokakṣema's equivalent is *wei-shen* 威神), which permits an extension of the Buddha's function. By the authority of the Buddha his followers are empowered to perform acts which would otherwise be beyond their capabilities, and are thus able to take part in his work of teaching and saving sentient beings. This applies both to the characters who appear in the sūtras and to those who are concerned with their propagation. In this way the concept of the *anubhāva* of the Buddha

16 Some of these features may well have been shared with one or more Mainstream Buddhist sects, i.e., may not have been exclusive to the Mahāyāna.

17 On this topic see my recent article 'Is the *Dharma-kāya* the Real 'Phantom Body' of the Buddha?' *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 15, 1 (1992), pp. 44-93. The application of the same method to other doctrinal concepts may yield similarly interesting results.

plays an important role in claims by followers of the Mahāyāna for the ultimate authenticity of their teachings.

We also find in Lokakṣema's translations the notion of an immense profusion of Buddhas of the present, each one resident in his own Buddha-field (*buddhakṣetra*) in another world-system (see especially *PraS*, *TSC*, *AjKV*), with not only the developments in cosmology which that notion entails, but also lavish descriptions of specific Buddha-fields (see *AkTV*; see also many of the predictions in other texts). Here Buddhism comes closest to Christian conceptions of Paradise, although there are important differences between the two systems which make comparison risky. The faithful may have experience of these Buddha-fields during their lifetimes (see *PraS*) or be reborn in them in their next lives, if certain conditions are fulfilled (see *AkTV*).

The chief concern of Mahāyāna sūtras is, of course, the career of the bodhisattva. In Lokakṣema's translations attention is directed to certain key stages in this career (a systematic theory of ten stages or *bhūmis* appears to be absent). These are the initial thought of awakening (*bodhicittotpāda*), whereby a person first aspires to the state of Buddhahood and becomes a bodhisattva; and the three closely related events which usually take place myriads of lifetimes later, namely the realisation of the fact that dharmas are not produced (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*); the attainment of the stage of non-regression, whereupon a bodhisattva is assured of reaching his or her goal (*avaivartika*); and the prediction (*vyākaraṇa*), when the Buddha under whom the bodhisattva is currently serving predicts his or her eventual awakening. This prediction almost always takes place according to a strict formula: the Buddha emits a ray of light

from some part of his face; the light illuminates the entire universe and then is reabsorbed into the Buddha's topknot; Ānanda rises and asks what the meaning of this portent is; the Buddha then gives the prediction for one of the bodhisattvas in the audience. Full details are generally supplied—how many *kalpas* later the event will take place, the name of the *kalpa* in which it will occur, the name the bodhisattva will bear when he or she is a Buddha, the name of his or her Buddha-field and perhaps a description of its beauties, a description of his or her ministry with numbers of followers, details concerning the duration of the teachings, etc., etc. All this is followed by great rejoicing. Predictions occur in nearly all the sūtras listed above; they were obviously greatly relished by the compilers of Mahāyāna sūtras—sometimes there are even predictions within predictions.

In the way these sūtras treat of the bodhisattva we find what may seem to us to be a strange blend of the mythic and the mundane. On the one hand we have the grand flourishes of the predictions and all the other dramatic elements of the texts, with their gigantic time-scales and their displays of supernatural power by the great bodhisattvas like Mañjuśrī, while on the other hand we are told that the bodhisattva who continues to live at home should refrain from drinking alcohol, or that he (clearly men are intended here) should regard his wife and children as his enemies. The word 'bodhisattva' in fact denotes a high, almost superhuman ideal at the same time as it is a practical designation for ordinary followers of the Mahāyāna (although there appears to be some disinclination to apply the term to women). On the day-to-day level of the modes of behaviour and attitude required of these people, Lokakṣema's translations contain much interesting material. Often a distinction is made between

'renunciant bodhisattvas,' i.e., those who have left the world and joined the Buddhist Order, and 'householder bodhisattvas,' those who continue to take part in worldly affairs, follow an occupation, bring up a family, and so on. Sometimes we find a fourfold division into male and female renunciants (Mahāyāna *bhikṣus* and *bhikṣuṇīs*—'monks' and 'nuns') and householders (Mahāyāna *upāsakas* and *upāsikās*—best understood as male and female lay practitioners, rather than as laypeople in the ordinary sense), with special rules being laid down for each of the four classes (see particularly the *PraS*; the *CKT* has similar passages). There is a strong emphasis in some of the sūtras on the importance of the householder-bodhisattva, and when one considers that in the early period of Chinese Buddhism the native following would have been a predominantly lay one, it becomes quite understandable why the first missionaries selected these texts for translation.

There is no space here to go into all the rules of conduct laid down for bodhisattvas; suffice it to say that a high moral tone is maintained throughout, while some sūtras give evidence of an especially strong preoccupation with ethics (e.g., the *KP*). Perhaps the most important aspect of conduct dealt with, apart from the general practice of the six perfections (see, e.g., *DKP*), is the virtue of giving or generosity (*dāna*), which is also the first perfection. This no doubt reflects—at least in part—the economic basis of the Buddhist Order. As is well-known, the householders give alms (in the form of food and other material goods) to the *bhikṣus* and *bhikṣuṇīs*, in return for which the latter bestow on them the 'gift of the Dharma' (*dharmadāna*), the merits of which are frequently extolled. This fundamental exchange of material and spiritual support is often celebrated at great length in dramatic passages describing dinners

held by wealthy bodhisattvas for the Buddha and his followers (see *PraS*, *DKP*, *AJKV*, *CKT*). The frequency of these passages illuminates the social configurations of the Mahāyāna, as well as of Mainstream Buddhism, which was its matrix.

In dealing with female followers of the Mahāyāna our texts display the same ambivalence (or better, variety of attitudes) towards women which is characteristic of Buddhism as a whole. On the one hand the contribution of lay women to the upkeep of the Order must have been important, while on the other hand women were seen as a troublesome source of temptation and a constant threat to the spiritual progress of men. In some Buddhist sources, as the work of Diana Paul, Nancy Barnes-Schuster and others has shown, the condemnation of women reaches surprising degrees of virulence. In Lokakṣema's translations one does not find such extreme misogyny, and there are in fact some rather positive messages, but women are by no means admitted to full equality or treated with complete even-handedness. Moral prescriptions relating to them characterise their peculiar faults as fickleness and unreliability, superstitiousness, love of seductive adornment, flirtatiousness and so on, but at the same time they are able to enjoy most of the benefits of the religion on an equal footing with men (note in this connection the common use of the phrase 'sons and daughters of good family...'). Women may conceive the aspiration to awakening (*bodhicitta*) and thus become bodhisattvas, but before they attain Buddhahood a change of sex is necessary (this problem is treated in some depth in the *DKP*). An interesting detail in the *AkTV* is that women who are reborn in Akṣobhya's Buddha-field are promised

completely painless childbirth there.¹⁸

Lokakṣema's translations provide evidence of many other items of religious practice. Among them one may note the worship of relics and texts enshrined in stūpas, the construction of images of the Buddha (see *Aṣṭa*, *PraS*), the cults of other Buddhas like Amitābha (see *PraS*) and Akṣobhya (see *AkTV*), and the cultivation of special meditations or *samādhis* (see *PraS*, *DKP*, *CKT*, *Śgs*). Of great importance in our texts is the veneration of the sacred word, both in its written form, as an enshrined text, and—more commonly—in the person of the 'preacher of the Dharma' (*dharmabhāṇaka*), a figure whom we may identify with the compilers and disseminators of Mahāyāna sūtras. The readers or hearers of these sūtras are repeatedly exhorted to honour the 'preacher of the Dharma' from whom they have obtained them, and to regard him or her as they would the Buddha. There is a whole complex of ideas here, including such concepts as 'great learning' (*bāhuśrutya*) and the 'good friend' (*kalyāṇamitra*). All this is bound up with constant self-justification and self-glorification: these sūtras are indeed the true teachings of the Buddha, despite all appearances and claims to the contrary, and at every step one is reminded of the great merit to be derived from reading, reciting, copying, preserving and imparting the texts to others; the merit of memorizing a single verse from one of them is said to outweigh that to be gained by filling entire universes with jewels and offering them to the Buddha. The sūtras are even supposed to have talismanic properties, in that they render one safe from thieves, poisonous snakes, death from fire and water, harass-

18 On the subject of attitudes to women see my 'Who Gets to Ride in the Great Vehicle?', pp. 76-79. Despite Paul's pioneer work, a fully satisfactory study of the gender politics of Mahāyāna Buddhism remains to be written.

ment by civil authorities, attack or possession by demons, drought, hailstorms and other natural disasters (see *PraS*, *AjKV*, *AkTV*). The reverse side of this coin is the frequent denunciation of the sūtras' detractors, described as immoral and perverse *bhikṣus* who cast doubt upon the authenticity of the Buddha's holy teachings and wreak great spiritual harm on themselves and on others.

In this connection one catches glimpses of the Mahāyāna's relationship with Mainstream Buddhism, which allegedly emphasises the goal of personal release (i.e. Nirvāṇa). The term 'Hīnayāna' ('inferior vehicle or way') hardly occurs at all in Lokakṣema's texts—the usual designation is 'the way of the Hearers and the way of the Solitary Buddhas' (*śrāvakayāna*, *pratyekabuddhayāna*)—but the fact that those who aim for Arhatship and Nirvāṇa are pursuing an inferior goal is nonetheless pointed out, and the chief disciples of the Buddha, as representatives of this inferior dispensation, are occasionally depicted in the most embarrassing circumstances (see *DKP*, *AjKV*). At the same time it is accepted that the 'Hearers' also have their part to play (see especially *AkTV*, where the *śrāvakas* of Abhirati are described), and that all members of the Order are worthy of respect, whatever their persuasion.

In their more philosophical passages Lokakṣema's sūtras have much to say about the false views (from which spring the false goals and practices) of their opponents—the main objects of attack being false views about the existence of an abiding 'person' or 'self' and about the existence of *dharmas* as independent entities. These views are countered with the doctrine of universal emptiness (*śūnyatā*), which in effect takes the Buddhist teaching of non-self to its logical conclusion. Despite its abstruseness, the doctrine of

emptiness is no mere theoretical postulate, but the very foundation of the bodhisattvas' daily life, of their observance of morality and their cultivation of meditation.

In this brief sketch of some of the major themes of Lokakṣema's texts many important topics have not been mentioned at all. Only a full and systematic study of the material will enable us to put everything in proper perspective, to disentangle all the information relevant to a particular subject and to isolate earlier and later developments. Nor should we focus our attention solely on the doctrinal contents of these texts, lest we remain blind to the colour and richness, even extravagance, which characterise them as whole works. Reading them today, one can well imagine the sense of discovery, excitement, and perhaps even of alarm felt by those first Chinese converts to Buddhism in the late second century, as they were suddenly whirled into the exotic phantasmagoria of Mahāyāna sūtra-literature.

ABBREVIATIONS

- AjKV*: *Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinodanāsūtra* (4)
AkTV: *Akṣobhyatathāgatasyavyūhasūtra* (9)
Aṣṭa: *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (1)
CKT: *Ch'eng-chu kuang-ming ting-i ching* (T 630; see 11)
CSTCC: *Ch'u san-tsang chi chi* (T 2145)
DKP: *Drumakinnararājaparipṛcchāsūtra* (3)
KP: *Kāśyapaparivarta* (8)
LAN: *Lokānuvartanāsūtra* (6)
PraS: *Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasamādhi-sūtra* (2)
Śgs: *Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra* (10)
T: Junjirō Takakusu & Kaikyoku Watanabe, eds., *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō*, 55 vols. (Tokyo, 1924-29)
TSC: *Tou-sha-jing* (5)
WWP: *Wen-shu-shi-li wen p'u-sa-shu ching* (7)

A NOTE ON THE CONCEPT OF 'RŪPA' AND THE ORIGINS OF BUDDHIST ART

Anupa Pande

The present note essays a brief historical and hermeneutic enquiry into the context of Buddhist metaphysical usage and its relevance to Buddhist art and aesthetics¹. In pre-Buddhist usage, *rūpa* generally had the sense of perceptible form signifying something beyond it, that is, it had the sense of an expressive sign or symbol rather than a self-contained or self-sufficient sensuous form. Buddhist metaphysical usage, on the other hand, appears to eliminate the sense of any invisible significance from *rūpa* and thus to downgrade it from the status of a 'symbol' to that of plain sensuous content or matter. Thus, 'form' ceased to be the revelation of a hidden divinity; it turned into corruptible matter. This change of meaning from Vedic to early Buddhist usage is apparently consistent with the so-called anti-metaphysical tendency of early scholastic Buddhism. Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that the vast development of art, poetry, meditation and esoterism in the Buddhist tradition suggests that, despite Abhidharmic metaphysics, the Buddhists never ceased to be sensitive to the transcendental and imponderable significance of what is given in experience. Perhaps it may remind one of the current dissociation of sensibility between scientific empiri-

1 The idea of Buddhist aesthetics is relatively new, see G.C. Pande, 'Reflections on Aesthetics from a Buddhist Point of View', *Buddhist Studies* No.4, Journal of the Department of Buddhist Studies, Delhi University, 1977; and Anupa Pande, 'Buddhism, Theatre and Architecture' (International Seminar, Research Institute of Buddhist Studies, Sarnath, March 1989).

cism and positivism, on the one hand, and existentialism and surrealism in literature and art, on the other. While Buddhist metaphysics deprecates *rūpa* as corruptible, Buddhist religious and aesthetic notions appreciate *rūpa* as a symbol or manifestation.

Turning to the earliest usage in the Ṛk-saṃhitā², we see that *rūpa* is a visible form through which an essentially invisible deity expresses itself creatively. This mysterious creative power behind *rūpa* is called *māyā*. The higher correlate of *rūpa* is *Vāk* or *Dhī*, 'seeing speech' or 'luminous idea'. 'Vāk alternating with *dhī*, is the power of making by wisdom and truth, creating, fashioning of forms. This creative power is superior to particular created forms, which not only reveal but also conceal³. In the Brāhmaṇas all *rūpas* are said to belong to the Divine Artificer who gained them from Fire. 'In other words, all forms are originally contained in divine wisdom. The forms which man perceives, thus, are not phantasms produced by the senses or the mind but created things rooted in reality⁴.

In the Upaniṣads, *rūpa* is clearly a limited mode of manifestation. Thus the Kaṭha elaborates the *rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpaḥ*⁵, the Chāndogya mentions the three basic forms in which

2 *Nabho na rūpaṃ jarimā mināti* (1.71.10), *Tveṣam rūpaṃ kṛṇute* (1.95.8), *Atra te rūpaṃ uttamam apaśyam* (1.163.7), *Viśvam eko abhicaṣṭe śacībhir dhrājir ekasya dadṛṣe na rūpaṃ* (1.164.44), *Ni māyino mamire rūpaṃ asmin* (3.38.7), *Rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva tadasya rūpaṃ praticakṣaṇāya* *Indro māyābhiḥ puru-rūpa iyate* (6.47.18), *Sa Kaviḥ Kāvya Purū rūpaṃdyaur iva puśyati* (8.41.5), *Jānanto rūpaṃ* (10.123.4), *Kaviḥ Kavivā divi rūpaṃ āśayati* (10.124.7), *Ghoṣa idasya śṛṅvire na rūpaṃ* (10.168.4).

3 G.C. Pande, *Foundations of Indian Culture* (Delhi 1984), p.324.

4 *Ibid.*, p.325.

5 Kaṭha-upa, 2.69.10.

Being is manifested⁶, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka speaks of the two *rūpas* of Brahman⁷. As a manifestor *rūpa* can be the meditative door to the unmanifest essence of Brahman, though as a limited mode it can be, along with *nāma*, a delusive principle.

In the age of the Vedantas, *rūpa* not only has the popular sense of visible form and colour but also the abstract, scientific sense of form as may be evidenced from Pāṇini's Aṣṭadhyāyī⁸. Its use for 'representation' was popular enough for it to form the common word for coins then beginning to be used.

Thus, when Buddhism first arose in India, *rūpa* was used not only in common discourse but also in specialised discourses acquiring scientific and metaphysical senses. It signified visible form, colour and shape, symbolic representation or image as in meditation or coinage, abstract paradigm or form as in grammatical theory, expressive or quasi-expressive mode as in Upaniṣadic metaphysics, creative form or analogy as in poetry. Of these, two meanings appear to have influenced Buddhist usage most, viz., the popular and the Upaniṣadic. Popularly, *rūpa* was colour and shape, in Vedic-Upaniṣadic metaphysics, the sensible stuff of the phenomenal world just as its correlate, *nāman*, signified the nameable or intelligent stuff of the world. Together Name and Form, *nāma-rūpa*, signified the modal aspect of reality⁹.

The Buddha is believed to have addressed his audience in Māgadhī, allowing them to remember his teachings in their own

6 Chāndogya-upa, 6.4.

7 Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upa, 2.31.

8 Aṣṭadhyāyī, 3.1.25, 6.3.85, 1.1.68.

9 Cf. Br., 1.4.7.

dialects¹⁰. As a genuine Māgadhī Canon no longer exists and as the surviving versions of the Canon post-date the Buddha and thus represent a considerable period of development¹¹, there is no hope of discovering the Buddha's own linguistic usage. Nevertheless, the standardised usage in canonical writings may be expected to have been fashioned out of an original usage not too distant from the historical Buddha through a process of philosophical definition.

It has been argued that originally the Buddhist usage of *rūpa* rested on its contrast with *dhamma*¹². *Dhamma* was the principle of supramundane and eternal reality. This use of *dhamma* has been compared to the Upaniṣadic Brahman¹³, which naturally suggests that *rūpa* should correspond to Upaniṣadic *nāma-rūpa*. In fact, in the ancient formula of the *paṭicca-samuppāda*, *nāma-rūpa* occurs as the 'support' of *viññāṇa*¹⁴. However, in the prevailing context of Pāli Theravāda, *viññāṇa* was subsumed in *nāma-rūpa* which was equated to the five *khandhas*. At the same time, *dhamma* in the singular tended to be used mainly for 'doctrine' while *dharmā* in the plural came

10 Vinaya, Cullavagga (Nālandā) 1956), p.229 — *Anujānāmi, bhikkhave, sakāya niruttīyā Buddhavacanāṃ pariyāpūṇitūṃ ti.*

11 Cf. G.C. Pande, *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism* (3rd ed., Delhi 1983), pp.12-16.

12 On Schayer's view, cf. IHQ VII, Calcutta 1936.

13 W. Geiger, 'Dhamma and Brahman', *Zeitschrift für Buddhismus* III, Munich 1921 [tr. for *Dialogue* IX, 1-3, Colombo 1982]. See also his *Pāli Dhamma vornehmlich in der kanonischen Literatur*, Munich 1920 (repr. in *Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden 1973).

14 E.g. D, 15, S XII, 38-40.

to signify all impermanent elements or phenomena¹⁵. The contrast between *dhamma-dhātu* and *rūpa-dhātu*, however, remained. But the Upaniṣadic Brahman-*nāma-rūpa* contrast as one between eternal being and transient appearance ceased to be paralleled by the *dhamma-rūpa / nāma-rūpa* contrast. Early Buddhist thought exemplified by the Theravāda concentrates on the transience of all empirical elements sought to be understood in terms of an immanent causal law rather than of any transcendent and eternal ground. Thus, *rūpa* came to be understood principally in terms of *dhātu* (as world or realm of experience), *āyatana* and *khandha*. As *dhātu*, *loka* or *avacara*, it stood between *kāma* and *arūpa* and signified the meditational worlds of the first three *dhyānas*¹⁶. As *āyatana* or sphere, it signified the visible form of objects, i.e., colour and shape¹⁷. As *khandha* it signified forms of matter and material products¹⁸.

Despite this diversity of usages, the sense of 'form' is ubiquitous as proved by the Chinese translation of *rūpa* by *se* (色)¹⁹. It is contrasted not with body but with formlessness which is available in the meditational realms of empty space, nothingness, pure consciousness or borderline consciousness. Thus, *rūpa* appears to signify the determinate forms of matter and material bodies. As matter *rūpa* is principally though not wholly equated to the five senses and the corresponding sensibilia²⁰. Its defining characteristics are determinateness in

15 Cf. O. Rosenberg, *Die Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie* (Heidelberg 1924), p.83.

16 *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Patna 1975), pp.20-1.

17 *Ibid.*, pp.5-6.

18 *Abhidharmakośam* I (Varanasi 1970), p.30.

19 E.g. Mahāvīyutpatti (Tokyo 1959); W.E. Soothill, *Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms* (London 1937; repr. Taipei 1970, Delhi 1987), esp. p.220a.

space and time ('It's here now'), and resistance, i.e., it is *sani-darśana* and *sapratigha*²¹. Contrasted with this sensuous realm is the non-sensuous realm of *manas*, *dharmadhātu* and *mano-vijñānadhātu*, as well as the eternal realm of the *asamskṛta*.

Rūpa, thus, is conceived as an instantaneous phenomenon dependent on sensory activity. The conception of such instantaneousness, however, showed some metaphysical instability. Since the phenomena are classifiable and recurrent, one was led to postulate corresponding elements and characters (*dharmasvabhāva*, *dharmalakṣaṇa*), but what then was the status of past and future elements? Should not one distinguish the nature of an element from its actual occurrence²²? If the Sarvāstivādins tended to readmit substance through the back door, Sautrāntika iconoclasm prepared the way for the Vijñānavāda demolition of matter²³. Some kind of phenomenalist idealistic reduction of 'matter' appeared unavoidable.

For the Upaniṣads, *nāma-rūpa* signified the fleeting appearance of what is eternally real. For the early Buddhists, fleeting *nāma-rūpa* constituted the sole reality since they denied what is not given in experience²⁴. *Nopalabhyate* constituted for them a sufficient disproof of any transcendent substance²⁵. This was doubtless an effective move against the popularly satis-

20 Abhidharmakośa, 19.

21 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, pp.19, 24.

22 Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (London 1923, repr. Delhi 1988).

23 Cf. Vasubandhu, *Vijñaptimātratā-Vimśikā*, vv. 11-17.

24 Cf. A. Bareau, *Les Sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule* (Saigon 1955), p.137.

25 This is strikingly illustrated in the Kathāvatthu in its debate against the Puggalavāda. See PTS ed., Vol.I, pp.1-69.

fying basis for Buddhist religion and ethics. Morality demands a continuing identity between work and desserts²⁶. Religious salvation conceived as the simple annihilation of experience could hardly attract many. It was natural, then, for the Buddhist religion to centre around the adoration of the Founder himself. Faith in the Buddha was one of the Three Jewels as attested by Aśoka himself²⁷. Even though the physical body of the Buddha was sometimes declared as merely corruptible (*pūtikāya*) and emphasis laid on his Doctrinal Body (*dharmakāya*)²⁸, this did not commend itself to all. Several sects reintroduced the transcendent in some form or other. Among these may be mentioned the Mahāsāṅghikas, Lokottaravādins, the Caityakas etc.²⁹. Among other things the Buddha was conceived as supra-mundane, constituted by pure elements³⁰. His physical body, too, is pure and unlimited³¹; it is in fact only apparitional, the projection of human form. The dividing line between mind and matter, *citta* and *rūpa*, seems to disappear. *Rūpakāya* becomes *nirmāṇakāya*³². In other words, the material body of the Buddha is not a corruptible substance but a mere form or appearance

26 The classical argument for continued identity is that it is necessary to avoid the faults of *kṛta-praṇāsa* and *akṛtābhyāgamah*. Cf. *Milinda-pañho* (Bombay 1940), pp.42-51.

27 Cf. Aśoka's Bhabru Edict.

28 Cf. N. Dutt, *Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism* (London 1930), pp.99-100; La Vallée Poussin, *Le Muséeon*, 1913, pp.259-90.

29 See A. Bareau, *Les Sectes bouddhiques (op. cit.)*, N. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism* (Calcutta 1941, rev. ed., 1971), G.C. Pande, *Bauddha Dharma Ke Vikas Ka Itihas* (3rd ed., Lucknow 1990).

30 Bareau, *op. cit.*, pp.57 ff.

31 *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

32 Cf. M.M. Gopinath Kaviraj on the idea of *nirmāṇakāya* (*Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavan Studies I*, Benares 1922), pp.47-57.

through which a supramundane Being manifests himself. The Dārṣāntikas explicitly visualised the possibility of *rūpa* being undefiled or *anāsrava*³³. Even the Sautrāntikas held that *rūpa* and *citta* are mutually *bījas*³⁴.

Rūpa thus tended to be assimilated to *citta* and was recognised as a possible vehicle for the manifestation of what essentially transcended it. With the recognition that the material body of the Buddha is not only an image projected by him, the way is theoretically opened for the creation of the Buddha image in art³⁵. Although the metaphysics of several early Buddhist schools tended to degrade *rūpa* to merely corruptible matter, the development of a devotional Buddhology in the transitional schools to Mahāyāna discovered the symbolic or significant aspect of *rūpa* as manifestation, apparation or image and thus contributed to the development of Buddhist plastic art.

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33 Bareau, *op. cit.*, p.160.

34 *Ibid.*, p.158.

35 A.K. Coomaraswamy has discussed the subject, see, e.g. his *Figure of Speech or Figure of Thought* (London 1946).

TWO BUDDHISMS RECONSIDERED

Charles S. Prebish

It has been nearly fifteen years since my book *American Buddhism*¹ was published. By design, it represented an initial effort to assess and understand Buddhism's progress in acculturating to an American environment. I concluded the first portion of the volume with a summary section called 'A Tradition of Misunderstanding: Two Buddhisms in America'. In my use of the term 'Two Buddhisms', I was not trying to imply that there were only two kinds of Buddhism in America, however conceived, but rather that there had been **two completely distinct lines of development** in American Buddhism. The first form of Buddhism, I argued, represented the Buddhism practised by essentially Asian American communities. Collectively, they emphasised basic Buddhist doctrines and practices (many of which reflected sectarian peculiarities), were markedly conservative and presented a primarily stable climate for their members. The second line of development included those groups that emerged shortly after the social and religious revolution of the 1960s. At the time, I described these latter groups as 'flashy, opaquely exotic, and "hip"². In many cases they depended on the personal charisma of a flamboyant Asian Buddhist master for their impetus, often eschewing basic Buddhist doctrine and solid Buddhist practice in favour of something more uproarious. Invariably, it was these latter groups that caught the

1 See Charles S. Prebish, *American Buddhism* (Duxbury Press, North Scituate, Mass, 1979).

2 *Ibid.*, p.51.

public eye, often arousing serious suspicion about the nature of the obviously progressing Buddhist movement in America.

Nonetheless, I was by no means unsympathetic to the dilemma faced by the modern American Buddhists of the time. I referred to one of my favourite and temperate resources for assessing forms of religiosity: Robert Michaelson's *The American Search for Soul*. Michaelson suggested that, among religious experiments in America, the ones surviving and having long-lasting influence would be 'those that can, on the one hand, stimulate or elicit the power of spiritually transforming experience and faith and, on the other hand, channel that power into disciplined action'³. He went on to suggest just what was necessary for such a result: 'What is needed is a combination that holds in creative tension a number of seeming opposites; spontaneity and control, spirituality and practicality, ecstasy and action, grace and morality, virtue and power, individuality and community'⁴. Certainly, none of this was beyond the reach of any Buddhist group in America. In fact, in a rather extended review of *American Buddhism* (and several other volumes) Priscilla Pedersen said as much. She argued that emergent Buddhism in America needed to preserve the authenticity of the Buddhist tradition while making appropriate adaptations to a new clientele in a new cultural milieu if it was to thrive on American soil⁵. It was a position with which I concurred then, and still do.

3 Robert S. Michaelson, *The American Search for Soul* (Louisiana State Univ. Press, Baton Rouge, 1975), pp.27-8.

4 *Ibid.*

5 K. Priscilla Pedersen, 'Feature Book Review', *Philosophy East and West* 34, 1 (January 1984), pp.95-103.

Although I continued to study the Buddhist tradition in America, presenting papers at professional meetings, writing in scholarly journals and edited volumes, and giving Dharma talks at a number of American Buddhist centres, I never heard the phrase 'Two Buddhisms' again until December 1992 when Rick Fields used it in a telephone conversation. In the interim, only the descriptive language had changed, reflective perhaps of a concern for being politically correct. One Buddhism now referred exclusively to ethnic Asian-American Buddhist groups in America, to some extent considered highly 'fundamentalist' or 'dogmatic' or 'devotional' by its rivals. The other Buddhism included mostly members of European-derived ancestry, deemed 'intellectually arrogant' or 'purely enlightenment seeking' or even 'White Buddhists' by its seemingly adversarial ethnic Buddhist counterparts. Needless to say, ethnic Buddhist groups apparently felt that they represented the various 'true lineages' and authentic heritage of Buddhist teaching, while the newer form of emergent American Buddhism felt it had made innovations that were both necessary and important for Buddhism's successful move to the West. At best, the above is hardly reflective of Buddhist tolerance and compassion, and at worst, symptomatic of an inferred racism on each side. Unfortunately, it wouldn't be going too far, I think, to submit that all of the above claims are to some extent true. As a result, Donald Tuck's prominent book *Buddhist Churches of America: Jodo Shinshu*⁶, which documents many of the attitudes cited above as normative in the large and consequential ethnic Buddhist group cited in the title, becomes an important resource for understanding one kind of Buddhism in America. For the other kind of Buddhism in America, one needn't look too far in the emerging popular litera-

6 Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, New York, 1987.

ture of American Buddhist culture. In the Winter 1991 issue of *Tricycle*, Helen Tworikov editorialised that 'If we are to affirm true pluralism we must accept that one person's practice is another's poison' but that 'The spokespeople for Buddhism in America have been, almost exclusively, educated members of the white middle class'⁷. She goes on: 'Meanwhile, even with varying statistics, Asian-American Buddhists number at least one million, but so far they have not figured prominently in the development of something called American Buddhism'⁸. The above statement provoked Ryo Imamura, an 18th generation Jōdo Shinshū priest and prominent member of Buddhist Churches of America, to write in an unpublished letter (dated 25 April 1992) to the editor of *Tricycle*⁹:

I would like to point out that it was my grandparents and other immigrants from Asia who brought and implanted Buddhism in American soil over 100 years ago despite white American intolerance and bigotry. It was my American-born parents and their generation who courageously and diligently fostered the growth of American Buddhism despite having to practice discretely in hidden ethnic temples and in concentration camps because of the same white intolerance and bigotry. It was us Asian Buddhists who welcomed countless white Americans into our temples, introduced them to the Dharma, and often assisted them to initiate their own Sanghas when they felt uncomfortable prac-

7 See Helen Tworikov, 'Many is More', *Tricycle* 1, 2 (Winter 1991), p.4.

8 *Ibid.*

9 Shared with me in a personal correspondence from Ryo Imamura dated 10 January 1993

ticing with us . . .

We Asian Buddhists have hundreds of temples in the United States with active practitioners of all ages, ongoing educational programs that are both Buddhist and interfaith in nature, social welfare projects. . . everything that white Buddhist centers have and perhaps more. It is apparent that Tworikov has restricted 'American Buddhism' to mean 'white American Buddhism', and that her statement is even more misleading than one claiming that Americans of color did not figure prominently in the development of American history.

Additionally, and curiously, a tally of *Tricycle's* highly interesting feature 'What Does Being a Buddhist Mean to You?' indicates that of the forty-seven individuals pictured since the publication's beginning (and through Winter 1992), thirty-seven are Caucasians.

The problem being described, however, is even more complicated than it seems. Much of this is summarised well in the updated, third edition (1992) of Rick Fields' *How the Swans Came to the Lake*¹⁰. In an absorbing chapter on 'The Changing of the Guard' (pp.359-80), he points out that while it is barely a century since the important World Parliament of Religions, held in Chicago in 1893, (as noted above) more than a million Americans refer to themselves as Buddhists. More importantly, as America continues to present a virtual haven for endangered Buddhist lineages from Asia, the entire Buddhist landscape of

10 See Rick Fields, *How the Swans Came to the Lake* (Shambhala, Boston, 3rd ed., 1992).

traditions and sects is now present on American soil. This is both exciting and perilous. Amidst what Fields calls the 'cross-lineage and cross-cultural borrowing', the problems of continuity are exacerbated. Despite actually making a reasonable case for North America as a 'melting pot' for American Buddhism, Fields takes the contrary position, noting that the effort would be a case 'of the whole amounting to less than the sum of its parts'¹¹. He thinks Buddhism in North America will continue to be pluralistic, and while he sees this circumstance as one of great opportunity, through dialogue and exchange, it is also filled with serious problems . . . ones going far beyond ethnic fundamentalism or intellectual arrogance. Most observers or investigators of the current American Buddhist scene would probably agree that generalisations are either altogether impossible or just plain foolish. Nonetheless, at the very least, any serious and careful examination of the 'Two Buddhisms' in America would necessarily include, in addition to the issues already cited, concern for a consideration of the monastic sangha versus the laity, the role of women in American Buddhism, the abuse of power and authority by some Buddhist leaders, and the role of 'socially engaged Buddhism'. We can only consider some of these matters here.

Peter W. Williams, in his (1990) book *American Religions*, identifies three categories to describe the way Asian religions impact on America: (1) 'ethnic religions', or those practised by Asian immigrants and, to an extent, by their descendants, (2) 'export religions', or those popular among well-educated, generally intellectual Americans, and (3) 'new religions', or those developing in consonance with the process outlined by Jacob

11 *Ibid.*, p.370.

Needleman and others, and often as revolutionary outgrowths of religions cited in the first two categories¹². This threefold designation is to some degree an extension of anthropologist Robert Redfield's categories of 'great traditions' and 'little traditions'¹³. The great traditions refer to the religions of the literate and elite. They are the religions of books and scholars. The little traditions are less historically grounded; they are popular expressions of the great traditions, transmitted less through books and scholars and more through family values and community practice. Williams' categorisation is useful in understanding ethnic Buddhist groups, such as Buddhist Churches of America, as 'little tradition' manifestations of an 'ethnic religion', while identifying Zen and Tibetan groups as 'export religions', part of the 'great tradition', and representing an 'elite Buddhism in America'. To some extent, one may infer that Williams links the on-going success of ethnic religions to the degree to which they make the transition from past to present, to their ability to become **Americanised**. And he knows this is no simple task either: 'To become American means more than to effect a geographic relocation to the horizontal midsection of the North American continent, or even to become a citizen of the United States. In the fuller sense, it means becoming acculturated, adopting a distinctively American way of living and looking at the world as its own'¹⁴. Additionally, acculturation generally proceeds far more slowly than one would prefer, is an arduous process and resists the urgency of some individuals (especially in America)

12 See Peter W. Williams, *American Religions: Traditions and Cultures* (MacMillan, New York 1990), p.417.

13 See Robert Redfield, *The Little Community and Peasant Society* (Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago 1960).

14 *Ibid.*, p.430.

to force proverbial square pegs through round holes.

One of the great challenges facing the American Buddhism of today encompasses finding a means of reconciling the vastly different emphases of ethnic Buddhist and exported Buddhist groups. No doubt the circumstance is complicated by enormous misunderstandings on both sides of the issue. In the August 1991 issue of *Dharma Gate*, a newspaper publication of the One Mind Zen Center in Crestone, Colorado, editor Hye Shim (Sarah Grayson) Se Nim wrote¹⁵:

'Buddhism is coming to us from many cultures. Each come with their own understanding mixed with indigenous elements of that culture. We can be Buddhist, but we cannot be Tibetans, Japanese, Korean, Sri Lankan, Burmese, etc. For us as Westerners to create a Buddhist culture at this time, it has to resonate with our experiences as Western people. So, what does apply here? The earliest Buddhists here maintained Buddhism strictly as an ethnic bonding and did not expect or make it possible for Westerners to become a part of it. That can't work for Americans'.

Such an approach is both inaccurate and frightening. It also reflects a serious misunderstanding of the early Asian-American Buddhist endeavour. Worse yet, based on her assumption that shamanism and Buddhism have been linked in a variety of cultures, including Asia and America, the editor makes a rather passionate plea for endorsing shamanism as the vehicle to

15 See *Dharma Gate* 1, 2 (August 1991) p.2.

'create a rich and integrated Buddhist culture in the West'¹⁶. The problem is significantly more complicated than she imagines. Because she believes that 'The authoritarian and hierarchical systems that were imported with Japanese Buddhism have never meshed very well with Americans and in a very short time began to seem obsolete'¹⁷, she has effectively eliminated the possibility of ethnic Japanese-American Buddhist groups from participating in her vision of a thriving American Buddhism. Ryo Imamura, however, points out that things are equally problematic in non-ethnic American Buddhism. He notes that¹⁸:

White Buddhists treat their teachers like gurus or living Buddhas whereas we Asians regard ours to be fallible human beings who represent an honored tradition and not themselves. White Buddhist centers rise and fall dramatically like ocean waves whereas Asian temples seem to persist uneventfully and quietly through generations. White practitioners practice intensive psychotherapy on their cushions in a life-or-death struggle with the ego whereas Asian Buddhists just seem to smile and eat together. It is clear that, although they may adopt Asian Buddhist names, dress and mannerisms, white Buddhists cannot help but drag their Judeo-Christian identities and shadows with them wherever they go.

Rather than presenting a negative verdict, Imamura stresses

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Ibid.*

18 Imamura, unpublished letter to *Tricycle*.

positive prospects for the future: 'This certainly makes for an exciting and dramatic new form of Buddhism'¹⁹.

There are other predicaments too. Don Morreale published more than 300 pages of (essays and) listings of American Buddhist groups in his *Buddhist America: Centers, Retreats, Practices*²⁰, yet every single listing is of a **meditation group or temple**. Does this emphasis reveal a subtle, unspoken prejudice which inherently presumes non-meditative groups to be, at best, unworthy of citation in an American Buddhist compendium, and at worst, not really **Buddhist**? Morreale even notes that many of the ethnic meditation temples didn't respond to his questionnaire, and he ponders whether it was motivated by 'conviction that their principal duty is to their own ethnic constituencies'²¹.

The Introductory essay in Morreale's book, 'Is Buddhism Changing in North America?', was written by Jack Kornfield, well-known co-founder of the Insight Meditation Society, identified by Rick Fields as one of the 'men who care'. Near the end of his essay, Kornfield says something extraordinary²²:

As Buddhism comes to North America, a wonderful process is happening. All of us, as lay people, as householders, want what was mostly the special dispensation of monks in Asia: the real practice of the Buddha. American lay people are not content to go and hear a

19 *Ibid.*

20 See Don Morreale (ed.), *Buddhist America: Centers, Retreats, Practices* (John Muir Pubs, Santa Fe, New Mexico, 1988).

21 *Ibid.*, p.xxi.

22 *Ibid.*, p.xxv.

sermon once a week or to make merit by leaving gifts at a meditation center. We, too, want to live the realizations of the Buddha and bring them into our hearts, our lives, and our times. This is why so many Americans have been drawn to the purity of intensive Vipassana retreats, or to the power of Zen *sesshin*, or even to the one hundred thousand prostrations and three-year retreats of the Vajrayana tradition. Somehow we have an intuitive sense of the potential of human freedom and the heart of basic goodness, the timeless discovery of the Buddha.

Aside from a rather restrictive definition of the term **American**, which I don't share, and the presumption that **all American Buddhists are lay disciples**, which I equally don't share, Kornfield seems to be rather clearly excluding anything non-meditational from the **real practice of the Buddha**. In doing so, he seriously underestimates the nature, import and efficacy of Pure Land Buddhism, for example, in a cavalier fashion.

One would be wrong to presume the above to be a one-sided argument. In a recent letter to the editor of *Tricycle*, Venerable Dr Havanpola Ratanasara, Executive President of the American Buddhist Congress in Los Angeles, wrote²³:

About 'The Changing of the Guard', this article doesn't really hit the mark for me. The impression I get is that the author wants the reader to believe that the conclusion (that American Buddhism puts an emphasis on householder instead of monk, and the community instead of monastery) is representative of all or most of

23 See 'Letters to the Editor', *Tricycle* 1, 4 (Summer 1992), p.77.

what is going on in American Buddhism. This is not so, even among Western-born . . . The criticism made about the Buddhist order of monks in general is inaccurate and impolite. It tends to include, by association, all the Sangha, while overlooking the contributions made by the *Bhikkus* [sic] and their monasteries.

When questioned about the above letter, in a telephone conversation of 12 January 1993, Dr Ratanasara indicated to me that Mr Fields not only had a limited understanding of the Buddhist tradition, but that his book on American Buddhism presented a prejudiced viewpoint in not recognising the importance of the Theravāda tradition in America. More specifically, he maintained that 'secularization will not work' in American Buddhism. He argued for Buddhist communities to work under the guidance of monks, and that the Vinaya need not be altered at all, or new commentaries constructed, in order to confront ethical circumstances in changing times and cultures, but decisions of the 'Sangha as a community of monks' would be offered to adjust and introduce new accommodations in the traditional manner of *katikāvatas* or codes of conduct for the communities so that they live in conformity with the Vinaya. When queried as to whether non-ethnic American Buddhists were currently joining the monastic community in significant numbers, he mentioned that one person in Virginia had recently become a bhikkhu! Regarding the relationship between ethnic and non-ethnic American Buddhists, he said the issue was 'irrelevant', that acculturation would 'happen automatically' as American Buddhism matured. He also said that White Buddhists needed more time to study and understand the core teachings of Buddhist cultures and traditions, and to stop coming to 'hasty' conclusions. Dr

Ratanasara concluded by telling me that Los Angeles was the most important Buddhist centre in the United States, and that additional American urban areas were now modelling themselves on the Sangha Council of Southern California.

Other examples abound. At the 1987 Conference on World Buddhism in North America, held at the University of Michigan, Eleanor Rosch reported that one American Theravādin sāmaṇera said 'Make Theravada monasticism workable in this country. Please. We need it for the purity of the teachings. If you don't, the teachings will turn into something else. They will turn into Ram Dass. They will turn into therapy. I'm seeing it happen'²⁴. This latter quote is just as scary as the citation from the *Dharma Gate* editorial. The conference, however, did affirm a 'Statement of Consensus' designed to foster affirmation of a **common Buddhist heritage** and cooperation between **all American Buddhist groups**. In a truly ecumenical spirit, it affirmed²⁵:

- (1) to create the conditions necessary for tolerance and understanding among Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike.
- (2) to initiate a dialogue among Buddhists in North America in order to further mutual understanding, growth in understanding, and cooperation.
- (3) to increase our sense of community by recognizing and understanding our differences as well as

24 Eleanor Rosch, 'World Buddhism in North America Today', *The Vajradhatu Sun* 9, 1 (Oct.-Nov.1987), p.8.

25 See *The Vajradhatu Sun*, op.cit., p.28.

our common beliefs and practices.

(4) to cultivate thoughts and actions of friendliness towards others, whether they accept our beliefs or not, and in so doing approach the world as the proper field of Dharma, not as a sphere of conduct irreconcilable with the practice of Dharma.

The 'Statement of Consensus' of the Conference on World Buddhism in North America seems to imply a different operative model than the one suggested by Peter Williams, and is better identified in terms of what Robert S. Ellwood, Jr. has called **established religion** and **emergent religion**²⁶. Established religion doesn't appeal to a religious elite, arguing that ordinary folk can attain religious truth and experience. Further, established religion locates the pursuit of ultimate reality firmly within the context of one's traditional community, cognisant that religion as practised by the 'little tradition' is sufficiently devout for religious attainment. What makes it **established** is its constancy, its rejection of what is radical, its **duration**. In Ellwood's words, it implements 'the normative values of the community'²⁷. He maintains that established religions are both international and intercultural. Emergent religion generally appears during changing times. It reflects an uncertainty about, but orientation towards, the future. It usually chooses and emphasises something new and innovative from the established religion that serves as its foundation. It often focuses its attention around a charismatic leader who brings new members

26 For a discussion of this topic, see Robert S. Ellwood, Jr., *Introducing Religion from Inside and Outside* (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 2nd ed., 1983), pp.140-54.

27 *Ibid.*, p.143.

into the fold. Emergent religion can be further categorised into (1) 'intensive' emergent religion and (2) 'expansive' emergent religion. The former group tends to withdraw from the mainstream of society to intensify its religious practice (usually drawn from within the context of established religion). An example of this type of group would be the Amish. The latter group also withdraws from society but, unlike intensive religion, its intent is to establish **what it is**, to infuse established religion **with new ideas, new practices, new approaches** that make it applicable to a new setting. It is not at all unusual for emergent religions to become established religions within a couple of generations. This process reflects what Max Weber called the 'routinization of charisma'. Thus, Shinran's Jōdo Shinshū is an example of emergent religion becoming established. It is quite possible to see Buddhism in America in this light. Some Buddhist groups, such as Buddhist Churches of America and various Theravādin communities fit the description of established religion. The remainder of Buddhist groups (including, for example, various Tibetan and Zen groups, or Nichiren Shōshū) could easily be referred to as emergent religions, moving at various speeds, governed by factors such as secularisation and the like, towards status as established religions. In this way **all American Buddhist groups** fit properly under the Buddhist umbrella, no group more or less valid than any other.

In the nearly two decades that I have been writing about Buddhism in America, I have consistently argued that since the vast majority of Buddhists in that country were members of the laity, for Buddhism to be truly American, it would need to address the dilemma of tailoring the **major emphasis** of Buddhist practice to lay rather than monastic life. Initially, the suggestion was rather widely and aggressively attacked by what seemed to me like most of the Buddhist groups in America.

The substance of the critique presumed that I ignored the monastic sangha, the very basis and foundation of Buddhist community life. Of course I did nothing of the kind. I simply acknowledged what Buddhists in Asia have recognised for more than two millennia. Most practitioners, for an enormous variety of entirely valid reasons, cannot make the full and complete commitment to the rigorous practice associated with monastic life. That doesn't mean we should ignore the monastic tradition, or exclude it from American Buddhist life, but rather that we provide the context for all Buddhists in America to practise in a fashion appropriate to their choice of approach. In so doing, we would simply be following, and perhaps adapting, an Asian Buddhist model predicated on the notion that there have always been more members of the laity than members of the monastic tradition, but that both endeavours needed to be affirmed and endorsed for the successful development of Buddhist religious life. Such an approach has not always been clear in the popular literature. In Spring 1992, the *Tricycle* editorial observed that 'Just now, ours is not predominantly a Buddhism of removed monasticism. It is out of robes, in the streets, in institutions, workplaces, and homes'²⁸. The editorial closed with this remark: 'While Buddhist history is steeped in monasticism, our own democratic traditions compel us to share the burden of social problems'²⁹. For some Buddhists in this country, monastic and otherwise, the above comments may be perceived as highly inflammatory, possibly even reflective of a rejection of the entire monastic vocation. To be sure, American Buddhism might

28 See Helen Tworikov, 'The Formless Field of Benefaction', *Tricycle* 1, 3 (Spring 1992), p.4.

29 *Ibid.*

redefine somewhat the nature of the symbiosis between the two main component groups of the Buddhist Sangha, but neither enterprise would ever be disparaged by the other. In Morreale's 1988 volume, Jack Kornfield called the same process **integration** and, along with democratisation and feminism, considered it one of three major themes in North American Buddhism³⁰. So, within a decade, many writers, mostly identified with non-ethnic American Buddhism, had begun to echo my own sentiment. No one, however, has made the argument so eloquently, and with such awareness of the complexity of the task, as Rita Gross in her utterly brilliant book *Buddhism After Patriarchy*³¹. Gross recognises that what she refers to as 'monasticism after patriarchy', while understanding that new and vital archetypes must replace Buddhism's current 'very weak models for meaningful lay life', must forge new monastic paradigms that are androgynous and free of prejudice or discrimination³². The movement to a truly post-patriarchal monastic tradition is at least as threatening to traditional Buddhism in Asia as to the conflict between the 'Two Buddhisms' in America, as outlined above, and of course Gross argues persuasively for an androgynous lay Buddhism as well. Additionally, Gross identifies, addresses and **validates** the emphasis of those Buddhists who are trying to work out an intermediary lifestyle that incorporates **both monastic and lay features** into serious, rigorous Buddhist practice.

Associated with the struggle to redefine community life in

30 Kornfield, in *Buddhist America*, p.xv.

31 See Rita M. Gross, *Buddhism After Patriarchy* (State Univ. of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1993).

32 *Ibid.*, pp.240-9.

American Buddhism, accommodating both ethnic and largely non-ethnic groups, is a new emphasis on active expressions of compassion as perhaps the major component of a revitalised Buddhist ethics that has been called 'socially engaged Buddhism'. In an interesting new book entitled *Inner Peace, World Peace*³³, Kenneth Kraft, the editor, provides an interesting survey chapter in which he chronicles many of the activities collected under the above rubric, such as the founding of the Buddhist Peace Fellowship in 1978, Thich Nhat Hanh's many significant endeavours in North America, the Dalai Lama's efforts and, most importantly, the growing body of literature that has accompanied the effort. Kraft shows how socially engaged Buddhism in America has utilised well-known methods of social action in that culture: voter mobilisation, letter writing campaigns, voluntary charity work, tax resistance, product boycotts, and so forth. What is most puzzling here is that one of the major foci of socially engaged Buddhists in the West consists of providing aid and support to ethnic Buddhist groups, both here and in Asia, while, with few exceptions, ethnic Buddhists in America seem not to be specially active in the movement.

A creative commentary on Buddhism's attempt to renew its commitment to generating and practising a revitalised, value-orientated ethical life is the development of Thich Nhat Hanh's 'Order of Interbeing', the successor to Vietnam's Tiep Hien Order. It tries to provide a creative (even experimental) individual and collective methodology for the application of Buddhist principles to today's world. The major thrust of the

33 See Kenneth Kraft (ed.), *Inner Peace, World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and Nonviolence* (State Univ. of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1992), and especially pp.1-30.

group is to practise the traditional five vows of the laity, in conjunction with fourteen additional precepts that amplify and augment the values underlying the original five. Moreover, Nhat Hanh has struck a careful balance between meditational training and political activism, emphasising each activity as mutually influencing. In so doing, both ethnic and non-ethnic American Buddhist groups are provided with an agenda for activism that benefits all Buddhists. Despite its clever use of what Fields calls 'cross-cultural borrowing' and genuine potential for an honourable rather than politically correct multiculturalism in American Buddhism, this approach has not been uniformly accepted.

One of the most fruitful approaches to understanding the attitudinal differences between ethnic and non-ethnic American Buddhists can be extracted from Kraft's work in *Inner Peace, World Peace*. He suggests that Buddhists in Asian and Third World countries are often engaged in a serious struggle for political and cultural survival. He notes that 'Those involved in such conflicts typically have little interest in the theoretical implications of nonviolence or the latest innovations in spiritual/activist practice'³⁴. Most Western Buddhists have never shared that tragic experience; it's a form of suffering they've never experienced. Yet their teachers have. Chögyam Trungpa's *Born in Tibet* remains a chilling testament to the fallout of a world filled with suffering. Thich Thien-an's work with Vietnamese refugees both before and after the fall of Saigon documents how suffering sometimes fosters what one writer called 'the exigencies of a major transplantation of human

34 *Ibid.*, p.24.

beings to a totally new environment³⁵. Irrespective of whether the individual teacher is Jiyu Kennett or Maezumi Rōshi, Shinzen Young or Havanpola Gunaratana, Karuna Dharma or Ryo Imamura, Sharon Salzberg or Tarthang Tulku, they all might come to manifest the most creative sort of eclectic ecumenicism that provides the potential for understanding and growth rather than misunderstanding and divisiveness in American Buddhism. It is their legacy that provides hope and potential for 'Two Buddhisms in America' to coalesce, to grow and mature into an 'American Buddhism', valourising the notion that, in Helen Tworikov's words, 'There is no one way to be a Buddhist'³⁶.

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35 This statement was made by Lenore Friedman.

36 Tworikov, 'Many is More', p.4.

COMMENTS ON 'IS EARLY BUDDHISM ATHEISTIC?'

BY DAVID J. KALUPAHANA

L. M. Joshi*

Here I shall confine my observation to the early Buddhist conception of religious truth, although my statements concerning Buddhist doctrinal points are based on memory.

The most important religious term and the most fundamental philosophical concept of the Buddhist tradition is Dharma/Dhamma. Unfortunately, however, Prof. Kalupahana does not even mention this term in his analysis of the early Buddhist attitude towards the conception of 'God', 'unseen order', or 'divinity'. In our opinion, in any discussion of the Buddhist attitude towards God, one cannot afford to ignore a consideration of the role of the notion of Dharma in Buddhist religious life and thought. In view of this, we are constrained to say that the conclusions arrived at by Kalupahana are hasty and questionable.

The notion of Dharma constitutes the core of Buddhist religiousness and thought. One can say that Dharma offers us an alternative to God; Dharma does not perform the functions of God; but it certainly functions, has functioned for more than twenty-five centuries, as the Buddhist alternative to God. It is in the light of the Buddhist notion of Dharma that one can study

* Delivered at the Second East-West Religions in Encounter Conference, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, January 1984.

and appreciate the Buddhist attitude towards God, Unseen Order, or Creator Lord of the world.

There is no doubt that Buddhism is an atheistic or non-theistic system of religious thought. The history of Buddhist religiousness is monumental historical evidence of the existence of a great world religion without having a theory of a God-creator. Buddhism does not teach belief in the existence of God as the creator and governor of the universe. On the other hand, it shows that a theistic conception of ultimate Reality or supreme Truth is not enough. In other words, Buddhism shows that ultimate Reality cannot be conceived in theistic terms only, that there can be and is a non-theistic perspective also, as valid or reasonable as the theistic one.

The Buddhist word for ultimate Truth or supreme Reality is Dharma. If the word God is one of the several symbols of this Reality, which is essentially transcendental and ineffable, then one can say that Dharma and God are interchangeable words. However, if the word God is the personal name of the Creator and the ruler of the universe, then the Buddhists have been clearly indifferent towards him.

It is a well known fact that in the ultimate sense Dharma is another name of the Buddha and the Buddha is not different from Buddhahood or Nirvāṇa/Nibbāna. Here we would like to quote an important observation by Edward Conze:

'We are told that Nirvāṇa is permanent, stable, imperishable, immovable, ageless, deathless, unborn, and unbecome, that it is power, bliss and happiness, the secure refuge, the shelter, and the place of unassailable safety, that it is the real Truth and the supreme Reality; that it is the Good, the supreme goal and the one and only consummation of our life, the eternal, hidden and

incomprehensible Peace.

Similarly, the Buddha who is, as it were, the personal embodiment of Nirvāṇa, becomes the object of all those emotions which we are wont to call religions'.

(*Buddhism: Its Essence and Development*, p.40).

It has been said that Dharma is also one of the names of Nirvāṇa. In this sense Dharma is the object of the highest knowledge which is identical with Enlightenment or Buddhahood. It is in this sense of ultimate Truth or supreme Reality that Dharma is revered and adored by devout Buddhists. It is in this sense that Dharma is called the excellent refuge (*saraṇam varam*). All Buddhists take refuge in this Dharma.

The Pāli scriptures identify Dharma and Buddha. He who sees the Dharma, sees the Buddha (*yo dhammaṃ passati so Buddhaṃ passati*). It is not the human Buddha who is identified with the Dharma. It is the Tathāgata, the Transcendent One, who has gone beyond the stages of divinity (*deva*) and humanity (*manussa*) and has reached the wholly other sphere, the Abode of Excellent Peace (*santi vara padam*), who is identified with the Dharma. In one of his discourses, the Buddha clearly says that he is not a man or a god, but a Buddha. The Tathāgata is also called *Dhamma-bhūta* or 'Truth-embodied', *Brahma-bhūta* or 'Holiness-embodied', *Ñāṇa-bhūta* or 'Knowledge-embodied', and so on. The word 'Brahma' in this context means the Holy or the Sacred, that is to say, Brahma in this place is a name of Dharma. The Suttanipāta identifies *brahmācariya* with *dhammacariya*. The epithet *Brahma-bhūta* does not have any Brahmanical overtones; it is purely a Buddhological epithet like *Sīti-bhūta*, *Nibbuta* etc.

It is unfortunate that Kalupahana has misunderstood not only the meaning of *Brahma-bhūta* as an epithet of the Tathā-

gata, but also the position of gods in the Buddhist theory of the sentient world. His translation of *Brahma-bhūta* as 'become Brahmā' is wrong. The Buddha is far superior to Brahmā and all the other gods; he is called the 'Teacher of gods and men' (*sathā deva manussānam*). Indra or Śakra, the lord of gods, and Brahmā the great god, are his devout servants. In one of his former births, the Bodhisattva had been born as Brahmā. The Buddha, however, is the Enlightened One, the Seer of Truth (*Dhamma-dassī*), Knower of the world (*Lokavidū*), Giver of Immortality (*Amatassa-dātā*), and one who has attained the Supreme Purification (*anuttara-visuddhi*). To say that the Buddha has 'become Brahmā' is not only erroneous but also blasphemous.

None of the gods is free from the cankers (*āsavas*); one of the characteristic achievements of the Buddha is that he is free from the cankers. The Buddha knows all the gods, their past and future destinies, he knows all the heavens where different classes of gods live. But he knows much more than this; he knows the Dharma and is in possession of the Peace that passeth understanding. None of the gods knows where the four great elements, viz. earth, water, air and fire, cease; but the Buddha knows where these elements cease (see *Dīghanikāya*, 11). It is true that the gods mentioned in Buddhist texts are good and moral beings; they are more powerful than human beings. But they are not perfect beings; all the gods are subject to the law of karma; all of them are still in *Samsāra*; they have to practise the Holy Eightfold Path and they have to perfect themselves in the Triple Training if they want to achieve ultimate Release (*vimutti*). In view of the above picture of the position of gods in Buddhist cosmology, it is not correct to say that Brahmā, Indra and other gods mentioned in early Buddhist texts represent the idea of that 'divinity' or 'unseen order' which

William James had in his mind. For he talks of the 'supreme good' which consists in our harmonious adjustment to the 'unseen order'. Man's supreme good, according to early Buddhism, consists in achieving *Nirvāṇa*/Dharma and not in becoming one of the gods living in one of the heavens.

It is worthy of remark here that Buddhism also teaches the existence of an 'unseen order'. The name of this 'unseen order' is also called Dharma. Dharma in this sense means the order of law of the Universe which is said to be everlasting and immanent. This order of law is not created by any god nor is it a command of the Buddha. Whether or not the Tathāgatas appear in the world, the firm order of law (*dhammaṭṭhititā*) or the regulative principle (*dhammaniyāmatā*) continues and operates in the universe without any interruption. An example of this functioning of the universal order of law or Dharma is that all compounded or conditioned things or elements are characterised by impermanence, suffering and selflessness. Another example of this order of Dharma is taught in a verse of the *Dhammapada* (v.5): 'Hatred is never appeased by hatred in this world; it is appeased only by love; this is an everlasting law'. It is perhaps possible to suggest that this aspect of the Dharma is comparable in some degree to the 'unseen order' of which William James talks.

Prof. Kalupahana has in his paper referred to the principle of 'dependent origination' (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) which the Buddha discovered in the course of his Enlightenment. This principle of 'dependent origination' is also an aspect of the Dharma/Dhamma. Its knowledge is called *dhamma-ñāṇa*. Kalupahana translates *dhamma-ñāṇa* as 'knowledge through experience' and says that what James called 'knowledge of acquaintance' is comparable to this 'knowledge through

experience'. It is very difficult for us to accept this translation and the parallel drawn by him. The knowledge of the principle of dependent origination is nothing less than the highest knowledge which results in ultimate Release. The Buddha described this principle as the supreme Truth (*dharmma*) which is 'profound, difficult to see, difficult to understand, quiescent, excellent, beyond discursive reasoning, subtle and knowable only by the wise' (Mahāvagga I, 5.ii). The Pāli phrase *dharmma-ñāna* means 'knowledge of the Truth'. James' conception of 'knowledge of acquaintance' can hardly come near the Buddha's knowledge of the Truth.

Lal Mani Joshi

EDITORIAL NOTE

Ekottarāgama Translation

Owing to the fact that we have experienced some problems in obtaining a reliable (both from the time and the translation itself points of view) French version of this important work, we have decided that in future it will appear in English, translated by Ven. Huyèn-Vi in collaboration with the assistant editors.

EKOTTARĀGAMA (XV)

Translated from the Chinese version by
Thích Huyèn-Vi
in collaboration with
Sara Boin-Webb and Bhikkhu Pāsādika

Seventh Fascicle

Part 17

Ānāpāna[smṛti] (a)

1. 'Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvastī, at the Jeta Grove, in Anāthapiṇḍada's Park. Then, in time, the Exalted One put on his [outer] robes and took up his alms-bowl. Entering the city of Śrāvastī, he was followed by Rāhula. Caring for the latter, he turned to the right and looking back, said: Now, Rāhula, you must contemplate form as being impermanent. — Certainly, Exalted One, replied Rāhula, form is impermanent. — O Rāhula, the Exalted One went on to say, feeling, perception, formative forces and consciousness — they are all absolutely impermanent. — Again Rāhula responded: Certainly, Exalted One; feeling . . . and consciousness — all are impermanent. — Now Venerable (*bhadanta*) Rāhula thought to himself: For what reason (*kiṃkāraṇa*) am I being cared for while just reaching the city? And why is it that on the way the Exalted One admonishes (*avavadati*) me? Now I ought to

1 See T 2, 581b29 ff, and its Japanese translation at Hayashi, p.124 ff; cf. M I, 420 ff. (Mahā-Rāhulovādasutta); I.B. Horner, *The Middle Length Sayings II*, 91 ff.

return to my place; no need to enter the city and beg for alms-food. — So, midway on the spot, Venerable Rāhula returned to the Jetavanavihāra², and with robes and alms-bowl, he proceeded to the foot of a tree and sat down cross-legged (*pariyāṅka*), straightening body and mind. Fully concentrated and with one-pointedness of mind (*cittaikāgratā*), he contemplated form, feeling, perception, formative forces and consciousness as being impermanent. Meanwhile, the Exalted One had finished begging for alms-food in Śrāvastī and, after his repast at the Jetavanavihāra, he took his walking-exercise (*caṅkramaṇa*). In the course of time he came to the place where Rāhula was to be found and addressed him as follows: You should practise [mindfulness of] breathing (*ānāpānasmṛti*). If such is your practice (*dharma*) all sorrow (*śokasaṃjñā*) you may experience is bound to be completely left behind. You are still in the grip of worldly ways³ and muddled thinking. Covetousness (*lobha*) and attachment (*anunaya*) have to be eradicated. Now, Rāhula, you should cultivate friendliness (*maitrī*) in your heart. You have already cultivated it, but any dislike (*dveṣa*), any aversion (*pratigha*) still in existence — an end has to be put to all that once and for all. O Rāhula, you must also cultivate a heart [full of] compassion (*karuṇā*). You have surely cultivated it, but even the slightest [tendencies towards] cruelty (*vihimsā*) in your heart have to be wiped out. You must further cultivate a heart [full of] sympathetic joy (*muditā*). [Although] you have already done so, you must [persist in your practice in order to] cleanse your heart totally of jealousy (*īrṣyā*). O Rāhula, do cultivate equa-

2 After Hackmann, p.67.

3 Lit. *kumārga*; for 露 THV reads 路.

nimity (*upekṣā*)⁴. You have certainly been doing so, [but continue cultivating it] so as to extirpate conceit (*māna*) and arrogance (*mada*).

Thereupon the Exalted One addressed these verses to Rāhula:
 Eschew once and for all attachment to views and
 Always follow [instead] the Teaching wholeheartedly.
 He who is endowed [due to Dharma practice] with [insight-]
 Knowledge will therefore be held in esteem everywhere.
 Holding [aloft] for mankind the torch of wisdom (*vidyā*),
 One will dispel the darkness [of delusion] and [thus]
 Be deeply respected by gods and *nāgas*.
 [This is the] proper [way of] venerating one's Master.

Thereupon the bhikṣu Rāhula, in reply to the Exalted One, uttered the following verses:

I will not be attached to views and will
 Always follow the Teaching. (T 2, 582a)
 Being endowed with [insight-]knowledge [due to
 Dharma practice], [I will] thus be able [really] to venerate
 the Master.

Having given his instruction, the Exalted One left and went back to his own quiet room, whilst Venerable Rāhula was wondering how one would practise [mindfulness of] breathing, abandon [vain] thoughts and overcome all sorrow. Then Rāhula rose from his seat and went to the Exalted One's whereabouts. On his arrival, he bowed down his head at [the Exalted One's] feet and sat down at one side. Presently (*muhūrtena*), he rose again and asked the Exalted One: How does one practise [mindfulness of] breathing, abandon [vain] thoughts and overcome all

4 Lit. the Chinese corresponds to *āraṅśacitta*, 'a mind given to protection'.

sorrow? How does one obtain as sublime result (*mahāphala*) the taste of deathlessness (*amṛtarasa*)? — The Exalted One replied: Well said, well said (*sādhu*), Rāhula! You are indeed capable of asking this question and thereby 'roaring the lion's roar' (*siṃhanādanādin*) in front of the Tathāgata: How does one practise [mindfulness of] breathing . . . the taste of deathlessness? Now, Rāhula, listen attentively and take heed (*śṛṇu sādhu ca suṣṭhu ca manasi-kuru*)⁵ The time has come for me to elucidate and give you details (*nir-diś*). — Just so, Exalted One, replied Rāhula. While Venerable Rāhula [joined his hands as a token of reverence] to receive the Exalted One's Teaching, he was given the following instruction:

A bhikṣu intent on a quiet, secluded and really lonely place [goes there], sits down cross-legged and straightens body and mind. Concentrating on the tip of his nose without letting mental proliferation (*nānātvā*) arise, he breathes out⁶ a long [breath] and is fully aware of it; breathing in⁶ a long [breath], he is fully aware of it; breathing out a short [breath], he is fully aware of it; breathing in a short [breath], he is fully aware of it; breathing out a cool [breath] . . . breathing in a cool [breath] . . . breathing out a warm [breath] . . . breathing in a warm [breath],

5 Cf. for instance, Mahāvvyut. 6215.

6 I.e. *āśvāsa-praśvāsa* which, according to the Chinese EĀ means 'exhalation and inhalation'; also the St Petersburg Sanskrit dictionary and Monier Williams take *praśvāsa* to mean 'inhalation'. In general, Pāli scholars translate the dvandva compound as 'inhalation and exhalation', whilst pundits in Thailand understand it the other way round. In the *Index to the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* by A. Hirakawa (Tokyo 1973), however, the Tibetan and Chinese versions of the Sanskrit compound corroborate the interpretation of the majority of scholars: 'inhalation and exhalation'. See F. Edgerton's interesting entry in his BHSD, p.110.

he is fully aware of it. He contemplates the whole bodily [process of] inhaling and exhaling⁷ and is fully aware of everything. When there is breathing he is fully aware of its presence, and when there is no breathing he is also fully aware of its absence. In the event of breathing out conditioned by the mind, he is fully aware of it; and in the event of breathing in conditioned by the mind, he is again fully aware of it. In this way, Rāhula, one can practise [mindfulness of] breathing and thereby abandon all thoughts of aversion and confusion (*vikṣiptasamjñā*), overcome all sorrow and thus obtain the taste of deathlessness as sublime result.

When the Exalted One had imparted his subtle Teaching (*sūkṣmadharma*) in some detail to Rāhula, the latter rose from his seat, paid his respects at the Buddha's feet, circumambulated⁸ [the former] thrice and left. Rāhula went to the foot of a tree in the Andhavana⁹, sat down cross-legged and straightened body and mind, concentrating on the tip of his nose without letting any redundant (*adhika*) thoughts arise. Breathing out a long [breath], he was fully aware of it; breathing in a long [breath], he was fully aware of it; breathing out a short [breath] . . . a cool [breath] . . . a warm [breath] . . ., he was fully aware of it. He contemplated the whole bodily [process of] inhaling and exhaling and was fully aware of everything. When there was breathing . . . and no breathing he was also fully aware of its absence. In the event of breathing out . . . breathing in conditioned by the mind, he was again fully aware of it.

7 Here, contrary to the foregoing, the succession of the respiratory process is reversed. Cf. n.6.

8 I.e. *pradakṣiṇā*; see Soothill, p.169a: 'turning or processing with the right shoulder towards an object of reverence'.

9 Cf. DPPN I, 111f.

Then Rāhula wisely reflected (*manasi-kr*) thus: A mind full of attachment subsequently set free from [all passions] is cleansed (*nirmukta*) of all that is karmically unwholesome (*akuśala*). He [entered and] remained in the first absorption (*dhyāna*) in which there is thinking, deliberation (*savitarka*, *savicāra*)¹⁰ and mindfully experiencing joy (*prīti*) and happiness (*sukha*). Upon the cessation of thinking and deliberation, he [realised] perfect inner quiet and perfect concentration (*adhyātmaṃ samprasāda*, *cetassa ekotībhāva*)¹¹. He [entered and] remained in the second absorption in which there is neither thinking nor deliberation, yet mindfully experiencing joy [born] of concentration (*samādhi*). Then perfectly mindful, after the cessation of joy (*niṣprītika*), while experiencing just that physical well-being (*sukhaṃ ca kāyena pratisaṃvedayati*)¹² which the Noble Ones experience (*upa-labbh*) with equanimity¹³, complete satisfaction (*paritoṣa*) and mindfulness, he [entered and] remained in the third absorption. When he had gone beyond (*prahāna*)¹⁴ pleasure and pain and was rid of sorrow, he [entered and] remained in the fourth absorption which is free of both suffering and happiness and utterly pure [because of] equanimity and mindfulness.

With the help of this concentration, his mind became utterly pure and was rid of flaws (*rajas*) and blemishes (*doṣa*), while his body was exceedingly supple (*mṛdu*). He recognised places from the past and remembered what he had previously

10 See Mahāvīyut. 1478.

11 *Ibid.*, 1479.

12 *Ibid.*, 1480.

13 Cf. n.4.

14 See Mahāvīyut. 1481.

done. He vividly (*dravyatas*) recognised his [former] abodes¹⁵ during incalculable aeons. He also remembered former existences (*jāti*) — one, two, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, an hundred, a thousand, ten thousand, several hundred thousand previous lives, a period of evolution and of destruction [of the world] (*vivarta*, *saṃvartakalpa*), innumerable periods of evolution and destruction, hundreds of millions, incalculable aeons. [He remembered:] I was born and had such and such a name, belonged to such and such a lineage, had such and such food, experienced such and such pains and pleasures, had [such and such] long and short life-spans. There I died, here I was reborn; here I died [again] and was reborn there. —

With the help of this concentration, his mind was utterly pure and rid of flaws, blemishes and all fetters (*saṃyojana*). Furthermore, he [directed his] mind to the knowledge of beings' coming into existence. With the purified and immaculate 'divine eye' (*divyacakṣus*) he saw [many] kinds of beings — how they are born and how they die. He understood in accordance with fact (*yathābhūtam*) that [beings] are good-looking, ugly, well-destined or ill-destined — depending respectively on their good and bad behaviour (*carita*) and deeds (*kr̥ta*). [He understood that] on the one hand, there are beings who bodily, vocally and mentally misbehaved, insulted the Noble Ones, held false views, performed actions determined by false views and who, at the breaking up of the body and after their death, have gone to hell (*naraka*); that, on the other hand, there are beings who bodily, vocally and mentally behaved well, did not insult the Noble Ones, always held right views, performed actions determined by right views and who, at the breaking up of the

15 Cf. *ibid.*, 207: *pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti-jñāna*.

body and after death, have gone to a good, a heavenly world (*sugati, divyam*). This [superknowledge (*abhiññā*) of his] is called the purified and immaculate 'divine eye' [thanks to which he] saw [many] kinds of beings . . . [and thanks to which he] understood in accordance with fact that [beings] are good-looking . . . depending respectively on their good and bad behaviour and deeds.

Moreover, he directed his mind to effect the destruction (*kṣaya*) of the mind's malign influences (*āsrava*). He realised and knew in accordance with fact: This is unsatisfactoriness (*duḥkha*); he realised and knew in accordance with fact the origin (*samudaya*)¹⁶ of unsatisfactoriness, its final cessation (*duḥkhanirodha*) and what has necessarily to be done (*avaśya-kārya*) in order to overcome unsatisfactoriness¹⁷.

By dint of such penetrating insight (*vipaśyanā*), his mind was freed from the malign influences of desire (*kāmāsrava*), of becoming (*bhava*) and of ignorance (*avidyā*). Having realised [ultimate] freedom (*vimukti*), he gained the [insight-]knowledge of this freedom and knew in accordance with fact: Birth and death have come to an end, the holy life (*brahmacarya*) has been lived, what had to be done has been done; and there will be no more coming into existence.

At that time Venerable Rāhula became an Arhat¹⁸ and,

16 After Hayashi, who reads 集 for 習.

17 I.e. *duḥkhanirodagāminī pratipad*: the path leading to the final cessation of unsatisfactoriness.

18 According to the Pāli tradition, at the end of the Cūḷa-Rāhulovādasutta (M III, 277-80; S IV, 105-7), Rāhula's becoming an Arhat is mentioned (see Malalasekera II, 737-40); an account of his realisation of three kinds of superknowledge (*abhiññā*), viz. remembrance of former existences, the 'divine

after his realisation of arhatship, he rose from his seat, adjusted his robes and went to the Exalted One's whereabouts. [There] he bowed down his head at [the Exalted One's] feet, stood to one side and said to the Exalted One: [My] aspirations have come true: the eradication of all malign influences. — Then the Exalted One said to all the bhikṣus [present]: Among all those who realised arhatship, none is like Rāhula. For what reason? As far as the eradication of malign influences is concerned, there is the bhikṣu Rāhula [who has achieved it,] and in respect of observing rules and of being given to training (*śikṣā*), there is again Rāhula [who excels]. All previous Tathāgatas and Perfectly Enlightened Ones, too, had this bhikṣu Rāhula [as their son]¹⁹, and it was the bhikṣu Rāhula who was anxious that he should be called 'son of the Buddha' who himself, following the Buddha, reached the ultimate goal (*dharma*). — Amongst my disciples, the Exalted One went on saying to the bhikṣus, the foremost among those capable of observing the rules of training is the bhikṣu Rāhula²⁰. — Then the Exalted One uttered these verses:

[If one] conscientiously [observes] the rules of moral training
One will perfect all one's spiritual faculties (*indriya*).
One has to [develop them] step by step until one reaches [the

eye' and eradication of all malign influences, is not, however, given either at M I, 420ff. or at the above places. For a parallel to Rāhula's *abhiññās*, cf. for instance, M I, 22f. (Bhayabheravasutta), I.B. Horner, *op. cit.* I, 28f.; cf. also Nyanaponika, *Buddhist Dictionary* (revised ed.), Colombo 1956, p.2f.

19 As for Rāhula's being mentioned, not as having been the son of 'all previous Tathāgatas', but the son of the Bodhisatta referred to in numerous Jātakas, see DPPN II, 739ff.

20 Cf. A I, 24: *Etad aggaṃ bhikkhave mama sāvakānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ sikkhākāmaṇaṃ yadidaṃ Rāhulo.*

ultimate goal];

Completely ridding oneself of all fetters. —

Having listened to the Exalted One's words, all the bhīkṣus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.'

Abbreviations

All Pāli texts are quoted according to the Pali Text Society (PTS) editions

- A = *Āṅguttara-Nikāya* (PTS).
 BHSD = F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, New Haven 1953.
 DPPN = *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names* by G.P. Malalasekera, 2 vols, London 1937-8.
 EĀ = *Ekottarāgama*, T 125
 Hackmann = H. Hackmann, *Erklärendes Wörterbuch zum chinesischen Buddhismus, Chinesisch-Sanskrit-Deutsch*; ed. by J. Nobel (6 fascs., a-ch'a-ch'a - ni-shi-t'an), Leiden 1951-4.
 Hayashi = Japanese translation of the *Ekottarāgama*: Hayashi Gorō (Gohō), *Kokuyaku Issaikyō*, Agon-bu B, Tokyo 1933, repr, 1969., p.124 ff.
 M = *Majjhima-Nikāya* (PTS).
 Mahāvvyut. = *Mahāvvyutpatti*, ed. R. Sakaki, 2 vols, Kyoto 1926.
 S = *Saṃyutta-Nikāya* (PTS).
 Soothill = W.E. Soothill, L. Hodous, *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms*, London 1937.
 T = *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* or *Taishō Issai-kyō*, 100 vols, Tokyo 1924 -.
 THV = Thích Huyền-Vi (his emendations or comments).

CORRECTIONS — EKOTTARĀGAMA XV (BSR 10, 2 1993)

p.215, n.4.: for *āraḥṣacitta* read *āraḥṣācitta*.

p.216, l.16: for *nānātvā* read *nānātva*.

p.218, l.9: for *cetassa* read *cetasa*.

p.220, n.17: for *duḥkhanirodagāminī* read *duḥkhanirodhagāminī*.

p.222, l.17: for *ni-shi-t'an* read *ni-shih-t'an*.

p.222, l.20: for 'Agon-bu B' read 'Agon-bu 8'.

NEWS AND NOTES

Exhibitions on Central Asian Culture

1. National Museum, New Delhi, 21 March - 11 April. Included were two lectures in honour of Sir Aurel Stein given by Prof. B.N. Mukherjee (University of Calcutta) and Krishna Deva, Retired Deputy Director General, Archaeological Survey of India.
2. 'Lost Empire of the Silk Road' — Fondazione Thyssen-Bornemisza, Lugano-Castagnola, 25 June - 31 October. 70 examples of Buddhist art from Khara Khoto dating from the 11th-13th centuries, rediscovered in 1908 and housed in the Hermitage Museum, St Petersburg. Includes a rare two-headed Buddha.
3. 'Buddhism in Upper Central Asia from 1st to 10th century' — Musée Guimet, Paris, September-November.
4. 'In the Steppes of Genghis Khan'. Art and Artefacts from Mongolia — The October Gallery, London, 6 May - 19 June.

Lectures

1. Prof. Y. Karunadasa (Postgrad. Inst. of Pali and Buddhist Studies, Kelaniya, Sri Lanka) gave a rare series of twelve public lectures on Theravāda Buddhism at the School of Oriental and African Studies (Univ. London) from May. The first six were based on the Nikāyas with the remainder based on the Abhidhamma.
2. Eric Cheetham will be the main speaker in a unique series of public lectures on Chinese Buddhism. Part I will comprise twenty talks at the Buddhist Society, London, every other Wednesday from 13 October at 6.30pm. The course spans

five centuries, covering pre-Buddhist Chinese society and the personalities who introduced and 'established' Buddhism. Part II (commencing October 1994) will comprise approximately fifteen talks and spans a further three centuries, during which Buddhism was transmuted into distinctive Chinese forms and left a legacy of influential schools of thought and practice — T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, Ching-t'u and Ch'an.

'Some parts of this tremendous story will display striking similarities to the entry of Buddhism into this [Ed. or, indeed, into any Western] country . . . the Chinese experience offers instructive models of the pitfalls and potential solutions to the difficulties of cross-cultural transmission which is being engaged in here and now'.

Buddhist Cultural Centre

This new centre claims to supply 'almost all your religious needs' in the form of texts, secondary literature, magazines and audio-visual materials (although no catalogue is mentioned in the initial publicity leaflet). It is situated at 125 Anderson Road, Nediwala, Dehiwala, Sri Lanka.

New BPS catalogue

The Buddhist Publication Society, a specialist publisher on Theravāda Buddhism, has issued its new descriptive catalogue for 1993-4. A copy of this 60-page catalogue will be sent upon request. While the catalogue itself is free, a contribution of US\$1.50 (or its equivalent) to cover the cost of air mail postage would be appreciated. Write to: Buddhist Publication Society, P.O. Box 61, Kandy, Sri Lanka.

Obituaries

André Bareau (31 December 1921 - 2 March 1993)

The death of Emeritus Professor André Bareau aged 71 marks the end of a special period of Buddhist studies.

Of Protestant stock, Bareau was born in Saint-Mandé (Val-de-Marne) and pursued Oriental studies at the Sorbonne under the supervision of two of the most qualified tutors of his time, the Sinologist, Paul Demiéville, and the Sanskritist, Jean Filliozat. During the Occupation he was a school teacher but thereafter (1946-7) he was awarded diplomas in Philosophy and Indology and, in 1951, gained his doctorate for a translation of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī — the first book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

His formal career as an Orientalist began in 1947 in the capacity of research assistant at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. In 1956 he was appointed Director of Studies in 'Buddhist Philology' (— a position created specially for him) at the Sorbonne, from where he retired in 1973, but two years earlier he occupied the Chair of Buddhist Studies at the Collège de France, where he remained until last year. He also directed the Centre de recherche sur l'Asie centrale et la Haute-Asie in succession to the Tibetologist, R.A. Stein. Over a period of thirty years he travelled extensively in India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Cambodia exploring their Buddhist sites.

His vast output of literary contributions to an understanding of early Buddhist doctrine and history and an appreciation of the value of the relevant source materials spanned a period of no less than forty years. As with his near contemporary and kindred spirit in Belgium, Mgr Etienne Lamotte, he emphasised

the necessity of presenting his arguments by reference to the original texts in their earliest recensions — Pāli, Sanskrit and Chinese. Of all his works, however, three stand testimony to his industry and devotion: *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques* (1955), *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (1955) and *Recherches sur la biographie du Bouddha dans les Sūtra-piṭaka et les Vinayapiṭaka anciens* (2 vols, 1970-1). Intended for more popular consumption, he also compiled an anthology of translated texts on the life and teaching of the Buddha, *En suivant Bouddha* (1985).

Of a modest and quiet disposition, Prof. Bareau lived in the bosom of his large and close-knit family in the Paris suburb of Sceaux. One may mention another very human quality: his great love of cats! He will be sadly missed but, conversely, will live on in his works which doubtless will inspire a new generation to specialise in his chosen field of studies.

Jan Ergardt (d. 23 December 1992)

Until his untimely death, Dr Ergardt lectured on the History of Religions at Lund University. In 1970 he obtained his doctorate for a study of 'Buddhismen i Västerlandet: Undersökning av engelsk buddhism under 1900-talet' (— 'a survey of the history and ideas of . . . Buddhism in England' based on the contents of *The Buddhist Review*, *Buddhism in England* and *The Middle Way*). His major writings took the form of two monographs published by Brill, Leiden: *Faith and Knowledge in Early Buddhism*. 'An analysis of the contextual structures of an arahant-formula in the Maj-jhima-Nikāya' (1977), and *Man and His Destiny*. *The Release of the Human Mind*. 'A Study of Citta in Relation to Dhamma in some Ancient Indian Texts' (1986).

CORRECTIONS — Review of *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden* (BSR 10, 2, 1993)

p.234, l.21 for *kramenānyajanmātareṣv* read *kramenānyajanmāntareṣv*.

p.235, l.4: for 'pleonastische' read 'pleonastisch'.

p.236, l.1, p.237, l.2: for *araṇyaka(s)* read *āraṇyaka(s)*.

p.236, l.8: for 'words' read 'word'.

p.236, n.3: for 蓄 read 畜 .

p.237, l.10: for *gentivus* read *genitivus*.

p.237, l.11: for 'Hindernisses' read 'Hindernisse'.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Discourses of Gotama Buddha. Middle Collection. Tr.
David W. Evans. Janus Publ. Co., London 1992. xxvi + 449 pp.
£18.99

It is most gratifying to see another translation of the Majjhima Nikāya. The first, by Lord Chalmers, has been reprinted by the Indian Book Centre, Delhi (2 vols, 1988), the second, by I.B. Horner, is still available, whilst a revised version of Nāṇamoli's translation is scheduled to appear from Wisdom Publications (Boston) next year. My own selection of ninety suttas from Nāṇamoli's work is still in print but only obtainable with difficulty from Bangkok.

The present translator has attempted something new, a much abbreviated version, describing his principles in doing this in the Introduction. No-one who has read the Pāli text will deny the value of such revision. The best examples that I have seen of this so far were by the late Nāṇamoli himself. By his standards the abbreviations in this book are severe indeed. They have enabled 152 discourses occupying 1,152 pages in Horner's translation, to be contained in less than half that number of pages. Some suttas emerge from this treatment better than others. For instance, No.114 benefits from such treatment; the essential material is clear and nothing is lost except a jungle of verbiage, useful for oral repetition but a menace to readers. More discursive suttas, however, tend to suffer, as with one of my favourites, No.56. Not only are examples omitted but the glorious eulogy to the Buddha spoken by Upāli is missing. Such severity in foreshortening threatens the emotional impact of

these discourses.

This approach can also gloss over difficult passages, often ones where a profound teaching is given, as is the case with No. 18. It would appear that the translator has not consulted the treatise by Nāṇananda, *Concept and Reality* (BPS, 1971) on the difficult word *papañca*. The PTS Dictionary does this word less than justice but it is on this that the translator has depended, for we find it rendered by 'obsession/obsessive'.

Though the translator claims that this is a new version based on the PTS text and though he acknowledges help from Horner's translation, there are places where his work seems like a précis of *The Middle Length Sayings*. A case in point is found in No.26. In this sutta Horner has made a mistake, one which was reproduced by the BPS in their Wheel series. The Bodhisatta's two teachers do not treat him in the same way, though Horner and Evans have them do so. Nāṇamoli's translation is correct and differentiates them according to the Pāli text: 'Thus Alāra Kālāma, my Teacher, placed me, his pupil, on an equal footing with himself, and awarded me the highest honour. . . Thus Uddaka Rāmaputta, my companion in the life divine, placed me in the Teacher's place and accorded me the highest honour'.

It seems that Evans' work must be rated as a partly new translation, albeit the English he uses is not always the most elegant. Admittedly, it is a constant temptation to fall into 'Palicised' English, as Horner did frequently. I find Nāṇamoli much more readable, while Evans' work lacks some of the interesting words and constructions that Nāṇamoli abbreviates only moderately, and a different result must be expected from such radical cuts as we have here.

Examples of infelicitous renderings are 'Exemplar' for *tathāgata* and 'not a liver of the good life' for *abrahma-*

cariyaka, though even this is better than the 'non-Brahma-farer' of Horner. Nāṇamoli's 'life divine' for *brahmacariya* has much to be said for it.

This book will be a good introduction to the Majjhima Nikāya and perhaps cause those who want to study it in greater depth to take up the Pāli text and read it in the original.

Laurence Mills

The Itivuttaka. The Buddha's Sayings. Tr. John D. Ireland. Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy 1991. 123 pp. \$7.50.

After enjoying the new Udāna translation which Ireland produced in 1990 (BPS), I was delighted that he continued to use his translating skills to render this text also. We are much indebted for his hard work in turning these two 'minor' books into readable English. A comparison with the Pali Text Society's old translation will reveal what a great improvement he has wrought with both accuracy and style.

The legend is that these short suttas, 112 in all, represent the collection of the Buddha's teachings repeated by Khujjuttarā, a woman servant to Sāmāvātī, one of King Udena's queens. In those days high caste women generally and queens in particular had little freedom to attend teachings personally. Sāmāvātī was fortunate that she had a servant so devoted to the Buddha. Ireland remarks: 'Whether or not this story is true . . .', and well might he do so. Every sutta is addressed to bhikkhus, not even one to a layman, let alone a laywoman. One may hazard an opinion that Sāmāvātī would have been in trouble trying to practise, in the midst of sensual Indian court life, the advice given to forest-dwelling monks. Though the content of some of

these discourses would be appropriate for the householder's existence, many of them would not increase the harmony of family life. The Buddha, who knew the minds of others, would have known that Khujjuttarā repeated teachings to her mistress but, according to this collection, he never addressed the needs of women in a royal court. Whatever it was Khujjuttarā heard and repeated is clearly not included here. Those sayings are apparently lost and have been replaced by the present anthology.

A weakness of the Pāli Sutta collections is in fact the paucity of teachings addressed and relevant to householders. Long ago in Bangkok when I had a scheme to collect all this, I found that hardly 300 suttas (or parts of them) contain such material among the tens of thousands of discourses. Monks have preserved teachings for and by themselves, they rarely kept in mind teachings addressed to bhikkhūṇis and were little interested in preserving what must have been thousands upon thousands of talks delivered by the Buddha to laypeople. If this fact is not taken into consideration, very considerable distortion is liable to take place in Dhamma practice at home. Trying to be a monk and raise a family is not likely to succeed!

Let us hope that Ireland will continue to produce good translations. Even from the corpus of Pāli works much still remains to be done.

Laurence Mills

Shantideva's Bodhicaryavatara. Original Sanskrit Text with English Translation and Exposition Based on Prajñākaramati's Panjika. Parmananda Sharma. Foreword by H.H. the Dalai Lama. Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi 1990. xxxv, 487 pp. Rs.550.

Parmananda Sharma is a retired principal of a Government College in Dharamsala. Formerly an English language and literature teacher, he has had a long-standing interest in comparative religion. His proximity to the Tibetan community in Dharamsala around the Dalai Lama has resulted in a study of Tibetan history and culture as well as a long poem on the life of the Dalai Lama, whom he clearly admires. His motive for writing this translation and study of the Bodhicaryāvatāra is to 'supplement and augment' the previous translations in the 'noble effort of bringing to the notice of the world this great classic of Madhyamika philosophy'. He claims to be writing not for the approval of 'pedagogues' but 'for the common man'. This worthy undertaking might be compared to that of a retired school-teacher in England to convey in ordinary language the meaning of a great Greek or Latin classic that has moved and inspired him.

His approach is to provide a literal rendition of the root verses and follow them with a prose commentary that is a blend of his own reflections and the interpretations of the classic Indian Buddhist commentator Prajñākaramati. Without consulting the Prajñākaramati text (which, unlike Śāntideva's original, is not reproduced), it is thus difficult to tell which ideas are Sharma's and which Prajñākaramati's. The only time one can safely make this distinction is when Sharma alludes to Christian or, more frequently, Hindu writings such as the Bhagavadgīta and the Upaniṣads.

Without being brought up or trained in a Buddhist culture, Sharma, for all his sympathy, betrays an occasional Hindu perspective in his reading of the text. A striking example of this is found in Chapter 8, verse 89, where he renders *viveka* in its brahmanical sense of 'discrimination', instead of its Buddhist sense of 'solitude'. So instead of 'reflecting on the virtues of

solitude', he writes: 'Having in such ways contemplated over the qualities of 'viveka' or discrimination one should set at rest conceptions and contemplate on bodhicitta'. In order to justify this reading, he has to invent his own somewhat far-fetched commentary about 'sifting the noble from the ignoble and the base from the lofty' to support the idea that moral discrimination should precede such meditation, rather than quiet surroundings and a peaceful mind — a meaning which is abundantly clear from the preceding verses.

On the whole, however, Sharma's translation of Śāntideva's verses seems reliable. His commentary offers reflections which are occasionally insightful, but often little more than a lengthy restatement of the verse in prose. One senses that at times the 'common man' for whom he is writing has a familiarity with Indian culture (including the ability to read Sanskrit in devanāgarī script) that would preclude many Western readers. A native English speaker might also find some of the author's choice of words archaic.

Despite Sharma's declared indifference to the 'expectations of the pedagogues', a closer look at some of the key verses in Chapter 8 about the equality and exchange of self and other reveals the limitations of an approach that, in spite of its declared aims, nonetheless claims to be a translation of Śāntideva's text. Sharma's concern for the common man allows him selectively to render freely or ignore phrases from both Śāntideva and Prajñā-karamati that do not fit with his interpretations, which often seem based on Hindu rather than Buddhist notions of spiritual practice. In particular, he fails to see how many of Śāntideva's arguments about the equality of self and other are ethical rather than ontological assertions and ignores passages of Prajñā-karamati that emphasise this point. This would support Paul Hacker's assertion, in his article 'Schopenhauer und die Ethik des

Hinduismus', 'that morality only fulfills the functions of preparing mystical insight, . . . as everywhere in Hinduism'. Śāntideva's concern, common to Mahāyāna Buddhist thought, is simply the alleviation of others' suffering.

In spite of these reservations, Parmananda Sharma's work is nonetheless a useful addition to the growing literature in English on the Bodhicaryāvatāra. One hopes that it will indeed serve to reawaken interest in this classic Mahāyāna poem in Śāntideva's land of birth where it has been forgotten for so long.

Stephen Batchelor
Hans Gruber

Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden. Begonnen von Ernst Waldschmidt. Im Auftrage der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen herausgegeben von Heinz Bechert. 7. Lieferung: Nachträge zu *adharima / avidyābhisamcetanā-hetoh* bearbeitet von Michael Schmidt und Siglinde Dietz¹. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1992. I-III, 481-560 pp. DM 52.

This seventh fascicle of the Göttingen Sanskrit dictionary (SWTF) contains further corrigenda and addenda, and what has been written about them in the sixth fascicle in BSR 9, 2 (1992), p.210, also applies to the present one. In the editor's preface it is stated that the material basis of this fascicle *vis-à-vis* the sixth

1 I am much beholden to Dr Dietz for kindly having placed at my disposal two articles published in IJ which have been indispensable to the writing of this review.

has been but slightly changed; six new sources are mentioned, five fragments of Vinaya texts and some passages belonging to the Cūḍapanthaka-Avadāna (all published in L. Sander, E. Waldschmidt, *Sanskrihandschriften aus den Turfanfunden V*, Stuttgart 1985). On pp.II-III are listed, together with the bibliography, newly added abbreviations pertaining to texts drawn upon in SWTF, to other texts and to secondary literature. Again, the work under review testifies to the compilers' impeccable scholarship. However, in just a few places there may be room for different translations or explanations, and in the following I should like to refer to two entries which appear somewhat peculiar.

On p.517, *anyajanmāntara* (*anyajanma-a°*) is translated as 'Zeitpunkt oder Gelegenheit anderer Existenzen'. This expression occurs at Yogavidhi 43 R6, edited by D. Schlingloff (IJ VII (1963-4), p.151). The Yogavidhi, as Schlingloff explains, was written on the lines of Patañjali's Yogasūtras, viz. sūtras (the 'root text') presented piecemeal in the body of an explanatory text. Thus *anyajanmāntara* is part of the commentary on *paripākāt* / where it says: *ropanaparipācanavimuktay[o] hi krameṇānyajanmāntareṣv a[pi] . . .* ['kinds of] (temporary?) release for the purpose of (or due to?) causing to grow and bringing to maturity gradually during other (future) lives. . . . Unfortunately, owing to the fragmentary nature of the text it is very hard to know precisely what it means. The context, nevertheless, makes it clear that *paripāka* or *paripācana* is the theme dealt with, and 'bringing to maturity', I think, rather implies continuity and not just 'Zeitpunkt, Gelegenheit'. Cf., for instance, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Pradhan ed.) 151, 12 (III, 37): *na hi punar vipākād vipākāntaraṃ janmāntareṣu pravardhate /* where *antara* means 'other' as is borne out by the Tibetan and Chinese translations. In the St. Petersburg Sanskrit dictionary,

Böhtlingk and Roth translate *janmāntara* as 'eine andere Geburt, ein anderes Leben. . . , das zukünftige Leben', and similarly *bhavāntare* as 'im anderen, zukünftigen Leben. . . pleonastische auch mit dem gleichbedeutenden *anya* verbunden'. Likewise, Monier-Williams has '*antara, in fine compositi, "different, other, another"*'².

On p.558, the compilers have put behind the entry *avaś-yāya-sātātī* (or *°nī?*) 'meaning not clear'. This adjective forms part of a fragment published at Sander, Waldschmidt, *op. cit.*, 1036 V2: *~ī yaṣṭi up[a]sthāpayitavya* for which the editors tentatively propose the following translation: 'Ein Pfosten mit einer taotropfenförmigen Spitze (?) ist aufzurichten'. Dietz thinks this translation rather unlikely since in this place the text seems to be about a kind of meditation ('. . . da von einer Art Meditation die Rede zu sein scheint'). She refers to H. Bechert (ed.), K. Wille (compiler), *Sanskrihandschriften aus den Turfanfunden VI*, p.221 (Sg 107), where further information is given regarding fragment No.1036: 'fragment corresponds to Taishō 1435. XXIII, 301a22-b13 (end of Bhikṣu-vinaya), identification by J.W. de Jong'. Now a new translation is offered, after the Chinese: 'Man muß den Kontemplations(Meditations = *dhyāna*)-Stab kultivieren (= *bhāvayitavya*)'. In IJ 31 (1988), pp.11-16, J.W. de Jong published 'Three Sanskrit Fragments of the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins'. Treating the fragment in question, he translated the relevant Taishō passage in which the sentence tallying with the problematic entry reads: 'He should store meditation sticks' (p.12). The context reveals that an

2 As for during other (future) lives. . . , Dietz has called my attention to the fact that, in spite of the rendering 'Zeitpunkt. . .' quoted above, after the cited place at Yogavidhi is given in brackets 'während. . .' which does, in fact, con-note continuity.

aranyaka monk, required to be conversant with the special rules of forest-dwelling, ought to be an adept in meditation and an *ārya-pudgala*. If he is not, he should at least be studious instead of being a collector of precious things. Then, as for *avaśyāyaśātātī*, de Jong writes:

'It is difficult to see how this corresponds to the 'meditation stick' mentioned in the Chinese text. . . the translators have probably added the words 'meditation' as this stick is used to wake up meditating monks who have fallen asleep. . . The Vinaya of the Dharmaguptakas adds 'the stick for beating the dew'. Undoubtedly, this term renders *avaśyāyaśātātī yaṣṭi*. The facsimile is not easy to read and it is possible that one should read *-śātānī* instead of *-śātātī*, which is difficult to explain'.

These remarks on the Vinaya term under discussion, I think, make it sufficiently clear that it is not a kind of meditation that is alluded to here. Central Asian or Northern Chinese Sangha members might have been at a loss for an explanation of the necessity of storing³ 'sticks for beating off (*śātānī*) dew'. It may still be possible, however, to watch forest-dwelling monks of the present time in tropical countries who occasionally use sticks when on their alms round at dawn in order to find their way through dense, wet vegetation and, very importantly, to ward off snakes. Alms collecting (*piṇḍapāta*) in areas infested with snakes can be quite an effective training in cultivating mindfulness. Still, 'Kontemplations-Stab' is certainly

3 蓄 xù means both 'to cultivate' and 'to store up, furnish, supply', to which latter *upasthāpayitavya*, here meaning 'to be provided, to be placed before', corresponds. As for *upasthāpayitavya*, cf. SWTF, fasc.6, p.403 sq., where under this entry the Vinaya term being discussed here is also quoted together with the tentative translation cited above.

not to be understood figuratively; *avaśyāyaśātānī yaṣṭi* seems to be that utensil used by *aranyakas* whenever obliged to take an overgrown jungle trail.

Though having already spent considerable time on SWTF, fasc.7, I have not come across a single misprint. Whilst negligible, the following stylistic point could be raised: on p.497, *a-nivṛta* is translated as 'ungehindert . . .', followed by the explanatory 'durch die Hindernisse des Heilvollen (*nīvaraṇa*)', which could be understood as 'the karmically wholesome being a hindrance' (*genitivus subiectivus* vs. *gen. obiectivus*). According to the context, 'Hindernisses für das Heilvolle' ('hindrances, obstacles to the karmically wholesome') is to be preferred.

Bhikkhu Pāsādika

The Dating of the Historical Buddha (Die Datierung des historischen Buddha). Part 1 (Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung IV.1). Ed. Heinz Bechert. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1991. xv, 525 pp. n.p.

In an earlier number of this journal (BSR 5, 2, 1988, pp.149-54), I gave a short report in a symposium on the date of the Buddha, which was organised by Prof. Heinz Bechert, under the sponsorship of the Committee for Buddhist Studies of the Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, at Hedemünden near Göttingen, 11-18 April 1988. I concluded my report by stating that everyone interested in the subject would hope that the publication of the proceedings of the symposium would not be delayed too long.

The first part of the proceedings, entitled *The Dating of the Historical Buddha* and edited by Bechert, includes all the papers

which had been revised and returned to him by the designated date. A number of the papers have a summary in English added to them, which will make their contents more accessible to those, particularly in the East, who are likely to be very interested in the subject but unable to read the papers in the original French or German. One paper, which was delivered in German, has been completely translated into English.

The editor has arranged the papers into the following groups: 1) History of research; 2) The date of the Buddha in the context of Indian cultural history; 3) The chronology of the Buddha: Indian tradition evaluated; 4) The spread of the Theravāda chronology and its implications; 5) Traditions of late Indian and Tibetan Buddhism; 6) Central Asian traditions; 7) East Asian traditions; 8) The axial age theory and the dates of the Buddha. To these papers are prefixed an introductory essay: 'The scope of the symposium and the question of methodology' by the editor himself, and an appendix, 'La date du Buddha', extracted from the *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien* by Étienne Lamotte. The abbreviations used in the various papers have been standardised by the editor and are listed at the end of the volume.

In his introductory essay, the editor gives a résumé of the history of investigation into the problem, and then summarises the papers included in the volume. The majority of them are factual, giving information about the history of scholarship in the subject, the date of the death of the Buddha as it is given in various traditions, etc. Perhaps the most important of these factual papers is H. Härtel's discussion of the archaeological evidence concerning the places where the Buddha is said to have lived or which he is said to have visited. Härtel concludes that there is doubt whether some of them existed in the sixth century B.C.E. and believes that 'the dating of the Buddha in the fifth to fourth century B.C. is quite probable'. He is careful to

include the words 'said to . . .' in his assessment, since it is quite possible that when the sermons were first collected some of them had no locale attached to them, and place names were inserted in them at a later date when early redactors standardised the opening formulae.

For many readers, the most interesting part of the proceedings will be the third section, in which seven papers contain attempts to date the Buddha on the basis of an evaluation of the Indian traditions. G. Yamazaki adheres to a date c. 480 B.C.E., while P.H.L. Eggermont suggests a date as late as the time of Aśoka himself. The remainder suggest dates in between these two extremes, but differ among themselves as to the precise date and also the means of evaluating what that date might be. Their reasons for accepting some evidence and disregarding other evidence sometimes seem to be rather subjective.

The judgements of a number of participants were, in fact, somewhat subjective, and to some extent contradictory. So H. Bechert states that we must conclude that 'Buddhism was still a rather young movement at the time of Aśoka', indicating that Aśoka lived not long after the Buddha, while A. Bareau writes of 'a great transformation, which completely changed the nature of Buddhism' and concludes that 'a rather long time had passed between the Parinirvāṇa and Aśoka's reign'. The subjectivity in the assessment of the degree of development of Buddhism is also found in the assessment of time, since 'not long' and 'rather long' lead to a bracket of dates which do not differ by more than thirty years. A similar degree of subjectivity is seen in W. Halbfass's conclusion that when Megasthenes visited the city of Pāṭaliputra around 300 B.C.E., Buddhism was still rather young and 'not yet two centuries old'.

Bechert himself lays stress upon the archaeological evidence and the history of social development, and opts for a date be-

tween 80 and 130 years after the Buddha for Aśoka, but gives no direct evidence for his choice in his paper, beyond stating that he feels that the death of the Buddha could not have been after the time of Alexander's Indian campaign. It should be noted that some papers were rewritten, to a greater or lesser extent, in the light of other papers which were presented at the symposium, so that dates which they propose are not necessarily the result of a completely independent investigation into the subject. In his paper on the contemporary background to the origin of Buddhism, for example, G. von Simson takes account of Härtel's archaeological evidence in suggesting a rather late date for the founder of Buddhism. It is debatable, therefore, whether von Simson and Härtel together provide any stronger support for a late date than Härtel alone.

The mention of differing dates in various traditions may make some readers of this journal believe that different beliefs about the dates of the Buddha are stratified in accordance with the different traditions or schools of Buddhism, with Theravādin sources giving one date, and the other schools other dates. It might be helpful, therefore, to explain the nature of the problem insofar as it applies to the Theravādin school alone. According to the traditional Theravādin chronology, the Buddha died in 544 B.C.E. (the so-called 'long chronology'). This date was adopted by the international Buddhist movement at the third conference of the World Fellowship of Buddhists in 1954. There is, however, no authority for this date in any early Theravādin texts known to us today, and it seems to be a later invention.

The early Sinhalese Pāli chronicles, the *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Mahāvāṃsa*, probably written in the fourth and fifth centuries C.E. respectively, state that Aśoka was consecrated 218 years after the death of the Buddha. The chronicles list the kings of Magadha reigning between the death of the Buddha and the

accession of Aśoka, and give their regnal years which do indeed add up to 218. The Greek kings named by Aśoka in his edicts can be dated within a very narrow margin to c. 268 B.C.E. (a recent discussion broadens this a little to 280-67 B.C.E.), which enables us to state that 218 years before Aśoka's accession would give a date c. 486 B.C.E. (the 'corrected long chronology'). The Pāli Vinaya Piṭaka, however, give a list of five mahātheras who are called *vinaye pāmokkha*. The first of them was alive at the time of the Buddha and the fifth at the time of Aśoka. Rhys Davids long ago pointed out that these five mahātheras could not have spanned the period from 486 to 268 B.C.E., and the information given in the *Dīpavaṃsa* and *Mahāvāṃsa* makes it clear that there was a teacher-pupil relationship between them, and that they in fact spanned a period of about 150 years. We can therefore calculate that the Buddha died a little before 400 B.C.E. There are, however, passages in the *Dīpavaṃsa* which some scholars claim are traces of the so-called 'short chronology' which dates the Buddha's death to c.368 B.C.E., since they seem to say that the Third Council, which was held in the eighteenth year of the reign of Aśoka, occurred 118 years after the death of the Buddha.

The problem then, when considering this matter from the Theravādin viewpoint alone, is to decide whether most weight should be put upon a date handed down by tradition, a date depending upon the reigns of kings, a date arising from information about the length of life of mahātheras and the years in which their pupils were ordained, or a statement about the number of years which had elapsed between two events. As already noted, modern Buddhists decided in 1954 to ignore the calculations of (mainly) Western scholars and to accept the traditional date. Those who believe that the early Buddhists had access to kingly records and other archive material of a Purāṇic

type accept the date around 486 B.C.E. Those who believe that they recorded the life-spans of mahātheras, rather than the reigns of kings, opt for a date around 400 B.C.E. Divergencies from these figures are possible because in recent years it has been realised that in Sanskrit and Pāli the words *śataśata*, 'one hundred', also mean 'any very large number', so that the figures given in the chronicles may not be precise dates, but may merely be expressions of the fact that Aśoka lived a long time after the Buddha.

Although I personally accepted a date around 400 B.C.E. in my own contribution to the symposium, because I believe that it is supported to some extent by the information from Jain sources about the date of Mahāvīra, who was a contemporary of the Buddha, I have to admit that it is a personal preference, not capable of proof beyond all shadow of doubt. In the first place, the text of the chronicles is not always clear, and a certain amount of textual emendation is required to make everything fit together. Nor is all necessary information given, and the dates of the ordination of some theras have to be assumed. There is, moreover, the problem that the synchronism with the death of the Buddha at the beginning and the accession of Aśoka at the end of this period, and other kings in between, depends upon knowledge of events in specific years in the mahātheras' lives. It is clear that it was very important to remember the age at which theras were ordained and the number of years which had passed since their ordination, because their seniority in the Sangha depended on such information. It is not, however, clear why the tradition upon which the chronicles were based should have included synchronous information, particularly about secular events. The fact that details of the mahātheras' lives are consistent (after emendation) does not in itself prove that the details are neces-

sarily correct. I have already referred to the fact that the figure of 218 years is, according to the chronicles, consistent with the length of the reigns of the kings of Magadha during this period, although few people would accept that the figures are correct.

More controversial than the differences in the dating is perhaps the way in which some participants explain how the different dates in tradition and the literary texts have been arrived at. Much of what has been said about this will need to be reconsidered and perhaps revised in the light of G. Obeyesekere's paper which, in its published form, differs considerably from the paper he delivered at the symposium. Entitled 'Myth, history and numerology in the Buddhist chronicles', it shows how the numbers 18 and 9 recur again and again in the length of reigns, suggesting that regnal years as recorded in the chronicles may be valueless as a basis for calculating dates. In the revised version, Obeyesekere reassesses early Buddhist chronology and transfers the analytical strategy which he employed in his discussion of Dhātusena's patriline to events pertaining to the chronology of the historical Buddha. In so doing, he dismisses the claim that there are traces in the *Dīpavaṃsa* of the so-called 'short chronology'. If he is correct to do so, then he renders irrelevant the efforts which some participants, who believe that the short chronology represents the earliest Buddhist chronology known to us, have put into the task of explaining how the short chronology was adapted to fit in with the figures of the long chronology.

Two further parts of the proceedings are promised.* They will contain papers which were not revised in time to be included in the present publication, other papers from scholars who were not invited to the symposium or were unable to accept the invitation, and a selection of documents concerning the history of research into the dates of the Buddha, including texts

and a bibliography. It is, however, already possible to answer the question I put at the end of my report on the symposium: 'What did this symposium achieve?' As the organiser of the symposium makes clear in his introductory essay, it was not possible to provide a new chronology of the Buddha's dates which would be approved of by all or even most experts. It is, however, possible to say that the general agreement which existed until recently among scholars, that the Buddha died within a few years of 480 B.C.E., is no longer held by the majority of those who attended the symposium. It would appear that most participants would put the date of the Buddha's death later, in some cases much later, than 480 B.C.E. No evidence was forthcoming which would enable a more exact statement to be made, and Bechert comments that it seems unlikely that such evidence will be discovered in the foreseeable future.

K.R. Norman

* *Ed.* Part 2 was published last year.

An Introduction to Buddhism. Teaching, history and practices. Peter Harvey. Cambridge University Press, 1990. xxii, 374 pp. Hbk £35, pbk £10.95 (ISBN 0 521 30815 1 / 0 521 31333 3).

An Introduction to Buddhism. Geshe Kelsang Gyatso. Tharpa Publications, London 1992. x, 150 pp. Hbk £8.95. pbk £5.95.

These two books represent different approaches to the challenge of communicating the Dharma to English-reading people. If one wants the essence of the Dharma in an inexpensive format then one could choose the Geshe's book. The other work would be preferred if a comprehensive account of Buddhism was required. With the former you get the viewpoint of one Buddhist school,

in fact Gelugpa, though at the end of the book (p.144), it is called the New Kadampa tradition. Whether authors should claim to be introducing Buddhism when, in fact, it is the views of one school that they are expounding is a moot point. This reviewer was guilty of the same offence with his book *Buddhism Explained* which deals only with the Theravāda teaching and neglects to mention that other Buddhists understand things rather differently.

The Geshe's book outlines basic Buddhism in Part One, briefly describing Buddha, Mind, Rebirth, Karma, Precious Human Life, Meditation, Death, and the Buddhist Way of Life. The section on meditation is not really adequate but then how much can be explained of practice anyway in a book? Part Two gives some details of the Hīnayāna path, though it is not called that, being entitled the Path to Liberation. Appropriately, renunciation is outlined and the three higher trainings are given prominence, leading to the attainment of 'foe-destroyer', a literal rendering of the Tibetan translation of Arhat (but note that Buddhaghosa explains in exactly the same way). Under renunciation, there is a good section on seven types of suffering. The Bodhisattva path leading to Buddhahood occupies Part Three. As one would expect, compassion and the six pāramitās are expounded; there is also a Gelugpa logical exposition on emptiness, which perhaps rather misses the point, if emptiness may be so described, for it is not logical at all. The ten bodhisattva grounds (*bhūmi*) are mentioned as leading to Buddhahood, obviously a far distant goal. Nothing much is said of the Vajrayāna as being a short path to the goal.

This brief book is adequate though not exactly inspiring. It lacks humour (how many Buddhist books are so serious?) and while it is adorned with images of the thirty-five Buddhas of Confession, this has only some meaning in connection with

Appendix II. A curious choice of illustrations. What a newcomer to Buddhism will make of prostrating to these thirty-five Buddhas is quite another thing.

Turning to Dr Harvey's book, this has a much wider range, both from the points of view of all the varied Buddhist schools, and their geographical and historical occurrences. This book strikes me as a very honest attempt to present the full range of Buddhism within the compass of just over 300 pages. A hard task to accomplish well.

Four chapters are given to the Buddha's background, his life and teachings with their extensions to the emperor Aśoka and the rise of the Mahāyāna. Two chapters follow on Mahāyāna Philosophy and Holy Beings. Then a chapter is interposed on Later History and Spread of Buddhism. Four chapters come next on Buddhist practice: Devotion, Ethics, Sangha and Meditation. Finally, a bit more history is presented in the Modern History of Buddhism in Asia, and Buddhism Beyond Asia. This is a nicely balanced mixture of doctrine and history, backed by a good bibliography.

The picture of Buddhism given to the reader is a fair-minded one. While the author seems most interested in Theravāda, he presents Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna adequately. As far as history is concerned, we are given a realistic account — with the occasional warts where Buddhists were in conflict with each other. The growth of Buddhism in the West also receives some attention.

Of particular note is the way that similar practices from different schools are gathered in one chapter. For instance, Chapter 8 includes devotion as expressed through bowing, offerings and chanting. Refuges, images and protective chanting are also covered. Finally, devotion to various Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, as well as the Lotus Sūtra, is outlined. Pilgrimages

and festivals are also given attention in this chapter.

Good indexes complete the book, which is adorned with photographs and maps as well.

One may reflect that now people are very fortunate to have available such a well-presented account of the Dharma. My own introduction was by reading Christmas Humphreys' Penguin, *Buddhism*, a volume now so out of date and in places very inaccurate (though, perversely, it is kept in print); it is a great pity that Harvey's excellent book has not replaced the Humphreys volume. Certainly, if I were asked to recommend one work to introduce Buddhism to an intelligent person, it would be that of Peter Harvey.

Laurence Mills

The Buddhist Path to Awakening. A Study of the Bodhi-Pakkhiyā Dhammā. R.M.L. Gethin. E.J. Brill, Leiden 1992. xii, 382 pp. \$111.50.

This book is a very comprehensive and detailed study of a list of Buddhist teachings, referred to in the Sutta Piṭaka of the Pāli Canon as the seven sets of 'dhammas that contribute to awakening' (*bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*), and later cited in Buddhist commentarial literature as 'the thirty-seven dhammas'. The seven sets being the four establishments of mindfulness (*sati-paṭṭhāna*), the four right endeavours (*sammappadhāna*), the bases of success (*iddhipāda*), the faculties (*indriya*), powers (*bala*), factors of awakening (*bojjhaṅga*) and the noble eight-factored path (*ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo*), and are understood to embody the essential path of spiritual practice as envisaged by the Buddha and his early followers.

Previously, the most extensive treatment of the *bodhi-*

pakkhiyā dhammā has been the fourth chapter of Har Dayal's *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*. However, written over sixty years ago, it contains a number of serious errors, although still useful for its reference to Sanskrit works if these errors and Dayal's general unsympathetic attitude are ignored. Then there is Étienne Lamotte's essay included in *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna* (III, pp.1119-37)¹. Many other works on Buddhism have referred to the seven sets in passing and the individual items have been dealt with separately by others as general Buddhist teachings. However, all these references to the *bodhipakkhiyā dhammā* have now been superseded by Rupert Gethin's detailed and excellent study of the subject. Originally submitted as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Manchester in 1987, it has now been published, we are told, in substantially its original form (— the reviewer has noted there have been additions made to the extensive bibliography of works published since then).

The book begins with an interesting and well-balanced introduction. Commencing with some remarks on the limitations of Western academic studies in comparative religion for an understanding of Buddhist doctrine, the author leads us step by step through a consideration of the nature of Pāli canonical literature to the actual subject matter of his study. The book itself is in two parts, the first six chapters being concerned with an examination of the seven sets individually. The second part deals with them collectively and their treatment in the Abhi-

1 There is also a modern Theravāda work, *The Requisites of Enlightenment*, a translation from the Burmese of Ledi Sayadaw's *Bodhipakkhiyā-Dīpanī* (BPS, Kandy 1971).

dhamma and in later literature. The author has allowed the source material to speak for itself by quoting extensively from the Pāli suttas, while also making use of Buddhist, and even non-Buddhist, Sanskrit material. Being evidently a competent Pāli scholar, the author has not had to rely on previous and possibly inaccurate translations of the texts he quotes (— a necessary qualification for this study he has undertaken). Careful attention has been paid to the definitions of terms and the development of the traditional interpretations of the Abhidhamma and Commentaries. There are sections devoted to an examination of such terms as *ekāyana*, *Dhamma/dhammā*, *saddhā/pasāda*, *upekkha* and so forth in the contexts where they occur that are most illuminating. Regarding the first mentioned, it is perhaps not generally appreciated that translations of *ekāyana* as 'the only way'² or 'the sole way'³ are inaccurate and misleading in the context of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*⁴. Having investigated the various stages of the word elsewhere, Gethin confirms that *ekāyana* indicates '... a path that leads straight and directly all the way to the final goal' and interestingly concludes that as a spiritual and mystical term it is really untranslatable (p.65). Of interest also are the analyses made of several key suttas, such as the *Mahācattārīsaka Sutta* (M 117) in Chapter VI — the single most important sutta for understanding the nature of the noble eight-factored path. Notable also is the examination of the *Mahāvagga* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* in

2 *The Way of Mindfulness* by Bhikkhu Soma.

3 *Kindred Sayings V*; also Nyanaponika, *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation*, London 1962.

4 The preamble to the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (D 22, M 10) would be better rendered as 'This path, bhikkhus, is a direct way for the purification of beings ...' (*ekāyano ayaṃ bhikkhave maggo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā ...*).

Chapter VII. The importance of this *vagga* is that it contains sections or *samyuttas* on each of the seven sets. The treatment of the sutta material generally in this study provides a welcome addition to our knowledge of many less well-known suttas 'lying between' those most often quoted that Masefield, following Rune Johansson, complains are rarely mentioned in works on Buddhism⁵.

Having noted Gethin's expert handling of his sutta material and its technical terminology, there are occasional lapses. One thing that surprised the reviewer was his translations of *vitakka-vicāra* in the *jhāna* formula as 'initial and sustained application' without note or comment of any kind. Some recent translators have preferred such renderings as 'thinking and exploring'⁶, 'thought and reasoning'⁷, 'thinking and pondering'⁸, etc. And Kalupahana⁹ even insists that '... a wrong translation of the terms *vitakka/vicāra* as "initial thought/discursive thought" instead of "reflection/investigation" has led to the belief that at the end of these four stages (i.e. *rūpajjhānas*), all mental processes, such as discrimination and analysis, are eliminated'. It would be interesting to have had our author's reasons for retaining the translation he has. However, this is but a minor point.

5 Peter Masefield, *Divine Revelation in Pāli Buddhism*, London 1985, p.xv.

6 Ñāṇamoli, *The Guide*, London 1962, p.136.

7 Rune E.A. Johansson, *Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism*, London 1985, p.42.

8 M.O'C. Walshe, *Thus Have I Heard* (translation of *Dīgha Nikāya*), London 1987; but see Khantipālo's review (BSR 7, p.108), where he criticises this rendering.

9 David J. Kalupahana, *A History of Buddhist Philosophy*, Honolulu 1992, p.36.

The present work is not content merely to list the thirty-seven items, as others have mostly done, but demonstrates the inner coherence of the group of seven sets as forming an integrated whole. What is perhaps most illuminating in this study is that it reveals the existence of causal relationships between the various factors, according to the basic Buddhist insight of dependent origination. This is shown by the repetition of factors distributed among the seven sets. Thus, mindfulness (*sati*), *samādhi*, *virīya*, etc., are viewed in their differing conditioning and supportive aspects, as either *bojjhaṅgas*, *indriyas*, *balas* or path-factors (*maggaṅgas*) and so forth. A parallel method of treating sets of *dhammas* is to be found in the first and earliest book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*¹⁰.

This study of the *bodhipakkhiyā dhammā* also reveals it as a subtle and complex system of meditation practice leading to the highest goal. Such a system of practice, embodied in the Sutta Piṭaka of the Pāli Canon, would hardly be guessed at by those only acquainted with modern popular expositions of Buddhism. This gradually becomes evident as one progresses through the first half of the book and the sixth chapter, dealing with the noble eight-factored path, is perhaps the central and most important section. The path is put in perspective as an advanced teaching and the consummation of the development of the three Trainings (*sikkhā*) in morality, concentration and wisdom (*sīla, samādhi, paññā*). These constitute the gradual course of spiritual development, beginning with moral conduct, behavioural and sense-control, the practice of the four *sati-paṭṭhānas* and the rest. It is only when this course is well

10 Cf. Nyanaponika, *Abhidhamma Studies*, BPS, Kandy 1965, p.36f.

underway and nearing completion that the factors of the noble path appear, leading to 'fruition' that is Awakening. Thus, '... the (eight-factored) path is seen as the fulfilment of the seven sets' (p.321). Also, the course of practice as envisaged here does not accord with some modern ideas — issuing perhaps originally from the later Commentaries — that sharply distinguish between the practice of *samatha* (calm) and *vipassanā* (insight), as if a choice could be made between two alternative practices. From this early material, it seems, calm and insight, *jhāna* and Awakening, are inextricably interwoven. Indeed *samādhi*, as the eighth factor, *sammāsamādhi*, is the culmination of the noble eight-factored path, and the mental processes of one attaining *jhāna* are no different from one attaining this path and the destruction of the *āsavas* (p.172). Necessary for both is the elimination of the *nīvaraṇas* (hindrances), which is essentially what the practice of the *bodhipakkhiyā dhammā* is all about. One feels the definitive work on what the early Buddhists actually understood by such terms as *jhāna*, *āsava*, has yet to be written, despite the mass of material that has appeared in recent years on Buddhist meditation.

The second half of the book surveys the references to the *bodhipakkhiyā dhammā* in later Buddhist literature, the Commentaries and the Abhidhamma, including their treatment according to the extant Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma works. It was the tenth chapter, dealing with the seven sets in the Paṭi-sambhidāmagga, Dhammasaṅgaṇī and Vibhaṅga, however, that the reviewer found heavy going and the attention began to flag. However, it must be admitted that this was probably due to the reviewer's inadequate knowledge of the Abhidhamma, rather than any fault of the author. The book ends with a concluding summary, an appendix listing the textual references and then a list of references to *indriyas*, path-factors, etc., found in the

classes of *citta* and the Abhidhamma *mātikā*. There is a glossary of terms, a comprehensive bibliography and index. It is very well produced and any printing errors are minimal.

Fihally, it must be reiterated that this book is an excellent and informative study of early Buddhist practice and teaching. Its extensive coverage and unbiased treatment of its source material should make it an important reference work in the field of Pāli and Buddhist Studies.

John D. Ireland

Dependent Arising and Emptiness: A Tibetan Buddhist interpretation of Mādhyamika philosophy emphasising the compatibility of emptiness and conventional phenomena. Elizabeth Napper. Wisdom Publications, Boston, London and Sydney 1989. xiv, 849 pp. Hbk. £34.95/\$49.95.

Elizabeth Napper has translated about the first sixth of Tsong kha pa's insight section of the *Lam rim chen mo*, Tsong kha pa's great treatise in which he integrated the entire Buddhist path into a series of explanations and instructions for practice based ultimately on the structure of the three types of motivation found in Atiśa's *Bodhipathapradīpa*. This discussion of insight is one of the most important sources for Tsong kha pa's understanding of Madhyamaka philosophy, and the opening 62 pages (in translation) of Tsong kha pa's text gives a wonderfully clear overview of his vision of the Madhyamaka approach, particularly with reference to the much-debated and, at least for Tsong kha pa, much-misunderstood issues of Madhyamaka ontology — what is and what is not being negated, and how to avoid over- and undernegating with the hellish results that Mādhyamika authors ruefully predict for their opponents (see

pp.383 ff). In Napper's well-organised and literal (if sometimes perhaps overliteral) translation, Tsong kha pa covers such central issues as how to understand the distinction between interpretable (*neyārtha*) and literal (*nītārtha*) texts, who is to count as a reliable source for understanding the ultimate truth (it is no surprise for those who know Tsong kha pa to discover that it is primarily Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti), the need for analysis in order to apprehend the ultimate truth, how to identify correctly what is being negated, and the central pivot of Tsong kha pa's vision of Madhyamaka — the mutually-implicative compatibility between emptiness and dependent origination. Tsong kha pa sees nearly all Tibetan teachers both before and at his time — and after, if we are to follow Tsong kha pa's dGe lugs descendants — as failing to identify correctly the object of negation (**inherent** existence rather than existence as such) and thus tending either to overnegate and end up with a completely nihilistic annihilationism, or undernegate and teach something which can be grasped as inherently existing. Often his opponents are accused of falling into both errors at the same time, and it is a cherished belief of the dGe lugs tradition that Tsong kha pa himself required direct guidance from Mañjuśrī in order to understand correctly the subtle viewpoint which would neither under- nor overnegate and which alone, therefore, could properly integrate as mutually implicative emptiness and dependent origination.

Napper's book is in the tradition of large books on Tibetan Madhyamaka, particularly the dGe lugs tradition, springing from what has been called the 'Virginia school'. Her mastery of Tibetan is excellent, her understanding of the dGe lugs tradition is impressive and she has worked through these texts with contemporary Tibetan teachers. She avoids some problems which have beset previous 'Virginia studies' by concentrating on Tsong

kha pa's understanding of Madhyamaka as exemplified particularly by the *Lam rim chen mo* which, in spite of its nominal connection with the *Bodhipathapradīpa*, is not a direct commentary on a previous Indian text. Napper is all too aware, nevertheless, of the problems involved in generalising without qualification about 'the dGe lugs tradition', and this is a study of Tsong kha pa's understanding of Madhyamaka with assistance from later teachers, in particular the four lamas from perhaps the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries who annotated the *lam rim chen mo* in order to produce the Four Interwoven Annotations (*Lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma*), and occasional reference to contemporary Tibetan teachers. Napper's translation of this most important section of Tsong kha pa's text is quite short relative to the length of her book, but she has also devoted a further 171 pages to translating the interwoven annotations themselves in the form of an integral commentary with expansion of abbreviated quotations and occasional explanatory notes where necessary, and also extensive footnotes. She has also translated in appendices 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's Topical Outline, mainly to the translated material, and also prepared a list of emendations to the Delhi edition of the Interwoven Annotations based on a microfilm of a copy (possibly from China) in the University of California, Berkeley. In addition, Napper supplies a useful Tibetan-Sanskrit-English glossary to most of the technical terms. Although she explains the structure behind her creation of one integrated commentary out of four sets of annotations, it is not always easy to relate individual parts of the commentary to particular commentators. Her stated idea is to produce something which would correspond to the sort of overall picture that a contemporary Tibetan would reach through reading all the annotations together, and the same idea is behind her translations of the many quotations from Indian

Madhyamaka sources, where the Tibetan dGe lugs writers often add explanatory material which is integrated unmarked into Napper's English translation. Thus the eventual picture in reading the integrated commentary is one of contemporary dGe lugs understanding of Tsong kha pa's vision of Madhyamaka. Those reasonably unfamiliar with Madhyamaka should not think that this material and understanding — impressive and perhaps convincing though it is — is uncontroversial. Assuming contemporary lamas correctly understand Tsong kha pa — and Napper has some interesting discussions of disputes among later dGe lugs writers where Tsong kha pa was less than fully lucid and even possible criticisms of Tsong kha pa's understanding in his early life — still there are alternative Tibetan ways of reading Madhyamaka as yet little studied, and our understanding of Tsong kha pa himself may well remain provisional until we have adequately studied his rivals.

This is an authoritative translation and study. In a lengthy analysis of the translated material, Napper outlines Tsong kha pa's approach and argument and, using the structure of over- and undernegation, she examines interpretations of Madhyamaka by most Western scholars writing in English in the light of Tsong kha pa's understanding. Few scholars escape this critique. Napper's point is that Tsong kha pa was a careful scholar working with a full range of Indian Madhyamaka texts (admittedly in Tibetan translation, without those works which were translated into Chinese but not Tibetan), and Tsong kha pa's interpretation — which seeks to avoid mystification and follows a rigorously 'commonsense' analytical approach — deserves to be taken extremely seriously by Western scholars. In that I would concur, and although it is clear that she is herself an enthusiast for Tsong kha pa's approach, Napper has by and large avoided the more obvious adherence to 'the dGe lugs

tradition' sometimes detected in other works from the Virginia school. Moreover, coming from this background, it is refreshing to see her taking into consideration a large amount of contemporary Western scholarship — if only to criticise it. Whether her criticisms are always justified remains to be seen. For the moment Napper's critique of Western scholarship in the light of Tsong kha pa stands as a stimulating and reasonably comprehensive survey, and for this reason, as well as its clarity and accessibility, her book can be recommended as the first recourse for those new to Tsong kha pa's perspective, a perspective which is of vital importance in contemporary Madhyamaka studies. The translation of the material from the *Lam rim chen mo* is central to the debate and with Napper's lengthy introduction is not too difficult. The material from the Four Interwoven Annotations is much more difficult, shows the nature of dGe lugs scholasticism and is for those who wish to take their study of Tibetan Madhyamaka further — or those who are already hooked!

The material translated from Tsong kha pa has been translated previously in Alex Wayman's *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real* (Columbia U.P., 1978), but Wayman's translation has been criticised by others and Napper devotes a lengthy appendix to demonstrating in detail its inadequacies. In this she is completely convincing. She generously ends a devastating critique by paying respects to Wayman's pioneering work. She is right to do so. We sometimes forget how rapidly our appreciation of Tibetan Madhyamaka has developed in the last fifteen years. When Wayman's translation of Tsong kha pa first appeared there was very little else available in Western languages and it was tremendously exciting, particularly for those coming from an Indological or philosophical background, to have access finally in English to a major work on Madhyamaka

by Tsong kha pa, even if it was in Wayman's difficult and sometimes idiosyncratic English. Wayman was a pioneer, but like a good disciple of Karl Popper, it is a delight for me to recognise that one of the most valuable aspects of Wayman's translation of the *Lam rim chen mo* was that by reaction it stimulated the excellent work of Elizabeth Napper. She is continuing to translate the rest of Tsong kha pa's section on insight, and we should look forward very much to its appearance in the not too distant future.

Paul Williams

Ethics, Wealth and Salvation. A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics. Ed. Russell F. Sizemore and Donald K. Swearer. University of South Carolina Press, Columbia 1990. xv, 311 pp. \$42.50. Pbk repr. 1993, \$18.95.

This volume is a publication in the Studies in Comparative Religion series and emerged from a conference sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Henry Luce Foundation. It appears little more than a decade after *Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method* (edited by David Little and Sumner B. Twiss) which broke new and important ground in this infant field. The book explores Theravāda ethics from a variety of disciplinary approaches, focusing especially on the issue of wealth, acquisition and distribution.

In their Preface, the editors note that the tension between salvation for individuals and social good is certainly not unknown within the Theravāda tradition. They cite 'the tensions between the mundane (*lokiya*) and the transmundane (*lokuttara*) realms of being and acting, between kammic and nibbānic values, and between the ideals of world ruler (*cakkavatti*) and

world renouncer (*sammāsambuddha*), laity and monks' (p.xii). Of course, no one volume could comprehensively address all the issues that might emerge from the main focus identified above. Nonetheless, there is a series of six unifying themes that run through the text: 1) non-attachment in the context of the possession of material wealth, 2) ethical guidance in the context of instruction for salvation, 3) individual virtue in terms of social effect, 4) *dāna* or religious giving, 5) the Sangha in its role as social power, 6) universality, discussed in terms of equality, justice and individualism.

The main text of the volume is organised into five parts: Buddhism and Ethics, Social Ethics and Salvation, Wealth and Charity, Contexts of Buddhist Moral and Religious Values, and Buddhism and Beyond — The Universality of the Problem of Distributive Justice. The volume is initiated by a lively Introduction that addresses each of the six unifying themes. Unlike many such text introductions that simply cite the contributors and briefly identify the nucleus of their entry, this Introduction makes a genuine, independent contribution to the literature of Buddhist ethics. Of course, Swearer has long been interested in the topic and has contributed vastly to our understanding of Theravāda ethics. Sizemore, however, has utilised his training in Christian ethics to complement Swearer's approach by adding new insights and perspectives flavoured by his wide knowledge of the literature in the broader discipline of religious ethics. The result is a statement useful for both the novice and the scholar.

The entire first part of the book is occupied by Phra Rājavarāma's 'Foundations of Buddhist Social Ethics'. He holds the rank of Chao Khun Thēpawēthi, and previously served as abbot at Wat Phra Phirain monastery and Secretary General of Mahāchulalongkorn University, Bangkok. His essay is one of the

most concise yet thorough general introductions to Theravāda Buddhist ethics in print. My praise for this work is best expressed by its inclusion in my own edited volume, *Buddhist Ethics: a Cross Cultural Approach* (Dubuque, Iowa 1992).

The second part contains three essays. The first, 'Ethics and Wealth in Theravāda Buddhism: A Study in Comparative Religious Ethics' by Frank Reynolds explores Buddhism's position on wealth as a middle ground between asceticism and excess. He explores the issue of kamma, concluding that present accumulation of merit through proper moral behaviour yields future wealth. A parallel between individual and society is drawn utilising the figure of the virtuous king or *cakkavatti*. David Little's 'Ethical Analysis and Wealth in Theravāda Buddhism' is subtitled 'A Response to Frank Reynolds'. Little functions just as a well-versed respondent in a conference panel might. He dissects and augments Reynolds' positions and conclusions, recasting them in the context of philosophical ethics. As such, the entire emphasis is enhanced. The third contribution to this section is Russell Sizemore's 'Comparative Religious Ethics as a Field: Faith, Culture, and Reason in Ethics'. His essay centres the enquiry in its proper disciplinary location. Additionally, he utilises the points of disparity in the two previous essays as a means of asserting and demonstrating the complexity of the issue.

The third part of the volume contains two essays, John Strong's 'Rich Man, Poor Man, *Bhikkhu*, King: Aśoka's Great Quinquennial Festival and the Nature of *Dāna*', and Nancy Auer Falk's 'Exemplary Donors of the Pāli Tradition'. Of course, the unifying feature in this section goes beyond the topic of the essays. Both Strong and Falk are graduates of the History of Religions Program at the University of Chicago. Thus they share a methodology, and it is useful here in addressing the

issue of *dāna*. Strong discusses the figure of Aśoka, a figure he knows extremely well through his exceptional translation of and enquiry into the *Aśokavadāna*, whilst Falk considers the figures of Anāthapiṇḍika and Visākḥā. Taken as a whole, these figures outline a variety of Buddhist positions on *dāna*, namely, those of the *cakkavatti*, wealthy merchant and devoted housewife respectively. As a result, the section defines exemplary lay behaviour with respect to *dāna*.

Part four offers three essays, two of which are anthropological in focus. Steven Kemper's 'Wealth and Reformation in Sinhalese Buddhist Monasticism' draws on his fieldwork in Sri Lanka and, tempered by input from the *Mahāvamsa* and *Cūlavamsa* as well as the *katikāvatas*, discourses on the utilisation of monastic wealth. For Charles Keyes, the focus is Thailand where he spent more than twenty years researching village life. 'Buddhist Practical Morality in a Changing Agrarian World: A Case from Northeastern Thailand' is essentially a case study of Ban Nong Tun village in the Thai province of Mahasarakham. The third essay is Robin Lovin's 'Ethics, Wealth, and Eschatology: Buddhist and Christian Strategies for Change'. Lovin compares Buddhist monasticism to Christian monasticism, concluding that in Benedictine monasticism social change was expected through radically altering the social order, while in Buddhism the Sangha was the exemplary model for effecting society's overall but gradual purification.

Part five includes two essays, Ronald M. Green's 'Buddhist Ethics: A Theoretical Approach' and John P. Reeder, Jr.'s 'Individualism, Communitarianism, and Theories of Justice'. The two essays pull many of the volume's themes together and offer general concluding remarks. This is especially interesting because Green and Reeder are perhaps farthest removed from formal academic training in Buddhism of any of the con-

tributors. The scholarly distance from Buddhist studies is valuable and refreshing and these final two essays leave the reader with much to ponder.

Edited volumes such as this, even ones that explore a somewhat specific topic, generally fail. This one doesn't. The scholarship is sound, the presentation clear, the perspective open and questioning. The editors have provided a valuable research tool and resource book for a wide audience. I would recommend it for all personal Buddhological libraries.

Charles S. Prebish

The Lion-Dog of Buddhist Asia. Elsie P. Mitchell. Fugaisha, New York and Renens (Switzerland) 1991. Distributed by Charles E. Tuttle, Rutland, Vermont and, in the UK, by Clifford L.B. Hubbard, Ffynnan Cadro, Ponterwyd, Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, Wales. 191pp. \$50.00.

This constitutes a unique study of a little known subject except possibly among the cognoscenti who exhibit at Crufts and other dog shows.

It encompasses a charming and graphic description of the 'dog of Fo' (Chinese: 'Buddha') — the fusion of Indian lion and Chinese dog that coincided with the Buddhist conquest of China. This breed, now known as the *shih tzu*, *kara-shishi* [Japanese: 'Chinese dog-lion'] or *koma-inu* ['Korean dogs'], *su tu* (Vietnamese) and *sing tow* (Thai, cp. *simha*, Sinhalese, *chindit*, Burmese — all three depicted as temple guardians), is related to the Japanese Chin, and the Lhasa Apso ('sleeping dogs, since they make very cosy bed companions for a chilly night' — p.28). 'He cherishes humans and craves their companionship' (p.28 — a

trust that has been completely betrayed in modern China where, e.g. the indigenous Pekinese is nowhere to be found). Between the eighth and eleventh centuries, the breed resided at the Imperial Court in Peking. In about 990, Emperor Tai-tsung was presented with a 'Lo-chiang dog' named Tao Hua ('Peach Flower'), who became inseparable from his master. He preceded the emperor to the audience chamber, announcing the former's arrival with a bark. When his owner fell ill, he would not eat; when he died, the dog cried. In despair, the new emperor had the grieving dog carried in the imperial chair to his late master's tomb where he pined away and was duly buried beside his former owner (p.30).

The Chinese court received lion-dogs in 1645, 1653 and 1908 from the Dalai Lama of Tibet where, apart from being close to the lamas, they turned the huge 'prayer' wheels in the temples. In China the lion-dogs were sculpted and placed in pairs at the entrance to temples: the male (to the east) with a paw resting on a ball (symbolising the sun, the Dharmaratna or *śūnyatā*); the female (to the west) holding a cub. The male with open mouth and his partner with closed mouth respectively begin and end the mantra *aum*. Their patience, steadfastness and ego subjection are also narrated by the author (pp.56-7).

Chapters Three and Four are essentially descriptions of the portrayal of lion dogs in, respectively, (Chinese) jade and (Japanese) *netsuke*.

Chapter Five turns to Tibet where, in a nation of dog lovers on a par with Great Britain, no less than three breeds participate in international dog shows. These are the Lhasa Apso, Tibetan terrier and spaniel (which, with the Japanese Chin, is akin to the Pekinese). A fourth breed, the indigenous mastiff, was used as guard dogs. The legendary 'snow lion' (*kang seng*) was adopted as the national guardian and symbol of

Buddhism, appearing on the Tibetan flag as a pair symbolising the spiritual and temporal functions of the Dalai Lama (and on his personal seal). It is often depicted in paintings and bronzes, notably as the bearer of Mañjuśrī, the Bodhisattva of Wisdom. However, at its most endearing it is widely portrayed in the carpets and rugs that can be acquired from handicraft sections of Tibetan communities in exile (but mainly in India).

With regard to the place of animals in religion (Ch.6), the ancient Egyptian attitude was exceptional; that of the Semitic religions was (and largely remains) hostile, whilst the Hellenic was ambivalent. Fortunately, progressive animal welfare policies have triumphed in (at least north-western) Europe, particularly in England 'which since the eighteenth century has been a center for a humane ethic for the Western world' (p.138).

Side issues touched upon include vivisection, *ahimsā* and vegetarianism. Although Ch. VII of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* condemning meat-eating is generally agreed to be a later interpolation, nevertheless the Aśokan inscriptions governing animal welfare set the Buddhist tone in this respect. In China and Japan there was (and is in the latter) provision for pet funerals. One of the reviewer's heroes is Tsunayoshi, the 'Dog Shōgun' (r. 1680-1709), who decreed that all animals, but especially dogs, must be treated with the greatest courtesy and consideration.

There are just three contentious points in this otherwise excellent book:

1. The definitions (on p.12) of 'dog-lion' and 'lion-dog' should surely be reversed with the former term referring to the living exemplar.
2. The legend of the Buddha sitting so long in meditation that snails took up residence on his head (p.48) is obscure. The curls that are such a distinguishing feature on Indian Buddha-heads were traditionally intended to connote Siddhartha's *kṣatriya*

origins.

3. Is there really any hard evidence to suggest that the Manchus derived their name from Mañjuśrī? (p.63).

The reader should be made aware that the end notes (pp.179-83), although alluded to in the Table of Contents, are not actually referred to in text.

Profusely illustrated by photographic examples of the 'dog of Fo', in painting and sculpture, this book will prove a constant delight and welcome addition to the (smaller) coffee table.

RBW

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We welcome contributions to this journal, particularly in the field of early mainstream Buddhism and especially Buddhism in Central Asia except that, since they are adequately covered in other journals, Tibetan studies *per se* should be avoided.

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